# Linking Security System Reform and Armed Violence Reduction

PROGRAMMING NOTE

OECD

Conflict and Fragility

Linking Security System Reform and Armed Violence Reduction

PROGRAMMING NOTE

OECD

This work is published on the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD. The opinions expressed and arguments employed herein do not necessarily reflect the official views of the Organisation or of the governments of its member countries.

Foreword

Armed violence is an everyday reality for millions of people around the globe. More than 700 000 people die as a result of armed violence each year. Many more experience traumatic loss in their families and are left with lasting psychological and physical scars. The impact of armed violence extends further, negatively influencing development, peace and good governance, often by creating a climate of impunity, corruption and by undermining public institutions. It is also closely tied with transnational crime and the misery and abuse associated with the illegal trafficking of arms, drugs and people. Finally, the economic impact of armed violence is striking with the cost of lost productivity due to non-conflict armed violence alone estimated to cost upwards of USD 95 billion annually worldwide. This violence has important youth and gender dimensions. The majority of perpetrators and victims are men, while women and girls are at greater risk of violence that is less visible and committed in the private sphere, including intimate partner violence, child abuse, sexual and gender based violence. Measures at reducing armed violence are therefore also measures at reducing human suffering.

The OECD DAC policy paper *Armed Violence Reduction: Enabling Development,* published in 2009, acknowledged as a challenge the increased levels of armed violence in non-conflict countries, the increasing linkage between conflict and crime, rapidly growing youth populations in the south and accelerating levels of unregulated urbanisation. The paper provided a methodology to help donors tackle the programming challenging of reducing armed violence. Building on the OECD DAC policy paper, three programming notes were developed to contribute to our understanding of specific types of armed violence: **Youth and armed violence**, **armed violence in urban areas** and **Security System Reform in relation to Armed violence reduction**. Each note aims to improve our understanding of these dynamics while also offering practical assistance on assessments, programme design, risk management, monitoring and evaluation, as well as on entry points for direct and indirect programming.

2011 is an important year for global efforts at Armed violence reduction with a series of regional best practice seminars as well as the high-level

conference on Armed violence reduction in the context of the Geneva declaration on armed violence and development, scheduled for October 2011. I strongly encourage the use of these programming notes to strengthen our understanding of these critical development issues and to support new innovative programmatic guidelines for Armed violence reduction.

Jordan Ryan
Assistant Administrator and
Director, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery
United Nations Development Programme

Acknowledgements

Table of contents

Tables

Boxes

List of abbreviations

AV	Armed Violence
AVR	Armed Violence Reduction
AWG	Action Working Group on Safety and Security in the Skopje Old Town
CENAP	*Centre d'Alerte et de Prévention des Conflits*
CICS	Centre for International Cooperation and Security
CIGI	Centre for International Governance Innovation
CST	Community Security Team
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DCAF	Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration
DESEPAZ	*Programa Desarrollo, Seguridad y Paz* (Program for Development, Peace and Security)
FRIDE	*Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior*
GBV	Gender Based Violence
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
ICG	International Crisis Group
INCAF	International Network on Conflict and Fragility
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation

MDG	Millennium Development Goals
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PHR	Physicians for Human Rights
PMC	Private Military Company
PM&E	Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation
PSC	Private Security Company
QUNO	Quaker United Nations Office
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SCR	Security Council Resolution
SJR	Security and Justice Reform
SSD	Security Sector Development
SSR	Security System Reform
UN	United Nations
UNAMSIL	United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNIDIR	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNSG	United Nations Secretary General
WHO	World Health Organisation

OECD Armed Violence Reduction (AVR) programming notes

Approximately 740 000 people die as a result of armed violence each year. Armed violence erodes governance and peace whilst slowing down achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG's). It can have as significant an effect on security and development in settings of chronic violent crime and inter-personal violence as it can in societies affected by war or civil conflict. An armed violence agenda therefore includes a wide range of countries, cities and citizens whose development and security are under threat. It refers to the use or threatened use of weapons to inflict injury, death or psychosocial harm.

To help desk officers and conflict/fragility experts who are working to tackle the problem of armed violence, OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members have requested three *Armed Violence Reduction (AVR) Programming Notes* to build on the OECD DAC policy paper on *Armed Violence Reduction: Enabling Development* (OECD, 2009). The three notes cover:

- **Armed violence in urban areas***: The majority of the world's population now lives in urban centres. As economic transformations accelerate rural-urban migration, the rural poor are being converted into an urban poor who populate mega-slums on the periphery of major urban centres. More and more of these areas are afflicted by high levels of armed violence.

- **Youth and armed violence:** The largest-ever generation of young people is now entering adulthood. Almost half of the world's population is under the age of 24 and the vast majority of 10-24 year olds live in less developed countries. Youth are particularly at risk of being exposed to and engaging in, armed violence and crime.

- **AVR and Security System Reform** (SSR): AVR and SSR have similar objectives and are mutually reinforcing. But they also have their distinct methods, entry points and comparative advantages. It is important to understand the linkages between the two approaches in order to maximise the impact of public safety and security interventions.

To ensure an effective response to armed violence, the programming notes use an armed violence "lens", which was developed in *Armed Violence Reduction: Enabling Development*. The lens helps practitioners consider the key elements shaping armed violence patterns. These include the **people** affected by armed violence, the **perpetrators** and their motivations, the availability of **instruments** (arms) and the wider **institutional/cultural** environment that enables and/or protects against armed violence. The lens highlights risk factors associated with armed violence and their vertical linkages from the local to the global level. It encourages practitioners to think outside specific sector mandates and provides practical entry points for AVR programming.

Armed violence prevention and reduction are feasible but require significant leadership by affected states and investment of financial resources by development partners. They also require the ability to engage with non-state and sub-national actors. Finally, evidence suggests that effective interventions need a good evidence base, participatory assessments and the simultaneous engagement in multiple sectors (reflecting the broad range of interrelated issues and actors involved), at multiple levels (local, national, regional and global) and over a longer time horizon.

Introduction

Security System Reform (SSR[1]) and Armed Violence Reduction (AVR) share the same objective: to contribute to stability, safety and security as an enabling environment for development. As such, "SSR and AVR are highly complementary and mutually reinforcing" (OECD, 2009, p. 111). Building on the recent OECD policy paper, *Armed Violence Reduction: Enabling Development* (2009), this note describes how the linkages between AVR and SSR programming can be used effectively in programme design and implementation for donors, policy makers and practitioners, as well as programme managers, practitioners and civil society staff at headquarters and in the field.

This topic falls under the umbrella of the OECD DAC's International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF), which aims to advise donors on how best to assist countries in preventing or recovering from conflict and fragility. Both AVR and SSR are key policy and programmatic building blocks in helping to build peaceful states and viable state institutions in post conflict and fragile settings. In this sense AVR and SSR form a critical part of the reform agenda in post conflict and fragile settings. Both AVR and SSR can be seen as core areas of reform that help bridge the security-development nexus and also help to operationalise the peacebuilding and statebuilding narrative.

This programming note gives guidance to those seeking to reinforce programmes by utilising the linkages between AVR and SSR in cases where it has been calculated that such synergy would enhance impact. Attention is given to AVR topics and programming options that offer relevant ways to improve the service delivery of security and justice bodies, which are not (sufficiently) addressed within current SSR programmes as detailed in the *OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform* (2007). Likewise, the note also points out ways in which AVR projects can be complemented by concurrent SSR operations. The approaches are illustrated by examples from the field demonstrating how and why the AVR-SSR synergy has proven useful in particular settings.

The structure of the paper is as follows:

- Chapter 1 provides a concise discussion of the **concepts of SSR and AVR** and a brief overview of the linkages between the two.

- Chapter 2 starts at the beginning of the programming cycle by focusing on **assessment and design,** specifically using the Armed Violence (AV) lens and innovative assessment techniques to underscore how they can help fine-tune SSR programme planning.

- Chapter 3 introduces **two programmatic approaches** that can help promote positive synergies between AVR and SSR. The first discusses how SSR programming can adopt an AVR emphasis. The second discusses ways to ensure that AVR and SSR programmes and activities complement each other.

- Chapter 4 describes **entry points for programming.** It gives examples of how the existence of an SSR programme can facilitate the introduction of AVR and vice versa.

- Chapter 5 concludes the programming note with a brief description of the different AVR and SSR approaches to **monitoring and evaluation**. Specific consideration is given to indicator design and involvement of local stakeholders.

Chapter 1

The concepts of Security System Reform and Armed Violence Reduction

Security System Reform

"Security System Reform is another term used to describe the transformation of the 'security system' – which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions – working together to manage and operate the system" (OECD, 2005, p. 20). SSR programming aims to support countries in the development of more effective, efficient and accountable security and justice systems, which are better able to meet the justice and security needs of its citizens in "a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of governance and the rule of law" (OECD, 2005; OECD, 2007). By carefully identifying the security needs of the people in a society – including women, men, boys, girls, minorities, vulnerable groups etc. – and what is required to meet those needs, an SSR programme can be designed to improve the ability of the security system to provide security services. As such, the concept of SSR emphasises a people-centred approach. Its method for achieving security of the population is to improve the capacity and accountability of security institutions and bodies.

