Conflict and Fragility

Armed Violence Reduction

ENABLING DEVELOPMENT



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Armed Violence Reduction

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Foreword

We are pleased to provide the foreword to this policy paper on armed violence reduction, which was developed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development – Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC).

740 000 people die as a result of armed violence each year and it also seriously undermines the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals. This policy paper on armed violence reduction, prepared over a two-year period through a process supported by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Kingdom, amongst other members, will help the development community understand the dynamics of armed violence and what we can do about it.

The United Nations Secretary-General will submit a report on the links between armed violence and development to the General Assembly by the end of 2009. Further political momentum is being provided by the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development which now commits the 103 signatory States to achieve measurable reductions in armed violence. This OECD policy paper provides practical support to these initiatives by setting out how good words can be turned into good programmes to help reduce armed violence globally.

The paper outlines a number of significant emerging trends. Conflict and crime are increasingly linked. Levels of armed violence are a severe challenge in many non-conflict countries. Increasing youth populations in the global South and the emergence of ungoverned urban spaces and youth gangs are a growing reality in many parts of the world. Alongside this, there are increasing links between local, national, regional and global security, for example through the trafficking of drugs, arms or people.

Donors have given relatively little attention to these issues as compared to conflict or war. Compounding this, most donor organisations are set up to respond at national, not local or regional, levels.

The paper provides the methodology which helps donors tackle the challenges outlined above. It builds on existing frameworks, approaches and

lessons learned from security sector reform, as well as conflict and crime prevention. The innovation in this paper is the focus on the victims and perpetrators of armed violence and the institutional and cultural environment that allows violence to flourish. We believe this broader approach will provide useful guidance in addressing the root causes of armed violence and the motivations of perpetrators.

The paper provides useful signposts for assessments and programming. It reveals the value of combining a variety of assessment methodologies, including public health assessments, to better access information and understand people's views. The paper also puts forward two main approaches: direct programming that aims to prevent and reduce armed violence, and indirect programming whereby existing sector-specific strategies and interventions are adapted to address known risk factors that contribute to armed violence. In addition, the paper highlights the benefits to be gained by bringing together development, political, military, policing and diplomatic efforts.

We encourage policy advisors at all levels and programme staff on the ground in countries with armed violence problems to read and assimilate this paper. This would help underpin growing OECD work on armed violence reduction, which we support and welcome.

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Abstract

This OECD policy paper explains why development policy makers and practitioners should aim to prevent and reduce armed violence, and suggests a comprehensive, multi-level approach for doing so. It outlines:

- *How armed violence undermines development, whether in conflict, post-conflict or non-conflict contexts.*
- *The emerging patterns and trends in armed violence, including the growing overlaps between conflict and crime, and the resulting programming gaps.*
- *How development practitioners on the ground can combine different assessment methods and programming responses for more effective interventions to reduce and prevent armed violence.*
- *How emerging approaches to armed violence reduction and prevention (AVR) service the broader goals of state-building, peacebuilding and development through their explicit focus on strengthening the legitimacy and resilience of state-society relations.*
- *The need to reinforce whole-of-government responses that synchronise development, political, military, policing and diplomatic efforts.*

Overall, the paper signposts how development programming is evolving to respond to the emerging landscapes of underdevelopment and insecurity. It lays the foundation for the future development of operational and programmatic guidelines for armed violence reduction.

This policy paper was conceived primarily for OECD-DAC donors and development practitioners, at both the headquarters and field levels. Many of the ideas and approaches are equally relevant to developing country civil servants and NGOs.

Acknowledgements

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The principle authors are Deirdre Collings (SecDev), Rafal Rohozinski (SecDev) and Robert Muggah (Small Arms Survey). Substantive inputs and editorial support were also provided by Pamela Scholey, Jennifer Hazen, Tore Rose and Keith Krause. A range of independent experts contributed to this paper. They include, *inter alia*, Jarat Chopra, Luis Duque, Jazna Lazervic, Hugo van der Merwe, Willy Nindorera, Christina Powell, Robert Scharf, Chris Stevenson, Noel Stott, Ilona Szabo and Phil Williams. Particular thanks are due to the work stream co-chairs Camilla Sugden and Kate Joseph (DFID) and Paul Eavis and the team at UNDP's Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR). Special thanks go to members of the independent expert review panel, many of whom also provided substantive inputs for the paper: Mary Anderson, Paddy Barron, Jeremy Brickhill, Alexander Butchart, James Cockayne, Daniel Luz, Mark Etherington, Maximo Halty, Bjorn Holmberg, Adele Kirsten, Karen Landgren, Andrew McLean, David Meddings, Julie Myers, Eleanor O'Gorman, Nikkos Passas, Ted Paterson, Eugenia Piza-Lopez, Jorge Restrepo, Hans Risser, Jonathan Sandy, Claire Scheurer, Frances Stewart and Brian Thomson. The work of the drafting team also benefited greatly from several rounds of inputs provided by members of the OECD CPDC Security and Development Task Team. Thanks are also due to the OECD staff Margarete Jacob, Carola Miras and Stephanie Coic as well as to PAC for preparing this publication.

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Executive Summary

The incidence of armed conflict and combat deaths has been declining in recent years. But the number of people killed by *armed violence* has not. Approximately 740 000 people die as a result of armed violence each year. The majority of these deaths occur in countries not affected by conflict; they are instead due to homicide and interpersonal violence.

Armed violence includes *the use or threatened use of weapons to inflict injury, death or psychosocial harm, which undermines development*. For policy makers, the armed violence perspective offers a broader view than armed conflict alone by also including situations of chronic *violent crime* and *interpersonal violence*. This is because armed violence in non-conflict settings can have as significant an effect on security and development as it does in societies affected by war.

The human and developmental costs of armed violence are far-reaching. Armed violence can destroy lives and livelihoods, disrupt access to and delivery of education, health and other social services, induce mass displacement, and restrict mobility, investment and trade. It can also undermine governance, fuel illicit economies and informal nodes of power, destroy social and human capital, and feed cycles of violence, poverty and socio-political exclusion. Ultimately, armed violence makes development impossible and undermines attainment of the Millennium Development Goals. It also imposes significant economic costs in terms of lost productivity and welfare; those costs range in the hundreds of billions of dollars.

Armed violence is also a *security threat*. Real and perceived insecurity generated by violence affects households, communities, countries and regions. It also undermines efforts to ensure global security. The perpetrators of armed violence are wide-ranging – they include criminals, militants, insurgents, gang members, vigilante groups and terrorists, as well as individuals, and in some cases members of the police, military and private security forces. And while the perpetrators and victims of armed violence are primarily young males, armed violence in fact affects the young and old, rich and poor, men and women, boys and girls.

Armed violence trends and programming gaps

A focus on armed violence highlights emerging trends in insecurity that are blurring the dividing lines between armed conflict and crime, fragility and stability, and community, national, regional and global security. Examples of these trends include:

- The incidence of armed violence in many non-conflict countries exceeds that of certain countries affected by war.
- There are growing linkages in certain countries and cities between socio-political conflict and crime.
- Societies emerging from armed conflict are prone to higher-than-expected rates of armed violence.
- Armed violence is escalating in rapidly urbanising cities and towns.
- Under-governed spaces are emerging and expanding, particularly in fragile contexts and collapsed states.
- State actors are colluding with non-state criminal groups and enterprises.

These emerging patterns of armed violence are symptomatic of deeper global processes that are interacting to transform the basic conditions of security and underdevelopment around the world. Examples include the relative weakening of national institutions in relation to global macroeconomic stability and financial confidence; the growing empowerment of non-state actors; rapid and uncontrolled urbanisation; environmental degradation; and major demographic transformations such as the growth of young and frequently unemployed populations. Globalisation and the relative freedom of movement of capital, goods and individuals have also enabled thriving global illicit markets in weapons, commodities and financial flows.

The new landscapes of insecurity reveal eight development programming gaps:

- Inadequate capacity to deal with the convergence of conflict and criminal violence.
- Ineffective or narrowly conceived programmes during the post-conflict transition.
- Failure to correctly identify the risks and impacts of armed violence.
- Difficulties in planning and programming at the sub-national and regional levels.
- Lack of experience programming on armed violence-related issues in urban areas.

- Dealing with the challenges of youth gangs and youth at risk with regard to armed violence.
- Insufficient understanding of and investment in violence and crime prevention.
- Inadequate awareness of the relationships between underdevelopment and (transnational) organised crime.

Armed violence reduction and prevention, and the armed violence lens

Armed violence reduction and prevention (AVR) aims at reducing the risks and impacts of armed violence. AVR is not a new form of programming. Rather, it is an emerging set of practices that builds on existing frameworks, approaches and lessons learned in areas such as conflict prevention, peacebuilding, crime prevention and public health. Many development practitioners and their national partners now agree that more comprehensive approaches are needed to reduce and prevent armed violence. Hard-won lessons have revealed the limitations of narrowly conceived responses for controlling the misuse of weapons, reintegrating ex-combatants, and fighting crime and dealing with youth gangs. Experience also underscores the ineffectiveness of top-down strategies that fail to address the security needs of communities and citizens.

Ongoing AVR programming in the field, while still in its infancy, is signposting a number of critical ways forward. An emerging lesson is the importance of integrated and multi-sectoral approaches that combine developmental and preventive approaches with more effective law enforcement efforts. Likewise, multi-level responses are needed, which address armed violence risk factors at the local, national, regional and global levels.

AVR practitioners have also learned that although each situation of armed violence is unique, different manifestations of armed violence – from armed conflict and post-conflict to criminal – often share common patterns of structural and proximate risk factors**.** Identifying and acting on these commonalities can open up new opportunities for the cross-pollination of conflict, crime and public health approaches to diagnosing and responding to armed violence.

Based on this accumulated knowledge, this policy paper introduces an "armed violence lens" that captures the key elements and levels that shape armed violence patterns, namely: the *people* affected by armed violence, the *perpetrators* and their motivations, the availability of *instruments* (arms), and the wider *institutional/cultural* environment that enables and/or protects against armed violence.

The lens underscores the way violence transcends different development and security sectors. It also emphasises how local manifestations of armed violence are shaped and influenced by national, regional and global factors. In so doing, it encourages practitioners to think outside of particular programming mandates and consider the entirety of the problem at hand. Shared analysis based on the lens can help bring together a diverse array of actors who work on different aspects of armed violence, but not necessarily with each other.

Assessments: Applying the armed violence lens

Genuinely effective AVR interventions require clear diagnostics of the context-specific geographic and demographic patterns of armed violence, as well as the risk and protective factors.

The armed violence lens does not supplant existing assessment and programming tools such as conflict or stability assessments, analysis of the drivers of change, governance and criminal justice assessments or the public health approach to violence prevention. Rather, it serves as a complementary framework that can help identify how different tools and data sources can be mixed and matched for more sophisticated diagnostics and targeted responses.

AVR encourages development policy makers and practitioners to draw on multiple methods and data sources to build a solid evidence base on which to plan programming. The four most directly relevant tools include:

- Conflict and stability/fragility assessments, which analyse the underlying structural conditions of instability, institutional capacities and fragilities, socio-economic and political dynamics, and key actors. AVR recommends that conflict assessments be adapted and applied in non-conflict contexts affected by armed violence.
- A public health approach, to map armed violence patterns, "hot spots", risk factors and protective factors.
- Governance and justice sector assessments, which can generate vital information on the role, capacities and challenges of the formal institutional environment with respect to enabling, or protecting against, armed violence. They can also serve as a barometer of government legitimacy.
- Various survey instruments, such as victimisation surveys, security and safety audits, and small arms and multidimensional armed violence surveys. Various existing surveys can help capture people's views of insecurity, as well as data related to the availability, trade and demand for weapons.

Tools to capture risk factors and linkages at the regional and global levels remain inadequate. Overall, more work is needed with end-users to determine how multiple sources of information can best be gathered, shared and translated into effective programming, in a way that is both practical and realistic.

Programming implications and approaches

The AVR approach expands development programming horizons in a number of directions, by encouraging:

- Creative adaptation of conflict, crime and violence prevention approaches, as field practitioners are already doing from Colombia and Brazil to Bangladesh and South Africa.
- Sub-national and local-level programming. The local level is where armed violence is experienced most directly, and is also where some of the most active and promising initiatives and partnerships have been taking place.
- Programming efforts at the regional and global levels to tackle key risk factors, such as arms transfers and transnational organised crime.

While strong focus is needed on the sub-national and regional levels, the national level remains a vital programming arena that is critical to the sustainability of efforts – including successes achieved at the local level. National-level strategies offer the opportunity to bring together development and security actors around a common vision of AVR, and to synchronise cross-sectoral efforts. National development frameworks and public security strategies can help to prioritise interventions and co-ordinate whole-of-government responses.

Development programming *in* or *on* situations of armed violence involves high stakes, given the inherent complexity and possibility of actually doing harm. As such, it is important that all development programming be AVR-sensitive. While conflict-sensitive assessments are now routinely applied in conflict and post-conflict contexts, they should also be adapted and deployed in other situations in which there is armed violence.

AVR has two main programming approaches: direct and indirect. Direct programming aims to explicitly prevent and reduce armed violence. Indirect programming requires development agencies to adapt existing sector-specific strategies and interventions in order to better address known risk factors that contribute to armed violence or to enhance protective factors. Established programming streams particularly suited to integrating indirect AVR sub-goals include: poverty reduction, governance, security system reform (SSR), health and education, gender and the environment.

Direct AVR programming is an emerging and indeed growing area of practice around the world. Many ongoing interventions – in Latin America, the Caribbean, eastern and southeastern Europe, sub-Saharan Africa, South East Asia and the South Pacific – are signposting important programming directions in the areas of community security; urban armed violence reduction; gangs and youth at risk; and organised and petty crime. The paper concludes with a brief look at these emerging programming areas. While systematic evaluation of these efforts will be required,

It is already clear that many of them share the following organisational principles:

- A rigorous diagnostic of the local situation using multiple methods and data sources.
- Local ownership and leadership.
- A bottom-up perspective on security.
- An understanding of the multifaceted and multi-level nature of armed violence.
- The introduction of multi-sector responses that address elements and relationships captured by the armed violence lens.
- Investment in prevention by identifying and responding to risk factors and strengthening the resilience of communities, societies and states.

Armed violence reduction and prevention (AVR) and other OECD-DAC priorities

The annexes to this paper situate AVR with respect to other OECD-DAC policies. They show how the AVR approach reinforces and enhances member investments in SSR, and how AVR can build on conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Importantly, AVR also holds strong promise for pursuing the broader goals of state-building. This is because chronic armed violence signals a fragile situation. The AVR approach stresses the importance of bottom-up perspectives on insecurity and institutional responsiveness. This perspective helps practitioners to focus on the local political processes and relationships that shape armed violence dynamics (rather than on transferring generic institutional models and solutions). In this way, AVR provides a clear opportunity to train attention on the design of effective strategies to strengthen the legitimacy and resilience of state-society relations. In so doing, it helps to navigate the terrain between the *Paris Principles* and standards for *Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations.*

Next steps

The OECD-DAC International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) will take forward work on AVR based on this policy paper and in line with the INCAF Programme of Work and Budget (PWB) for 2009/2010.

Introduction

Armed conflict and direct combat deaths appear to be on the decline in the 21st century (Human Security Report, 2006, 2008; CICS, 2005a; UNDP, 2005a). But the number of people killed and affected by *armed violence* is not. Approximately 740 000 people die as a result of armed violence each year. More than 490 000 of these deaths occur in countries not affected by conflict; they are instead due to homicide and interpersonal violence. Fewer than 55 000 of the total are direct casualties of war.

Development practitioners understand armed violence as *the use or threatened use of weapons to inflict injury, death or psychosocial harm, which undermines development*. This perspective broadens our understanding beyond *conflict* alone to include situations of *violent crime* and *interpersonal violence*. In other words, armed violence occurs in multiple contexts – from societies ostensibly at peace, to populations stumbling into crisis, having been affected by war and now entering a recovery phase.

The armed violence perspective signals a broader spectrum of countries, regions and communities whose security and development are under threat. It also draws attention to the new landscapes of insecurity – such as the melding of conflict and criminal violence and the growing challenges of urban-based violence and armed youth gangs. In so doing, it underscores how local-level manifestations of armed violence are increasingly shaped by regional and global influences and trends – such as the expansion of transnational crime and the growth in proportion of young, frequently unemployed populations in many developing countries.

This paper sets out the rationale for why development policy makers and practitioners should aim to prevent and reduce armed violence. It outlines the negative development impacts of armed violence, whether in conflict, post-conflict or non-conflict contexts; the emerging patterns and trends in armed violence; and the resulting development programming gaps. The policy paper then considers how development programming has been evolving to respond to armed violence.

Armed violence reduction and prevention (AVR)

Armed violence reduction and prevention (AVR) programming aims to reduce the risks and effects of armed violence. AVR is not a new form of programming. Rather, it is an emerging set of practices that has been evolving on the ground, and that builds on existing frameworks, approaches and lessons learned in the areas of conflict prevention, peacebuilding, crime prevention and public health. In essence, AVR recognises that armed violence is caused by multiple risk factors and shaped by influences from the local to global levels. It also recognises that although each manifestation of armed violence is unique, both conflict and criminal armed violence often share common features and risk factors. These commonalities open up new opportunities for the cross-pollination of conflict, crime and public health approaches to diagnosing and responding to armed violence.

AVR programming, while still in its infancy, is signposting a number of critical ways forward. An emerging lesson is the importance of integrated and multisectoral approaches that combine developmental and preventative programming with more effective law enforcement and diplomatic/political efforts. Likewise, multi-level responses are needed that address armed violence risk factors at the local, national, regional and global levels. For OECD-DAC donors, this underlines the importance of synchronised whole-of-government efforts.

AVR offers a set of approaches that can help achieve the broader goals of state-building,[1] peacebuilding and development (including aid effectiveness). This is because chronic armed violence signals a *fragile situation*.[2]

AVR aims directly at enhancing state and civil society capacities to address insecurity *as defined and perceived by the people and communities affected by armed violence*. This dual focus on addressing people's insecurity through institutional responsiveness helps practitioners to focus on the local political processes and relationships that shape armed violence dynamics. In this way, AVR provides a clear opportunity to design more effective strategies to strengthen the legitimacy and resilience of state-society relations.[3]

1 OECD-DAC (2008a, 2008b) views state-building as an endogenous process to enhance the capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state with a view to enhancing the resilience of state-society relations.

2 The state may or may not be fragile overall, but it is fragile with respect to those citizens, communities, cities or sub-state areas that are under threat from armed violence.

3 Strengthening the resilience of state-society relations is a key objective of international engagement in fragile states. Resilience is found in the strength of "local political processes that create public institutions and generate their legitimacy in the eyes of a state's population … [That is, processes] through which citizens' expectations of the state and state expectations of citizens are

In so doing, it helps to navigate the terrain between the *Paris Principles* and standards for *Good International Engagement in Fragile States* (Box I.1).

Box I.1. AVR, aid effectiveness and implications for state-building

In 2008, OECD-DAC members deepened their commitment to the 2005 *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness* by way of the *Accra Declaration*.[4] The Paris and Accra Declarations have important implications for thinking about AVR.[5] For example, donors should not ask, "how can we undertake AVR in partner countries", but rather, "how can we support local partners who want to pursue AVR in affected countries?"

The pursuit of aid effectiveness, however, is premised on the assumption that a government is willing and able to lead and is perceived as legitimate by its citizens. In areas affected by high levels of armed violence, these assumptions do not always hold. Rather, to reiterate the point above, chronic armed violence signals a *fragile situation*. As such donor commitment to aid effectiveness needs to be balanced against other concerns about the accountability, responsiveness and legitimacy of state institutions. Paris Principles must be balanced with OECD DAC's *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations*, which state that the ultimate objective for international engagement is to nurture "effective, legitimate and resilient states".

The AVR approach – with its focus on a bottom-up understanding of people's insecurity and the interrelationships with the wider institutional environment – encourages donors to move beyond asking "why a state is failing"[6] to consider: "*Whom is the state failing, where, how and why?"*[7] This question puts the focus squarely on understanding armed violence within the context of local political processes and state-society relations. It is essential for navigating the terrain between the Paris Principles and those for Good International Engagement in Fragile States. Answering it can help to identify effective local pathways to security and a state-building agenda dedicated to strengthening legitimacy and resilience.[8]

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reconciled and brought into equilibrium with the state's capacity to deliver services." See OECD-DAC, 2008a.

4 The *Accra Agenda* reinforces DAC members' commitment to ensuring that developing countries are "clearly in charge of their own development process".

5 Accra stresses that national ownership can be nurtured at different levels and by various actors, including NGOs, community-based organisations and local government.

6 This question can limit analysis to issues of technocratic institutional reform (often in the donor's own image), rather than encouraging consideration of the fabric of local state-society relations.

7 AVR helps to answer these questions by *mapping the incidence of armed violence and people's perspectives on insecurity.*

8 Further discussion in found in Annex A of this paper. See also OECD-DAC, 2007d.

Reader's guide

This paper does not speak to all aspects of ongoing donor efforts to prevent and reduce armed violence. Many donors are already heavily invested in conflict prevention and peacebuilding, human rights promotion, and other programming such as SSR, DDR, and mine action that also directly or indirectly aim to promote security and stability.

The policy paper builds on the considerable range of related OECD-DAC Guidance, including *Helping Prevent Violent Conflict* and the Handbook on *Security System Reform*. The aim is not to recycle the lessons learned or rehash best practices that are already well established. Rather, the emphasis is on the distinct value added of the AVR approach, and to draw attention to a range of issues that are not yet well addressed in existing DAC guidance (Figure I.1).

The paper has five chapters and three annexes:

Chapter 1 makes the case for why armed violence matters. It considers the key drivers of armed violence and its wide-reaching effects.

Chapter 2 identifies current trends in armed violence, how these trends are being shaped by underlying global processes, and current development programming gaps.

Chapter 3 outlines the AVR approach for development policy makers and practitioners, and introduces an armed violence lens that can enhance diagnosis and response.

