



**Global
Partnership**

for Effective Development
Co-operation

Making Development Co-operation More Effective

2016 PROGRESS REPORT



**50
YEARS**

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Making Development Co-operation More Effective

2016 PROGRESS REPORT

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Foreword

Effective development co-operation is a prerequisite for sustainable progress in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. This report is the product of a global monitoring exercise designed to generate evidence on progress in making development co-operation more effective. This second edition since the establishment of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation in Busan in 2011 aims to build political momentum for change, ensuring that we are able to identify remaining challenges and learn from each other about ways to improve the effectiveness of development co-operation at the country and global levels.

The Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation is unique. Its inclusive, multi-stakeholder character enables a broad range of development stakeholders to make strong contributions to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda. Its monitoring framework represents a distinct tool to track progress amongst development partners in the spirit of mutual learning and accountability. The First High Level Meeting (Mexico City, 2014) made use of the results from the first monitoring round to guide discussions. Likewise, at the end of 2016, the Second High Level Meeting of the Global Partnership – in Nairobi, Kenya – will use the findings from this report to underpin inclusive dialogue on the individual and collective action that is still needed to enhance development impact and yield sustainable results on the ground.

We would like to thank the many dedicated stakeholders and partners who contributed to making this a particularly successful monitoring round. The reporting was led by 81 low and middle-income countries and garnered the participation of 125 countries, 74 development organisations and hundreds of civil society organisations, private sector representatives, trade unions, foundations, parliamentarians and local governments; their diversity reflects the increasingly diverse nature of our development co-operation landscape. This record level of participation demonstrates a shared commitment to making development co-operation more effective.

We extend our sincere thanks to all of the participating countries, institutions and individuals for their engagement in this collective effort. We would like to thank the OECD/UNDP Joint Support Team for their work in facilitating the 2016 monitoring round and preparing the progress report: designing the methodology, supporting countries in managing the process, compiling the results and conducting the analysis, drawing on inputs from a broad range of partners. Our thanks are extended also to the members of the Monitoring Advisory Group for their guidance.

The Global Partnership is committed to continuing to provide data and evidence to support country-led efforts and inform global policy dialogue on effective development co-operation, including follow-up and review of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). We urge development stakeholders everywhere to make the most of this report and the intense exercise it summarises by using the evidence to guide policy dialogue at all levels – country, regional and global – to celebrate progress and successes, address hurdles, and jointly devise a way forward.

We are confident that the analysis and information contained herein will also make an important contribution to discussions in Nairobi in November 2016 and beyond, helping us to maximise the contribution of effective development co-operation – collectively, inclusively and effectively – to realising the development ambitions we all share.



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This 2016 monitoring report would not have been possible without the unique contributions of thousands of people around the world. The OECD-UNDP joint support team would like to extend its special thanks to the 81 governments that participated in the 2016 Global Partnership monitoring round; in particular, to the national co-ordinators who managed the process of data collection at the country level. Likewise, we would like to thank the close to 4 000 people in 125 development agencies, civil society organisations, private sector associations, trade unions, parliaments and local governments who engaged in the monitoring process at the global and country levels.

Making Development Co-operation More Effective: 2016 Progress Report was prepared by a team comprising **Alejandro Guerrero** (lead), **Cibele Cesca**, **Elena Costas-Pérez**, **Jocelene Fouassier**, **Valentina Orrù**, **Nathan Wanner** and **Philippe Chichereau**, under the supervision and strategic guidance of **Hanna-Mari Kilpelainen** (OECD) and **Yuko Suzuki Naab** (UNDP), and the general direction of **Nadine Gbossa** (OECD) and **Simona Marinescu** (UNDP).

Major contributions and commentary were received from **John Egan** (*Chapter 2: Focus on development results*); **Anna Piccinni** and **Lisa Williams** (*Chapter 3: Country ownership of development co-operation*); **Talita Yamashiro-Fordelone** (*Chapter 4: Inclusive partnerships for effective development*), and **Joëlline Benefice**, **Thomas Boehler**, **Emily Esplen**, **Lucie Faucherre**, **Katherine Gifford**, **Ida McDonnell**, **Esther Schneider** and **Zohra Kahn** (*Chapter 5: Transparency and accountability for effective development*). We would also like to thank **Mark Baldock**, **Pablo Basz**, **Thomas Beloe**, **Emily Davis**, **Guillaume Delalande**, **Poul Endberg-Pedersen**, **Beakal Fasil**, **Orria Goñi**, **Frans Lammersen**, **Willem Luijkx**, **Aimée Nichols**, **Mara Niculescu**, **Marjolaine Nicod**, **Ashley Palmer**, **Julie Seghers**, **Salma Talaat**, **Rufei (Sophia) Wang** and **Anna Whitson** for their critical contributions to the implementation of the 2016 monitoring round at its various stages.

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Several commentators from different organisations also helped to strengthen the analysis contained in this report. We would particularly like to thank the technical teams of the **CSO Partnership for Development Effectiveness**, the **Effective Institutions Platform**, **GenderNET**, the **International Aid Transparency Initiative**, the **OECD Development Assistance Committee Secretariat**, the **Open Budget Partnership**, the **PEFA Secretariat**, the **United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs**, the **Task Team on CSO Development Effectiveness and Enabling Environment**, and the **World Bank** for their technical contributions and early access to data.

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The 2016 monitoring report was prepared under the auspices of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation, which is co-chaired by the ministers **Goodall Gondwe** (Malawi), **Claudia Ruiz Massieu** (Mexico) and **Lilianne Ploumen** (Netherlands). We specially thank their offices for the guidance, political impulse and steering role provided throughout the 2016 monitoring round. The Global Partnership is jointly supported by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

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Acronyms and abbreviations

AfDB	African Development Bank
AsDB	Asian Development Bank
BOAD	West African Development Bank
CAF	Development Bank of Latin America
CarDB	Caribbean Development Bank
CPDE	CSO Partnership for Development Effectiveness
CPIA	Country Policy and Institutional Assessment
CSO	Civil society organisation
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EIB	European Investment Bank
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GAVI	Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization
Global Partnership	Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation
IATI	International Aid Transparency Initiative
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IsDB	Islamic Development Bank
NDF	Nordic Development Fund
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
ODA	Official development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OFID	OPEC Fund for International Development
PEFA	Public expenditure and financial accountability
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
UN	United Nations
UN Habitat	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UN OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UN Women	United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
UNDCF	United Nations Development Cooperation Forum
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

Executive summary

The Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation sustains political commitment and upholds accountability for improving the effectiveness of development co-operation. It does this by regularly monitoring progress on the implementation of agreed development effectiveness principles and related commitments at the country level; and by facilitating dialogue and encouraging the sharing of experiences among governments, multilateral organisations, civil society, parliamentarians and the private sector. The Global Partnership drives change in the way development co-operation is provided by generating evidence to highlight where attention is needed, and by encouraging members to respond to the evidence by agreeing on individual and collective action to accelerate progress.

This monitoring report is an integral part of this process. It compiles data reported by the governments of the 81 low and middle-income countries and territories that participated in the Global Partnership's second monitoring round, generating evidence on the implementation of agreed principles for effective development co-operation:

1. focus on results
2. country ownership of development priorities
3. inclusive partnerships for development
4. transparency and mutual accountability.

The monitoring exercise looks, on the one hand, at how effectively governments put in place a conducive environment to maximise the impact of development co-operation and enable contributions from nongovernmental actors (i.e. civil society and the private sector); and on the other, how effectively development partners deliver their support. It uses ten selected indicators to track progress and create a shared, action-oriented roadmap for making development co-operation more effective, building a foundation for mutual accountability amongst all development stakeholders.

The 2016 monitoring round drew record participation, both in terms of numbers and of diversity: 81 low and middle-income countries; 125 development partners; 74 development organisations; and hundreds of civil society organisations, private sector representatives, trade unions, foundations, parliamentarians and local governments. The data and evidence they generated covers the vast majority (up to 89%) of development co-operation finance programmed for these 81 countries.

Overall, the results of the 2016 monitoring round testify to important progress towards achieving the development effectiveness goals agreed in Busan in 2011 at the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness.

The development community is adopting a decisive focus on results for more impact at the country level: 99% of countries have development strategies at the national and sector levels; 74% of countries have set out their priorities, targets and indicators in a single strategic planning document. In addition, 85% of development partners' new programmes and projects are aligned to country-led results frameworks.

Evidence reveals a promising evolution towards more inclusive partnerships amongst governments, civil society organisations (CSOs) and the private sector. In 70% of countries, the government and the private sector

express equally strong interest in strengthening dialogue, with issues of mutual benefit offering an entry point for building a common public-private agenda for sustainable development. Almost 90% of governments consult CSOs on national development policy. Amongst themselves, CSOs have also improved co-ordination for programming and engagement.

Transparency is also growing, with more publicly available information on development co-operation than ever before: 72% of development partners assessed for transparency achieved a “good” score in their reporting to at least one of the three international databases on development co-operation finance and 39% achieved “excellent” in reporting to one or more systems. In parallel, countries have taken strides to enhance the transparency of their budgeting procedures: they now record 66% of development co-operation finance in national budgets that are subject to parliamentary oversight. Furthermore, 47% of countries are tracking public allocations for gender equality and women’s empowerment.

While these gains are encouraging, they are coupled with an overall need to adapt to a dynamic and evolving development landscape, as well as specific areas where concerted effort is required to unlock bottlenecks.

For example, development partners use government sources and systems to track results for only 52% of interventions – meaning that broadly half continue to rely on other sources of information. Similarly, governments are engaged in the evaluation of results for only 49% of development partner interventions.

Overall performance by countries in strengthening their own systems is mixed: while 18% of countries – including several fragile states and small-island developing states – have improved their public financial management systems, 23% have experienced a decline and 58% of countries show no substantial change. Also, development partners channel only 50% of development co-operation finance through countries’ public financial management and procurement systems.

Inclusiveness is essential for ensuring that development processes and results are widely owned. Yet only 51% of countries have all the elements in place for meaningful dialogue with CSOs. In 63% of countries, the potential for quality public-private dialogue is affected by a lack of champions to facilitate dialogue; in 81%, there is a scarcity of instruments and resources to translate public-private dialogue into action.

To be effective, countries need to manage diverse financial flows in a complementary and strategic manner. Yet development partners’ improvements in medium-term predictability of development co-operation have been limited to only 4%, reaching 74% in 2016. A major institutional and cultural shift is needed to arrive at regular publication of real-time information that meets country needs for planning and managing development co-operation.

The transparency and inclusiveness of country-level mutual reviews also require improvement: less than half of countries involve local governments and non-state stakeholders in these assessments or make the results public.

Moreover, these review processes continue to be largely formulated around traditional development assistance models and require adaptation to the evolving partnership approaches.

Finally, the 2016 Global Partnership monitoring evidence has shown that strong institutionalised partnerships at the country level can build mutual trust and underpin transparency and accountability. It also confirms that across principles and indicators, there are countries, development partners and non-state stakeholders that demonstrate the capacity to progress on agreed effectiveness principles. This indicates great potential for identifying success factors, sharing lessons and facilitating mutual learning to accelerate the global development communities’ efforts to deliver on the Sustainable Development Goals by 2030.

Chapter 1

Overview of the 2016 Global Partnership monitoring round

This chapter provides an overview of the results of the 2016 monitoring round of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation. It offers a summary of progress in aligning development co-operation with the development effectiveness principles agreed at the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, 2011. It identifies approaches that have driven change in specific countries or among key stakeholders, as well as signalling areas that demand further attention.

The Addis Ababa Action Agenda called for continued efforts to improve the quality, effectiveness and impact of development co-operation, recognising the importance of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation as a relevant global instrument to this end (United Nations, 2015b: 58). The role of development co-operation is evolving in the context of universal commitments to scaled-up targets for ending all forms of poverty, fighting inequalities and tackling climate change by 2030, while ensuring that no one is left behind. More and more developing countries are fuelling their own development, as well as providing development co-operation. Remittances, social business and foundations offer new options for development finance. While development co-operation is only part of the solution, it can play a catalytic role in leveraging funding, and in supporting knowledge and technology transfer for sustainable development. In this context, delivering more effective development co-operation is an essential component of the formula for achieving the development aspirations materialised in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

The Global Partnership contributes to driving development impact


The Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation was endorsed in 2011 by 161 countries and heads of multilateral and bilateral institutions, and representatives of public, civil society, private, parliamentary, local and regional stakeholders committed to strengthening the effectiveness of their development co-operation by putting into practice four principles:

1. **Focus on results:** Investments and efforts have a lasting impact on eradicating poverty and reducing inequality, on sustainable development, and on enhancing country capacities; they are aligned with the priorities and policies set out by countries themselves.
2. **Country ownership:** Countries define the development priorities and model they want to implement.
3. **Inclusive partnerships for development:** Sustainable development depends on the participation of all stakeholders and benefits from the diversity of roles and complementarity of contributions.
4. **Transparency and mutual accountability:** Development co-operation efforts are transparent and accountable to all relevant stakeholders, including all citizens.

The Global Partnership supports the implementation of the Busan commitments and promotes accountability for them.¹ By facilitating the sharing of knowledge and lessons, it maintains and strengthens political commitment for more effective development co-operation. It brings together development stakeholders around an overarching goal: to maximise the contribution of development co-operation to poverty eradication and shared prosperity.

The Global Partnership monitors progress on the implementation of the development effectiveness principles and related commitments at the country level (Figure 1.1). The fundamental objectives of the monitoring process include, on the one hand, assessing how effectively governments² put in place a conducive environment to maximise the impact of development co-operation and enable contributions from non-governmental actors (i.e. civil society and the private sector); and on the other, measuring how effectively development partners deliver their support. The Global Partnership monitoring drives change in the way development co-operation is provided by generating evidence to highlight where attention is needed and encouraging members to respond to the evidence by agreeing on individual and collective action to accelerate progress.

The Global Partnership tracks development stakeholders' progress towards more effective development co-operation using ten selected indicators (Table 1.1). Iterative rounds of monitoring track progress over time, allowing the members of the Global Partnership to extract lessons and create a shared, action-oriented roadmap for making development co-operation more effective and building a foundation for mutual accountability amongst all development stakeholders.³

Figure 1.1. **Who participated in the 2016 monitoring round?**

 Table 1.1. **The monitoring framework: Shared principles and differentiated commitments for more effective development co-operation**

Indicators	Stakeholder responsible for reporting progress			
	Country governments	Development partners	Civil society	Private sector
1 Development partners use country-led results frameworks	■	■		
2 Civil society organisations operate within an environment that maximises their engagement in and contribution to development	■	■	■	
3 Public-private dialogue promotes private sector engagement and its contribution to development	■		■	■
4 Transparent information on development co-operation is publicly available		■		
5a Development co-operation is predictable (annual)		■		
5b Development co-operation is predictable (medium-term)		■		
6 Development co-operation is included in budgets subject to parliamentary oversight	■	■		
7 Mutual accountability is strengthened through inclusive reviews	■			
8 Governments track public allocations for gender equality and women's empowerment	■			
9a Governments strengthen country systems	■			
9b Development partners use country systems		■		
10 Aid is untied		■		

The 2016 monitoring round drew record participation, both in terms of numbers and of diversity of profiles: 81 low and middle-income countries led national assessments of the effectiveness of development co-operation, reporting on their co-operation with 125 development partners. The broad range of stakeholders participating in the process – in total 125 countries, 74 development organisations and hundreds of civil society organisations, private sector representatives, trade unions, foundations, parliamentarians and local governments – reflects the increasing diversity of the development co-operation landscape (Figure 1.1).

The data and evidence they generated covers the vast majority (up to 89%) of development co-operation funding programmed for these 81 countries.⁴ This diversity and coverage confirms the increasing commitment of the international community to the development effectiveness agenda.

As countries prepare for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, adopted by the UN General Assembly in September 2015, the results of this second monitoring round will help governments and international partners to set their baselines on several relevant Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) indicators; using high-quality data, it will enable them to track progress while analysing linkages, at the country level, between the effectiveness of development co-operation and sustainable development.

The 2016 monitoring round shows that development co-operation is becoming more effective, but at an irregular pace

The data presented in this report were provided by the governments of the 81 low and middle-income countries and territories that participated in the 2016 monitoring round, in co-ordination with their development partners who engaged in the monitoring process. Data for assessing transparency of development co-operation (Indicator 4), quality of budgetary and financial management systems (Indicator 9a) and aid untying (Indicator 10) were gathered from existing global sources and assessments. The results of the 2016 monitoring round testify to important progress towards achieving the development effectiveness goals agreed in Busan.

Focus on results: The development community is adopting a decisive focus on results for more impact at the country level

The 2016 monitoring round shows that countries have taken the lead in defining their development priorities, targets and indicators that form the basis for national development efforts, with results frameworks in place in almost all countries.


Ninety-nine per cent of countries have development strategies at the national and sector levels; in 74% of countries, priorities, targets and indicators are found in a single strategic planning document.

Development co-operation partners are aligning their efforts with these national priorities; in the design phase, 85% of new development co-operation interventions draw their objectives from country-led results frameworks, representing a very positive baseline for the future.

Overall, 85% of development partners' new programmes and projects are aligned with countries' own results frameworks. Those who do so most regularly are the UN agencies (96%), multilateral development banks (89%) and bilateral partners from the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) (81%). Yet only 52% of results are tracked using government sources and systems, and governments are only engaged in 49% of evaluations.

Yet moving from planning to managing for results remains a challenge, both for countries and for their development partners. The development effectiveness of policies and programmes is held back, on the one hand, by countries' need to further strengthen their results-based budgeting, monitoring and evaluation systems. On the other hand, while development partners have aligned with existing country systems in the planning phases, they need to extend this to the monitoring and evaluation phases, including relying on countries' own monitoring indicators and sources of data, and carrying out joint evaluations with governments (Figure 1.2). Countries also must ensure wide collaboration amongst the diverse public institutions that manage development resources, capacities and incentives.

Figure 1.2. **What is the state of play in focusing on results?**
All countries reporting in the 2016 monitoring round



Assessing the focus on results

To assess whether governments and their development partners are focusing on results, the Global Partnership monitoring framework looked, for the first time in 2016, at whether countries have established country-led results frameworks, and whether development partners align with and use these frameworks (Indicator 1a). The results for this monitoring round constitute the baseline.

Country ownership: Advances in implementing country ownership have levelled off in recent years

Despite significant initial progress in implementing commitments related to country ownership (2005 10), the 2016 monitoring round reveals mixed progress in recent years (Figure 1.3). Overall, advances in strengthening and using countries' public financial management and procurement systems have been limited. Yet behind the global aggregates there are many positive stories: among other things, several fragile states and small-island developing states made progress in strengthening their country systems, often with partner support; and there has been notable progress in development partners' use of countries' own financial reporting and auditing procedures. Progress in untying aid has levelled off since peaking at 80% in 2010.

Country performance in strengthening public financial management systems is mixed: 18% of countries have strengthened them, 23% have experienced a decline and 58% of countries show no substantial change.

Overall progress by development partners in using country systems remains below target: half (50%) of development co-operation is channelled through countries' own public financial management and procurement systems. Nevertheless, bilateral partners beyond the OECD DAC have made great strides in increasing their use of country systems, with a notable surge from 4% to 40% since 2010.

In terms of predictability, development co-operation has maintained a good level of predictability in the short term, with over 80% of funds being disbursed as planned, but with no significant progress since 2010. Medium-term predictability slightly increased, but remains a pending challenge.

To be effective countries need to manage diverse financial flows in a complementary and strategic manner. Development partners have improved medium-term predictability of development co-operation only marginally, by 4%, reaching 74%. Yet some funds and initiatives have almost doubled their medium-term predictability since 2013.

Inclusive partnerships: Greater inclusiveness is helping to create synergies and capitalise on diverse and complementary contributions

Evidence reveals a promising evolution towards more inclusive partnerships in most countries, with clear readiness to engage demonstrated by all parties (Figure 1.4). The majority of countries and official development partners facilitate consultative dialogue with civil society organisations (CSOs) around development policies. CSOs are also organising themselves to engage in this dialogue, and are improving co-ordination amongst themselves for more effective programming of activities.

Almost 90% of governments consult CSOs on national development policy. CSOs also have improved co-ordination amongst themselves for programming and engagement.


There is a strong interest in engaging in public-private dialogue, with issues of common interest and mutual benefit – such as education gaps, professional skills development and mitigating exogenous impacts from the globalised economy – offering an important entry point for productive dialogue.

In 70% of countries the government and the private sector express an equally strong interest in strengthening their dialogue. Issues of mutual benefit offer an entry point for building a common public-private agenda for sustainable development.

Figure 1.3. **What progress has been made in strengthening country ownership of development co-operation?**

Global score
(for all 81 countries)

Scores for the countries reporting in both rounds



Assessing country ownership

The Global Partnership monitoring framework assesses the degree of alignment with this principle by looking at the progress made by countries in strengthening their core public financial management institutions (Indicator 9a) and by development partners in using these domestic institutions and systems to deliver their funding (Indicator 9b); the extent to which this funding is untied (Indicator 10); and the annual and medium-term predictability of development co-operation (Indicators 5a and 5b).

There remain, however, constraints for meaningful engagement on the organisational side: current structures and institutional mechanisms for engagement and dialogue with CSOs and the private sector often lack the instruments, logistics, feedback loops and facilitators that could make engagement meaningful and action-oriented.

Only 51% of countries have all the elements in place for ensuring meaningful dialogue. In practice, several factors limit the effectiveness of consultations in influencing national policy, including difficult or polarised political contexts, fragility and conflict, and ad hoc consultation mechanisms.


Figure 1.4. **What progress has been made in creating more inclusive partnerships for development?**

All countries reporting in the 2016 monitoring round

Indicator 2.


Civil society organisations operate within an environment that maximises their contribution to development

For each dimension, percentage of the countries with all the elements in place



Indicator 3.

Public-private dialogue promotes private sector engagement and its contribution to development



Assessing inclusive partnerships for development

In 2016, the Global Partnership monitored two Busan commitments on inclusiveness for the first time. Participants reported on the existing environment for inclusive development partnerships, assessing whether the environment maximises the contribution of civil society organisations to development (Indicator 2) and whether essential conditions for good dialogue between the public and private sectors are in place (Indicator 3). The current round provides the baseline for monitoring future progress in these areas.

Transparency and accountability: More information on development co-operation is publicly available, but accountability mechanisms need to be more inclusive

Access to high-quality, timely and relevant information on development funding means that:

- governments can plan and strategically manage the use of diverse development co-operation resources in support of their development priorities
- development partners can co-ordinate their support to promote synergies as well as avoid fragmentation and duplication of efforts
- non-state actors can harmonise their development efforts, provide input for the definition of priorities, and hold public officials and development partners accountable for their performance on commitments.

Accountability amongst all development stakeholders allows for collective assessment of progress towards agreed targets and helps to ensure that development interventions are relevant and effective, while building trust.

On the whole, development partners have made progress in the comprehensiveness of publicly available information on development co-operation, and moderate progress in upgrading reporting practices to make reporting more timely. Publishing forward-looking information to enable countries' effective planning and strategic management of diverse development resources remains as a key challenge; publishing accurate data also needs continuous attention.

Seventy-two per cent of development partners assessed for transparency achieved a “good” score in their reporting to at least one of the three international databases on development co-operation finance; 39% achieved “excellent” in their reporting to one or more systems.

Countries have taken strides to enhance their budgeting procedures; two-thirds of development co-operation finance is now recorded in budgets subject to parliamentary oversight, and a growing number of countries track gender budget allocations – almost twice as many compared to the previous monitoring round. There is room for improvement, however, in budget planning processes and information management systems for public expenditure.


Countries now record 66% of development co-operation finance in national budgets that are subject to parliamentary oversight.

Gender budget tracking also needs to be linked with broader budget reforms and the information produced needs to inform policy planning and budgeting.

Gender is increasingly mainstreamed into budgeting: 47% of countries are tracking public allocations for gender equality and women’s empowerment.

Progress in enhancing mutual assessments at the country level is often hindered by the lack of inclusiveness and transparency in the review processes. Moreover, these processes generally continue to be formulated around traditional development assistance models, making it essential to adapt them to the evolving partnership approaches characteristic of the SDG era.

More than two-thirds of countries (69%) conduct joint reviews of progress towards country-level targets together with their partners. Nonetheless, transparency and inclusiveness need improvement: less than half of the countries involve local governments and non-state stakeholders in these assessments or make the results public.

Figure 1.5. **What progress has been made in implementing the principles of transparency and accountability?**

Assessing transparency and accountability

The Global Partnership reviews progress in improving transparency and accountability by looking at whether: information on development co-operation is publicly available (Indicator 4); development co-operation is recorded in annual budgets subject to parliamentary oversight (Indicator 6); public allocations for gender equality and women's empowerment are tracked in a transparent manner (Indicator 8). It also looks at the quality of joint processes to assess progress on commitments related to development co-operation (Indicator 7).

The way forward for enhancing the effectiveness of development co-operation in the new 2030 development landscape

Countries are seeing an increase in the quantity and diversity of private and public resources available for development, including domestic and private finance, which are becoming the most prominent development resources. Development co-operation can act as a catalyst for these diverse flows, while providing critical finance for the countries most in need. The growing number of development co-operation partners, instruments and modalities, however, poses challenges for countries in strategically managing their development resources. *To meet these challenges and deliver the necessary development results, institutional and partnership arrangements will need to evolve and become more inclusive.*

Across principles and indicators, there are countries, development partners and non-state actors that have demonstrated their capacity to make progress on the agreed effectiveness principles. This indicates great potential for identifying success factors, sharing lessons and facilitating mutual learning. Effective practices and lessons identified in one country or by one development partner can accelerate progress amongst others. Multi-stakeholder partnerships such as the Global Partnership, which also embraces South-South and triangular co-operation, can facilitate the sharing of lessons, enabling the global community to deliver on the SDGs by 2030. *Drawing on the evidence base behind this report, the Global Partnership can support exchange amongst countries and stakeholder groups to identify, disseminate and replicate successful approaches to development co-operation on the ground.*

In this challenging context, the centrality of countries' core results frameworks, budgeting and planning procedures, and financial management systems remains pivotal for linking resources, assets and knowledge with national development priorities and results. *Deepening the impact of development co-operation will require not only enhancing development partners' alignment to these country results frameworks throughout the programme cycle, but also using information on results to guide further decisions and efforts.*

Further progress also needs to be made in promoting the use of countries' public financial management and procurement systems by development partners. *Unlocking the existing bottlenecks will depend on honest dialogue between countries and development partners to address persistent constraints, including devising new, innovative ways of jointly managing risks.*

The evidence is clear: development partners need to review – and as necessary renew – their institutional set-ups and approaches to development co-operation. Improvements in transparency and predictability depend on robust policies, sound corporate processes and well-functioning systems. The current lack of forward-looking planning information hinders countries' strategic management of development co-operation, constraining progress in recording development co-operation in country budgets and limiting global transparency and country-level predictability. Addressing systemic and technical bottlenecks will help in providing real-time information on ongoing and forward-looking activities to meet countries' information needs. But to make real strides, it will be essential to address deep-rooted institutional constraints through a whole-of-government approach, engaging the various line ministries for the effective delivery of development co-operation.

This monitoring round also demonstrated that building institutionalised partnerships at the country level is an enabler for effectiveness. *The long-term presence of a development partner, programme-based support, and systematic engagement and dialogue with the national government facilitate mutual trust and understanding.* Strong, well-grounded partnerships can also facilitate the incorporation of forward-looking information provided by development partners into national systems – a vital prerequisite for fully realising the benefits of increased transparency and enabling better results management and accountability. The 2016 monitoring round found that institutionalised partnerships were relevant also in promoting greater predictability and use of national public financial management systems by development partners.

The Global Partnership will continue to adapt and respond to the 2030 Agenda. To effectively contribute evidence to the follow-up and review of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals, the Global Partnership's monitoring framework will be revised to reflect updates in commitments by stakeholders, as well as the growing diversity of approaches to development co-operation and country contexts. The lessons learned through the 2016 monitoring round will inform this review, as will the feedback from a broad range of stakeholders and from the Global Partnership's Monitoring Advisory Group.

To realise fully inclusive partnerships, the Global Partnership stakeholders will need to continuously explore new approaches to strengthening multi-stakeholder dialogue at the country level; development partners can contribute by targeting support to strengthen and institutionalise mechanisms for engagement with civil society and the private sector. This will need to be complemented by comprehensive efforts to broaden existing dialogue and accountability structures beyond the domain of traditional development assistance, fully reflecting the diversity of stakeholders and maximising the synergies, complementarity and mutual learning that will make it possible to attain the SDGs.

As a well-established multi-stakeholder mechanism, the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation offers a unique platform for governments and non-state actors, including the private sector and civil society, to align their efforts and secure convergence of their engagement in development for more rapid progress in addressing the priorities of the 2030 Agenda. Strengthening the effectiveness of development co-operation is a critical underpinning factor for sustainable development; the two agendas share a common logic of transformation and complementary theories of change. *The eradication of poverty and the reduction of inequalities require technically sound solutions, institutional capacity, broad partnerships, and optimally used resources – all interdependent and mutually reinforcing drivers of success.*

2016 monitoring findings at a glance


The following section summarises the key findings from the 2016 monitoring round regarding progress in implementing the four principles for effective development co-operation: focus on results, country ownership, inclusive partnerships, and transparency and accountability. This section and the subsequent chapters are organised around these four principles.

Focus on results


Countries have made progress in developing results frameworks

Governments agreed to focus on development results by establishing transparent, country-led results frameworks that can support results-oriented planning and strategic policy making.


Indicator 1b looks at whether a country has results frameworks in place, and whether there are key strategic planning documents containing its national development priorities, targets and results indicators.



What priority-setting mechanisms do countries have in place at the national and/or sector levels?



What types of results frameworks are countries using? (Number of countries)



Results at a glance

1. Countries have made **very good progress** in developing **country-led results frameworks**:
 - Most countries have **multiple priority-setting mechanisms** at the national and sector levels.
 - In three out of four countries, priorities, targets and indicators can be found in a **single strategic planning document**.
2. Countries **still have a way to go** in translating their strategic plans and priorities into **results-based budgeting and implementation**; they also need to strengthen their **monitoring and evaluation systems** so that they generate useful information on results.

Greater use of results information is essential for achieving better development results

- ▶ Moving from strategic planning to results-based management will require **high-level leadership**, more **effective implementation** of legislation and policies, and **strengthened country institutions** and systems.
 - ▶ Many regions face similar **challenges in implementing a results-based approach**, including:
 - **co-ordination and alignment** of budgetary and strategic planning processes
 - the need for **institutional reform** to align public management with results-oriented practices.
- Cross-regional learning** can help in identifying solutions to these challenges.

Focus on results

Good partner alignment with country results frameworks needs to be matched by greater use


Development partners committed to: using country-led results frameworks to plan and design new development co-operation programmes and projects; using countries' monitoring and evaluation systems to track progress on and achievement of results; minimising the use of other frameworks.

Indicator 1a measures the alignment of development partners' new interventions with the objectives and results defined by countries themselves; it also looks at development partners' reliance on countries' own statistics and monitoring and evaluation processes to track progress.


Scope of the assessment

2 819 new interventions approved in 2015 (valued at USD 73 billion)

To what extent do development partners use countries' own results frameworks?



What result frameworks do they use?



Results at a glance

1. Development partners tend to **align new interventions to objectives prioritised by countries**, relying heavily on national development plans and sector strategies.
2. The use of **country results information** and reliance on domestic **monitoring and evaluation systems** to track project implementation and impact is significantly lower.

The next step is to increase the use of country-led results frameworks for implementation, monitoring and evaluation of development interventions

- ▶ Country **results indicators**, local **monitoring systems** and **national statistics** need to be used more widely; **government involvement in evaluations** also needs to increase, which may entail expanding support to countries for strengthening national results frameworks and associated tracking systems.
- ▶ Countries are **embedding the Sustainable Development Goals** in their national results frameworks; this opens up opportunities for development partners to strengthen their alignment with national priorities and focus on locally-defined development results.


Country ownership

New approaches can help to strengthen country systems

Governments agreed to improve the quality of their national public financial management and procurement systems in order to enhance their effectiveness and improve governance.

Indicator 9a measures the quality of country systems using the World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) scores, rating the quality of budgetary and financial management.

How strong are countries' budgetary and public financial management systems?



What progress have countries made in strengthening their systems? (2010-15)



Results at a glance

1. The quality of **budgetary and public financial management** in most assessed countries (87%) has remained stable at **moderate levels** since 2010.
2. Budgets are better designed than implemented; most countries need to:
 - make their **budgets more comprehensive and credible**, and effectively **link them to policy priorities**
 - ensure good **predictability** and **oversight** in the management of public expenditure
 - subject their budgets to timely and accurate **accounting, fiscal reporting** and **public auditing**
 - strengthen **procurement** practices.
3. The **lack of predictability, inclusion in budgets and effective delivery** of development co-operation funding are included among the crucial hurdles holding back the overall quality of country systems.

Country systems need to be strengthened

- ▶ Continue work on **joint diagnostics** to identify weaknesses in domestic institutions and co-ordinate support to strengthen them.
- ▶ Move from "best practice" to "**best fit**" approaches to improving public financial management and procurement systems.
- ▶ Find ways to build **political commitment** to support long-term institutional change and reforms in public financial management.
- ▶ Conduct broad **public administration reforms** in parallel to strengthening of country systems to ensure effective transformation.
- ▶ Build a strong **evidence base** on what works and promote active **peer learning**.

Country ownership


Partner use of country systems has slightly increased

Development partners agreed to use country systems as the default approach to deliver development co-operation in support of activities managed by the public sector.

Indicator 9b measures the proportion of development co-operation disbursed for the public sector using the country's own public financial management and procurement systems.




Global score
(81 countries)



How does the use of country systems differ by region?



How do development partners differ in their use of country systems?



Results at a glance

1. In general, the **use of country systems has increased** by 6% since 2010.
2. **Bilateral partners** have driven the increase in use of country systems – particularly those beyond the OECD DAC, who increased their use from 4% to 40%.
3. Development partners are finding diverse ways to use specific systems – increasingly relying on countries' own **budget execution** procedures, **financial reporting** and **auditing mechanisms**.
4. In contrast, the use of countries' **procurement systems** has decreased since 2010.