The security system is comprised of nine sub-sectors (OECD, 2007): accountability and oversight; defence; intelligence and security service; integrated border management; police; justice; private security and military companies; and civil society. Certain sectors may be targeted for reform based on the needs identified within the specific context or as entry points for wider reform. Yet it is important to remember that the sectors form a holistic system. As such, reform in one sector needs to take into account the effects of insufficiencies in other sectors and the impact of reforms on related sectors as well. Thus, collaboration between sectors is fundamental and the concept of SSR is holistic in its approach to design and implementation of programming.[2]

Armed Violence Reduction

Increasingly, it is being recognised that armed violence has a profound negative effect on (human) development (United Nations Secretary General (UNSG), 2009; OECD, 2009; Geneva Declaration, 2006; Geneva Declaration, 2008). Armed violence is broadly defined as: "the use or threatened use of weapons to inflict injury, death or psychosocial harm, which undermines development" (OECD, 2009, p. 21). This includes interpersonal violence such as violent crime and collective violence such as armed conflict, gang violence, or forms of organised crime. AVR programmes focus on reducing armed violence by integrating "developmental and preventative programmes with more effective law enforcement and diplomatic/political efforts" (OECD, 2009, p. 22).

AVR programming targets risk and protective factors that appear to increase or reduce the likelihood of armed violence. For example, a large presence of arms in a community can be a risk factor for armed violence, whereas an attitude or culture within a society that challenges the use of firearms can be a protective factor. These factors are identified through rigorous analyses of data drawn from epidemiological and other quantitative as well as qualitative methods, which assemble information on types and levels of armed violence. In addition, the "armed violence lens" helps capture key features of armed violence that can increase practitioners' awareness of context-specific drivers, risk factors, protective factors and effects of armed violence (OECD, 2009, p. 49). Its application in assessments helps create a rich picture of the various elements of armed violence: the **people** it affects; the **perpetrators**; the **instruments** with which it is perpetrated; and the **institutions** that influence it; as well as its local, national, regional and global dimensions.

AVR programmes address the causes and effects of armed violence at different levels: at international and national levels – the institutional actors and legal frameworks managing and governing the use of armed violence – as well as at the local community and individual level. AVR programmes often seek to establish security as defined by ordinary citizens, since the local and sub-national level is where armed violence is experienced most directly. In doing this, AVR explicitly recognises that citizens' perceptions of security are not necessarily uniform: men and women, people of different ages, social or ethnic backgrounds may have different perceptions of security needs. As such, AVR programmes are closely linked to community security programmes. AVR programmes seek to increase security through direct programmes that specifically target the reduction and prevention of armed violence and its effects, as well as indirect programmes that involve development programming that mainstream AVR elements so that programming is AVR-sensitive and includes AVR sub-goals (OECD, 2009, p. 86-87). For example, direct programming targets factors contributing to the use of armed violence such as Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). Indirect

Box 1.1. **A common denominator in SSR and AVR: The importance of gender**

The mutual aim to be people-centred represents a strong link between SSR and AVR. Tuning security programmes to the needs of citizens requires recognising that these needs, like communities, are not homogenous. Security and armed violence are highly gendered: men, women, boys and girls[3] contribute to and experience violence and insecurity in different ways. This understanding is made explicit in both AVR and SSR literature: unequal access to security and justice services, normalisation of gender-based violence and imbalanced representation within security forces are seen as corollaries of gender disparities that shape the security realities of men and women, boys and girls differently. Therefore, at each point within programming, security practitioners should consider the particular experiences of men and women, as well as the role that gender relations and norms play in enabling or reducing violence. Including such a perspective not only enhances programmes' efficacy and reach, but can furthermore work to address some of the systemic sources of insecurity.

Specific guidance for mainstreaming gender in programmes can be drawn from both AVR and SSR approaches. One common aim is to gather accurate perspectives of men and women, boys and girls and integrating those particular views into programming. This necessarily involves considering and accommodating for social and practical barriers (*e.g.* restricted mobility; public participation; literacy) that may restrict men or women from participating in assessments, monitoring and evaluation surveys. It also requires collecting sex-disaggregated data and striving to maintain gender balance in (participatory) surveys. Application of the AV lens in (SSR) assessments can assist in highlighting the specific factors that increase men and women's likelihood of becoming a target and/or perpetrator of violence, as well as their specific roles in formal and informal institutions that enable or reduce the use of armed violence. It can also help to highlight barriers that prevent the recruitment, integration and promotion of women in the security bodies – an aim of SSR programmes.

This type of analysis can be used to appropriately target programming responses and monitor the effects of programmes for men and women. Moreover, analysis of gender-sensitive data can help programmers design and further develop indicators that reflect men and women's distinct perceptions and experiences of (in)security. In turn, this can inspire new approaches or reveal valuable entry points for programmers to co-operate with local actors in addressing locally-defined aspects of (in)security that stem from gender norms and relations, such as violent masculinity or unequal participation in (oversight of) security forces. In this way, including gender perspectives allows for more precisely tailored security programmes that meet people's expectations and needs.

For further reference see: Bastic, M. (2008), *Integrating Gender in Post-Conflict Security Sector Reform, Policy Paper No.29*, DCAF (Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces), Geneva.; Valasek, K. (2008), "Security Sector Reform and Gender", *Gender and Security Sector Reform Toolkit,* DCAF, Geneva.; and: Kristen, A. (2007), *Guns and Roses: Gender and Armed Violence in Africa,* UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), Geneva.

programming targets more general protective and risk factors for armed violence, which can include urban renewal schemes and street lighting projects.

Conceptual synergies between AVR and SSR

The ultimate objective of both SSR and AVR is to contribute to a safe, stable and secure environment in which development can take place. As such, they are mutually complementary programming strategies. However, each

---

Box 1.2. **Complementarities of AVR and SSR: The justice sector**

AVR and SSR both incorporate a focus on justice as an important component for reducing violent conflict, armed violence and enhancing crime prevention – all of which are conditions for a stable, conducive environment for development. Both assert that the justice sector is instrumental for people's security. That said, both approaches have slightly different, but complementary, perspectives on how justice contributes to security.

For SSR, building legitimate, democratic judicial institutions, which subscribe to international human rights standards is fundamental and must be addressed in a comprehensive manner (OECD, 2007, p. 182). In addition, the justice sector is vital for effective SSR because it is directly linked to successful service delivery in many other security sectors, in particular police and prisons. AVR on the other hand, draws attention to how criminal justice reform – improving the capacity to detect, investigate, adjudicate and sentence criminal offences – may be connected with indirect security provision such as community centres that counsel at-risk youth or provide sports and music clubs as an alternative to joining gangs. As such, indirect AVR programming is able to reinforce some core activities of SSR (such as reforming juvenile detention centres or strengthening police presence in gang epicentres) and, thereby, enhance whole-of-government approaches (OECD, 2009, p. 51).

Moreover, formal and informal justice mechanisms are seen as an important part of the risk and protective factors for armed violence that can be targeted in AVR programming. SSR equally recognises the importance of both formal and informal mechanisms for the justice sector and the need to address both in programming. Applying both AVR and SSR perspectives encourages attention to how justice is provided through both formal and informal arrangements, the possible tensions between them and their impact on other components of security. Furthermore, each perspective offers insight into the array of justice mechanisms that security programmers can support when tailoring a programme to a specific context.

Since both AVR and SSR accrue importance to the justice sector, and, taken together, recognise the several ways in which it links with security, it is an area where there is a great need as well as opportunity to ensure complementarity and to avoid duplication and gaps. Justice is therefore one of the sectors where synergies, in terms of entry points, sequencing and complementary programming, can greatly enhance the effectiveness of both programmes.

---

programme has its own specific methods to reach this common objective, which implies that each has a comparative advantage. The most effective synergies can be found where each approach can employ its strengths while being complemented by the other. In other words, when thinking about the opportunities for effective synergies between AVR and SSR, it is important to consider the added value and comparative advantage of each approach.

SSR focuses on building an effective, efficient and accountable security system that meets people's security and justice needs in order to contribute to an environment in which people feel safe. This necessitates due attention to differing security needs of, for instance, men and women as well as vulnerable ethnic and social groups. Yet, although the concept of SSR promotes a people-centred and holistic approach, SSR practice mostly focuses on enhancing the ability of the state to meet a range of security and justice challenges and needs through the mechanisms and instruments at its disposal (OECD, 2007, p. 21; OECD, 2005, p. 1). SSR programmes are typically carried out as purely technical enterprises (Rathmell, 2009), in that they concentrate on improving operations capacities and mostly use a "train and equip" method. As such, the people-centred approach of SSR is often not operationalised and while attention has been focused on pursuing holistic SSR, this has proven very difficult to put into practice. However, SSR offers a clear and well-developed set of guidelines and tools for,[4] as well as practical experience in, strengthening the capacity of security institutions and oversight bodies,[5] and this is where its comparative advantage lies.

