Preventing and Reducing Armed Violence in Urban Areas

PROGRAMMING NOTE

OECD

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Foreword

Armed violence is an everyday reality for millions of people around the globe. More than 700 000 people die as a result of armed violence each year. Many more experience traumatic loss in their families and are left with lasting psychological and physical scars. The impact of armed violence extends further, negatively influencing development, peace and good governance, often by creating a climate of impunity, corruption and by undermining public institutions. It is also closely tied with transnational crime and the misery and abuse associated with the illegal trafficking of arms, drugs and people. Finally, the economic impact of armed violence is striking with the cost of lost productivity due to non-conflict armed violence alone estimated to cost upwards of USD 95 billion annually worldwide. This violence has important youth and gender dimensions. The majority of perpetrators and victims are men, while women and girls are at greater risk of violence that is less visible and committed in the private sphere, including intimate partner violence, child abuse, sexual and gender based violence. Measures at reducing armed violence are therefore also measures at reducing human suffering.

The OECD DAC policy paper *Armed Violence Reduction: Enabling Development,* published in 2009, acknowledged as a challenge the increased levels of armed violence in non-conflict countries, the increasing linkage between conflict and crime, rapidly growing youth populations in the south and accelerating levels of unregulated urbanisation. The paper provided a methodology to help donors tackle the programming challenging of reducing armed violence. Building on the OECD DAC policy paper, three programming notes were developed to contribute to our understanding of specific types of armed violence: **Youth and armed violence**, **armed violence in urban areas** and **Security System Reform in relation to Armed violence reduction**. Each note aims to improve our understanding of these dynamics while also offering practical assistance on assessments, programme design, risk management, monitoring and evaluation, as well as on entry points for direct and indirect programming.

2011 is an important year for global efforts at Armed violence reduction with a series of regional best practice seminars as well as the high-level

conference on Armed violence reduction in the context of the Geneva declaration on armed violence and development, scheduled for October 2011. I strongly encourage the use of these programming notes to strengthen our understanding of these critical development issues and to support new innovative programmatic guidelines for Armed violence reduction.

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Acknowledgements

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List of abbreviations

ADR	Alternative Dispute Resolution
AVR	Armed Violence Reduction
CBO	Community-based Organisation
CCV	Conflict, Crime and Violence
CDD	Community Driven Development
COPRODEP	Council of the Participatory Development Project
CPTED	Crime Prevention through Environmental Design
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration
DESEPAZ	*Programa Desarrollo, Seguridad y Paz* (Programme for Development, Peace and Security)
ECD	Early Childhood Development
FGC	Family Group Conferencing
GIS	Global Information System
IADB	Inter-American Development Bank
ICPC	International Centre for the Prevention of Crime
INCAF	International Network on Conflict and Fragility
INURED	Interuniversity Institute for Research and Development
IRC	International Rescue Committee
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

PRODEPPAP	*Projet Pilote de Développement Communautaire Participatif à Port-au-Prince*
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SSR	Security System Reform
UN	United Nations
UN HABITAT	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WHO	World Health Organisation
YCCR	Youth for Change and Conflict Resolution

OECD Armed Violence Reduction (AVR) programming notes

Approximately 740 000 people die as a result of armed violence each year. Armed violence erodes governance and peace whilst slowing down achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG's). It can have as significant an effect on security and development in settings of chronic violent crime and inter-personal violence as it can in societies affected by war or civil conflict. An armed violence agenda therefore includes a wide range of countries, cities and citizens whose development and security are under threat. It refers to the use or threatened use of weapons to inflict injury, death or psychosocial harm.

To help desk officers and conflict/fragility experts who are working to tackle the problem of armed violence, OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members have requested three *Armed Violence Reduction (AVR) Programming Notes* to build on the OECD DAC policy paper on *Armed Violence Reduction: Enabling Development* (OECD, 2009). The three notes cover:

- **Armed violence in urban areas***:* The majority of the world's population now lives in urban centres. As economic transformations accelerate rural-urban migration, the rural poor are being converted into an urban poor who populate mega-slums on the periphery of major urban centres. More and more of these areas are afflicted by high levels of armed violence.

- **Youth and armed violence:** The largest-ever generation of young people is now entering adulthood. Almost half of the world's population is under the age of 24 and the vast majority of 10-24 year olds live in less developed countries. Youth are particularly at risk of being exposed to and engaging in, armed violence and crime.

- **AVR and Security System Reform** (SSR): AVR and SSR have similar objectives and are mutually reinforcing. But they also have their distinct methods, entry points and comparative advantages. It is important to understand the linkages between the two approaches in order to maximise the impact of public safety and security interventions.

To ensure an effective response to armed violence, the programming notes use an armed violence "lens", which was developed in *Armed Violence Reduction: Enabling Development*. The lens helps practitioners consider the key elements shaping armed violence patterns. These include the **people** affected by armed violence, the **perpetrators** and their motivations, the availability of **instruments** (arms) and the wider **institutional/cultural environment** that enables and/or protects against armed violence. The lens highlights risk factors associated with armed violence and their vertical linkages from the local to the global level. It encourages practitioners to think outside specific sector mandates and provides practical entry points for AVR programming.

Armed violence prevention and reduction are feasible but require significant leadership by affected states and investment of financial resources by donors. They also require the ability to engage with non-state and subnational actors. Finally, evidence suggests that effective interventions need a good evidence base, participatory assessments and the simultaneous engagement in multiple sectors (reflecting the broad range of interrelated issues and actors involved), at multiple levels (local, national, regional and global) and over a longer time horizon.

Chapter 1

Cities and violence

For the first time in history, urban centres[1] are home to half the world's population and are expected to absorb almost all new population growth over the next 25 years (United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN HABITAT), 2007). With this unprecedented urbanisation have come many challenges, not the least of which is climbing rates of murder and assault in many urban areas. As a result, urban violence reduction and prevention are now a top policy concern for governments and donors.

The relationship between cities and violence is more complex than often assumed. While many cities are plagued by high levels of violence that threaten development, there is nothing inevitable about violence in cities. In the first place, cities are not always more violent than rural areas.[2] Nor are more crowded cities always more violent: cities like Santo Domingo, Guatemala City and Kathmandu, have very high murder rates in relation to their population,[3] but other very large cities such as Dhaka, Mumbai and Cairo have homicide rates below the national average (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2007). Additionally, research suggests that some types of violence, especially domestic violence, may be more prevalent in rural areas rather than cities (World Health Organisation

(WHO), 2005). What does seem to matter is the rate of growth of a city. A review of 50 countries found a strong, positive correlation between the annual rate of growth of a city and the murder rate (World Bank, 2010).

Today's cities – especially those that are growing very quickly – experience a convergence of factors that put them at risk for destabilising levels of violence if they are not appropriately addressed. Cities have the potential to be prime sites for violence prevention, because resources and services are concentrated there and geographical proximity facilitates outreach to communities and households. Yet on the most basic level, many city governments and labour markets are simply unable to keep pace with urban growth. Recent migrants to the city may find that job opportunities are scarce, or perhaps even

worse than those they left behind. Structural inequalities are often more palpable in urban areas: a youth growing up in a slum next to a wealthy gated community is conscious every day that others do not live in the same conditions he experiences.[4] The sense of social exclusion that accompanies this is one of the most important triggers for reactionary violence, usually taken out on fellow community members (Galtung, 1996) and also creates fertile breeding ground for mobilisation of violence by political and economic power actors.