Chapter 4 outlines the potential for an expanded assessment toolkit that blends information and datasets from a variety of existing tools, including conflict assessments, the public health approach to violence prevention, governance and criminal justice assessments and various survey instruments.

Chapter 5 considers the implications of the AVR approach for development programming, and outlines the main programming approaches (direct and indirect). It also introduces a selection of newer programming areas that are showing potential for integrated AVR responses (community security, municipal security, youth gangs, and crime and violence prevention).

The three annexes provide an overview of i) how AVR complements existing OECD-DAC priority areas (*e.g.* fragile states/state-building, conflict prevention/peacebuilding and SSR), ii) regional instruments that are related to AVR and iii) additional examples of AVR indirect programming in relation to poverty reduction, governance, SSR and the environment.

The figure below indicates the extent to which existing OECD-DAC guidelines address key issue areas for armed violence. The black squares indicate extensive coverage of a topic. Dark grey indicates some coverage. Light grey indicates minimal coverage. White squares indicate the issue is not addressed. The evident gaps for certain issue areas suggest the need for more attention and work.

Figure I.1. **OECD-DAC Guidance: Policy and programming gaps**



Chapter 1

What is Armed Violence?

This chapter addresses:

- The impacts and costs of armed violence for development
- Key features of armed violence
- Key drivers: Structural and proximate factors

Armed violence consists of *the use or threatened use of weapons to inflict injury, death or psychosocial harm, which undermines development*. Although present in all societies, armed violence disproportionately affects low- and-middle income countries (WHO, 2008; CICS, 2005a, 2005b; UNDP, 2005a; Small Arms Survey, 2003). It is not just Afghanistan, Somalia, Sri Lanka and Sudan, but also South Africa, Guatemala, El Salvador and Jamaica that are badly affected.[1] The World Health Organisation (WHO) reports that armed violence is among the top five leading causes of deaths for adults (WHO, n.d., 2006, 2008).

The human costs of armed violence are far-reaching. It destroys lives and livelihoods, disrupts access to education, health and social services, reduces social and human capital by sowing fear and insecurity, and results in high economic costs owing to years of lost productivity. Armed violence can induce large-scale displacement, restrict mobility, reduce investment and access to credit and trade, and contribute to the growth of illicit markets and power structures. It can also undermine governance and state stability, while creating or taking root in under-governed spaces.[2] Armed violence is a cause and consequence of a range of risk factors such as horizontal inequalities, poverty, socio-political exclusion and governance challenges.[3]

1.1 The impacts and costs of armed violence for development

Armed violence impedes the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs – Box 1.1). More than 20 of the world's 34 poorest countries are affected by or emerging from armed conflict, most of them in Africa. Likewise, homicidal violence and violent crime are heavily

1 A number of countries in southern Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean experience homicide rates of more than 20 per 100 000 per year compared with the global average of roughly 7 per 100 000.

2 Under-governed areas include those lacking the presence or authority of formal state structures/representatives. In fact, most "under-governed" areas feature some form of traditional or alternative governance institutions, leaders and practices. These alternatives are often regarded as more legitimate and representative than the central government in the eyes of the local population. However, alternative governance structures can also be coercive and exploitive (while lacking legitimacy), especially when authority is based on enforcement by armed non-state actors linked to criminal enterprises. See Clunan and Trinkunas, forthcoming, and Lamb, 2007.

3 "Horizontal inequalities" refers to inequalities among groups living in the same society. For further discussion, see Stewart, 2008; Stewart, Brown and Langer, 2008; Diprose and Stewart, 2008; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; and Collier *et al.,* 2003.

concentrated in many lower- and middle-income countries. Even certain countries that appear to be making strong national progress on the MDGs can suffer from localised pockets of chronic armed violence. For example, while Brazil is well on its way to achieving its MDG targets for education, two-thirds of the residents of the violence-affected *favelas* do not possess primary school certification.

Armed violence exacts a major economic toll, particularly on the poor and vulnerable segments of society. War-affected countries often experience a reduction in the annual growth of their economies of 2% of gross domestic product (GDP)[4] and low growth rates persist long after the shooting stops (Collier, 2007). The average cost of a civil war is estimated at approximately USD 65 billion dollars.[5] Likewise, the global cost of homicidal violence to societies around the world is USD 95-160 billion a year (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2008). As much as USD 400 billion is lost when considering lost productivity from lives prematurely cut short by violence.

Armed violence leads to the destruction of lives and property and also undermines local and foreign investment. It contributes to "unproductive" expenditures. Research suggests that developing countries may spend between 10-15% of their GDP on law enforcement, as compared to 5% in developed states (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2008).

The impacts of armed violence on national economies cannot be overstated. In Guatemala, for example, armed violence costs the equivalent of 7.3% of GDP in 2005, far outstripping spending on health or education (UNDP, 2006a).[6] Likewise, if Jamaica and Haiti reduced their homicide rates to a level commensurate with Costa Rica, their respective annual growth rates could increase by an estimated 5.4% (World Bank and UNODC, 2007).

4 See Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2008). Between 1990 and 2005, armed conflicts in Africa cost some USD 280 billion, which approximates the amount of international aid flows by principal donors during the same period. See Oxfam, IANSA and Saferworld (2007).

5 See Collier and Hoeffler, 2004b. Their model assumes a seven-year war, and a fourteen-year post-war recovery period. This estimate includes: over USD 49 billion in military expenditures and economic losses, another USD 10 billion in post-conflict effects, and roughly USD 5 billion in healthcare costs.

6 Estimate includes health sector costs, institutional costs, private security expenditures, impacts on the investment climate, and material losses.

Box 1.1. **Armed violence obstructs attainment of the MDGs**

Millennium Development Goal	**Armed violence effects**
Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger	Loss of livelihoods; unemployment; displacement; malnutrition; changes in household composition; increased number of female-headed households; disruptions in service/welfare provision, internal trade and markets; reduction in access to food and fee-based health and education services (especially by girls).
Achieve universal primary education	Destruction of schools; disruption of schooling (especially for female children); diversion of state revenues from social expenditures to military/public security.
Promote gender equality and empower women	Increased number of female-headed households; Increased rates of gender-based violence; deepening poverty, including loss of land and homes when husbands are killed; ill-health resulting from HIV, prostitution and other illicit or dangerous means of income-generation; recruitment of women and girls into armed groups; lack of access to disarmament benefits during disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes.
Reduce child mortality	Destruction, disruption and/or overburdening of medical facilities; disruption of livelihoods; Reduced food security; increased mortality due to disease and malnutrition (especially for females); decreased protection/welfare due to changes in family composition.
Improve maternal health	Destruction, disruption and/or overburdening of health infrastructure; restricted mobility.
Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases	Destruction, disruption and/or overburdening of health services and sanitation; poor living conditions for the displaced; Increased exposure to sexual violence and prostitution.
Ensure environmental sustainability	Accelerated rural-to-urban migration and growth of slums; Reduced access to safe drinking water and sanitation (including destruction of infrastructure); Unregulated resource exploitation and deforestation.

1.2 Key features of armed violence

Armed violence is often restricted to specific geographic areas of a region, country or municipality. While certain areas of a country or city may function normally, others can suffer from acute levels of armed violence. Peripheral, marginal and historically neglected regions such as border areas and city slums are often under-governed and vulnerable to the growth of informal and/or predatory power structures. Examples include the paramilitary-dominated areas of northern Colombia, rebel-held regions of Sri Lanka, southern Lebanon, militant-controlled neighbourhoods of Mogadishu (Somalia) and the urban shantytowns of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paolo (Brazil).

Armed violence can exhibit regional and transnational dimensions. For example, it can rapidly spread across territorial borders, such as during clashes between rival pastoralist groups, or among criminal groups that traffic arms from country to country across the Horn of Africa. Meanwhile less visible, organised international criminal syndicates, diaspora groups and criminal gangs can also directly influence the localised dynamics of armed violence.

Armed violence is deeply gendered. Across all societies, young males are the most common perpetrators, as well as victims, of armed attacks. Although women, boys and girls suffer as direct victims, many more emerge as survivors of non-lethal attacks, caretakers of male victims and as newly *de facto* heads of households. Gender-based sexual violence is endemic in most war zones and perpetrators are seldom brought to justice. Women and children's victimisation by armed sexual assault and human/sex trafficking often goes unrecorded (Box 1.2).

Widespread armed violence constitutes a failure of public security. Chronic levels of armed violence signal a *fragile situation* in which the state does not exercise a monopoly over the legitimate use of force in all its territory, or uses force excessively to quell dissent or crime (Annex A). In such contexts, many civilians may feel better represented, serviced or protected by armed groups than by the public authorities. They may also access better economic opportunities and security through participation in related illicit markets than in the formal economy (even if the local armed actors extract protection monies and engage in other predatory behaviours).

Box 1.2. **Armed violence and women: Bearing the burden**

Men are the most common direct victims of armed homicide. However, women, children and other vulnerable groups like the displaced suffer disproportionate impacts, such as: the loss of a male breadwinner and/or male protector, the burden of care for injured family members, the collapse or inaccessibility of health and education services, disruptions to livelihoods, impoverishment and/or forced flight, and sexual violence.[7]

Armed violence is often accompanied by gender-based sexual violence, and not only in conditions of war. Rape, domestic violence, murder and sexual abuse are significant causes of female mortality and leading causes of injury for women aged 15 to 44. In conditions of chronic or acute armed violence, female mobility is constrained, often affecting the gathering of wood, water and access to local markets without threat of armed sexual attack, as in the cases of Darfur, Kenya and Burundi. In post-conflict settings, stress combined with the availability of small arms leads to a rise in established-partner violence. In non-conflict settings, research shows that women are more likely to be attacked by a partner if a gun is available.

Although data are not comprehensive, WHO claims that 40-70% of all female homicides are committed by an established partner (WHO, 2002). In South Africa almost half (43%) of all reported female homicides were committed with firearms in 2000, making it a major external cause of death for women. Rather than contributing to higher levels of protection, gun ownership at home can increase the risk of homicide by a family member.

The experience of armed violence is influenced not only by gender but also by other factors, such as age, race, ethnicity, class, and religion. During the civil war in Guatemala, for example, women and children of ethnic Mayan origin were specifically targeted. In the Rwandan genocide, gender-selective killings targeted specifically Tutsi men, whereas Tutsi women frequently became the victims of sexual violence. Acts of gender-based violence do not necessarily always involve the use of weapons, but arms are often directly or indirectly linked to violence.

Knowledge of how armed violence affects women and development is not well understood. Impacts tend to be hidden in the power structures that marginalise and restrict women's voices and participation. More research is needed to understand the full range and weight of consequences for individual women, as well as their families, communities and societies.

Source: IRIN, 2008; Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2008; UNODA and OSAGI, 2001; WHO, 2002; Jackson *et al.,* 2005; Johnson *et al.*, 2005; Amnesty International, IANSA and Oxfam International, 2005; IANSA, 2006.

7 When husbands are killed, women frequently lose their access to farmlands and the right to live in their marital homes. The resulting survival choice for many affected women and children is prostitution, commercial labour or domestic servitude. This has consequences for ongoing exposure to violence and ill health from communicable diseases and poor working conditions, as well as future community exclusion.

Armed violence is routinely used to control territory, specific populations, natural resources, local economies and state institutions, with no regard for the rule of law. Armed non-state actors are seldom signatories to key legal standards or instruments that regulate the use of force.[8] They are rarely accountable to international oversight or transparency mechanisms (this can also be a problem with state security services). As the UN Secretary-General points out, "where the use of armed violence becomes an engrained means for resolving individual and group grievances and conflicts, legal and peaceful dispute resolution mechanisms are eroded and the rule of law cannot be upheld" (United Nations, 2008).

1.3 Key drivers: Structural and proximate factors

Each situation of armed violence features its own unique combination of drivers, dynamics and effects. Any external intervention must be sensitive to the particular context in which armed violence occurs. Despite their unique characteristics, however, most situations of armed violence also share a number of common underlying structural and proximate risk factors.

Structural risk factors include social, political and economic inequalities/exclusion; systemic unemployment and underemployment; rising perceptions of economic deprivation or grievances; rising expectations in the face of limited or non-existent opportunities; weak or problematic governance (including impunity in the judicial system and an ineffective criminal justice system, public security failure, corruption, lack of effective service delivery, penetration by organised crime and illicit markets, insufficient investment in social policies and programming, under-governed spaces and other deficits that compromise effective, impartial governance); resource scarcity and competition; rapid and unregulated urbanisation; demographic youth bulges, especially of young males in areas with limited education and employment opportunities; and unequal gender relations.[9]

Proximate risk factors[10] include sharp economic shocks; natural (and human-induced) disasters such as drought; easy access to alcohol, narcotics

8 Private security actors are playing an increasingly prominent role across different contexts of insecurity – whether as official support to military and security operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Liberia and elsewhere, or hired by governments as privatised adjuncts to official forces or hired by communities and individuals for protection in violent contexts.

9 See Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2008 for a review of the literature on structural risk factors.

10 For more detailed analysis of risk factors see WHO, 2002 and Small Arms Survey, 2008.

and small arms; and fresh exposure to past violence – whether this has occurred at the national, community or familial level.[11] Gang membership appears to be associated in part with family origins characterised by domestic violence and other proximate factors.[12]

In certain cases, unregulated small arms can serve as a major risk factor: they can act as a trigger, turning a non-violent situation into a lethal encounter. Small arms and light weapons (SALW) control therefore offers an important entry-point for donors, affected governments and civil society actors.

11 Civil conflicts can often reignite, and/or sustain high levels of armed violence linked to crime. A violent family history, including gender-based violence, is strongly correlated with higher incidences of individual violence. For more discussion of the links between early childhood influences and later propensities for violence, see Pinheiro, 2006.

12 For example, the explosion of gangs such as *pandillas* and *maras* in Central America is linked to the exposure of youth to armed conflict and the widespread availability of arms in post-conflict settings, as well as the connections to organised transnational crime and the presence of convicted felons deported from developed countries. For a thorough review of gangs in Latin America and the Caribbean, consult www.usaid.gov/locations/latin_america_caribbean/democracy/gangs.html. See also Jutersonke, Muggah and Rodgers, forthcoming for a discussion of gangs in Central America.

Chapter 2

Armed Violence Trends and Programming Gaps

This chapter addresses:

- Global factors influencing armed violence trends
- Development policy and programming gaps

The past decade has witnessed a proliferation in the range and complexity of armed violence. Examples include:

- *The incidence of armed violence in many non-conflict countries exceeding that of certain countries affected by war.* The risk of dying violently in parts of Brazil, Jamaica, Trinidad or Guatemala is higher than in many countries afflicted by war.
- *The linkages in certain countries and cities between socio-political conflict and crime.* In conflict-affected countries such as Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Somalia and Sudan, armed groups often fragment and seek to control illicit markets. In many cases these groups are not just locally connected; rather, they are aligned with transnational criminal networks and global supply chains.
- *Higher than expected rates of armed violence in societies emerging from conflict are prone to.* Many post-conflict countries are susceptible to war recurrence or experience high rates of homicidal and criminal violence.
- *The escalation of armed violence in rapidly urbanising cities and towns*. Contexts of rapid urban growth, inner cities and slums can exhibit above-average rates of armed violence and a proliferation of youth gangs and militia groups, as is the case in Rio de Janeiro, Guatemala, San'a, Nairobi, Port-au-Prince and Port Moresby.
- *The emergence and expansion of under-governed spaces, particularly in fragile contexts and collapsed states.*[1] These areas tend to be controlled not by public authorities, civic entities and their security forces, but by non-state actors who are often well armed.
- *The collusion of state actors with non-state criminal groups and enterprises.* These networks of patronage and clientelism have lasting negative impacts on the rule of law, the state's ability to deliver basic welfare services and provide public security, and the resilience of state-society relations.

Such trends are symptomatic of deeper global processes that are interacting to transform basic security conditions around the world. They also reveal a number of development policy and programming gaps. The remainder of this section considers first the underlying factors, and then the gaps.

[1] See Chapter 1, note 2 for an explanation of the term 'under-governed spaces'.

2.1 Global factors influencing armed violence trends

The weakening of national and local institutional capacities – A range of economic forces is challenging the reach and capacity of public institutions to resolve local economic problems, ensure the security of their populations, and control their own territories and jurisdictions. National capacities can be further hollowed out when routine corruption intersects with criminal enterprises, feeding a growth of illicit power structures (UN-Habitat, 2007).

Empowerment of non-state actors and networks, including militant and criminal networks – The growth and influence of these groups is due in part to lowered barriers to trade, finance and communication. This has enabled them to undertake illicit transactions in a way that escapes easy detection by state authorities and traditional national control and regulation systems.

Reduced opportunities for formal employment, and the rise of informal economies and illicit markets – The rapid mobility of capital, labour and technology has resulted in the progressive deindustrialisation of certain areas and relocation of employment opportunities to other regions. Globalised trade structures and structural adjustment have also undermined agricultural productivity in certain lesser-developed economies (Bello, 2008). A growing number of young people are therefore entering informal markets,[2] working longer hours for less pay and with fewer security guarantees. They are at risk of selecting better-paying alternative livelihoods such as gang membership and organised or petty crime.

Unregulated urbanisation and the growth of slums and urban violence – The majority of the world's population now lives in urban centres, and this trend is continuing (UN-Habitat, 2007; DFAIT and CCHS, 2007; Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2008). As economic transformations accelerate rural-to-urban migration, the rural poor are being converted into an urban poor who populate vast, densely packed and unplanned mega-slums on the periphery of major urban centres. This is especially true in the developing world, home to 90% of the world's slum population.[3] Slums lack basic public infrastructure and services and the presence of civil authorities. They also concentrate horizontal inequalities and social exclusion. Governance voids are often filled from the street, in the form of armed criminal syndicates, gangs, vigilante groups and neighbourhood watch associations. As alternative governance systems become entrenched within slums, so too do their illicit economies, welfare and protection systems.

2 By some estimates the informal economy accounts for 100% of all new jobs in Latin America, 90% in Africa and 60% in Asia. See IRIN, 2007.

3 By 2050, the slum population will reach 3 billion persons. According to UN-Habitat (2007) some 72% of urban sub-Saharan Africans and 80% of Nicaraguans and Haitians currently live in slums. See also DFAIT and CCHS, 2007.

Growth in the proportion of excluded and marginalised youth – The largest-ever generation of young people is now entering adulthood. Almost half of the world's population is under the age of 24, and the vast majority of 10- to 24-year-olds live in less developed countries. Crime and violence are strongly associated with the growth and proportion of youthful populations, especially young males. This association constitutes a *potential risk factor* for the onset of armed violence, and is not a direct cause (UN-Habitat, 2007). Although at risk, it is important to ensure that youth are not inadvertently criminalised and stigmatised, by recognising the other factors at play (Box 2.1). The current challenge is clear: 200 million youth live on less than USD 1 a day, 130 million are illiterate, and 74 million are unemployed.[4] The ILO estimates that some 400 million new and better jobs are needed just to absorb today's youth. The challenge will only increase in the future, as the continued globalisation of employment markets accelerates job insecurity in vulnerable communities.

Expansion of transnational organised crime – A range of factors, including the growth of an international supply chain in illegal commodities, has facilitated the spread and entrenchment of transnational criminal networks. Illicit cross-border financial flows are estimated at USD 1-1.6 trillion annually – a figure eight to ten times higher than ODA. Through their creation and protection of parallel illegal markets, criminal networks enable the global illicit trade in arms. They provide a channel for non-state actors and groups to source weapons, which are a critical risk factor for armed violence.[5] Organised crime can supplant failing state institutions, fuel corruption in central government as well as in the police and public security services, and compete with state authority, legitimacy and service provision. It often replaces or transforms non-violent market and dispute resolution arrangements with coercive and at times violent ones. The UNODC considers crime to be a significant enabler of conflict-related violence. In some cases, development assessment studies have tagged organised crime as a key security threat.[6]

4 World Bank estimates, cited in UN-Habitat, 2007.

5 Government corruption provides an entry point for organised crime. Local conditions of exclusion, systemic lack of opportunities and underdevelopment provide others.

6 For example, a recent strategic assessment for a post-conflict African country considered the primary security threat to be the possibility of a closer link between organised crime and the political elite. The review noted that current need for international aid outweighed the elites' need to seek patronage alliances with organised crime. However, even a small shift in this direction would likely further alienate the international community leading to withdrawal of support and crisis. See Vaux *et al*. 2006.

Climate change and increasing environmental degradation – These processes contribute to resource-based conflicts over land, minerals and other natural resources, and water. Resource scarcity is also fuelling internal and cross-border displacement and migration that is undermining otherwise sustainable agro-pastoral practices and adding to the growth of urban slums.

Box 2.1. **Young guns and the demographic risks of armed violence**

From the alleyways of Nairobi's Kibera slum to the cocaine-processing enclaves of Colombia's highlands and militia encampments in Darfur, the age of violence entrepreneurs is strikingly similar. The overwhelming majority of those wielding arms are male and less than 30 years old. In developed countries males are responsible for four out of every five violent crimes.

For several decades there has been growing awareness that those countries with a large proportion of young adults have an elevated risk of experiencing the emergence of new civil conflict, political violence, and domestic terrorism.

However, a youthful society constitutes a potential risk, rather than a cause, of the onset of collective armed violence. Other factors are critical, including: limited livelihood prospects; under-employment; social exclusion; rising expectations and thwarted socio-economic mobility; compromised masculinity; rapid urbanisation and social dislocation; past exposure to violence, including in the family home; and, human rights violations, including denial of political rights. In some cases, as in West and Central Africa, youth are rapidly recruited (voluntarily and forcibly) from urban slums into more structured political institutions such as militia or even rebel groups.

Public health research has identified additional important predictors for youth at risk of violence, including the presence of gangs in the neighbourhood, having an older sibling who is in a gang, feeling unsafe at school or in the neighbourhood, substance abuse, and school bullying.

Studies indicate that the risk of conflict associated with a large youth bulge is roughly comparable to risks associated with low levels of per capita income or high levels of infant mortality – around 2.3 times that of other factors. Some demographers argue that a large youth bulge facilitates political mobilisation and recruitment into state and non-state forces and criminal networks.