Risk needs to be managed, not avoided

- ▶ Development partners tend to rely more on country systems when their **quality is high**, although in **highly aid-dependent countries** they are often willing to assume certain risks.
- ▶ **Evaluation and peer learning** can help to identify and scale up approaches that work, even in the most challenging country contexts.
- ▶ **Innovative approaches** include risk pooling and experimenting with hybrid or novel modalities of development co-operation – beyond budget support.

Country ownership


Progress in untying aid is leveling off

Development co-operation is untied when bilateral partners do not impose geographical constraints on the use of the funds. In Busan, development partners agreed to further untie development co-operation.

Indicator 10 measures the percentage of bilateral development co-operation provided by OECD-DAC members that is fully untied.



What is the progress in the share of aid that is untied?



Results at a glance

1. The share of **untied aid has marginally increased** since 2010; the global average hovers around the peak value reached in 2013.
2. Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom maintain fully or almost fully untied aid; on the other hand, six DAC members have not achieved the 2010 level of 74% untied development co-operation.
3. The increasing involvement of the **private sector from development partner countries** in delivering development co-operation needs to be carefully managed to avoid further tying of aid.

Untying aid further will need broad collective action

- ▶ **Peer pressure** amongst the development partner community has helped some partners build support within development agencies to further untie their programmes.
- ▶ The **quality of national procurement systems** can influence the share of aid that is untied; on the other hand, in fragile situations untying aid can play a crucial role in improving these systems.

Country ownership

Annual predictability of development co-operation has not increased

Development partners committed to disbursing funds in a timely and predictable fashion, according to agreed schedules, so as to enable countries to plan and manage their development policies and programmes with greater effectiveness.

Indicator 5a measures the proportion of development co-operation funding that is disbursed to a country's government within the fiscal year in which development partners schedule it. It captures both the reliability of development partners in delivering the resources, and how accurately they forecast and disburse this funding.




Global score
(81 countries)


Progress over time
(60 countries)



How does annual predictability vary by region?



How does annual predictability vary by development partner?



Results at a glance

1. Annual predictability remains **at similar levels to five years ago**, falling short of the Busan target; this global average hides important variations, however, among countries.
2. Developing **long-term partnerships** pays off: a country's most significant development partners, both in terms of funding volumes and length of relationship, tend to be their most predictable partners.
3. Predictability is more challenging in **difficult country contexts**. Annual forecasting seems to overestimate the implementation and absorption capacity of the countries with weaker institutions and public administration.

Effective partnerships and instruments help to overcome technical and structural barriers to annual predictability

- ▶ Investing in **partnerships with countries** is essential. Initiatives such as agency-wide, multi-year rolling plans and budgeting frameworks; longer-term country partnerships, strategies and development co-operation instruments; and effective tracking and reporting all help to increase annual predictability. In contrast, fragmented and short-term support is associated with lower predictability levels.
- ▶ **Country context matters** for predictability. A realistic approach in preparing annual forecasts is particularly important in fragile and conflict-afflicted states.

Country ownership


Medium-term predictability has slightly improved

Development partners committed to providing forward-looking information on upcoming funding in a timely and predictable fashion, according to agreed schedules, so as to enable countries to plan and manage their development policies and programs with greater effectiveness.


Indicator 5b measures the estimated share of development co-operation funding covered by indicative forward expenditure or implementation plans that are shared with the country government (for one, two and three years ahead).




Progress over time
(42 countries)



How much improvement is still needed in medium-term predictability?



Which partners have made the biggest gains in medium-term predictability?



Results at a glance

1. Since 2013, there has been a **4% increase in medium-term predictability**, to 74%. Multilateral development banks and bilateral partners continue to lead in the ranking.
2. **The relative importance** of each development partner to the country determines the level of engagement with the government, affecting the partner's reliability in providing regular estimates, which are crucial for short- and medium-term planning and budgeting.

Medium-term predictability enhances countries' strategic planning and budgetary capacity

- ▶ Lack of medium-term predictability hinders countries' capacity to manage development resources in a complementary and strategic manner; it also affects the **credibility and comprehensiveness** of their budgetary and public financial management process.
- ▶ Providing timely and accurate **forward-looking funding estimates strengthens domestic accountability**, as it influences the likelihood of recording development co-operation on national budgets.
- ▶ Close to half of the participating countries have or are preparing **medium-term expenditure frameworks** – accurate forward-looking estimates will enhance the quality of these frameworks.


Inclusive partnerships

Creating an enabling environment for civil society requires further effort


Governments committed to creating an enabling environment for civil society organisations (CSOs) so as to maximise their contribution to development. CSOs agreed to make their operations more effective.

Indicator 2 looks at: government support for multi-stakeholder dialogue around national development policies; CSO accountability and transparency; official development co-operation with CSOs; and the legal and regulatory environment where CSOs operate.


Percentage of countries with all the elements in place




Do governments support multi-stakeholder dialogue on national development policies?




Do civil society organisations adhere to development effectiveness principles?



Do official development partners co-operate with civil society organisations?



How enabling is the legal and regulatory environment?



Continued efforts are needed to build an enabling environment that will maximise the contribution of civil society to development

- ▶ Governments need to improve their **legal, regulatory and operational policies and practices**, including:
 - ensuring **freedom of expression and association**
 - engaging with CSOs in a **transparent and representative way**
 - improving **regulations to facilitate the operational functioning** of CSOs
 - not marginalising any social group
 - **strengthening the institutional mechanisms** for engagement.
- ▶ CSOs can increase their **development effectiveness** by:
 - **improving co-ordination** of their activities
 - **strengthening reporting** on their development efforts.
- ▶ Development partners can help **strengthen dialogue mechanisms** with CSOs.

Inclusive partnerships


There is great potential to partner with the private sector

Governments committed to engaging with the private sector: to improve the legal, regulatory and administrative environment for private investment; and to ensuring a sound policy and regulatory environment for public-private partnerships.

Indicator 3 measures the quality of public-private dialogue by looking at the legal and regulatory environment for private sector activities, a country's readiness to conduct public-private dialogue and the effectiveness of selected dialogue platforms.



What are the conditions and potential for public-private dialogue?



Results at a glance

1. In most countries, the private sector and the government are **willing and ready to engage** with each other.
2. A **lack of champions** and **scarcity of instruments and resources** to facilitate and support public-private dialogue diminishes the quality of the dialogue.

Mutual benefit is a powerful driver of good public-private dialogue

- ▶ To be successful, public-private dialogue must address topics of **mutual benefit**.
- ▶ Instruments and logistics are less of an issue when the private sector is **willing to engage**.
- ▶ **High-level political leadership** helps.
- ▶ The emergence of **champions** is facilitated when both sides express trust and willingness to engage.
- ▶ Focusing on **common interests** and orienting the dialogue towards **useful outputs and results** helps sustain the relationship.
- ▶ Participation of **small and medium enterprises** in the dialogue ensures an inclusive process.
- ▶ Strengthening and institutionalising **mechanisms for engagement** is critical; development partners can play a catalytic role in this sense.


Transparency and accountability

Transparency is moving in the right direction

Development partners agreed to improve the availability and public accessibility of information on development co-operation and other development resources in a timely, comprehensive and forward-looking manner.

Indicator 4 assesses the extent to which development partners are making information on development co-operation publicly accessible, and in line with the Busan transparency requirements.

What systems and standards do development partners use to provide online data on development co-operation in an open and accessible manner?



Results at a glance

- ▶ In general terms, the three assessments show that although development partners have differing strengths in terms of transparency, **the overall picture is good**.
- ▶ Of the 61 partners assessed, **24 achieved "excellent" scores** in at least one of the three assessments (40% of the assessed partners) and 44 achieved "good" in one or several of them (72%).
- ▶ Most notable progress on the timeliness and comprehensiveness of publicly available data, while the publication of forward-looking information continues to be a challenge. Also, observed **trade-offs between data timeliness and accuracy**.

Improvements in transparency depend on robust policies, sound corporate processes and systems, and dedicated staff

- ▶ Analysis reveals that good reporting to a specific platform or standard does not automatically imply equally good reporting through other channels, evidencing the need to **focus on specific institutional hurdles** in terms of systems, policies or culture.
- ▶ Investments in **corporate processes and information management infrastructure** can help to improve the supply of publically available information on development co-operation.

Transparency and accountability

Development co-operation is increasingly on budget

Governments and development partners committed to including development co-operation funds in national budgets subject to parliamentary oversight.

Indicator 6 measures the share of development co-operation funding for the public sector recorded in annual budgets that are approved by the national legislatures of partner countries.




66%


Global score
(81 countries)

Progress over time


(60 countries)



How does the share of on-budget development co-operation vary by region?



How does the share of on-budget development co-operation vary by partner?



Results at a glance

- ▶ There has been **good progress** since 2010: 15 countries and 29 development partners have met the target of recording 85% of development finance in national budgets.
 - Most countries in **Latin America and the Pacific** have met the target.
 - **Multilateral development banks and some bilateral partners** outperformed other development partners.

Further progress calls for improvements in budgeting systems and processes of countries and their partners alike

- ▶ **Development partners** may need to continue **investing in corporate systems and processes** to generate timely projections, in accordance with countries' budget planning cycles.
- ▶ **Institutionalising the relationship with the country** matters: larger, more focused country programmes, implemented through national systems and integrated into national budgets, enable parliamentary oversight and accountability.
- ▶ To facilitate the inclusion of development co-operation on budget, ensure adequate oversight and effective use of funds, and increase mutual accountability, **countries** may need to strengthen **budget planning processes and information management systems for public expenditure**. Creating **budgetary incentives for line ministers** to report development co-operation on budget may contribute to central oversight of public expenditure.

Transparency and accountability


Tracking budget allocations for gender equality and women's empowerment is improving

Countries committed to putting transparent systems in place to track public allocations for gender equality and women's empowerment, so as to ensure that public expenditure is appropriately targeted to benefit both women and men.

Indicator 8 measures the percentage of countries with systems in place to track public allocations for gender equality and women's empowerment, and that make this information publically available.




Global score
(81 countries)



Do countries have the systems they need to track budget allocations for gender equality and women's empowerment?

for all 81 countries



Results at a glance

1. In 72% of the countries, at least **one of the three basic elements** for tracking gender-related allocations is in place; nearly half of the countries have **all three elements in place**.
2. The next step is to effectively **mainstream gender-responsive programming** across the entire budget, beyond specific sectors and programmes.
3. Countries encounter challenges in moving from the formulation of gender-responsive policy, law or strategies to the **systematic tracking of gender equality allocations and impacts**.

Transparent systems and the use of gender-disaggregated information are crucial for gender equality


- ▶ **Transparency in gender tracking systems** is critical for effective policy formulation and for accountability.
- ▶ Using gender-disaggregated **data to inform policy and budgeting decisions** is fundamental for achieving gender equality and sustainable development.

Transparency and accountability


Mutual assessment reviews need to evolve with the changing development landscape

Countries agreed to put in place inclusive mutual assessment reviews to respond to the needs and priorities of domestic institutions and citizens.


Indicator 7 measures whether a country has four out of five criteria in place: 1) an aid or partnership policy; 2) country-level targets; 3) regular joint assessment of progress against targets; 4) local governments and non-executive stakeholders included in the assessments; and 5) public availability of the results.



Global score
(81 countries)



What progress have countries made in conducting and sharing inclusive mutual assessments?



Results at a glance

1. Progress in **enhancing mutual assessments** is limited due to the **need for greater inclusiveness and transparency** around these process.
2. Countries with mutual assessment reviews have an **increasing number of basic elements** in place for effective accountability, but often these are not enough for meaningful accountability.
3. Parliamentarians and other stakeholders **need to be sufficiently engaged** in reviewing progress against national targets; there is also room to make the results of these reviews **more transparent**.

Rethinking mutual accountability structures to reflect evolving development models and partnerships

- ▶ While established mutual accountability structures are formulated on traditional development assistance, partnerships for the Sustainable Development Goals increasingly encompass **whole-of-government approaches**, as well as a **variety of development partners**, including southern partners, businesses and philanthropies. These partners all need to be accountable to each other.
- ▶ Most low and middle-income countries need to make mutual accountability processes more relevant in the light of their **evolving development models and partnerships**. **Emerging approaches** in some middle-income countries can provide important lessons.

Notes

1. More information is available at: www.effectivecooperation.org.
2. Note on terminology: the following terminology is used throughout this report: participating country(ies) = the 81 low and middle-income countries/governments in Africa, Asia, the Pacific, Latin America and Eastern Europe/Central Asia who receive development co-operation and participated in the 2016 monitoring round; reporting country(ies) = used in specific cases when not all participating countries/governments reported on an indicator; government(s) = governments of the 81 participants in the 2016 monitoring round; country(ies) = low and middle-income countries/governments; country/national systems = public financial management and procurement systems of the above countries/governments; development partner(s) = providers of development co-operation (including bilateral and multilateral providers, funds and initiatives); stakeholders = all those who make decisions on and/or are impacted by development co-operation.
3. The first round of the Global Partnership monitoring exercise was completed in 2014, with the participation of 46 developing countries and covering around 46% of total official development assistance programmed for developing countries (OECD/UNDP, 2014).
4. In terms of coverage, the 2016 monitoring exercise assessed performance related to USD 55.2 billion in development co-operation disbursements in 2014, equivalent to 82% of country programmable official development assistance (ODA) for the 81 participating countries (USD 67.3 billion based on data from the OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System). The monitoring exercise also assessed commitments amounting to USD 72.8 billion, equivalent to 89% of total country programmable ODA in 2014 (USD 81.7 billion).

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Chapter 2

Focus on development results

This chapter looks at how – and how much – development partners are using country-led results frameworks to plan and design new interventions, to set objectives for expected results, and to monitor and track progress (Indicator 1a). In addition, it assesses to what extent results frameworks exist in participating countries and examines their characteristics in each (Indicator 1b). The chapter draws on insights provided for close to 3 000 major projects and programmes approved in 2015, equivalent to USD 72 billion in development co-operation, as well as a review of government strategic planning documents for the 81 countries participating in the 2016 monitoring round. It also draws on regional assessments of countries' progress with managing for development results, as well as other complementary sources of evidence, to inform the interpretation of the findings of the monitoring survey.

A country-led results framework is understood as one that is led or originated by the government of the country itself, rather than being provided or imposed by development partners. This can include any form of government-led planning instrument¹ that defines a country's approach to development, sets out its development priorities and establishes the results expected to be achieved. It also outlines the systems and tools that will be used to monitor and evaluate progress towards these targets, establishes the indicators of progress and determines the baseline against which results will be measured.

In 2011, governments and development partners committed in Busan to adopting “transparent, country-led and country-level results frameworks and platforms [...] as a common tool among all concerned actors to assess performance based on a manageable number of output and outcome indicators drawn from the development priorities and goals of the developing country” (OECD, 2011: 5). Development partners committed to “minimise their use of additional frameworks, refraining from requesting the introduction of performance indicators that are not consistent with countries’ national development strategies” (OECD, 2011: 5).

By aligning with a country's results framework, development partners ensure that development co-operation addresses the country's priorities and contributes to its capacity to plan, monitor, evaluate and communicate its progress towards sustainable development.

Indicator 1b. Countries have results frameworks in place

The Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation monitoring framework provides a contextual assessment of each government's results frameworks at the national and sector level (Box 2.1). Focusing on development results entails five elements: strategic planning, results-based budgeting, effective implementation, and monitoring and evaluation for results (APCoP, 2011; Kaufmann, Sanginés and García Moreno, 2015). The Global Partnership's monitoring framework focuses on assessing whether the first element – a country-led results framework which can support results-oriented planning and strategic policy making – is in place.


Box 2.1. How do we assess the existence of country-led results frameworks in participating countries?

Participating governments were requested to describe the main characteristics of their country's results framework(s), identifying the key strategic planning documents where their development priorities, goals and targets are set out. These may include:

- long-term vision documents (typically covering ten years or more)
- mid-term national development plans (typically covering four to six years)
- programmes or strategies in any of the following key sectors: education, health, transport or public finance (these sectors account for the lion's share of public expenditure)
- strategies or compacts developed jointly by the government and its development partners.

Overall, countries have made very good progress with the development of country-led results frameworks since Busan, consolidating previous gains² and accelerating the pace of change since the initial agreement to focus on development results was forged in 2005.³ Most countries have developed multiple priority-setting mechanisms at the national and sector level (Figure 2.1). These strategic planning tools complement each other, with a diverse level of detail.

Figure 2.1. **Countries have established priority-setting mechanisms at the national and/or sector levels**




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Of the 81 countries participating in the 2016 monitoring round, virtually all (99%) have one or more strategic documents that meet the requirements for having a country-led results framework (Figure 2.2).⁴ In the vast majority of participating countries, this strategic document is either the country's long-term vision (34 countries) or its mid-term national development plan (33 countries). Of these 67 countries, 55 include development priorities, targets and indicators in these strategic documents. Another five countries establish these priorities at the sector level.

Countries whose key planning documents clearly articulate their development priorities and targets provide direction for themselves as well as clarity for their development partners. In 60 countries (74%), priorities, targets and indicators can be found in a single strategic planning document. Sector plans and medium-term expenditure frameworks are also a rich source of information about development goals and targets, often reflecting both countries' and development partners' efforts to develop sector strategies based on evidence and joint diagnoses.⁵

Figure 2.2. **Long-term vision documents and national development plans include countries' key development priorities, targets and results indicators**



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Moving from planning to managing for results is a challenge

Despite the progress in planning for development results, recent regional and country assessments indicate that countries still have a way to go in translating their strategic plans and priorities into results-based budgeting and implementation; they also need to strengthen their monitoring and evaluation systems so that they generate useful information on results. In Latin America and the Caribbean, for example, an analysis of 24 countries found that between 2007 and 2013 there had been “a positive evolution of institutional capacities to implement management for development results”, including improvements in “medium- and long-term national planning capacity, medium-term budgeting, program budgeting, and several financial management instruments”.⁶ Less progress was noted, however, in “evaluation of spending effectiveness, incentives for achieving institutional objectives, and evaluation systems” (Kaufmann, Sanginés and García Moreno, 2015: xxvi-xxvii).

Another study in nine Southern and East African countries⁷ found mixed progress with six aspects of managing for development results.⁸ The highest scores were in planning, leadership and institutional capacity; countries face challenges with accountability and limited progress has been made in budgeting, and in monitoring and evaluation (AfCoP-MfDR, 2015: 19). A study of eight West African countries⁹ found similar overall results: leadership and planning were rated strongest, but progress in budgeting, accountability, and monitoring and evaluation was limited; and while institutional capacity to deliver goods and services was rated lowest, relatively high scores were recorded in institutional planning.

Box 2.2. Regional priorities for improving results-based management

A series of studies have noted that different regions face similar challenges in implementing a results-based approach to public management. In the planning phase, for instance, several regions highlight improving the co-ordination and alignment of budgetary and strategic planning processes as a priority. This would allow the budgeting process to include information on past and expected performance at its various stages. The importance of institutional reforms to align public management processes with results-oriented management concepts has also been noted, including the provision of quality services and good public sector performance.

Once programmes are in place and co-ordinated, implementation and monitoring become essential to ensure that the planned results are achieved. All regions place priority on strengthening and developing inclusive platforms for monitoring and evaluation, highlighting the need to establish comprehensive management information systems and accountability tools to adequately monitor financing and its impact on development results.

However, regions also face specific challenges. Latin America and the Caribbean countries have longer experience aligning the public management cycle with a results-based approach; this region includes among its priorities improving service delivery and ensuring effective management of fiscal risk. In Asia, political leadership is still a key focus in order to ensure policy coherence and alignment. Finally, in Africa, governments still need to foster a results-based culture in public administration, strengthening and building skills in data gathering and processing and development planning.

Sources: NEPAD (2016), “African Pilot Programme on Enhancing the Use of Country Results Frameworks: Report on findings presented at a consultation held in South Africa hosted by the NEPAD Agency”; AfCoP-MfDR (2015), “The status of managing for development results in the COMESA region”, http://api.ning.com/files/vZYf6JWsbIBPQNvdnJ1TJ7r3FgGMl3Jl066q8liHbtJ8vrpgJ9E1DCBHm8uV9WY40A1HAJL-6LdQn1Efh4EVsJcnZhWtSLCZ/AfriK4R_COMESA_Report_GB_WEB.pdf, p. 65; Kaufmann, J., M. Sanginés and M. García Moreno (eds.) (2015), *Building Effective Governments: Achievements and Challenges for Results-based Public Administration in Latin America and the Caribbean*, <https://publications.iadb.org/bitstream/handle/11319/6960/Building-Effective-Governments.pdf?sequence=4>, pp. 40-43; AP-DEF (2015), “Realising the Addis Ababa Action Agenda at country level: Using development finance to achieve country results”, <http://effectivecooperation.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/BKK-DFA-results-workshop-key-messages.pdf>.

Many regional and cross-regional studies highlight issues that need to be addressed to improve results-based management in the public sector, including the need for greater leadership, more effective legislation and policies, strengthened institutions and systems, improved statistical capacity, as well as increased domestic resource mobilisation.¹⁰ Recommendations arising from one region may be of high relevance to countries in another (Box 2.2).

Indicator 1a. Development partners are using existing country-led results frameworks in planning and designing new interventions

The extent to which development partners use country-led results frameworks in designing new development programmes and projects is a fundamental aspect of country ownership. The same is true for the use of countries' own results frameworks, and their monitoring and evaluation systems, to track progress on and achievement of results, minimising the use of other frameworks. As part of the monitoring process, development partners provided details of major new interventions in each participating country (Box 2.3); the sample involved close to 3 000 development projects and programmes approved during 2015, representing USD 72 billion in development co-operation funding.¹¹

Box 2.3. How do we measure whether development partners align with and use country-led results frameworks in designing new interventions?

Based on information provided by development partners on major programmes and projects, approved during 2015 in each participating country, the government of that country identified:¹


- the share of interventions drawing their **objectives** from country-led results frameworks, plans and strategies
- the share of **results indicators** included in the interventions' results framework that draw on results indicators from existing country-led results frameworks, plans and strategies
- the share of results indicators that will be tracked using **sources of data** provided by country-led monitoring systems, government data or national statistical services
- the share of interventions that plan a **final evaluation**, and to what extent the country government is involved in that evaluation.


1. For each country, development partners were asked to report on the largest interventions approved in 2015 (up to a maximum of ten per country), preferably above USD 1 million. If no intervention above that threshold was approved in 2015, they were requested to report the largest intervention(s) approved in the country in that year.

Results from the 2016 monitoring round indicate that development partners are increasingly using country-led results frameworks in the design of new interventions. They need to do more, however, to ensure that country-led results indicators and data are used to monitor these new interventions, and to engage the country governments more in evaluating development impacts. This is particularly true for United Nations (UN) agencies, multilateral development banks and Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members, and less so for vertical funds and other bilateral partners.

The objectives of the majority of development partners' new interventions (85%) are drawn from documents that serve as country-led results frameworks; in terms of ranking, those who do so most regularly are the UN agencies (96%), multilateral development banks (89%) and bilateral partners from the DAC (81%) (Figure 2.3).

Figure 2.3. **Focus of development partners on country-defined priorities when designing new interventions**
Percentage of intervention



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Development partners' new interventions are generally well aligned with objectives set by governments in country-led results frameworks

The majority of development projects and programmes that draw on country-led results frameworks use national development plans and sector plans as their main reference point (Figure 2.4). These interventions are, consequently, more directly aligned with country-led results frameworks than those relying on a development strategy agreed by the development partner with the country; albeit informed by the country's priorities, these latter add additional layers of development planning and co-ordination for the country.


In terms of development partners' preferred use of specific government strategic planning tools, vertical funds and initiatives, multilateral development banks, UN agencies and DAC members rely primarily on national development plans and sector plans to define new interventions, although country strategies and partnership documents agreed with the specific government are also frequently used (Figure 2.4). Vertical funds and global initiatives like Gavi or the Global Fund relying on country-led results frameworks (72% of new programmes and projects) tend to privilege the use of sector and national development plans due to their sectoral or thematic focus; this is also the case for philanthropic foundations. Other international organisations, such as regional political bodies, tend to define their engagement with countries based on ministerial plans.

In terms of development co-operation modalities, some show higher levels of use of country-led results frameworks than other modalities. Policy-based lending¹² and budget support are usually associated with a specific government agenda for policy reform, showing stronger alignment with national results frameworks than project-based interventions. Technical co-operation projects tend to focus on outputs and intermediate outcomes, and therefore typically take institutional/ministerial plans and joint government-development partner strategies as their reference point for planning and measuring results, rather than high-level strategic documents such as national development plans and sector plans. Some development partners place emphasis on specific development co-operation modalities and this in turn influences the effort they need to make to


align with country-led results frameworks. Data show, however, that when governments are supported in defining their results frameworks and interventions are carefully designed, all modalities can align with and rely on country-led results frameworks.

Figure 2.4. **Instruments used for alignment with country-led results frameworks**

By planning instrument



By type of development partner




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Country results indicators and data need to be used more widely, and government involvement in evaluations needs to increase

While 85% of interventions draw their objectives and development focus from country-led results frameworks, survey results show that only 62% of results indicators are drawn from these frameworks and only 52% use data from governments' own monitoring systems or statistics. By development co-operation modality, policy reform programmes, budget support programmes and technical co-operation projects rely more on government data to track progress towards the intervention's results. In terms of partners, vertical funds, bilateral partners (non-DAC) and UN agencies make greater use of indicators from country-led results frameworks and are more likely to rely on government data sources to track progress than other development partners (Figure 2.5).


Figure 2.5. The use of country results information to define and monitor new interventions



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The extent to which development interventions are evaluated is high. Final evaluations are planned for 77% of the new interventions reported on, with interventions above USD 5 million more likely to be evaluated than smaller projects. These evaluations range from basic assessments of project completion reports to resource-intensive impact evaluations. Nonetheless, much more needs to be done to engage governments in the evaluation processes themselves (Figure 2.6). About half of the new interventions plan some level of government engagement in the evaluation. When government participation is envisaged, engagement is mostly limited to helping to define the scope of the evaluation (68%); government involvement in actually carrying out the evaluation, or in co-financing it, is reported in only one-third of planned evaluations with some government involvement. The overall picture reveals that, while multilateral development banks, DAC members and UN agencies place greater relative emphasis on evaluating development programmes, all development partners tend to engage the government to a similar extent – i.e. in about half the interventions. Foundations represent a positive exception, as they engage the government in evaluating 80% of projects.

Figure 2.6. Government involvement in evaluations of projects and programmes



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Multilateral banks lead development partner efforts to focus on results, while most bilateral partners lag behind

Multilateral development banks have been at the forefront of development partners' efforts to focus on results over the past decade and a half, both in their own operations and in underpinning countries' efforts to increase their focus on results (Box 2.4).¹³ Together with the United Nations and other international agencies, seven of these banks have responded to the demand from their members for evidence on development results and performance by implementing the Common Performance Assessment System (COMPAS).¹⁴ COMPAS measures the capacity to manage for development results and monitors progress over time. The introduction of corporate results frameworks¹⁵ has also helped multilateral development banks to track progress on development goals and in organisational performance, including in areas critical to effective development co-operation. While these frameworks are common amongst multilateral development banks, only a small number of bilateral partners use them to measure progress in a systematic manner (OECD, 2016b).

DAC members have not made as much progress with focusing on results, and only a small number of them use results frameworks to measure their own progress in a systematic manner (OECD, 2016b). A synthesis of DAC peer reviews between 2012 and 2014 found that all were struggling to embed results-based management practices in their approach to development co-operation (OECD, 2014: 250). A recent OECD survey of 30 development partners found that while the country programme strategies of most are aligned with their country partners' priorities and results, and that most draw on partner country results information at the project, activity and country levels,¹⁶ it was not possible to determine the extent to which this alignment leads to actual utilisation of country results frameworks for planning, monitoring and evaluation. The extent to which development partners are accountable to, and communicate with, countries on their results was also unclear (OECD, 2016b).

Box 2.4. Supporting a greater focus on results

Aid Effectiveness 2011: Progress in Implementing the Paris Declaration noted two ways in which development partners can support management for results: by building capacity in the countries where they work, and by building their own internal capacity to focus on results (OECD, 2012: 89). This includes capacity both in management for development results, and in statistical and information systems.

Multilateral development banks have invested in communities of practice on managing for development results in Asia and the Pacific, Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean.¹ Lessons from their evaluations indicate that programmes to support governments in adopting a greater focus on results would benefit from: taking a truly demand-driven approach; developing greater understanding of the country context and political economy around reforms (i.e. "best fit" instead of "best practice"); and putting in place good project monitoring systems that allow for flexible management of institutional reforms, as unexpected challenges will often emerge during implementation (World Bank, 2008: 40-41; IDB, 2014; ADB, 2014).

Recently, a Global Partnership Initiative on Results and Mutual Accountability began a two-year pilot on Enhanced Use of Country Results Frameworks² in three regions (NEPAD, 2016). The initiative has helped develop a methodology to better link national development strategies and results frameworks with budgeting processes and available development finance.

...

The Partnership in Statistics for Development in the 21st Century (PARIS21) advocates for the integration of reliable data in policy- and decision making, co-ordinates development partner support to statistics, and promotes dialogue between users and producers of statistics. By underpinning national statistical systems and facilitating statistical capacity development at the country and regional levels, PARIS21 helps to solidify country results frameworks and increase the use of national statistics and data.³ This work is enhanced by the recently launched Global Partnership for Sustainable Development Data.⁴

1. The African Community of Practice on Managing for Development Results receives support from the African Development Bank and the African Capacity Building Foundation. The Inter-American Development Bank supports the Community of Practice on Management for Development Results in Latin America and the Caribbean. Support from the Asian Development Bank to the Asia Pacific community of practice ended in November 2015 (ADB, 2016).

2. The objectives of the pilot are: to improve the use of partner country results frameworks; to integrate accountability for results at the country level; to create effective country-region-global linkages; and to integrate financing and results processes (Africa Platform for Development Effectiveness, 2015).

3. PARIS21 is hosted at the OECD and was established in 1999 by the United Nations, the European Commission, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (PARIS21, n.d.).

4. The Global Partnership for Sustainable Development Data brings together governments, international organisations, companies, civil society groups, and statistics and data communities in support of improving the effective use of data, filling key data gaps, expanding data literacy and capacity, and increasing the openness of data (Global Partnership for Sustainable Development Data, n.d.).

While development partners recognise that countries often lack capacity and there are challenges to ensure the availability and reliability of data, these “were not used to excuse lack of progress in the use of country-led results frameworks and results information” (OECD, 2016b: 15). Development partners “continue to invest in building the results management capacity of partner countries”; at the same time, however, they also recognise that “this could be undertaken in a more systematic manner” (OECD, 2016b: 15).

There has been mixed progress amongst development partners in building internal capacity to focus on results, with “a missing middle in the use of results information between project/activity and programme levels, and accountability and communication” (OECD, 2016b: 1). Many development partners do not emphasise the use of results information for quality assurance and learning, and their policy formulation and strategic decision making do not appear to be driven by analysis of results (OECD, 2016b).

The main obstacles to the use of country-led results frameworks are inter-connected

Obstacles to the use of country results frameworks exist for countries and their development partners and they are interconnected – and it is important that they be addressed separately, and jointly.

All participating countries as a whole have made very good progress in identifying their national development goals and targets; where they need to ensure that they invest equal effort is in implementing, monitoring and evaluating the achievement of these goals and targets. This calls for political leadership, appropriate policies, accountable institutions, capacity and resources. Good co-ordination across government at the national and subnational levels is also essential. External support for countries in accomplishing this must be systematic and should focus on country-led action plans. The European Union’s Joint Programming initiative offers an example of mechanisms to co-ordinate and align multiple bilateral partners behind country-led priority-setting

mechanisms while also encouraging the production of in-country results information to track progress and report on development achievements (Box 2.5).

Box 2.5. **The European Union Joint Programming initiative**

The European Union (EU) and its member states are committed to joint planning of development co-operation with partner countries. Together, they undertake analysis of the country situation and develop a joint response, which is used at the country level by the EU delegation, other EU institution field offices and EU member state staff to develop a strategy, in close co-operation with the local government, civil society, private sector and other stakeholders. The timing of the joint programming is synchronised with that of the partner country's national plan and results framework and covers the same period. Each joint strategy includes a framework for monitoring its implementation and the results achieved against agreed indicators. Wherever possible, development partners draw on existing in-country results frameworks to provide such indicators and reporting mechanisms.

Joint Programming is being applied in 56 countries; joint strategies have already been agreed in 25 of these.

Sources: European Commission (2015a), "EU Joint Programming: Guidance pack 2015", <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/minisite/what-joint-programming>; European Commission (2015b), "Joint Programming tracker", <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/document/joint-programming-tracker>.

The mixed progress of development partners as a whole in introducing results-based management in their own development co-operation programmes indicates that many need to make greater efforts to articulate the results they seek to achieve at a range of levels – from global to regional, by theme or sector, and most importantly in their partner countries. These expected results should be firmly anchored in the objectives and desired results set by the country itself, and form the basis for development co-operation efforts. This requires political leadership, as well as corporate commitment and willingness to learn from the results. Development partners also need improve their use of results information for learning and decision making.

At the root of the challenge is the need to ensure that results inform decision making throughout all activities – planning, budgeting, implementation, monitoring and evaluation – and that there is integration and co-ordination among all these elements throughout the various phases of the project and programme management cycle.

The way forward for focusing on development results

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development lays out common and interconnected challenges facing all countries – developing and developed – and societies. The 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) offer a shared results framework for countries and their development partners; their 169 targets serve as a broad set of intended results for countries, and for development co-operation in general. The SDGs are therefore likely to be at the heart of efforts by countries and their development partners to integrate the 2030 Agenda into their respective results frameworks.¹⁷ Notwithstanding the significance of this overarching global framework, however, it is essential to remember that achieving the priorities defined by countries themselves must form the basis that defines the focus of development co-operation.