AVR is broader in scope than SSR, as it "aims to reduce the risks and effects of armed violence" (OECD, 2009, p. 22). AVR programming addresses contextual factors of security, such as socio-economic development and community coherence. Thus AVR is able to target risk and protective factors at all levels (from international to local). As such it can include a focus on improving the capacity of state institutions – such as ministries of health, education or internal affairs – as well as legal reform to deal with armed violence.[6] However, given AVR's explicit emphasis on establishing security at the local level including community security, its comparative strength lies in its ability to drive bottom-up or top-down (for instance strengthening national firearms control regimes) interventions grounded in good contextual understanding and on the basis of a developmental and local approach. Recognising that local communities are not homogeneous, the AVR approach advocates for the differentiation between the security needs of various social groups and provides examples of how to break data down on the bases of, for example, gender, social status and identity traits.

By drawing on the comparative advantages, the two approaches can mutually reinforce each other. There may even be overlaps – for example, it is easily recognised that SSR (by improving the capacity of security bodies) can

reduce risk factors for armed violence. However, this does not mean that SSR and AVR programmes should be merged. Blurring the distinction between programmes will make it more difficult to identify clear programming tasks and thereby risks increasing co-ordination problems.

Instead, effective linkages can be found by carefully assessing which programmatic approach, or what combination or sequence of the two, is most suited to address particular justice and security needs. For example, as was pointed out above, the comparative strength of AVR lies in its grassroots, developmental and locally focused approach that often remains underdeveloped in SSR practice. By complementing SSR with the grassroots components of AVR, programming can become more people-centred and locally responsive, which could increase the programmes' efficacy and sustainability. Similarly, SSR has the potential to yield national level impacts through comprehensive and integrated reforms of the security system, which can contribute to stronger AVR programmes by scaling them up into SSR's institutional reform of security bodies.

In general terms, the AVR approach can help fine-tune SSR interventions and enhance effectiveness by highlighting local, people-centred security issues and proposing innovative means to address them; AVR can serve as an entry point for dialogue on SSR (and vice versa); and SSR and AVR programming are complementary (OECD, 2009, p. 111-112). The rest of this note elaborates these synergies in more detail, starting with assessment and design of programming (Chapter 2), subsequently looking at practical programming options (Chapter 3), then turning to mutual SSR and AVR entry points (Chapter 4) and finally discussing synergies in monitoring and evaluation (M&E) (Chapter 5).

Chapter 2

Assessment and design

Both Security System Reform and Armed Violence Reduction strongly advocate that diagnostic assessments of the local context are central to effective programme design, implementation and evaluation (OECD, 2007, p. 41; OECD, 2009, p. 60). SSR has a well-developed assessment methodology that is laid out in the OECD DAC's *Handbook on Security System Reform – Supporting Security and Justice*. It gives clear guidance for SSR assessments in the different subsectors of the security system and advocates for the inclusion of people's perceptions of security and security needs in SSR assessments. AVR promotes the combined use of specialised methodologies and tools that bring critical elements contributing to armed violence to the fore. Incorporating such an AVR focus in SSR assessments can help refine, enhance and refocus SSR towards its people-centeredness.[7] Incorporating an AVR perspective in SSR assessments can highlight which approach or combination of approaches is most likely to generate positive results. Additionally, an AVR focus in SSR assessments can assist in creating programmes that are more relevant to the specific needs of partner countries (in particular at the community level) and, thereby, are better received by its affected population. Community members are more likely to support activities they see as responding to their articulated concerns (OECD, 2005, p. 66), which can enable programmes to garner the local "buy in" that eludes many donor-driven SSR activities.

There are two ways in which an AVR perspective can be included in SSR assessments: *(1)* by applying the Armed Violence lens; and *(2)* by applying the specialised methodologies and tools AVR advocates.

Applying the armed violence lens in SSR assessments

The armed violence (AV) lens helps structure analyses according to people, perpetrators, instruments and institutions that influence levels of armed violence.

- The **people** component of the AV lens is primarily guided by the question: "What is needed to make individuals and communities feel safe and secure in the particular contexts in which they live?" (OECD, 2009, p. 51). This includes attention to the diverse perceptions of security needs that the different groups (gender, age, social identity) within these communities may have. Including this component in SSR assessments can help ensure an accurate picture of micro-level security needs of women and men as well as other groups and re-emphasise a people-centred SSR approach.

- The **perpetrator** component of the AV lens focuses on mapping the motivations (socio-economic, social status and identity, cultural factors, political identity and group status) of perpetrators and the ways in which they are organised by disaggregating data by gender, age, location and ethnicity (OECD, 2009, p. 53) (Box 2.1). SSR assessments – focusing heavily on security needs and institutional capacity – often give little explicit attention to the role of perpetrators. Yet, this information can help fine tune SSR assessments in order to effectively address perpetrators and contextual causes of insecurity.

- The **instruments** component of the AV lens draws attention to the supply and availability of weapons and ammunition, which pose a risk factor for armed violence. It also includes a focus on the demand

---

Box 2.1. Viva Rio in Haiti: How an AVR assessment revealed incentives for reducing violence

What works: The Tambou Lapè programme focused on reducing violence in Bel Air, an area in the centre of Haiti's capital Port au Prince. Through a process of extensive consultations with community members, the NGO Viva Rio found out, among other things, that both community members and gang leaders had vested interests in educating their local youth. This prompted an initiative that used collective incentives to reduce violence by introducing scholarship lotteries in communities that achieved concrete reductions in violence within specific timelines and neighbourhoods as part of Tambou Lapè programme.

Why it works: Investing time and resources into participatory assessments enabled Viva Rio to capitalise on local protection factors. A focus on the people and the perpetrators helped to reveal issues concerning the role of gangs in the community, their motivations and the reputation they maintained as both predatory and protective actors. This information then provided starting points for the design of activities directly linked to the common social concerns of both the community and gangs, and allowed setting concrete parameters on which to base indicators and benchmarks.

Source: Viva Rio (2009), *Honour and Respect for Bel Air*, Annual Report 2008, Haiti.

---

factors that drive people to acquire or retain weapons (Box 2.2). In order to create an effective, efficient and accountable security system, SSR assessments need to include a focus on the capacity of the sub-sectors and the system as a whole to effectively deal with the prevalence of instruments of violence.

- The **institutions** component of the AV lens distinguishes between the formal and informal institutions that regulate and control the use of armed violence. SSR focuses primarily on the formal institutions *i.e.* those bodies and actors, state or non-state, delivering security and justice services. The informal institutions are the social and cultural practices, norms and values that organise social behaviour and form the rules of the game for armed violence.

In particular, application of the AV lens in assessments of the sub-sectors of the security system emphasises and highlights important issues that would be underemphasised or overlooked in regular SSR assessments. Table 2.1. lists aspects that are (re-)emphasised when the AV lens is incorporated in SSR assessments, per sub-sector of the security system.

Box 2.2. SALW assessment in Burundi: A focus on people, perpetrators, instruments and institutions

What works: A community-level assessment done in Burundi sought to provide valuable information regarding the impact of the presence of weapons in a community, citizens' motivations for obtaining weapons initially and for retaining them despite disarmament campaigns. It was revealed, for instance, that people characterised insecurity brought about by weapon ownership as a disintegration of community trust. Popular perceptions of weapons, weapon owners and disarmament campaigns were also discussed. Perpetrators were often identified as former combatants who failed to reintegrate and turned to armed crime or mercenary work as an economic recourse. Instruments were often obtained to commit crimes or resolve disputes, but rarely for personal protection. The instruments could be hired out, illustrating the degree to which criminal weapons possession had been (informally) institutionalised. And the implication of the police and army in the lending of weapons further demonstrated the involvement of formal institutions.

Why it works: All of the information gathered in the community assessment is essential for focusing disarmament campaigns on the appropriate risk and resilience factors within the given context, thereby showing options for specifically targeting those factors that could strengthen the local community disarmament strategy.

Source: Forbes, A. (2007), *Rapid Assessments of the Impact and Perceptions of Small Arms in the Burundi Interior*, DanChurchAid and Conseil National des Eglises du Burundi.