Source: Geneva Declaration, 2008.

2.2 Development policy and programming gaps

The emerging trends in armed violence reveal a number of development policy and programming gaps:

Gap 1: Inadequate capacity to deal with the convergence of conflict and criminal violence – Donor programming frameworks and procedures are seldom adequately equipped to address the linkages between conflict and criminal violence. Specifically, they struggle to develop programming options that can suitably target the (informal) relationships between state and non-state armed actors on the one hand, and transnational systems of organised crime, and their attendant political economies, on the other. While many practitioners recognise that the structural and proximate risk factors shaping armed violence should be analysed and addressed at multiple levels (*e.g.* local, national, regional, and global), they often lack the tools to do this.

Gap 2: Ineffective or narrowly conceived programmes during post-conflict transition – Development donors often face multiple and shifting risks of armed violence in the aftermath of war. Between 20% and 40% of the countries emerging from conflict relapse into conflict within five years.[7] Even when there is no war recurrence, many post-conflict contexts register rates of armed violence that are similar to, or higher than, wartime levels.[8] The specific geographic location of the violence may shift from previously defined war zones to under-governed urban slums (Box 2.2). Most post-war security promotion, however, focuses on a defined category of armed actors and the underlying issues that fed the political conflict.[9] There may be insufficient attention paid to the existing patterns of armed violence on the ground, to post-war political economies, and to identifying and addressing risk factors for future armed violence.

Gap 3: Failure to correctly identify the risks and impacts of armed violence – In conflict settings, high death rates result from both direct war violence and the indirect effects of war that limit access to food, clean water, and healthcare. In non-conflict settings, high levels of armed homicide and crime can be motivated by social exclusion and other factors of underdevelopment (in Jamaica, for example). Beyond this, many armed violence incidents go unreported, especially in developing contexts and by those afflicted by armed violence, where reporting systems are often weak. Addressing the causes and

7 See, for example, Collier *et al.,* 2003. See also Suhrke and Samset, 2007 for an examination of these trends.

8 Research shows that societies emerging from conflict suffer from widespread psychological trauma and higher levels of *normalised* violence. See UNODC, 2007.

9 See, for example, Muggah, 2008, for a critical review of post-war security promotion interventions.

consequences of armed violence through development programming requires a clear understanding of the specific local conditions, including the structural and proximate factors that fuel violence. This requires a broad approach to diagnostics, which leverages different data sources and methods such as conflict assessments, public health approaches, and crime prevention methods.

Gap 4: Difficulties in programming above and below state level – Armed violence can spill across borders. Alternatively, localised armed violence can be shaped by regional and global factors. Because development donors often focus on the "national" level, they may find it difficult to design appropriate interventions to address armed violence above and below that level. But recognition and investment in understanding these global-local and regional dynamics can facilitate the identification of entry points for more effective donor engagement (for example, area-based programming, community and municipal interventions, whole-of-government responses, and more co-ordinated global and regional action against illicit flows and organised crime).

Box 2.2. **Armed violence in post-conflict contexts**

Research suggests at least five types of armed violence that continue, emerge or worsen in post-conflict contexts:

- Political violence such as assassinations, kidnappings, mass displacements, and bombings.
- Routine state violence involving unlawful or disproportionately violent law enforcement, elimination of political rivals and supporters, torture, and support to human-rights-abusing "civilian defence" militias.
- Economic and crime-related violence such as armed robbery, extortion, kidnapping, control over markets, human, drug and arms trafficking, domestic and sexual violence, youth gang-related violence.
- Community and informal justice and policing violence, such as lynching, vigilante action, mob justice, youth gang enforcement and turf battles and civilian defence organisation activities.
- Post-war displacements and disputes such as clashes over land and revenge killings.

These types of armed violence need to be addressed within a broader framework of recovery that seeks to reinforce or establish state legitimacy and national resilience. It should be noted that in certain contexts, incomplete disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and security system reform (SSR) can unintentionally exacerbate insecurity.

Source: Chaudhary and Suhrke, 2008.

Gap 5: Inexperience programming in urban areas – Urban-based armed violence is significant, and there is growing recognition of the negative impacts of such violence on urban governance and socio-economic development. The World Bank, its sister agencies and UN-Habitat have developed some expertise on addressing various aspects of crime and insecurity in cities. Although urban-based AVR programming is becoming a priority focus for a good number of affected governments and multilateral donors, many development agencies lack the experience, institutional know-how and practical tools to undertake effective programming.

Gap 6: Challenges of youth gangs and youth at risk of armed violence – The problem of disaffected young males who embrace crime and violence as an alternative livelihood is considered by certain authorities as a major "security risk" (Jutersonke, Muggah and Rodgers, forthcoming; UN-Habitat, 2007). In some cases, crackdown interventions are launched as a pretext for avoiding more intractable issues relating to inequality or employment creation. But many donors have yet to adequately address the complex issues involved with youth gangs.[10] Evidence suggests that targeted preventive interventions focused on proximate and structural risk factors can generate a demonstrated positive effect (WHO, 2008; World Bank and UNODC, 2007).

Gap 7: Insufficient investment in prevention – Donor efforts to reduce armed violence and assist with post-conflict recovery are important means of preventing a return to violent conflict. While investment in conflict prevention is warranted, a persistent challenge is that the repertoire of evidence-based conflict prevention initiatives remains slim. It is difficult to convincingly *prove* that a specific programming initiative ended conflict or kept armed violence from breaking out.[11] Still, given the magnitude of post-conflict spending, modest investments in preventive action should be given more attention (Box 2.3). In the case of interpersonal violence and crime prevention, a growing evidence base is identifying entry points that warrant development investment, some of which may also be applicable to conflict situations.

Gap 8: Insufficient understanding of the relationships between under-development and transnational organised crime – Comparatively little is known about how different forms of development can enhance or diminish

10 Analysis of ODA websites and documents from 22 OECD-DAC members found programming on this issue to be mostly focused on legal and criminal justice reforms and efforts to address violence against children and women. See WHO, 2008.

11 The OECD-DAC (2008c) has developed guidance on monitoring and evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding, and is piloting the standards in a range of contexts.

the capacity of organised crime agents to exploit financial, transportation and communication systems. For example, development interventions often advance national deregulation and integration with global markets. At the same time, however, there is insufficient investment in building the requisite capacities for monitoring cash flows, enhancing criminal justice, ensuring an independent judiciary and providing accountable security delivery (*e.g.* policing and border control). This risks exposing communities to extortion, corruption and penetration by organised crime. West Africa, which is currently infiltrated by Colombian narcotics cartels because of its open borders, weak policing and high rates of political corruption, offers an illustrative example.[12]

Box 2.3. **Conflict prevention under-funded in Haiti**

In 2002, the Organisation of American States (OAS) mission in Haiti was supporting a broad range of preventive programming in security, human rights, justice, reintegration and good governance. It asked for USD 15 million for two years; it received just USD 5 million. When the country was crippled by a small insurrection in 2004 that led to the departure of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the UN mission that followed cost upwards of USD 400 million, with some USD 1 billion pledged for development programming by over a dozen donors. Would more energetic support of the OAS have made a difference? The answer is not known. But failing to deliver minimal backing meant preventive efforts never had the slightest chance of succeeding.

Source: Collings, 2005.

12 See Cockayne 2007 and UNODC, 2008. For a recent UN statement on the role of organised crime and drug cartels in Guinea-Bissau see: http://africa.reuters.com/top/news/usnJOE492012.html.

Chapter 3

Armed Violence Reduction and Prevention (AVR) and the Armed Violence Lens

This chapter addresses:

- Lessons learned that are shaping AVR
- The armed violence lens: A strategically integrated approach
  - The four core elements: People, perpetrators, instruments and institutions
  - People
  - Perpetrators
  - Instruments
  - Institutions
- The four levels: Local, national, regional, and global

Many development practitioners and their national partners now agree that comprehensive approaches are needed to reduce and prevent armed violence. They have begun to adapt a wide assortment of programmes to meet this objective. Ongoing programming in the field is signposting a number of critical ways forward.[1] This section considers a range of lessons learned and programming experiences that have shaped the AVR approach. It then introduces the armed violence lens, which can help development actors to better identify drivers, risk factors and the effects of armed violence, and identify strategic entry points for intervention.

3.1 Lessons learned that are shaping AVR

A wide assortment of post-conflict recovery and peacebuilding, development and security promotion experiences are generating critical insights that are shaping the AVR approach. Key lessons include the following.

The need to consider demand factors in SALW control – Small arms control programmes were at first primarily technical operations intent on controlling the "supply" of weapons (through production and stockpile controls, export and import regulation, arms destruction). But recent experience demonstrates that to be effective, interventions must consider *why* people acquire and misuse weapons. SALW programmes have evolved accordingly – from weapon buy-back programmes to community-based weapons for development activities (Albania), weapons lotteries (Haiti),[2] community storage and safekeeping facilities (Somalia) and broader approaches that focus less on gun control and more on reducing the demand for arms.[3] *For AVR, the key lesson is that sustainable approaches need to focus on the structural, institutional and socio-cultural factors that fuel the "demand" for small arms as well as protective factors that can guard against their future misuse* (Yeung, 2008; Jackman, 2007; Atwood, Glatz and Muggah, 2006).

1 However, as noted in the Introduction, there is not yet sufficient evaluative evidence to develop solid operational programmatic guidance. Moreover, there is a significant need to increase technical exchange and knowledge within the development assistance agencies that are working on different aspects of armed violence issues.

2 Weapons lotteries offer incentives to individuals to turn in their weapons in exchange for a lottery ticket, with which they can win a number of prizes, from kitchen appliances to motor scooters. Other innovations include lotteries for armed violence reduction wherein local gang leaders are offered "incentives" (motorcycles, education scholarships) in exchange for meaningful reductions of gun violence in areas ostensibly under their control.

3 An example is found in the evolution of UNDP's programming among pastoralist communities in the Garissa region of Kenya.

The need for comprehensive approaches to disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) – DDR efforts have often focused on narrow criteria associated with disarming (male) combatants, cantonment and reinsertion. The result was often "incomplete DDR" with limited meaningful reintegration, and strong prospects for a return to armed violence. Many DDR programmes are shifting away from short-term interventions focused on ex-combatants and decommissioning of arms to more integrated community- and national-based interventions (United Nations, 2006). Some seek to improve the absorptive capacity of communities to receive ex-combatants,[4] and also target the development of longer-term national strategies for job creation and poverty reduction. In addition, there is growing recognition of the need to adopt preventive action targeting disaffected young men at risk of future recruitment. *For AVR, a key lesson is that DDR should be approached from within a state-building perspective. Sustainable reintegration requires community-based and national development approaches designed to strengthen the resilience and legitimacy of state-society relations.*

Applying developmental and preventive approaches to dealing with crime and youth gangs – Law enforcement needs to be balanced with broader developmental and preventive strategies. Conventional state-led approaches to dealing with crime and youth gangs have preferred heavy-handed "law and order" responses. But these efforts overlook the underlying factors shaping the emergence of urban armed violence and youth gangs. *The important lesson is that AVR interventions should address the specific structural and risk factors that give rise to armed violence, and not just the people brandishing the guns.*[5] *Strengthened and accountable criminal/restorative justice approaches need to be reinforced and integrated with targeted development assistance, improved governance, community mobilisation and other development approaches.*

Crime and violence prevention can be effective – A range of tools and methods that has proved effective in reducing armed violence in high- and medium-income contexts may be usefully considered in lower-income environments. Especially important are the crime prevention and public health approaches for tracking the geographic and demographic patterns of armed violence, and identifying risk and protective factors, both of which can inform efforts to prevent and reduce armed violence (see Chapter 4).

4 This requires attention to issues of transitional justice, as well as the communities' psychological and socio-economic absorptive capacities. See Colletta *et al.*, 2008 and Colletta and Muggah, forthcoming for a review of interim stabilisation measures and second-generation DDR.

5 See Jutersonke, Muggah and Rodgers, 2009 for a review of so-called "mano dura" and "mano amiga" interventions in Central America that emphasise enforcement and voluntary approaches to violence reduction.

For example, comprehensive interventions adopted by municipal authorities in areas of Colombia (*e.g.* Bogota, Medellín and Cali) were guided fundamentally by solid monitoring and regular mapping of "hot spots". *An emerging lesson is the utility of mapping actual patterns and relationships shaping armed violence, identifying key risk and protective factors, and adapting and monitoring interventions.*

Multi-sectoral and multi-level efforts led by community groups and governments are yielding promising results – Many AVR initiatives have gradually developed into multi-sector and multi-level programmes. Many started out with a narrow focus on gun control, but later evolved to address other factors identified as essential for reducing armed violence, such as unemployment, gender relations, police reform and community mobilisation. Some have achieved promising outcomes, although few have been systematically evaluated and documented (see Chapter 5). *The emerging lessons are that integrated, multi-sectoral efforts are required to sustainably reduce armed violence, and that successful interventions often combine elements of conflict, crime prevention and public health approaches.*

The need for donors to work at three levels – prevention, law enforcement and diplomacy – and for integrated and synchronised whole-of-government approaches – Related to the previous point, experience in both conflict and crime-affected contexts has underlined the multidimensional complexity of armed violence, and the growing interconnections between local, national, regional and global risk factors.[6] As already noted, law and order crackdowns and forcible disarmament campaigns are unlikely to generate sustainable reductions in armed violence because they fail to address underlying political and development problems. Likewise, development interventions alone cannot address the range of political and security issues involved (especially when political grievances and/or organised crime is involved). *For AVR this lesson is the need for whole-of-government efforts that synchronise development, political, military/police and diplomatic efforts (ODA and non-ODA). Synchronisation of efforts requires all parties to share a common vision of the interlocking security and development issues and levels that combine to create armed violence.*[7]

Increase the involvement of all actors in assessments, programme design, and evaluation – Although young men are the primary perpetrators and victims of armed violence, the effects of armed violence reach across gender and age and negatively impact the young and old, rich and poor, men and women, and boys and girls. Youth, because they are a high-risk group,

6 For example, where local conditions of underdevelopment and poor governance provide fertile entry points for transnational organised crime to take root.

7 Further discussion is found in Box 3.5 below.

should play an important role in the design of AVR programming, much of which is likely to target this group. Women, both as perpetrators and victims, offer an alternative perspective on the risk factors associated with violence, as well as on the various manifestations of violence – many of which may not be experienced by men.

In sum, these lessons show that narrow programming responses will not do. It is not sufficient to focus only on controlling the weapons, or on the perpetrators, or on fixing institutional weaknesses. Nor is it enough to pick away at aspects of armed violence through uncoordinated development or law enforcement or diplomatic initiatives. Moreover, programming needs to take account of the risk factors that interact across levels in our globalised world – from the local "hot spots" of armed violence, through to the wider national, regional and global environments that shape and condition the local level. Sustainable AVR requires a comprehensive vision of the problem and a strategically integrated approach. The armed violence lens, to which we now turn, can help.

3.2 The armed violence lens: A strategically integrated approach

Understanding of and programming to combat armed violence is challenging. This is because armed violence has political implications (even when the violence itself may not be politicised), and is seldom random.[8] This means that the promotion of effective and practical measures to prevent and reduce armed violence depends on the development of reliable information and analysis of its causes and consequences, and its interrelationships at multiple levels.

The armed violence lens captures key features and levels of armed violence. Its various components have been developed in consultation with development practitioners, and are grounded in the AVR programming lessons learned in conflict, post-conflict and crime-/violence-affected contexts (listed above). The lens offers a flexible and unified framework for thinking about the context-specific drivers, risk factors, protective factors and effects. It is also unconstrained by preconceived assumptions regarding donor-imposed categories such as "conflict", "crime" or "fragile".

As Figure 3.1 shows, the armed violence lens emphasises:

- The *people* that are affected by armed violence – both the first-order victims and the wider communities and societies that also suffer consequences.
- The *perpetrators* of armed violence (and their motives for armed violence).

8 What is more, different groups often have an interest in understating or concealing the scope of lethal armed violence, making the collection of reliable data and impartial analysis particularly challenging.

- The *instruments* of armed violence (with a focus on their availability and/or supply.
- The wider *institutional*/cultural environment (both *formal* and *informal*) that enables, or protects against, armed violence.

The lens also draws attention to the fact that risk factors exist and interact at different levels, from the local to the global.

The armed violence lens underscores the way violence transcends separate development sectors, and highlights the potential for cross-sector and integrated responses. It also highlights the potential connections between different elements and levels: these are often treated separately due to disconnected sector or thematic programming streams. The lens encourages development practitioners to think outside their particular programming mandates and to consider the entirety of the challenges at hand.

Figure 3.1. **The armed violence lens**



A unified analysis of armed violence can help bring together a diverse array of actors who are otherwise working on different aspects of the issue. For example, it can assist practitioners working on criminal justice reform to consider how their programming efforts and objectives are potentially connected to interventions focused on community security, crime prevention, restorative justice, SALW control or initiatives targeting at-risk youth. It can also encourage improved whole-of-government responses.

It is important to note that the armed violence lens should not supplant existing assessment and programming tools such as conflict or stability assessments; drivers of change, governance and criminal justice assessments; or a public health approach. Rather, it serves as a complementary framework that can help to identify how different tools and data sources can be combined to enhance existing diagnostics and formulate more strategic or targeted interventions.

3.2.1 The four core elements: People, perpetrators, instruments and institutions

People

The armed violence lens chooses a *people*-centred perspective on security. A bottom-up perspective is central to designing strategies that build or reinforce the legitimacy and resilience of local capacities and, ultimately, state-society relationships. A starting point for any AVR intervention is to understand who is being affected by armed violence, where, when, how, and why.[9] A critical question to guide interventions is: what is needed to make *individuals and communities feel safe and secure in the particular contexts in which they live?* The emphasis is on understanding how people define their security needs.

Development programming should seek to generate improvements in both the real and perceived senses of security and wellbeing of individuals and communities, while contributing to (or at least not undermining) the effectiveness, legitimacy and resilience of the state. Although bottom-up analytical perspectives on security are the focus, it should be recalled that national and municipal governments play a critical role in creating an enabling environment and providing resources to maintain local-level successes.[10]

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9 This requires mapping the geographic and temporal patterns of armed violence, as well as the demographic characteristics of people, to identify how armed violence impacts specific population groups, such as men, women, girls and boys in different ways.

10 In terms of programming, building and sustaining these local-national linkages is crucial. Moreover, bottom-up perspectives will likely be

Box 3.1. **Preliminary questions for understanding people's security needs**

How do men, women, boys and girls define their security needs?

Who is being *directly* affected by armed violence [including explosive remnants of war (ERW)] and in what ways?

Where and when are attacks committed, and by whom?

Who is being *indirectly* affected, and in what ways?

Who is *not* being directly/indirectly affected, and why? What protective factors exist?

Are all incidents of armed violence being captured in existing reporting systems? If not, why not?

How do people perceive/relate to state institutions and actors?

How do people perceive/relate to the perpetrators of armed violence?

Are non-perpetrators investing in personal defence? Why?

To whom do people turn for justice and security services? [11]

Are there adequate provisions for victim assistance?

Are data disaggregated by gender, age and other relevant demographic characteristics?

Perpetrators

The *perpetrators* of armed violence are heterogeneous. They consist of state and non-state security actors, groups of mainly predatory young men, and individuals involved in interpersonal and domestic violence. Some perpetrators adopt hierarchical formations such as militia, organised crime and certain types of gangs, while others form looser networks. Perpetrators are highly gendered – most violence is committed by males – though women are also occasionally perpetrators and should not be overlooked.

insufficient for addressing organised crime. In contexts where illicit markets form the backbone of the local economy, many have a vested interest in their perpetuation. Other approaches may be required in order to identify and respond to regional and transnational factors influencing the dynamics of local armed violence.

11 This question helps to identify the existing non-state and/or informal security and justice actors and institutions that can form part of a multi-layered response in fragile states. See OECD-DAC, 2007d.

Understanding the motivations of perpetrators and the ways in which they are organised is essential for designing effective AVR interventions. Motivations often involve issues related to personal and/or community security; socio-economic stability and opportunity; individual/social status, identity and belonging; cultural factors; political identity; and group status. A clear diagnosis of the circumstantial and structural risk factors is critical.[12] At a minimum, disaggregated demographic data (*e.g.* gender, age, and ethnicity) are required to effectively target initiatives.

Instruments

The *instruments* aspect of the lens focuses on the supply and availability of weapons and ammunition, together with the presence of explosive remnants of war in conflict and post-conflict contexts. The relatively widespread availability of weapons does not *cause* armed violence, but should be considered a risk factor.[13]

Analysis often draws attention to institutional weakness at the national level (for example, inadequate legislation or enforcement capacity, ineffectual stockpile management, weak border controls, corruption, and subversion of governance by illicit power structures and organised crime), localised security problems, and regional and global factors (cross-border and transnational arms flows; linkages with organised crime networks, illicit markets and global supply chains, etc.). It can also reveal potential opportunities for working with motivated local governance institutions (*e.g.* municipal governments) that are well positioned to invoke policies and other programmes for controlling arms within their jurisdictions.

As already noted, conventional approaches to addressing instruments have tended to limit their scope to technical arms control. Second-generation arms control efforts are adopting more developmental approaches to address the underlying demand factors for small arms and the factors creating an enabling environment for violence. The AVR approach represents a further evolution, by including analysis of how arms are integrated into a community's socio-economic, cultural and political fabric, and how this links up across the local, national, regional and global levels.

12 These can include: public security and development failures and other failures of governance; political grievances and/or greed, corruption and the protection of state/personal interests; lack of alternative livelihoods; lingering post-conflict inequalities; social or cultural factors tied to patriarchy and masculinity; and other risk factors like prior exposure to violence (including in the home), lack of education opportunities, and the availability of arms, alcohol and drugs.

13 See Small Arms Survey, 2008, 2007, 2006, 2005, 2004, 2003, 2002 and 2001. See also SALW guidance chapter in OECD-DAC, 2005a.