In this context, the following suggestions can help strengthen the overall focus on results and improve alignment of development co-operation with country-led results frameworks:

- **The SDGs articulate a common ambition across countries at all stages of development. Yet each country's relative focus on these depends on its own priorities for sustainable development or, as the case may be, for development co-operation.** In the first instance, the SDGs provide the overarching framework within which government and development partners can identify priority areas of common interest. This is an important first step in aligning development partners' efforts and ensuring impactful partnerships towards these 17 priorities identified and agreed globally.
- **At the level of individual development programmes and projects, country-led results frameworks must provide the central reference point for all development efforts.** This will ensure that the interpretation of the SDGs to the country context, the core priorities identified at country level, and the desired results and outcomes specifically associated with achieving the SDGs locally form the basis for development co-operation efforts. Evidence confirms that this is happening in practice: all participating countries as a whole have made progress in identifying their national development goals and targets, and development partners are using these to design the objectives and development focus of their interventions.
- **The next step will be to increase the use of country-led frameworks in the implementation, monitoring and evaluation phases of development interventions.** Country results indicators, local monitoring systems and national statistics need to be used more widely, and government involvement in evaluations needs to increase. This may entail expanding the support to countries to strengthen their national results frameworks and associated national systems for statistics and for monitoring and evaluation.
- **Even with full alignment to country results frameworks, these efforts will deliver optimal impact only if information on results is used to guide further decisions and efforts.** Concrete and substantive results information is essential for countries and their development partners alike. Countries using results information achieve better development results by improving the effectiveness of policies and budgets, and enhancing internal and external accountability. Current regional work to strengthen the linkages between planning and budgeting should continue, increasing the capacity to learn from results information and introducing a culture of managing for results. For development partners, results information is essential to help them to draw the link between their contributions and the impact of development co-operation. There are some 80+ SDG targets that focus on outcome change; these can offer a robust framework for countries and their development partners to measure progress towards development results.¹⁸ Using SDG progress information provided by countries themselves (and through the United Nations follow-up and review mechanisms) to assess the effectiveness and relevance of development co-operation can help to reduce the "introduction of performance indicators that are not consistent with countries' national development strategies", as called for by the Busan Partnership agreement (OECD, 2011: 5).

Notes

1. The monitoring guide (OECD/UNDP, 2015) invited participating countries to describe the main characteristic of the country's national/sector framework and to provide links to the following documents: long-term vision document; mid-term national development plan; medium-term expenditure (or budget) framework; sector programmes or strategies in transport, education, healthcare, public finance; common results framework agreed between the government and development partners; joint government/multi-donor programme, compact or facility.
2. A 2012 report on progress in implementing the Paris Declaration (OECD, 2012) found that an increasing number of countries had results frameworks in place, but that greater efforts were needed to implement the frameworks. In addition, while development partners were adopting results-oriented management systems, they were not necessarily using results indicators drawn from partner countries' national development strategies or results frameworks.
3. The 2011 Paris Declaration survey monitoring report (OECD, 2012) found that in 2010, 21% of surveyed countries (16) had relatively strong country-led results frameworks, up from 5% in 2005 and 6% in 2007.
4. Yemen did not provide a response to Indicator 1b due to ongoing conflict.
5. In a recent complementary assessment regarding the influence of development partners in setting national policy priorities, government officials consistently reported that partners help them shape policies and increase the focus on results in many ways (Custer et al., 2015). Although most development partners contribute to the policy-making process of partner countries by providing targeted analytical work and technical assistance, and by facilitating policy dialogue and peer learning, policy advice from multilateral partners and relatively small DAC member countries, such as Austria and Finland, was considered the most useful.
6. The Inter-American Development Bank used a focus on managing for development results to analyse five areas of public policy management: planning; budgeting; public financial management; programme and project management; and monitoring and evaluation.
7. Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, United Republic of Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
8. The AfriK4R Readiness Tool assessed six elements: leadership for results; planning for results; budgeting for results; institutional capacity; monitoring and evaluation, and statistical capacity; and accountability for results. Assessment of institutional capacity covers: co-ordination of planning and budgeting with delivery of goods and services; ability to plan at sector and departmental levels; and whether the necessary institutional, technical and human resources are in place to enable implementation to achieve the expected results (AfCoP-MfDR, 2015: 13).
9. Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Togo.
10. See IDB (2014); Kaufmann, Sanginés and García Moreno (2015); AfCoP-MfDR (2015); and AP-DEF (2015). Findings from the cross-regional work carried out by the Global Partnership initiative on "Results and Mutual Accountability" also support the regional diagnostics cited.
11. The average intervention size was USD 25 million. Most of the interventions reported had a budget of USD 1-50 million (72%); 16% were smaller and 12% were larger projects and programmes.
12. In general, policy-based loans are made in the form of budget support and are linked to the implementation of agreed policy reforms, in conjunction with structural reforms and development expenditure programmes in the borrowing country. Disbursements are quick, often made in one single transaction. The policy reforms are intended to have wide impact across sectors and on the economy as a whole.
13. Adoption by world leaders of the Millennium Declaration (United Nations, 2000) led to the establishment of a set of 8 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and 18 targets. These provided direction for development co-operation efforts over 15 years. Countries and development partners subscribing to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness recognised the importance of focusing on results and using data to improve decision making about development co-operation efforts (OECD, 2005: para 43, p. 7). Through the Accra Agenda for Action, countries and their partners committed to improving management for results and being accountable and transparent to the public for results (OECD, 2008: para 22, p. 19). The Paris Declaration called for results-based management of development co-operation, envisaging the use of information on results by countries and their development partners to plan, budget, implement, monitor and evaluate their efforts towards sustainable development.
14. The seven multilateral development banks are the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the International Fund for Agricultural Development, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the World Bank Group (Managing for Development Results, n.d.).

15. Corporate results frameworks track progress at three levels: global development results; results achieved at the country level and by multilateral, international and regional organisations supported by development partners; development partners' operational and organisational performance (OECD, 2016a: 5-6).
16. Twenty-four of the 29 DAC members, 4 multilateral and regional development banks, the International Fund for Agricultural Development and GAVI participated in the survey, which was administered by the OECD Development Co-operation Directorate (OECD, 2016a).
17. Participants in the Development Co-operation Forum's Uganda High-level Symposium in November 2015 noted the importance of embedding the 2030 Agenda in national and local development strategies and policy frameworks (DCF, 2015). In updated guidance to UN country teams on the development of new UN Development Assistance Frameworks, the United Nations Development Group indicated that it expects the new development assistance frameworks to "respond to the imperatives of the 2030 Agenda and effectively address the complex and interconnected nature of the SDGs" (UNDG, 2016: 5). Most respondents to a recent OECD survey pointed to various steps that can be taken to link the SDGs with their own development goals and policies, and to update their results frameworks (OECD, 2016b).
18. Among the 169 targets articulated for the 17 SDGs, 62 are for means of implementation and 19 relate to policy measures or other process-related actions. The remaining targets are focused on sustainable development outcomes (OECD, 2016a). As part of its programme of work on results-based decision making in development co-operation, the OECD is looking at how the results frameworks of countries and their development partners might be better linked to development co-operation using an SDG-based approach. At a workshop in February 2016, it was suggested that the DAC should further examine an SDG-based results approach to development co-operation (OECD, 2016c).

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Chapter 3

Country ownership of development co-operation

The Busan Partnership agreement is founded on the commitment to promote ownership by countries of their own development agenda. Ownership requires that a country has sufficient support among stakeholders within and outside of the government to build the institutional capacity required for defining and implementing a national development strategy. This chapter reviews the state of implementation of this commitment, as well as the challenges encountered in putting it into practice. Specifically, it focuses on findings from the 2016 monitoring round related to: country efforts to strengthen budgetary and public financial management systems (Indicator 9a); development partner reliance on country systems and processes to deliver funding (Indicator 9b); progress in untying aid (Indicator 10); and efforts by development partners to make the delivery of development co-operation more predictable (Indicator 5).

In a well-cited quote, former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan notes that, “good governance is perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development”.¹ Decades of mounting evidence have helped to forge a consensus that development cannot be imported; for development efforts to be successful and sustainable, and for development co-operation to effectively support these efforts, countries need to take the driver’s seat and lead the implementation of their own development processes (Jerve, 2002; OECD, 2009; Booth, 2012; Kindornay, 2016). Building on this well-established consensus, the Busan Partnership agreement committed all parties to ensuring that the principle of country ownership guides their actions.²

Country ownership is usually understood as the principle by which countries determine their own development priorities and based on these, define, lead and implement their preferred model of development.³ Chapter 2 covered an important dimension of country ownership by assessing the extent to which governments are increasing their leadership and strengthening their planning instruments to produce development results. This chapter covers another crucial element: the extent to which the implementation of development efforts is led and owned by countries themselves. It does so by looking at: the progress made by countries in strengthening their core public management institutions; whether development partners are using domestic institutions and systems to deliver their funding; to what extent the funding is untied; and whether development partners are becoming more predictable with the development co-operation they provide.

The overall picture that can be gathered from the 2016 monitoring round is that previous gains have been maintained. Yet while there was good progress in implementing commitments related to country ownership during the period 2005-10, current trends are only partially on track to meet the ambitious targets set in Busan. Countries and development partners continue to make significant investments in strengthening country systems, yet the results of these efforts are mixed and improvements in country ownership are taking place at a slow pace. The number of participating countries experiencing an increase in the quality of their country systems is similar to the number of those observing a decline; the use of country systems by development partners and the predictability of development co-operation have improved only slightly since Busan; and the level of untied aid continues to hover around the peak levels reached in 2013.

Yet these global averages hide significant variation in the effectiveness of countries and their development partners in strengthening country ownership; a revision of these differences may provide useful lessons for peer learning and for guiding future action.

Indicator 9a. Country systems are strengthened

Strengthening the governance and functioning of core public sector institutions is central to efforts to build effective governments. In Busan, parties committed to enhancing the way resources for development are managed, as part of a broader agenda to strengthen public management and governance. In particular, governments in lower and middle-income countries agreed to continue to improve the quality of their national public financial management and procurement systems – often referred to in general terms as “country systems” (Box 3.1). The Busan Partnership agreement also commits development partners to using country systems when providing development co-operation to partner governments, instead of relying on parallel systems ruled by distinct policies and processes.

Well-performing country systems are essential to ensure that public expenditure for ambitious national plans translates into development results in the most efficient, effective and sustainable manner (World Bank, 2012; ADB, 2014). They set out the regulations, systems and processes to be followed by the officials managing public expenditure in budget execution, financial reporting, auditing and procurement. Because they determine how governments collect, manage and allocate public resources across different sectors, the quality of country systems has a transversal effect on overall development effectiveness and results.

Box 3.1. How do we measure the quality of countries' public financial management systems?

Indicator 9a measures the proportion of participating countries moving up by at least half a point on the World Bank's Quality of Budgetary and Financial Management scale.

This indicator is based on the scores for the quality of budgetary and financial management of the World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA).¹ Scores range from 1.0 to 6.0, in half-point (0.5) increments; the higher the score, the more reliable the country's budget and financial management system is considered to be.

The World Bank assesses whether the country meets the following three dimensions:

1. a comprehensive and credible budget, linked to policy priorities
2. effective financial management systems to ensure that the budget is implemented as intended in a controlled and predictable way
3. timely and accurate accounting and fiscal reporting, including audited public accounts and effective arrangements for follow up.

For the 2016 monitoring round, the Global Partnership monitoring framework drew on the most recent CPIA scores (2015) assessing the quality of budgetary and public financial management; these scores are available for 60 of the participating countries.

Target for 2015: Half of countries move up at least one step (i.e. 0.5 points) on the CPIA scale for Quality of Budgetary and Financial Management (CPIA 13).

¹ This indicator takes the value of one CPIA sub-dimension – CPIA 13 – focused on the quality of budgetary and public financial management.

In general, little progress has been made since 2010, with some notable exceptions

The quality of budgetary and public financial management for most assessed countries (87%) continues to fall within the "moderate" category (Table 3.1). The results suggest that most countries still need to make improvements in: making their budgets more comprehensive and credible; linking their budgets effectively to policy priorities; implementing expenditure in a controlled and predictable way; and subjecting budgets to timely and accurate accounting, fiscal reporting and public auditing.

The target set in Busan called for progress of at least half a point, in no less than half of the reporting countries, by 2015. While this target has not been met, a comparative look at performance between the baseline year (2010) and 2016 yields some interesting trends (Figure 3.1). Eleven countries (18%) made progress in strengthening their country systems: Chad, Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Liberia, Nepal, Samoa, Sudan, Tuvalu and Zimbabwe. Most of these countries are either classified as fragile states⁴ or small island developing states. The fact that these governments made progress despite a complex country context sends an encouraging message. There was little overall change in 35 countries (58%), most of which underwent ups and downs during the 2010-15 period. More worryingly, 14 countries (23%) experienced a decline in the quality of public financial management. Despite the decline, all of these countries except one remained within the "moderate" category, preserving some of the earlier gains; South Sudan experienced the only observed decline to the "weak" category, largely a result of internal conflict.

Table 3.1. **The quality of country systems remains moderate**
Quality of budgetary and public financial management (CPIA 13)

Score	2010		2015	
	Number of countries	%	Number of countries	%
Strong	4.5	2	4	0
	4.0	7	12	7
Moderate	3.5	23	40	21
	3.0	13	23	21
	2.5	8	14	10
	2.0	4	7	0
Weak	1.5	0	0	1
Total countries assessed:		57		60



Source: Assessment based on data from the World Bank (2016a), CPIA-13 scale for quality of budgetary and public financial management.
StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933423940>

Figure 3.1. **Trends in strengthening country systems**
 2010-15

Since 2010, number of countries that have:



StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933423719>

Achieving and sustaining gains in public sector and governance transformation requires continued investment

Institutional change takes time. It involves not only a transformation of rules and processes, but also building capacity to implement these rules; it calls for reshuffling managerial functions, overcoming inertia as well as internal and external resistance; and, often, it requires instilling new cultural norms and practices. With this in mind, the results of the 2016 monitoring round with a longer-term perspective yield a picture that is less bleak: since 2005, more countries have made progress in strengthening country systems than those that have experienced setbacks. In addition, publicly released CPIA scores have a negative bias, as CPIA scores are confidential for the countries with greater development success.⁵ If we include the 21 participating countries for which CPIA scores are not released because of their higher level of development, relying on the information provided by similar assessments (i.e. public expenditure and financial accountability, or PEFA, assessments), the overall picture changes: 35% of participating countries have strong public financial management institutions, 64% rank within the moderate category and only 1 falls in the weak category (Box 3.2). Even so, progress since 2010 remains limited.

Box 3.2. The key challenges in public financial management

Despite the differences from country to country in public financial management capacity, interesting patterns emerge from the latest publicly available public expenditure and financial accountability (PEFA) assessments (Table 3.2). For 70 participating countries, the data confirm that budgets are better made than executed (De Renzio, Andrews and Mills, 2010). This is important because budget preparation reflects the intended behaviour of governments, while budget execution – which includes internal audit, control, cash management and procurement – reflects actual behaviour; it is therefore more influenced by politics, and hence is harder to reform (Andrews, 2013). Execution also goes beyond the role of the budget office: decentralised units across government have to be effective in performing good cash management, financial reporting, oversight and procurement, and disparities in capacities across ministries will affect performance. More important, predictability, coverage and management of development co-operation funding are signalled as a key public financial management challenge in most participating countries.

Table 3.2. Most common challenges in public financial management

PEFA scores

Weak public financial management areas <i>C to C+ scores</i>	Very weak public financial management areas <i>D to D+ scores</i>
Public access to key fiscal information	Effectiveness of internal audit
Predictability regarding the availability of funds for commitment of expenditures	Predictability of direct budget support
Stock and monitoring of expenditure payment arrears	Effectiveness in collection of tax payments
Quality and timeliness of in-year budget reports	Availability of information on resources received by service delivery units
Extent of unreported government operations	Legislative scrutiny of external audit reports
Legislative scrutiny of the annual budget law	Financial information provided by development partners for budgeting and reporting on project and programme aid
Effectiveness of payroll controls	Proportion of aid that is managed by use of national procedures
Multi-year perspective in fiscal planning, expenditure policy and budgeting	
Composition of expenditure out-turn compared to original approved budget	
Quality and timeliness of annual financial statements	
Effectiveness of internal controls for non-salary expenditure	
Competition, value for money and controls in procurement	
Quality and timeliness of annual financial statements	
Scope, nature and follow-up of external audit	
Oversight of aggregate fiscal risk from other public sector entities	

Notes: Data for 70 participating countries, latest PEFA assessment publicly available. **Bold** for issues directly or indirectly related to development co-operation.

Source: PEFA Secretariat (2016), “Public expenditure and financial assessments”, dataset, <https://pefa.org/assessments/listing>.

Most countries have taken action to strengthen their public financial management systems, although with mixed results

The global financial crisis and its aftermath put the revenue and expenditure management of most countries to test, triggering widespread actions to strengthen these areas (Cangiano, Curristine and Lazare, 2013); many of the countries participating in the 2016 monitoring round made significant investments to upgrade their country systems. In recent years, efforts to establish or expand public financial information management systems included more than 135 programmes in 75 countries.⁶ Many other countries are upgrading their public financial management and procurement regulations, re-engineering administrative and budgetary processes, and building staff capacity. In particular, countries have made efforts to strengthen their independent audit and oversight institutions, develop annual budgets with fiscal year forecasts, elaborate budget proposals and annual reviews, and align expenditures and investment priorities (World Bank, 2016a: 38); in this monitoring round, 48 of the participating countries (59%) reported having a medium-term expenditure framework in place or in the making.

Example of modernisation efforts: To improve the links amongst its budget and policy priorities, fiscal reporting and management systems, the government of Madagascar adopted the National System of Monitoring and Evaluation, aligned with the priorities of the National Development Plan, which in turn sets the strategy and framework for the five-year budget. Since 2015, budget execution reports are published on the website of the Ministry of Finance; considerable efforts have been made to consolidate information on arrears, renegotiate with creditors and improve monitoring (World Bank, 2016a: 39). As a result, between 2014 and 2015, Madagascar raised its CPIA score – which had experienced a sharp decline (from 3.5 to 2.0) following the global financial crisis – to 2.5.

Development partners have supported these efforts by offering close to USD 16 billion since 2010 to support strengthening of public financial management in the 81 participating countries.⁷ Many countries have used this support to diagnose their country systems and implement action plans to strengthen them; other countries, like Zimbabwe, have managed to make significant improvements in public financial management quality independently.⁸

Research indicates, however, that while partners' support to financial management modernisation efforts has been positively and significantly associated with better country systems, the effectiveness of partners' support is mixed (De Renzio, Andrews and Mills, 2011).

The frequently limited results achieved by these reforms is the subject of abundant literature and significant self-reflection among government officials and governance advisers. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, fiscal stress has deteriorated the quality of budgetary and public financial management, triggering transformations that lean towards centralised decision making and top-down budgeting approaches (Alesina, Ardagna and Trebbi, 2006; Randma-Liiv and Bouckaert, 2016: 228).

Emerging approaches may help in strengthening country systems

Despite the limited recent progress, findings from recent evaluations, academic research and practitioners' joint technical work shed light on several elements that are commonly viewed as increasing the chances of success in efforts aimed at improving the quality of country systems:

- **Joint diagnostics have helped to identify weaknesses in domestic institutions and co-ordinate development partner support to strengthen them.** In sharp contrast with other areas of public sector management, public financial management modernisation efforts benefit from a host of diagnostic

tools that assess the general quality of country systems, as well as that of specific institutions, against international benchmarks and standards (PEFA Secretariat, 2011; De Renzio, 2013). These tools allow governments to identify institutional needs and help development partners to guide their support for public financial management and to estimate the fiduciary risk in using country systems.⁹ Since 2005, more than 535 PEFA assessments have been carried out in over 150 countries, including the 81 participants in the 2016 monitoring round – some of them at subnational level as well. Encouragingly, these assessments are typically multi-stakeholder efforts, including governments and multiple partners.

- **Diagnostics need to be complemented by a stronger evidence based on *how* institutional change happens, and *what* it contributes to performance and results.** The identification and successful diffusion of attractive “best practice” in public financial management have been well captured by current international standards, such as the PEFA. Governments that meet the standard gain external legitimacy, comparing institutions against best practice serves as a departure point in policy discussions and reform design (World Bank, 2012). However, there is a growing acknowledgement that *one-size-fits-all* approaches to public financial management modernisation do not work and the consensus needs to be challenged by trying innovative approaches (OECD, 2015a: 207-211). As the World Bank put it in revising the organisation’s overall strategy in this area, “*what works* in public sector management reform is highly context-dependent and explicit evidence remains limited” (World Bank, 2012: 1). Acknowledging the limits of current approaches, investing in expanding the evidence base of what works and how it happened should be welcomed. Pilot approaches such as those being tested by the Effective Institutions Platform and the Collaborative Africa Budget Reform Initiative are a step in the right direction (EIP, 2015; CABRI, 2014).
- **A move from “best practice” to “best fit” may help move improvements in public financial management and procurement forward.** There is significant uncertainty about the institutional forms that are suited for improving public sector performance in a given context, and standardised approaches do not seem to work. The joint work of governments and development partners in this area is slowly moving from “best practice” to “best fit” approaches (World Bank/IMF, 2013; Andrews, 2015). Basically, this implies focusing on each country’s specific and locally-defined problems and priorities. Achieving such a shift requires substantive changes in organisational thinking and incentives, as well as active “listening” and alignment with country priorities (Custer et al., 2015).¹⁰ In doing so, however, governments and partners will ensure that their efforts to address weaknesses in public financial management or procurement systems are owned by those most affected by them (Andrews, Pritchett et Woolcock, 2013). This requires a flexible, iterative approach; it also calls for acknowledging that public institutions are defined by complexity, and therefore some degree of experimentation, coupled with tight feedback loops, is needed to allow learning and evidence-based institutional change to happen (Ramalingan, 2013; Levy, 2014). Public financial management modernisation processes are more effective when they are designed with clear focus and to account for uncertainty, and when they are closely monitored and flexible in navigating unplanned hurdles and unexpected opposition (World Bank, 2012: 5); this requires overcoming institutional aversion to risk and occasional failure (OECD, 2015a: 191-211).
- **It is fundamental to foster political commitment for longer-term change.** Assessing the political space, room for manoeuvre and institutional capacity, *and* using those assessments to shape the design of public financial management modernisation reforms is crucial (Dener, Watkins and Dorotinsky, 2011; World Bank/IMF, 2013: xv), as is understanding the position and comparative advantage of each of the core institutions expected to drive the reform, particularly the Ministry of Finance (Mustapha and Welham, 2016). Equally important, given the lengthiness of the implementation of this type of institutional change, is the need to strengthen internal accountability and top-down co-ordination within government;

most evaluations have found that sustained political commitment is key to the successful implementation of reforms (Lawson, 2012; World Bank, 2013; IDB, 2014; ADB, 2014). Such commitment is important in balancing the short-term costs of institutional change with the longer-term benefits of stronger country systems; the immediate benefits of upstream reforms are often not obvious to policy makers, while the political costs and bureaucratic challenges of implementing them frequently are. Evaluations indicate that government commitment to reform at the technical level, or pressure from legislatures, civil society or development partners, are not enough if strong political leadership of the process is lacking; when political leadership is present, however, they can help sustain these efforts (Lawson, 2012). In sum, realism in the scope of institutional change ambitioned, a more candid and flexible approach on *how* to sequence the process, and making the benefits of these reforms more obvious to maintain political commitment throughout the reform, are frequently recommended for sustainable institutional change (World Bank, 2010: 223-255).

- **Reforms in public financial management and broader reforms of the public administration are interdependent.** It is difficult to separate efforts to achieve effective country systems from the need to develop and retain a capable civil service (OECD, 2015a). Whether it be strengthening of the independence and capacity of the judiciary to prevent impunity and discourage corrupt behaviour (Haruna and Vyas-Doorgapersad, 2016) or improving the effectiveness of public institutions for sustained service delivery and good governance – changes in all public domains need to be addressed in parallel, with a particular emphasis on capacity development (OECD, 2011b: 8-9; World Bank, 2012, 2013).

Indicator 9b. Development partners use countries' own public financial management and procurement systems

In Busan, development partners agreed to “use country systems as the default approach for development co-operation in support of activities managed by the public sector” (OECD, 2011a: para 19a). The Global Partnership monitoring framework measures the use of public financial and procurement systems as proxies for the use of broader national systems and institutions (Box 3.3). These fiduciary systems are important for ensuring the integrity, efficiency and effectiveness of government institutions. By using them, rather than setting up parallel ones, development co-operation partners help to strengthen national institutions, thereby contributing to the ownership and long-term sustainability of development efforts.

Box 3.3. How do we estimate the use of country systems by development partners?

Indicator 9b measures the proportion of development co-operation disbursed to the government using the country's own public financial management and procurement systems. This includes using the country's own rules and procedures – versus those of the development partner – for budget execution, financial reporting, auditing, and procurement of goods and services.


Target for 2015: For this indicator, the targets depend on the quality of country systems, as measured by Indicator 9a:

- In countries scoring 4.5 and above in quality of country systems, development partners were expected to reduce the gap in the use of country systems by two-thirds.
- In countries scoring between 3.5 and 4.5, they were expected to reduce the gap by one-third.
- Busan did not establish a target for countries with weaker country systems.

Globally, there is a slight upwards trend in the use of country systems

Across the 81 countries reporting to Global Partnership 2016 monitoring round, half of the recorded disbursements to governments used country systems. Among the 60 countries that participated in both the 2011 and 2016 monitoring rounds, there is an increase in the use of country systems of 6% (Figure 3.2). This increase is driven by greater reliance by development partners on national budget execution procedures to manage development co-operation funds, but particularly by greater use of countries' own financial reporting requirements and auditing mechanisms; collectively, the use of these three elements averaged at 55%; in contrast, reliance on national procurement systems declined slightly (by 2%) as compared to 2010.

Figure 3.2. **Overall trends in use of country systems**
For the 60 countries participating in both the 2011 and 2016 monitoring rounds




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Although overall progress in using country systems has been slow, there are some encouraging cases. For example, in the subset of 30 countries with CPIA scores that call for greater use of their country systems by development partners (i.e. 3.5 to 4.5), the use of these systems grew by 9% as compared to 2010 (54% compared to 45%); the Busan target for these countries was to reduce the gap by a third, reaching 65% use of country systems. Overall results also hide important variations across the 30 countries: 18 of these countries (or 60%) saw an increase in the use of their systems, while the remaining 12 countries experienced some reduction in use. Seven countries saw a particularly high level of use of country systems, surpassing the 65% target: Plurinational State of Bolivia, Mali, Pakistan, Rwanda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, and Uganda. Encouragingly, in some of these cases, the good results were driven by higher use of domestic procurement systems.

Development partners show significant divergences in their use of country systems (Figure 3.3). Since 2010, an equal number of development partners have increased their use of country systems as those that have experienced a decrease (about 41% of partners in each case). Multilateral development banks continue to be the leaders, although there has been some decline in their use of these systems, followed by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) bilateral partners, and by vertical funds. Other bilateral partners beyond the DAC have made great strides in increasing their use of country systems, with a notable surge from 4% to 40% since 2010. UN agencies and other international and regional organisations, however, continue to rely on corporate systems to deliver the lion's share of their development co-operation.

Figure 3.3. **Development partner use of country systems**
By type of partner



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Several factors influence development partners' use of country systems

Results from the 2016 monitoring round indicate that the degree to which development partners make use of country systems is significantly influenced by the country context, as well as by the development partners' own approaches and policies. In practice, the data follow a u-shaped curve, with greater use of country systems both for countries with stronger and weaker country systems, but for different reasons:

- **To a certain extent, development partners base their decisions about whether to use country systems on the quality of a country's budgetary and public financial management.** Multivariate analysis of the monitoring data shows a positive and significant relationship between the quality of a country's budget and financial management (i.e. Indicator 9a) and the degree of use of country systems. The better the quality of country systems, the lower the perceived fiduciary risk and therefore the higher the proportion of development co-operation disbursed using the country's own public budget and financial management systems.
- **Countries that are more dependent on external support tend to experience a higher use of their own systems.** According to Knack (2014: 843), one explanation for this phenomenon is that, in order to deliver higher levels of development co-operation, development partners have to rely on modalities similar to budget support.
- **Development partners show unique risk avoidance and risk management profiles.** These profiles, in turn, determine partners' differing approaches to similar country contexts (CABRI, 2014: 35-36). In addition to fiduciary risk, some partners may take into consideration non-fiduciary factors, such as the human rights situation, quality of policies and pro-poor commitment, or macroeconomic stability. Analysis of the 2016 monitoring data indicates that characteristics such as these are important factors affecting partners' decision as to whether to use country systems.¹¹
- **Partners use country systems applying different modalities of development co-operation.** Half of the development partners assessed in the 2016 monitoring round are using country systems, despite their relatively low use of general and sector budget support modalities.¹² This suggests that they are finding ways to rely on country systems for diverse types of development co-operation support (Box 3.4).

Box 3.4. **Factors and initiatives that increase the use of country systems**

Perceived risk is an important factor in determining the use of country systems. A comparative assessment of seven major partners (CABRI, 2014: 38) revealed that while the World Bank and regional development banks establish the eligibility of country systems based on a clear fiduciary focus, other partners tend to include non-fiduciary factors in determining eligibility. Partners such as USAID, the European Union, Germany and the United Kingdom consider democracy, human rights and governance factors in determining eligibility. France, Germany and others also take into consideration the macroeconomic context. Increasingly, development partners are clarifying their criteria for using country systems and establishing procedures for managing fiduciary and non-fiduciary risk using co-ordinated and targeted approaches. For example, sector budget support mechanisms help partners focus resources on sector institutions, which are considered to be comparatively stronger. Multi-donor trust funds, such as the very large Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, channel resources for government-led programmes by using some elements of country systems and by sharing risks among multiple partners. Other practices involve civil society in the steering committees of multi-donor trust funds, thereby creating greater alignment to country needs as well as domestic pressure for adequate use of the funding (Manuel et al., 2012: 23).

Specific reactions to macroeconomic shocks also help to increase the use of country systems. For example, development banks have progressively taken a role as counter-cyclical lenders, placing emphasis on quick-disbursing lending associated to policy reforms, which accelerate the speed of delivery and create fiscal space when most needed (Griffith-Jones and Gottschalk, 2012). These loans also tend to be sizeable in volume. As the transfers are disbursed directly to treasuries, by definition they tend to use country systems. These practices extend to the World Bank, regional development banks, and bilateral development banks from Brazil, Canada, the People's Republic of China and Germany (Ferraz, Além and Madeira, 2016).

Finally, some development partners are experimenting with innovative development co-operation modalities at the country level that rely on greater use of country systems. Luxembourg developed budgeted aid in Senegal, a hybrid between project-type interventions and sector budget support. Results-based modalities, where funds are disbursed after achieving the intended results, are also gaining attention. The World Bank's Program-for-Results (PforR) modality is an example of this approach, with total financing of USD 12 billion from 2012 to 2016 to support USD 57 billion worth of governments' own programmes. Complementary technical assistance is often included as part of the package to assist governments in strengthening their own country systems.

Indicator 10. Aid is untied

Tied aid implies funding for which partners establish geographical restrictions as to where the funds can be spent (OECD, 1987). Tying funding decreases the effective use of the funds and reduces the value-for-money of development co-operation, since it limits the suppliers who can bid on the procurement of goods and services to those who are located in the restricted set of territories (typically the country of the development partner). For this reason, goods and services procured with tied aid tend to be more expensive or offer less quality than their equivalents procured from local suppliers in the country where the project or programme is being implemented, or from other more competitive foreign suppliers (Ellmers, 2011).

It is estimated that the costs of tied aid are anywhere from 15% to 30% higher than those for untied aid (Bhagwati, 1967; Jepma, 1991; Clay, Geddes and Natali, 2009). Aside from economic costs, however, tied aid also challenges the country's ownership of purchasing decisions and deprives the country of potential positive externalities in using development co-operation, such as creating markets for local suppliers (OECD, 2011c). It also complicates alignment and harmonisation of development partner procedures. Untied aid provides cost-effective goods and services while at the same time creating local opportunities and increasing transparency around procurement processes (European Commission, 2002).

In 2001, DAC bilateral partners agreed on a recommendation to immediately untie aid to the least developed countries which can least afford the costs associated with tied funding (Box 3.6) (OECD, 2001). In 2008, this recommendation was revised to include untying aid to the heavily indebted poor countries, without reducing support to the groups of countries benefiting from the original recommendation (OECD, 2014).¹³ The Paris Declaration called on DAC members to continue to make progress in untying, and the Accra Agenda for Action encouraged all development partners to “elaborate individual plans to untie their aid to the maximum extent”; yet neither targets nor timelines were established in either of these two declarations. Likewise, the Busan Partnership agreement urged development partners to “accelerate efforts to untie aid” (OECD, 2011a).

By 2005, less than two-thirds of development co-operation was provided with restricted procurement from substantially all development partners. Significant progress was then made, until 2010, when the trend slowed as the financial and economic crises put pressure on development co-operation budgets, challenging efforts to untie development assistance (OECD, 2015c; OECD/UNDP, 2014).

Box 3.5. **How do we measure untied aid?**

Indicator 10 measures whether development assistance from DAC bilateral development partners is untied.


Aid is considered untied when the bilateral partner does not impose geographical constraints on the use of these development co-operation funds (e.g. requiring that the procurement of goods and services using these funds is made from suppliers based in specific countries).

Target for 2015: Continued progress over time.

Since 2010, the share of bilateral official development assistance (ODA) reported as untied has increased only marginally and the global percentage of untied aid continues to hover around the peak value reached in 2013 (Figure 3.4). DAC members reported that in 2014, the last year for which data are available, 78% of their bilateral ODA was untied; considering only the 81 countries that participated in the 2016 monitoring round, the share is slightly higher (79%).¹⁴

These global levels of untied aid mask differences amongst bilateral partners in terms of performance in untying ODA. Several countries – mostly in northern Europe – could be considered untying champions, maintaining fully or almost fully untied aid programmes (above 95%) since 2010; Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom are in this group. Six DAC members, however, have not yet achieved the 2010 level of 74% untied aid. Others, such as the EU, Korea and Spain, experienced a notable increase between 2010 and 2014, by raising the share of untied aid by around 20 percentage points. Italy experienced the largest increase, by almost 35 percentage points.