When these conditions combine with **inadequate government capacity** to provide basic services, including security, power vacuums are created that can be filled by non-state actors. As centres of power and conflict, cities are natural sites for criminal rent-seeking, or for political actors vying for the state's attention. In countries ranging from Brazil, to Pakistan and South Africa, entire sections of cities have fallen under the control of armed groups or "violence entrepreneurs", who use their control over territory and populations for political or financial ends.

Other key risk factors in urban environments have to do with the **disruption of social networks** that inevitably accompanies rapid urbanisation. Whereas in rural areas, kinship and ethnic networks can be relied upon for support and for controlling violence, in rapidly growing urban areas these networks are more tenuous (Kurtenbach, 2009). In more extreme cases, community leaders who could play a mediating role have been killed or silenced with fear of retaliation. In turn, young parents raising children in challenging urban environments where resources are scarce and where they are disconnected from family and other social networks that would support them, find it difficult to provide the sense of social connection their children need to develop non-violent coping skills.

Markets for firearms and illicit drugs are more prominent in urban areas, adding another layer of risk for violence. The proliferation of guns in these areas increases both the possibility that they will be used and that the resulting violence will be lethal. Drugs and violence interact in urban communities in a variety of ways, ranging from violent behaviour induced by drug use or motivated by the need to buy drugs, to social cleansing of drug users by armed groups, to violent gang activity to control territory for drug sales or to settle disputes in the drug trade (Moser and McIlwaine, 2004; WHO, 2010). Where drug networks become institutionalised in urban neighbourhoods, they may supplant the state, even to the extent of providing social services from food programmes to basic security. The drug trade exerts other indirect effects on violence through what Gaviria has termed "criminal externalities". These include the draining of criminal justice resources, an increased supply of weapons by drug groups and the creation of a drug culture that idealises easy money and violence as a way of meeting needs or getting ahead socially (Gaviria, 1998).

Structure of the note

This note considers practical approaches for reducing and preventing armed violence[5] in urban settings, using the AVR lens.[6] In the following chapter, it outlines the core characteristics of effective urban violence prevention programming and discusses strategies for assessment and programme design, followed by entry points for programming. Next, the note reviews the evidence base for direct and indirect programming, followed by a discussion of how common risks can be managed and implications for monitoring and evaluation. Empirical examples are given to illustrate examples of effective approaches and programmes.

Chapter 2

Characteristics of effective urban violence prevention programmes

Violence is highly context-specific and interventions to address it must also be tailored to the particular social, cultural, economic and political context. There are, however, some common characteristics that can be identified. Generally speaking, effective programmes tend to:

- **Be rooted in the context in which they will be implemented:** For this, effective programmes are ideally developed in partnership with the target community and based on solid knowledge of the challenges and capacities for addressing violence. This includes a solid understanding of the ways violence impacts different groups by gender and other factors.

- **Logically link problems to perceived drivers and to measureable outcomes:** This can be done by conducting an assessment of the violence problem and the factors that seem to driving it in an assessment. Next, these drivers are linked to actions that will address them and ultimately to desired outcomes (such as a reduction in violence, or changes in behaviour) that can be measured.

- **Draw on the evidence base:**[7] The reasons for using evidence-based programmes are both practical and ethical. Programmes that have worked elsewhere are more likely to be effective if adapted adequately. On the ethical side, it is problematic to experiment with human life and the potential consequences of ineffective or counter-productive programming are substantial. Therefore, in Latin America and, increasingly, in Africa, programmes have co-ordinated with Violence Observatories, which collect data from a variety of sources and agencies to provide the basis for evidence-based programming (see Chapter 3).

- **Address more than one risk factor:** Risk factors are characteristics of an individual or his/her environment that increase the propensity for violent behaviour.[8] Experience has shown that programmes tackling more than one risk factor tend to be more effective in reducing violence.

- **Engage multiple sectors:** No one government agency, with the possible exception of police, has violence prevention as its main priority. This means that violence is only a peripheral concern for most government departments. In addition, risk and protective factors for violence cut across various sectors. Because of this multi-dimensionality of drivers, interventions in one sector alone, or in various sectors done in isolation, are likely to either shift the problem elsewhere or duplicate efforts. The available evidence suggests that a key component for effective prevention is collaboration across multiple sectors (health, education, criminal justice), to ensure a more integrated response.

- **Intervene at multiple levels:** Working at the local level is essential in violence programming because it is closest to the affected populations and most responsive to local needs. However, because different levels of government perform different functions, it is necessary to work across these levels to address the different dimensions of urban violence and ideally locate local programmes within a national strategy for prevention. Donors and other external actors can support strengthening capacity for such coordination.

Chapter 3

Assessments and programme design

In high-violence situations, governments and donors never have a full picture of the situation at their disposal. The tendency is often to make assumptions about missing information, in order to plan actions. This is especially a problem when programmes are designed based on assumptions about the drivers and triggers for violence, without careful verification that these are indeed the factors driving violence. Instead, experience shows that it is better to recognise that some information is unknown, and perhaps cannot be known, than to base planning on assumptions.[9]

Violence prevention programming is most effective when it draws on a solid evidence base, including rigorous diagnostics of when, where, why and by whom violence is perpetrated. In higher-capacity contexts, this evidence comes from triangulating different sources of data, for example in violence observatories. In resource-poor contexts, conditions for large-scale data collection rarely exist and donors usually do not have time to build this capacity before developing programmes.

Effective AVR interventions in urban areas rely on solid assessments of the needs of the target community, the risk factors driving violence in the community and the existing capacities to address violence. In other words, assessments explore questions such as: what is the perceived problem of violence in this area of the city and what seems to be producing it? How is the community currently handling the problem and what capacities can be built upon to do it better? The assessment also identifies how different groups (women, youth, or others) participate in the problem and/or are affected differently by it and the groups that should be targeted for some kind of behavioural change.

Before moving on to the design phase, it is critical to discern the extent to which the target community is ready for intervention. If sufficient capacity doesn't exist, or security is too fragile, an intervention can put residents at more risk. There are, regrettably, examples of programmes that have put

community residents in harm's way. In these cases, other preliminary steps may need to be taken first.

Inclusive assessment for programme design

High-violence contexts present tough challenges for encouraging participation in decision-making. High costs, security concerns, tight timelines and fear of being perceived as taking sides often hinder donors from fully engaging communities in planning. Yet, few efforts are likely to be sustainable unless communities are included and have some ownership over the programmes to be implemented. These "insiders" are vital sources of cultural intelligence and internal divisions that affect programming. One good place to start is by setting up a committee or work group of key stakeholders to advise on the assessment, including community members, local research groups, women, youth and elders and others. This not only brings diversity in perspective to the assessment, but also increases trust between the target population and those collecting the data. Additionally, local stakeholders may be more aware of the available sources for data and culturally sensitive ways to obtain them (how to ask questions, whom to ask, times of day that are best for interviewing, etc.). It is critical at this stage to reach out to groups that are less accessible, for example mothers, former combatants/gang members, or other excluded or stigmatised groups. Best practice recommends documenting how these groups are included in the assessment and design of programmes.