Box 3.2. **Preliminary questions for understanding the motivations of, and risk factors affecting, perpetrators**

- Who is committing armed violence? Where? When? What are their motivations?
- How are the perpetrators related to the people?
- How are they related to state actors and institutions?
- How is demand for arms shaped by the wider formal institutional environment?
- How is demand for arms influenced by the informal institutional environment and norms?[14]
- How is access to weapons influenced by other factors at multiple levels – including illicit markets, weapons trafficking, lack of employment opportunities, penetration of organised crime, and proximate risks such as arms supplies, alcohol and drug availability, etc.?
- How is demand for arms influenced by a desire to manage/protect illicit markets?
- To what extent is alcohol or substance abuse a factor?
- What factors lead people in the same community (and same demographics) to not possess or misuse a weapon? Are these entry points for AVR?

Institutions

The *institutional* dimension focuses on the rules of the game that emerge from formal laws, informal norms and practices, means of enforcement and organisational structures in a particular context.[15] Institutions that enable or restrain armed violence range from formal prescriptions and rules of governance at the national, municipal or local level to those within the private sector, the media, community-based institutions and traditional or cultural practices. Both formal and informal institutions can make certain populations more vulnerable to armed violence, or function to reduce and prevent it. For instance, unequal norms in marriage laws, asset ownership and inheritance can expose women and children to increased victimisation. Alternatively, local authorities responsible for alcohol sales, gun legislation, policing and urban development, for example, can play an important role in exacerbating or reducing the likelihood of armed violence.

14 For example, cultures of masculinity, guns as a currency to acquire a wife, land or goods, and cultural/traditional control or regulation norms.

15 See OECD-DAC's module on *Institutional Change and Violent Conflict* in OECD-DAC, 2005a.

Box 3.3. **Preliminary questions about the supply and demand of instruments**

- Where are weapons concentrated (geographically and demographically)? When are they used?
- How are weapons sourced? Who is supplying them?
- What types of arms are in circulation and what do they cost? What assets are used to acquire them?
- What economic, social, political and cultural factors shape demand for weapons?
- How are small arms perceived by the public?
- What international and regional systems (formal and informal) are in place to regulate arms? Are they enforced? What factors limit their effectiveness?
- What national and local systems (formal/informal) are in place to regulate arms? Can they be supported? What factors limit their effectiveness?
- Have efforts been made to regulate arms in the past? Were they effective?
- Are there penalties for illegal arms?

Assessments of formal institutions often focus on capacities and deficits in the public security and justice sectors (*e.g.* within ministries of the interior, defence, police, social affairs, justice, customs and immigration) and related issues such as inadequate legislation, regulation and enforcement, corruption, and security system abuse. They should also consider broader problems of governance and social protection that compromise equitable service delivery, and/or feed systematic social exclusion or collective grievances. Formal institutional assessments should also consider the capacity and credibility of relevant data reporting systems in both the health and criminal justice sectors.

Analysis of *informal institutions* typically focuses on social and cultural factors, including culturally accepted norms that support the use of violence to resolve conflicts, enable impunity and encourage arms holding. It should also consider potential protective factors that can be strengthened to reduce the risk of violence, such as social norms and community associations, traditions and practices, as well as notable leaders and individual efforts. NGOs that support groups of elders to reassert control over armed youth and promote sustainable resource management practices in South Sudan and Kenya are an example of this.[16] Context-specific cultural knowledge is essential. Municipal-level institutions, as well as traditional, customary and community-based organisations/institutions, are a special focus for AVR attention, given their frontline capacity to reduce insecurity and enhance the wellbeing of individuals and communities.

16 See, for example the work of PACT Sudan, at http://www.pactsudan.org/.

3.2.2 The four levels: Local, national, regional, and global

Analysis based on the armed violence lens spans four levels of engagement.

It begins with the *national level*, as this provides the overall backdrop indicating *where* armed violence problems are likely concentrated, and can help to identify "hot spots" where programming should be focused. Analysis also considers national-level factors that shape armed violence patterns and their historical trends, and factors shaping a programmatic response: the willingness of national authorities to address armed violence, the capacities of state institutions, and the practicality of engagement by development actors, based on the (political) orientation of national authorities, with the underlying causes of armed violence.

The armed violence lens can facilitate this common analysis and development of a shared strategy. It can harness the valuable insights of development actors, who are well placed to understand how regional and global factors are connected to local- and national-level dynamics of armed violence and development, and the potential repercussions of whole-of-government interventions. Whole-of-government efforts to reduce armed violence are often led by departments of defence and/or foreign affairs. The AVR perspective suggests that development actors also have an important seat at the table. Equally critical, however, is analysis of (and programming at) the *local level*. The armed violence lens encourages an in-depth analysis of the specific causal, risk and protective factors, their interrelationships, and opportunities for intervention that can enhance Armed violence reduction and prevention. Depending on the context, *local* can refer to a district, municipality, city, village, community, neighbourhood or street. At both the national and local levels, the connections outwards to the regional and global levels should be incorporated.[17]

Factors at the regional and global levels can be directly implicated in shaping violence at the local level. They also present entry points for AVR. External factors such as international demand for narcotics and other illegal or illicit commodities, as well as regional and global arms flows, may be significant factors behind localised armed violence. Local communities and economies, as well as local and national governments, may be penetrated and shaped by transnational criminal syndicates. In addition, armed violence systems may expand across borders (for example, maras in Latin America, pastoralist conflicts in Africa), requiring programming with a regional orientation.

17 This includes assessment of the local vulnerabilities (such as unemployment, insecurity and corruption) that provide entry points for external influences and illicit power structures.

Box 3.4. **Preliminary questions for understanding the institutional environment**

- How do *formal institutions of governance* contribute to: i) peoples' sense of security; ii) perpetrators' demand for weapons; iii) proliferation of arms; and iv) the incidence of armed violence?
- What factors reduce the state's ability and willingness to address armed violence problems?
- In what ways do state representatives and public authorities contribute to armed violence?
- What is the public authorities' relationship to the perpetrators of armed violence?
- In what ways does the formal economy intersect with armed-violence-enabled illicit economies? Who are the key players?
- How can ministries of the interior, defence, social affairs, and customs and borders and the criminal justice system[18] support AVR priorities? What are the capacities? What are the challenges?
- Is the legal framework dealing with armed violence issues adequate? Is it accepted and respected? Does capacity exist to enforce it?
- Is the country party to relevant international or regional conventions and treaties? If so, are these adequately respected by, and reflected in, domestic law and practice?
- What are the capacity, role and accountability of the police and criminal justice/prison systems? Do the police and justice system and personnel have sufficient capacity and *security* to investigate serious crimes?
- Are formal institutional reporting systems in the criminal justice and public health sectors accurately capturing data on all victims of armed violence? What are the barriers and capacity problems? Are certain types of victims (or certain areas) being systematically excluded from assistance?
- What is the (real/potential) capacity of local-level formal governance structures, including municipal governments, to act on AVR concerns?
- How do *informal institutions or practices* contribute to: i) peoples' sense of security; ii) perpetrators' demand for weapons; iii) proliferation of arms; and iv) the incidence of armed violence?
- What factors enhance or reduce the ability of traditional or community institutions and leaders to address armed violence problems? What are the capacities? What are the challenges? Are there actual or potential AVR champions? Do they enjoy popular legitimacy? What types of support do they need?
- What are the prospects or entry points for reinforcing a *culture of peace?* (United Nations General Assembly, 1999, 2001a)
- To which institutions do men, women, youth turn for justice and security provision?

[18] See also the criminal justice assessment guidance in Rausch, 2006 and the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (n.d.).

Alternatively, international action at the transnational level – including counter-narcotics and anti-trafficking and anti-money laundering efforts – can generate negative impacts on the political economy of local communities dependent on the related resource flows. Likewise, deportations of convicted felons (from developed countries such as the United States or Canada to Haiti or Guatemala) can introduce risk factors at the community level, with harmful effects on community insecurity. Intervention efforts must take account of the relevant linkages, as well as the potential unintended consequences of interventions at different levels (Box 3.5).

Box 3.5. **Synchronising whole-of-government efforts**

The armed violence lens highlights the multiple causes and drivers of armed violence, and the interplay of local, national, regional and global factors. These factors require a complex response. In certain cases, diplomatic initiatives may be an effective way of countering the trans-boundary effects of arms, narcotic or human trafficking. In others, military or law enforcement interventions may be more appropriate. In still other situations, development-oriented actions focused on enhancing community security and alternative livelihoods may be key.

A comprehensive approach is required if AVR is to be effective. This often translates into a combination of enforcement- and development-led interventions, otherwise known as "whole of government" efforts (diplomacy, defence and development). Donor whole-of-government efforts have improved significantly over the past few years, with important mechanisms like pooled funding, joint assessments and inter-sector task forces. But achieving genuinely comprehensive approaches remains challenging.

Consequently, a "synchronised" effort may be more practical to achieve a unified objective. Unlike "co-ordination", which implies a process of active engagement at the operational level, synchronised approaches enable partners to act autonomously within their own mandates to address common challenges. Effectively synchronised approaches require a common understanding of the problem and of the ultimate longer-term objectives.

Chapter 4

Assessments: Applying the Armed Violence Lens

This chapter addresses:

- Adapting and combining existing assessment methods
- Making existing tools more AVR-sensitive
  - Combining existing tools around the armed violence lens
  - Strategic conflict assessments, in both conflict and non-conflict contexts
  - Public health approach: Mapping armed violence and building the evidence base
  - Governance and criminal justice assessments
  - Survey instruments
- Promising tools and new data sources
- Exploring data gaps and additional data sources
- Emerging principles for good practice in assessments
- Implications for monitoring and evaluation

Assessments are central to effective AVR programming. They establish key criteria, benchmarks and data essential to the design of interventions and monitoring and evaluation of effectiveness (Alkire, 2008). It is important to stress that the armed violence lens is not a "new" assessment tool. Rather, it serves as a complementary framework that can help development practitioners and their counterparts draw together information and insights derived from existing assessment tools.

Development actors routinely use a range of assessment tools to diagnose different aspects of armed conflict, state fragility, governance, crime and victimisation. By some estimates more than 100 different assessments are fielded by the UN system alone (Miller and Rudnick, 2008). Many of these overlap, and are used concurrently by different development and security actors in the same country. This has led to a degree of assessment fatigue and the duplication of efforts. At times, it has also led to incoherence, as different development, security and humanitarian actors arrive at different conclusions on how to prioritise, sequence interventions, or effectively integrate their efforts.

The armed violence lens can improve coherence by focusing attention on a set of challenging issues that reside at the nexus of security *and* development. By explicitly bringing different types of assessment tools together from the conflict, crime and public health sectors, it can help development actors think through complex determinants, protective factors and effects of armed violence. In so doing, it can also help to identify strategic entry points for intervention, thereby bridging the assessment-to-programming challenge (Box 4.1).

While AVR encourages development policy makers and practitioners to draw on multiple methods and data sources to build a solid evidence base for programme planning, it also recognises the long-standing challenge of turning analysis into programmes. More work is needed, including engagement with end-users, to determine the most cost-effective and realistic avenues for gathering, processing and sharing multiple sources of data, and how shared analysis can be translated into effective programming. Recent innovations, like crime and violence observatories, may be an important part of the solution.

4.1 Adapting and combining existing assessment methods

Existing assessments can be used creatively to capture key characteristics of armed violence. This can be achieved by *adapting existing tools to make them more AVR-sensitive* and by *combining different assessment methods and approaches*.

4.1.1 Making existing tools more AVR-sensitive

Many different types of thematic and sector-specific assessments generate data and insights that are relevant to understanding aspects of armed violence.[1] Where reducing armed violence is a demonstrated priority, the armed violence lens can usefully guide the adaptation of any given assessment instrument by identifying additional issue areas and/or questions that could be easily added. The additional information gathered would be relevant for a wide range of development actors interested in AVR programming, and could help them mainstream AVR goals.

4.1.2 Combining existing tools around the armed violence lens

To more directly capture the complex elements and dynamics of armed violence, different tools and methods can be combined (Box 4.2). The four most directly relevant tools include: strategic conflict and stability/fragility assessments; the public health approach; governance and criminal justice assessments; and a range of population-based survey instruments. This section considers each of these approaches in turn.

Strategic conflict assessments, in both conflict and non-conflict contexts

Strategic conflict assessments and related instruments such as drivers of change, power analysis, and stability and fragility assessments generally identify the key factors shaping conflict and insecurity. These instruments generate qualitative analysis of the underlying structural conditions of instability, institutional capacities and fragilities, the social, economic and political dynamics, key actors and their motivations, and the underlying political economy of conflict.

Conflict assessments are routinely used to target assistance to prevent the outbreak of violence, support a negotiated end to conflict, plan and prioritise post-conflict recovery efforts, and mitigate the risks of the conflict resuming. With respect to AVR, such assessments can generate critical data and inputs relating to the effects of conflict on specific population groups (*e.g.* women, youth), the motivations of perpetrators, the dynamics of small arms availability and (formal and informal) institutional risk factors (including issues like corruption and cultural factors shaping patterns of violence).

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1 Examples include assessments designed to appraise conflict, stability and fragility, as well as drivers of change, power analysis, poverty, SSR, governance, social exclusion, public safety, health and education, labour and employment, gender equality and relations, victimisation, vulnerable groups, water and sanitation, environmental resource use, agriculture and rural development, nutrition and household surveys.

Box 4.1. **Many assessments, not enough coherence**

Development actors regularly use a wide range of assessment tools and methods to inform different aspects of their programming. Examples of the many tools that exist include:

- *Conflict, stability, fragility and governance assessments,* including SSR assessments, fragility assessments, drivers of change, power analysis, landmine impact surveys, and explosive remnants of war (ERW) and small arms baseline surveys that are applied in countries affected by, or emerging from, conflict and those considered fragile.
- *Public health surveys and crime prevention assessments,* which often combine population-based surveys, surveillance and incident monitoring. They can also include justice and governance assessments and SSR surveys undertaken in countries affected by high levels of crime-related armed violence and insecurity.
- *A wide range of sector-specific survey instruments and assessments.* These focus on underlying factors that, while not exclusive to armed violence, can potentially exacerbate risk factors. Examples include: governance, poverty, gender, health, nutrition and food security, water and sanitation, urban and municipal services, infrastructure and planning and vulnerable groups.
- *A wide range of* ad hoc *assessments* ranging from ethnographic studies of specific communities and participatory urban/rural appraisal (and related methods), to assessments of the trade in arms, and of the macroeconomic impact of global remittance flows and other forms of informal and illicit value transfer.

Recommendations flowing from the use of a single assessment tool may favour sector- or thematic-specific responses, or be shaped by political factors associated with the commissioning agency. Typically, a single development actor employs more than one assessment instrument in the same context, with uncertainty as to how to link findings and recommendations. Programming staff are also challenged with turning empirical analysis into concrete programmes and policies.

Aid effectiveness requires greater effort by development actors and their partners to share data and findings, engage in *joint* (with national counterparts) and *joined-up* (with other donor) assessments, and undertake other actions to ensure a more comprehensive – but shared – vision of core development and security challenges, and appropriate responses.

Conflict assessments require time and intensive analysis. There is evidence that donors and multinational agencies have undertaken and applied them inconsistently. In most cases they are administered in conflict-affected countries, although this is changing. For example, DFID has undertaken strategic conflict assessments in Nigeria, Kenya, and Mozambique – countries not ostensibly at war – yielding analysis that identified key risk factors for AVR. *An important lesson is that conflict assessments can be adapted and usefully deployed in all countries or contexts experiencing, or at risk of, armed violence.*

Box 4.2. **Armed violence lens and data sources**

People – Solid evidence of people's understandings and experiences of insecurity and justice are seldom captured in conflict assessments. But participatory assessments,[2] community security/safety needs assessments and community-based action research offer promising entry points. Periodic household surveys (including victimisation surveys and armed violence baseline assessments) offer a potentially broader and more regular approach to gathering data in stable contexts, though there is growing evidence of **household or population-based surveys being undertaken in fragile circumstances**.[3] Finally, routine public health and crime data can help map the geographic and demographic patterns of armed violence and the characteristics of victims and perpetrators. This data, disaggregated according to location, sex and age, contribute to more specific targeting of AVR programming, which makes programmes more effective in preventing and reducing violence.

Perpetrators – Drivers of change and conflict/stability/fragility assessments can generally disaggregate the motivations of perpetrators. Likewise, solid public health and crime data generated from national and municipal surveillance systems can help appraise the demographic and geographic characteristics of victims and perpetrators. The public health approach can also help to identify risk and protective factors.

2 There are examples of instruments being developed and tested to measure real and perceived insecurity. For example, Caroline Moser has undertaken participatory mapping of insecurity in Latin America and the Caribbean (cf Moser and Rodgers 2005). The Small Arms Survey has also applied participatory monitoring and evaluation techniques to examine local definitions of security in South Asia, South East Asia and the South Pacific (Lebrun and Muggah, 2005; Moser-Puangsuwan and Muggah, 2003). Likewise, UNIDIR is piloting a Security Needs Assessment Protocol that aims to assess the security perceptions and needs of local communities – see Miller and Rudnick, 2008.

3 See, for example, the findings of Muggah, 2008 in Southern Sudan; Kolbe and Hudson, 2006 in Haiti; and Roberts *et al*., 2004 and Lafta *et al.,* 2005 in Iraq.

Box 4.2. **Armed violence lens and data sources (*continued*)**

Institutions – Formal institutional and structural factors are generally addressed in strategic conflict and stability assessments; they include the issues of corruption and linkages to organised and transnational crime. Governance and criminal justice assessments, as well as more conventional SSR surveys, can also provide data to guide AVR. Small arms surveys capture, among other things, issues relating to capacity and legislation for firearms regulation, management, destruction and enforcement. Assessments of informal institutions (such as existing security and justice providers) are often less well considered, and may require alternative assessment tools.

Instruments – Conflict assessments often have little to say about the availability of, trade in, ownership patterns of and demand factors for SALW, mines or other instruments. Information on small arms is only marginally captured in conventional assessment tools and national or municipal health and crime surveillance. As such, baseline surveys generated by various agencies such as the Small Arms Survey, Saferworld and SEESAC (among others) can capture relevant information.

Applying a combination of approaches, including strategic conflict assessments, can facilitate a better understanding of the dynamics of armed violence at multiple levels of analysis. For example, public health approaches can assist in diagnosing the geographic and demographic distribution of armed violence from the household to the national level. Strategic conflict assessments (and related instruments) occasionally capture linkages to organised and transnational organised crime, as well as related illicit flows of arms, people and commodities across borders. But a solid understanding of linkages at the regional and global level remains inadequate and should be the subject of additional research.

Public health approach: Mapping armed violence and building the evidence base

The *public health approach* is a systematic approach to diagnosing and responding to specific challenges. It relies on multiple data sources, including existing national and municipal surveillance systems and epidemiological tools, to map the geographic and demographic incidence of violence, and to identify violence-related risk and protective factors at multiple levels (Box 4.3).[4]

[4] A strength of the public health approach is that, unlike many other assessment methods, it makes no *a priori* assumptions regarding the causes or consequences of armed violence. Rather, it relies on systematic empirical investigation to build a geographic, demographic, social, and causal perspective on armed violence *as a social phenomenon*. This method has the potential to

Box 4.3. **Public health approaches to mapping risks of armed violence**

Understanding why violence occurs, who commits violent acts, and who is at risk of victimisation is at the core of strategies for armed violence reduction. At the centre of these interventions are risk factors, which paint a picture of perpetrators, victims, means, and types of violence in a community. These in turn enable policy makers to design interventions to target those perpetrating armed violence and protect the most vulnerable. Interventions may seek to change the behaviour of individuals or the dynamics of communities and/or create more protective physical and social environments.

Public health experts have found that general risk factors for armed violence include substance abuse, a history of victimisation, violence in the home, prevailing attitudes that support the use of violence, and high levels of economic inequality. Because of the focus on *prevention*, which is best served by early intervention in the life cycle of those at risk, special focus has also been trained on identifying additional risk factors for youth violence (Box 2.1 above).

Despite increasing knowledge about risk factors for violence, more research is required, especially in non-Western settings. More work is also needed to understand the range of potential protective factors that can contribute to the resilience of individuals, communities and societies in the face of the extreme adversity and violence.

Source: Small Arms Survey, 2008.

The public health approach often relies on quantitative data from the public health and criminal justice systems, where this is available and reliable. As such, it is well suited to countries with established national and local surveillance mechanisms and standardised reporting procedures. However, many low- and medium-income countries do not possess effective surveillance systems. This is especially the case in countries afflicted by conflict and high levels of armed violence, where there may be strong barriers to the systematic collection of data and where health systems have broken down and professionals have departed. It is also true for many otherwise non-conflict countries.[5]

reveal counterintuitive or otherwise hidden factors that may serve as important leverage points for armed violence reduction programming.

5 For example, SEESAC, 2006 found that even in southeastern European countries, data and reporting systems generally lacked the capacity and robustness for effective national surveillance of armed violence. Developing and improving national surveillance systems in the health and criminal justice fields are an important part of a longer-term support strategy for armed

Nevertheless, a wide number of population-based survey methods have been successfully used to generate data on armed violence in Brazil, El Salvador, Guatemala and other crime-affected Latin American countries, as well as Haiti, Jamaica, Kenya, Mozambique, Papua New Guinea, Somalia, Sudan, and others. The resulting information has often been used to develop AVR programming, raise awareness, engage in advocacy and sensitisation, mobilise community and national action, and develop a baseline for monitoring and evaluation of programming.

Despite its growing use by AVR practitioners, the public health approach is generally not well understood or applied by the peacebuilding and conflict prevention community, or by development actors outside the health sector. A number of international and national agencies (*e.g.* WHO, UNDP, the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and NGOs) have been at the forefront of promoting this approach for mapping, tracking and responding to armed violence in different country and city contexts.