Figure 3.4. **Share of untied aid**
Trends from 2005 to 2014 (most recent available estimate)



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Some development partners consider tied aid a means of promoting domestic companies while delivering development co-operation. Nonetheless, there is no strong evidence that tied aid significantly increases development partners' exports or generates higher employment (Lloyd et al., 2000; Pettersson and Johansson, 2013). Recent studies also reveal that the costs of untying aid may exceed any potential gains from tying (Knack and Smets, 2013). In this sense, the reasons for not untying aid seem to be driven by other considerations, such as the increasing role of donor-country private sector firms in the delivery of development co-operation.¹⁵

There are numerous factors that can encourage development partners to untie aid, among them peer pressure. The DAC recommendations, as well as the Paris Declaration and the Accra and Busan commitments, have associated untying of aid with aid effectiveness, thus creating incentives for countries to increase their share of untied aid (Knack and Smets, 2013). Research suggests that, to some extent, development partners are sensitive to the decisions of other development partners working with the same countries to untie their aid.¹⁶

Examples of good practice: Korea increased its share of untied aid from 32% in 2010 – when Korea became a DAC member – to 53% in 2014; following international pressure and a commitment to meet agreed standards, it further increased it to 75% by 2015 (Chung, Eom and Jung, 2015).

Governance challenges in recipient countries also influence development partners' decisions on untying aid. While the Accra Agenda for Action encouraged development partners to use "local and regional procurement [...] and allow local and regional firms to compete", recent research indicates that the quality of national procurement systems influences the share of aid that is actually untied (Ellmers, 2011).

Box 3.6. **Achieving effective untying of aid will require further efforts**

While aid is often formally untied to open up bidding to firms outside the development partner country, this might not be sufficient to achieve effective untied aid. Informal tying may occur if development partners use bidding processes that give advantages to their national companies, or if they simply choose to fund projects in sectors where national firms have a competitive advantage.

...

The 2001 *DAC Recommendation on Untying Official Development Assistance to the Least Developed Countries* called for ODA to be both formally and informally untied. A transparency provision asked that *ex ante* announcements of untied development co-operation offers be made, as well as *ex post* notifications on the contracts awarded; implementation of these provisions is still limited in the second aspect.

Contract awarding practices provide another perspective on the extent to which aid is effectively untied. In 2013, 48% of development co-operation contracts were awarded to suppliers from the bilateral partner country, 42% to suppliers from the recipient country and 10% to other suppliers. Overall, the share of contracts awarded to firms from the development partner country almost doubled between 2003 and 2013, reaching almost 90% for a number of development partners (OECD, 2015c).

Indicator 5a. Annual predictability of development co-operation

Governments that benefit from predictable development co-operation can plan and manage their development policies and programmes with greater effectiveness (Boxes 3.7 and 3.8). The Paris Declaration (2005) committed development partners to disbursing funds “in a timely and predictable fashion according to agreed schedules” (OECD, 2005). The Accra Agenda for Action re-emphasised the importance of predictability by urgently calling for the provision of “full and timely information on annual commitments and actual disbursements” (OECD, 2008). In Busan, development partners explicitly reaffirmed these predictability commitments.

Box. 3.7. How do we calculate the annual predictability of development co-operation?


Indicator 5a measures the proportion of development co-operation funding that is disbursed to the government within the fiscal year in which development partners scheduled it. It captures both the reliability of development partners in delivering the promised resources within the relevant year and their capacity to accurately forecast and disburse this funding (i.e. implement their development co-operation activities) within a 12-month period.

Target for 2015: Halving the gap between development co-operation scheduled for the next year and development co-operation actually delivered.


Globally, annual predictability has slightly decreased over the past five years. Countries participating in the 2016 monitoring round reported that 83% of all funds scheduled for the public sector was disbursed as planned within the fiscal year of reference, falling short of the Busan target of 90% and below the 2010 level.

However, this global average hides important variations among countries (Figure 3.5). Thirty-eight countries received less funding than was scheduled. On the other hand, 39 countries received more funding than was scheduled, with total unscheduled disbursements amounting to about USD 5.2 billion.

Figure 3.5. Annual predictability




UNDP note: References to Kosovo shall be understood to be in the context of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999).

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Regional data show significant variations in predictability (Figure 3.6), with averages for Latin America and East Asia above 90%, while Africa and the Pacific are well below this rate, indicating that the country context also matters. Countries like Egypt and the Federated States of Micronesia received only half of the funding originally scheduled by development partners, while the Dominican Republic and Nepal received well above the scheduled funding.

Figure 3.6. **Regional variations in annual predictability**
Percentage of development co-operation funding for the government sector




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Annual predictability of development co-operation is driven by a combination of technical and structural factors that need to be effectively managed

Previous research found that the adoption of certain structures and processes by development partners – including “agency-wide multiyear rolling plans and budgeting frameworks; longer-term country partnerships and strategies; new longer-term development co-operation instruments; effective tracking and reporting on disbursements” – resulted in increased predictability (OECD, 2011b: 10). While longer-term and more inclusive country partnerships were acknowledged as positively affecting the annual predictability of development co-operation, for example, shorter-term and fragmented country programming was found to inhibit predictable behaviour (Canavire-Bacarreza, Neumayer and Nunnenkamp, 2015). The analysis in this monitoring round confirms these findings, evidencing that a country’s most significant partners¹⁷ are also its most predictable; development partners with larger programmes also tend to be more predictable. Finally, multilateral development banks, UN agencies and bilateral partners, which tend to have greater country presence and systematically establish country strategies with partner governments, are shown to be more predictable than other partners (Figure 3.7).¹⁸

To successfully meet their commitments to make scheduled funds available within the year, development partners need to manage the complexity of each country’s context and their forecasts need to reflect challenging contexts. Data from the 2016 monitoring round confirm the findings of previous research (OECD, 2011b): there is a systematic positive correlation between the implementation capacity¹⁹ of the beneficiary public administration and the annual predictability of development co-operation. Good governance and overall quality of public sector management are also found to enhance annual predictability; more developed countries are better able to ensure that scheduled funds are disbursed within the year. Countries that transition to democracy are particularly rewarded with predictable funds, and even with steady over-disbursements (Canavire-Bacarreza, Neumayer and Nunnenkamp, 2015). On the other hand, as consistent with these findings, fragile states are particularly affected by low annual predictability.

Figure 3.7. Annual predictability of development co-operation



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Among the top performers, some multilateral and bilateral partners have shown significant progress in raising their annual predictability levels:

Examples of progress: The Asian Development Bank improved the clarity and public availability of information on the resource allocations of the Asian Development Fund. It also made improvements in the release of resources according to agreed schedules (MOPAN, 2013).

Luxembourg increased the percentage of funds disbursed as scheduled by 14% and decreased the funds disbursed beyond scheduled amounts. This is in line with Luxembourg's efforts to keep development co-operation budgets relatively stable and to develop long-term relationships with the countries it co-operates with (OECD, 2012b); it develops five-year programmes with each country, including indicative budgets to ensure better medium-term predictability.

Indicator 5b. Medium-term predictability of development co-operation

Medium-term predictability is a crucial dimension of effective development planning. When official development finance is predictable over the medium term, governments can use these resources to support long-term policies and programmes, and can record external development financing in the national budget (OECD, 2012a: 11). Sustained co-ordination between development partners is also possible when medium-term information on their respective support is made available. Acknowledging these multiple benefits, the Busan Partnership agreement called on development partners to provide governments in all the countries where they work with “rolling three-to-five-year indicative forward expenditure and/or implementation plans as agreed in Accra” (Box 3.7) (OECD, 2011a: 7, para. 24).


Box 3.7. How do we calculate the medium-term predictability of development co-operation?

Indicator 5b measures the estimated share of development co-operation funding covered by indicative forward expenditure or implementation plans shared with government (for one, two and three years ahead).

Target for 2015: Halving the gap between development co-operation funding not covered by indicative forward spending plans provided to governments by development partners.

Medium-term predictability shows only a marginal increase in 2015 as compared to 2013 data.²⁰ Overall, 71% of development co-operation funding is covered by indicative forward spending plans provided to countries, a slight increase over 2013 (70%). As detailed in Figure 3.8, 82% of estimated total development co-operation funding is currently covered by forward-spending plans for one year ahead. The availability of forward information decreases to 69% for two years ahead, and to 63% for three years ahead. These values are well below the targets for availability of forward expenditure plans, which stand at 92% of estimated total funding for 2016, 85% of estimated funding for 2017 and 79% of estimated funding for 2018.

Figure 3.8. **Medium-term forward-planning information provided by development partners**




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As indicated by the increase of estimates for three years ahead coupled with a reduction in the other components, some development partners are moving to longer-term forward spending plans, while others still need to increase the availability of forward spending plans for at least one and two years ahead.

Nonetheless, the overall trend is positive. When comparing only countries that participated in the 2013 and 2015 monitoring rounds, the percentage of funding covered by indicative forward spending plans increases to 74%.

The overall picture reveals significant differences in behaviour among development partners (Figure 3.9). As is the case with annual predictability, in-depth analysis shows that the greater the relative importance of the development partner to the country, the stronger the relationship with the national government, and therefore the greater the likelihood of that partner providing medium-term projections on a regular basis. Overall, multilateral development banks and bilateral partners display greater medium-term predictability compared to other development partners. Also, the results of the analysis suggest that, similar to the case of annual predictability, countries with stronger public sector management institutions are more effective in requiring (and obtaining) medium-term forecasts from development partners.²¹

Figure 3.9. **Medium-term predictability of development co-operation**
Percentage of development co-operation by partner type



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Examples of good practice: Korea improved medium-term predictability by more than one-third between 2013 and 2015 in reaction to recommendations made in the 2012 DAC peer review, which called for the partner to publish bilateral country programme estimates on an annual and medium-term basis. As an illustrative example, in preparation for increasing its ODA to Cambodia, Korea set out the budget growth path for its various agencies internally; it also shared this information with the Cambodian government.

The OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID) increased by 31% the medium-term predictability of its development co-operation programme between 2013 and 2015. In addition to increasing efforts to make forward spending plans available to countries, the fund raised internal awareness of its organisational performance through participation in global monitoring processes.

The way forward for achieving greater country ownership

Country ownership is fundamental to achieving sustainable development goals. It ensures that countries themselves lead their development processes; that support from development partners is relevant to country needs; that projects and programmes are effectively implemented; and that results are sustained. The 2016 monitoring round revealed that significant progress has been made by countries in enhancing the quality of their core domestic institutions, such as public financial management and procurement systems. Yet only some of these efforts are truly paying off in a sustained way.

Similarly, development partners' efforts to increase their use of country systems and deliver development co-operation in ways that strengthen these institutions have made only partial progress. The annual predictability of development co-operation is only slightly lower than it was in previous rounds. There has been limited progress in ensuring the medium-term predictability of development co-operation and in aid untying, with global averages hovering around the peak values achieved over the past five years. Nonetheless, these global averages mask important success stories of individual countries and development partners – such as the increase in use of country systems by bilateral partners beyond the DAC.

In this context, the following suggestions can help achieve greater country ownership and ensure the effectiveness of development efforts:

- **Invest in developing long-term partnerships to strengthen overall country ownership.** Analysis of monitoring data reveals that when partners make significant investments in a specific country by offering substantial and steady support to help the country build its domestic institutions, challenges such as development co-operation predictability and use of country systems are less significant. In contrast, shorter-term and fragmented country programming pose challenges to progress on several measures of country ownership.
- **Focus on improving the effectiveness and accountability of public institutions, sustaining public service delivery, and building sound public financial management and good governance.** These areas are inextricably linked to the effective use of country systems. At the same time, reforms in all public domains need to be addressed in a coherent manner, placing particular emphasis on capacity development (OECD, 2011b: 8-9; World Bank, 2012, 2013).
- **Allow innovative and alternative approaches to emerge and be tested.** While well-established joint assessments and co-ordinated support are laudable, development partners should allow for deviations from what they may consider best practice, seeking rather to identify the approach that offers the best fit for each country or circumstance. More active peer learning about experiences with the use of country systems, mid-term predictability, untying development co-operation and strengthening domestic institutions can help to underpin a more case-sensitive approach.
- **Assess the political space, the room for manoeuvring and the institutional capacity.** Political commitment is critical for long-term change. Careful assessments can help to shape the design of efforts to modernise public financial management, lend realism to the scope of ambition, allow a more candid and flexible approach to sequencing the process, and make the benefits of reforms more obvious. This in turn can help to maintain political commitment throughout the institutional change process. Joint diagnostics of weaknesses in domestic institutions allow partners and governments to co-ordinate support to strengthen them, while realistically estimating the fiduciary risks in using the country systems. The Effective Institutions Platform and the Collaborative Africa Budget Reform Initiative have piloted approaches to multi-stakeholder dialogue and peer learning that can help to improve the use of country systems.
- **Rely on flexible, iterative approaches to support evidence-based institutional change and uncover new and emerging practices.** There is limited evidence that standardised approaches to strengthening domestic institutions are effective. Public financial management modernisation processes are effective, rather, when they are designed with a targeted focus, when they allow for uncertainty, when they are closely monitored, and when they are flexible in navigating unplanned hurdles or opposition. To achieve the full set of Busan commitments related to country ownership, it is fundamental for development partners to overcome their institutional aversion to risk and occasional failure; this is a precondition for policy learning (OECD, 2015a: 191-211).

Notes

1. From a speech to the UN General Assembly, cited in United Nations (1998).
2. The international consensus around the principle of country ownership was first affirmed in the Millennium Declaration (2000); it has since been reaffirmed in the Monterey Consensus (2002) and in the outcome documents of the four High-level Forums on Aid Effectiveness (2005-11), including the Paris Declaration and the Busan Partnership agreement. In endorsing these agreements, parties committed to applying the principle to all their development efforts. In 2015, the international community re-committed to abiding by the principle of country ownership with the Addis Ababa Action Agenda and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.
3. This definition of country ownership includes the concepts of: capacity development (i.e. strengthened national capacity to lead development processes); alignment of development co-operation to national priorities, as discussed in Chapter 2; use of national systems to deliver development co-operation; and untying the provision of development co-operation from any procurement constraint. Broader definitions of the concept of country ownership also encompass the dimensions of inclusiveness (i.e. democratic ownership), which is discussed in Chapter 4, and of mutual accountability (i.e. all national actors and development partners are accountable for their actions), as discussed in Chapter 5. Other definitions of the principle emphasise concepts of national sovereignty (Kindornay, 2016).
4. For a list classifying fragile states according to definitions by the World Bank and the Fund for Peace, see: www.oecd.org/dac/governance-peace/conflictfragilityandresilience/docs/List%20of%20fragile%20states.pdf.
5. CPIA scores are only made public for countries that receive support from the International Development Association (IDA), the concessional branch of the World Bank; these countries are typically at a less advanced stage of development. Countries where the quality of public sector institutions is relatively stronger, and with higher levels of development, are characteristically eligible for lending from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the non-concessional branch of the World Bank; scores for these countries are not made public.
6. Data count of the World Bank's Financial Management Information System (FMIS) Mapper as of July 2016.
7. Data from the OECD's Creditor Reporting System.
8. For a description of the country context that drove the reforms in Zimbabwe, see World Bank (2016b). In Zimbabwe, efforts to enhance public financial management benefited from the country's comparatively high quality of civil service personnel and were driven by the need to improve the management of public expenditure in a fiscally constrained context.
9. As discussed later in this chapter, the analysis of the 2016 monitoring data reveals that partner behaviour is guided, among other factors, by the assessed quality of the public financial management systems in the countries in which they operate.
10. In a recent large-scale study on the capacity of development partners to influence policy in partner countries, a strong correlation was found between partners' alignment with national priorities, measured as the share of ODA allocated to the government's top ten priorities, and their ability to influence the reform agenda (Pearson's r -value of 0.57): "large international organizations, such as the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, and the European Union, align their reform efforts closely with the stated developmental objectives of partner countries and demonstrate a relatively high level of agenda-setting influence" (Custer et al., 2015: 75-76).
11. Multivariate analysis of the data, including fixed effects for countries and development partners, reveals that specific characteristics of development partners, such as internal policies or specific risk management profiles, are significantly associated with greater or reduced use of country systems across partner countries.
12. This contradicts the commonly held perception that only modalities similar to budget support can make full use of country systems. In 2014, project-like support (e.g. project-based, technical co-operation) represented 78.6% of total development co-operation, while the rest of modalities (e.g. general and sector budget support, pooled funds, etc.) represented only a small share.
13. These recommendations, however, exclude highly tied areas such as food aid and technical assistance (OECD, 2011c: 12-13).
14. All calculations for Indicator 10 (untied development co-operation) exclude development partners' administrative costs as well as in-country donor costs related to refugees. Annex A.10 provides the information by development partner and country recipient.
15. The European Commission considers that "untying is not a technical issue. It is a highly political question that touches on the reality of ownership and the neutrality of aid" (European Commission, 2008: 22).
16. A minimum amount of untying development co-operation is essential in a country, as "those donors who initiate the process of untying damage their own interests if others do not follow" (Jepma, 1991: 14).
17. The degree of relative importance of a development partner for a given country is estimated as the share of development co-operation funds provided by that partner to the country.

18. These results are derived from a multivariate analysis including 1 600 country-partner pairs. The analysis uses fixed effects for countries and development partners, and includes the explanatory and control variables described in the paragraph.
19. Measured by the quality of public administration (CPIA).
20. A 2013 baseline for this indicator was established for the first time during the 2014 monitoring round.
21. Multivariate analyses with fixed effects for countries and development partners reveal that the CPIA scores for “quality of public administration” and “governance and public sector management cluster” have a positive, significant correlation to medium-term predictability, *ceteris paribus*.

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Chapter 4

Inclusive partnerships for effective development

Delivering on the ambitious 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development will require mobilising all available financing, knowledge, skills and technology. To make this possible, it is essential to build inclusive partnerships for effective development that can create synergies and capitalise on diverse and complementary contributions. This in turn requires an enabling policy, legal and regulatory environment. Many development partners will need to change and adapt the way they work. This chapter looks at the existing environment for inclusive development partnerships. In particular, it reviews the current level of civil society engagement in development as well as the quality of public-private dialogue, focusing on: current efforts to create an environment that maximises the contribution of civil society organisations to development (Indicator 2); and whether essential conditions for good dialogue between the public and private sectors are in place (Indicator 3). It also explores how multi-stakeholder partnerships work in practice. The chapter concludes by proposing key elements for building more inclusive partnerships for development.

Inclusiveness is essential for effective development partnerships. A whole-of-society approach is needed to mobilise support and resources from all development partners; strengthen co-ordination and collaboration; create synergies and reduce duplication of efforts; and capitalise on the diverse and complementary contributions of stakeholders.

The Busan Partnership agreement and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development acknowledge the critical role of broad-based, inclusive partnerships in generating development results. Ultimately, development is about creating positive impact for society as a whole. Inclusive policy making and programming ensures that those directly affected can contribute to defining and tracking the development policies and programmes that are intended to improve their lives.

The Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation monitors two Busan commitments on inclusiveness: creating an environment that enables civil society organisations (CSOs) to contribute to development; and promoting private sector engagement through public-private dialogue. For the 2016 monitoring round, 60 countries reported on relevant national conditions for CSOs and private sector contribution to development (Box 4.1).¹ These assessments were made jointly by representatives of government, CSOs, the private sector, trade unions and development partners using multi-stakeholder dialogue and other consultative mechanisms.

Box 4.1. **How are inclusive partnerships measured in the Global Partnership monitoring framework?**

The Global Partnership monitoring framework measures progress on inclusive partnerships through Indicators 2 and 3 (OECD/UNDP, 2015). Because both of these indicators are new, the 2016 monitoring round sets the baseline for future rounds.

Indicator 2: Civil society organisations operate within an environment that maximises their engagement in and contribution to development

This indicator assesses how governments and their development partners contribute to an enabling environment for civil society organisations (CSOs), and how CSOs are implementing development effectiveness principles in their own operations.¹ It is composed of a four-module qualitative questionnaire at the country level covering:

1. the availability of spaces for multi-stakeholder dialogue on national development policies
2. CSO accountability and transparency
3. official development co-operation with CSOs
4. the legal and regulatory environment.

Indicator 3: Public-private dialogue promotes the engagement of the private sector and its contribution to development

This indicator measures the engagement of the private sector and the quality of public-private dialogue in a given country. Its three modules combine globally sourced quantitative scores and country-sourced qualitative information:

- Module 1 assesses the legal and regulatory environment and relies on data from five international indices: the public engagement index from the Open Budget Survey, which measures budgetary transparency and public participation in the budgeting process; the voice and accountability, rule of law, and control of corruption indices from the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators; and the citizen engagement in rulemaking index from the World Bank. ...

- Module 2 assesses each country's readiness for conducting public-private dialogue processes using country-sourced data gathered through a qualitative questionnaire.
- Module 3 (optional) assesses the effectiveness of a given public-private platform in the country through a case study.

1. The "Istanbul CSO Development Effectiveness Principles" were endorsed at the Open Forum's Global Assembly in September 2010 in Istanbul.


In general, progress in creating an enabling environment is limited

Policy, legal and regulatory settings influence the extent to which inclusive partnerships are able to flourish, permitting non-state stakeholders to maximise their contributions to development. Institutional arrangements and norms can facilitate or hinder stakeholders' ability to trust each other, for example, a pre-condition for partnerships to function effectively. In addition to data collected at the country level, the Global Partnership monitoring process includes data from five global indices (Box 4.1). While these measurements are included under Indicator 3, their analysis contributes to an overall assessment of the inclusiveness of each country's policy, legal and regulatory environment for development partnerships.

In general terms, these international indices show that progress in creating an enabling environment is limited (Figure 4.1). Looking at each assessment in more detail:

- Out of the 40 countries for which data are available, 20 report an increase, from very low levels, in transparency of government budgets and public engagement in the budgetary process. According to the Open Budget index, today some budget information is publicly available in most countries monitored. Among regions, Africa and Asia made the most progress, with close to half of Asian countries reporting advances in this area.
- As broad measures of governance, in the World Bank's composite indices on rule of law and on voice and accountability, over 65% of the 60 countries show minimal or no improvement since 2006. This is confirmed by an independent study run by the CSO Partnership for Development Effectiveness (CPDE) in parallel to the 2016 monitoring round, which shows that while participating countries have widespread constitutional recognition of rights, few have achieved full enforcement in practice and unreasonable restrictions continue to varying degrees (CPDE, 2016: 9-10).
- Progress in fighting corruption is also insufficient. The scores in 25 out of 59 participating countries (42%) for which data on this indicator are available remain unchanged in comparison to 2006 and have declined in 14 countries. In comparative terms, countries in Asia and the Pacific performed relatively better than those in other major world regions.
- Citizens' engagement in rule making is another area of low performance. The governments of most reporting countries have not made any progress or show a negative trend in public consultation when preparing regulations that affect citizens and the business community.

Figure 4.1. **Overall trends in the enabling environment for inclusive development**
Number of countries



StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933423804>

Indicator 2. Civil society operates within an environment that maximises its engagement in and contribution to development


Looking at the legal and regulatory environment for civil society organisations,² most of the 59 countries reporting on Indicator 2 have policies and regulations in place that recognise and respect CSOs' freedom of association, assembly and expression, and that facilitate the formation, registration and operation of these organisations. In almost 30% of the reporting countries, however, civil society organisations receive little or no government support and the regulations limiting the funding of CSOs by development partners are increasing (CPDE, 2016: 10; Dupuy, Ron and Prakash, 2016). Moreover, in over 20% of the reporting countries, certain civil society organisations are marginalised by laws and regulations that fail to support them or to recognise their rights.³ This is true, in particular, for organisations dealing with human rights – including women's rights – the environment, gender and sexual minorities, as well as labour and land rights (CPDE, 2016: 16). Recent studies suggest, however, that development partners' allocations are significantly more likely to channel contributions through CSOs instead of through the government, in countries that have been exposed by international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) for not fully ensuring civic liberties (Dietrich and Murdie, 2014).

Governments need to be more systematic in involving civil society

Most participating countries report that their government has procedures in place for consultation and dialogue around their own development plans (Figure 4.2). Yet while almost 90% report that they consult CSOs on the design, implementation and monitoring of national development policies, the quality of engagement varies. The factors that diminish the effectiveness of consultations in influencing national policies include difficult or polarised political contexts, fragility and conflict, ad hoc consultation mechanisms, and lack of co-ordination mechanisms to ensure broad-based CSO representation. CSOs that participated in these processes indicate that, to be effective, dialogue needs to be institutionalised; this should include establishing clear procedures for CSO engagement, involving a transparent and representative selection of CSOs, and creating effective feedback mechanisms (CPDE, 2016: 14).

Example of good practice: The Kenyan government brings CSOs together with numerous other development partners for monthly meetings on development co-operation effectiveness (CPDE, 2016: 14).

Figure 4.2. **Government support for multi-stakeholder dialogue on national development policies**
Percentage of countries



StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933423819>

While a great majority of countries report that the rights of CSOs to access government information are codified in laws and regulations, the assessments suggest that the quality of legislation varies and the scope of accessible information is often limited or selective. The reasons for this include the weakness of legislation guaranteeing access to information, as well as limited enforcement of such legislation; the provision of partial or outdated information in answer to requests also affects access. The CPDE notes, in this respect, that media organisations in particular are viewed with mistrust in some country contexts, despite their crucial role in disseminating information (CPDE, 2016: 16).

Forty per cent of the reporting countries point to the lack of resources and training opportunities for capacity building among stakeholders as a key obstacle to multi-stakeholder dialogue. This results mainly from limited/fragmented availability of financial resources, but also from the low priority assigned by governments to investment in capacity building. These challenges are particularly important for local CSOs, as fundraising is more difficult for them than for the international NGOs (Banks, Hulme and Edwards, 2015; CPDE, 2016: 17).


Development partners can support civil society organisations more effectively

The policies and practices of development partners also have an impact on CSOs' ability to operate effectively. The 2016 monitoring round shows that development partners overall are taking measures to support CSO contributions to development. More than 80% of reporting countries promote an enabling environment in their co-operation with civil society (Figure 4.3). In addition, almost 80% report that policy dialogue between development partners and the government includes the promotion of an enabling environment for CSOs as an agenda item. Finally, in more than 70% of reporting countries, development partners engage in consultation processes and are creating feedback mechanisms to ensure that CSO inputs are taken into account in their development co-operation policies at headquarters and in the field.

Yet while the overall picture is positive, in 30% of the reporting countries efforts to inform and co-ordinate with CSOs on development policy and programming need to be made more systematic. Furthermore, when consultation does happen, it is often not sufficiently inclusive. In some cases, arrangements do not allow for identifying the inputs from consultations that are actually taken on board in defining development policies. Finally, governments in one-third of countries have insufficient information on the support lent by development partners to (or through) CSOs, which poses an additional challenge to overall co-ordination of efforts.

Example of good practice: The European Union's Roadmaps for Engagement with CSOs are deemed a highly positive consultation experience by CSOs (CPDE, 2016: 26).

Figure 4.3. **Co-operation with civil society organisations by official development partners**
Percentage of countries




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Civil society organisations are improving co-ordination, accountability and transparency

A key area of good performance for CSOs is co-ordination of their activities among themselves and with other development actors. The existence of networks and platforms that convene CSOs at the national level helps them engage in transparency and mutual accountability initiatives more effectively. Over 90% of reporting countries indicate that they have CSO co-ordination structures that facilitate participation in national dialogue processes (Figure 4.4). In over 80% of the countries, there are also mechanisms to facilitate co-ordination on programming, both among CSOs and with other development partners.

Figure 4.4. **Civil society organisation adherence to development effectiveness principles of co-ordination, accountability and transparency**
Percentage of countries



StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933423834>

Several global initiatives have been launched recently to strengthen CSO accountability, such as the CPDE's CSO Accountability Documentation Project to map civil society accountability mechanisms in diverse contexts (CPDE, 2014) and the global standard for CSO accountability.⁴ The International NGO Accountability Charter, to which 25 of the largest CSOs at the global level report annually, is also driving CSO accountability (CPDE, 2016: 20). These international efforts are inspiring local CSOs and trade unions to implement similar parameters of transparency and accountability at the country level.


In around 40% of the reporting countries, there is clear room for improvement in reporting to the government and advancing implementation of CSO development effectiveness principles. Shortcomings in these areas are often related to three common causes: 1) the lack of a single platform representing all CSOs or a CSO co-ordinating mechanism; 2) a need to improve collaboration and build trust between government and CSOs; and 3) the scarcity or lack of funding to improve the effectiveness of CSO operations. It is also important for domestic CSOs and international NGOs to continue to build their joint work, as each has comparative advantages that are essential for development effectiveness.⁵

Example of good practice: NGOs in Cambodia share information on their funding and activities with the government twice a year (CPDE, 2016: 24). The data are publicly accessible.

Indicator 3. Public-private dialogue promotes private sector engagement and its contribution to development

Good dialogue between the public and private sectors depends on several factors: the willingness to engage and interact; the existence of champions to facilitate the dialogue; and the availability of supporting instruments (logistical, financial, capacity building). In the great majority of the 55 reporting countries, the private sector and the government express good or at least fair willingness to engage with each other and interact. As shown in Figure 4.5, however, the potential for quality public-private dialogue is affected by a lack of champions to facilitate the dialogue (in 63% of countries) and the scarcity of instruments and resources to support public-private dialogue (in 81% of countries).

Figure 4.5. **Conditions and potential for public-private dialogue**
Percentage of countries



StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933423841>

The presence of strong leadership and facilitators to put in place and drive effective instruments for public-private dialogue is essential.⁶ Across the countries that participated in assessing the quality of public-private dialogue, the presence of potential champions is more common when both sides – but the government in particular – express trust and willingness to engage. Similarly, instruments and logistics are less of an issue when the private sector is particularly supportive of the process.⁷

Participants attribute lack of willingness to engage in the dialogue process to political or ideological polarisation; perceived tax avoidance or rent-seeking attitudes among private sector representatives when approaching the government; and perceived government corruption or state capture. Existing or perceived linkages of business leaders to representatives of opposition parties, or vice versa, as well as negative experiences in past dialogue processes are also important factors mentioned as obstacles. Limited capacity to effectively carry out the dialogue processes also discourages participation.

Lessons from experience can help build successful public-private dialogue

The qualitative nature of the information provided on public-private dialogue permits a comparative analysis of the top and low performers, which in turn reveals common success factors:

- **Well organised co-ordination and institutional mechanisms enable the private sector to express and channel its views and needs.** Such mechanisms are usually established by sector (e.g. business associations, exporters' groups and professional bodies); however, there are also overarching bodies incorporating representatives from diverse private sector interests (e.g. national productivity committees), as well as government and organised labour associations. In most participating countries, small and medium enterprises are usually not part of these platforms, meaning that important voices are missing from the conversation. Nonetheless, some governments and development partners are supporting these enterprises to ensure that they are better represented in public-private dialogue. Their participation is essential to ensure that the outcomes of the dialogue reflect the broad set of private sector concerns.

Example of good practice: In the Dominican Republic, a partnership between the government and universities has established "service centres" to support small and medium enterprises. A presidential initiative also has been launched (Iniciativa Presidencial para el Apoyo y Promoción de las Medianas y Pequeñas Empresas) and there is a working group on small and medium enterprises that includes government and private sector representatives.

- **Issues of common interest and mutual benefit offer an entry point for building up trust and productive dialogue.** Participating countries mention that dialogue around issues of common interest to all stakeholders – such as education gaps, professional skills development, productivity gaps, mitigating exogenous impacts from the globalised economy, infrastructure shortages and allocation of support for private sector development – enables them to build co-operation without ideological or partisan disagreements.
- **High-level leadership signals high priority.** Platforms, initiatives or arrangements for public-private dialogue are often sponsored at the prime minister/presidential level, or at least at the level of a core minister. This provides political clout and visibility to the platform, and signals government prioritisation. High-level champions can also emerge from the private sector, particularly in countries where this sector is well organised through overarching co-ordination bodies.

- **Establishing quality dialogue takes time.** The good examples of public-private dialogue mentioned by the participating countries are often structures and arrangements that were created five to ten years prior to the survey. The good performance reported may result from a history of solving diverse challenges over time.
- **Platforms and venues for dialogue are fit-for-purpose.** A good match between the characteristics and needs of different private sector participants (more/less informal, larger/smaller firms, foreign-dominated/domestic firms, traditional/emerging sectors) and the government-supplied platforms and venues is common among the cases cited as being successful in influencing policy, regulation and strategic decisions.

Box 4.2. **A comparative assessment of effective public-private dialogue platforms in Colombia, Ethiopia and the Philippines**

Strengthening the conditions for the emergence of public-private dialogue platforms is an essential step for inclusive development, but establishing effective and sustainable platforms remains a challenge in many countries. Recent research (Herzberg and Wright, 2006) highlights six critical components shared by high-performing public-private dialogue platforms:


1. clarity on the mandate, structure and participation
2. facilitation and management that help steer the direction of the platform
3. a degree of managerial and financial autonomy to enable the platform to remain a neutral forum
4. clear outputs that are useful to the members of the platform
5. monitoring and evaluation arrangements that allow for tracking the impact of policy actions and that inform discussions
6. good outreach and communication, to facilitate the translation of complex discussions around policy reform options into simple language.

A comparative assessment of well-established public-private dialogue platforms in three participating countries – Colombia, Ethiopia and the Philippines – underlines the importance of these six dimensions (Figure 4.6). In all three countries, the assessed platforms share excellent clarity in terms of mandate, structure and participation, which are all established through formal government acts. In Ethiopia, the mandate clearly defines the structure of and participation in the platform, as well as the roles and responsibilities of the government; it provides a clear process for the discussion and resolution of specific issues. The three countries also share relatively high scores in all the other five dimensions, with the exception of monitoring and evaluation arrangements, which are still incipient in all the three cases.

A more detailed analysis reveals the particular features and practices that drive the performance of each platform. The Philippines' National Competitive Council stands out in terms of outputs, and outreach and communication; it prepares and effectively disseminates policy papers that are discussed in the broad community. In terms of autonomy, different models emerge: the Philippine platform is funded by development partners and the Colombian platform by the local government.

...

Figure 4.6. The six dimensions of public-private platforms



Colombia stands out in facilitation and management, with the Chamber of Commerce playing a strong role in driving the platform; this has given the platform an outstanding reputation amongst the local business community.