Data sources

The scope of data collection for an assessment will depend on the intended area of programming. For example, an intervention in one community can rely primarily on data from that community, with perhaps some city-wide data for comparison. For programmes with broader coverage, regional or national data may be needed. It is important to find sources of data that are available at regular intervals, such as weekly or monthly police reports, that can feed into monitoring of programmes and form the basis for adaptation of the programme if needed. These can be combined with longer-term monitoring of trends over time.

In higher-capacity contexts, these data can be obtained from police reports, vital records, hospital records (*e.g.* emergency injury records and inpatient records), rehabilitation centres, registries, population-based surveys and other sources. Assessments can be done using simpler tools, such as rapid assessments, small-scale hospital surveys, small victimisation surveys or even baseline surveys (Box 3.1). These exercises provide an important space for practitioners to refine their analysis of the situation and the impacts of different programmes on

that situation. Smaller-scale assessments are also easier and more cost-effective to conduct on a regular basis, as is needed in fragile situations where the context can change rapidly. Where possible, joint assessments with other agencies can maximise the use of resources, including human resources of local leaders whose energy is often stretc.hed thin by the challenges of providing information to various donor agencies at once. In some cases, governments have maximised resources by adding violence indicators to regular data collection instruments used by public health or education institutions.

In Latin America and the Caribbean, **Municipal Crime and Violence Observatories** have emerged as sources for collecting data on the people, perpetrators, instruments and institutional responses to violence in urban

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Box 3.1. **Inclusive assessment and design**

In high-violence situations, there is a tendency to rush programming in order to respond to urgent needs. Experience is showing, however, that it pays to take time to foster a participatory decision-making process. Programmes such as the World Bank's Community Driven Development and the United Nations (UN) Community Violence Reduction programmes do this by bringing communities together to identify development goals, define priorities and implement small projects. These programmes have been successful in contexts as diverse as the Philippines, Indonesia, Liberia, Haiti and China. Although violence prevention is not a direct objective, they have contributed to a "peace dividend" in many conflict and high-violence contexts because they give (often competing) groups a stake in development.

Fostering inclusion in programme design also means assessing the security needs of different social groups in order to best meet those needs. Some groups – for example women, youth, or minority ethnic or racial groups – may be more at risk of victimisation or perpetration, depending on context. Including diverse voices in programme design can help identify these needs and risks as well as foster more ownership over the means to address them.

Some Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have gone even further to make participatory processes a condition of funding. Pact, an international NGO focused on development and capacity building, does this by allocating a separate budget for participatory processes in communities. Community organisations are trained in tools such as stakeholder analysis and community mapping and funded to spend four to five days in communities with supervision by Pact staff, discussing needs and priorities. By keeping the budget separate and providing training, Pact has greater assurance that the beneficiaries in the communities are truly part of the decision-making process and that the eventual projects will have greater community ownership.

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areas. Informed by the public health approach to prevention,[10] observatories typically involve partnerships across the health, criminal justice and other sectors, who agree to share data on violence that can inform comprehensive prevention strategies. Violence data can be drawn from a variety of sources, including death certificates, vital records, hospital records, police crime statistics, court records and population surveys. The establishment of these observatories in various cities in Colombia is credited with helping design community programmes that contributed to dramatic reductions in homicide rates.

Employing the AVR lens for assessment

The AVR lens emphasizes the people affected by armed violence, the perpetrators of violence and their motives, the instruments used and the broader institutional/cultural environment that enables or protects against violence. Applied to urban violence prevention programming, an AVR assessment would explore the following areas:

People: An assessment of an urban area seeks to understand what needs to be done so that people feel safe and secure in their communities. It could begin by asking: How are men, women, youth and other groups affected differently by armed violence? Are there certain groups that tend to be victimised more often or more intensely? What characteristics do they share (such as age, gender, geography)? Where, when and why are they most vulnerable? How do people define their security needs? Are there particular times of day when people feel most vulnerable in their neighbourhoods? The assessment should also discern the existing capacities to confront violence: what mechanisms are people currently using to stay safe? What kind of capacity is available for organising collectively to confront the problem (*i.e.* what are the current programmes in place, the people who might be mobilised for the programme, etc.)?

Perpetrators: Understanding who the perpetrators of violence are, the forms of violence they use and the motivations driving their behaviour is critical to addressing urban violence. Male and female perpetrators, for example, will have different motives, victims and use different means to inflict violence. These differences matter for designing interventions. Are youth gangs driving fear and violence in this area, or is domestic violence a greater issue? How important are structural factors (governance, social or political exclusion) in motivating violence, compared to proximate drivers such as availability of alcohol or drugs? On the capacity side, can former perpetrators be identified that can be leaders or role models for other at-risk individuals? What community capacity exists to re-integrate perpetrators?

Instruments: This dimension emphasises availability of the means to commit armed violence, including weapons and ammunition. Questions for assessment could focus on the supply and availability of these means to perpetrators (who is providing them and how can they be obtained?), cultural norms that may drive or protect against the tendency to use weapons and the capacity of criminal justice institutions to control the supply and use of weapons.

Institutions: Finally, the institutional environment in which violence occurs is important. This includes the formal laws and informal social rules governing violent behaviour. Questions concerning the role of formal institutions could examine regulations on purchasing weapons or alcohol. Are police available and accessible in this area and do residents trust them to intervene to control violence? What role do social and informal institutions play? In areas of rapid urbanisation, social norms may be disrupted such that social control over violence is loosened. The anonymity experienced in dense living conditions may be another important factor governing behaviour in urban neighbourhoods. At the same time, community institutions such as youth groups or elders may be vital resources for promoting violence prevention, if adequately supported.

Moving from programme assessment to design

The task of programme design is to select the priority risk factors to be targeted and existing capacities that can be supported in addressing violence. Key questions to ask include: which risk factors seem most prevalent or are driving the most severe outcomes in this neighbourhood or municipality? Is there a group of risk factors that seem to be working together and that could be addressed together? For example, are limited educational, employment and recreational opportunities for youth combining with availability of alcohol and guns to drive a problem with youth violence? Which risk factors are best addressed within the budget and time constraints?

The next task is to define the objectives of the programme. These should specify the particular changes that are desired in the risk factors. For urban violence prevention, objectives are usually related to desired changes in attitudes, knowledge, skills or behaviour. They should also clearly define the target groups. Finally, programme design should consider how the programme fits with the values and practices of the target community. For further resources on programme design, see the list of resources at the end of this note.

Chapter 4

Entry points for AVR programming

Determining the appropriate entry points for programming will depend on the risk factors that have been prioritised during the assessment. For example, if the risk factors are situated mostly at the **community and family levels**, then these institutions may constitute the best entry points. An emerging body of evidence points to communities and neighbourhoods as key resources in designing violence prevention interventions. The effects of violence are felt most acutely at the community/neighbourhood level, so that even small, short-term interventions can be effective in providing visible, immediate results. Focused projects at the neighbourhood level can be scaled up later to the programme and policy levels once support is established for longer term interventions. In the process, they can contribute to a bottom-up process of strengthening state capacity and accountability.

The assessment also helps determine the **existing institutional capacities** to address violence, which itself is an important entry point. Even in the most violent contexts, people develop coping mechanisms to survive the daily reality of violence. These can include individual coping behaviours, as well as collective mechanisms, such as informal reconciliation bodies.[11] The challenge for donors is to identify the elements of existing mechanisms that contribute to security and violence prevention and use these to define project entry points.