Table 2.1. **Issues (re-)emphasised when using the armed violence lens in SSR assessments and programme design**

Sector	People	Perpetrators	Instruments	Institutions
Accountability and oversight	Capacity of civilian oversight committees and civil society oversight; decentralised accountability structures for all sectors of SSR; mechanisms which enable public complaint reporting	Criminal collusion with security and justice actors; corruption and immunity undermining the rule of law	Legislation on public gun ownership; regulation and tracking measures for legally purchased weapons	Informal or traditional mechanisms of oversight; local cultural systems of accountability; local perceptions of legitimacy and how to establish it; impunity undermining the rule of law
Defence reform	Perceived threats from military forces; perceptions of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programme beneficiaries; community needs for accepting DDR beneficiaries	Human rights abuse within military ranks; unemployed ex-combatants; ex-combatants excluded from DDR; incentives for disarmament; DDR programmes for vulnerable groups, in particular women and children	Capacity in effective stockpile management; capacity for management of de-issued arms (in DDR programmes); (ex) combatants' use and perception of weapons after discharge	Military role in internal (in)security; resistance to budget cutting of military; corruption and abuse of power within military; legal framework for defence forces role in providing security
Intelligence and security	Respecting human rights standards while engaging with citizens to gain local insights valuable to security; identifying trends of violence that excessively affect certain groups (including a focus on gender based violence [GBV])	Human rights abuses by intelligence service and security forces	Capacity to collect and analyse intelligence on weapons trade and weapons presence; responsibly sourcing the knowledge of men and women about weapon depots, hidden caches, trade routes etc.	Capacity and legal framework for intelligence and security forces

Table 2.1. **Issues (re-)emphasised when using the armed violence lens in SSR assessments and programme design** *(continued)*

Sector	People	Perpetrators	Instruments	Institutions
Integrated border management	Patterns of human trafficking; patterns of streams of refugees or victims of armed violence; patterns of influx of migration leading to chaotic urbanisation	Capacity to address trans-national crime syndicates; violence motivated by control of ports and border territories; unregulated passage of perpetrators across borders	Capacity to control weapons import and export; capacity for stockpile management of border management forces	Legal frameworks governing border management and migration departments and agencies; relations with neighbouring countries; corruption and collusion of border guards; capacity for addressing human trafficking
Police	Relations between police and societal groups (*e.g.* men, women, youths, minorities); decentralised mechanisms of accountability; level of responsiveness and capacity to respond to local concerns; capacity to provide assistance to victims, including specialised procedures for assisting victims of GBV; public expectations of security provision	(History of) human rights abuses within police ranks; criminal collusion or infiltration of police; level of police knowledge of perpetrators' motives, strategies; specialised tactics to address motivations and violent behaviour of perpetrators; level of police knowledge and capacity to deal with perpetrators of GBV	Capacity to track and manage weapons issued to police; capacity to enforce public arm regulations and laws; use of force training; weapons training; capacity to manage disarmament programmes	State of facilities; capacity of organisational management; protection and promotion of rule of law; human rights training; cultural attitudes regarding GBV; levels of corruption; existing local/informal security initiatives and links to formal structures
Justice	Accessibility of courts; trust in the court system/level of "vigilante justice"; personal security of judges, prosecutors and witnesses; informal justice networks	Corruption and "purchasable" justice; "catch and release" pattern of criminals; prosecution of banditry, interpersonal offenses	Capacity to prosecute public arms violations; legal framework and penalties for illicit arms possession	Legal framework for the protection of vulnerable groups' rights (domestic violence, GBV); impunity and corruption undermining rule of law; condition and function of facilities; informal justice institutions

Sector	People	Perpetrators	Instruments	Institutions
Prison	Separate prisons for women, men, children; (dis)trust in prison security; rehabilitation of prisoners	Human rights abuse by prison actors; collusion of criminals and prison guards; corruption	Availability of arms in prisons; stockpile management of confiscated weapons; prison personnel involvement in arms supplies	Integrity and security of facilities; corruption of prison guards; overcrowding leading to premature release
Private security and military companies (PSC/PMC)	Need for private security companies to fill gaps left by state security (security vacuum)	Human rights abuse by PSCs/PMCs, including sexual violence	Regulation of arms held by private security and military companies; demand factors for PSC/PMCs	Legitimacy and perceptions of need of companies; legal regulation; legal authority to use force; conflict or co-operation with state forces
Civil society	Public definitions of legitimate representation; belief in civil society's capacity to gauge, analyse and represent society's needs and concerns and to monitor risk factors	Role of local power-holders; issues of capture and collusion; capacity to monitor and represent victims of GBV	Knowledge of demand factors for weapons; knowledge of local perception of weapons; citizen movements or campaigns against arms; knowledge of sources and locations of arms	Integration of violence into local culture; regulatory framework for NGO operations; reputation of organisations within community and public institutions; groups' legitimate representativeness, including representation of gender, age and minority groups

Innovative assessment techniques

AVR recognises existing assessment methods, such as population-based surveys, stability and fragility assessments, conflict assessments, gender analysis and criminal justice and governance assessments but promotes combining these existing tools and data sources, to uncover the likelihood for violence and factors that can be targeted in programming (OECD, 2009, p. 41, p. 61). Among these methods, the public health approach for instance, offers a population-based analysis of the patterns, concentrations, risk factors and protective factors of armed violence. As in traditional epidemiology, which uses rigorous data collection techniques to map the causes and prevalence of a health risk within a population, public health approaches to armed violence

assessment aim to methodically deduce factors that increase or reduce the likelihood of violence, or the likelihood of a person becoming either a perpetrator or victim of violence (World Health Organisation (WHO), 2009a). This information can be used to enhance preventative responses at multiple levels, such as state interventions (including SSR programmes), legislative policies, municipal and community-based initiatives.

Box 2.3. **Types of security knowledge generated by the public health approach**

The results of a public health approach include quantified measures of:

- **What is happening**: Are particular types of violence (*i.e.* gun-shot, domestic abuse, rape, armed robbery, etc.) disproportionately prevalent?

- **Where it is happening**: Are particular areas more or less prone to violent acts than others?

- **To whom it is happening**; Are particular groups (women, men, girls, boys, ethnic groups, other minorities, etc.) more or less vulnerable to victimisation? Similarly, are particular groups more or less likely to become perpetrators?

- **When it is happening**: Do certain seasons, dates, or hours of the day see a significant amount of violent incidents? Are certain periods notably calm or less likely to be disrupted by violence?

- **How often it is happening**: Is the frequency of violence consistent enough to constitute a trend?

However, such public health information is not always accessible or available – particularly in fragile contexts – and is typically labour-intensive and expensive to collect. In volatile environments, there is also a heightened risk of producing inaccurate results. The OECD Armed Violence Reduction policy paper provides examples of other innovative data sources and tools that can generate similarly detailed information, including Geographic Information Systems and technologies that enable the combination of multiple data sources – such as statistics collected by customs officials, police, development agencies – to help analyse patterns that may direct targeted responses (OECD, 2009, p. 69) (for an example from Haiti: Kolbe and Hutson, 2006).

Statistical data on trends such as incidents of crime, demographic developments or food prices, can track correlations between these events and the occurrence of violence, which may assist analysts in identifying and addressing risk factors.[8] Similarly, disaggregating data by gender, age, ethnicity and/or geography reveals any disproportionate effects of insecurity on certain

groups or concentrations of insecurity in particular locations. Conversely, measures of where, when and to whom violence is **not** occurring can expose factors of local resilience and point to aspects that **reduce** the likelihood of violence.

If the quality of the data allows, SSR policy makers and programme coordinators can use population-based studies to design activities that are accurately based on local realities, aptly scaled and implemented at the appropriate level. For example, where the presence or absence of violence is localised, the aberration may indicate risk or resilience factors that are unique to a single community, and programming therefore may need to target this community in particular. By contrast, if certain trends are found consistently across several areas, this may signal systemic problems requiring effort to be channelled through more municipal or national reforms. Rigorous statistical evidence also has leveraging power to mobilise political means of addressing patterns of insecurity. Including statistical and public health experts in assessment teams may facilitate the generation and use of this type of data.[9]

Box 2.4. **Sierra Leone: Sexual abuse as a weapon of war**

What works: Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) utilises the skills, expertise and credibility of health professionals in campaigning against Human Rights violations. PHR conducted a comprehensive population-based study, assessing the prevalence and impact of sexual violence among Internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Sierra Leone. Employing rigorous scientific methodology and sampling techniques, the PHR researchers could record accurate statistics and make reliable extrapolations to document the nature and pervasiveness of the abuses reported in the survey. The study revealed, among other things, characteristics of the perpetrators, assistance needs of the victims and indicated the systemic use of sexual abuse by Revolutionary United Front (RUF) soldiers as a weapon of war. Their work, carried out with support from the United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and local aides, produced a report that was used to convincingly advocate for the Special Court on Sierra Leone and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to give priority attention and guarantee reparations to the victims of sexual violence.

Why it works: Epidemiological assessments and population-based studies are designed to accurately depict the occurrence of particular threats within a wider context. Collecting such information and presenting it in quantifiable terms can convey the distribution, outcomes and risk factors of violence. In Sierra Leone the study was made possible through the assistance of UNAMSIL, pre-existing population statistics and the existence of large IDP camps. These factors facilitated both access and necessary conditions for proper sampling – two common obstacles to conducting epidemiological studies in (post-)conflict areas.

Source: Thoms, O.N.T. and J. Ron (2007), "Public health, conflict and human rights: toward a collaborative research agenda", *Conflict and Health*, Vol. 1, No. 11.