Sources: OECD (2014a), "Public-private dialogue country profiles: Colombia interim report"; OECD (2014b), "Public-private dialogue country profiles"; OECD (2015), "Global Partnership indicator on private sector participation in public policies country profile – Ethiopia".

Multi-stakeholder dialogue and consultation takes on many forms

The 2016 monitoring round offered a unique opportunity to test the concept of multi-stakeholder dialogue as a mechanism for building inclusive national consensus around specific development priorities. In the countries reporting on the two inclusiveness indicators covered in this chapter, representatives from CSOs, trade unions, the private sector and development partners were given the opportunity to discuss the responses submitted by their national government, and to express their level of agreement.

While disparities exist among countries, there is a generally high level of consensus among stakeholders on the final responses: more than 85% of each stakeholder group agrees with the final country responses. The greatest dissention is on questions related to whether the legal and regulatory environment marginalises certain groups; and whether logistical, financing and capacity-building instruments are available to support public-private dialogue.

A comparative study of 11 participating countries found that they undertake consultations using a variety of approaches,⁸ including:

- full multi-stakeholder dialogue processes through existing structures and networks
- ad hoc multi-stakeholder information sessions with selected CSOs, development partners and other stakeholders participating in the data gathering and review process
- online surveys and other methods of gathering the views of the consulted parties.

Establishing inclusive multi-stakeholder dialogue processes is noted to be particularly challenging, as demonstrated by the examples in Box 4.3.

Box 4.3. **Lessons for making multi-stakeholder dialogue platforms work**

The international community increasingly relies on multi-stakeholder arrangements to promote inclusive approaches to development processes, such as the country-level mechanisms being considered by each country for the national follow-up and review of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Yet working in a multi-stakeholder fashion is not necessarily straightforward, and certain conditions need to be in place for arrangements to be successful.

Comparing the experience of the 2016 Global Partnership monitoring round with other detailed studies carried out in parallel in participating countries (CPDE, 2016; TT-CSO, forthcoming; Fowler and Biekart, 2016), a number of ingredients for successful multi-stakeholder dialogue emerge:

- **The right political, legal and regulatory environment** facilitates multi-stakeholder dialogue; changes in government, laws and regulations can provide an opportunity or a threat for advancing it.
- **A clear, well-guided and institutionalised process, with an appropriate timeframe**, is essential for establishing, conducting and maintaining multi-stakeholder dialogue, including clear objectives as well as clear roles and responsibilities for each of the stakeholders. It is important to allow sufficient time to “institutionalise” the dialogue; this includes appointing a person or organisation to take charge of organising meetings, guiding activities and fostering dissemination/implementation of decisions. Wherever feasible, the process should build on existing multi-stakeholder fora.
- **Involving the right people** is also important. These should be individuals and organisations that are able to represent or speak on behalf of a group of stakeholders, including local stakeholders. For the process to be fruitful, the stakeholders need to trust each other, or an independent third party can be involved to moderate and facilitate discussions. It is fundamental that all parties engage actively in the dialogue – some individuals might need training and capacity building to perform their tasks efficiently.
- **Adequate resourcing** is fundamental to establish a multi-stakeholder dialogue. Beyond the initial investments, there also needs to be a funding structure that will allow the platform to be sustained over time – or at least until it has achieved its core purpose.

Sources: CPDE (2016), “GPEDC Indicator Two: Civil society operates within an environment that maximises its engagement in and contribution to development – An assessment of evidence”, <http://csopartnership.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/GPEDC-Indicator-Two.pdf>; TT-CSO (forthcoming), “Global Partnership Initiative 12: Stock-take of indicator two monitoring”, <https://taskteamcso.com>; Fowler, A. and K. Biekart (2016), “Comparative studies of multi-stakeholder initiatives: Extended summary”, <https://taskteamcso.files.wordpress.com/2015/01/extended-summary-comparative-studies-of-msis2.pdf>.

In general, participants in the 2016 monitoring round expressed appreciation for the multi-stakeholder nature of the exercise. Focal points suggested by global CSO networks, such as the CPDE, played an important role in mobilising these organisations to participate and in building their capacity to engage meaningfully in the process. Occasionally, CSOs also helped organise consultations around the national assessment of the enabling environment. Many participating CSOs found the experience to be relevant and expressed that there was potential for greater engagement in future monitoring rounds (TT-CSO, forthcoming). Although the participation of private sector representatives was diverse in methodology

and scope, the reliance on focal points helped make dialogue possible in many cases. Most reporting governments also assessed the participation of CSOs and private sector representatives in their national monitoring process as “good” to “strong”.⁹

Example of good practice: The Competitive Cashew Initiative, established in 2009, is mainly financed by Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (GIZ), and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. GIZ leads implementation, working closely with its implementing partners: FairMatch Support, a Dutch-based NGO working on sustainable supply chain linkages, and the United States-based NGO TechnoServe, which provides technical assistance to local processors; other national and international companies contribute resources and expertise. The initiative has contributed to improving the quality of cashew nuts as well as to increasing annual net income for farmers in five African countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Mozambique. The steering and decision-making body is constituted by core partners. The programme is considered highly sustainable with durable positive results and the business relationships created along the supply chain are expected to continue to exist beyond the finalisation of the project.

The way forward for inclusive development partnerships

Civil society organisations and the private sector are crucial development partners in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Their contributions in all phases of consultation, policy making, planning and implementation of development efforts are essential to ensure that all resources and partners are engaged in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals. This makes it urgent to remove the obstacles that prevent their effective engagement, and to expand and strengthen spaces for policy dialogue and joint work. Only in this way can broad-based, inclusive development processes be made a reality.

The 2016 Global Partnership monitoring round offers the opportunity to assess the state of play in creating an enabling environment to maximise the contributions of civil society and the private sector to national development processes. It permits several overarching conclusions about what is needed to move forward quickly and effectively:

- **Improvements are still needed in the legal and regulatory environment and operational practices to enable civil society organisations to maximise their contribution to development.** Countries and development partners have made a good start in formalising arrangements to consult and engage CSOs in defining their development policies. Yet for these advances to fully translate into effective engagement, governments still need to: make improvements in ensuring freedom of expression and association; work towards transparent and representative selection of CSOs; and improve regulations that will facilitate the operational functioning of CSOs and will not marginalise any social group. CSOs can increase development effectiveness by improving co-ordination of their activities and strengthening reporting on their development efforts. Overall, limited information sharing was found to be a cross-cutting challenge that prevents greater engagement amongst all partners: CSOs, governments and their development partners.
- **Mutual benefit is a powerful driver for focusing public-private dialogue and enhancing its quality.** Evidence suggests that to be successful, public-private dialogue must address topics of mutual benefit for both the private sector and government, and that it must attract high-level representation. These conditions provide crucial entry points for developing a joint public-private work agenda with an orientation towards results. Inclusive dialogue platforms organised according to specific sector needs can inform national strategies and sector policies with improved understanding of and evidence around policy options. Finally, ensuring participation of small and medium enterprises and producers in public-private dialogue is a keystone for inclusive dialogue.

- **Strengthening and institutionalising mechanisms for engagement is critical to solidify relations with CSOs and the private sector.** Governments, civil society organisations and the private sector are often willing to engage in policy dialogue, and in several countries this has translated into action. There remain, however, constraints for meaningful engagement on the organisational side: current structures and institutional mechanisms for engagement and dialogue with CSOs and the private sector often lack the instruments, logistics, feedback loops and facilitators that could make engagement systematic, meaningful and action-oriented. To move the inclusiveness agenda forward, development partners have an important role to play in supporting the strengthening of dialogue mechanisms and enhancing the role of champions and facilitators amongst civil society and the private sector.
- **Sharing best practice is critical to replicate successes and scale up multi-stakeholder approaches to deliver on the SDGs.** There is great convergence around the principal goal of enabling all sectors of society to effectively contribute to national development, yet the mechanisms and processes through which the private sector and civil society engage at the country level widely vary amongst countries. As there are no universal blueprints on how to best engage with non-state actors, knowledge of effective practices and lessons identified in one country can serve to accelerate progress in another. Given the high expectations for multi-stakeholder partnerships to serve as a key ingredient for delivering on the SDGs by 2030, it is critical to facilitate the sharing of lessons. Thanks to its country-led, multi-stakeholder nature, the Global Partnership is well placed to support exchange amongst countries and stakeholder groups that can help to disseminate and replicate successful approaches.

Notes

1. Of the 60 countries that reported on Indicators 2 and 3, 54 countries reported on both indicators and 6 chose to report only on one of them: 59 countries reported on Indicator 2 and 55 countries on Indicator 3.
2. Data from Indicator 2, Module 4.
3. According to the Global Partnership monitoring guide, “marginalised people frequently experiencing different forms of marginalization or exclusion might include trade unions, women’s rights organisations, human rights organisations, organisations of indigenous people, environmental or land rights organisations, LGBT organisations, organisations of persons with disabilities, etc.” (OECD/UNDP, 2015).
4. The Global Standard for CSO Accountability is an initiative of nine well-established civil society accountability networks from different continents. At the moment, more than 1 500 CSOs are actively engaged in testing the parameters of the Global Standard and disseminate them to other CSOs in their respective countries. For more information, see: <https://icscentre.org/area/global-standard>.
5. Specifically, CSOs in developing countries have comparatively better grass roots knowledge and outreach capacity, while international NGOs generally contribute with stronger technical expertise and greater access to resources (Banks, Hulme and Edwards, 2015).
6. The OECD *Development Co-operation Report 2016* makes the case for business to invest in sustainable development: “Companies that introduce sustainability into their business models are profitable and successful, with positive returns on capital in terms of reduced risk, diversification of markets and portfolios, increased revenue, reduced costs, and improved value of products. Increasingly, investments in developing countries – and even in the least developed countries – are seen as business opportunities, despite the risks involved. On the other hand, companies provide jobs, infrastructure, innovation and social services, among others” (OECD, 2016: 17). The report discusses five “pathways” for “realising the enormous potential of the private sector as a partner for delivering on the SDGs”: attracting foreign direct investment; using blended finance; monitoring and measuring the mobilisation effect of public sector interventions on private investment; promoting social impact investment; and following principles and standards of responsible business conduct.
7. Qualitative responses provided for the different subcomponents of Indicator 3 support this finding. There are also strong correlations between the scores on “public sector willingness” and the “existence of champions/facilitators” (0.65), and on the scores regarding “private sector willingness” and the availability of “instruments and logistical support” (0.63).
8. The Global Partnership’s 2015-16 monitoring guide suggested that countries organise multi-stakeholder dialogue processes using focal points to represent the different constituencies in each country, as well as using existing dialogue structures and platforms in each country.
9. An Exit Survey was completed after the finalisation of the 2016 monitoring round. Governments in 70% of countries assessed CSO engagement in the process as good to strong; 46% of countries gave a similar assessment for private sector engagement.

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Chapter 5

Transparency and accountability for effective development

Transparency and accountability are vital to enhancing the impact of development co-operation and enabling the participation of citizens in the long-term development of their respective countries. This chapter reviews progress in implementing the Busan principles of transparency and accountability, including mutual accountability among partners, as well as accountability to beneficiaries of development co-operation and to all other stakeholders. It does so by measuring the public availability of information on development co-operation (Indicator 4); the extent to which governments and development partners work together to include development co-operation flows in budgets subjected to parliamentary scrutiny (Indicator 6); the share of participating countries able to track and make public allocations for gender equality and women's empowerment (Indicator 8), which is fundamental to enable transparency and accountability of policies towards women; and the implementation of inclusive review processes that strengthen mutual accountability among co-operation partners (Indicator 7).

The Busan Partnership agreement centres its mission on the principles of transparency, mutual accountability among partners, and accountability towards the intended beneficiaries of development efforts as well as towards the citizens who contribute to sustaining those efforts through public funding. This chapter reviews progress in implementing key Busan commitments on transparency and accountability.

Transparency in the management of development resources is a fundamental requirement for the integrity of development co-operation and a prerequisite for sustainable results. Access to high-quality, timely and relevant information on development funding helps governments to plan and manage the use of these resources in support of their development priorities. In today's increasingly diverse development co-operation landscape, transparency also helps development partners to co-ordinate their support, promoting synergies while avoiding fragmentation and duplication of effort. Information on current and future funding allows non-state organisations to harmonise their development interventions while enabling citizens and civil society to formulate their priorities, and to hold public officials and development partners accountable for performance on their commitments.

Transparency of development activities is also critical for building meaningful and accountable partnerships. Accountability mechanisms that engage all development stakeholders and allow for collective assessment of progress towards agreed targets – grounded in national development policies – help to ensure that development interventions are relevant and effective, while building trust.

This chapter explores whether development co-operation efforts are becoming more transparent and integrated in national decision-making processes to allow for greater accountability towards parliaments and citizens. It reviews the Busan commitments on improving transparency and accountability, looking at progress in:

- making information on development co-operation publicly available
- recording development co-operation flows in budgets that are subject to parliamentary scrutiny
- tracking public allocations for gender equality and women's empowerment
- improving the quality of arrangements for joint assessment of progress on agreed commitments.

In general, there is progress in transparency and accountability – but also some room for improvement

Driven by the significant progress made by some publishers, as well as the incorporation of many new publishers, there has been an increase in the supply of publically available information on development co-operation. Progress has been most notable in the timeliness and comprehensiveness of the information that is made publicly available, while the publication of forward-looking information continues to present a challenge for many development partners.

Progress also has been made in putting development funding on budget: 67% of development funding scheduled by partners for the public sector is now on budget, representing an increase of 13% over 2010. Despite this progress, the Busan target of 85% of funding recorded on annual budgets has not yet been met. In addition, budgets sent to parliaments estimated expected development financing at 27% higher than development partners' individual forecasts; this is also a challenge, as over-recording of development co-operation finance in national budgets hinders effective planning, budgeting and execution.

All participating countries reported on their efforts to establish and implement systems to track resources allocated for gender equality and women's empowerment, demonstrating increasing willingness to monitor advances in this area. In 73% of the countries, at least one of the three basic elements for tracking gender-related allocations is in place, and nearly half of the countries have all three elements in place.

This represents a very positive trend and constitutes a notable step towards gender-responsive budgeting. Going forward, more progress is needed in making these gender tracking systems transparent – which is critical for management and accountability purposes. It is also important that an increasing number of countries use the data generated to inform policy and budgeting decisions.

Finally, countries have a larger number of the elements required for mutual accountability, such as national aid or partnership policies that are approved by parliaments. Nonetheless, parliamentarians and other stakeholders are still not sufficiently engaged in the review of progress against national targets and there is room to make the results of reviews more transparent.

Indicator 4. Transparent information on development co-operation is publicly available

In Busan, development partners agreed to “improve the availability and public accessibility of information on development co-operation and other development resources” (OECD, 2011: 6). An important aspect of this commitment was the agreement to implement a common, open standard for electronic publication of timely, comprehensive and forward-looking information on resources provided through development co-operation to meet the information needs of governments and non-state stakeholders, consistent with national requirements. Parties to the Busan Partnership committed to establishing and fully implementing the standard by December 2015.

This common standard was to be based on the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) statistical reporting platforms and the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) standard. Following joint technical work and dialogue between the governing bodies of these entities, however, it became clear that it was not possible to develop a single common standard along the lines mandated by the Busan Partnership agreement.¹ This is due to fact that the OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System and Forward Spending Survey and the IATI standard are each designed to meet the different needs of different audiences and are therefore not directly comparable in assessing development partners’ reporting performance (OECD, 2015a; Box 5.1).

For this reason, the measurement of development co-operation transparency in this report relies on assessments of the extent to which information is made publically available through each of these channels, as agreed in Busan.

Box 5.1. How is transparency measured in the monitoring framework?

Three systems and standards provide online data on development co-operation in an open and accessible manner.

The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) maintains two databases that are the authoritative source of annual statistical information on international development co-operation flows reported by DAC members, multilateral organisations and bilateral partners outside the DAC:

1. the Creditor Reporting System, which records activity-level development co-operation flows, for statistical, accountability and monitoring purposes.¹
2. the Forward Spending Survey, which records partners’ development co-operation plans, for greater predictability of global and aggregate prospects.²

...

The third platform, the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) standard is an open-data standard that allows publishers to provide detailed information about their development co-operation activities in a timely and accessible manner. It aims to meet country needs for up-to-date information on current and future development co-operation in support of national budgeting, planning and management processes, as well as of domestic accountability.³

Each of these systems and standards plays an essential, complementary role in supporting the increased transparency of development co-operation. The Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation's monitoring framework relies on transparency assessments produced by the secretariats of each of the three systems to evaluate the performance of partners in making development co-operation information publicly available. The Global Partnership measures transparency by considering these assessments in parallel, providing sufficient disaggregation to identify strengths and weaknesses in each of the sub-dimensions of transparency established by the Busan Partnership agreement: timeliness, comprehensiveness and the provision of forward-looking data. In 2014, the Global Partnership encouraged the consideration of a fourth dimension: data accuracy.⁴ The assessments place varying weight on each of the specific dimensions, according to their relevance with respect to the use of the information; for example, the assessment of quality of reporting to the Creditor Reporting System places more weight on accuracy than on other dimensions, to emphasise statistical accuracy. This disaggregated analysis can help guide future efforts to improve the transparency of development co-operation.

To facilitate interpretation of the overall scores for these three transparency assessments, development partners are categorised on the same four-tiered scale: "excellent", "good", "fair" and "needs improvement". Nonetheless, each of the assessments has its own distinct underlying methodologies, and therefore they are not directly comparable amongst themselves. The main methodological differences lie in the definition of the various transparency dimensions, the weighting assigned to each dimension and the threshold set for each category on the four-tiered scale.⁵

1. www.oecd.org/dac/stats/idsonline.htm.

2. www.oecd.org/dac/stats/idsonline.htm.

3. IATI-reported statistics are updated daily and can be accessed through the IATI Dashboard: <http://dashboard.iatistandard.org/index.html>.

4. This dimension, originally proposed by the OECD-DAC Secretariat, has been included for several years in the assessment of the information published to the OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System and Forward Spending Survey; it is reported in the 2016 monitoring round as part of these assessments. Data accuracy is not yet part of the assessment of the information published to the IATI standard, as the relevant governing body has yet to agree on the assessment methodology for data accuracy.

5. For full technical details of the specific methodologies used to calculate these three transparency assessments, please consult the agreed methodological note at: <http://effectivecooperation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Steering-Committee-Documents-Indicator-4-final.pdf>.

The amount of information publicly available has increased, but it needs to be more timely and forward-looking

Overall, the number of development partners making information on development co-operation public across the three global data repositories and standards has increased at a good pace. In the case of the OECD-DAC reporting platforms, 70 official development partners are now publishing data for statistical and accountability purposes to the Creditor Reporting System, while 57 report data for forecasting purposes through the Forward Spending Survey; this is a marked increase compared to 2014, when the number of countries was 56 and 47, respectively. Many official development partners beyond the DAC have also agreed to be part of these transparency assessments. Similarly, there is a significant increase in the number of

organisations publishing to the IATI, with the total number of publishers more than doubling – from 210 to over 470 – between 2013 and 2016.² While both official and non-state development partners publish to the IATI, it is worth noting that since the previous monitoring round the number of official development partners publishing to the IATI has increased significantly, from 29 to 43.

For the 2016 monitoring round, one or more transparency assessments are available for a total of 61 official development partners.³ This represents a 50% increase in assessed partners since the 2014 monitoring round. Equally important, three-quarters of those 61 publishers report data to more than one of the three platforms and standards – making it possible to assess how transparent they are from diverse perspectives. Overall, these assessments of transparency cover about USD 160 billion in official development co-operation (official development assistance, or ODA, plus other official flows) – equivalent to about 87% of total official development support.⁴

Publicly available information on development co-operation is becoming more comprehensive

Across all three Busan dimensions of transparency (timeliness, comprehensiveness and the inclusion of forward-looking data), progress has been most notable with regard to comprehensiveness and timeliness. Good progress has been made in terms of the timeliness of the information reported to the OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System. Trends from two years ago indicate that some partners, such as Australia, Belgium, the European Union (EU) institutions, France, Germany and Spain, improved the timeliness of their reporting to that platform. In general, some countries experienced trade-offs between the timeliness and accuracy of the reported data which will need to be rebalanced. Austria, the Czech Republic, Finland, Iceland and Italy have improved the accuracy of their reported data (OECD, 2016: 16).

The current state of play among development partners publishing to the IATI also indicates good levels of timeliness. Among them, 56% of Busan endorsers now publish development co-operation data on a quarterly basis, while 31% publish up-to-date data on a monthly basis, including Canada, Denmark, the European institutions, the European Investment Bank, the Global Fund, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom and some United Nations agencies such as UNICEF, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Food Programme.

Comprehensiveness has also improved across all three assessments. The completeness of the information on past activities reported by a third of development partners to the OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS) has improved since two years ago – with only one case of decline. Among development partners that reported to the OECD-DAC Forward Spending Survey (FSS), the number of partners that have improved the completeness of these forecasts exceeded by 50% the number of partners that have seen a decline in comprehensives. Among development partners publishing to the IATI, 74% currently score above 60 points (“good”) in terms of comprehensiveness, and half of them are in the “excellent” category.

Making forward-looking information available is challenging, but feasible

Publishing information on planned development co-operation at both the global and the country levels helps country governments and their development partners to assess financing gaps, plan ahead, identify potential areas of collaboration, avoid overlaps and allocate development co-operation in a way that matches funding with needs. At global level, the transparency assessments of the OECD-DAC Forward Spending Survey report significant progress, with two-thirds of partners assessed ranking in the “good” or “excellent” categories. Most official development partners are now making public their development co-operation forecasts through this survey and seven new development partners were assessed in this round.

Looking at trends, however, while 12 partners evidence improvement since the baseline assessment two years ago, the scores of 11 partners have declined. The key weaknesses identified amongst the partners that obtained lower scores were in the comprehensiveness and accuracy of the reported forecasts.

Similarly, many development partners publishing to the IATI face challenges in publishing forward-looking data. While slightly more than half of the Busan endorsers publishing to the IATI have published at least some forward-looking data on activities for 2016-18, many publish only a tiny percentage, with only a quarter providing forward-looking data on over half of their activities. Nonetheless, this represents progress compared to the previous monitoring round, when only a handful of development partners publishing data to the IATI provided any forward-looking data at all. The challenges to publishing good forward-looking information for forecasting and planning include technical limitations within the internal systems of development partners as well as political and institutional barriers to the publication of planned development co-operation budgets.


The assessments – and the trends they evidence – indicate that on the whole, good forecasting needs to be institutionalised in partner agencies, adopting a demand-driven approach, if gains are to be sustained over time. In some cases, this will require an internal assessment of institutional and corporate hurdles that may be presenting obstacles to the availability of good forward-looking information.

Overall, transparency is moving in the right direction

In general terms, the three assessments show that although development partners have differing strengths in terms of transparency, the overall picture is good (Figures 5.1-5.3 and Table B.4). Of the 61 partners assessed, 24 achieved “excellent” scores in at least one of the three assessments (40% of the assessed partners) and 44 achieved “good” in one or several of them (72%). Belgium, Canada, the EU institutions, Sweden, the UNDP, UNICEF and the World Bank are examples of development partners with excellent or good scores in all three assessments. Several partners with excellent or good scores in one of the assessments show room for improvement, however, in one or more of the other assessments.


Figures 5.1-5.3 show the state of play of each of the three systems as of May 2016. It should be noted that the assessment for each system has been carried out individually, against differing criteria, and therefore the system-specific information shown is not comparable across the systems.

Figure 5.1. Overall transparency assessment of the OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System




StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933423865>

The assessment of retrospective OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System data is based on the weighted average of partners' performance in terms of timeliness (25%), comprehensiveness (15%) and accuracy (60%).⁵ A star-scoring system is used to assess these three transparency subdimensions. The OECD-DAC Secretariat calculated, retrospectively, a 2012 baseline for this monitoring round.

Figure 5.2. **Overall transparency assessment of the OECD-DAC Forward Spending Survey**

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The assessment of forward-looking data in the Forward Spending Survey is based on the weighted average of partners' performance in terms of public disclosure of this type of data (14%), timeliness (14%), comprehensiveness (43%) and accuracy (29%).⁶ A star-scoring system is used to assess these four transparency subdimensions. The OECD-DAC Secretariat calculated, retrospectively, a 2013 baseline for this monitoring round.

Figure 5.3. **Overall transparency assessment of the International Aid Transparency Initiative**

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933423889>

The overall assessment of the performance of development partners in publishing to the IATI is calculated by averaging the scores for the three dimensions of transparency, with equal weights being given to each after adjustment for the coverage of reported development co-operation flows. The IATI scores are converted to the standard Global Partnership scale as follows: excellent = score of 80% and over; good = 60-80%; fair = 40-60%; needs improvement = less than 40%.

Improvements in transparency depend on robust policies, sound corporate processes and systems, and dedicated staff

From the above analysis, it is clear that good reporting to a specific platform or standard does not automatically imply equally good reporting through other channels.⁷ Analysis of the individual partner assessments makes it possible to identify some common hurdles across development partners, where investments in corporate processes and information management infrastructure may help to improve the supply of publically available information on development co-operation:

- When the **institutional architecture** is fragmented, with multiple entities providing development co-operation, the transaction costs associated with collecting and processing data from various sources are high, unless there is some sort of holistic information management system; this in turn makes it difficult to improve timeliness or comprehensiveness.

- Adapting **transparency and disclosure policies** to an evolving policy environment requires dedicated attention, as even small policy differences may create unexpected transparency loopholes (IDB, 2013). It is crucial to invest in raising awareness among staff and create positive incentives and remedial mechanisms, as to improve understanding and effective implementation of transparency policies which can support the required institutional change over time.
- Adjusting **internal processes and information management systems** to a fast-changing environment requires sustained high-level leadership, especially in environments where quick gains sometimes prevail over structural reforms.
- The institutionalisation of **dedicated staff** and organisational units responsible for ensuring the implementation of transparency commitments and policies helps to improve compliance with transparency commitments.⁷ Generating and processing data effectively requires technical knowledge that takes time to acquire. It also calls for good co-ordination within an agency or across agencies.
- Improving transparency requires **institutional culture change**, as the staff providing the information must be incentivised to do so in a timely, comprehensive and accurate manner. Most development agencies have made efforts to sensitise staff about the commitment to transparency; nonetheless, the analysis and identification of any existing institutional disincentives could help to identify means of improving the quality of the information being reported.
- As the quantity and quality of information improve, more attention will need to be given to improving the use of the information by supporting the availability of data at the country level. It is only when usable data are routinely incorporated into national planning and budgeting systems that the benefits of increased transparency in contributing to better management for results and accountability will be realised.

Box 5.2. **Making transparency meaningful for countries and their people**

In Busan, the lack of up-to-date information on actual and future development co-operation was regarded as a key problem for countries. Since Busan much progress has been made, especially with regard to the publication of timely and comprehensive information. Nonetheless, the publication of forward-looking data, which is essential for national budgeting and planning, remains a challenge.

At present, the Global Partnership's transparency indicator only measures the provision of information by development partners, with an emphasis on inputs and activities. Performance is monitored at the global level, in contrast with other indicators for which information is collected at the country level. As the quantity and the quality of these data continue to improve, more attention will need to be given to the use of the data, especially at the country level.

Good examples of the use of timely, comprehensive and forward-looking data at the country level are emerging. Bangladesh recently upgraded the national aid information management system, enabling seamless transfer of data from the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI). The new upgraded system will enable better coverage, avoid double counting of development co-operation funding, and generally reduce workload and transaction costs for development partners working with Bangladesh.

...

The platform will allow the government to go beyond data collection, focusing on strategic analysis to guide decisions on resource allocation. Myanmar can capture data published to the IATI directly in its publicly accessible aid management information system, allowing the government to better allocate resources according to national priorities for social and economic development, and increasing the capacity of citizens to track the use of development co-operation funding in their country. Despite these emerging examples of good practice, however, much more remains to be done by both development partners and countries to maximise use of data at the country level.

Achieving the ambitious goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development will also require expanding the publication of information beyond development co-operation resources and activities, towards better transparency about development results and impacts. This transition will require closer collaboration among stakeholders, including governments, development partners and non-state actors.

Indicator 6. Development co-operation is on budget and subjected to parliamentary scrutiny

In Busan, governments and development partners committed to including development co-operation funds in national budgets (OECD, 2011). In addition to enabling parliamentary oversight, this is crucial for giving recipient governments clarity on available resources: line ministries can better formulate sector policies and plans, while ministries of finance and planning can allocate resources more efficiently among sectors. At the same time, the regular inclusion of development co-operation funding on budget helps to align development efforts with countries' own priorities; strengthens the comprehensiveness and credibility of domestic budgetary processes and institutions; and avoids undermining domestic decision making and accountability procedures.⁹

Parliaments have a crucial role to play in ensuring democratic ownership and domestic accountability over government expenditure. The full inclusion of development co-operation flows on the approved national budget facilitates scrutiny by parliaments and accountability to citizens, allowing greater democratic ownership of development efforts (Box 5.3). It also gives an indication of whether both development partners and governments are making efforts to connect development co-operation funding with the country's policies and programmes.

The share of development co-operation funding on budget has notably increased

Countries participating in the 2016 monitoring round report that two-thirds (66%) of development co-operation funding scheduled for the public sector is now on budget and overseen by parliament; but this is still 19% short of the target for 2015 (85%). Among the 60 countries that participated in both the 2011 and 2016 monitoring rounds, there is an increase in on-budget funding of 13%.¹⁰ In terms of total funding included in national budgets versus development partners' planned funding, governments also over-estimate expected amounts from development partners. Twenty-six percent of on-budget development co-operation funding was higher than actually planned by development partners (10% more than in 2010). This discrepancy between government budgeting and development partners' funding plans signals a mismatch in planning information and points to the need for more effective and regular information exchange.

Box 5.3. How does the monitoring exercise measure whether development co-operation flows are on budget and subject to parliamentary scrutiny?

Indicator 6: Development co-operation funding scheduled by development partners for disbursement to the public sector is recorded in annual budgets that are approved by the national legislatures of partner countries.¹

It is important to note that the term “on budget”, as used here, refers only to the recording of funding planned by development partners in the parliament-approved budget; it does not indicate whether the development partner used the government budget process to disburse the funds.² When national budgets include amounts that differ from those scheduled by development partners, parliament’s role in overseeing development effectiveness is considered to be limited to the amount reflected on budget (IPU, 2010).

1. Indicator 6 (“aid on budget subjected to parliamentary scrutiny”) assesses the amount of development co-operation funding scheduled for disbursement at the outset of year *n*. This distinguishes the measurement of the extent to which government budgets reflect *ex ante* aid estimates (Indicator 6) from the measurement of predictability, that is the extent to which scheduled funds are actually disbursed or the realism of estimates (captured by Indicator 5a).

2. Support lent by development partners can be “on budget” regardless of the chosen co-operation modality; in particular, it should be noted that alongside general and sector budget support, project-based co-operation also can be included on budget.

The disaggregated data reveal significant disparities across countries and regions. One-fifth of participating countries have reached or surpassed the target of having 85% of their development co-operation funding on budget; almost another fifth, however, do not reflect any development co-operation funding on their budgets (Figure 5.4). By region, most countries in Latin America and the Pacific have surpassed the 85% target; countries in Africa and South Asia are considerably behind; while the rest of the regions fall somewhere in between.


In general, lower income countries and fragile states record comparatively lower levels of scheduled development co-operation funding on annual budgets. This is particularly true for countries experiencing conflict or political crises, where little to no development co-operation funding is on budget; cases in point are the Central African Republic, South Sudan and Yemen.

From the perspective of development partners, 29 development agencies meet the target of recording 85% or more of their scheduled resources in national budgets. The top performers are regional development banks working in Latin America and Eastern Europe; they benefit from stronger budgetary processes in these regions, as well as a greater reliance on certain development co-operation modalities, such as loans.


Among groups of bilateral development partners, DAC members provide a lower average share of on-budget support than other bilateral partners do: 62% compared to 74%, respectively (Figure 5.5). Among the multilateral organisations, the development banks and vertical funds and initiatives perform comparatively better than UN agencies and other international organisations. In terms of bilateral partners, members of the DAC, Denmark, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway and Spain meet the Busan target, and Japan and Portugal come very close; as for the other bilateral partners, India, Kuwait, Chinese Taipei and the United Arab Emirates meet the target.

Comparing the sub-set of 51 development partners that participated in both the 2010 and 2015 monitoring rounds, bilateral partners on average show greater improvement in the share of development co-operation funding recorded in national budgets than multilateral agencies (14% compared to 5%, respectively).

Figure 5.4. Share of scheduled development co-operation that is included on budget and subject to parliamentary scrutiny



StatLink <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933423895>

Figure 5.5. **Share of development co-operation funding on budget, by development partner type**

StatLink <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933423907>

The responsibility of ensuring that development co-operation funding is on budget is shared amongst development partners and national governments. Development agencies need to provide accurate estimates of planned disbursements in a timely manner, i.e. during the early stages of the budget preparation process. Governments, in turn, need to include these estimates in their budgets when they submit these to the national legislative body. Incomplete inclusion in national budgets may result from lack of availability of good information on future resources, or it may result from incomplete use of such information by budget authorities; in either case, the lack of such information limits the ability of parliaments to oversee these funds.

The section below presents some factors that seem to be driving the results.

Investing in internal information management systems and adapting corporate processes can help development partners to generate accurate forward-looking projections in a timely manner.

As shown earlier in this chapter, one key weakness of most development agencies relates to the provision of forward-looking information that can be used for aid management and planning. Data from the monitoring exercise reveal a strong correlation between the availability of disbursement forecasts for a given year (a measure of mid-term predictability discussed in Chapter 3) and the degree of development co-operation funding that is on budget for that year.¹¹ At the headquarters level, development partners need to find ways of accommodating the specific planning horizons of the countries they work with.

Larger, more focused country programmes are associated with an increased share of development co-operation on budget.

Analysis of monitoring data shows that comparatively larger development co-operation programmes in a given country show higher levels of on-budget support submitted to parliament.¹² Development partners with a significant presence in a country tend to develop closer relationships with government institutions and are better able to synchronise with domestic cycles.¹³ On the other hand, fragmentation of support offered through smaller programmes across many countries has higher transaction costs, which may inhibit successful inclusion of scheduled finance on budget.

Using country systems and including development co-operation on budget are part of the same package.