Table 4.1. **Comparison of conflict assessments and public health approach**

	Conflict assessments	Public health approach
Tools	Used by international development and humanitarian agencies working in fragile, conflict or post-conflict countries. Examples include: • Checklist for Root Causes of Conflict (EU 2001) • Strategic Conflict Assessments (DfID2002) • Fragile States Grid (France 2007) • Conflict Development Analysis (UNDP 2003) • Conflict Analysis Framework (World Bank 2005) • Peace and Conflict Needs Assessments (World Bank and UNDG) • Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) • Stability Assessment (Clingendael 2005) • Joint Stability Assessment (UK 2006)	• Used by public health organisations, police, criminologists, social workers, municipal, state/provincial and national governments/ agencies. Presently in use by: • WHO and UNDP • PAHO (Violence Prevention Programme) • USAID (Global Demographic and Health Surveys) • UNODC (various) • The International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS) • Inter-American Development Bank

violence reduction and prevention. Donors have the opportunity – especially in post-conflict contexts – to invest in this strategy.

	Conflict assessments	Public health approach
Data sources	Analysis seeks to understand the production and distribution of power, wealth and destitution, and the incentives and disincentives of the structures, institutions and agents involved. Relies heavily on qualitative data sources: key informant interviews, focus group discussions, secondary literature. Primary data sources include: national officials, other donors and international organisations, victim groups, practitioners and experts, political parties and movements, armed non-state actor groups, NGOs, community groups, traditional leaders, and women's and youth groups.	• Takes an evidence- and process-based approach to building a profile of the risk factors, protective factors and consequences of armed violence. Employs both qualitative and quantitative sources of data, including: • Hospital intake systems • Mortuary reports, death certificates • Police reporting • National census/population studies, household surveys • Insurance records • Public health and criminological research and reports (victims' surveys, etc.); • Periodic population-based surveys.
Strengths	Analysis generates a detailed understanding of historical, social, political and economic context, and incorporates risk assessments and the possible impact of planned interventions. Other strengths include ability to capture specific armed violence data, and applicability to fragile state contexts. Some also develop future scenarios.	Approach can provide a comprehensive mapping of the risk factors and protective factors related to armed violence, identifying counterintuitive or hidden factors important to shaping effective responses. The collection of baseline data allows for long-term trend analysis, which is useful for programme monitoring and evaluation.
Weaknesses	Analysis can be subjective and limited in its ability to build a systematic perspective on all the possible causal and protective factors necessary to armed violence prevention programming. The approach is resource-intensive, which is a disincentive to its broad application at the field level.[6]	Insufficient data sources and collection techniques may result in significant gaps in coverage, limiting the utility of this approach in certain contexts.

Governance and criminal justice assessments

Governance and criminal justice sector assessments[7] capture vital information relating to the role and capacities of institutions and actors in the formal institutional environment to enable, or protect against, armed violence. Such assessments can serve as an important barometer of government legitimacy by gauging commitment and capabilities for providing transparent and equal access to justice and security for citizens. They can also highlight the overall commitment to the rule of law and human rights.

Survey instruments

Victimisation surveys generate important baseline data on the geographic and demographic patterns of armed crime, and also provide insight into the security needs of individuals and communities. More multi-dimensional survey tools – combining qualitative and quantitative assessments – can capture critical information relating to armed violence (Box 4.4).[8] Such instruments have been applied in fragile, conflict and crime-affected contexts to generate effective baselines for programme planning, design, monitoring and evaluation. There are also a variety of safety and security audit-type tools that seek to understand the perceptions and needs of local communities.[9]

Donor-sponsored surveys are often *ad hoc*, one-off studies. While they can generate valuable information in data-poor contexts, they do not necessarily contribute to the development of local capacity or support for AVR. An alternative approach is community-based action research that prioritises field-based activity and collaboration with, and the capacity-building of, local experts and activists. Such research can be a highly effective way to understand the security needs of communities, identify relevant entry points at that level, ensure local ownership and sustainability, and enhance local capacity for long-term trend monitoring, social mobilisation and advocacy.

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6 A 2007 DAC review found conflict assessments were not being systematically used to inform country programmes.

7 For example, the US Department of State's *Justice Sector Assessment Rating Tool*, which gauges the effectiveness of international capacity-building efforts in the criminal justice sector. See also Rausch, 2006.

8 Surveys, such as those developed by the Small Arms Survey, the Institute for Strategic Studies, the Danish Demining Group, or Saferworld, combine qualitative assessments of the political, institutional, social and economic dynamics of insecurity and conflict; quantitative victimisation data; and information on arms availability and supply.

9 UNIDIR's *Security Needs Assessment Protocol* is an emerging example. See Miller and Rudnick, 2008.

Box 4.4. **Applying surveys in southern Sudan**

In order to better understand the distribution and scale of armed violence in southern Sudan, the Small Arms Survey's *Human Security Baseline Assessment* undertook three victimisation surveys between 2006 and 2007.[10] Semi-random and geo-referenced household surveys were undertaken in Lakes state, Jonglei state, Eastern Equatoria state and the northern Kenyan region of Turkana. The surveys were designed to demonstrate the outcomes of recent disarmament campaigns, and the prospects for future interventions.

Victimisation surveys offer a range of critical outputs for AVR. First, with virtually no surveillance- or census-based data on population characteristics in the south, the survey offered critical data on a range of victimisation characteristics, socio-economic indices and other factors. Such data are invaluable for health and education planning. Second, survey results can be used as a baseline for AVR interventions – including DDR and community security promotion – both for identifying entry points and priorities, and for measuring outcomes over time. Third, since the surveys were undertaken in co-operation with local partners and enumerators, they offer a capacity-building opportunity and, more importantly, a unified overview of a range of complex issues for international and domestic policy makers.

Source: Muggah *et al.*, 2008.

4.1.3 Promising tools and new data sources

Emerging technologies, particularly in the field of knowledge management, hold significant promise for facilitating analysis of the different elements and dynamics of armed violence. Data-mining methods and visualisation tools can help identify and analyse linkages and patterns across large amounts of heterogeneous data. For example, individual and social relationships can be mapped spatially and in relation to others sources such as perception surveys and baseline economic and demographic data. Many of these technologies and methods have already been adapted and applied in military, security and business settings; they are only now beginning to make their way into the mainstream of development practice.

10 See http://www.smallarmssurvey.org for more information about the survey findings.

Some of these tools and methods include:

- *Geographic Information Systems (GIS)* – Recent advances have made GIS more powerful, less expensive, and easier to set up and use, especially under field conditions. Through the use of Internet-based tools such as GoogleEarth, data embedded in GIS layers can be made accessible to a wide range of potential partners and can significantly aid co-ordination by establishing a shared situational awareness among all partners, such as a common picture of the geographic and demographic concentrations of armed violence. This in turn can be mapped against other significant events and data. GIS is also helpful for mapping gaps in assessment and survey coverage (Box 4.5).
- *Internet- and radio-based systems for knowledge-sharing* – Blogs, email and Really Simple Syndication (RSS) feeds allow groups and individuals to aggregate and share information online and in real-time. The Internet is already empowering *ad hoc* early warning networks, often referred to as *hastily-formed networks,* in the disaster and crisis response communities, as military, humanitarian and development actors seek real-time information-sharing.[11] In areas where Internet penetration is limited, there are also ample opportunities to introduce communal and two-way radio mechanisms to enhance data collection, information transmission and sensitisation programmes.
- *Emerging tools for data-mining, network-mapping, visualisation and link analysis* – These tools are already used by customs, security and police officials to identify patterns of illicit trade, map the social and economic influence of local and transnational criminal and militant actors, and isolate other risk factors.[12] The identified patterns are then used to target responses. These tools make it possible to combine information from a variety of sources – such as that held by customs, police, border control agencies, national statistics agencies, development actors, telecommunications carriers and banks.

4.1.4 Exploring data gaps and additional data sources

The armed violence lens identifies analytical gaps that require research and analysis. Examples include assessment methods and indicators for measuring the impact on local communities of local and transnational organised crime, the illicit trade in small arms and other commodities, and financial flows. Relevant

11 For further information on hastily formed networks, see http://faculty.nps.edu/dl/HFN/index.htm.

12 Examples of tools for visual analysis of networks can be found at: Analyst's Notebook (I2) http://www.i2.co.uk, Visual Analytics http://www.visualanalytics.com and Palantir http://www.palantirtech.com.

Box 4.5. **Tools for operations, analysis and advocacy: Geographic Information Systems**

GIS is increasingly used by development and humanitarian actors as a means for supporting operations, conducting shared analysis, and advocacy.

In the **West Bank and Gaza**, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance uses GIS to maintain a database of socio-economic and demographic baseline data, plot the location and movement of development workers and projects, map security incidents by militant actors and the Israeli security and defence forces, and track checkpoints and their closures. This system allows a diverse range of development and relief actors to share a common situational awareness and has reduced the need for overlapping assessments.

In Sudan, UNDP's Threat and Risk Mapping and Analysis Project works with local communities to collect information and map security threats and socio-economic risks. These data are pooled with other data collected from a variety of sources, including information about basic service provision, land use, geology, rainfall patterns, suspected minefields, oil and mineral extraction sites, and livestock migration routes. The resulting database is available to all development actors and is actively used to inform programming by identifying priorities for intervention, co-ordination and impact assessment.

GIS is also increasingly used for broader analysis and advocacy. The emergence of inexpensive and easy-to-use tools, devices and platforms such as GoogleEarth has made GIS accessible to a new range of potential users and uses. For example, during the 2006 Lebanon war, GIS – in combination with GoogleEarth – was used by relief agencies and NGOs to map bomb damage and mark areas hit with cluster munitions. These data were used to estimate costs of reconstruction and plan day-to-day operations. In Darfur, the US **"Holocaust Foundation"** prepared a GoogleEarth-based map that provided an interactive atlas of the conflict and its consequences.

In Iraq, GIS has been used to predict areas of heightened militancy and the likely location of improvised explosive devices and ambush sites. This use of GIS brings together data from multiple sources, including community-level perception surveys, household-level data on employment, poverty, ethnicity and political affiliation, and incident reporting. GIS has also been applied to crime prevention in developed economies and is in use by many cities and municipalities for planning policing and other community-level social service, education and employment generation activities.

data sources come from migration services, financial tracking mechanisms, and intelligence from diaspora communities. In fragile contexts and communities affected by high levels of criminal armed violence, these datasets can be critical for addressing the factors affecting community-level insecurity.

To date these data sources and analysis have rarely been incorporated into development practice; the exception is where development interventions have intersected with whole-of-government approaches. The reasons for this are partly the result of bureaucratic cultures. The relationship between development actors and national security institutions is not always a close one: they do not always see the connection between development programming and security sector issues. A close working relationship is not always appropriate to every development context.

National security institutions are also concerned about issues of confidentiality. Such institutions may not openly share information for fear that it may compromise police investigations and related operations. Humanitarian and development actors share similar concerns about the use of information. In insecure situations, humanitarian and development practitioners have been reluctant to share it with the military and security forces active in a country, out of concern for maintaining their neutrality, impartiality and their relationships with local communities. The growth in civil-military relations, such as the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan, is beginning to bridge this military-humanitarian divide.

4.2 Emerging principles for good practice in assessments

Invest in evidence-led approaches to enhance outcomes and "do no harm". Development interventions that enter into the complex dynamics of armed violence risk doing harm if not well conceived. Context-specific knowledge of the key elements and dynamics of armed violence are essential. This requires investments in assessment tools and methods that generate credible and reliable data on local conditions, relationships and perceptions.

Use joint assessments where possible. National/municipal ownership and co-ordination between government agencies and multilateral, bilateral and civil society actors are key considerations when embarking on an armed violence assessment.[13] The most effective approach is led and owned by national actors in co-ordination with donor countries, multilateral organisations, and civil society.

13 Civil society actors include elders associations, women, youth, survivor assistance groups, veterans, community associations and religious organisations. Wherever possible, efforts should be made to also obtain the views of armed non-state actor groups (*e.g.* militias, gangs). While this will likely present political challenges at different levels, these perspectives form an important part of the armed violence equation, and careful engagement may yield promising pathways forward.

In certain situations, joint assessments may be difficult.[14] Likewise, governments may choose to ignore certain sensitive but critical issues. There is an obvious role for civil society to tighten or expand understandings of armed violence.[15]

Ensure assessments capture the people's understanding of their security needs. Assessments should identify to whom specific population groups turn for the provision of justice and security (both public and private). These perspectives are critical for building strategies that strengthen the legitimacy and resilience of fragile states (OECD-DAC, 2007d).

Creatively adapt to the data limitations of different contexts. In deteriorating, fragile and conflict settings, assessments may be limited to strategic conflict assessments, limited hospital-based studies and victimisation and small arms baseline surveys. In *post-conflict and criminal violence situations*, the scope for donor action may be wider. Assessments can potentially draw on a larger range of surveillance- and survey-based sources and instruments.

Invest in strengthening national capacities for data collection, reporting and analysis. Investment should aim to build the capacity of national and community-level criminal and health-reporting surveillance systems that are essential for AVR. Cost-effective systems can also be developed in order to gather and manage data so that they are shared with other institutions and support AVR advocacy campaigns and strategies. One potential way forward is the creation of crime and violence observatories, as has been undertaken in Honduras, Guatemala and other countries.

Combine tools and methods to generate a rich mix of qualitative and quantitative data. This can include the application of conflict assessments in non-conflict countries afflicted by armed violence and the use of the public health approaches to map armed violence in countries emerging from conflict or undergoing transition. It also includes investment in promising analytical techniques and new data sources.

4.3 Implications for monitoring and evaluation

Develop indicators in partnership with local stakeholders. Local stakeholders are best placed to identify appropriate benchmarks of success. Local ownership and engagement can also help to build longer-term capacity for research and advocacy around armed violence issues, and ensure more regular collection of data.

14 The 2008 Accra Declaration commits OECD-DAC members to undertake joint assessments in countries in fragile situations, "to the maximum extent possible".

15 For example, civil society activists can generate appropriate data and perspectives on armed violence, which can provide useful correctives and open up national dialogue, as happened in El Salvador.

Indicators must be context-specific. For example, in some cases, using an indicator that tracks the number of homicides may not be a good indication of the social and economic distortions caused by armed violence. This can be true in territories controlled by organised crime or warlords, where homicide rates can actually decrease as control over the population becomes solidified through the threat of violence alone.

Identify project-specific indicators and benchmarks. This will often require differentiating between micro- and macro-level indicators. In many cases it will be difficult to demonstrate the impact of a single programme on a national homicide rate, because there are too many other factors influencing this rate. However, micro-level indicators – such as the level of crime in the community, the number of participants benefiting from the programme, or changes in the community's perceptions about security – can offer important evidence of the effectiveness of AVR programming at the local level (Box 4.6).

Box 4.6. **AVR programme monitoring indicators from the Viva Rio initiative in Brazil**

The Brazilian NGO Viva Rio prioritised investment in the development and tracking of indicators to monitor and measure armed violence linkages and programming impacts (see Box 5.7 for the full Viva Rio case study). Statistical databases were used to target specific projects and campaigns. Relevant indicators to measure possible risk factors and outcomes included:

- The degree of public support for civilians not carrying guns (tested by national referendum).
- The numbers and types of guns collected.
- Changes in the levels of trust between police and affected communities.
- Use of violence by police in the line of duty.
- The capacity of *favela* associations and organisations to sustain projects when funding ended.
- Attitude changes of target groups and wider society in relation to SALW.
- Changes in the degree of socio-economic exclusion.
- The degree of interaction between project participants, their preparedness to address the multifaceted nature of armed violence, and interventions focused on addressing risk factors, perpetrators and victims.

Chapter 5

Programming Implications and Approaches

This chapter addresses:

- Programming implications: Expanding horizons
  - Conflict, crime and violence prevention
  - Local-level programming
  - Global and regional levels
  - National level
- AVR programming approaches
- Indirect AVR programming: Sensitive and inclusive
- Direct AVR programming
  - Community security and development
  - Urban armed violence and municipal government
  - Armed youth gangs and youth at risk of organised armed violence
- Crime and violence prevention
- Proposed next steps

The AVR approach has distinct implications for development practice. The first section of this chapter signposts some ways in which AVR can contribute to programming at the local, national, regional, and global levels. The second section presents two main programming approaches, direct and indirect.

5.1 Programming implications: Expanding horizons

AVR underscores the need for context-specific understanding of the patterns, causes and dimensions of armed violence. Recognising that multiple factors influence the risk of armed violence, the AVR framework expands programming horizons in a number of directions: *horizontally,* to bring to bear conflict, crime and violence prevention approaches; *upward,* to address the influences of the regional and global levels on national and local dynamics; and *downward,* to involve the local levels (and provide a connection to the national level). At the same time, programming at the national level remains crucial. These expanded horizons are briefly treated below.

Conflict, crime and violence prevention

At the field level, development practitioners are actively exploring the comparative advantages of combining conflict, crime and the public health approaches to violence prevention for AVR. Municipal governments in Latin America and South Africa, for example, are exploring the potential for adapting DDR-type approaches to disarm youth gang members and integrate them back into their communities (Box 5.1).

Local-level programming

AVR emphasises the importance of addressing manifestations of armed violence at the sub-national, local and community levels. This is because armed violence is experienced most directly and immediately by neighbourhoods, communities and households. Municipalities and civil society organisations are frontline partners for AVR programming.

The local level constitutes an active arena for ongoing efforts to reduce and prevent armed violence. Examples of this *direct* AVR programming include efforts to improve and strengthen community security, to reduce urban violence through support for *safe cities,* to address youth gang violence, and to invest in crime and violence prevention. To date, a number of initiatives have demonstrated real potential for sustainable improvements in safety, security and development, as detailed in Section 5.2.2 below.

Box 5.1. Combining conflict and violence prevention in Brazil, Colombia and Bangladesh

Development practitioners are actively exploring the linkages and potential of combining conflict, crime prevention and public health approaches across a range of contexts.

Brazil: The Brazilian government has been exploring the potential of adapting DDR for youth gang members to reduce urban crime and violence. Donor-funded research has supported this effort, which resulted in policy proposals for DMI – Disarmament, Mobilisation and Integration – to be incorporated into Brazil's National Program of Public Security and Citizenship (PRONASCI). Based on emerging DDR best practice, the proposed DMI strategy involves *disarmament* of youth (and society at large), *mobilisation* of the community and society to accept and forgive ex-gang members, and action to ensure their effective *integration* into the social mainstream. The package of DMI proposals ranges from changes in police-youth relations, legislative reform, permanent weapons' collection campaigns and social mobilisation and reconciliation to initiatives that expand alternative opportunities and choices for youth.

Colombia: In Colombia, UNDP launched two violence prevention initiatives that complement the Government's ongoing DDR process – the Urban Security Project (USP) and the Prevention of Youth Recruitment into the Armed Conflict Project (PFR). The USP, modelled on the successes of Bogota's dramatic reduction in homicide and crime levels (70% and 14%, respectively), was exported to three armed violence-affected cities (Medellín, Villavicencio and Pereira). It sought to strengthen local governance capacities for reducing armed violence through a multi-pronged strategy to build awareness, reduce and control small arms and light weapons through voluntary means, and support vulnerable youth at risk. The *PFR* project sought to prevent the forced recruitment of youths by illegal armed groups through the mitigation of key risk factors, including youth unemployment, social exclusion and lack of community cohesion. Due to the extreme sensitivity of these issues, the project was named Promotion of Children's and Youth's Rights. Both projects embodied key aspects of emerging AVR practice, such as community-led vulnerability-mapping to identify risk factors and strengthen protective factors, and strong stakeholder participation at all stages of the process.

Bangladesh: Many multilateral and bilateral donors consider Bangladesh to be a pre-conflict fragile state. The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers used the public health approach to map the risk factors that render children and youth vulnerable to recruitment by armed criminal gangs and as potential future soldiers. High-risk groups include children/youth living in slums or on the street, as well as the internally displaced, refugees, and those previously involved in conflict. The Coalition called on the Bangladeshi government, international and national agencies and donors to engage in preventive action by promoting legislative reform and developing educational and social (re)integration programmes to reduce the vulnerabilities of those at risk of current and future armed violence.

By way of more general observation, an interesting example comes from Somaliland. There, a government-led disarmament effort generated few returns until community members mobilised to enforce community norms concerning the display of weapons (Box 5.2). In this instance, the community applied its moral authority to signal their support for central government, and then took concrete action to effectively disarm the armed actors. Overall, this community-based support worked to reinforce and extend the legitimacy and authority of national security sector institutions (police and army). For donors, the Somaliland experience highlights the importance of community-based initiative and mobilisation for effective and sustainable AVR outcomes. It underlines the merits of looking closely at the community level and the enticing prospects for promoting "bottom-up" security in a way that also strengthens the legitimacy and resilience of the state.

Global and regional levels

AVR highlights the importance of regional and global influences that can shape and fuel more localised forms of armed violence. Some of these influences are beyond the scope and mandate of development donor intervention and require law enforcement and policy dialogue/diplomatic efforts, or synchronised whole-of-government responses.[1] Others, however, are amenable to external development initiatives. For example, in countries and regions where armed violence is linked to a large pool of unemployed youth, donors and development banks could work to support the creation of jobs in light industry or agriculture (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2008).

A number of international conventions and agreements target different aspects of armed violence – from risk factors like arms and narcotics – to the protection of human rights and vulnerable groups, and a culture of peace (see Box 5.3 and Annex B). These multilateral agreements can offer entry points for donors to:

- Support national governments in upholding, implementing and strengthening existing global and regional norms and measures.
- Engage national and regional partners in a dialogue about armed violence, its causes and its consequences.
- Contribute to building the capacity of civil society to advocate for national adherence to and implementation of these measures, and to explore how these measures can be used to encourage armed violence reduction in specific contexts.

[1] See Box 3.5 above on the synchronisation of whole-of-government efforts.

Box 5.2. **Community-based AVR: Bottom-up disarmament in Somaliland**

When the Somali National Movement (SNM) came to power in the early 1990s, large quantities of weapons remained in the hands of the civilian population. Armed young men quickly established new clan-based militias and bandit "deydey" gangs. While the former had some legitimacy in the eyes of the people, being seen as clan defence organisations, the latter preyed on the civilian population and were viewed as criminals. Both types of groups extorted taxes from the civilian population and in practice were often indistinguishable.