Box 4.1. **The importance of strong leadership**

Experience from various countries shows that urban violence prevention programmes need solid commitment and leadership at a high level, from someone who can take responsibility for keeping crime and violence on the policy agenda. This has often been the mayor, chief executive or another official at the local government level.

Source: International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC), 1999.

Other entry points have to do with **existing resources** that urban residents can mobilise. Space is one – buildings that are not being used can be renovated for use as meeting spaces for service delivery, youth programmes or cultural centres. There may also be human resources available to draw on, such as community leaders, technicians and professionals who can assist in development efforts. Finally, labour resources can be harnessed to implement construction or other service projects. Labour-intensive infrastructure projects have had important successes in mobilising communities, as have community clean-up campaigns (Llorente and Rivas, 2005). Overall, channelling existing resources toward common development goals can help establish a "peace dividend" that gives urban residents a greater stake in reducing violence.

Building on existing capacities extends to engaging with **municipalities**, who are on the frontlines of urban violence prevention. Indeed, most demand for support in violence prevention today comes from municipal governments. Many municipal governments have had success in reducing violence by enforcing local by-laws to address drivers of violence, especially restrictions on the sale of alcohol and firearms. For example, the Development, Security and Peace Programme (DESEPAZ) in Cali, Colombia implemented a series of strategies to prevent violence and improve security through local by-laws. The Interventions included efforts to enhance public security by enforcing existing state and city regulations and using the mayor's office to issue new decrees and laws. For example, the mayor restricted the hours during which alcoholic beverages could be sold. Similarly, the high proportion of homicides committed with guns prompted prohibitions on the carrying of guns in public during high-risk weekends, holidays and election days.

In urban areas, **service provision** tends to be a strong source of grievances or conflict between groups if coverage is perceived as uneven. Basic services projects can present a good opportunity for communities to work together and build better relationships of tolerance. As one example, Viva Rio's approach in Rio de Janeiro and Bel-Air, Haiti, involves mobilising local service providers and youth to deliver basic services like water and sanitation,[12] thereby helping to reduce an important driver of violence.

Chapter 5

Direct AVR programming in urban areas

Direct programming for Armed Violence Reduction explicitly aims to reduce or prevent violence. Interventions can be implemented through one sector or across sectors. Generally speaking, more effective initiatives have generally involved multiple sectors at once. This is due to the fact that, firstly, risk factors for violence fall within the areas of focus of various sectors and, secondly, that co-ordinating across multiple sectors helps avoid duplication of efforts. Combining long and short-term interventions is also more effective: often immediate-term, quick-impact interventions such as police training can be combined with longer-term programmes to change cultural norms around violence for more comprehensive results. This section first discusses direct programming by sectors and then covers successful multi-sectoral programmes. Note that all programmes have not been evaluated to the same standard: we include available information about evaluations on each intervention and provide sources.

Violence is most often managed through the **criminal justice sector**, responsible for the arrest and detention of violent perpetrators. An emerging approach, **"hot spots" policing** is based on the recognition that crime and violence are rarely random, but rather tend to be concentrated in particular geographic areas and occur at particular times of the day. The approach uses homicide and victimisation data to locate high-crime areas and target law enforcement to these.[13] The approach has also been applied in Belo Horizonte, Brazil, through the *Fica Vivo* (Stay Alive) programme. This programme used various data collection methods to identify homicide hotspots and aimed to control crime through a mix of police intervention and social programmes, with a focus on youth.

Another variant of hot spots policing, **problem oriented (result oriented) policing**, focuses on service to the community and the notion of pro-active intervention, rather than a reactive response to crime. The goal is to identify problems that arise, to analyse the causes and to tailor responses accordingly (ICPC, 2008). **Community policing** aims to reduce crime through community

partnership, defining policing "as something not done *to* people but *with* people" (*The Economist*, 2009). It focuses on working with and engaging the community and community structures in a partnership approach to identify, respond to and solve crime and disorder problems that affect the local community (ICPC, 2008). In post-conflict countries, community policing is a form of security sector assistance that can effectively be provided from peacemaking, through humanitarian and development stages of assistance. The proximity to the population that community policing entails also facilitates the ability of police to give more attention to the needs of more vulnerable groups, such as women, elderly and youth.

Also within the criminal justice sector, **alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms** have been shown to be effective for resolving conflict and increasing trust**.** They aim to resolve conflicts out of court and have been deemed promising for increasing access to justice for marginalized communities. They often fit within a broader **restorative justice approach**, which aims primarily to address the harm done to individuals or a community by a criminal action, rather than on punishing the offender. A common element,

Table 5.1. **AVR direct programming for urban violence prevention**

AVR Lens	Entry Point	Entry Point
People	Criminal Justice	Community policing; alternative dispute resolution
	Health	Hospital protocols to identify and serve victims; prenatal care; nutrition; awareness-raising programmes
	Education	School-based prevention programmes on non-violent conflict resolution; anti-bullying programmes
Perpetrators	Criminal Justice	Restorative justice programmes; family group conferencing; reintegration of perpetrators
	Health	Rehabilitation services for perpetrators, including recovery from their own victimisation
Instruments	Criminal Justice/ Security	Disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration (DDR) programmes; Small arms and light weapons (SALW) programmes
	Health	Raising awareness about gun violence
	Education	Education campaigns to address culture of weapons/violence
Institutions	Criminal Justice	Improving police capacity for "hot spots" or intelligent policing; building community policing capacity
		Improving police/ legal procedures for addressing gender based violence (sensitivity training for police, women's police stations)
	Health	Building institutional capacity for victim response
	Education	Curricula for violence prevention in schools; social inclusion; peace building
	Multi-sectoral	Crime and violence observatories for data collection; programme design

> ### Box 5.1. **The Boston gun project**
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> *The Boston gun project*, later known as Operation ceasefire, was a problem-oriented policing initiative aimed at addressing the problem of gun violence in Boston, Massachusetts. The project created a working group, which consisted of law enforcement personnel, youth workers and researchers, to analyse the underlying causes of the problem. Based on the analysis, they implemented Operation Ceasefire, which focused on a small number of chronically offending gang-involved youth responsible for much of Boston's youth homicide problem. Police patrolled regularly to check that offenders on probation were in compliance with their probation orders. The project also established a coalition between the police and social workers to come up with effective measures to prevent gang violence. The total crime rate declined by 29 percent and the rate of violent crime was lowered by 16 percent.
>
> *Source:* World Bank, 2003.

Family Group Conferencing (FGC), convokes families of both the perpetrator and the affected person or group to discuss the impacts of the action, determine appropriate reparations and devise a plan for the perpetrator and his/her family to ensure positive behaviour in the future. In New Zealand, FGCs are mandated for juvenile offenders and restorative principles are also available for adult offenders.