Comparative analysis of the behaviour of development partners across countries reveals that the use of national public financial management and procurement systems (Chapter 3) to deliver development co-operation is associated with a higher share of on-budget development co-operation.

Conversely, partners that rely more on project-based development co-operation, technical co-operation, and programmes implemented through non-government partners or through subnational governments tend to be less successful at being on budget.¹⁴

Greater orderliness of domestic budget processes can facilitate reporting of development co-operation in the national budget. If budget planning processes are weak and disorderly, it is difficult for governments to make systematic use of the information their partners provide. All 81 participating countries have undertaken public expenditure and financial accountability assessments (PEFA), and these assessments are public in most cases.¹⁵ Comparative analysis shows that the countries scoring higher on “orderliness and participation in the annual budget” are more likely to include external support on budget.¹⁶

National budgetary rules and practices can create incentives to report development co-operation on budget. Government practices for managing expenditure determine how ministries and public entities treat the external funding allocated to them, creating incentives to report development co-operation on budget. Case studies reveal that some specific arrangements and budgetary rules may discourage line ministries from disclosing development co-operation funding as part of their budget (Mokoro Limited, 2009). For better comprehensiveness of the budget, these measures need to be compensated with positive incentives for timely inclusion of all types of development finance on budget and stronger central oversight of public expenditure.

Example of good practice: By strengthening budget oversight and ensuring that the budget includes loans as well as grants for all public entities, the Philippines increased the share of development co-operation on budget from 26% in 2010 to 74% in 2015.

Countries can benefit from establishing development co-operation policies and better information management systems. Most top performers have both development co-operation policies and information management systems in place. However, data analysis suggests that these elements alone are not enough to ensure that development co-operation is always included on budget.¹⁷

Examples of good practice: In Rwanda, where the aid policy specifies that all development co-operation should be on budget, 76% of support is now on budget (compared to 61% in 2010).

Improvements in aid information management systems in Madagascar and Moldova have been matched by increases in on-budget funding (24% and 11% respectively) compared to the 2014 monitoring round.

The timing of information flows among development partners does not always coincide

Data reveal that when the fiscal year of countries and its partners overlap, the likelihood of recording development co-operation in the national budget is lower. Partners’ ability to facilitate information on time may be limited by internal constraints of their own budget and programming cycles.¹⁸ This may require them to customise reporting arrangements to fit countries’ own budget preparation schedules, providing at least preliminary estimates (e.g. pre-budget statements) that can inform the preparation of government budgets.¹⁹

Example of good practice: New Zealand develops multi-year preliminary estimates and shares these with its partner countries. This is particularly helpful in countries that experience capacity and institutional constraints. New Zealand obtained an average of 92% of on-budget development co-operation in 16 partner countries in this monitoring round.²⁰

Indicator 8. Governments have systems in place to track allocations for gender equality and women's empowerment

The Busan Partnership agreement commits its endorsers to accelerating and deepening efforts to collect, disseminate, harmonise and make full use of data disaggregated by sex to inform policy decisions and guide investment so as to ensure that public expenditures are targeted appropriately to benefit both women and men (OECD, 2011: 5). The Addis Ababa Action Agenda reaffirms this priority, clearly stating the importance of achieving greater transparency and accountability through gender responsive budgeting and tracking (United Nations, 2015a). The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development commits the development community to working “for a significant increase in investments to close the gender gap” (United Nations, 2015b). In line with these commitments, the creation and application of well-articulated and inclusive budget tracking systems is essential to ensure that resources are mobilised and allocated effectively to achieve gender equality and women's empowerment (Box 5.4).²¹

Women represent more than half of the citizens in all countries that participated in this monitoring round. Tracking budget allocations with a gender perspective makes it possible to apply a gender lens to development co-operation funds recorded in national budgets, and builds the accountability that incentivises gender equality. The implementation of these systems is also fundamental for promoting governments' accountability towards the sustainable development agenda.²²

Box 5.4. When does a government have what it takes for tracking public allocations for gender equality and women's empowerment?

Indicator 8: Percentage of countries with systems that track and make public allocations for gender equality and women's empowerment.

To be considered as having the fundamentals to track gender-related allocations, countries need to fulfil at least one of the following three criteria:

1. The country has an official government statement on a system for tracking budget allocations for gender equality and women's empowerment. Such systems ensure that expenditures are targeted appropriately to benefit both women and men; they can include gender budget statements, classifiers, gender markers and even preliminary guidelines as outlined in call circulars.
2. Allocations for gender equality and women's empowerment are systematically tracked through an officially planned, regular process.
3. Leadership and oversight of the tracking system is carried out by the central government unit in charge of public expenditure.

In addition, countries also need to make publicly available budget information that focuses on gender equality. This can be through parliamentary oversight, civil society scrutiny, publications, websites or other means.

Tracking and collecting information on allocations related to gender equality and women's empowerment encourages countries to work toward creating and strengthening these elements.

More governments report having systems in place to track public allocations for gender equality

Whereas in 2014 the indicator for tracking gender-related budget allocations was piloted as an optional indicator, in the 2016 round all participating countries reported against it, suggesting firm commitment to establishing and implementing systems to track resources allocated for gender equality and women's empowerment (Box 5.4).

Of the 81 countries reporting on this commitment, 58 (72%) report that they have in place one of the three basic elements for meeting the Busan commitment, with two-thirds of these having all three basic conditions in place. Transparency is a precondition for accountability to citizens, and close to half of the countries (47%) meet the Busan commitment of having tracking systems *and* making the information publically available (Table 5.1).

Progress is happening. If we focus only on the comparable sub-sample of 31 countries that reported on this indicator in both 2014 and 2016, the number of countries with transparent tracking systems increased in 2016 – from 9 to 15 countries; this represents an important increase, including countries from every region and income level.

Table 5.1. **Countries have systems in place to track budget allocations for gender equality and women's empowerment**

Key element	Percentage of countries	Number of countries
Countries have systems that track public allocations for gender equality and women's empowerment (meet one or more of the following three criteria):	72%	58
1. There is an official government statement on a system to track allocations for gender equality and women's empowerment.	62%	51
2. Allocations for gender equality and women's empowerment are systematically tracked.	41%	33
3. Leadership and oversight of the tracking system is provided by the central government unit in charge of public expenditures.	52%	42
Information is made public: Gender equality disaggregated budget information is made publically available.	51%	41
Countries have systems that track public allocations for gender equality and women's empowerment and make the information public.	47%	38

Several countries explicitly mention gender-responsive budgeting as essential for establishing and implementing tracking systems. Nonetheless, countries also frequently report encountering challenges in moving from formulation of gender-responsive policy, law or strategies to the systematic tracking of gender equality allocations (Box 5.5). For example, Cambodia reports good progress in developing sector-specific gender mainstreaming action plans based on sex-disaggregated data, but indicates that these action plans are not always used to inform budgetary allocations.

Example of good practice: Kenya's gender-responsive budgeting guidelines support the integration of gender data into planning and budgeting, and the country has integrated gender in its Public Finance Management Strategy (2013-18). Its performance management tools, including public expenditure reviews, include indicators for tracking the allocation and utilisation of funds to support gender equality.

Despite overall progress, however, countries still find it challenging to effectively mainstream a gender perspective across the entire budget – beyond specific sectors and programmes. Of the 51 countries with an official government statement on tracking gender equality allocations, 35% (18 countries) report a lack of systematic tracking in practice. To illustrate, Albania reports that despite the presence of a tracking system and strong government oversight, systematic tracking is not yet in place, in part because of challenges in sector-level execution. Thirty-three countries, or 41%, report the use of sex-disaggregated data and indicators to support budgetary allocations. Yet many of these same countries indicate that these data are not comprehensively disaggregated across all sectors, hindering systematic tracking. Finally, 20 countries (25%) indicate that the government conducts regular impact assessments of budgets and expenditures; these address how women and men benefit respectively from government expenditures. Strengthening the feedback loop between this growing base of evidence and the formulation of gender-related policies and budget decisions is next up on the agenda of many governments.

Box 5.5. **Success stories in implementing gender-responsive budgeting**

Through more than a decade of work on gender-responsive budgeting in over 70 countries, UN Women has documented a set of conditions that promote financing for gender equality:

- high-level political support
- strong policy and legal frameworks, coupled with well-aligned gender equality plans and national development strategies
- technical capacity in gender-responsive planning and budgeting
- participation of multiple stakeholders to strengthen accountability
- robust systems for tracking results; these systems provide data on financing needs and gaps, which in turn contribute to effective planning and budgeting.

Experiences from participating countries provide illustrative examples of how these critical elements have contributed to progress in the establishment of tracking systems:

Honduras. In 2015, gender equality was included as a requirement in the General Provisions of the General Budget of Revenues and Expenditures. Several government agencies began using gender markers in their budgets to fulfil this requirement. An analysis of the 2015 budget shows that ten sector ministries are using markers for gender-specific allocations in their budgets.

Nepal. Based on a decade of work, Nepal has developed and refined its budget classification system to categorise gender-responsive allocations at the national and sectoral levels. With strong support from the Ministry of Finance, the comprehensive application of this system has contributed to an increase in gender-responsive allocations, from USD 0.877 billion in 2012-13 to USD 1.36 billion in 2014-15; this represents almost 22% of the overall government budget.

Rwanda. In Rwanda, legal and policy frameworks have strengthened the tracking of gender equality allocations. The revision of the Organic Budget Law in 2013 requires all government agencies to prepare and report on the implementation of their gender-responsive budgeting.

Indicator 7. Mutual accountability is strengthened through inclusive reviews

The principle of mutual accountability recognises that development impacts improve when all parties take responsibility for their contributions. The Busan Partnership agreement commits countries to having “inclusive mutual assessment reviews” in place at the country level by 2015;²³ these frameworks should respond to the needs and priorities of domestic institutions and citizens (Box 5.6).²⁴

Box 5.6. When are inclusive mutual assessment reviews in place?

Countries with at least four out of the following five elements in place are considered to have the type of mutual assessment reviews envisioned by the Busan Partnership:

The country has:

1. an aid or partnership policy that defines the country's development co-operation priorities
2. country-level targets (for both the country and its development partners)
3. mutual assessment against these targets at least every two years.


The reviews are inclusive and transparent through:

4. the active involvement of local governments and non-executive stakeholders
5. the public availability of comprehensive results of the review.

Mutual assessments are increasing, although inclusiveness continues to be a challenge

An encouraging number of countries are undertaking mutual reviews to track progress on commitments and targets relating to the effectiveness of development co-operation; of the 81 countries participating in the 2016 monitoring round, more than two-thirds assess progress towards country-level targets together with their partners. Nonetheless, many countries still find it challenging to meet the full set of requirements associated with inclusiveness and transparency: only 35 (46%) meet the required four out of five criteria for regular and inclusive mutual assessment (Figure 5.6).

Figure 5.6. Countries have inclusive mutual assessment reviews




StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933423918>

Breaking down the overall assessment, countries report relatively high scores in several areas: 64 countries (80%) have aid or partnership policies and 10 more are drafting these; 62 countries (77%) have targets against which to measure progress; and 56 (69%) conduct joint assessments against these targets. Yet similar to the findings from the 2014 monitoring round, involving local governments and non-executive stakeholders in these processes (47%) and making the results of these assessments publicly available (44%) continue to present challenges. These two elements limit the overall scope and impact of mutual assessment reviews.

A closer look at the sub-sample of 42 countries that participated in both the 2014 and the 2016 monitoring rounds reveals that while the overall share of countries with the necessary four out of five criteria for inclusive mutual assessments has slightly decreased (from 57% to 55%), there has been progress on each of the specific criteria (Figure 5.7).²⁵

Amongst the countries that participated in both monitoring exercises, the biggest strides were made in the areas of joint assessments against targets (+14%) and involvement of local governments and non-executive stakeholders (+14%); progress was also made in establishing aid/partnership policies (+7%) and country level targets (+5%). In 2016, the same number of countries reported publishing the results of assessments as in 2014.

Figure 5.7. **Progress in developing the key elements for inclusive mutual assessment reviews**



StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933423921>

Box 5.7. **Survey confirms the need for strengthened mutual accountability**

The results of the fourth Development Co-operation Forum Accountability Survey, undertaken in 2015, show that 90% of participating countries have national development co-operation policies in place, a slight increase over the 2013 survey (from 43 to 52 countries).

Some national development co-operation policies have started to reflect key aspects of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, including a broadened concept of development co-operation as demonstrated by the coverage of diverse development financing

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instruments in national policies: for example, 32 out of 40 cover official development assistance as a catalyst for other types of financing; 29 out of 36 cover other external public finance for sustainable development; and 22 out of 37 cover other external private finance for sustainable development.

Nonetheless, the study also revealed persistent challenges and need for improvement in several areas:

- inclusion of targets for individual development partners in national development co-operation policies (only 20% contain these)
- collection of quality data in development co-operation information systems
- operationalisation of country-led results frameworks
- capacity for results-based monitoring and evaluation
- availability of adequate financial resources for the implementation of accountability and transparency systems.

Additionally, while the important role of parliamentarians, local governments, civil society organisations and citizens is increasingly recognised, their engagement remains limited throughout the development co-operation process. Additionally, the survey found that while 34 out of 58 countries have results frameworks, these seem to be disconnected from national monitoring frameworks.

The study features policy advice, including:

- Reviews of national development co-operation policies should be led and owned by the national governments.
- Development partners should lend support to countries in engaging a broad range of stakeholders.
- National policies should respond to demands from citizens for greater transparency and accountability around development co-operation.
- Development partners should adjust their national development co-operation policies to increase the use of country systems and avoid the use of parallel systems.
- Development partners should support developing countries in enhancing their institutional and technical capacity for monitoring and review of development co-operation.

Notes: The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs undertakes these biennial surveys to monitor, review and document evidence on the state of play of development co-operation on the ground, in preparation for the Development Cooperation Forum. The study is available at: <https://www.un.org/ecosoc/en/tracking-development-cooperation>.

Although practices and arrangements to engage broader national and non-state stakeholders differ widely, this area remains a challenge, even in well-developed accountability frameworks. Many countries have structured opportunities for civil society, the private sector and others to engage in the design and implementation of mutual assessment reviews, and Chapter 4 discusses how different governments structure the relationship with non-state stakeholders. Yet even in countries with sophisticated government-led mutual accountability frameworks, such as Viet Nam, the engagement of broader national stakeholders remains limited; more work also is needed to engage local governments and parliamentarians.

Important guidance can be gathered from examples of mutual accountability in practice

Among the countries where positive change is happening, complementary qualitative information (Boxes 5.7 and 5.8) points to a range of examples that can serve as guidance for other countries:

Countries are updating their development co-operation and partnership policies to align them with the 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals.

- **Bangladesh** is developing a new national development co-operation policy and a Joint Co-operation Strategy that will integrate the national development priorities with the Sustainable Development Goals.
- **Sao Tome and Principe** makes effective development co-operation a priority as part of its general government programme for a transformational agenda for 2030.

Countries are building on productive partnerships at the sector and sub-sector levels to make dialogue more concrete and actionable.

- In **Malawi**, progress in growth and development is assessed through joint sector reviews by the government and its development partners.
- In **Papua New Guinea**, partnerships driven by sector mechanisms institutionalise the dialogue process and illustrate the government's leadership in co-ordinating development co-operation resources.

Development partners are investing in institutionalising key elements of mutual assessment reviews.

- **Spain** is contributing to the **Plurinational State of Bolivia's** national action plan to improve the effectiveness of development co-operation.
- The **Asian Development Bank** is supporting **Mongolia's** drafting of a partnership policy.
- **Bangladesh, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Myanmar** and the **United Republic of Tanzania**, among others, are working with the UNDP to establish development co-operation policies; strengthen development co-ordination dialogue fora; and build capacity for co-ordination and management of development co-operation in key ministries.

Joint action has contributed to improving data availability and quality.

- **Malawi** improved data quality thanks to a 2015 review of its aid management platform, conducted together with development partners.

Box 5.8. Mutual accountability in practice

In 2016, the OECD DAC conducted a peer learning exercise to help its members deliver on the principle of mutual accountability. It looked at evidence from three case studies – in Burkina Faso, Timor-Leste and Togo – to study how mutual assessment reviews can reinforce partnerships and enable mutual accountability. The exercise showed that while the Busan indicator on mutual assessment reviews provides a useful framework for partnerships, in practice more is needed to ensure mutual accountability.

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It evidenced numerous reasons why this is true:

1. It is not enough for partner countries to have **aid or partnership policies** as stand-alone documents; to enable mutual accountability these need to be linked to national development strategies and state budgets. Clarifying the role, principles and added value of development in funding national priorities can provide a positive incentive and basis for mutual accountability and transparency, at the same time helping to ensure impact and sustainability, particularly in less aid-dependent countries.

In all three case study countries, good public financial management is considered a key success factor; yet building capacity in this area poses challenges. The peer learning exercise confirmed the importance of ensuring that development co-operation is on budget and predictable, to increase accountability and transparency among all stakeholders and improve the capacity of governments to plan for results and sustainability. Accurate forward planning can also improve the quality of dialogue on delivering aid effectively by enabling stakeholders to discuss long-term development challenges and potential solutions.

2. **Country-level targets** for development co-operation are useful when they drive all development co-operation interventions. Partners' choice of co-operation modalities also affects how different activities impact on the same goals and results. For instance, stand-alone projects fragment co-operation, reducing overall impact. For development partners, strong inter-ministerial co-ordination also ensures coherence across the system and can provide an impetus to other partners to co-ordinate beyond information sharing. Experiences in joint programming, including the European Union exercise, provide lessons on how to work collectively towards the same targets.

Technical assistance needs to be demand-driven, responding to the gaps identified by the government; too often, however, this type of co-operation undermines ownership and sustainability, and provides limited knowledge transfer. DAC members need to identify good practice, while also strengthening their support to national efforts to build strong human resources and organisational capacity.

3. **Mutual assessments and review** have limited impact when they are run by development partners in parallel to other monitoring exercises. Continuous, frank dialogue and trust, on the other hand, leads to collective commitments and strategic discussions beyond disbursements and activities. To allow development partners to engage in collective dynamics with the partner government in its national language, a degree of field presence is essential.
4. Active **involvement of local government and non-executive stakeholders** in mutual review can have limited impact if these stakeholders are not involved in planning and do not have a clear picture of budget allocations. Current OECD-DAC mutual reviews, however, tend to focus on a narrow range of development partners and, to some extent, civil society organisations.
5. Improved **transparency on mutual assessment** is a first step towards domestic accountability, but advocates – who use the available information, synthesise it and share it in a way that is useful to end beneficiaries – are essential.

The way forward for transparency and accountability

Transparency and accountability are essential for building meaningful partnerships and achieving development results. Inclusive accountability mechanisms, grounded in national development policies, help to ensure that development interventions are relevant and effective.

The 2016 Global Partnership monitoring exercise shows that development partners are lending increased attention to transparency in their development activities. Countries are also exploring ways to ensure that systems are in place to track budget allocations for gender equality and women's empowerment; and they are working to strengthen in-country accountability mechanisms. To live up to the ambitions of the 2030 Agenda, however, and unleash the necessary resources for sustainable development, more effort is needed on various fronts.

- **Development partners are publishing more data on their development co-operation than ever before, yet timely and forward-looking reporting remains a challenge.** Additional efforts are needed to improve the comprehensiveness and accuracy of the reported information. This can be partially achieved by addressing systemic and technical bottlenecks. A real upgrade in transparency, however, will require better provision of real-time information on ongoing activities, to complement development partners' verified historical data and big-picture forecasts. This shift can transform reporting practices, enabling them to fulfil the needs of information users – particularly in developing countries. In addition, the 2030 Agenda calls for moving beyond reporting on inputs and financial support to reporting on development results. Development partners could scale up incipient initiatives being tested by some multilateral and bilateral partners to make results information available and understandable – including the findings from evaluations.²⁶
- **Mutual assessment reviews have become more structured, but need to reflect the increasingly complex development co-operation landscape.** In the assessments comprised by the 2016 monitoring round, the areas where the least progress is noted are transparency and inclusiveness. Established mutual accountability structures are formulated on traditional development assistance, whereas partnerships for the Sustainable Development Goals increasingly encompass whole-of-government approaches, as well as a variety of development partners including southern partners, businesses and philanthropies. Most middle-income countries are yet to identify updated arrangements that could make these mutual accountability processes more relevant in light of their evolving development finance models and partnerships. Emerging approaches in some middle-income countries can provide important inspiration and merit closer examination.
- **All told, 15 countries and 26 development partners have met the target of recording 85% of development finance in national budgets. Notwithstanding this notable progress, however, further improvements are needed in the budgeting systems and processes of countries and their development partners alike.** Timely information provided by development partners in accordance with countries' budget planning cycle is essential, and data suggest that fully overlapping budget cycles between countries and development partners may hinder the inclusion of planned finance in national budgets. Evidence also points to the importance of investing in larger, more focused country programmes that are implemented through national systems and integrated into national budgets, enabling parliamentary oversight and accountability. By strengthening budget planning processes to facilitate inclusion of development co-operation on budget and continuing to strengthen information management systems for public expenditure, governments can ensure adequate oversight and effective use of funds while increasing mutual accountability. Finally, appropriate budgetary rules and processes incentivise line ministries to disclose their development co-operation funding for central oversight of public expenditure.

- **Gender responsive budgeting is increasing; the next step is to improve systematic tracking of this information and use it to inform budget allocations.** Despite overall progress, countries encounter challenges in mainstreaming a gender perspective across the entire budget – beyond specific sectors and programmes. By working together to strengthen the systematic application of tracking systems while also building national capacity to produce, analyse and use sex-disaggregated data for planning and budgeting purposes, development partners can ensure that national budgets are gender-responsive. Strong linkages also need to be built between gender-responsive budgeting and wider public financial management reforms; when grounded in policy frameworks informed by strong gender analysis, these reforms can contribute to ensuring the availability of quality data on how resources are used, which in turn can support greater gender responsiveness in allocations.

Notes

1. For a detailed account of the initial agreements and joint work in this area, see OECD (2012).
2. The IATI is the main platform for disclosure of private and non-profit development co-operation information. In December 2015, the IATI registered 292 non-state publishers, including non-governmental organisations, foundations, academic institutions and private corporations (IATI, 2016).
3. Of the 61 official development partners for which one or more transparency assessments are available, the OECD-DAC Secretariat provided assessments for 43 partners reporting to the OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System and 46 reporting to the OECD-DAC Forward Spending Survey; the IATI secretariat provided assessments for 43 partners publishing to the IATI. Note that several public entities, pertaining to the governments of Canada, France and the United Kingdom, and to European Union institutions, also publish individually to the IATI, raising the number to 70 official publishers. For comparability purposes, an average at government level (weighted by the size of the specific development co-operation programme) was calculated to produce the transparency assessments for these various public institutions and ministries belonging to the same government. Disaggregated assessments per IATI publisher can be found in Table B.4.
4. Estimates calculated using OECD data for 2014, comparing the contribution of the 61 assessed providers to total net official development finance for that year.
5. The accuracy of data is the degree to which the data correctly value what they are designed to measure. The measurement of the quality of the OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System data is based on assessment of the quality of reporting against several key fields: type of aid; bilateral/multilateral classification; channel codes; purpose codes; quality of descriptive reporting; tying status; and quality of reporting against the policy markers.
6. Assessment of the accuracy of data reported to the OECD-DAC Forward Spending Survey is based on the overall quality of the data submitted to the Survey on Forward Spending Plans. Ex-post assessment of the accuracy of the indicative expenditures, as reported to the Forward Spending Survey, is based on their comparison with final figures reported to the OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System.
7. Simple comparisons of transparency assessments reveal that correlations between the assessments performed by the IATI and the OECD are minimal. The correlation between the two assessments performed by the OECD is also very weak (0.144). This suggests that investments in improving reporting to one platform do not imply improvements in reporting to other platforms or surveys; each may require specific investments.
8. Focal points at the OECD Development Co-operation Directorate indicate that changing statistical correspondents too regularly represents an important challenge, as institutional memory tends to be lost when correspondents leave their jobs.
9. For details on the negative effects “off-budget” support can have on accountability, see Bräutigam and Knack (2004) and Barder (2009).
10. Comparisons with the 2010 baseline consider the sub-set of 60 countries that reported both in the 2010 Paris Declaration survey and in the 2016 monitoring round, for comparability purposes.
11. The statistical correlation between availability of forecasted expenditure plans for 2016 by provider, as reported by the national government, and the share of development co-operation on budget is 0.433. Multivariate analyses with fixed effects indicate a significant and positive effect of availability of development partners’ projections for the next year (Indicator 5b) and its development co-operation being recorded on budget. The effect is significant and the findings are robust to different model specifications.
12. Multivariate analyses with fixed effects find a significant and positive effect between the size of the development partner’s programme in a given country and the share of the programme being recorded on budget.
13. The likelihood of recording development co-operation funding on budget increases for major partners of any given country, as measured by the share of total development co-operation funding provided to the government. The findings are robust to different model specifications.
14. Multivariate regression analysis with fixed effects suggests that greater use of country systems (Indicator 9b) is also associated with higher share of on-budget support (Indicator 6). Consistent with this finding, some development partners that rely on technical co-operation and comparatively small grants show lower overall performance than those that rely on larger investment projects or budget support modalities.
15. The PEFA provides the foundation for evidence-based measurement of countries’ public financial management systems that looks at the extent to which these systems, processes and institutions contribute to the achievement of desirable budget outcomes.

16. Results from multivariate regression analysis with fixed effects, performed using 2016 monitoring data and latest publicly available PEFA scores for participating countries (<https://pefa.org/assessments/listing>).

17. Multivariate regression analysis with fixed effects shows a positive and significant relationship between having development co-operation policies in place and the share of development co-operation funding on budget. Similarly, although data do not reveal a significant correlation with having aid information management systems in place, careful observation of the data shows that, particularly among low-income countries, aid information management systems may be positively compensating for weaker whole-of-government public financial management systems, helping improve the share of development co-operation on budget.

18. Results from multivariate analysis of monitoring data, including fixed effects for countries and development partners. The analysis reveals that some difference in fiscal years between countries and development partners increases the likelihood of registering their development co-operation on budget – particularly if development partners are able to close their own budget preparation earlier than partner countries.

19. See Moon and Williamson (2010) for a discussion of approaches to address this challenge.

20. “The New Zealand Aid Programme consists of two multi-year (three-year) appropriations approved by parliament: International Agency Funding and International Development Assistance. This three-year envelope is described in the International Development Group’s Strategic Plan; the current version covers the period 2012/13-2014/15. Annually, the New Zealand budget (“Estimates” document) is presented to parliament in May and legislation is passed to reflect this. The multi-year appropriations are approved as separate legislation in the year of inception, but the expenditure within them is reforecast on an annual basis and published in the Estimates document. At the start of a multi-year appropriation, the Minister of Foreign Affairs approves allocations for the three-year period based on indicative spend by programme and sector, estimated total country aid flows and the strategic focus and funding implications for each programme” (OECD, 2015b).

21. High-level advocacy and dialogue resulted in the inclusion of Indicator 5c.1 in the recently adopted indicators for the Sustainable Development Goals. The indicator is defined as the “Percentage of countries with systems to track and make public allocations for gender equality and women’s empowerment”. This indicator was originally conceived as part of joint work between UN Women and the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation, and was tested in 35 countries during the 2014 monitoring round. For the 2016 monitoring round, the indicator was rolled out in all 81 participating countries. The experience and lessons from developing the methodology and conducting analysis for Indicator 8 provide important grounding for the work to be done within the context of the Sustainable Development Goals. Qualitative data provided by countries reporting on Indicator 8 provide useful guidance on what specific methodological refinements may be needed.

22. In March 2016, this indicator was selected by the UN Inter-agency and Expert Group on SDG indicators established to measure governments’ commitment to allocate resources for gender equality and women’s empowerment (Sustainable Development Goals Indicator 5c).

23. These reviews are defined as national exercises that allow for active involvement of local governments and non-executive stakeholders while engaging both developing country authorities and providers of development co-operation at a senior level.

24. The Busan Partnership agreement stipulates that, beyond government and development partners, mutual accountability includes intended beneficiaries, citizens, and relevant organisations and constituents.

25. While an increasing number of elements for effective mutual accountability are in place, the number of countries with at least four of these elements in place has slightly decreased. This is in part due to the highly restrictive nature of this indicator, which requires that at least four out of five criteria be fulfilled. In practice, many countries that already met four of the criteria in the 2014 monitoring round are now meeting all five criteria; likewise, many countries that met one or two criteria in 2014 meet three criteria in this round, increasing the number of elements for effective mutual accountability, but falling short of qualifying for Indicator 7. Some other countries, like the United Republic of Tanzania, did not qualify because they are undergoing a transition in aid policies and mutual accountability arrangements, despite having qualified in the past.

26. The Sustainable Development Goals have led to a renewed focus on making information on the impact and results of development co-operation as readily available as information on inputs is now becoming. Currently, data on outputs and outcomes included in monitoring and evaluation systems of providers and governments are only occasionally disclosed, yet some emerging initiatives are promising. For example, in July 2016 the World Bank’s Mapping for Results initiative made available the details, geolocation and results for 92% of the institution’s 1 645 ongoing development interventions. Regional development banks and bilateral agencies are increasingly exploring approaches to transparency around results.

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Annexes

Data related to the Global Partnership monitoring exercise

Annex A Monitoring data: Countries and territories

Annex B Monitoring data: Development partners

Annex C Coverage of monitoring data

The data presented in this report were provided by the governments of the 81 low and middle-income countries and territories that participated in the 2016 monitoring round, in co-ordination with their development partners who engaged in the monitoring process. Data for assessing transparency of development co-operation (Indicator 4), quality of budgetary and financial management systems (Indicator 9a) and aid untying (Indicator 10) were gathered from existing global sources and assessments. Development partners are listed individually when the data reported indicate that the development co-operation financing they provided to the public sector exceeded USD 20 million and covered more than one country; other partners are aggregated under the heading “All others”.

Annex A

Monitoring data: Countries and territories

Note: The tables in this Annex are numbered using the Global Partnership Indicator numbers.