The SNM's embryonic police and army were incapable of dealing with either the clan militias or the "deydey" bandits, and unable to establish law and order. Crime, shoot-outs and an atmosphere of armed terror and impunity pervaded Somaliland.

The new government formally announced a disarmament and integration process but lacked the capacity and authority to implement it. Instead, a popular community-based effort involving traders, civil society groups, traditional and religious leaders, women's groups and female kiosk traders successfully mounted a "NO GUN" campaign, in which men with guns were shunned, heckled on the streets and refused services. Poets and musicians joined the campaign with public anti-gun performances while sheiks preached against the carrying of weapons at Friday mosque.

In a matter of weeks this campaign cleared the streets of weapons and created sufficient popular pressure to persuade clan militias to disarm and join the national security forces. To this day, although Somaliland has not formally disarmed and few personal weapons have actually been collected, guns are seldom if ever seen in public. The new national police and army remain, in the public eye, the only legitimate persons entitled to carry weapons.

Source: Brickhill, 2008.

At the global level, two risk factors are especially relevant in shaping patterns and outcomes of armed violence: arms transfers and transnational organised crime.

There is an important role for OECD-DAC members with respect to arms transfers and trafficking. Significant exporters of arms and ammunition to developing countries bear an important responsibility to ensure that the weapons do not end up fuelling violence or undermining sustainable

development.[2] A useful entry point relates to the tightening of arms export and import controls and stockpile management and destruction. With respect to drug trafficking, donor countries that are experiencing significant consumption or use of trafficked goods (*e.g.* narcotics, exploitable resources) can also take action to reduce domestic demand and tighten domestic controls.

With respect to organised and transnational organised crime, recent innovations such as the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) offer promising models (Box 5.4). However, existing approaches for dealing with organised crime tend to isolate it as a phenomenon that is somehow divorced from the local context (Cockayne and Pfister, 2008). By contrast, the armed violence lens draws attention to the local conditions and risk factors that can encourage the penetration and entrenchment of organised crime and illicit markets at the local level. Development actors are well-placed to grasp these local manifestations, as well as the potential local-level repercussions of efforts to eradicate organised crime. Their efforts can provide important complements to higher-level diplomatic and law enforcement initiatives to address organised crime.

There is a need to further *develop global norms around a shared understanding of armed violence* – its negative development and governance effects, the factors that fuel it, strategies to reduce and prevent it, and appropriate donor responses.

National level

In line with Paris Principles and the Accra Declaration, alignment with national responses to armed violence is essential to ensure their effectiveness and sustainability. This may not always be possible, given that many situations of armed violence, as this report has made clear, signal a fragile situation.[3] However, the national level is important for setting the tone, generating widespread understanding of the problem and the response, and directly implementing strategies, policies and laws, or creating an enabling environment at the local level where this can take place. National ownership is vital for the sustainability of efforts, including successes achieved at the local level.

2 See for example the OAS Code of Conduct, the NADI Framework and the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports.

3 As such, the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations apply. See discussion in Annex A of this paper.

Box 5.3. Global and regional instruments relevant to armed violence reduction

Numerous international conventions and agreements support efforts to reduce and prevent armed violence. These agreements offer important entry points for encouraging national action.

At the global level, many conventions and commitments provide for the protection of human rights (*e.g.* the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, conventions on the rights of women and children), put forward goals for social and economic development,[4] address the instruments of violence,[5] emphasise good practices,[6] and tackle risk factors for violence.[7]

Existing regional measures target key risk factors for armed violence, such as small arms. These measures can function to both reduce specific risk factors and open new entry points for a broadened AVR approach. The number of regional instruments is growing (see Annex B). Importantly, regional measures to reduce the opportunities for the illicit trade in small arms and drugs and for organised crime generate openings for:

- Co-ordinated cross-border action.
- Regional dialogue to better understand the regional dimensions of armed violence.
- Regional dialogue on issues of organised crime, illicit flows of goods and money laundering, and on the prospects for enhanced intelligence-sharing and co-ordinated action on these issues.
- More comprehensive domestic reform to enhance controls over small arms (*e.g.* training of customs and border guards, improved stockpile management).
- Regional and national dialogue concerning the need to address domestic *demand* for arms.

4 For example, the MDGs.

5 For example, the UN Programme of Action and the Landmine Treaty.

6 For example, the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, and the OSCE principles on SALW.

7 For example, the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, UN Convention Against Corruption, and resolutions on child soldiers.

Box 5.4. **International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala**

The International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) is being hailed as a groundbreaking effort through which the international community is assisting a national government to curtail armed violence, protect human rights and strengthen the rule of law. It promises to help the Guatemalan government investigate and prosecute organised crime and the illegal armed groups that plague the country.

Guatemala's 36-year civil war, which killed some 200 000 people, ended in 1996. Since that time high levels of violent crime and vigilante justice (including that committed by police and prison guards) continue to pose a serious challenge to the country, with illegal security organisations penetrating the government, rivalling its power and benefiting from a post-war culture of impunity (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, forthcoming).

Recognising the limitations of Guatemala's judicial institutions to cope with this legacy, Guatemala's Human Rights Ombudsman Sergio Fernand o Morales Alvarado first posed the idea of an international commission in 2003. This eventually led to the establishment of the UN-led CICIG, which was ratified by Guatemala's Congress in 2007.

The Commission is tasked with investigating crimes committed by criminal structures and clandestine security organisations that threaten civil and political rights in the country and undermine the rule of law. It will also work to strengthen the capacity of government institutions, such as the public prosecutor's office, the police and the judiciary, to dismantle clandestine organisations.

Source: Green, 2007.

National-level strategies across a wide range of sectors can play an important role in AVR – provided they are informed by solid awareness of, and information on, the context-specific risk factors for, and effects of, armed violence. Examples of relevant sectors and issue areas include: poverty reduction, rural and urban development, youth, employment, gender equality, health, education, various aspects of governance (including public sector reform, public or national safety and security, decentralisation, corruption, SSR), crime reduction and protection of vulnerable groups, *inter alia*.

The national level also offers the opportunity to bring together development and security actors around a common vision of the context-specific dimensions of armed violence, to develop a cross-sector agenda for action. The security system is central for sustainable results – from the police, judicial and penal systems through to intelligence, customs and border controls.

So too are ministries of health, education, social welfare, youth, labour/employment, agriculture and others.

While whole-of-government perspectives and action are essential for sustained and effective AVR, international development actors are well aware of the challenges they face within their own bureaucracies around such efforts. These include the lingering divide between security and development agencies, interdepartmental competition and isolation, and the substantial transaction costs associated with inter- and intra-donor co-ordination.

Whole-of-government challenges are magnified in developing countries affected by chronic violence. They are rendered more intractable by lack of resources and institutional capacity among partners, intense and personalised inter-ministerial competition between politicised entities, and, in some cases, endemic nepotism and corruption. There are no easy solutions. National commissions or interministerial/departmental co-ordinating mechanisms can be effective, provided they are invested with sufficient resources and convening power to be taken seriously.

Two common national mechanisms – National Development Strategies [including Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs)] and National Security Strategies – offer the potential for broadened perspectives on, and responses to, armed violence.

National development frameworks (including PRSPs) can help prioritise various risk factors for armed violence within government and donor planning and budgeting.[8] The inception phase provides an opportunity for more inclusive public debate on armed violence issues, and identifying and responding to the security needs of local populations. This can open discussion to address the multiple interlocking factors that fuel armed violence, and the importance of integrated, multi-sector responses. There are several factors that need to be addressed in order to ensure that AVR priorities are integrated into national development frameworks and PRSPs:

- Ensuring meaningful civil society participation in the process – especially that of the most vulnerable communities and populations affected by armed violence. This includes community consultation, but also ensuring that vulnerable groups (including women and youth) are provided with the capacity, access, confidence and security to speak.

8 A small but growing number of countries are moving in this direction. For example, Uganda and Sierra Leone have incorporated a specific security "pillar" in their PRSPs. In Burundi, security is aligned within the governance pillar. Some countries that have developed a National Action Plan on Small Arms and Light Weapons are also integrating this within their PRSP.

- Ensuring that ministries and departments that are typically excluded in national development or PRSP discussions and processes (such as those associated with the security sector) are involved in defining the agenda.
- Signalling sensitive issues, including the role of certain actors that are deeply implicated in armed violence, such as conflicts between groups, together with government corruption, legitimacy failures, state or para-state involvement in armed violence and/or public connections to organised and informal criminal groups.

External development actors can help with the first two challenges by providing technical assistance and the evidence base to ensure armed violence issues are broadly considered. This may also stimulate wider social mobilisation against violence and toward more co-operative engagement to tackle the factors contributing to armed violence.[9]

National or public security strategies can also provide the basis for co-ordinating whole-of-government responses to reduce armed violence (Box 5.5). Development actors can contribute technical support to encourage a consultative process that includes those communities most affected by armed violence, and the collection of evidence that illuminates the underlying developmental problems that feed armed violence. The evidence base could include lessons learned from other contexts, programmes, and responses.

For example, certain interventions that combine "law and order" activities (*e.g.* intelligence-led interventions, forcible weapons seizures, and increased policing presence) with preventive and developmental strategies targeting key risk factors (*e.g.* gun availability, alcohol and narcotics abuse) and strengthening protective factors (*e.g.* education and health promotion for high-risk households, recreation alternatives and livelihood support, access to legitimate justice mechanisms) are good examples. So too are the recent experiences of certain community – and municipal-based interventions.

Development actors have acted as effective sponsors of country-based armed violence research, working variously in partnership with NGOs, community-based organisations, academic institutions and governments. In some cases, these efforts have directly catalysed government action on AVR, as in El Salvador (Box 19). Development actors can also play a vital role in building national capacity for armed violence-related data collection, management and processing, which is important for local ownership and sustained national responses.

9 The specific role of donors and development agencies in relation to the latter challenges will likely be determined on a case-by-case basis.

5.2 AVR programming approaches

Development programming in or on situations of armed violence involves high stakes, given the complexity and the potential to do harm. As such, it is important that development programming be *AVR-sensitive*. This requires programming to be informed by an understanding of armed violence dynamics, risk factors and effects in order to avoid exacerbating any of these elements. It is now standard recommended practice to review *all* development programming with a conflict-sensitive lens, such as the Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (OECD-DAC, 2001, 2008c).

Early analysis can help development practitioners avoid generating negative and unintentional consequences. Examples include ensuring that the provision of clean drinking water does not aggravate inter-pastoral or pastoral-local community tensions; understanding when a disarmament programme might render a community vulnerable to attack by other armed groups; and identifying when development assistance provided to one group (*e.g.* refugees or ex-combatants) can exacerbate tensions between that group and the broader community. Conflict-sensitive approaches can easily be adapted to non-conflict situations in order to anticipate how development interventions can potentially reduce (or exacerbate) armed violence.

Box 5.5. National and "citizen" security strategies in Jamaica and Brazil

In **Jamaica,** the British, Canadian and US governments provided joint technical assistance toward the development of the National Security Strategy. The strategy includes a comprehensive range of reform programmes – including changes in the division of responsibilities between Jamaican police and defence forces, a review of the criminal justice and legislative systems, reform of intelligence systems, a dismantling of organised crime organisations, and local crime prevention and community development projects in target neighbourhoods (OECD-DAC, 2007d).

In **Brazil,** the 2007 National Programme for Public Security with Citizenship (PRONASCI) seeks to reduce armed violence by co-ordinating public security and social policies in partnership with various federal, state and municipal government bodies as well as with civil society. The approach includes improvement in public and prison security, strengthened measures to fight organised crime and corruption, and a critical preventive/rehabilitative focus on young adults who are at risk of committing crimes or who have already offended. The effort is supported by multidisciplinary teams, including social workers, psychologists, educators and other specialists.

Analysis for AVR sensitivity requires the input and perspectives of local actors and beneficiaries. This should not be a one-time assessment. An impact review should be conducted when decisions are made about the programming portfolio for a country or city, when programmes and projects are designed and planned, and after these programmes and projects are implemented. The analysis should be conducted at the national level, as well as at the level of programme implementation.

Beyond AVR sensitivity, programming can be:

- *Direct* – meaning programming that specifically targets the reduction and prevention of armed violence and its effects. AVR direct programming is where some of the newer programming approaches are presently emerging.

Box 5.6. **Using evidence to mobilise government action on armed violence in El Salvador**

In El Salvador, evidence of the costs and development impacts of armed violence was leveraged by civil society to mobilise the government into action. The resulting policies and actions contributed to a significant drop in armed violence levels in certain critically affected areas.

In 2003, a broad-based coalition – Society Without Violence (SWV) – undertook a comprehensive and ground-breaking assessment of the costs, impacts and sources of armed violence in 2003. Financed by UNDP, the Firearms and Violence study mustered compelling data on the magnitude of the problem, as well as its sources and priorities for intervention; this drew strong media attention.

On the basis of the evidence, the SWV worked with the National Council for Public Security to successfully lobby government. By 2006, the Ministry of Security had enacted significantly tighter controls on firearms registration, ownership and carrying. It also imposed a firearms tax, the proceeds of which are being used to expand health services and coverage. In addition, the Ministry passed a decree allowing municipalities to restrict the ability of civilians to carry arms in public, which contributed to a significant decline in armed crime and homicide rates in at least two of the most violence municipalities (San Martin and Ilopango).

The compelling evidence base also helped SWV to lobby the government to establish a National Commission on Citizen Security and Social Peace, whose members represent five political parties, university rectors, private sector representatives, religious actors and others. The Commission was tasked with creating a shared vision around locally appropriate strategies to reduce and prevent armed violence. In 2007, the Commission released a report with some 75 proposals for AVR.

- *Indirect* – meaning development programming streams that are not focused solely on reducing or preventing armed violence, but which mainstream AVR elements so that programming is AVR-sensitive *and* includes AVR sub-goals.

Both approaches are elaborated below. It is important to note, however, that the distinctions between *direct* and *indirect* programming are not always clear-cut.[10]

5.2.1 Indirect AVR programming: Sensitive and inclusive

Indirect AVR programming refers to programmes that do not target AVR as their primary objective. Rather, their main target will be other development objectives, such as reducing poverty or improving governance. However, if they are AVR-sensitive, they will also see opportunities to reduce risks and enhance protective factors. As such, they **incorporate** certain AVR priorities by including specific AVR sub-goals. For example, an urban renewal programme for a particular city could also seek to address slums affected by chronic violence as a key element of the overall programme. Alternatively, a public health education programme for a given district could include modules on mine risk, gun violence, domestic violence and gender-based violence.

Indirect programming often targets the deep-rooted structural, institutional and/or cultural factors that can feed armed violence. Examples of these factors include: socio-economic (horizontal) inequalities; social or political exclusion; widespread unemployment; governance challenges or failures; weak, ineffective or corrupt public security institutions; corruption and cultures of impunity; rapid and unplanned urbanisation; resource scarcity and environmental degradation that compromises livelihoods; unequal gender relations; and cultures of violence. However, indirect programming can also target armed violence *effects* and known *risk factors*. Established programming streams that are particularly suitable for integrating AVR sub-goals include: poverty reduction, governance, SSR, health and education, gender and the environment.

By way of example, Table 5.1 provides examples of indicative indirect programming in relation to health and education programming. Programming options are disaggregated according to the armed violence lens – people,

10 For example, a security system reform initiative may be direct or indirect depending on how it is configured and targeted. Similarly, a mine-action programme may be mainstreamed within a poverty reduction initiative (indirect programming), while also yielding direct and measurable impacts on the reduction and prevention of armed violence.

perpetrators, instruments and institutions. Note, however, that the relevance, appropriateness and precise formulation of these linkages will vary by context. Additional examples of indicative indirect AVR programming in the areas of poverty reduction, governance, SSR and the environment can be found in Annex C.

5.2.2 Direct AVR programming

Direct AVR programming seeks to explicitly prevent and/or reduce armed violence, and enhance real and perceived security. Direct programming targets those risk and causal factors that, if effectively diagnosed, can yield a measurable decrease in armed violence and mitigate negative effects. A typical AVR programme would include, for example, a gun-free zone established by public authorities and communities in order to generate a clear reduction in homicidal violence and victimisation according to defined geographic, temporal and demographic criteria.

The conceptual and operational parameters of direct AVR programming are emerging from ongoing programming in the field. Many direct AVR interventions are beginning to yield important directions for future programming. While systematic documentation and evaluation of these activities is still required, it is already clear that most direct AVR programmes share the following organisational principles:

- A rigorous diagnostic of local context using multiple methods and data sources.
- Local ownership and leadership.
- A bottom-up perspective on security.
- An understanding of the multifaceted and multi-level nature of armed violence.
- The introduction of multi-sector and multi-level responses that address elements and interrelationships captured by the armed violence lens.
- Attention to preventive action (in addition to reduction) by identifying and responding to risk factors.

By way of example, Box 5.7 presents the Viva Rio effort in Brazil, which has been operating for over a decade and has evolved towards an exemplar AVR approach.

Table 5.1. **Health and education: Examples of AVR programming sub-components**

Elements of Lens	Indicative examples
People	• Education and public health-related efforts (at all levels) to raise awareness of the costs and impacts of armed violence, mine risk, cultures of violence, gender relations, gender-based violence, human rights, culture of peace (risk and protective factors) • Programmes to ensure the equal access of girls to schooling and to prevent girls from dropping out (risk factors) • Assistance to armed violence victims, including outreach to victims of domestic and gender-based violence (effects and risk factors) • Ensuring safe access to, and delivery of, education and health services to areas and populations that are excluded, and/or experiencing/at risk of armed violence (structural and risk factors) • Education- and health-related programmes that encourage social cohesion and community development (protective factors)
Perpetrators	• Early childhood education, and development of primary school curricula that encourage nonviolent resolution of disputes (risk factors) • Programmes to improve the educational prospects for at-risk children and youth, especially those likely to result in viable employment (risk factors) • Health and education programmes to reduce and prevent domestic violence and gender-based violence (risk factors)
Instruments	• Education- and public health-related efforts (at all levels) to raise awareness of the costs and impacts of armed violence, mine risk, cultures of violence, gender relations, gender-based violence, human rights, culture of peace (risk and protective factors)
Institutions	• Building public health systems' capacities for violence and crime reporting (data collection, analysis, reporting) (institutional capacity for improved response) • Building public health systems' capacities and outreach for improved reporting on domestic and gender-based violence (institutional capacity for improved response) • Reform of educational curricula to nurture a culture of peace, gender equality, respect of difference, peacebuilding and social inclusion (structural and risk factors)

To date, the bulk of programming experimentation is focused on (or originates from) the local level and/or specific themes and approaches. The latter also correspond to some of the programming gaps outlined in Chapter 2 above. For the purpose of this paper, four of these newer areas are outlined, along with some illustrative examples: community security; urban security and work with municipalities; youth gangs and armed violence; and armed violence and crime prevention.

Box 5.7. **Direct AVR programming in Brazil**

Rio de Janeiro is one of the wealthiest cities in Brazil. It also suffers from extreme income inequality and high levels of armed violence, which are concentrated in its illegal slums, or *favelas*. The *favelas* suffer from social exclusion, stigmatisation, a lack of state services and protective presence and *de facto* control by heavily armed drug factions. The main perpetrators and victims of armed violence are drug traffickers, gang members and the police, with some one million citizens caught in the crossfire.

Viva Rio, a local NGO founded in 1993, initiated a programme with a fairly narrow focus on raising awareness, public mobilisation, and gun control. This initiative eventually broadened out to include gender issues, specifically targeted programmes directed at youth, legislative campaigns, policing reforms, and community development work in the *favelas*. By 2005 Viva Rio was active in 82 municipalities, and partnered with educational institutes, community associations, community radio stations, NGOs, churches, police units and penitentiaries.

In 2003, Viva Rio's disarmament campaign helped to push through a new gun law (the Disarmament Statute). This law, in combination with a voluntary gun turn-in campaign, is considered largely responsible for a 12% drop in the number of gun deaths in Brazil between 2004 and 2006.

Viva Rio's experience demonstrates the importance of the following programming elements:

1. *Diagnosis.* A public health approach was used to map armed violence risk and protective factors. This was combined with contextual analysis of the historical, structural and cultural factors motivating armed violence. Factors included: chaotic urbanisation; exclusion; the lack of non-drug-related economic opportunities; the failure of the state to provide services or guarantee public security; a violent and corrupt police force; an ineffective judiciary and penal system; the social, economic and protective status offered by gang membership; cultural factors such as *"machismo";* and the widespread availability of guns and drugs with linkages to transnational crime.

Box 5.7. **Direct AVR programming in Brazil (*continued*)**

2. *Local ownership and capacity.* The programmes required flexibility and a home-grown capacity to conduct research and analysis to respond to the openings offered by a newly developing political and social environment.

3. *An integrated approach to programming that addressed the interrelated aspects of gun violence in Rio.* Viva Rio attests that no single programming focus would, by itself, have worked. Instead, it was the combination of community development, youth programming, policing reform, legislative change, and political mobilisation that together contributed to the reduction in armed violence. The armed violence lens highlights how specific programmes contributed to addressing each of the four elements of the lens:

   - **Perpetrators:** A focus on poor, young males (15 to 24 years of age) who have not completed primary school. Programming includes: income generation and job access, education and recreation, and conflict mediation.
   - **Institutions:** Police training and reform, improvement of police-community relations, the federal and state judiciary**,** and legislation to reduce the availability of weapons. A culture of violence is addressed through a sophisticated communications strategy, conflict mediation centres and free legal aid.
   - **Instruments:** Voluntary gun collection and successful advocacy for the national Disarmament Statute.
   - **People:** Awareness-raising, social mobilisation, community development work.
   - **Levels:** Community projects are located within the *favelas*, with staff from the same community. Local-level pilot initiatives in social inclusion and police reform have been carried up to the national level and mainstreamed by the state.

4. **Time frame.** It took ten years for Viva Rio to register clear, quantifiable evidence of success (a drop in the annual rate of gun deaths in Rio). Activities needed to be structured and funded on a long-term, flexible and sustainable basis.