Other ADR mechanisms include **community-based mediation and arbitration centres**, aimed primarily at increasing access to justice for marginalised populations. Many Latin American countries, including Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia and Costa Rica, have developed *Casas de Justicia* (House of Justice) that provide information on the law and justice system so that people have a better understanding of their rights. *Casas de Justicia* also offer conflict resolution services, which involve professionals from various sectors, such as educators, psychologists, lawyers and police officers. Colombia first launched *Casas de Justicia* in 1995. Today, there are 40 *Casas de Justicia* providing services, including conflict resolution, to the most marginalised populations. With their services, people are able to resolve their disputes peacefully. They have served over 90 000 people, exceeding the original expectation. In Bolivia, *Centros Integrados de Justicia* (Integrated Justice Centres) have been established in remote regions to provide access to law and justice and other services to marginalised populations, particularly Indigenous Peoples (ICPC, 2008). Honduras has developed "mobile justice of the peace courts," consisting of buses operating as mobile judicial offices that serve marginal areas of Tegucigalpa and San Pedro (World Bank, 2010).[14]

Other criminal justice approaches aim to enforce local by-laws that address triggers for violence, such as controlling the sale of weapons and alcohol. **Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Control Programmes** have been successful in some cases. These evolved from the national weapon buy-back programmes to community-based weapon control approaches (OECD, 2009). One example is the Weapons Lotteries in Port-au-Prince, Haiti by the non-governmental organization Viva Rio.

A fundamental component of prevention in high-violence communities is providing immediate services to victims of violence. **Public health** sector interventions include both services for victims of violence as well as preventative initiatives. Promising improvements to victim services include improving hospital and clinic protocols for identifying victims of violence, documenting cases and connecting victims to other needed services. Some developing countries, including Bangladesh, Malaysia, Namibia and Thailand, have established one-stop crisis centres at the national level, which offer a range of integrated services to victims of child abuse, intimate partner violence and sexual violence (Box 5.2). Psychosocial interventions, such as psychological debriefing and cognitive behavioural therapy, are also used to address victims' mental health problems that include anxiety, post traumatic stress disorder and depression.

Box 5.2. **Victim support programmes in Malaysia**

A **One-Stop Crisis Center** was first established by emergency department staff in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in 1993. It aimed to provide a co-ordinated inter-agency response for victims of sexual violence. In 1996, the Ministry of Health issued a directive to all government hospitals to establish a one-stop crisis centre. By 1998, 94 centres were operating in public hospitals around the country, providing a range of integrated services to address child abuse, intimate partner violence and sexual violence. Their services include medical, psychological, social, forensic and legal services at a single location.

Source: WHO, 2007; 2009.

Other direct programmes within the health sector are aimed at **raising awareness** about armed violence and its impacts, changing attitudes and values that tolerate violence and providing information about services to vulnerable groups. Some programmes have used the media for this, such as one successful intervention in Western Nigeria that targeted female street hawkers in the city (see Box 5.3). More effective interventions have tended to target a range of actors, including potential perpetrators, groups vulnerable to victimisation and service providers.

> ### Box 5.3. **Preventing violence against street hawkers in Nigeria**
>
> An intervention to **prevent violence against female street hawkers in Western Nigeria** was successful in reducing physical and sexual violence. The intervention took place in three cities located in south-western Nigeria: Abeokuta, Ibadan and Osogbo, which are the capital cities of Ogun, Oyo and Osun States respectively. The programme developed educational materials for street hawkers, their friends and families, police and justice officials. Next, a series of trainings for street hawkers was conducted to discuss the findings of the survey, raise awareness on the definition and impact of violence (including sexual harassment, rape and assault), provide information on the services available to victims, develop assertiveness skills and give information on alternative livelihood opportunities (entrepreneurship programmes). Separate trainings for police and judicial officers were conducted on the vulnerability of street hawkers to violence and the importance of arresting perpetrators as a deterrent.
>
> An impact evaluation concluded that the intervention was effective in increasing awareness of different forms of violence against hawkers and in increasing reporting of violence. The evaluation also showed a reduction in physical violence and a significant drop in sexual violence over the course of the programme. These results show the importance of taking gender into account in understanding the needs of different groups and designing ways to improve their security.
>
> *Source:* Fawole et al., 2003.

Within the **education** sector, **direct school-based armed violence prevention programmes** have shown promising results: feeling a sense of connectedness to one's school has been shown to be one of the most important protective factors against violent behaviour and other risky behaviours, making schools a key site for intervention to reduce violence (World Bank, 2008). Programmes include training in non-violent conflict resolution and positive social skills. Several governments have also adopted anti-bullying programmes that engage teachers and other school officials to decrease aggressive behaviour.

The importance of engaging multiple levels of government

Generally speaking, more effective initiatives have involved multiple sectors. No single government agency, with the possible exception of the police, has violence prevention as its main priority. This means that violence is only a peripheral concern for most government departments. In addition, risk factors for violence cut across various sectors, from deficiencies in health care and nutrition, to issues with leaving school early, to unemployment and poor

infrastructure. Taken together, the multi-dimensionality of violence and the fact that no one agency is mandated to address all of its dimensions, speaks clearly to the need for sharing responsibility for violence prevention across sectors. Interventions in one sector alone, or in various sectors done in isolation, are likely to either shift the problem elsewhere or duplicate efforts. The more effective approaches to prevention have involved co-ordination across multiple sectors. For example, enforcing local by-laws to restrict alcohol and gun sales, coupled with the establishment of mediation centres to promote nonviolent conflict resolution and public education on preventing crime and violence helped reduce the homicide rate by an estimated 44 percent between 2002 and 2005 in Diadema, Brazil (Duailibi *et al.*, 2007). In addition, multi-sectoral co-ordination offers more opportunities to combine long and short-term interventions. Often immediate-term, quick-impact interventions, such as police training, can be combined with longer-term programmes to change cultural norms around violence for more comprehensive results.

Box 5.4. **Multi-sectoral, multi-level intervention in Côte d'Ivoire**

The project, **Protection from Gender-Based Violence in Côte d'Ivoire**, implemented by International Rescue Committee, aimed to prevent sexual violence against women by *(i)* raising awareness about the issue, *(ii)* providing assistance to victims and *(iii)* improving co-ordination between and the capacity of local organisations and state institutions to respond to and prevent violence, including the armed forces, UN agencies and government ministries. The project was implemented from May 2008 to November 2009.

A key element of the project's success was its focus on co-ordination among international agencies, local groups and multiple levels of government. Components on the national level included a national media campaign, training of security forces to sensitise them to the problem of gender-based violence, improve their response to victims and strengthening of service providers to handle the expected influx of victims following the awareness-raising campaign. A second component focused on building co-ordination mechanisms at the national level to ensure a synchronised response from all actors involved in gender-based violence programming in the targeted area at various levels of government.

An evaluation determined that 711 survivors had been served and 46 000 reached through awareness-raising activities. The number of survivors receiving assistance increased by 48.6 percent between 2008 and 2009. Additionally, the percentage of people surveyed who indicated that awareness campaigns contributed to changing their attitude towards sexual violence against women reached 83.1 percent.

Source: International Rescue Committee (IRC), 2009.

Most effective programmes also involve multiple levels of government. Working at the local level is essential in violence programming because it is closest to the affected populations and most responsive to local needs. However, because different levels of government perform different functions, it is often necessary to work across multiple levels to address the different dimensions of urban violence. Local efforts are more likely to be effective if supported by a regional or national framework on violence prevention.