Gender analysis of peace and security strategies and programmes has received greater prominence in line with the United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolutions on women, peace and security (notably SCR 1325 in 2000 and SCR 1820 in 2008). A focus on the impact of conflict on women, calls for their greater participation in peacebuilding as well as combating sexual violence in conflict, are framing greater attention to how security risks and situations are assessed and how programmes such as SSR and AVR can reflect these issues. In 2009, OECD DAC added a separate section of guidance on "Integrating Gender Awareness and Equality" in the widely-used Handbook on Security System Reform. Such adaptations continue to refine programme assessment and design. Overall, an AVR-SSR approach encourages a pragmatic

---

Box 2.5. Bangladesh: Community consultation process on SALW and an SSR programme

What works: Since Small arms and light weapons (SALW) and Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are considered an increasing security problem for Bangladesh, the Bangladesh National Forum Against Small Arms and the Non-governmental organisation (NGO) Saferworld undertook an extensive community consultation to identify safety and security concerns of communities related to SALW and IEDs. The consultations brought together the perspectives of 150 community representatives from 6 districts. They not only highlighted the role of SALW and IEDs as a source of human insecurity, but showed that the role of the police and border agencies was not always optimal. The border agencies were not able to control the trafficking and smuggling of arms whilst law enforcement agencies were in some cases a source of firearms. Consequently, the recommendations flowing from the consultation process involved the strengthening of the capacity of law enforcement agencies for stock-pile management and the strengthening of the Bangladesh Rifles – the agency responsible for border management – as well as the customs and immigration agencies. In addition, it was stressed that for effective policing (including on SALW and IED related matters) trust between communities and the police is important, and therefore programmes to reinforce community policing were recommended.

Why it works: The community-based consultations provided a grassroots perspective on SALW's impact on human security, generating valuable information for both national and international actors trying to develop policies and programmes to address these issues. The conclusions from the process highlighted gaps in the security sector and came up with recommendations to solve the challenges. Thus, the SALW consultations led to recommendations for a potential SSR approach. Moreover, the consultation process allowed local communities to engage with issues that were formerly dominated by the state, which is not only important in order to find solutions, but also for increasing cooperation between the state, community actors and citizens.

Source: National Forum Against Small Arms and Light Weapons and Saferworld (2006), *Challenges to Peace and Security: Consulting Communities on Small Arms in Bangladesh*, Saferworld, London.

---

and hands-on approach to assessment, where various tools are used flexibly to find an appropriate mix of methods for the specific context and are directly linked to programme needs, involving programme staff and beneficiaries from the outset.

Programme design

Locally focused assessment prompts awareness of community dynamics at the earliest phase of programming, during design and planning. Including a focus on issues highlighted by the AV lens in an SSR assessment and using population-based statistics to collect accurate knowledge of incidents and types of armed violence can help identify local complexities that need to be addressed through SSR programming. When subsequently setting up a programme, project coordinators need to ensure that due attention is given to each of the issues in the design of the objectives, beneficiaries, indicators for monitoring and evaluation and outputs of a programme. Incorporating this knowledge into design facilitates tailoring programme responses to the local-level where the impact of violence is often most acute and dynamics are most context-specific (Moser and McIlwaine, 2006).

Chapter 3

Synergies between AVR and SSR programming activities

AVR emphasis in SSR

Having used the AV lens and other (combinations of) innovative assessment methods to identify where SSR can be strengthened, the next step is to integrate these insights into actual programming activities. As in the example of Bangladesh in Box 2.5, applying an AVR focus to a security assessment can highlight certain aspects of AVR that need to be effectively addressed in

Table 3.1. **Ideas for SSR programme activities with an AVR emphasis**

SSR subsector	AVR emphasis in SSR
Police	Addressing the role of police officers as perpetrators, both towards women and men Capacity-building on responding to gender-based violence/domestic violence Capacity-building on addressing youth violence Capacity-building on monitoring crime and homicide rates Capacity-building on crime reporting systems and co-operation with public health systems
Defence	Addressing the role of (ex-) military as perpetrators both towards women and men
Justice	Addressing formal and informal institutions governing gun ownership and violent behaviour Addressing formal and informal institutions covering the protection of vulnerable groups Capacity-building to address land disputes Capacity-building on adjudicating gender-based violence/domestic violence Capacity-building on adjudicating youth violence
Civil society	Capacity-building on monitoring of armed violence, including violence perpetrated by actors in the security system Capacity-building in campaigning and advocacy on armed violence, including violence perpetrated by actors in the security system Capacity-building in campaigning and advocacy on gender-based violence/domestic violence

SSR practice. Another clear example of SSR incorporating an AVR empha-sis is the focus of many police and defence reform programmes on SALW management and disarmament (see for an example in Cambodia: Bourne and Greene, 2004). However, there are many other ways in which an AVR emphasis in SSR can enhance the effectiveness of SSR programmes.[10] Only a proper assessment can indicate what form such a synergy should take in a specific situation. However, in general, four sub-sectors were found to benefit in particular from an AVR emphasis: police reform, defence reform, justice reform and civil society. Table 3.1. gives a, by no means exhaustive, list of ideas for SSR programming with an AVR emphasis in these sectors.

Box 3.1. **Colombia: Police reform on domestic violence with a social service emphasis**

What works: The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) has recognised that domestic violence is a major problem in Latin-America and the Caribbean and has incorporated it as a focus in their violence reduction programming. An example of this can be found in Colombia, where the IDB's projects have included a focus on improving the interface between the police and victims of domestic abuse. To achieve this, the IDB projects involved the training of police officers on appropriately handling cases of domestic abuse. As part of this programme, the IDB's project in Bogotá also involved the establishment of "**family police stations**". These were multi-services stations that provided vic-tims of domestic abuse with access to policing, legal, psychological and medi-cal services in one location. In spite of some room for improvement in terms of enforcement and capacity to mediate physical aggression against women, the multi-service police stations were rated as "the most helpful public sector institution in addressing issues of domestic violence".

Why it works: The project in Bogotá shows an innovative way of emphasising social services as part of a police reform programme. The programme effec-tively integrated a focus on social assistance for victims of domestic abuse into a wider programme to improve police capacity in addressing domestic abuse and providing assistance to victims. By setting up multi-disciplinary family police stations, the police reform programme explicitly allowed a more holistic, multilevel and multi-sectoral approach to the issue of domestic violence.

Source: Alda, E., M. Buvinić and J. Lamas (2006), "Neighbourhood Peacekeeping: The Inter-American Development Bank's Violence Reduction programmes in Colombia and Uruguay", *Civil Wars,* Vol. 8, No. 2, p. 197-214.

Complementary AVR and SSR programming

Beyond including due focus on AVR aspects in SSR programmes, synergies can also be found between concurrent AVR and SSR programmes. Awareness of the comparative advantages of each approach and the complementarity of these comparative advantages, will ensure that the most effective combination between AVR and SSR can be coordinated while reinforcing the strength of each programme's niche activity.

Practically, these comparative advantages can be combined into positive synergies in a number of ways, amongst which:

- Sequencing of efforts – for example ensuring that SSR programmes build on existing AVR initiatives and vice versa. For more information see the chapter on entry points (Chapter 4).

- Combining of efforts: SSR programming (for example capacity-building of the police to address crime) can have a deterrent impact on crime, whereas AVR can target risk and protective factors for potential perpetrators of that same crime (youth employment schemes, etc.) as well as design programmes to incentivise local community members to engage in violence reduction (for an example from Haiti, see Box 2.1).

- Formal and informal institutions: SSR targets more formal institutional reforms of the security provision bodies (with some level of attention to non-state actors in justice and security). AVR can work in tandem on reforming informal institutions (*i.e.* the practices, norms and values that organise social behaviour) connected to violent behaviour.[11]

- Table 3.2. gives a few practical suggestions and ideas – by no means exhaustive – for complementary SSR and AVR programmes.

Table 3.2. **Ideas for complementary AVR and SSR programmes**

AVR programme	SSR programme
Neighbourhood watch groups; citizen emergency response teams; community safety initiatives	Community-policing training programmes for police forces; public outreach campaigns to increase police relations with communities
Mechanisms for anonymous reporting of abuse by security forces	Appointing official ombudsman
Gender-sensitive youth programmes to reduce risk of recruitment or victimisation	Specialised and gender-sensitive DDR programmes to address youth violence; gangs that recognise the distinct roles of men and women in conflict and armed violence
Community disarmament; changing gendered cultural and social norms that support weapons possession	SALW stockpile management programmes for police and defence forces; DDR programmes for former soldiers

Table 3.2. **Ideas for complementary AVR and SSR programmes** *(continued)*

Supporting local peace councils to resolve non-violent disputes	Capacity building of local justice/mediation systems
Security forums between community and state actors	Creating public oversight and accountability mechanisms
Awareness raising campaigns for communities and children on mines and unexploded ordnance	Training of specialist de-mining units
Crime reduction through community development, "convivencia" programmes, alcohol reduction programmes	Crime reduction through capacity building of police and justice sector to respond to and prosecute crimes and assist victims
Rehabilitation projects for perpetrators; development and implementation of alternative sentencing programmes	Capacity-building of justice and penal systems to pursue, prosecute and sentence perpetrators; implementing parole systems or time limits on pre-trial detention to reduce prison numbers
Awareness raising campaigns/sensitisation on GBV/ domestic violence; changing gendered cultural and social norms that support GBV; assistance programmes (shelters and services) for victims of domestic/sexual violence	Legal reform on GBV/domestic violence (addressing formal institutions); capacity-building of security institutions on gender and procedures for dealing with victims of GBV; ensuring fair representation of men and women in the security bodies
Care for youth involved in violence or substance abuse; campaigning to change social norms and mindsets that contribute to youth violence	Capacity-building of police, justice and prison sectors on addressing youth violence, prosecution and incarceration

Another way in which programmes can be mutually sensitive is by ensuring communication between the different programmes and the actors involved in them. By ensuring that stakeholders in SSR programmes are aware of what is happening in AVR programming and vice versa, connections can be made where necessary.