5. **Evidence.** A key objective was to develop indicators to monitor and measure armed violence linkages and programming impacts. Statistical databases are used to support projects and campaigns.

Source: Boueri, 2008; Jackman, 2007; De Carvalho and Correa, 2007; Centre for International Cooperation and Security, 2005; and World Bank, 2004.

Community security and development

Community-based approaches to reducing armed violence in both urban and rural areas offer promising entry points for direct AVR programming. Community-based AVR is attractive because:

- Baseline data can be more detailed and adopt locally grounded perspectives.[11]
- Local ownership can be readily established.
- Community leaders tend to be closer to local populations, and potentially more responsive to their needs.
- Success can be more clearly identified and replicated.

As an emerging practice area, community safety and security programming puts ordinary local residents in the lead. Such interventions facilitate their ability to identify their own security needs, formulate and implement appropriate responses, and design and track indicators of success. Programming examples, while not evaluated, are emerging across a wide variety of contexts.[12] Box 5.8 considers typical features of a community-based direct AVR programme, viewed through the armed violence lens. Box 5.9 provides an example from Macedonia.

Community sensitisation and mobilisation around AVR can be an important first step for engaging local and national government action – as both the Viva Rio and El Salvador examples, cited above, demonstrate.[13] Beyond this, community involvement can be an essential ingredient for achieving and sustaining effective AVR interventions regardless of the level at which they are initiated.

Urban armed violence and municipal government

A growing number of urban areas are afflicted by high levels of armed violence. With the number and size of urban areas and urban slums projected to rise, especially in the developing world, the potential for escalating incidence of armed violence poses a significant concern for many governments. As a result, urban-centred AVR is emerging as an important priority.

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11 Such data can focus on, *inter alia*, attitudes and security requirements; cultural factors; the community's relationship to the perpetrators of violence and to the formal institutions of public security; existing security providers; and risk factors and local protective factors.

12 These include UK-NGO Saferworld's and the UNDP-supported SEESAC initiatives together with non-government-led initiatives in Latin America. See, for example, Saferworld, 2006.

13 The Viva Rio example is in Box 5.7; El Salvador is in Box 5.6.

Box 5.8. Community-based programming, viewed through the armed violence lens

People	*Stakeholder involvement* – with community members centrally involved in the development of community security initiatives.
	People-centred diagnostics – assessments focusing on the community's real and perceived security needs.
	Social mobilisation and awareness-raising – including educational campaigns to address cultures of violence and gender relations.
	Assistance to victims of armed violence – including improving access to justice for victims of gender-based violence.
	Improving the security of the community environment – for example introducing street lighting or neighbourhood watch programmes.
Perpetrators	*Targeting actual or potential perpetrators* with special educational, recreational and alternative livelihood programmes. Many have a focus on youth.
Instruments	*Controlling the instruments of violence,* with initiatives ranging from weapons amnesties to voluntary collections, weapons-for-development initiatives, gun-free zones and other efforts to put guns beyond use.
Institutions	*Strengthening existing community security, justice and protective factors* and informal institutions that can guard against armed violence.
	Building trust between communities and local authorities – including the police, other security providers and sometimes the private sector. Some also expand to directly include the formal participation of governance structures and authorities.

Box 5.9. **Safer communities: A promising AVR approach**

In the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, crime rates fell by 70% in nine communities that hosted Safer Community Projects (SCP). SCP, an initiative of UNDP and the South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) has proved its ability to achieve measurable, high-impact AVR outcomes. SCP's success lies in its strong community ownership and comprehensive approach. Key programming features include the following:

1. *Community perception surveys capture people's perceptions of security, attitudes toward arms, and opinions on possible interventions.* The results are used to shape intervention strategies and programme design.

2. *Local expertise improves analysis of the sources and motivations for armed violence within communities.*

3. *Raising grass-roots awareness builds buy-in.* Programming seeks to change attitudes and behaviour through advocacy, risk education and public information on small arms issues and effects.

4. *Communities identify the key security issues themselves, and participate in programme design and implementation.* Local authorities and police are encouraged to take the lead by establishing strategic partnerships involving public organisations, the private sector and voluntary bodies.

5. *Quick impact projects yield immediate safety improvements, build confidence and encourage buy-in.*

6. *Linkages to wider development activities often focus on risk education and public information to improve perceptions of human security.*

7. *Linkages to public collection of weapons by way of "local amnesties" arranged by appropriate authorities.* SCPs are most effective when considered during the strategic and operational planning phases of small arms and light weapons control programmes.

8. Strong monitoring and evaluation dimensions capture positive impacts and results, while also serving as a "village early warning system".

SCPs are backed up by Safer Community Plans, which provide guidance on project design, implementation and monitoring and evaluation.[14]

14 The SCP toolkit can be found at: http://www.seesac.org.

Municipal-based programmes – often called "safer city" or "citizen security" programmes – have achieved tangible improvements in the reduction of armed crime and violence. They often combine a reliance on community involvement in planning and implementing responses with the added benefit of the direct engagement and leadership of local structures of governance (Box 5.8). Mayors and local authorities in particular are often well placed to lead and co-ordinate integrated policy and programmatic efforts that target the specific security needs of their constituents, through:

- *Policy development,* including developing public security plans; specifying the types of crime and violence that are to be the objects of public policy; identifying the risk factors for the types of crime and violence that can be addressed through prevention programmes; and integrating the police as part of the solution, in co-ordination with other authorities and community agencies.
- *Establishing and enforcing public ordinances* that target key risk factors, for example, instituting night-time curfews and early closure of bars, and tightening controls on the public display of weapons.
- *Initiating urban renewal schemes* with an emphasis on improving the living environment, such as through the provision of parks and recreation, public lighting and electrification, and the presence of government in violence affected areas.
- *Enhancing municipal service delivery,* including access to water and sanitation, waste collection, low-income housing, public transport, early childhood education, youth programming, revenue collection, health programmes, and enforcement of local ordinances. These efforts improve the urban environment and the quality of life. Many of these services also target risk factors for armed violence, and are recognised elements of cross-sector crime and violence prevention strategies.
- *Building institutional capacity for sustained AVR action,* such as improved and systemised data collection, reporting and analysis of risk factors for armed violence, and interagency co-ordination in support of cross-sector strategies.

Box 5.10. **Urban AVR programming, viewed through the armed violence lens**

People	*Encouraging stakeholder involvement and people-centred diagnostics of insecurity* by using tools like victimisation surveys, safety audits, environmental assessments and stakeholder consultations. Some also employ public health and crime data to map the spatial and demographic distributions of armed violence. Community members and local authorities are centrally involved in the development of community security plans.
	Improving the security of the urban environment, by removing opportunities for particular crime and violence problems. In the language of crime prevention, this cluster of activities is called *situational prevention,* and includes approaches such as Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED). *Improved service delivery,* especially to areas at risk.
	Assistance to victims and potential victims (groups at risk).
Perpetrators	*Actions aimed at groups at risk.* In some cases, this includes direct engagement of youth gang members (see next theme in this section), and/or programmes for at-risk youth. In crime prevention, this cluster of activities is called *social prevention.*
Instruments	*Controlling the instruments of violence* through improved policing and enforcing public ordinances, usually backed up by community mobilisation and participation.
Institutions	*Law enforcement and judicial/policing reform* with measures to improve access to justice, including restorative justice, alternative dispute resolution, legal aid, community policing and gun control.
	Reform and capacity-building for improved service delivery to affected communities.
	Institutional outreach to improve community trust in local authorities and institutions. This can extend to institutional reform at the city level to encourage participatory crime prevention approaches, with safety incorporated as a cross-cutting issue for all departments of local government, the criminal justice system and civil society.[15]

15 This is stressed by UN-Habitat's Safer Cities Programme. Self-initiated municipal initiatives (as in much of Latin America) may be more restricted, although most efforts stress improved relations with, and the participation of, local communities.

Box 5.11. **Armed violence in an urban context: The Medellín case**

Between 1991 and 2006, Colombia experienced a tenfold drop in armed violence. Success was due to broad-based activity that combined intensive action against organised crime with targeted development strategies. An important innovation was the municipality of Medellín's Programme for the Prevention of Violence in the Medellín Metropolitan Area (PREVIVA).

In the 1990s, Colombia's rates of armed violence were among the highest in the world. Some 15 000-20 000 people were killed in crime and 1 500-2 000 in conflict, with monumental costs to productivity, investment and public confidence in governance. At least 90% of all violent deaths were committed by firearms.

In Medellín, a combination of narco-trafficking and paramilitary and guerrilla violence contributed to the extremely high homicide rate of 381 per 100 000 in 1991, compared to a national average of 82 per 100 000. By 2006, that rate dropped by more than 90%. This decline was due to a number of factors, including nationally led coercive actions against organised crime; the disarmament and demobilisation of paramilitaries since 2003 and their integration into local structures and markets; and other developmental interventions led by faith-based and private sector groups, as well as Medellín's PREVIVA strategy launched in 2004.

PREVIVA's multi-sector approach was grounded in collaboration between municipal governments and communities. A central goal was to increase the absorptive capacity of areas that were to receive demobilised gang members, and to increase people's confidence in government. PREVIVA's strategy included integrated action related to:

- **People:** civic awareness campaigns and plans, which set clear benchmarks for reducing homicide and assault levels.
- **Perpetrators:** interventions with gang members; preventive action focused on at-risk youth, with programming from early childhood aggression reduction to increased access to higher education, as well as the stimulation of alternative labour options and micro enterprise.
- **Instruments:** weapons recovery programmes sought to change attitudes toward weapon ownership and use.
- **Institutions:** strengthening relations between police and communities; enhancing the efficiency and transparency of municipal institutions designed to redress conflict; and municipal "pacts" to encourage a culture of legality.

Box 5.11. **Armed violence in an urban context: The Medellín case (*continued*)**

PREVIVA was backed up by two important innovations:

An armed violence database, which mapped the intensity, concentrations and demographics of armed violence using available crime and health-related data as well as information from victimisation surveys, which also identified risk and protective factors for armed violence. The user-friendly database was consulted by municipalities and communities for planning, awareness-raising and advocacy activities.

Inter-sector joint action committees, formed through participatory consultations and formalised by Mayoral decree, which guided the planning, monitoring and evaluation of PREVIVA activities and outcomes.

Source: Duque, 2007.

The engagement of municipalities and public authorities can be triggered by community-based mobilisation around AVR, or by the demonstrated successes and advocacy of community-based AVR initiatives. In Brazil, for example, public safety and security issues are traditionally handled at the national or state level. However, intense public pressure in that country resulted in interventions at all levels of government, with marked successes at the municipal level. Likewise, UN-Habitat's Safer Cities Initiative has helped catalyse and shape municipal crime and violence prevention strategies in Africa, Asia, eastern Europe and Latin America.[16] Box 5.10 considers typical features of an urban direct AVR programme, viewed through the armed violence lens.

Despite the promising results of municipal-led AVR, few multilateral and bilateral donors are partnering directly with municipalities. Rather, donors are still primarily equipped to channel assistance through national authorities and institutions or through NGOs. This presents a bureaucratic constraint to supporting local-level partners, since aid investments are approved and accounted for through national treasuries and ministries of finance.

Precedents are emerging for overcoming this donor bias toward national institutions. The World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) have been leaders in this regard. For example, during the 1990s, Bogota, Cali, and Medellín each received loans from IADB to finance specific interventions focusing on armed violence reduction. Loans were guaranteed by the national government, but secured, managed, and repaid at the city

16 See the UN-Habitat Safer Cities website, http://staging.unchs.org/programmes/safercities/projects.asp.

level. IADB later approved more than USD 150 million in citizen security loans to Uruguay and other countries (Box 5.11).

Targeted technical assistance and support can help municipal-level AVR initiatives overcome important capacity gaps. Common factors inhibiting more effective engagement in direct AVR include weak financial or technical capacity, limited capacity to collaborate with different levels of government, and the susceptibility to corruption of local-level initiatives. Assistance with forging linkages at higher levels of government is especially important in order to ensure the sustainability of municipal-level AVR initiatives.

National governments can provide a wider enabling environment for the sustainability of municipal-level successes. This includes supportive policies, cross-sector co-ordination and the provision of resources. Specifically:

- Reduction of overcrowding in urban slums requires national policies targeting rural underdevelopment.
- Community policing efforts need to be backed up by reform, co-ordination and standards set at higher levels.
- Arms availability requires national legislative efforts, accountable enforcement capacities, and effective customs and border controls.
- Scaling up pilot projects and urban safety initiatives require national government co-ordination and assistance.[17]

National-local linkages are also critical from a state-building perspective. This is because effective municipal interventions can restore the population's faith in the legitimacy and effectiveness of governance. Municipal efforts that connect with provincial and national levels can strengthen the perceived legitimacy of the state in the eyes of the citizenry (see Box 5.12). Those that do not can make cities centres of competition for become competing centres of power and legitimacy.

Armed youth gangs and youth at risk of organised armed violence

Armed youth gangs are often the motivating factor for community and municipal mobilisation to reduce armed violence. Youth gangs are highly differentiated in their origins, degrees of hierarchy and organisation, and their various connections to organised crime, transnational crime, the wider community, and political parties and governments. In certain instances, gangs themselves may have evolved precisely to fill "insecurity voids" owing to a lack of legitimate public security provision.

17 International Conference on State of Safety in World Cities, Monterrey, Mexico, 2007.

Gangs are complex organisations that often change motivations and adopt new structures over time. Very generally, gangs can be:

- Strongly linked to their communities, serving as neighbourhood watch and self-defence groups. In some cases, such gangs may evolve into more predatory and criminally motivated actors, as in certain parts of Central America.
- Connected to political parties and personalities and mobilised to defend specific interests during periods such as elections, as in Kenya and Haiti.

Box 5.12. **The World Bank: Supporting municipal-led AVR**

The World Bank's Small Grants Programme for Violence Prevention supports municipal-level initiatives that advance community-based perspectives to reduce armed violence. Initiatives focus on reducing the number of weapons in circulation, altering the attitudes and behaviour of the agents that might potentially use them, and strengthening public and private institutions for enhanced security and good governance.

Lessons emerging from this experience emphasise the importance of:

- *Multi-sector strategies grounded in a common vision* of the risks affecting citizen security.
- *Diagnostics and data cost-sharing:* Evidence-based diagnostics are critical for a common vision and the development of local and national strategies. Projects showed how costs for gathering, managing and analysing data on different types of armed violence can be shared with other institutions.
- *Long-term implementation plans with interagency co-ordination.*
- *Matching public sector budgetary allocations for security with commensurate allocations for preventive action.*
- *Focusing on those at risk* of following a criminal career path.
- *Reinforcing existing security mechanisms:* Promoting local customs and minimally shared social rules to generate a sense of belonging, facilitate peaceable coexistence, and encourage respect for common heritage, civic rights and duties.
- *Seeking local solutions* in neighbourhoods and targeted 'hot spots', together with initiatives that bring the police and community closer together in designing participatory strategies.
- *Upholding law and order* through the accountable punishing of those who harm public wellbeing, while supporting those who foster peace, solidarity, respect, and community cohesion.

- Closely connected with defence of the interests of organised criminal syndicates and racketeers, including drug traffickers, as in Colombia and Mexico.
- Associated with regional and transnational gang networks involved in a combination of activities noted above, and operating to secure political and/or economic interests specific to the gang, as in West Africa, North America, the Caribbean and elsewhere.

There are no simple solutions for dealing with armed youth groups. In many cases, the designation of such entities as "criminal" can prompt aggressive crackdown operations, which in turn can exacerbate armed violence on the ground. Ultimately, there is no substitute for sustained context-specific diagnostics. The armed violence lens can help to identify key interrelationships that require consideration in AVR programme design. Criminologists and social scientists concede that the most fruitful strategies emphasise prevention and voluntary measures rather than simple suppression and enforcement-based approaches. This is especially true for armed youth in areas suffering from underdevelopment, exclusion, endemic violence (including family violence)[18] and limited livelihood opportunities.

Promising strategies for addressing armed gangs tend to combine:

- Community-based approaches to enhance community willingness and capacity to absorb ex-gang members.
- Shorter-term responses providing immediate alternative opportunities to encourage exit strategies for gang members.
- Longer-term efforts targeting formal and informal institutional change to address the underlying conditions that encourage or compel individuals to choose youth gang membership.
- Preventative strategies that target at-risk youth.

Box 5.13 views these elements through the armed violence lens. Box 5.14 provides some summary lessons learned from the Caribbean region. An over-arching lesson learned is the importance of engaging youth and gang members themselves in the development of appropriate responses and solutions (WHO, 2008; UN-Habitat, 2007; UNDP, 2006b).

18 A study in El Salvador stressed the importance of family factors for youth joining gangs. For example, 83% of gang members' families live in poverty, 73% come from households headed by single mothers; and physical violence was present in 80% of the households. For a broader discussion see IADB, 1999.

Box 5.13. **Youth gangs and youth-at-risk programming, viewed through the armed violence lens**

People	*Community-based approaches* involve the community as part of the solution and seek to improve community capacities to absorb and accept ex-gang members (see Box 5.11).
Perpetrators	*Shorter-term responses target active gang members* and offer viable alternatives to gang membership. Activities often focus on creating employment opportunities and promoting meaningful skills training and development; sporting and cultural activities that strengthen self-respect and self-esteem; interventions that facilitate gang exit strategies; and, temporary or long-term reductions in arms availability, alcohol and drugs. *Efforts to route out organised armed crime.* *Preventive strategies that target at-risk youth.* Development actors are starting to pilot activities in this area. For example, UNDP undertook preventive programming in Colombia as the country underwent a partial DDR process (see Box 5.1). More general programming often includes early childhood development and mentoring, and the provision of employment opportunities and efforts to encourage youth to remain in school, reduce alcohol and substance abuse, get involved in after-school activities, and understand the dangers and realities of gang life.
Instruments	*Controlling the instruments of violence* through measures targeting either the temporary or longer-term reduction in arms availability, including action to route out organised crime.
Institutions	*Formal institutions* – including improved governance, security system reform (judicial and penal systems, community-based policing), improved capacities to route out organised crime, national and urban policies that pay specific attention to youth, employment creation. *Informal institutions* – with programmes addressing cultures of violence, gender relations and women's status, masculinity and identity, family violence and gender-based violence.

Box 5.14. **Targeting young guns in the Caribbean**

A review of ten AVR programmes tackling youth violence in the Caribbean region and Rio de Janeiro found that criminal justice and punitive responses were less effective than previously believed. More effective interventions shared similar features, namely:

- *A community focus,* with a careful diagnostic of the social factors associated with the display and use of weapons within the community.
- *Community councils* that advised the police about the conditions, needs, perceptions and possible solutions to community security problems.
- *A multi-sector approach,* combining economic and social development incentives, community policing, targeted awareness-raising and special programmes for young males at risk;
- *A targeting of young males,* as the community members most vulnerable to choosing or being recruited into armed violence. Interventions focused on providing employment and education opportunities, recreation, music and arts, entrepreneurial support and micro-credit and mentoring in alternative forms of nonviolent conflict resolution;
- *Police reform and outreach,* adopting community policing approaches and nurturing close youth-police relations with a view to enhancing trust in the police.
- *Police champions* led the community policing effort, championing the necessary behavioural and social change required.

Source: Jackson, 2003.

Crime and violence prevention

The WHO, World Bank and UNODC urge development actors to pay greater attention to crime and violence prevention. Established approaches and methods for effective crime and violence reduction exist.[19] However, these methods were developed in the context of higher-income countries (*e.g.* the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Netherlands and Australia). It is not yet clear that the same approaches can be effectively adapted to contexts that report pervasive and uneven rates of poverty, severely limited livelihood opportunities, chronic armed violence and deeply problematic governance.

19 See, for example, work by WHO and UNODC on violence and crime prevention.

Box 5.15. WHO: Promising strategies for reducing the incidence and effects of violence

A strengthened violence prevention agenda would address common underlying risk factors by aiming to:

1. Increase safe, stable, and nurturing relationships between children and their parents and caregivers.
2. Reduce availability and abuse of alcohol.
3. Reduce access to lethal means.
4. Improve life skills and enhance opportunities for children and youth.
5. Promote gender equality and empower women.
6. Change cultural norms that support violence.
7. Improve criminal justice systems.
8. Improve social welfare systems.
9. Reduce social distance between conflicting groups.
10. Reduce economic inequality and concentrated poverty.

Source: WHO, 2008.

However, it is important to note that the community, municipal and youth violence approaches outlined above are largely based on locally elaborated crime and violence prevention approaches.[20] While rigorous evidence-based evaluations are lacking, the outcomes in certain communities and cities are promising.

In 2006, the World Bank sought to estimate the cost-effectiveness of crime and violence prevention in a developing country. While the findings are preliminary, the Bank concluded that investment in prevention programmes – focusing primarily on at-risk individuals – was the most cost-effective means of preventing criminal violence in Brazil. Given these results, the Bank argued there is "systematic underinvestment in prevention in Brazil" (World Bank, 2006a).

For development donors, a key conclusion is that investment in piloting carefully researched and contextualised preventive approaches is important – it can be lower risk and lower cost, and may well make a difference (Box 5.15). It is equally important, however, to also invest in the long-term

20 For this reason, the key programming pillars will not be repeated here.

monitoring of preventive efforts to build the evidence base for establishing which approaches work, as well as their cost-effectiveness. For example: did at-risk individuals who participated in an AVR initiative resort to armed violence five years on? (Box 5.16.)

The World Bank's follow-on work in Latin America and the Caribbean in 2007 stressed the need for locally tailored multi-sector and multi-level responses that combine integrated crime and violence prevention initiatives with criminal justice-focused approaches. The Bank also stressed the importance of undertaking regional and global measures to address transnational organised crime, together with the illicit flow of drugs and small arms. These findings align with the AVR approach developed in this paper.

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* *

Box 5.16. **The need for long-term monitoring of prevention initiatives**

In Brazil, a programme to prevent youth at risk of embracing armed violence showed promising short-term outcomes for the individuals involved. The longer-term impact of the effort, however, is not guaranteed. Claims of effectiveness would require long-term tracking of the programme participants.