Table A.1a. [1/2] **Development partners use country/government-led results frameworks: Alignment of new interventions to national priorities**

	Number of interventions assessed	Amount (USD m)	The objective of the development intervention is drawn from country/government-led results framework(s)							No (%)	No response (%)
			Yes (%)	... from the national development plan (%)	... from sector plans and strategies (%)	... from institutional or ministry's plans (%)	... from other government planning tools (%)	... from development partner's strategy agreed with the government (%)			
Afghanistan	39	1 659.8	76.9	10.3	17.9	17.9	12.8	17.9	17.9	5.1	
Albania	39	683.7	79.5	10.3	20.5	15.4	0.0	33.3	5.1	15.4	
Angola	17	867.6	94.1	35.3	0.0	58.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.9	
Armenia	45	809.2	91.1	17.8	37.8	0.0	4.4	31.1	6.7	2.2	
Bangladesh	74	3 706.3	89.2	54.1	12.2	4.1	1.4	17.6	10.8	0.0	
Belarus	11	114.0	100.0	63.6	0.0	0.0	18.2	18.2	0.0	0.0	
Benin	62	356.6	83.9	17.7	29.0	12.9	1.6	22.6	4.8	11.3	
Bhutan	10	83.4	90.0	20.0	10.0	20.0	0.0	40.0	10.0	0.0	
Bolivia	48	1 687.5	87.5	50.0	20.8	2.1	0.0	12.5	8.3	4.2	
Burkina Faso	22	410.1	100.0	36.4	13.6	4.5	9.1	36.4	0.0	0.0	
Burundi	15	195.0	26.7	20.0	0.0	0.0	6.7	0.0	0.0	73.3	
Cambodia	67	873.3	100.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Cameroon	23	558.0	69.6	13.0	17.4	13.0	8.7	17.4	17.4	13.0	
Central African Republic	5	62.7	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	
Chad	18	294.4	88.9	5.6	5.6	33.3	0.0	44.4	5.6	5.6	
Colombia	53	3 419.5	92.5	43.4	11.3	11.3	0.0	26.4	7.5	0.0	
Comoros	10	40.2	90.0	50.0	20.0	0.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	0.0	
Congo	3	77.2	100.0	33.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	66.7	0.0	0.0	
Cook Islands	17	44.9	94.1	41.2	23.5	5.9	5.9	17.6	5.9	0.0	
Costa Rica	112	491.8	65.2	47.3	0.0	15.2	2.7	0.0	34.8	0.0	
Côte d'Ivoire	53	2 660.9	90.6	67.9	7.5	0.0	0.0	15.1	7.5	1.9	
Democratic Republic of the Congo	81	1 366.7	100.0	46.9	27.2	3.7	4.9	17.3	0.0	0.0	
Dominican Republic	101	860.4	81.2	18.8	15.8	20.8	5.0	20.8	16.8	2.0	
Egypt	35	3 680.9	68.6	17.1	17.1	5.7	2.9	25.7	0.0	31.4	
El Salvador	18	327.3	77.8	38.9	5.6	22.2	0.0	11.1	11.1	11.1	
Ethiopia	103	4 121.3	94.2	39.8	33.0	5.8	1.0	13.6	2.9	2.9	
Fiji	17	39.5	58.8	11.8	29.4	11.8	0.0	5.9	41.2	0.0	
Gabon	24	499.3	100.0	50.0	16.7	0.0	0.0	33.3	0.0	0.0	
Gambia	11	41.5	81.8	36.4	36.4	0.0	9.1	0.0	0.0	18.2	
Guatemala	2	150.6	100.0	0.0	50.0	0.0	0.0	50.0	0.0	0.0	
Guinea	8	124.5	100.0	12.5	25.0	50.0	12.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Honduras	23	569.3	82.6	13.0	4.3	17.4	0.0	47.8	8.7	8.7	
Kenya	85	3 700.8	70.6	38.8	4.7	5.9	1.2	20.0	29.4	0.0	
Kiribati	9	20.7	100.0	66.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	33.3	0.0	0.0	
Kosovo	36	180.0	91.7	19.4	41.7	2.8	11.1	16.7	8.3	0.0	
Kyrgyzstan	35	457.8	94.3	37.1	25.7	8.6	2.9	20.0	0.0	5.7	
Lao People's Democratic Republic	63	552.2	95.2	41.3	15.9	9.5	1.6	27.0	4.8	0.0	
Liberia	17	913.0	100.0	94.1	5.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Madagascar	57	517.6	80.7	40.4	26.3	3.5	5.3	5.3	10.5	8.8	
Malawi	38	573.9	92.1	31.6	26.3	10.5	2.6	21.1	5.3	2.6	
Mali	47	535.4	61.7	27.7	6.4	12.8	0.0	14.9	6.4	31.9	

"-" Data are not available.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933423976>

Table A.1a. [2/2] **Development partners use country/government-led results frameworks: Alignment of new interventions to national priorities**

	Number of interventions assessed	Amount (USD m)	The objective of the development intervention is drawn from country/government-led results framework(s)							No (%)	No response (%)
			Yes (%)	... from the national development plan (%)	... from sector plans and strategies (%)	... from institutional or ministry's plans (%)	... from other government planning tools (%)	... from development partner's strategy agreed with the government (%)			
Marshall Islands	6	87.7	83.3	16.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	66.7	0.0	16.7	
Mauritania	19	181.1	89.5	0.0	21.1	0.0	0.0	68.4	0.0	10.5	
Micronesia	1	107.1	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	
Moldova	31	235.3	83.9	16.1	38.7	0.0	9.7	19.4	12.9	3.2	
Mongolia	51	879.8	68.6	17.6	17.6	3.9	0.0	29.4	29.4	2.0	
Mozambique	62	1 647.3	95.2	17.7	48.4	12.9	4.8	11.3	4.8	0.0	
Myanmar	63	2 944.5	57.1	17.5	25.4	6.3	0.0	7.9	15.9	27.0	
Nauru	13	44.7	100.0	76.9	7.7	0.0	7.7	7.7	0.0	0.0	
Nepal	51	1 633.1	84.3	47.1	5.9	2.0	13.7	15.7	15.7	0.0	
Niger	10	144.0	50.0	10.0	10.0	0.0	20.0	10.0	0.0	50.0	
Nigeria	54	1 872.2	48.1	3.7	1.9	0.0	0.0	42.6	11.1	40.7	
Niue	3	12.3	100.0	66.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	33.3	0.0	0.0	
Pakistan	36	3 883.7	100.0	8.3	30.6	8.3	13.9	38.9	0.0	0.0	
Palau	2	13.2	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	
Papua New Guinea	36	956.1	100.0	38.9	8.3	8.3	8.3	36.1	0.0	0.0	
Paraguay	12	169.0	100.0	50.0	33.3	8.3	0.0	8.3	0.0	0.0	
Peru	57	1 776.2	93.0	24.6	26.3	10.5	19.3	12.3	7.0	0.0	
Philippines	66	4 440.9	97.0	42.4	9.1	10.6	16.7	18.2	3.0	0.0	
Rwanda	47	962.4	89.4	29.8	38.3	2.1	2.1	17.0	10.6	0.0	
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	7	6.7	85.7	28.6	28.6	0.0	0.0	28.6	14.3	0.0	
Samoa	3	30.6	33.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	33.3	0.0	66.7	
Sao Tome and Principe	3	27.2	100.0	0.0	66.7	0.0	0.0	33.3	0.0	0.0	
Senegal	53	747.0	94.3	7.5	60.4	3.8	3.8	18.9	5.7	0.0	
Sierra Leone	30	135.3	90.0	26.7	0.0	30.0	26.7	6.7	0.0	10.0	
Solomon Islands	13	64.7	38.5	15.4	15.4	0.0	0.0	7.7	0.0	61.5	
Somalia	131	1 367.2	76.3	8.4	19.8	0.8	11.5	35.9	7.6	16.0	
South Sudan	21	530.1	71.4	4.8	66.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	23.8	4.8	
Sudan	57	220.0	87.7	19.3	61.4	1.8	5.3	0.0	7.0	5.3	
Tajikistan	15	190.6	66.7	46.7	0.0	13.3	0.0	6.7	33.3	0.0	
Tanzania	74	1 166.7	89.2	25.7	31.1	14.9	1.4	16.2	10.8	0.0	
Timor-Leste	23	217.6	95.7	65.2	8.7	8.7	0.0	13.0	4.3	0.0	
Togo	27	255.7	96.3	51.9	25.9	3.7	3.7	11.1	0.0	3.7	
Tonga	8	67.3	87.5	25.0	37.5	0.0	12.5	12.5	12.5	0.0	
Tuvalu	7	19.7	100.0	85.7	0.0	14.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Uganda	53	1 134.1	92.5	30.2	34.0	5.7	0.0	22.6	1.9	5.7	
Uruguay	10	1 281.7	90.0	10.0	20.0	20.0	10.0	30.0	0.0	10.0	
Vanuatu	14	111.6	85.7	42.9	14.3	0.0	0.0	28.6	14.3	0.0	
Viet Nam	67	4 663.9	98.5	26.9	23.9	0.0	9.0	38.8	0.0	1.5	
Yemen	7	126.1	100.0	14.3	57.1	0.0	14.3	14.3	0.0	0.0	
Zimbabwe	23	156.3	91.3	43.5	4.3	26.1	0.0	17.4	8.7	0.0	
Total	2 819	72 839.6	84.8	32.1	20.6	7.8	4.6	19.5	9.0	6.1	

"-" Data are not available.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933423976>

Table A.1b. [1/2] **Development partners use country/government-led results frameworks to design, monitor and evaluate new interventions**

	Number of interventions assessed	Amount (USD m)	Average number of results indicators per intervention	Percentage of results indicators which are drawn from country/government-led results frameworks (%)	Percentage of results indicators which will be monitored using government sources and monitoring systems (%)	Percentage of new interventions that plan a final evaluation (%)	Percentage of new interventions that plan a final evaluation with government involvement (%)
Afghanistan	39	1 659.8	7	42.2	72.2	66.7	47.6
Albania	39	683.7	8	89.2	74.5	90.9	78.8
Angola	17	867.6	3	97.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Armenia	45	809.2	5	39.2	59.6	93.0	60.5
Bangladesh	74	3 706.3	7	57.9	49.9	94.6	56.8
Belarus	11	114.0	6	65.9	55.5	80.0	50.0
Benin	62	356.6	9	68.7	70.2	71.4	32.1
Bhutan	10	83.4	8	75.4	52.4	70.0	60.0
Bolivia	48	1 687.5	5	69.7	45.3	85.1	74.5
Burkina Faso	22	410.1	15	43.4	44.7	90.9	90.9
Burundi	15	195.0	11	62.8	62.8	100.0	66.7
Cambodia	67	873.3	1	75.0	79.2	44.8	43.3
Cameroon	23	558.0	5	61.4	54.2	95.7	65.2
Central African Republic	5	62.7	8	39.7	52.4	40.0	40.0
Chad	18	294.4	4	62.2	53.4	66.7	5.6
Colombia	53	3 419.5	7	41.7	38.1	63.6	29.5
Comoros	10	40.2	4	68.0	62.0	75.0	37.5
Congo	3	77.2	6	80.6	16.7	100.0	66.7
Cook Islands	17	44.9	4	91.1	73.3	100.0	100.0
Costa Rica	112	491.8	5	72.3	39.5	49.1	4.5
Côte d'Ivoire	53	2 660.9	16	42.7	35.3	96.3	63.0
Democratic Republic of the Congo	81	1 366.7	9	62.6	52.3	95.3	82.8
Dominican Republic	101	860.4	4	73.6	39.2	41.0	12.0
Egypt	35	3 680.9	8	63.7	39.0	96.0	64.0
El Salvador	18	327.3	6	56.1	49.9	80.0	46.7
Ethiopia	103	4 121.3	8	82.8	70.1	80.0	61.3
Fiji	17	39.5	6	56.1	71.0	100.0	37.5
Gabon	24	499.3	4	79.4	84.0	50.0	37.5
Gambia	11	41.5	11	17.0	34.1	77.8	66.7
Guatemala	2	150.6	9	92.3	53.8	100.0	100.0
Guinea	8	124.5	7	51.9	48.1	100.0	66.7
Honduras	23	569.3	6	68.7	77.9	90.9	81.8
Kenya	85	3 700.8	10	60.2	49.4	83.3	45.0
Kiribati	9	20.7	7	59.6	64.7	77.8	11.1
Kosovo	36	180.0	7	50.7	41.0	77.8	22.2
Kyrgyzstan	35	457.8	11	89.9	88.1	91.7	45.8
Lao People's Democratic Republic	63	552.2	5	62.6	55.6	60.3	55.6
Liberia	17	913.0	6	51.8	53.5	100.0	11.8
Madagascar	57	517.6	6	46.7	47.7	91.7	62.5
Malawi	38	573.9	5	74.6	54.9	91.9	35.1
Mali	47	535.4	8	54.9	46.3	84.4	12.5

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Table A.1b. [2/2] **Development partners use country/government-led results frameworks to design, monitor and evaluate new interventions**

	Number of interventions assessed	Amount (USD m)	Average number of results indicators per intervention	Percentage of results indicators which are drawn from country/government-led results frameworks (%)	Percentage of results indicators which will be monitored using government sources and monitoring systems (%)	Percentage of new interventions that plan a final evaluation (%)	Percentage of new interventions that plan a final evaluation with government involvement (%)
Marshall Islands	6	87.7	11	100.0	100.0	75.0	75.0
Mauritania	19	181.1	2	90.7	38.9	70.6	35.3
Micronesia	1	107.1	26	100.0	100.0	0.0	0.0
Moldova	31	235.3	6	45.5	39.2	54.8	38.7
Mongolia	51	879.8	6	51.0	40.3	68.6	56.9
Mozambique	62	1 647.3	8	65.4	51.5	69.4	38.7
Myanmar	63	2 944.5	8	55.7	38.4	91.3	47.8
Nauru	13	44.7	4	87.2	92.3	61.5	61.5
Nepal	51	1 633.1	2	53.1	46.8	52.1	29.2
Niger	10	144.0	17	50.1	51.1	83.3	50.0
Nigeria	54	1 872.2	5	70.2	71.0	90.6	53.1
Niue	3	12.3	7	72.2	55.6	33.3	33.3
Pakistan	36	3 883.7	4	65.1	51.6	91.4	40.0
Palau	2	13.2	2	100.0	100.0	50.0	50.0
Papua New Guinea	36	956.1	6	81.1	75.1	86.1	86.1
Paraguay	12	169.0	18	50.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Peru	57	1 776.2	6	53.9	46.3	93.0	56.1
Philippines	66	4 440.9	4	70.7	65.4	95.5	59.1
Rwanda	47	962.4	5	58.1	51.0	76.6	36.2
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	7	6.7	5	0.0	16.7	71.4	0.0
Samoa	3	30.6	12	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Sao Tome and Principe	3	27.2	12	88.9	94.4	66.7	33.3
Senegal	53	747.0	5	88.2	65.7	96.2	86.5
Sierra Leone	30	135.3	5	62.8	40.6	81.5	70.4
Solomon Islands	13	64.7	14	61.2	30.2	85.7	85.7
Somalia	131	1 367.2	7	39.3	37.1	62.8	31.4
South Sudan	21	530.1	5	9.6	12.6	55.0	40.0
Sudan	57	220.0	4	50.0	6.2	52.2	30.4
Tajikistan	15	190.6	5	76.2	78.1	100.0	86.7
Tanzania	74	1 166.7	7	70.1	65.3	82.2	43.8
Timor-Leste	23	217.6	9	51.0	41.1	82.6	52.2
Togo	27	255.7	7	66.5	60.0	88.0	76.0
Tonga	8	67.3	4	71.9	67.7	62.5	50.0
Tuvalu	7	19.7	3	100.0	100.0	85.7	85.7
Uganda	53	1 134.1	6	45.7	35.2	96.1	45.1
Uruguay	10	1 281.7	4	65.3	74.5	55.6	33.3
Vanuatu	14	111.6	12	28.6	44.4	100.0	80.0
Viet Nam	67	4 663.9	9	28.9	23.3	66.7	39.4
Yemen	7	126.1	2	25.0	0.0	42.9	0.0
Zimbabwe	23	156.3	17	49.9	36.9	82.6	60.9
Total	2 819	72 839.6	6	61.5	52.4	76.6	47.8


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933423983>

Table A.1c. [1/2] **Countries/governments set their own development priorities and results: Existence of country/government-led results framework(s)**

	Countries/governments that have established priority-setting mechanisms at the national and/or sector level							A country/government-led results frameworks is present and includes priorities, targets and indicators
	Long-term vision	National development plan	Sector strategies					
			Education	Healthcare	Transport	Public finance		
Afghanistan	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes, reflected in various plans	
Albania	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Angola	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes, reflected in various plans	
Armenia	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Bangladesh	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Belarus	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Benin	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes, reflected in various plans	
Bhutan	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Bolivia	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Burkina Faso	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Burundi	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Cambodia	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Cameroon	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Central African Republic	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Chad	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Colombia	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Comoros	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Congo	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Cook Islands	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Costa Rica	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Côte d'Ivoire	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Democratic Republic of the Congo	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Dominican Republic	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Egypt	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes, in a single strategic document	
El Salvador	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Ethiopia	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Fiji	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes, reflected in various plans	
Gabon	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes, reflected in various plans	
Gambia	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes, reflected in various plans	
Guatemala	Yes	-	-	-	-	-	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Guinea	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Honduras	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Kenya	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Kiribati	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Kosovo	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Kyrgyzstan	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Lao People's Democratic Republic	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Liberia	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes, reflected in various plans	
Madagascar	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Malawi	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes, reflected in various plans	
Mali	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes, in a single strategic document	

"-" Data are not available.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933423997>

Table A.1c. [2/2] **Countries/governments set their own development priorities and results: Existence of country/government-led results framework(s)**

	Countries/governments that have established priority-setting mechanisms at the national and/or sector level							A country/government-led results frameworks is present and includes priorities, targets and indicators
	Long-term vision	National development plan	Sector strategies					
			Education	Healthcare	Transport	Public finance		
Marshall Islands	Yes	-	-	-	-	-	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Mauritania	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Micronesia	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Moldova	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Mongolia	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes, reflected in various plans	
Mozambique	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Myanmar	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes, reflected in various plans	
Nauru	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Nepal	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Niger	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes, reflected in various plans	
Nigeria	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Niue	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Pakistan	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Palau	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Papua New Guinea	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Paraguay	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Peru	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Philippines	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Rwanda	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Samoa	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Sao Tome and Principe	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes, reflected in various plans	
Senegal	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Sierra Leone	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Solomon Islands	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes, reflected in various plans	
Somalia	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes, in a single strategic document	
South Sudan	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Sudan	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Tajikistan	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Tanzania	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Timor-Leste	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Togo	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Tonga	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Tuvalu	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes, reflected in various plans	
Uganda	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Uruguay	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Vanuatu	Yes	-	-	-	-	-	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Viet Nam	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Yemen	-	-	-	-	-	-	No	
Zimbabwe	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes, in a single strategic document	
Total (%)	74.1	76.5	80.2	79.0	58.0	56.8	48	

"-" Data are not available.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933423997>

Table A.2. [1/2] **Civil society organisations operate within an environment that maximises their contribution to development**

	Afghanistan	Albania	Angola	Armenia	Bangladesh	Belarus	Benin	Burkina Faso	Burundi	Cambodia	Cameroon	Colombia	Cook Islands	Costa Rica	Cote d'Ivoire	Democratic Republic of the Congo	Dominican Republic	Egypt	El Salvador	Fiji	Gabon	Gambia	Honduras	Kenya	Kiribati	Kosovo	Kyrgyzstan	Lao People's Democratic Republic	Liberia	Madagascar		
Module 1 • Availability of spaces for multi-stakeholder dialogue on national development policies																																
1 Are civil society organisations (CSOs) consulted by the government in the design, implementation and monitoring of national development policies?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
2 Do CSOs have the right to access government information?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
3 Are there resources and/or training opportunities for addressing capacity building of all stakeholders (including government, CSOs and co-operation providers) to engage meaningfully in multi-stakeholder dialogue?	x	✓	✓	✓	x	x	✓	✓	x	✓	x	✓	x	x	✓	x	✓	x	✓	x	x	✓	x	✓	x	x	-	✓	✓	x		
Module 2 • CSO development effectiveness: Accountability and transparency																																
4 In practice, are there CSO-managed processes in place to address transparency and multiple accountabilities in CSO operations?	x	✓	✓	✓	x	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	✓	x	x	✓	✓	x	✓	x	✓	x	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	
5 Do CSO-initiated co-ordination processes exist to facilitate consolidated and inclusive CSO representation in policy dialogue (e.g. umbrella organisation, CSO network, consultation practices)?	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	x	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	
6 Do mechanisms exist to facilitate co-ordination on programming among CSOs (collaboration to optimise impact and avoid duplication) and with other development actors?	✓	x	✓	✓	x	x	✓	x	x	✓	x	✓	x	x	✓	✓	x	x	✓	x	✓	x	✓	✓	✓	x	✓	✓	✓	✓		
7 Are there other significant initiatives related to CSO development effectiveness principles (Istanbul Principles and the International Framework for CSO Development Effectiveness) being implemented at the country level?	x	x	✓	x	✓	✓	✓	x	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	x	✓	✓	x	x	✓	x	✓	x	✓	x	✓	x	✓	x	x	x		
8 Do CSOs report annually to government on the basic finances, sectors of support and main geographic areas of involvement in development?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	✓	✓	x	✓	✓	x	✓	x	✓	✓	-	✓	x	✓	x	✓	✓	✓	-	✓	x	✓		
Module 3 • Official development co-operation with CSOs																																
9 Do providers of development co-operation consult with CSOs on their development policy/programming in a systematic way?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	✓	x	✓	✓	✓	x	x	-	✓	✓	x		
10 Are providers promoting a CSO enabling environment in their co-operation with civil society?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	-	✓	✓	✓		
11 Is the promotion of a CSO enabling environment an agenda item in providers' policy dialogue with partner governments?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	-	x	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	✓	✓	✓	x	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	✓	-	✓	✓	✓		
12 Do providers share information on their CSO support with the government?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	x	✓	x	x	✓	x	✓	x	-	x	✓	x	✓	-	✓	✓	✓		
Module 4 • Legal and regulatory environment																																
14 Is there a recognition of and respect for CSO freedom (association, assembly and expression) in the Constitution and more broadly in policy, law and regulation?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
15 Is the legal and regulatory environment enabling for CSO formation, registration and operation?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
16 Does the legal and regulatory environment facilitate access to resources for CSOs?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	✓	x	x	x	✓	x	x	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	-	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	✓	✓		
17 Does the legal and regulatory environment marginalise certain groups?	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	✓	x	x	✓	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	-	✓	✓	x	x	x	x	x	x		

Legend: ✓Yes xNo
StatLink <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933424006>

Table A.2. [2/2] **Civil society organisations operate within an environment that maximises their contribution to development**

	Malawi	Moldova	Mongolia	Mozambique	Myanmar	Nauru	Nepal	Niger	Nigeria	Papua New Guinea	Paraguay	Peru	Philippines	Rwanda	Samoa	Senegal	Sierra Leone	Solomon Islands	Somalia	Sudan	Tajikistan	Tanzania	Timor-Leste	Togo	Tonga	Uganda	Vanuatu	Viet Nam	Zimbabwe	
Module 1 • Availability of spaces for multi-stakeholder dialogue on national development policies																														
1	✓	✓	✗	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
2	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
3	✓	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗	
Module 2 • CSO development effectiveness: Accountability and transparency																														
4	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	
5	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
6	✓	✗	✗	✓	✓	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗	✓	
7	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓	✗	
8	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗	✓	✓	-	✓	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	
Module 3 • Official development co-operation with CSOs																														
9	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	
10	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓	-	✗	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	
11	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓	
12	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	-	✗	✓	✗	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	
Module 4 • Legal and regulatory environment																														
14	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	-	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
15	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	-	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
16	✗	✓	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	-	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓	
17	-	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓	-	✗	✓	✓	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	-	✗	✗	

Legend: ✓ Yes ✗ No

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933424006>

Table A.3. [1/1] **Public-private dialogue promotes private sector engagement and its contribution to development***

	Private sector willingness to engage	Government willingness to engage	Existence of potential champion	Availability of instruments to facilitate dialogue
Albania	8	7	8	8
Angola	5	10	8	7
Armenia	8	8	7	7
Bangladesh	8	7	6	6
Belarus	7	7	8	6
Benin	7	7	5	4
Burkina Faso	8	7	8	5
Burundi	7	5	5	4
Cambodia	9	9	10	7
Cameroon	7	6	6	5
Chad	6	6	0	1
Colombia	8	7	9	8
Cook Islands	10	5	7	3
Costa Rica	8	7	6	4
Côte d'Ivoire	8	7	7	7
Democratic Republic of the Congo	10	6	10	8
Dominican Republic	8	8	9	9
Egypt	6	3	2	3
El Salvador	3	4	0	0
Fiji	8	10	10	10
Gabon	5	7	7	2
Gambia	10	6	10	10
Honduras	9	10	9	10
Kenya	8	8	10	6
Kiribati	9	9	6	1
Kosovo	3	1	3	1
Kyrgyzstan	7	7	1	9
Lao People's Democratic Republic	7	7	7	3
Liberia	10	8	8	6
Madagascar	8	7	6	4
Malawi	5	5	4	3
Moldova	5	6	2	3
Mongolia	8	7	8	4
Mozambique	5	6	5	3
Myanmar	7	6	7	5
Nauru	10	9	10	9
Nepal	9	9	6	5
Niger	5	8	7	6
Nigeria	10	9	9	3
Papua New Guinea	7	7	7	3
Paraguay	6	5	8	3
Peru	9	5	7	6
Philippines	9	6	8	7
Rwanda	8	9	9	7
Senegal	8	9	7	9
Solomon Islands	7	4	8	3
Somalia	6	5	5	2
Sudan	7	4	8	3
Tajikistan	8	8	8	7
Tanzania	10	10	7	8
Timor-Leste	8	8	7	7
Togo	5	4	0	1
Tonga	9	4	7	2
Viet Nam	7	6	7	4
Zimbabwe	9	9	-	8

* Score from 0 (weak) to 10 (strong).

"-" Data are not available.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933424018>

Table A.5a. [1/2] **Development co-operation is predictable (annual)**

	Total direct disbursements in the country/territory	Disbursement for the public sector	Scheduled disbursements for the public sector	Indicator 5a. Annual predictability of development co-operation			
				2015		2010 (for reference)	
				a = "as scheduled"	b = "beyond scheduled"	a = "as scheduled"	b = "beyond scheduled"
				(USD m)	(USD m)	(USD m)	(%)
Afghanistan	3 096.27	2 474.84	2 695.64	75.8	17.5	83.2	0.4
Albania	470.47	455.07	375.30	93.2	23.2	81.7	16.1
Angola	498.86	493.51	902.83	54.7	0.0	-	-
Armenia	358.08	280.61	295.07	85.1	10.6	87.2	0.4
Bangladesh	3 256.78	2 834.42	1 616.58	83.6	52.3	90.0	5.6
Belarus	80.58	79.19	80.94	97.8	0.0	-	-
Benin	324.11	257.07	288.48	81.5	8.6	93.5	9.8
Bhutan	98.51	93.19	85.01	99.6	9.1	-	-
Bolivia	1 318.48	1 194.87	1 149.63	97.0	6.7	93.8	6.2
Burkina Faso	1 065.54	915.02	1 229.03	59.0	20.8	84.2	11.1
Burundi	374.42	306.50	434.37	57.6	12.8	80.7	5.1
Cambodia	1 116.68	959.02	794.66	87.2	27.7	68.6	21.8
Cameroon	292.96	244.71	480.07	46.1	11.9	70.2	2.3
Central African Republic	107.48	84.32	50.00	100.0	40.7	83.7	20.9
Chad	126.60	115.97	135.44	85.6	0.0	93.9	25.1
Colombia	2 318.77	2 100.63	1 942.02	98.4	9.0	85.5	9.0
Comoros	34.92	33.32	22.88	73.7	49.4	80.2	9.8
Congo	21.56	21.22	22.36	94.5	0.5	-	-
Cook Islands	22.59	13.58	8.01	76.3	55.0	-	-
Costa Rica	364.93	253.66	184.46	98.9	3.8	-	-
Côte d'Ivoire	1 036.83	939.62	1 182.76	78.0	1.8	-	-
Democratic Republic of the Congo	1 093.82	763.63	979.28	77.6	0.5	65.0	16.8
Dominican Republic	472.51	409.91	205.39	93.8	53.0	94.4	7.2
Egypt	1 455.64	1 309.74	706.21	28.7	7.2	87.1	50.4
El Salvador	306.09	228.71	163.00	74.2	47.1	93.2	17.6
Ethiopia	2 485.80	2 283.77	1 690.84	71.8	46.9	89.2	21.1
Fiji	66.58	10.19	10.20	99.9	0.0	97.4	2.0
Gabon	108.84	84.26	94.18	83.9	6.2	50.2	6.6
Gambia	41.08	33.50	21.78	70.9	12.8	78.9	14.1
Guatemala	261.13	119.23	39.38	98.8	34.2	81.4	3.3
Guinea	270.17	234.57	164.98	96.8	31.6	-	-
Honduras	600.03	310.11	268.56	94.8	17.1	95.0	22.7
Kenya	2 092.66	1 337.58	1 452.45	88.8	2.1	67.0	1.3
Kiribati	64.36	64.36	89.06	68.8	4.8	-	-
Kosovo	287.51	94.85	52.08	82.3	54.8	81.5	19.3
Kyrgyzstan	86.79	67.47	81.67	82.6	0.0	87.8	36.2
Lao People's Democratic Republic	513.80	477.74	488.55	93.3	4.6	93.5	5.1
Liberia	719.84	151.93	202.20	75.1	0.0	33.3	14.8
Madagascar	565.19	508.47	566.47	82.7	7.9	76.3	24.4
Malawi	909.02	680.44	992.62	67.6	1.4	90.9	18.0
Mali	684.42	589.38	1 257.75	41.5	11.5	81.1	4.2

"-" Data are not available.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933424029>

Table A.5a. [2/2] **Development co-operation is predictable (annual)**

	Indicator 5a.						
	Total direct disbursements in the country/territory	Disbursement for the public sector	Scheduled disbursements for the public sector	Annual predictability of development co-operation			
				2015		2010 (for reference)	
				a = "as scheduled"	b = "beyond scheduled"	a = "as scheduled"	b = "beyond scheduled"
(USD m)	(USD m)	(USD m)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	
Marshall Islands	91.54	66.08	91.55	72.2	0.0	-	-
Mauritania	191.06	131.28	158.60	66.6	19.6	77.4	0.0
Micronesia	115.03	33.53	115.03	29.2	0.0	-	-
Moldova	301.47	273.40	329.12	82.2	1.0	82.2	13.6
Mongolia	304.38	204.97	203.05	94.9	6.0	82.7	14.6
Mozambique	1 867.09	1 696.02	1 575.60	97.2	9.7	99.3	6.0
Myanmar	561.86	254.87	289.21	88.1	0.0	-	-
Nauru	30.54	26.56	22.05	100.0	17.0	-	-
Nepal	1 037.41	905.99	322.28	94.4	66.4	96.7	16.6
Niger	122.50	103.09	89.99	82.4	28.0	88.7	35.6
Nigeria	540.41	170.66	210.16	81.2	0.0	73.6	34.0
Niue	8.85	8.50	8.50	100.0	0.0	-	-
Pakistan	2 472.53	2 285.76	2 281.86	98.2	2.0	85.3	40.6
Palau	22.04	20.87	20.87	100.0	0.0	-	-
Papua New Guinea	622.87	305.38	243.95	96.3	23.1	62.9	3.4
Paraguay	40.03	36.22	18.89	97.7	4.4	-	-
Peru	517.33	348.70	377.75	90.1	2.4	96.2	2.5
Philippines	2 994.42	2 888.13	2 973.65	92.7	4.6	98.9	8.4
Rwanda	847.84	589.20	633.54	87.9	3.1	93.6	23.0
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	15.10	15.10	19.31	78.2	0.0	92.8	95.5
Samoa	70.24	70.24	133.61	52.4	0.4	99.9	3.1
Sao Tome and Principe	9.79	8.51	6.33	99.7	19.7	83.7	6.7
Senegal	647.34	580.75	530.69	97.6	10.9	77.8	13.6
Sierra Leone	493.81	333.63	354.67	94.1	0.0	88.1	22.9
Solomon Islands	108.66	55.99	58.42	88.1	8.0	79.6	2.2
Somalia	560.63	156.94	176.20	88.8	0.0	-	-
South Sudan	252.74	2.64	0.00	0.0	0.0	81.5	25.4
Sudan	755.68	444.35	121.19	46.3	82.2	78.5	29.5
Tajikistan	545.67	420.29	445.48	93.9	0.5	90.0	33.9
Tanzania	2 765.31	1 810.03	1 446.40	77.5	38.1	89.0	11.8
Timor-Leste	282.81	161.24	160.26	77.4	23.1	72.3	8.7
Togo	268.83	236.23	161.70	82.0	43.9	66.4	34.5
Tonga	61.08	50.61	46.90	100.0	7.3	83.1	22.2
Tuvalu	12.49	6.97	5.52	100.0	20.9	-	-
Uganda	1 007.59	519.27	536.99	90.4	2.7	82.8	3.5
Uruguay	443.75	371.20	348.41	99.5	6.6	-	-
Vanuatu	71.61	36.93	37.04	99.7	0.0	95.7	20.7
Viet Nam	4 207.16	4 094.39	4 177.17	97.5	0.5	90.5	3.5
Yemen	309.12	309.12	259.51	99.6	16.4	-	-
Zimbabwe	103.47	0.00	0.00	0.0	0.0	-	-
Total	55 152.81	43 943.77	42 493.65	83.2	16.8	-	-
For reference 2010 and 2015 rounds (60 countries and territories)	50 395.06	40 460.00	38 417.50	83.7	17.8	84.5	14.6

"-" Data are not available.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933424039>

Table A.5b. [1/2] **Development co-operation is predictable (medium term)**

				Indicator 5b. Medium-term predictability	
	One year ahead	Two years ahead	Three years ahead	2015	2013 (for reference)
	a	b	c	d = (a+b+c)/3	
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
Afghanistan	92.4	43.6	43.6	59.9	-
Albania	90.2	81.8	55.7	75.9	83.4
Angola	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	-
Armenia	88.5	88.3	83.7	86.8	97.5
Bangladesh	98.6	98.6	98.6	98.6	64.1
Belarus	99.9	97.5	94.2	97.2	-
Benin	92.3	92.3	79.5	88.1	52.6
Bhutan	81.3	77.9	77.9	79.0	-
Bolivia	98.0	96.5	93.9	96.1	-
Burkina Faso	94.4	76.7	54.4	75.2	97.2
Burundi	91.7	79.7	35.9	69.1	71.9
Cambodia	98.6	97.9	88.4	95.0	97.9
Cameroon	89.5	72.8	72.8	78.4	59.7
Central African Republic	98.3	78.5	78.5	85.1	-
Chad	93.5	93.5	93.5	93.5	-
Colombia	98.6	55.1	55.1	69.6	-
Comoros	42.9	42.9	0.0	28.6	-
Congo	100.0	100.0	39.2	79.7	33.3
Cook Islands	79.5	66.6	52.6	66.2	-
Costa Rica	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-
Côte d'Ivoire	83.7	54.6	54.6	64.3	35.3
Democratic Republic of the Congo	85.2	43.2	43.2	57.2	34.5
Dominican Republic	85.0	93.8	0.0	59.6	-
Egypt	95.1	95.1	95.1	95.1	34.2
El Salvador	51.6	22.0	1.2	24.9	2.0
Ethiopia	52.4	43.0	5.0	33.5	85.4
Fiji	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-
Gabon	90.4	0.0	0.0	30.1	-
Gambia	41.4	41.4	0.0	27.6	-
Guatemala	59.7	0.0	0.0	19.9	0.0
Guinea	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	-
Honduras	86.9	70.6	69.2	75.5	9.0
Kenya	100.0	100.0	96.4	98.8	77.8
Kiribati	100.0	0.0	0.0	33.3	47.8
Kosovo	100.0	89.5	86.6	92.0	64.9
Kyrgyzstan	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	-
Lao People's Democratic Republic	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-
Liberia	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	-
Madagascar	83.7	56.3	53.4	64.5	0.0
Malawi	98.8	52.6	52.6	68.0	52.0
Mali	95.9	95.9	95.9	95.9	53.3

"-" Data are not available.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933424039>

Table A.5b. [2/2] **Development co-operation is predictable (medium term)**

				Indicator 5b. Medium-term predictability	
	One year ahead	Two years ahead	Three years ahead	2015	2013 (for reference)
	a	b	c	d = (a+b+c)/3	
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
Marshall Islands	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	84.3
Mauritania	90.6	0.0	0.0	30.2	-
Micronesia	0.0	0.0	0.0		60.2
Moldova	99.5	97.0	76.9	91.2	39.6
Mongolia	55.0	52.7	54.6	54.1	-
Mozambique	55.0	54.7	54.7	54.8	74.1
Myanmar	18.0	18.0	18.0	18.0	-
Nauru	88.1	84.9	84.9	86.0	62.0
Nepal	68.9	65.8	25.5	53.4	80.6
Niger	56.2	51.8	45.7	51.2	73.8
Nigeria	3.0	2.6	2.6	2.7	-
Niue	0.0	0.0	0.0		82.8
Pakistan	81.2	81.2	81.2	81.2	-
Palau	94.4	0.0	0.0	31.5	69.3
Papua New Guinea	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	-
Paraguay	26.5	0.0	0.0	8.8	-
Peru	11.5	11.5	11.5	11.5	43.0
Philippines	77.2	77.0	76.0	76.7	76.3
Rwanda	98.3	79.1	79.1	85.5	77.0
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	-
Samoa	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100
Sao Tome and Principe	100.0	6.7	6.7	37.8	-
Senegal	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	93.4
Sierra Leone	53.3	53.3	53.3	53.3	-
Solomon Islands	100.0	100.0	97.4	99.1	-
Somalia	56.6	44.0	39.7	46.8	-
South Sudan	100.0	0.0	0.0	33.3	-
Sudan	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	71.3
Tajikistan	99.1	95.0	61.0	85.0	60.7
Tanzania	98.7	56.0	45.0	66.5	80.9
Timor-Leste	65.4	61.2	21.5	49.4	77.4
Togo	17.9	17.9	13.4	16.4	100
Tonga	38.0	38.0	38.0	38.0	-
Tuvalu	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	-
Uganda	92.5	93.1	92.5	92.7	-
Uruguay	85.9	55.0	55.0	65.3	-
Vanuatu	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	-
Viet Nam	97.0	97.0	94.3	96.1	93.1
Yemen	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-
Zimbabwe	3.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	-
Total	82.3	69.2	62.5	71.3	70.0