Box 3.2. **Skopje: Combining an existing SSR programme with a new AVR initiative**

What works: The community of Old Town, in Skopje, Macedonia, suffered from high levels of pick-pocketing and theft, drug dealing, prostitution, armed robberies and assault. The police were perceived as weak and distrust of the police was high. With international support a bike police unit was established, but this proved ineffective. In this context, **Saferworld,** with a local partner, implemented a community safety programme, starting by having 9 focus group meetings with different community stakeholders to identify priorities in their security concerns. An "Action Working Group on Safety and Security in the Skopje Old Town (AWG)" involving representatives of a community NGO, the municipality, the local police station, the police bike team and the local business association was set up to address the priorities. In consultation with the police the AWG identified a way to restructure the organisational set-up of the police station so that more patrols could take place at no additional cost. At the same time, several community actions were taken to address crime, including removing stalls from illegal vendors that narrowed passage ways, installing anonymous crime reporting boards and the hiring of a private security group as an additional crime deterrent measure. The combinations of measures led to a modest decrease in recorded criminal incidents, including armed violence.

Why it works: The approach started by identifying priorities by community members themselves. It then involved all relevant stakeholders, including representatives from existing police stations and earlier reform projects in the working group to carry out the action plan. This ensured easy and quick communication with the relevant institutions. It also seems to have allowed for smooth connections to existing programmes, and for addressing both the formal institutional level and community level activities.

Source: Saferworld (2006), *Creating Safer Communities: Lessons from South Eastern Europe*, Saferworld, London.

Chapter 4

Entry points

SSR as an entry point for AVR

In some cases, governments may be wary of local level interventions and will want to control interventions closely. This is especially the case in situations of internal conflict where the government is fighting one or more rebel groups, as for example in Sri Lanka. In such cases, the government may be more open to discussions on institutional reform of the security institutions than on discussions of broader AVR involving communities. Once these reforms are initiated, efforts can be made to open up discussions with the national authorities and advocate for complementary AVR programming. A particular opportunity for this can be found when institutional and technical approaches fall short of expected results. This can be the case when an SSR programme is not able to address the security needs of communities as experienced on the ground. An example of this can be found in Haiti, where initial programmes by the UN heavily targeted institutional capacity but, in light of the limited effectiveness, evolved into more community-based AVR programmes.[12] Also in cases where SSR programmes are in fact yielding good results, additional AVR programmes can be particularly reinforcing and complementary, as in many cases where small arms reduction and legislation efforts have formed part of SSR programming.

AVR as an entry point for SSR

Circumstances common to fragile contexts, in which the state is unable or unwilling to effectively deliver security, justice and other services to all its citizens, can critically hinder the practical implementation of SSR. In such a situation, an SSR approach may not be the most appropriate entry point for programming, given that working with state institutions is very difficult and likely to be ineffective in increasing the delivery of security and

justice services to the local population. An extreme example of this situation is Somalia. Under this type of condition, it may be more effective to start with community based AVR programmes, which, besides more immediately addressing justice and security needs at the local level, can also provide an opening for SSR programming at a later stage.

Similarly, this approach can be taken where state institutions are abusive and/or where there is a large amount of distrust amongst the population towards them. Building local level security initiatives as well as working with local/non-state security and justice actors[13] can provide a basis for discussing reforms of the security institutions and foster the population's trust required to enhance governance in areas where the state previously had no access.

Another way that AVR can facilitate the introduction of SSR programmes is by virtue of its people-centred focus, evidence driven methods and advocacy work. For example, the AV lens for people and perpetrators may prompt investigations into corruption, weakness, or abuse within one or several of the state security sectors. If evidence can be substantiated, presenting this information to local governments or international donors may help to mobilise the political support needed for implementing SSR programmes (for an example from Sierra Leone, see Box 2.4).

Box 4.1. **Community security teams in Cali: An AVR entry point for community policing reform**

What works: In Cali, Colombia, youth Community Security Teams (CSTs) were set up to provide basic security for neighbourhoods that were considered too dangerous for policing patrols to enter. The CSTs were given organisational support as well as training in first aid and personal security by a local community peace council (DESEPAZ). After CSTs were accepted and legitimised by the community, cooperation with the local police was initiated through community-policing reform and formal law enforcement could gradually be reintroduced.

Why it works: Success in this case was attributed to the ability of the CSTs to improve security conditions, garner the community's support and initiate a more positive relationship between the local police and the local people. Building this rapport principally requires that state security forces become familiar with local programmes and explore the benefits of co-operation. Similarly, it is necessary for community-based projects to establish an organisational structure conducive to partnering with local authorities or (inter)national security forces operating in the area.

Source: Hill, R., J. Temin and L. Pacholek (2007), "Building Security Where There Is No Security", *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development,* Vol. 3, No. 2, p. 38-51.

Chapter 5

Monitoring and evaluation

Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) is the practice of tracking the progress of a programme, determining what changes it has brought about and gauging the greater implications of those outcomes. AVR and SSR each make distinct contributions to M&E, which reflect their particular approaches to establishing security and stability. AVR emphasises the role of the local context and people, particularly in developing M&E indicators (OECD, 2009, p. 73). SSR's treatment of M&E is oriented toward programme management, particularly as a tool for process appraisal and adjustment (OECD, 2007, p. 71). The contributions of each primarily fall within: *(a)* developing indicators and *(b)* involving local stakeholders.

Developing indicators

Within M&E, **indicators** are precise descriptions of evidence that can measure the level of change brought about by a programme. Identifying indicators at the planning stage helps to clarify project objectives and enables baseline assessment, which allows a programme's progress and impact to be measured against initial conditions. The SSR Handbook suggests evaluation criteria that follow general OECD standards for assessing development programmes, broken down into the following categories: **relevance**, **effectiveness**, **efficiency**, **impact** and **sustainability**. Additionally, a description is given on important characteristics of indicators, such as measurability, context-specificity, clarity and feasibility (OECD, 2007, p. 72). The AVR policy paper contributes insight on adapting indicators to local levels and specific projects (OECD, 2009 p. 73). When designing indicators, the complementarity of these approaches highlights a focus on, among others:

- what indicators best reflect manifestations of violence as experienced by local men and women, boys and girls

- which manifestations of violence can be realistically targeted; which are beyond the reasonable scope of the programmes' impact

- what local behaviours can be used to indicate popular attitudes, beliefs and/or perceptions; how might those behaviours vary between different impacted groups

- what indicators are specific to the micro-level and thereby offer more acute evidence for the impact of a specific programme at the local level

- what existing data sources (*i.e.* school attendance records, medical clinic records) could supply relevant information without having to develop new monitoring systems

Involving local stakeholders: Ownership and frontline capacities

Developing locally attuned indicators opens a valuable opportunity to include local stakeholders in the early stages of programme design, ensuring that expectations are realistic and fostering a common vision of success held by the donor, recipient state and communities. While both SSR and AVR note the importance of involving local partners, their reasons for doing so reflect their distinct approaches. SSR emphasises the participation of local stakeholders in programme evaluations as part and parcel of building both local ownership and state-society relations within the partner country (OECD, 2007, p. 242). AVR accentuates how local participation in M&E enables programmes to access local insight and capitalise on the rooted position of community members for rapid monitoring and response. Moreover, including local stakeholders in the development of benchmarks and indicators increases the capacity of the community for research and advocacy (OECD, 2009, p. 73). This can fortify longer-term civil society oversight of the security forces, which contributes to the sustainability of reforms in the security system.

Developing local knowledge and skill in systematic data collection, recording and reporting, as well as data analysis for M&E on issues of security and armed violence (with a gender focus) are just a few examples of how donors can effectively partner with local actors whilst encouraging local ownership and increasing long-term sustainability. What is more, implementing ongoing local monitoring programmes can work as an early warning system and improve the level of knowledge on issues such as corruption. This could enable local partners, given their frontline proximity, to engage in rapid-response and preventative activities.