Chapter 6

Indirect AVR programming in urban areas

Indirect AVR programming refers to initiatives that do not have armed violence reduction as their primary objective, but that address risk factors for armed violence in some way. These can range from urban development interventions, over education and child development, to youth employment and skills training programmes.

One of the most promising approaches is **Early childhood development (ECD)**. Evidence from programmes in various countries demonstrates that investing in high-quality ECD programmes – including health care, nutritional support, mental stimulation, parenting training and educational activities – yield some of the strongest impacts on risky behaviours from violence to criminal activity and substance abuse (Schweinhart *et al.*, 2005; United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), 2007; World Bank 2008).

Programmes to improve school enrolment and reduce dropouts are also key indirect interventions to reduce armed violence among youth. Leaving school early is recognized as one important risk factor for youth violence. To address this, some governments have implemented **conditional cash transfer programmes** to provide incentives for students to stay in school. An assessment of Mexico's *Oportunidades* programme documented an increase in secondary school enrolment by eight percent for girls and five percent for boys and an increase in grade completion by ten percent; similarly, Brazil's *Bolsa Escola* programme reported lower dropout rates (0.4%) for participants compared to non-participants (5.6%) (Guarcello *et al.*, 2006). Other policy changes that have shown an effect on dropout rates are eliminating expulsion requirements for pregnancy or loosening them for behavioural problems (World Bank, 2008). Other programming options are second-chance and after-school programmes, which have shown promise in the Caribbean and Brazil.

Violence prevention components are increasingly being incorporated into broader **urban upgrading** projects. These take two forms: situational prevention and social prevention. Situational prevention focuses on transforming the

built environment to reduce opportunities for crime and violence. The Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) approach is the most prominent method for this. It includes three elements: *(1)* natural surveillance, *(2)* the control of natural access points to public spaces and *(3)* natural territorial reinforcement. Designing public spaces to attract people of different generations and backgrounds invites a broad range of potential users to gather and increases the sense of belonging and ownership. An example is to build a park to include sports areas as well as play areas for smaller children and benches for senior residents. CPTED interventions are promising in that they reduce opportunities for crime as well as citizens' fear of crime. For example, in South Africa, the environmental designs including the improvement of lighting in public transportation, reorganisation of bus terminals and reducing the distance between services alleviated the feeling of insecurity among citizens (ICPC, 2008).

Social prevention in urban upgrading seeks to take advantage of the investments in infrastructure and social programmes and mainstream prevention at the local level to the overall project. For example, the World Bank has included social prevention within the Barrio-Ciudad urban upgrading project in Honduras. The component is aimed at reducing the high levels of youth homicide, youth violence and associated risk factors in the targeted neighbourhoods and municipalities. It includes diagnostics through a mapping exercise using Global information systems (GIS), official data and community-based assessments; situational prevention through CPTED design; social prevention through support to conflict resolution bodies, alternative livelihoods and skills development, family support and recreational opportunities; community and municipal liaison officers who carry out diagnostics, formulate plans and coordinate with Community Safety Councils (also supported by the project); and a monitoring and evaluation component.

Community-driven development programmes aim to create a "peace dividend" in high violence communities by bringing people together around shared development goals. The World Bank has promoted this approach as a way to give communities a bigger stake in development in contexts as diverse as Indonesia, Haiti, Afghanistan and the Philippines. In this approach, communities form committees to prioritise development goals and then are given responsibility for implementing small projects (World Bank, 2006). The United Nations' Community Violence Reduction approach uses a similar method, putting communities in charge of developing a work plan and carrying out small projects in high-risk areas. While many of these initiatives have been successful in building trust and collective action toward commonly-defined goals, it is important not to ask too much of communities. That is, community approaches are limited in what they can achieve in communities and ideally should be linked to broader, structural interventions.

Box 6.1. **Community-driven development in Port-au-Prince Haiti**

The World Bank implemented a pilot Community-driven development CDD project in Cite Soleil and Bel-Air, two slums in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area. The pilot project, Projet Pilote de Développement Participatif a Port-au-Prince/Urban Community Driven Development Pilot Project in Port-au-Prince (PRODEPPAP) aimed to mitigate conflict/violence and support stabilisation in targeted slum areas by *(i)* quickly providing improved access to basic services and income generation opportunities to beneficiary community groups or associations; and *(ii)* contributing to strengthen the social cohesion and capital in the targeted communities.

An evaluation of the pilot concluded that PRODEPPAP was successful in helping to create and strengthen social cohesion through the creation of development committees/councils (COPRODEPs), made up of representatives from 138 Community-based organisations (CBOs) from Cité-Soleil and 105 CBOs from Bel-Air. The COPRODEPs were able to successfully prioritise and allocate resources for the implementation of community subprojects that were proposed and implemented by CBO members themselves through a participatory and inclusive process. The project was also able to achieve participation of local government authorities, which served to improve the relationship between local government and civil society, in terms of helping local government representatives to better understand and address their constituents' needs. Based on the success of the pilot, a national-level urban CDD project was launched in 2009.

Source: World Bank, 2009.

Youth development and inclusion is gaining ground as an indirect approach to the problem of youth violence. In violent contexts, youth confront a host of incentives to engage in violence, whether via formal conflict, organised crime or neighbourhood gangs. Young people usually have a more difficult time finding stable jobs that pay adequate wages than adults. Particularly at-risk youth have less access to information about job availabilities and training opportunities because of their limited social network. They may also face stigmatisation due to prior involvement in violence or association with particular social groups. Employment services can indirectly work to reduce the risk of youth involvement in violence when they include career guidance, education, skills training and social services and are connected to the labour market (Cunningham *et al.*, 2008). In Colombia, the Youth for Change and Conflict Resolution (YCCR) programme aims to reduce juvenile crime and violence by creating economic opportunities for youth (ICPC, 2008). Bogota and Cali have experienced a high rate of poverty and unemployment among youth, which further encouraged youth to join paramilitary groups and street

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Box 6.2. **Youth development in the Dominican Republic**

The World Bank-supported **Youth Development Project in the Dominican Republic (DR)** combines a Youth and Employment Programme (Juventud y Empleo) with the Second Chance Education Programme toward reducing violence. The 2005 DR Poverty Assessment and Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) both pointed to the lack of viable job opportunities in the country as a factor in the notable increase in crime and violence during the late 1990s and early 2000s. The Youth Development Project offers training and internships to at-risk youth and provides high school dropouts with evening and weekend schooling in order to complete their degrees. Key outcomes achieved after the first impact evaluation included ten percent higher wages for participants, higher quality of employment as measured by employer-sponsored health insurance. However, it is important to note that the programmes have not been evaluated for their direct impact on violence reduction specifically, but for their indirect impact via improved access to alternatives.

Source: Card et al., 2006; World Bank, 2006.

Box 6.3. **Youth inclusion in Liberia**

In post-conflict **Liberia,** the **Youth Education for Life Skills** programme combined training in nonviolent conflict resolution and strengthening self-esteem with a media and outreach campaign to educate older residents about the situations of youth. Over time, people in the communities began to see youth as a positive force for development and give youth more access to assets and opportunities in the community. Greater integration of youth also means giving youth – often a majority group – a stronger voice in decisions that affect them, by supporting greater political participation and youth-led initiatives. Projects may include youth members on their decision or implementation boards, for example. The project was evaluated and determined to have been successful in improving youths' knowledge and life skills and their integration in the community. The project was not evaluated on violence outcomes, but perceptions of the community were that the training had changed attitudes of youth about violence and contributed to reductions in violent behaviour.