The programme focused on youth sports and vocational education. The evaluation found that participants reported improved interpersonal relations (family, peers, school and community), less involvement in risk situations (abuse of alcohol and drugs and fighting), and an increased sense of preparation for the marketplace and a better outlook on their futures.

The evaluators concluded that these achievements have the potential to serve as longer-term protective factors against armed violence, which in turn may also reduce armed violence in the community. However, they also underline the limitations of this claim, given the formidable structural issues that are outside the scope of the project. These include widespread unemployment, insufficient family income, poor public education, and endemic urban violence.

The evaluation results underline the need for long-term tracking of prevention projects and outcomes. What choices will these youth make – or have thrust upon them – five years hence? It also highlights the need for integrated multi-sectoral and multi-level responses.

Source: Peres *et al*., 2007.

Proposed next steps

This OECD-DAC policy paper lays the basic foundations for the future development of operational and programmatic guidelines for AVR. An AVR work stream will require:

- Additional consultation and information exchange among OECD-DAC members, their partners and technical agencies working on different aspects of AVR.[21]
- Field-based testing and piloting of the AVR approach, including the opportunities and challenges for mustering multiple data sources to inform programming.
- More investment in the monitoring, evaluation and reporting of ongoing AVR efforts in the field to build the necessary evidence base for more effective direct and indirect programming.

21 Technical and knowledge exchange on AVR should be encouraged to enhance programming among development and security professionals, practitioners and academics working in the areas of criminal justice and community policing; organised crime and corruption control; conflict, crime and violence prevention; and a range of related development issues (poverty reduction, youth employment and psychology, urban renewal and rural development, governance, transitional justice, small arms control, DDR, mine action and assistance to victims, protection issues, gender and gender-based violence and other areas).

Annex A
AVR and other OECD-DAC priorities

AVR has important links to a number of OECD-DAC priority issue and programming areas: state-building and fragile situations, peacebuilding and conflict prevention, and SSR. Below is a short overview that situates AVR with respect to these areas.

A.1. State-building and fragile situations

States are fragile when "state structures lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the security and human rights of their populations" (OECD-DAC, 2007a). The presence of endemic armed violence signals a *fragile situation*. The state itself may or may not be fragile overall. However, it *is* fragile with respect to the areas or populations affected by endemic armed violence.[1]

According to OECD-DAC's Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations, the objective of donor engagement is to nurture "effective, legitimate and resilient states". International support efforts should be "concerted, sustained and focused on building the relationship between state and society". This is echoed by more recent work of the OECD, which emphasises the importance of political processes to negotiate state-society relations as a basis for state-building (OECD-DAC, 2008a). To date, however, donor responses have tended toward a more state-centric emphasis designed to strengthen institutional effectiveness through capacity-building and reform (OECD-DAC, 2007d).

Diagnosing programming opportunities from the vantage point of AVR refocuses attention on state-building strategies to strengthen state-society relations. For example:

1 Even stable states that contain localised pockets of endemic armed insecurity in their urban slums or rural hinterlands are "fragile" with respect to those areas and/or populations.

- *AVR emphasises a bottom-up focus on the security needs and perceptions of the people and communities impacted by armed violence.* In fragile situations, AVR is not only about the will and capacity of the state to provide security. It is also about the *orientation* of state action: does a given strategy respond to people's real and perceived security needs? Does it strengthen the *legitimacy* of formal institutions and processes in the eyes of the people by improving their responsiveness and effectiveness? Or are strategies mostly concerned with strengthening regime or elite control?[2] To boost state-society resilience, strategies should seek to identify and address the underlying causes for violence and insecurity (from the point of view of the people affected), and not simply deal with armed violence symptoms through heavy-handed law-and-order responses (although these can *also* be an essential part of the response package, especially in contexts of organised crime). At the same time, strategies should also seek out and work with *actually existing security providers* – meaning those leaders, groups or institutions that people turn to or rely on for whatever security they have in real terms. As recent work by the OECD suggests, these *real* security providers can form a critical part of a multi-layered national strategy for both state-building and reducing armed violence in fragile situations.[3]
- *AVR draws attention to the motivations of the perpetrators* of armed violence. In many contexts, an AVR perspective can reveal core issues that undermine the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of individuals and communities. This can be related to a legacy of state neglect and persecution. It can derive from grievances connected to social exclusion, horizontal inequalities, a failure of service delivery, and an inability to pursue livelihoods. The armed violence lens underscores the benefits of a multi-sector engagement to reduce insecurity, with attention to, for example, education, health, livelihoods, social mobilisation and urban renewal.
- *AVR assesses the relationship between the perpetrators and the formal and informal institutions that enable and/or collude with violence.* In some contexts, the armed violence lens can draw attention to the political and economic interests of powerful state elites and their connections with armed groups (both state and non-state). The application of the lens

2 As noted in the introduction to this paper, an AVR perspective encourages consideration of the following question: ***whom is the state failing, where, how and why?***

3 See OECD-DAC, 2007d. *Actually existing security providers* are also important to understand for any partnerships pursued at the community or local level, so as not to create parallel systems that compete with or undermine local institutions that are invested with popular legitimacy.

encourages a more comprehensive reading of the interconnected interests that pose challenges – but also opportunities – for donor engagement beyond building operational capacity. This relates to the ongoing work of the OECD-DAC on whole-of-government approaches to fragile states and situations, which aims to reinforce donors' policy coherence across diplomatic, security, development and financial engagement.

- *AVR draws attention to the broader regional and transnational factors* that shape and fuel armed violence in some contexts, and which can also undermine state legitimacy and resilience – such as, for example, small arms flows and organised crime.

An AVR approach helps to broaden and refine our understandings of fragility and fragile contexts, while also highlighting a wider range of tools and approaches to address it.

A.2. Peacebuilding and conflict prevention

The field of peacebuilding and conflict prevention continues to evolve and adapt to the changing global context and deepening awareness of what drives conflict and violence.[4] AVR is just one expression of this evolution.

- *AVR identifies emerging areas for programming.* An armed violence lens draws attention to a range of "drivers" that may not be considered by conflict and development practitioners. It draws attention to criminality and the different forms of armed violence in transitional and recovery contexts; armed gangs; and the concentration of armed violence in under-governed areas such as urban slums. It encourages a more sustained examination of global level influences that can entrench armed violence at the local level, such as transnational organised crime.
- *AVR reinforces holistic perspectives and responses.* AVR reinforces good practice in the conflict prevention field. Specifically, it emphasises the complexity of armed conflict, including its local political economy. In certain contexts, for example, a key emphasis of AVR interventions would be to assess the involvement of armed groups in illicit economic networks, the transnational criminal dimensions, and the extent to which ordinary people now find their livelihoods (and perhaps also protection) within this system. Such a perspective is essential for calibrating both security and development responses so as not to do harm, and for more effective whole-of-government efforts.

4 See, for example, the wide-ranging programming typology presented in OECD-DAC, 2008c.

- *AVR broadens assessment toolkits.* AVR encourages development actors to use a broader range of existing assessment tools and methodologies to capture a rich blend of both qualitative analysis (of structures, institutions, actors, political economies) and quantitative and survey data to map the geographic and demographic patterns of armed violence, as well as other important elements highlighted in the armed violence lens.[5] Mixed datasets, when aided by the armed violence lens, can help donors to better identify strategic entry points for action; fine-tune their interventions demographically and geographically, to better target vulnerable individuals, areas and groups; and consider preventive programming to address context-specific risk factors and strengthen protective factors.
- *AVR extends conflict approaches beyond* conflict *contexts.* AVR highlights how established peacebuilding and conflict prevention approaches could be (and are being) adapted to reduce and prevent armed violence in non-conflict contexts. As noted, this move reflects the growing recognition that high levels of interpersonal or criminal armed violence generally have roots in underdevelopment and exclusion, with many of the same risk factors that fuel political conflict. Effective AVR initiatives should seek to build on conflict and peacebuilding toolkits. For example, there is ongoing experimentation in Latin America and South Africa to adapt DDR approaches for the demobilisation and integration of youth gang members.
- *The armed violence lens can help to illuminate important linkages for more effective post-conflict programming, such as more integrated DDR, SSR and SALW.* By drawing attention to the context-specific connections among people, perpetrators, instruments and institutions, the lens encourages a more integrated and sequenced approach among a variety of recovery and development programming streams. For example, it can illuminate important synergies and dependencies across the three programming areas of DDR, SSR and SALW, which are frequently pursued independently. Thus, in any particular context, it may highlight how sustainable DDR will require simultaneous SSR and SALW-related programming.[6]

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5 For example, people's perceptions of security, perpetrator's motivations, the influence of informal institutions, the supply of arms, and factors at different levels.

6 This can include customs and border control systems; small arms and light weapons legislation and accountable law enforcement; capacity to ensure the security of government small arms and light weapons stockpiles and effectiveness of weapon's destruction programmes; crime reduction and prevention; and police reform to improve public confidence and trust in the police as a prelude to civilian micro-disarmament.

A.3. AVR and security system reform

SSR aims to support partner countries to develop effective and accountable systems of security and justice (OECD-DAC, 2007b). AVR seeks to address the sources of armed insecurity that affect groups, communities, areas and/or societies. As such, AVR adopts a broad view of specific public security challenges with a bottom-up emphasis that also extends to consider regional and transnational influences.

In contexts affected by, or at risk of, armed violence SSR and AVR are highly complementary and mutually reinforcing. Examples include:

- *The AVR lens can help fine-tune SSR interventions and enhance effectiveness.* AVR's sub-national and supra-national perspectives can contribute to a more comprehensive view of security-related issues and linkages that are pertinent to SSR. For example, AVR's sharp focus on people's insecurity reinforces and supports the people-centred approach advocated by SSR.[7] AVR provides a lens to solidly address this issue within SSR programming, while highlighting essential linkages that also require consideration. In this way, the lens can help fine-tune SSR programming to ensure harmonisation and alignment with state-building objectives. Also, as described in Section 5.2.1 above, SSR programming that is AVR-sensitive can contribute to reducing risk factors for armed violence, while at the same time enhancing the effectiveness of core SSR programmes (by addressing those same factors).
- *When SSR is not on the national agenda, AVR initiatives can open up entry points for dialogue.* For example, in El Salvador, civil society mobilisation to document the extent and effects of armed violence on the population produced compelling results that catalysed central government engagement. Alternatively, in Brazil, community-based efforts to address youth violence opened space to discuss community-based policing, and attendant issues of police, judiciary and penal reform at the national level. Various AVR initiatives can provide entry points to examine and promote democratic controls over the security sector and judicial independence and strength, and address problematic linkages of the security sector with non-state actors, political factions or parties, and informal or illicit economies.

7 See, for example, OECD-DAC, 2007b, page 21. Public distrust of the state security sector is often a key factor in armed violence contexts. To date, however, SSR programming has tended to focus more on improving the operational capacities of the security sector, rather than on how it is perceived by, and relates to, the wider society – especially the most vulnerable.

- *SSR and AVR programming are complementary.* Effective SSR can play a critical role in enhancing public security and reducing risk factors for violence, such as the demand for arms. For example, visible progress on police reform can improve the public's perceptions of security, which can in turn enable a voluntary weapons collection programme. The AVR lens can also contribute to linking crime and conflict issues within broader SSR strategies.

Annex B

Table A.1. Examples of regional instruments for AVR

Objective	Africa	Americas	Asia-Pacific	Middle East	Europe
Small arms and light weapons control	ECOWAS Moratorium (1998, 2001) and Convention (2006)	OAS Convention (1997)	Pacific Islands Forum (2003)	League of Arab States (Resolution 6447 2004)	EU Code of Conduct (1998, 2003)
	Bamako Declaration (2000)	OAS Model Regulations (1998)	Nadi Framework (2000)	League of Arab States (Resolution 6625 2006)	OSCE Document (2000)
	SADC Firearms Protocol (2001)	Antigua Guatemala Declaration (2006)	APEC Declaration (2003)		
	Nairobi Protocol (2004)		ACP-EU (2446/98) (1998)		
Crime and drug prevention	Interpol Regional Directorate for Africa (2001) and Interpol Regional Directorate for Middle East and North Africa (2001)	Interpol Regional Directorate for the Americas (2001)	Interpol Regional Directorate for Asia and South Pacific (2001)	Interpol Regional Directorate for Middle East and North Africa (2001)	Interpol Regional Directorate for Europe (2001)
	Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (FATF-style regional body) Intergovernmental Anti-Money Laundering Group in Africa (GIABA) (FATF-style regional body)		Eurasian Group (FATF-style regional body)		Eurasian Group (FATF-style regional body)
	Sub-regional policing co-operation arrangements including WAPCCO, SARPCCO, EAPCCO, CAPCCO, NAPCCO	Merida Initiative (2008)	ASEANAPOL Pacific Transnational Crime Coordination Centre		EUROPOL (1999)
	Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD)				EUROJUST
					Various OSCE and CoE initiatives

Source: SAS, 2008, 2007, 2006, 2005.

Annex C

Additional examples of indirect programming

As discussed in Chapter 5 of this publication, indirect AVR programming refers to programmes that do not target AVR as their primary objective. Rather, they target other development priorities (such as the reduction of poverty), but because they are AVR-sensitive, they also include specific AVR sub-goals. The tables below provide examples of indicative indirect programming in the areas of poverty reduction, governance, health and education and the environment. Programming options are disaggregated according to the armed violence lens – people, perpetrators, instruments and institutions. Note, however, that the relevance, appropriateness and precise formulation of these linkages will vary according to the context-specific analysis of a particular set of armed violence circumstances on the ground.

Table C.1. Poverty Reduction: Examples of AVR programming sub-components

Elements of lens	Indicative examples
People	• Assistance to armed violence victims, particularly young mothers, single-headed households, children and youth, the disabled, the displaced (effects) • Safe access programmes to water, fuel and farm lands for vulnerable groups in areas affected by armed violence; urban planning (structural and risk factors) • Community-based Weapons for Development programming (structural and risk factors)
Perpetrators	• Sustainable employment and alternative livelihood programming for youth involved in, or at risk of, armed violence (structural and risk factors) • Rural development programmes in areas that feed rural-to-urban slum migration (structural and risk factors)
Instruments	• Mine action, to increase productivity, agricultural potential, resumption of livelihoods, revaluation of property, access to markets, improvement in the provision of social services (effects and risk factors) • Support to community-based organisations or local authorities in areas afflicted by poverty and armed violence for programming and community mobilisation (risk factors)
Institutions	• Improved service delivery to areas affected by armed violence, or areas at risk of armed violence (for example, under-governed, peripheral areas) (structural and risk factors) • Expanded economic opportunities through macroeconomic reform and development of trade and manufacturing sectors • Reformed trade and agricultural policies to enhance food security • Expanded services and employment opportunities in rural areas to prevent mass migration to the urban areas, and the subsequent increase in city slum areas

Table C.2. Governance (not including SSR): Examples of AVR programming sub-components

Elements of lens	Indicative examples
People	• Safer community/cities initiatives, especially targeting those afflicted by armed violence or at risk (structural and risk factors and effects) • Urban planning (structural and risk factors and effects) • Rural development and sustainable natural resource management, especially of marginalised/peripheral/under-governed areas and those that feed rural-urban migration to slums (structural and risk factors) • Programming to reduce and prevent domestic and gender-based violence (structural and risk factors and effects)
Perpetrators	• Development of context-specific AVR-sensitive national, regional or local policies or programmes of action that target improved service delivery, especially in the areas of: poverty reduction, youth, education, employment, gender, rural development, municipal development, crime prevention, transitional justice, human rights (structural and risk factors and effects) • Legislation and ordinances that target identified risk factors in areas affected by armed violence (for example, alcohol restrictions, display and carrying of weapons, curfews etc.), and capacity-building for accountable enforcement (risk factors) • Government-led programmes that target identified AVR risk factors or the enhancement of protective factors (for example, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, early childhood education, social cohesion) • Broad-based support for sustainable DDR (may also require involvement of security sector) (risk factors and effects)
Instruments	• Municipal or local-level small arms and light weapons programmes, including mine action, to increase awareness about the risks posed by mines and small arms, and to encourage registration of legal arms, and the turning in to the police of illegal arms (risk factors and effects) • Public health campaigns that highlight small arms and light weapons and armed violence awareness (costs and impacts to society) (risk factors)

Table C.2. Governance (not including SSR): Examples of AVR programming sub-components (*continued*)

Institutions	• Decentralisation efforts, with AVR-sensitive components for areas afflicted by, or at risk of, armed violence (structural/institutional factors) • Public sector capacity-building and reform, with particular attention to issues of corruption, oversight and accountability and equitable service delivery, including to the populations affected or at risk of armed violence (structural/institutional, risk, effects) • Institutional reform to address political grievances, social exclusion and human rights violations, and to improve protective mechanisms for the vulnerable (structural/institutional risk factors) • Building national statistical capacities and reporting systems for violence and crime reporting (data collection, analysis, use in policies and programming) especially within the criminal justice and public health systems (institutional capacity for improved response) • Capacity-building and advocacy to ensure government compliance with all relevant human rights-related global conventions and agreements • SSR and public security reform

Table C.3. Security System Reform and indirect AVR programming: Examples of AVR programming sub-components

Elements of lens	Indicative examples
People	• Security system reform in support of safer community/cities initiatives (structural and risk factors and effects) • Assessments that capture the security and justice perceptions and needs of the people – especially of marginalised areas/populations/demographics and among those afflicted by or at risk of armed violence – that are used to design and monitor SSR efforts (structural and risk factors and effects)
Perpetrators	• Development of national policies or programmes of action that are AVR-sensitive (context-specific), especially in the areas of: small arms and light weapons, community policing, criminal justice reform, restorative justice, and crime and violence prevention (structural and risk factors and effects) • Police training, capacity-building and reform for enhanced accountability, protection of human rights, service to communities, community-based policing (institutional, risk factors and effects) • Reform and capacity-building for effective implementation of global codes of conduct for use of force and firearms by law enforcement officials (risk factors) • Anti-corruption efforts within the security sector (risk factors) • Integrated SSR, DDR and small arms and light weapons efforts, with a context-specific framework and sequencing (risk factors and effects)
Instruments	• Legislation and capacity-building to restrict access to small arms and light weapons by those convicted of committing established partner or gender-based violence (effects) • Capacity-building for development of appropriate security-related legislation, and for accountable enforcement capability, including community liaison (risk factors) • Capacity-building for effective implementation of national and regional SSR action plans and crime/trafficking control agreements (risk factors) • Capacity-building for improved stockpile management (risk factors)

Table C.3. Security System Reform and indirect AVR programming: Examples of AVR programming sub-components (*continued*)

Institutions	• Capacity-building and reform of public security institutions and personnel to strengthen civilian oversight, rule of law, human rights • Context-specific AVR-sensitive reform and capacity-building of police, judiciary and prisons, restorative justice approaches, border guards, improved crime detection and accountable prosecution, adequate protection in the prosecution of criminal cases (structural/institutional, risk factors, effects) • Capacity-building and reform to prevent and reduce human trafficking, including enhanced protective mechanisms for the most vulnerable • Institutional reforms toward "multi-layered justice and security" (OECD-DAC, 2006) that recognise and incorporate non-formal, but legitimate, justice and security providers (institutional) • Building capacity for anti-corruption efforts linked to illicit trafficking in resources, arms, drugs (risk factors) • Building capacity for in-country narcotics control programmes • Reform and capacity-building to support community-based policing and ensure fair pay and conditions of service for police at all levels (protective and risk factors) • Programming to reduce and prevent predation, human rights violations and gender-based violence committed by security sector officials (institutional and effects)

Table C.4. Environment: Examples of AVR programming sub-components

Elements of Lens	Indicative examples
People	• Sustainable land management projects that reduce vulnerability to climate change, overuse and environmental degradation (risk factors) • Programmes to improve sustainable access to safe drinking water and sanitation, especially for communities/demographics afflicted by, or at risk of, armed violence, such as the displaced, refugees, urban slums (risk factors and effects)
Perpetrators	• Programmes for alternative livelihoods, resource and land management in areas where armed violence is linked to the narrowing of livelihood options and competition for scarce resources due to environmental degradation (structural and risk factors)
Instruments	• Mine action and attention to unexploded ordinances that undermine community livelihoods and access to natural resources (risk factors and effects)
Institutions	• Legislation and capacity-building to protect and effectively manage natural resources, and ensure access to safe drinking water and sanitation (risk factors and effects) • Legislation and capacity-building to enhance sustainable livelihoods in rural areas, especially those that are major sources of rural-to-urban migrants (structural and risk factors) • Urban planning to improve living conditions, public infrastructure and service access in urban slums (structural and risk factors)

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- Armed Violence and Prevention Initiative (AVPI), University of Bradford http://www.bradford.ac.uk/acad/cics/projects/arms/AVPI/
- Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue http://www.hdcentre.org/
- Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) http://www.csvr.org.za/
- Children in Organised Armed Violence (COAV) http://www.coav.org.br/
- Clingendael Institute, Security and Conflict Programme http://www.clingendael.nl/cscp/
- Demographic and Health Surveys http://www.measuredhs.com/
- Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development http://www.genevdeclaration.org
- Institute for Security Studies (ISS) http://www.csvr.org.za/
- International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) http://www.iansa.org/
- Project Ploughshares http://www.ploughshares.ca/
- SaferAfrica http://www.saferafrica.org/
- Saferworld http://www.saferworld.org.uk/
- Small Arms Survey (SAS) http://www.smallarmssurvey.org
- United States Institute of Peace (USIP) http://usip.org
- Viva Rio http://www.vivario.org.br/publique/cgi/cgilua.exe/sys/start.htm?tpl =home&UserActiveTemplate=_vivario_en

International Organisations

- Pan-American Health Organisation (PAHO), Violence and Injury Prevention programme
  http://www.paho.org/English/HCP/HCN/VIO/violence-unit-page.htm
- UN Children's Fund (UNICEF)
  http://www.unicef.org/
- UN DDR Resource Centre
  http://www.unddr.org/
- UN Development Programme (UNDP)
  http://www.undp.org/cpr/we_do/armed_violence.shtml
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