Box 5.1. **Mali: Participatory monitoring and evaluation**

What works: Citing the critical need to recognise the value of local perceptions, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) conducted a study highlighting the benefits of participatory monitoring and evaluation (PM&E) approaches. Premised on the idea that positive outcomes must be apparent to the affected communities in order for disarmament campaigns to be successful, UNIDIR applied PM&E to assess the local impact of a weapons collection programme in Mali. Community members and programme beneficiaries identified a range of indicators that they felt were relevant to and significant of the programme's outcomes. These indicators, often qualitative, described observable behaviours that local stakeholders used to assess, *inter alia*, security and the restoration of social capital in their community. This was presented as an alternative to applying pre-determined, and often strictly quantitative, indicators – such as number of weapons collected – which do not always reflect local standards of success.

Why it works: PM&E was applied to create monitoring practices that emphasise how local stakeholders perceive their situation and the programme. Given that M&E indicators often receive a great deal of attention from donors and practitioners, including accurate portrayals of local expectations and assessments in M&E criteria can allay conflicting interpretations of success between local and foreign stakeholders. The study elicited several indicators of how a particular community defined security, how they understood the disarmament programme and how they believed they could contribute to it. Such information could also work to manage expectations, encourage sustained monitoring from the ground, as well as bolster local ownership by providing clear and concrete venues for local input.

Source: Mugumya, G. (2004), *Exchanging Weapons for Development in Mali: weapons collection programmes assessed by local people*, UNIDIR (United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research), Geneva.; Muggah, R. (2005a), *Listening for a Change! Participatory Evaluation of DDR and Arms Reduction in Mali, Cambodia and Albania*, UNIDIR, Geneva.

Notes

1. In keeping with the OECD terminology and definitions, this paper will use the term Security System Reform, however it is recognised that this is not the only term used to refer to SSR-style programming. Other terms include, amongst others, Security Sector Reform, Security and Justice Reform (SJR), Security Sector Development (SSD) and sometimes Rule of Law programming. Although the term used in this paper is Security System Reform, the paper's ideas are equally applicable to other programmes with similar objectives, regardless of the terminology.

2. Chapter 7 of the *OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform* (OECD, 2007) discusses programming for each of the sectors and indicates, per sector, the relevant linkages with other sectors of the security system, which need to be considered in programming. Please refer to this chapter for a more detailed explanation of the various programmatic options.

3. Children and youth form a particularly important category for AVR programming. For more information on programming for youth violence reduction programming, see the OECD's programming note on this.

4. One clear example is the *OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform* (2007).

5. In that sense, SSR can be seen as a statebuilding effort, as "it attempts to reinforce the positive reciprocal relations between a state that delivers services for its people and social and political groups who constructively engage with their state" (Wyeth and Sisk, 18 June 2009, p. 5, citing OECD (2008), *Statebuilding in Situations of Fragility: Initial Findings*).

6. In that sense, AVR could be considered a peacebuilding approach, which "involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development" (Wyeth and Sisk, 18 June, 2009, p.5, citing *Conceptual basis for peacebuilding for the UN system* adopted by the Secretary-General's Policy Committee, May 2007). However, AVR is broader than peacebuilding, in that it addresses many more factors than the national capacities at all levels for conflict management.

7. However, an AVR approach in assessments should not replace existing assessment methodologies. Rather, it can help draw together several assessment methodologies and make assessments and hence programming more sensitive to armed violence.

For a more detailed explanation, see: "Chapter 4: Assessments: Applying the Armed Violence Lens" (OECD, 2009).

8. An example from Colombia demonstrates how the correlation between armed violence and alcohol consumption led to municipal restrictions on liquor sales, which is purported to have effectively reduced homicide rates (Atwood, Glatz and Muggah, 2006, p.26).

9. The public health approach involves a very technical form of research, requiring specialised training in data collection, survey design, sampling techniques, and statistical analysis. Contracting assessment projects to epidemiologists – particularly those familiar with conflict research – or including them as part of assessment teams and programme staff can facilitate this process. For further discussion, see: Thoms and Ron (2008).

10. Another example of an integration of an AVR emphasis in a police reform programme can be found in the Community Based Policing programme in Kenya. For more information on this, see: Saferworld (2008), *Implementing Community-Based Policing in Kenya*, Saferworld, London.

11. For examples of how informal institutions can be addressed, see: WHO (2009b).

12. UNDP DDR 3rd Quarterly report cites SC/RES/1702 (2006) which "recognises the limitations of a DDR approach... and further recognises the role of the community in preparing the Republic of Haiti for gradual withdrawal of [Peace Keeping Operations]... This resolution is the successful outcome of a long and tough struggle undertaken by the DDR Integrated Section since mid-2005, advocating that...an innovative strategy with a strong focus on *'putting weapons beyond use in the context of community security approach'* must be developed." (UNDP, 2006).

13. For a discussion of the policy and conceptual issues involved in working with local/non-state justice and security actors, see: Scheye (2009b).

Bibliography

Alda, E., M. Buvinić and J. Lamas (2006), "Neighbourhood Peacekeeping: The Inter-American Development Bank's Violence Reduction programs in Colombia and Uruguay", *Civil Wars,* Vol. 8, No. 2, p. 197-214.

Atwood, D., A. Glatz and R. Muggah (2006), *Demanding Attention: Addressing the Dynamics of Small Arms Demand,* Small Arms Survey and QUNO (Quaker United Nations Office), Geneva.

Banal, L. and V. Scherrer (2006), "ONUB and the Importance of Local Ownership: the Case of Burundi", in *Security Sector Reform and UN Integrated Missions,* eds. Hänggi and Scherrer, DCAF (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces), Geneva.

Barltrop, R. (2008), *Country Study: The Negotiation of Security Issues in the Burundi Peace Talks*, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Geneva.

Bastic, M. (2008), "Integrating Gender in Post-Conflict Security Sector Reform". Policy Paper No. 29, DCAF, Geneva, w*ww.dcaf.ch/publications/ kms/details.cfm?lng=en&id=90764&nav1=5,* accessed 13 April 2010.

Bercovitch, D. (2009), *Tambou Lapé, a positive experience on youngsters' exit of armed violence*, Comunidad Segura, *www.comunidadesegura. org/en/STORY-Tambou-Lape-a-positive-way-out-from-armed-violence*, accessed 2 October 2009.

Bigerty II, R. and N. Ondiak (2009), *Haiti's Changing Tide: A sustainable security case study*, Center for American Progress, Washington, DC.

Bourne, M. and O. Greene (2004), *Armed violence, governance, security sector reform and safety security and access to justice,* CICS (Centre for International Cooperation and Security), Bradford, *www.brad.ac.uk/acad/ cics/publications/AVPI/briefing/AVPI_SSR_Briefing_Paper.pdf*, accessed 21 August 2009.

Buvinić, M., E. Alda, and J. Lamas (2005), *Emphasizing Prevention in Citizen Security. The Inter-American Development Bank's Contribution to*

reducing Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean, IDB (Inter-American Development Bank), Washington, DC.

Buvinić, M. and A. Morrison (1999a), *Preventing Violence. Technical Note 5,* IADB, Sustainable Development Department, Washington, DC, *www.iadb.org/sds/doc/SOCTechnicalNote5E.pdf,* accessed 22 December 2009.

Buvinić, M. and A. Morisson (1999b), *Controlling Violence. Technical Note 6,* IADB, Sustainable Development Department, Washington, DC, *www.iadb.org/sds/doc/SOCTechnicalNote6E.pdf,* accessed 22 December 2009.

CIGI (Centre for International Governance Innovation): Security Sector Reform Monitor (2009), *Haiti: May 2009 No.1*, CIGI, Waterloo, Canada.

Colletta, N. and R. Muggah (2009), "Rethinking Post-War Security Promotion", *Journal of Security Sector Management,* Vol. 7, No. 1.

Cuesta, J., E. Alda and J. Lamas (2007), *Social Capital, Violence and Public Intervention: The Case of Cali,* IDB, Washington, DC, *http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=973008*, accessed 22 December 2009.

Faltas, S. and W.C. Paes (2004), *Brief 29: Exchanging Guns for Tools. The TAE Approach to Practical Disarmament – An Assessment of the TAE Project in Mozambique,* World Vision and Bonn International Centre for Conversion, Germany.

Forbes, A. (2007), *Rapid Assessments of the Impact and Perceptions of Small Arms in the Burundi Interior,* DanChurchAid and Conseil National des Eglises du Burundi, *www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/spotlight/country/afr_pdf/africa-burundi-2007-1-Forbes-DCA-SALW.pdf,* accessed 22 December 2009.

Gauthier, A. and P. Bonin (2008), *Haiti: Voices of the Actors*, *Working Paper No.52*, FRIDE (Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior), Madrid.

Geneva Declaration (2006), *The Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence,* Geneva Declaration, Geneva, *www.genevadeclaration.org/fileadmin/docs/Geneva-Declaration-Armed-Violence-Development-091020-EN.pdf,* accessed 14 April 2010.