Source: Mercy Corps and United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 2006.

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gangs. The YCCR programme offers vocational training and facilitates job placement for at-risk youth in local organisations and businesses, including grants to youth-led micro-enterprises. According to the project evaluation, more than 1 000 youths who went through training have found permanent jobs.

Youth recreation programmes also aim to reduce violence by providing safe spaces and healthy alternative activities for youth in urban areas, by supporting music groups, sports teams and other activities. While these programmes are popular in many high-risk areas, few have been rigorously evaluated for their impact on violence reduction.

Box 6.4. **After school programme to reduce violence in Brazil**

The Open Schools *(Abrindo Espaços)* Programme was launched by UNESCO in 2001 and adopted by the Brazilian Ministry of Education in 2004 as a public policy entitled Open School: Education, Culture, Sport and Work for Youth Programme. The programme offers sports, cultural, arts and leisure activities and initial work training for youth on weekends. The evaluations have shown its success with relation to a reduction in the levels of violence registered in schools and their surroundings. In São Paulo, the Open Schools programme, known locally as the Family School, was implemented in 5 306 schools between 2003 and 2006 and helped reduce criminal acts by 45.5 percent.

Source: World Bank, 2008; UNESCO, 2007.

Chapter 7

Managing programming risks

High-violence environments are fraught with risks. Probably the most significant risk is that of doing harm by **reinforcing or deepening existing divisions**. One consequence of chronic violence is that people and communities often do not trust one other. These divisions may persist over generations. There is often fierce competition for attention from the state and for donor resources. Programmes meant to target vulnerable groups in these contexts may unintentionally generate more conflict if they do not address the relationships among different actors. For example, DDR programmes targeting former combatants may be viewed as rewarding antisocial behaviour if the damage suffered by the community as a result of their actions is not also given priority. Some programmes in violent or fragile contexts have incorporated special measures to support reconciliation across groups, such as supporting or re-establishing community mechanisms for accountability and conflict resolution.

Box 7.1. **Youth violence prevention in Timor-Leste**

Timor-Leste, and Dili in particular, has a troubled history with its youth. During the 2006 crisis and continuing to the present, violence is organised and resources are delivered through a complex network of overlapping memberships and alliances between gangs, martial arts groups, private security forces, police, military and politically minded veteran groups. These networks are financially supported through political patronage and are often integrated in communities and function with community support.

To address youth violence, youth programmes are some of the most common violence prevention programmes in Timor-Leste. Many donors provide sporting equipment, musical instruments and art supplies to promote student groups engaged in cohesive social activities. This seems well received by youth groups, but its long term impact is unclear.

Source: World Bank, 2010.

Related to this is the challenge of **choosing appropriate partners** in a sensitive environment. Fragile situations are often highly politicised and donors must take care to understand the local context when deciding whether and how to work with particular actors. In conflict or post-conflict contexts, donors may scramble to find reliable partners on the ground quickly. There appears to be little time to reflect on who is invited to the consultation table, but such reflection is crucial. One central challenge is to select state partners strategically, so as to avoid collaborating with corrupt institutions without isolating the state entirely. In situations where state capacity is weak, or a history of corruption exists, donors have often preferred to work directly with communities or the non-public sector. While this may facilitate more effective service delivery in the short term, it can have the effect of isolating the state, undermining it and further polarising state-society relations.

Consequently there is a risk of **undermining the state by prioritising support to civil society and the private sector over support for the state**. Healthy, resilient societies possess a capable state and strong civil society, which can help citizens hold both of them to account. The private sector can also be an important partner in delivering needed services and thus repairing state legitimacy. Donors can play an important role in bringing the state and non-public sector together. The World Bank Community Driven Development project in urban Port-au-Prince, for example, includes a provision that allows the municipal government to partner with a community-based organization to propose service delivery projects. Other organisations, such as Viva Rio, which works in Brazil and Haiti, contract public works companies to carry out service projects that are designed by communities, providing an important space for them to work together toward common goals.

In situations of crisis, state fragility can intensify if the state is overburdened with the challenges of co-ordinating aid flows and donor projects. In the initial stages, donors often prioritise relationships with partners on the ground, at the expense of building stronger relationships with other development partners and with the state. While this facilitates programme implementation in the short run, it can contribute to uneven coverage of services and duplication of efforts in the longer term. Ideally, donor initiatives should build capacity within the state to play a stronger co-ordinating role, for instance through oversight bodies.

Donors and their partners must also address the risk of excluding youth. Any sustainable violence prevention programme must address the task of **mobilising youth** toward positive social goals. In high-risk environments, youth may have few marketable skills and are likely to be or have been involved in illicit economic activities. The challenge is not only to provide positive alternatives, but also to address the forces that would keep young people from choosing them. This may require first creating safe, neutral

spaces where youth can explore different options and form healthy relationships, for example through sports and recreation. These activities may be less threatening to other power groups such as gangs and can help build credibility in the community for more comprehensive employment or educational projects later on.

Chapter 8

Monitoring and evaluation

Monitoring violence prevention programmes is absolutely essential, in order to know whether they are achieving their goals, whether certain components need to be modified or cut and whether resources are being spent efficiently. Monitoring and evaluation can help detect unintended consequences of the programme and, if necessary, address them appropriately. In addition, rigorous monitoring is crucial in order to creating an evidence base that can illustrate the need for further funding from donors, the need to start new projects and convince potential partners to offer support.

Monitoring is most effective when undertaken throughout implementation, so that the programme can be adapted if needed. In the best case scenario, one person is given responsibility for this task, preferably someone who has not been involved in the design and implementation of the programme, in order to obtain an objective measurement of achievements.

It is important to start with the objectives of the programme, which were defined in the design stage. From these, a set of indicators needs to be identified that can accurately measure the impact of the programme towards its objectives. On the macro level, indicators can include homicide rates, perceptions of insecurity and violent behaviours. A list of sample indicators used in a regional initiative for Latin America is provided in Box 8.1.

In addition to these macro-level indicators, the AVR lens emphasises the need to use context-specific indicators at the micro-level, in order to better track outcomes (Box 8.2). Following homicides may, by itself, be an incomplete measure of programme impact if it masks other problems caused by armed violence. For example, in under-governed areas, homicides may decrease as a particular armed group exerts control over the territory through other forms of repression. In addition, more micro-level, context-specific indicators will help in linking actions to outcomes, particularly in complex environments where attribution is difficult.

Box 8.1. **Regional system of co-existence and citizen security indicators in Latin America**

A collaborative effort among various governments in the Latin American region has developed a set of indicators for monitoring citizen security in the region and comparing trends across countries. Funded by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the project includes Ecuador, Honduras, Peru, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay and Colombia. Based on diagnostics in the participating countries, a set of 18 indicators was developed:

1. Homicides per 100 000 population

2. Deaths per 100 000 population

3. Suicides per 100 000 population

4. Deaths by firearms per 100 000 population

5. Thefts per 100 000 population

6. Aggravated robbery per 100 000 population

7. Kidnappings per 100 000 population

8. Percentage of infringements of the rules of traffic

9. Percentage of perception on the implementation of agreements

10. Rationale for the use of violence for any reason

11. Percentage of people with confidence in government institutions

12. Percentage of persons with fear perception

13. Percentage of people who perceive themselves to be insecure

14. Reported sexual offenses per 100 000 population

15. Prevalence of sexual violence

16. Child abuse rate per 1 000 persons under 18 years of age

17. Prevalence of domestic/family violence

18. Allegations of domestic/family violence per 100 000 population

In the next phases, the project will strengthen institutional capacity to collect and monitor data on these indicators, collect and synthesise best practices in the region and disseminate this information regularly via the various agencies and a website.

Source: IDB website *www.iadb.org/projects/project.cfm?id=RG-T1265* (project description).

Finally, because it takes people's experience of armed violence as a point of departure, the AVR lens emphasises an inclusive approach to monitoring and evaluation. This can help in fostering local ownership, which in turn builds capacity for research and advocacy around the problem of armed violence and increases the potential for sustainability of the programming.

Box 8.2. **Examples of micro-level indicators for monitoring project impact**

- Crime and Violence rates in the community

- Rates of petty crime or assault

- Level of community understanding of safety and violence

- Extent to which activities involve vulnerable groups (youth, women, socially marginalised groups)

- Number, availability and use of programmes that support positive parenting, conflict resolution skills, or other behaviours the programme seeks to influence

- Number of calls to police

- Number of neighbourhood residents participating in activities to reduce violence

- Number of residents using public spaces in the neighbourhood

- Characteristics and diversity of people using public spaces (different generations, social groups)

- Changes in residents' patterns of mobility within the neighbourhood (whether they are afraid to go out at night or to certain areas, etc.)

- Changes in protective behaviours (installing locks on the house, carrying weapons)

- Extent of interaction among residents

- Level of awareness about the programme in the neighbourhood

- Changes in perceptions of public institutions (police, legal services)

- State of order and cleanliness of the physical environment

- Extent of loitering, vandalism, graffiti

Source: World Bank, 2003.

Notes

1. Urban centres are generally understood as geographical areas where population density is higher than surrounding areas. The United Nations (UN) State of the World's Cities 2006/7 defines an urban agglomeration as the «built-up or densely populated area containing the city proper, suburbs and continuously settled commuter areas.

2. In an analysis of 50 countries using data from UNODC, the World Bank found that in 32 of the cases, the largest cities had homicide rates higher than their national average (World Bank 2010 forthcoming). However, in some other cities the reverse is true—the homicide rate within the city is lower than the national rate. In El Salvador, for instance, the homicide rate in the capital is less than the national rate by over 39 homicides per 100 000.

3. In Guatemala, an estimated 40% of homicides occurred in the capital city in 2006, where only 20% of the population resides (Matute & García, 2007). Santo Domingo, with just 10%of the country's population, saw nearly 18% of the homicides in 2005-06, while Panama City, with just 24% of the country's population, saw 68% of that country's homicides. Similarly, in Nepal, 33% of all homicides occurred in the capital city Kathmandu, which is home to just 3% of the population (UNODC, 2007).

4. Demographics play some role, as rural to urban migration tends to involve a youthful population, often associated with high violence. For example, cross-national comparisons have found that urban hotspots of gang activity had higher percentages of youth and minors than among the general population (Dowdney, 2004). However, in itself a youthful population does not predispose a city to higher violence. For a review see (Urdal, 2006).

5. This note deals specifically with urban armed violence. Much of the literature and programming addresses violence more broadly, and the terms "violence" and "armed violence" are often used interchangeably in policy literature and programme documents. This note will use "violence" to refer to interventions that have been applied to violence broadly, and "armed violence" where the use of weapons or other instruments is involved.

6. It should be noted at the outset that, because violence is highly context-specific, programs will need to adapt to different circumstances. Cities in countries that are emerging from conflict, for example, will require different adaptations than

middle-income countries with higher capacity and resources. This note does not pretend to provide specific prescriptions for these various contexts; rather, it is meant as a guide to orient programme design.

7.   To establish a strong causal relationship between the intervention and the desired outcome, evidence-based programmes are those that are based on: an established theory or model; a rigorous assessment of the context and needs; and the degree to which the target population actually received the services/intervention (coverage/dosage).

8.   There are no direct causes of violence; rather, there are characteristics of an individual's biology, personality and environment that impose stresses, which increase the risk that he or she will perpetrate or experience violence. The accumulation of these stresses, or risk factors, is associated with an increased tendency of being a victim or a perpetrator of violence. Protective factors, on the other hand, can be understood characteristics of an individual and his/her environment that strengthen the capacity to confront stresses without the use of violence (WHO, 2008).

9.   For example, many humanitarian interventions in post-conflict contexts where violence remains high have targeted aid toward those most in need, under the assumption that serving the neediest will stem further violence. Yet, more often than not, those most in need are not those who won the conflict, so that aiding them can be interpreted by the other side as an unfriendly political act. Because it was based on assumptions about needs, the aid targeted at Hutu refugees following the Rwandan genocide created resentment among Tutsi and moderate Hutus who stayed in Rwanda, and who saw these interventions as rewarding those who had committed genocide (Anderson, 1999).

10. The public health approach comprises interventions that are evidence-based and prioritise primary prevention. For more information see: *www.who.int/violenceprevention/approach/public_health/en/index.html*.

11. This should be done with caution: it is important not to romanticize traditional justice mechanisms as inherently just or focused on the welfare of the collective. In reality, most traditional systems are more hybrid in nature, often combining elements promoting reconciliation and justice with more negative aspects, such as exclusion or under-protection of different groups (youth, women). Yet the fact remains that these systems often represent at least a minimum consensus on how conflicts should be handled, and therefore are important foundations for broader interventions.

12. An impact of an assessment of Viva Rio's work in Bel-Air, Haiti concluded that Viva Rio's project had produced "visible and tangible improvements in various forms of service delivery," and that the organisation is now viewed as a "new kind of service provider" in Haiti (Mosteu and Muggah, 2010).

13. Evaluations of the approach in different US cities have found that hot spots policing can reduce crime in the targeted areas. Several studies into whether

this technique simply displaces crime and violence to other areas have not found increases in crime in nearby areas (Clarke and Weisburd, 1994; Hesseling, 1994), and one study found that hot spots policing actually created a "diffusion of benefits" to nearby areas (Weisburd and Green Mazerolle, 2000).

14. While these programs have had important successes in increasing access to justice and in resolving disputes outside of formal courtrooms, they have to date had only limited application. Their use remains constrained primarily to informal and community levels and to nonviolent, mostly petty crimes. Notable exceptions are New Zealand, as discussed above, Costa Rica and Chile (World Bank, 2010). One important limitation in application of ADR is to cases of domestic violence, where the power imbalance between victim and aggressor is often so large as to preclude the victim from effectively advocating for herself (see evaluation of Bogota programs in Guerrero, 2006).

Further reading

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Preventing and Reducing Armed Violence in Urban Areas

PROGRAMMING NOTE

To help experts and practitioners working to tackle the problem of armed violence, three Programming Notes build on the 2009 publication entitled *Armed Violence Reduction: Enabling Development*. These three notes cover:

- Armed violence in urban areas
- Youth and armed violence
- The linkages between Armed Violence Reduction and Security System Reform (SSR)

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