Geneva Declaration (2008), *Global Burden of Armed Violence*, Geneva Declaration, Geneva.

Hänggi, H. and V. Scherrer (2006), "Chapter 4: Recent Experience of UN Integrated Missions in Security Sector Reform", in *Security Sector Reform and Integrated Missions*, eds. H. Hänggi and V. Scherrer, DCAF, Geneva.

Henry L. Stimson Center (2008), *MINUSTAH,* Peace Operations Fact Sheet Series.

Hill, R., J. Temin and L. Pacholek (2007), "Building Security Where There is No Security", *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development,* Vol. 3, No. 2, p. 38-51.

ICG (International Crisis Group) (2006), *Haiti: Security and Reintegration of the State*, *Latin America/Caribbean Briefing No.12*, ICG, Brussels.

ICG (2007), *Consolidating Stability in Haiti*, *Latin America/Caribbean Report No. 21*, ICG, Brussels.

ICG (2008), *Reforming Haiti's Security Sector*, *Latin America/Caribbean Report No. 28*, ICG, Brussels.

ICG (2009), *Haiti 2009: Stability at Risk*, *Latin America/Caribbean Briefing No.19*, ICG, Brussels.

Neild, R. (1999), *The Role of the Police in Violence Prevention. Technical Note 9,* IADB, Sustainable Development Department, Washington, DC, *www.iadb.org/sds/doc/SOCTechnicalNote9E.pdf,* accessed 22 December 2009.

Kolbe, A.R. and R. Hutson (2006), "Human rights abuse and other criminal violations in Port-au-Prince, Haiti: a random survey of households", *The Lancet,* Vol. 368, p. 864-73.

Kristen, A. (2007), *Guns and Roses: Gender and Armed Violence in Africa,* UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), Geneva, *www.undp.org/cpr/documents/armed_violence/AV_gender.pdf,* accessed 13 April 2010.

Law, D.M. (2006), "Conclusion: Security sector (re)construction in post-conflict settings", *International Peacekeeping,* Vol. 13, No. 1, p. 111-123.

Leao, A. (2004), "Weapons in Mozambique, Reducing Availability and Demand", *Monograph No. 94*, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, *www.iss.co.za/pubs/Monographs/no94/Contents.html,* accessed 13 April 2010.

Mani, R. (1999), "Contextualizing police reform: Security, the rule of law and post-conflict peacebuilding", *International Peacekeeping,* Vol. 6, No. 4, p. 9-26.

Mobbek, E. (2006a), "MINUSTAH and the Need for Context-Specific Strategy: The Case of Haiti", in *Security Sector Reform and UN Integrated Missions: Experience from Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti and Kosovo*, eds. H. Hänggi and V. Scherrer, DCAF, Geneva.

Mobbek, E. (2006b), *MINUSTAH: DDR and Police, Justice and Correctional Reform in Haiti*, Action Aid, London.

Moser, C. and C. McIlwaine (2006), "Latin American Urban Violence as a Development Concern: Towards a Framework for Violence Reduction", *World Development,* Vol. 34, No. 1, pp.89-112.

Muggah, R. and K. Krause (2009), "Closing the Gap Between Peace Operations and Post-Conflict Insecurity: Towards a Violence Reduction Agenda", *International Peacekeeping,* Vol. 16, No. 1, pp.136-150.

Muggah, R. (2005a), *Listening for a Change! Participatory Evaluation of DDR and Arms Reduction in Mali, Cambodia and Albania*, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), Geneva.

Muggah, R. (2005b), *Securing Haiti's Transition: Reviewing Human Insecurity and the Prospects for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration*, Small Arms Survey, Geneva.

Muggah, R. (2008), "Guest Editorial: An armed violence prevention and reduction agenda", *Medicine, Conflict and Survival,* Vol. 24, No. 4, p. 255-259.

Mugumya, G. (2004), *Exchanging Weapons for Development in Mali: weapons collection programmes assessed by local people*, UNIDIR, Geneva.

Nindorera, W. (2007), *Security Sector Reform in Burundi: Issues and Challenges for Improving Civilian Protection,* Working Paper for CENAP (Centre d'Alerte et de Prévention des Conflits) and North-South Institute, Bujumbura, Burundi.

National Forum Against Small Arms and Light Weapons and Saferworld (2006), *Challenges to Peace and Security: Consulting Communities on Small Arms in Bangladesh*, Saferworld, London, *www.saferworld.org.uk/ images/pubdocs/Bangladesh%20report%20final.pdf,* accessed 8 April 2010.

OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) (2005), *Security System Reform and Governance,* OECD, Paris.

OECD (2007), *OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform. Supporting Security and Justice,* OECD, Paris.

OECD (2009), *Armed Violence Reduction. Enabling Development,* OECD, Paris.

OECD (April 2010), *Accelerating Progress Towards the MDGs in Conflict and Fragile Settings*, OECD, INCAF (International Network on Conflict and Fragility), Washington, DC.

Rathmell, A. (2009), "Security and Justice Development – What Next?", *Journal of Security Sector Management*, Vol. 7, No. 2.

Saferworld (2006), *Creating Safer Communities: Lessons from South Eastern Europe,* Saferworld, London, *www.saferworld.org.uk/images/pubdocs/ Creating_safer_communities_Dec06_%20English.pdf*, accessed 22 December 2009.

Saferworld (2008), *Implementing Community-Based Policing in Kenya*, Saferworld, London, *www.saferworld.org.uk/images/pubdocs/Report.pdf,* accessed 22 December 2009.

Santa Barbara, J. and G. MacQueen (2004), "Peace through health: key concepts", *The Lancet,* Vol. 364, p. 384-386.

Scheye, E. (2009a), *State-Provided Service, Contracting Out and Non-State Networks: Justice and Security as Public and Private Goods and Services*. OECD, INCAF, Paris.

Scheye, E. (2009b), *Pragmatic Realism in Justice and Security Development: Supporting Improvement in the Performance of Non-State/Local Justice and Security Networks*, Clingendael Institute, The Hague, *www.clingendael.nl/publications/2009/20090707_cru_local_justice_scheye.pdf*, accessed 18 September 2009.

Thoms, O. N.T. and J. Ron (2007), "Public health, conflict and human rights: toward a collaborative research agenda", *Conflict and Health,* Vol. 1, No. 11.

UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) (2006), *DDR Quarterly Report: Integrated DDR Section: UNDP–MINUSTAH*, UNDP, New York.

UNDP (2008), *UNDP Country programme document for Haiti (2009-2011),* UNDP, New York.

UNSG (United Nations Secretary General) (2009), *Promoting development through the reduction and prevention of armed violence (A/64/228),* United Nations General Assembly, New York.

Valasek, K. (2008), "Security Sector Reform and Gender", in G*ender and Security Sector Reform Toolkit,* DCAF, Geneva, *www.dcaf.ch/publications/kms/series_gssr-toolkit.cfm?nav1=5&nav2=6,* accessed on 13 April 2010.

Veen, E. van (2008), "Reverse Stakeholder Mapping: On the Need for Actor-Based SSR Strategizing in Post-Conflict Environments", *Journal of Security Sector Management,* Vol. 6, No. 2.

Viva Rio (2009), *Honour and Respect for Bel Air, Annual Report 2008*, Viva Rio, Haiti.

WHO (World Health Organisation) (2009a), *Violence Prevention Alliance: The Public Health Approach,* WHO, Geneva, *www.who.int/violenceprevention/approach/public_health/en/index.html,* accessed 22 December 2009.

WHO (2009b), "Changing Cultural and Social Norms that Support Violence", *Violence Prevention the evidence,* WHO, Geneva, *http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2009/9789241598330_eng.pdf,* accessed 22 December 2009.

Wyeth, V. and J. Sisk (2009), "Rethinking Peacebuilding and Statebuilding in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries", Unpublished discussion note for the OECD-INCAF, Geneva.

ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT

The OECD is a unique forum where governments work together to address the economic, social and environmental challenges of globalisation. The OECD is also at the forefront of efforts to understand and to help governments respond to new developments and concerns, such as corporate governance, the information economy and the challenges of an ageing population. The Organisation provides a setting where governments can compare policy experiences, seek answers to common problems, identify good practice and work to co-ordinate domestic and international policies.

The OECD member countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. The European Commission takes part in the work of the OECD.

OECD Publishing disseminates widely the results of the Organisation's statistics gathering and research on economic, social and environmental issues, as well as the conventions, guidelines and standards agreed by its members.

Linking Security System Reform and Armed Violence Reduction

PROGRAMMING NOTE

To help experts and practitioners working to tackle the problem of armed violence, three Programming Notes build on the 2009 publication entitled *Armed Violence Reduction: Enabling Development*. These three notes cover:

- Armed violence in urban areas
- Youth and armed violence
- The linkages between Armed Violence Reduction and Security System Reform (SSR)

www.oecd.org/dac/incaf

432011121E1