"-" Data are not available.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933424039>

Table A.6. [1/2] **Development co-operation is on budget**

	Indicator 6. Development co-operation on budget					
	Funds recorded in government annual budget	Scheduled disbursement for the public sector	2015		2010 (for reference)	
			Share recorded on budget	Share over-recorded on budget	Share recorded on budget	Share over-recorded on budget
(USD m)	(USD m)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	
Afghanistan	1 899.44	2 474.84	60.7	13.9	23.3	0.2
Albania	367.20	455.07	76.6	21.7	58.7	20.2
Angola	465.79	493.51	69.7	0.0	-	-
Armenia	200.94	280.61	69.2	4.1	80.2	1.2
Bangladesh	2 474.04	2 834.42	75.1	51.0	76.4	9.1
Belarus	-	79.19	0.0	0.0	-	-
Benin	138.95	257.07	46.4	3.7	18.2	0.4
Bhutan	68.39	93.19	71.2	11.5	-	-
Bolivia	2 677.54	1 194.87	95.1	59.2	41.8	0.9
Burkina Faso	881.25	915.02	56.9	20.6	62.1	17.9
Burundi	3.11	306.50	67.6	59.9	44.2	8.1
Cambodia	631.24	959.02	79.4	0.0	69.5	23.0
Cameroon	214.68	244.71	32.6	26.8	44.1	0.0
Central African Republic	-	84.32	-	-	0.0	100.0
Chad	-	115.97	0.0	0.0	62.1	26.3
Colombia	2 088.28	2 100.63	99.0	8.4	70.0	18.7
Comoros	-	33.32	0.0	0.0	11.0	0.0
Congo	0.00	21.22	0.0	0.0	-	-
Cook Islands	31.26	13.58	97.6	75.0	-	-
Costa Rica	-	253.66	-	-	-	-
Côte d'Ivoire	831.25	939.62	59.9	14.8	-	-
Democratic Republic of the Congo	-	763.63	0.0	0.0	41.0	32.5
Dominican Republic	53.63	409.91	22.4	15.4	80.4	48.4
Egypt	-	1 309.74	-	-	70.1	51.9
El Salvador	98.98	228.71	66.2	25.2	16.3	30.0
Ethiopia	1 612.44	2 283.77	62.6	34.3	69.1	19.9
Fiji	-	10.19	0.0	0.0	6.4	0.0
Gabon	-	84.26	0.0	0.0	26.9	4.4
Gambia	-	33.50	-	-	18.9	0.0
Guatemala	23.10	119.23	40.5	5.2	23.5	19.3
Guinea	41.38	234.57	41.4	0.0	-	-
Honduras	4.84	310.11	32.6	0.0	0.0	0.0
Kenya	1 574.79	1 337.58	78.2	27.9	44.8	0.3
Kiribati	87.79	64.36	98.6	0.0	-	-
Kosovo	13.01	94.85	16.6	33.6	16.8	9.4
Kyrgyzstan	2.29	67.47	7.2	0.0	44.3	0.0
Lao People's Democratic Republic	105.46	477.74	18.7	13.2	43.6	13.3
Liberia	833.88	151.93	100.0	65.9	0.0	100.0
Madagascar	519.96	508.47	81.8	10.9	44.3	24.7
Malawi	278.89	680.44	28.1	0.0	71.3	25.7
Mali	1 245.53	589.38	99.0	0.0	30.4	9.5

"-" Data are not available.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787//888933424043>

Table A.6. [2/2] **Development co-operation is on budget**

	Indicator 6. Development co-operation on budget					
	Funds recorded in government annual budget	Scheduled disbursement for the public sector	2015		2010 (for reference)	
			Share recorded on budget	Share over-recorded on budget	Share recorded on budget	Share over-recorded on budget
(USD m)	(USD m)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	
Marshall Islands	86.79	66.08	90.9	4.1	-	-
Mauritania	140.46	131.28	56.8	35.8	0.0	0.0
Micronesia	-	33.53	-	-	-	-
Moldova	218.93	273.40	66.3	0.3	74.9	9.2
Mongolia	21.35	204.97	6.9	34.1	24.8	18.4
Mozambique	1 435.63	1 696.02	68.4	24.9	82.1	2.7
Myanmar	0.53	254.87	43.9	0.0	-	-
Nauru	23.00	26.56	100.0	4.1	-	-
Nepal	212.10	905.99	62.4	10.3	51.8	5.2
Niger	70.82	103.09	89.8	30.2	44.0	42.3
Nigeria	-	170.66	0.0	0.0	77.3	28.8
Niue	-	8.50	-	-	-	-
Pakistan	785.84	2 285.76	34.4	0.0	55.5	36.0
Palau	20.80	20.87	99.7	0.0	-	-
Papua New Guinea	562.00	305.38	64.4	70.3	34.6	0.0
Paraguay	12.40	36.22	-	100.0	-	-
Peru	207.47	348.70	44.0	19.8	78.4	2.1
Philippines	2 486.20	2 888.13	73.1	12.6	26.4	0.0
Rwanda	548.74	589.20	75.7	11.0	61.8	17.0
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	14.38	15.10	74.5	0.0	0.0	0.0
Samoa	133.61	70.24	100.0	0.0	85.3	0.3
Sao Tome and Principe	5.34	8.51	63.4	25.0	64.6	9.5
Senegal	448.16	580.75	83.0	1.7	49.8	20.0
Sierra Leone	32.98	333.63	9.3	0.0	42.8	29.2
Solomon Islands	197.03	55.99	100.0	69.2	26.2	3.9
Somalia	59.64	156.94	31.3	0.4	-	-
South Sudan	252.74	2.64	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0
Sudan	234.95	444.35	0.0	100.0	24.1	33.6
Tajikistan	363.27	420.29	58.9	28.0	54.4	40.3
Tanzania	1 665.24	1 810.03	62.4	45.8	87.9	14.5
Timor-Leste	157.01	161.24	39.7	59.5	2.9	0.0
Togo	153.84	236.23	66.4	41.1	38.2	17.0
Tonga	43.58	50.61	68.5	26.3	63.8	17.2
Tuvalu	4.71	6.97	58.9	31.0	-	-
Uganda	351.01	519.27	55.4	74.8	72.5	3.3
Uruguay	369.11	371.20	98.9	6.6	-	-
Vanuatu	11.63	36.93	100.0	0.0	94.0	16.2
Viet Nam	4 556.16	4 094.39	94.6	13.2	80.3	4.8
Yemen	-	309.12	0.0	0.0	-	-
Zimbabwe	-	-	0.0	0.0	-	-
Total	35 356.80	43 943.77	66.1	25.8	-	-
For reference 2010 and 2015 (60 countries and territories)		-	66.6	26.8	53.7	16.6

"-" Data are not available.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787//888933424043>

Table A.7. [1/2] **Mutual accountability is strengthened through inclusive reviews**

	Criteria					Indicator 7. Inclusive, transparent mutual accountability reviews in place	
	Aid or partnership policy in place	Local targets for development co-operation	Joint regular assessment towards targets	Involvement of non-executive stakeholders	Results are made public	(At least 4 out of 5 criteria) 2015	(for reference) 2010*
Afghanistan	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	-
Albania	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Angola	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	-
Armenia	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Bangladesh	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Belarus	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Benin	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bhutan	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	-
Bolivia	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
Burkina Faso	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Burundi	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Cambodia	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cameroon	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Central African Republic	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Chad	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No
Colombia	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Comoros	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Congo	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Cook Islands	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	-
Costa Rica	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	-
Côte d'Ivoire	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	-
Democratic Republic of the Congo	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Dominican Republic	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Egypt	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
El Salvador	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Ethiopia	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Fiji	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No
Gabon	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Gambia	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
Guatemala	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Guinea	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Honduras	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Kenya	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No
Kiribati	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	-
Kosovo	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Kyrgyzstan	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Lao People's Democratic Republic	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Liberia	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Madagascar	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Malawi	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mali	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

* The 2010 results were based on a different set of criteria (see Chapter 4).

"-" Data are not available.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933424057>

Table A.7. [2/2] **Mutual accountability is strengthened through inclusive reviews**

	Criteria					Indicator 7. Inclusive, transparent mutual accountability reviews in place	
	Aid or partnership policy in place	Local targets for development co-operation	Joint regular assessment towards targets	Involvement of non-executive stakeholders	Results are made public	(At least 4 out of 5 criteria) 2015	(for reference) 2010*
Marshall Islands	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	-
Mauritania	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
Micronesia	Yes	No	Yes	No	-
Moldova	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mongolia	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Mozambique	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Myanmar	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	-
Nauru	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	-
Nepal	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Niger	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Nigeria	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
Niue	Yes	No	Yes	No	-
Pakistan	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Palau	Yes	No	Yes	No	-
Papua New Guinea	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
Paraguay	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	-
Peru	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Philippines	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Rwanda	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Samoa	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sao Tome and Principe	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No
Senegal	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Sierra Leone	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No
Solomon Islands	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No
Somalia	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	-
South Sudan	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Sudan	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Tajikistan	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Tanzania	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Timor-Leste	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
Togo	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Tonga	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes
Tuvalu	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Uganda	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Uruguay	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Vanuatu	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
Viet Nam	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Yemen	No	No	No	No	No	No	-
Zimbabwe	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	-
Percentage that answered "Yes"	80	77	69	46	42	46	42

* The 2010 results were based on a different set of criteria (see Chapter 4).

"-" Data are not available.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933424057>

Table A.8. [1/2] **Governments track public allocations for gender equality and women's empowerment**

	Government statement defining the tracking system	Gender allocations systematically tracked	System oversight by central government unit	Gender-related budget information publicly available	Indicator 8. 2015	Indicator 8. 2013 (for reference)
Afghanistan	No	No	No	No	No	-
Albania	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Angola	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Armenia	No	No	No	No	No	-
Bangladesh	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Belarus	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Benin	No	No	No	No	No	No
Bhutan	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	-
Bolivia	No	No	No	Yes	No	-
Burkina Faso	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Burundi	No	No	No	No	No	No
Cambodia	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	-
Cameroon	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	-
Central African Republic	No	No	No	No	No	-
Chad	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	-
Colombia	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Comoros	No	Yes	No	No	No	-
Congo	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Cook Islands	No	No	No	No	No	-
Costa Rica	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	-
Côte d'Ivoire	No	No	No	No	No	No
Democratic Republic of the Congo	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Dominican Republic	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	-
Egypt	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
El Salvador	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Ethiopia	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Fiji	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Gabon	No	No	No	No	No	-
Gambia	No	No	No	Yes	No	-
Guatemala	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Guinea	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Honduras	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
Kenya	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Kiribati	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
Kosovo	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Kyrgyzstan	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Lao People's Democratic Republic	Yes	No	No	No	No	-
Liberia	Yes	No	No	No	No	-
Madagascar	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No
Malawi	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
Mali	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-

"-" Data are not available.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933424067>

Table A.8. [2/2] **Governments track public allocations for gender equality and women's empowerment**

	Government statement defining the tracking system	Gender allocations systematically tracked	System oversight by central government unit	Gender-related budget information publicly available	Indicator 8. 2015	Indicator 8. 2013 (for reference)
Marshall Islands	No	No	No	No	No	No
Mauritania	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Micronesia	-	No	No	No	No	No
Moldova	No	No	No	No	No	No
Mongolia	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Mozambique	Yes	No	No	No	No	-
Myanmar	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	-
Nauru	No	No	No	No	No	No
Nepal	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Niger	No	No	Yes	No	No	No
Nigeria	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Niue	-	-	-	-	No	No
Pakistan	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Palau	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Papua New Guinea	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	-
Paraguay	No	No	No	No	No	-
Peru	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Philippines	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Rwanda	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Samoa	No	No	No	No	No	-
Sao Tome and Principe	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	-
Senegal	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Sierra Leone	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	-
Solomon Islands	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Somalia	No	No	No	No	No	-
South Sudan	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Sudan	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Tajikistan	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Tanzania	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Timor-Leste	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Togo	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Tonga	No	No	No	No	No	-
Tuvalu	Yes	No	No	No	No	-
Uganda	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Uruguay	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Vanuatu	No	No	Yes	No	No	-
Viet Nam	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	-
Yemen	No	No	No	No	No	-
Zimbabwe	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Percentage that answered "Yes"	63	41	52	51	47	29

"-" Data are not available.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933424067>

Table A.9a. [1/2] **Governments strengthen budgetary and public financial management systems**

	CPIA score (1.0 to 6.0)		
	2015	2013 (for reference)	2010 (for reference)
Afghanistan	3.5	-	3.5
Albania	-	-	-
Angola	-	-	-
Armenia	-	4.5	4.5
Bangladesh	3	3	3
Belarus	-	-	-
Benin	3.5	3.5	3.5
Bhutan	3.5	-	-
Bolivia	3	-	3.5
Burkina Faso	4	4.5	4.5
Burundi	3	3.5	3
Cambodia	3	3.5	3.5
Cameroon	3	3	3
Central African Republic	2.5	-	3
Chad	3	-	2
Colombia	-	-	-
Comoros	2.5	-	2
Congo	2.5	2.5	-
Cook Islands	-	-	-
Costa Rica	-	-	-
Côte d'Ivoire	3	3	-
Democratic Republic of the Congo	3	3	2.5
Dominican Republic	-	-	-
Egypt	-	-	-
El Salvador	-	-	-
Ethiopia	4	3.5	3.5
Fiji	-	-	-
Gabon	-	-	-
Gambia	3	-	3.5
Ghana	-	-	3.5
Guatemala	-	-	-
Guinea	3	-	-
Honduras	3.5	3.5	3.5
Kenya	3.5	3.5	3.5
Kiribati	2.5	3	-
Kosovo	4	4	4
Kyrgyzstan	3.5	-	3.5
Lao People's Democratic Republic	3.5	-	3.5
Liberia	3	-	2.5
Madagascar	2.5	2	2.5
Malawi	3	2.5	3

"-" Data are not available.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933424072>

Table A.9a. [2/2] **Governments strengthen budgetary and public financial management systems**

	CPIA score (1.0 to 6.0)		
	2015	2013 (for reference)	2010 (for reference)
Mali	3.5	3.5	3.5
Marshall Islands	2.5	2.5	-
Mauritania	3	-	3
Micronesia	2.5	2.5	-
Moldova	4	4	4
Mongolia	3.5	-	4
Mozambique	4	4	4
Myanmar	3.5	-	-
Nauru	-	-	-
Nepal	3	3	2.5
Niger	3.5	3.5	3.5
Nigeria	3	-	3
Niue	-	-	-
Pakistan	3.5	-	3.5
Palau	-	-	-
Papua New Guinea	3	-	3
Paraguay	-	-	-
Peru	-	-	-
Philippines	-	-	-
Rwanda	4	4	4
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	3	-	3.5
Samoa	4	4	3.5
Sao Tome and Principe	3	-	3
Senegal	3.5	3.5	3.5
Sierra Leone	3.5	-	3.5
Solomon Islands	2.5	-	2.5
Somalia	-	-	-
South Sudan	1.5	-	-
Sudan	2.5	2.5	2
Tajikistan	3.5	3.5	3.5
Tanzania	3	3.5	3.5
Timor-Leste	3	3	3
Togo	2.5	2.5	3
Tonga	3.5	-	3.5
Tuvalu	3.5	-	-
Uganda	3.5	-	3.5
Uruguay	-	-	-
Vanuatu	3.5	-	4
Viet Nam	3.5	3.5	4
Yemen	3	-	-
Zimbabwe	3.5	-	-

"-" Data are not available.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933424072>

Table A.9b. [1/2] **Development partners use government budgetary and public financial management systems**

	Direct disbursements for the public sector	Budget execution	Financial reporting	Auditing	Procurement	2015	2010 (for reference)
	(USD m)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
Afghanistan	2 474.84	50.1	44.4	50.1	6.2	37.7	21.9
Albania	455.07	30.9	25.3	28.5	18.9	25.9	11.1
Angola	493.51	100.0	6.1	6.1	97.2	52.3	-
Armenia	280.61	78.8	53.5	50.2	40.4	55.7	38.4
Bangladesh	2 834.42	23.3	89.3	87.5	21.1	55.3	56.0
Belarus	79.19	1.2	10.6	1.1	0.1	3.3	-
Benin	257.07	14.6	9.8	9.8	22.1	14.1	31.8
Bhutan	93.19	29.4	31.9	31.9	29.2	30.6	-
Bolivia	1 194.87	96.5	76.0	74.7	74.8	80.5	34.8
Burkina Faso	915.02	51.2	51.1	51.0	51.1	51.1	54.8
Burundi	306.50	9.4	9.4	9.4	9.4	9.4	25.1
Cambodia	959.02	59.2	54.6	54.5	23.1	47.8	21.6
Cameroon	244.71	62.4	25.0	24.4	48.7	40.1	14.0
Central African Republic	84.32	15.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.8	28.8
Chad	115.97	72.0	72.0	40.1	19.6	50.9	6.3
Colombia	2 100.63	50.7	42.9	42.9	0.7	34.3	6.6
Comoros	33.32	6.4	6.4	6.4	0.4	4.9	19.1
Congo	21.22	21.7	21.7	21.7	21.7	21.7	-
Cook Islands	13.58	100.0	100.0	1.4	98.6	75.0	-
Costa Rica	253.66	68.9	0.0	3.2	0.0	18.0	-
Côte d'Ivoire	939.62	62.3	62.3	62.3	62.3	62.3	-
Democratic Republic of the Congo	763.63	4.6	55.8	55.8	52.4	42.2	11.7
Dominican Republic	409.91	87.5	45.5	0.4	48.5	45.4	71.9
Egypt	1 309.74	38.6	34.7	17.4	20.6	27.8	50.8
El Salvador	228.71	74.1	22.6	22.6	24.2	35.9	27.9
Ethiopia	2 283.77	25.6	42.6	76.1	33.7	44.5	65.8
Fiji	10.19	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	35.5
Gabon	84.26	80.8	80.8	80.8	0.2	60.7	31.2
Gambia	33.50	21.6	23.4	21.6	20.3	21.7	17.1
Guatemala	119.23	27.3	23.7	22.2	0.0	18.3	27.1
Guinea	234.57	23.6	6.0	11.2	10.5	12.8	-
Honduras	310.11	89.1	88.9	12.4	14.7	51.3	27.9
Kenya	1 337.58	44.7	84.7	77.8	50.2	64.3	53.1
Kiribati	64.36	16.2	16.2	16.2	0.0	12.1	-
Kosovo	94.85	12.1	12.1	3.9	3.5	7.9	20.1
Kyrgyzstan	67.47	41.0	41.0	41.1	41.0	41.0	30.8
Lao People's Democratic Republic	477.74	27.2	21.7	19.0	20.7	22.1	40.0
Liberia	151.93	81.1	81.1	81.1	81.1	81.1	39.6
Madagascar	508.47	42.6	25.0	16.3	30.5	28.6	12.7
Malawi	680.44	38.8	34.6	34.1	23.5	32.7	65.2
Mali	589.38	93.7	93.7	93.7	93.7	93.7	33.3

"-" Data are not available.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933424087>

Table A.9b. [2/2] **Development partners use government budgetary and public financial management systems**

	Direct disbursements for the public sector	Budget execution	Financial reporting	Auditing	Procurement	2015	2010 (for reference)
	(USD m)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
Marshall Islands	66.08	92.9	92.9	92.9	87.4	91.5	-
Mauritania	131.28	78.6	73.1	73.1	1.8	56.6	31.5
Micronesia	33.53	2.3	2.3	3.7	2.3	2.6	-
Moldova	273.40	21.8	7.0	5.9	5.9	10.2	70.3
Mongolia	204.97	10.5	38.5	37.0	12.1	24.5	25.1
Mozambique	1 696.02	40.5	27.5	33.3	40.6	35.5	49.1
Myanmar	254.87	23.0	23.0	23.0	19.2	22.1	-
Nauru	26.56	53.1	53.1	7.6	33.7	36.9	-
Nepal	905.99	68.8	69.7	69.8	42.6	62.7	55.4
Niger	103.09	71.9	71.8	5.1	16.6	41.3	27.7
Nigeria	170.66	55.7	17.0	15.0	17.0	26.2	33.6
Niue	8.50	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.4	99.8	-
Pakistan	2 285.76	82.8	94.1	94.1	25.6	74.2	62.8
Palau	20.87	0.1	0.1	3.0	0.0	0.8	-
Papua New Guinea	305.38	43.4	43.4	43.4	11.5	35.4	24.9
Paraguay	36.22	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-
Peru	348.70	51.3	60.6	60.6	24.0	49.1	71.8
Philippines	2 888.13	80.1	72.1	83.4	78.4	78.5	70.2
Rwanda	589.20	68.0	84.0	78.2	87.8	79.5	53.4
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	15.10	99.1	99.1	99.1	99.1	99.1	2.3
Samoa	70.24	81.2	81.2	81.2	81.2	81.2	49.4
Sao Tome and Principe	8.51	19.2	19.2	19.2	20.3	19.5	16.0
Senegal	580.75	41.8	34.9	26.8	23.6	31.8	31.2
Sierra Leone	333.63	64.9	64.9	23.0	34.8	46.9	32.9
Solomon Islands	55.99	64.7	66.7	66.6	66.5	66.1	35.1
Somalia	156.94	29.4	29.5	28.2	28.2	28.8	-
South Sudan	2.64	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.6
Sudan	444.35	4.2	4.2	2.8	2.9	3.5	12.5
Tajikistan	420.29	28.9	22.9	3.5	0.6	14.0	30.7
Tanzania	1 810.03	67.7	40.6	85.4	36.4	57.5	77.3
Timor-Leste	161.24	24.4	23.1	22.7	36.7	26.7	16.8
Togo	236.23	13.3	6.5	6.5	11.5	9.5	52.4
Tonga	50.61	39.1	39.1	25.1	39.0	35.6	36.9
Tuvalu	6.97	57.3	57.3	57.3	57.3	57.3	-
Uganda	519.27	64.3	68.4	71.4	69.9	68.5	60.3
Uruguay	371.20	99.4	75.6	71.7	7.0	63.5	-
Vanuatu	36.93	74.3	74.3	5.7	36.9	47.8	30.7
Viet Nam	4 094.39	58.1	73.5	57.1	59.1	62.0	62.8
Yemen	309.12	30.7	30.7	30.7	0.0	23.0	-
Zimbabwe	-	-	-	-	-	0.0	-
Total	43 943.77	52.7	55.2	55.5	37.0	50.1	-
For reference 2010 and 2015 (60 countries and territories)	40 460.00	52.3	56.8	57.2	36.8	50.8	44.7

"-" Data are not available.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933424087>

Table A.10. [1/2] **Aid is untied**

	Total bilateral aid as reported to the DAC		Indicator 10. Aid is untied	
	in 2014*	Untied aid	Share of untied aid	2010
			b/a	(for reference)
	a	b	(%)	(%)
Afghanistan	4 750.21	3 316.51	69.8	62.9
Albania	302.14	217.18	71.9	61.7
Angola	103.61	87.21	84.2	56.8
Armenia	326.25	280.56	86.0	80.2
Bangladesh	2 247.43	1 901.44	84.6	75.4
Belarus	91.82	56.05	61.0	43.9
Benin	315.95	283.49	89.7	80.5
Bhutan	39.58	21.68	54.8	78.5
Bolivia	482.46	449.23	93.1	63.7
Burkina Faso	362.76	303.03	83.5	89.9
Burundi	350.75	313.19	89.3	89.3
Cambodia	895.68	703.41	78.5	79.9
Cameroon	709.37	613.66	86.5	67.2
Central African Republic	580.84	376.08	64.7	92.8
Chad	296.98	206.90	69.7	71.0
Colombia	1 144.71	711.64	62.2	47.9
Comoros	24.62	22.88	92.9	96.5
Congo	60.84	53.18	87.4	97.5
Cook Islands	30.80	29.96	97.3	94.7
Costa Rica	205.94	187.65	91.1	54.1
Côte d'Ivoire	505.88	426.29	84.3	89.3
Democratic Republic of the Congo	1 229.16	964.73	78.5	79.6
Dominican Republic	344.14	314.41	91.4	54.2
Egypt	1 458.69	977.67	67.0	80.3
El Salvador	318.46	270.50	84.9	68.4
Ethiopia	1 537.86	1 116.86	72.6	68.7
Fiji	77.12	58.89	76.4	64.0
Gabon	260.99	251.06	96.2	82.2
Gambia	23.35	20.60	88.2	79.3
Guatemala	279.09	163.75	58.7	46.5
Guinea	237.29	217.97	91.9	87.6
Honduras	260.40	197.52	75.9	71.1
Kenya	3 672.19	3 257.76	88.7	86.1
Kiribati	45.03	39.41	87.5	91.2
Kosovo	482.60	146.24	30.3	29.1
Kyrgyzstan	289.23	170.52	59.0	53.7
Lao People's Democratic Republic	504.25	394.75	78.3	80.4
Liberia	658.32	555.89	84.4	88.4
Madagascar	372.68	323.00	86.7	68.7
Malawi	583.57	498.96	85.5	87.3
Mali	1 013.07	843.73	83.3	76.5

* Excludes donor administrative costs and in-donor refugee costs.

"-" Data are not available.

Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933424090>


Table A.10. [2/2] **Aid is untied**

	Total bilateral aid as reported to the DAC in 2014*		Indicator 10. Aid is untied	
	a	Untied aid b	Share of untied aid b/a	2010 (for reference)
			(%)	(%)
Marshall Islands	82.88	77.40	93.4	92.2
Mauritania	113.14	91.46	80.8	77.3
Micronesia	174.18	169.30	97.2	95.9
Moldova	633.50	458.06	72.3	81.1
Mongolia	222.08	139.16	62.7	31.3
Mozambique	1 356.97	1 202.53	88.6	80.4
Myanmar	2 421.06	2 136.83	88.3	82.6
Nauru	16.36	15.24	93.2	98.5
Nepal	641.93	551.31	85.9	83.8
Niger	511.44	409.88	80.1	66.7
Nigeria	1 438.47	1 230.72	85.6	74.7
Niue	12.93	12.78	98.8	97.2
Pakistan	1 871.52	1 385.89	74.1	68.4
Palau	21.34	18.45	86.5	95.6
Papua New Guinea	505.34	448.02	88.7	89.8
Paraguay	250.62	222.77	88.9	63.7
Peru	637.47	507.95	79.7	62.4
Philippines	1 477.31	1 233.40	83.5	77.5
Rwanda	503.84	423.33	84.0	89.2
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	6.89	5.43	78.7	5.3
Samoa	72.51	57.30	79.0	86.3
Sao Tome and Principe	14.90	10.96	73.6	43.2
Senegal	838.98	768.38	91.6	85.7
Sierra Leone	577.65	553.26	95.8	91.3
Solomon Islands	227.62	201.76	88.6	98.3
Somalia	813.90	595.97	73.2	91.5
South Sudan	1 876.90	1 144.46	61.0	-
Sudan	615.59	343.69	55.8	65.8
Tajikistan	220.65	185.23	84.0	63.9
Tanzania	1 571.95	1 367.87	87.0	84.4
Timor-Leste	207.65	156.30	75.3	86.7
Togo	107.25	90.85	84.7	96.0
Tonga	64.79	40.91	63.1	94.3
Tuvalu	42.56	38.91	91.4	93.2
Uganda	1 151.37	1 057.52	91.8	88.8
Uruguay	89.22	83.76	93.9	45.3
Vanuatu	86.52	76.24	88.1	89.6
Viet Nam	2 615.25	2 073.31	79.3	77.4
Yemen	515.13	361.14	70.1	86.4
Zimbabwe	357.70	274.98	76.9	70.3
All other countries (75)	67 446.27	52 447.92	77.8	73.7
Total	119 889.73	94 016.09	78.4	74.2

* Excludes donor administrative costs and in-donor refugee costs.

"-" Data are not available.

Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933424090>

Annex B

Monitoring data: Development partners

Note: The tables in this Annex are numbered using the Global Partnership Indicator numbers.

Table B.1a. **Development partners use country-led result frameworks: alignment of new interventions to national priorities**

	Number of interventions assessed	Amount (USD m)	The objective of the development intervention is drawn from country-led results framework(s)							No (%)	No response (%)
			Yes (%)	... from the national development plan (%)	... from sector plans and strategies (%)	... from institutional or ministry's plans (%)	... from other government planning tools (%)	... from development partner's strategy agreed with the government (%)			
AfDB	53	2 439.2	84.9	45.3	18.9	1.9	18.9	0.0	0.0	15.1	
Arab Fund	-	0.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
AsDB	93	5 402.1	100.0	40.9	14.0	2.2	39.8	3.2	0.0	0.0	
Australia	44	632.3	84.1	38.6	9.1	6.8	27.3	2.3	6.8	9.1	
Belgium	23	237.1	91.3	21.7	47.8	4.3	17.4	0.0	0.0	8.7	
BOAD	4	65.4	100.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Canada	98	780.1	72.4	26.5	23.5	6.1	9.2	6.1	11.2	16.3	
China	17	898.5	100.0	17.6	11.8	0.0	70.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Denmark	23	192.9	78.3	39.1	13.0	0.0	26.1	0.0	21.7	0.0	
CAF	18	655.9	77.8	44.4	11.1	5.6	16.7	0.0	16.7	5.6	
EU Institutions	223	3 190.5	73.5	26.0	23.3	7.6	13.9	2.7	15.2	11.2	
Finland	9	67.7	88.9	33.3	11.1	11.1	22.2	11.1	11.1	0.0	
FAO	53	83.4	98.1	26.4	28.3	13.2	28.3	1.9	1.9	0.0	
France	62	2 138.3	90.3	33.9	33.9	4.8	17.7	0.0	9.7	0.0	
Germany	173	1 623.9	82.7	33.5	22.5	11.6	11.6	3.5	8.1	9.2	
GAVI	45	283.6	60.0	6.7	44.4	0.0	8.9	0.0	0.0	40.0	
Global Fund	21	1 271.8	100.0	57.1	28.6	0.0	14.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	
IFAD	14	562.0	100.0	28.6	28.6	7.1	28.6	7.1	0.0	0.0	
IDB	51	4 325.1	92.2	33.3	17.6	7.8	31.4	2.0	7.8	0.0	
ILO	16	24.0	87.5	12.5	0.0	6.3	68.8	0.0	6.3	6.3	
IMF	20	85.2	55.0	20.0	0.0	20.0	10.0	5.0	0.0	45.0	
IOM	26	72.1	92.3	11.5	19.2	11.5	3.8	46.2	7.7	0.0	
Ireland	11	41.5	90.9	27.3	54.5	9.1	0.0	0.0	9.1	0.0	
IsDB	31	1 876.2	100.0	6.5	3.2	3.2	83.9	3.2	0.0	0.0	
Italy	36	226.5	83.3	8.3	19.4	2.8	50.0	2.8	5.6	11.1	
Japan	213	9 243.9	93.9	61.0	20.2	2.8	9.4	0.5	1.9	4.2	
Korea	52	758.0	84.6	44.2	17.3	7.7	13.5	1.9	15.4	0.0	
Kuwait	5	148.5	20.0	20.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	20.0	60.0	
Luxembourg	11	51.4	100.0	9.1	81.8	0.0	0.0	9.1	0.0	0.0	
Netherlands	34	223.7	73.5	20.6	44.1	0.0	8.8	0.0	23.5	2.9	
New Zealand	36	154.5	83.3	25.0	11.1	11.1	33.3	2.8	13.9	2.8	
Norway	23	97.7	69.6	8.7	39.1	13.0	8.7	0.0	17.4	13.0	
OFID	13	218.0	69.2	46.2	7.7	0.0	15.4	0.0	0.0	30.8	
Portugal	2	3.2	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Spain	29	52.2	96.6	41.4	17.2	13.8	6.9	17.2	0.0	3.4	
Sweden	77	442.6	81.8	29.9	22.1	16.9	5.2	7.8	13.0	5.2	
Switzerland	94	440.7	72.3	37.2	22.3	5.3	6.4	1.1	26.6	1.1	
Chinese Taipei	4	14.7	100.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
UNDP	177	792.3	96.0	32.2	21.5	6.8	22.6	13.0	1.7	2.3	
UNFPA	62	100.7	96.8	35.5	19.4	14.5	14.5	11.3	3.2	0.0	
UNICEF	112	470.8	99.1	31.3	34.8	12.5	16.1	4.5	0.0	0.9	
United Arab Emirates	-	0.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
United Kingdom	55	2 619.3	45.5	21.8	10.9	3.6	5.5	3.6	50.9	3.6	
United States	194	5 896.3	79.9	24.7	13.4	11.3	21.6	8.8	19.1	1.0	
WFP	18	198.2	94.4	38.9	38.9	0.0	11.1	5.6	5.6	0.0	
World Bank	216	22 491.1	88.0	35.6	18.5	6.5	24.5	2.8	1.9	10.2	
WHO	77	410.9	94.8	5.2	14.3	23.4	50.6	1.3	2.6	2.6	
All others (78)	151	813.8	77.1	30.5	11.6	10.5	11.7	12.8	16.6	6.4	
Total	2 819	72 839.6	84.8	32.1	20.6	7.8	19.5	4.6	9.0	6.1	

"-" Data are not available.


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Table B.1b. **Development partners use country-led result frameworks to design, monitor and evaluate new interventions**

	Number of interventions assessed	Amount (USD m)	Average number of outcome indicators included in the project's results framework	Percentage of results indicators which are drawn from country-led results frameworks (%)	Percentage of results indicators which will be monitored using government sources and monitoring systems (%)	Percentage of new interventions that plan a final evaluation (%)	Percentage of new interventions that plan a final evaluation with government involvement (%)
AfDB	53	2 439.2	5	80.4	84.5	97.4	78.9
Arab Fund	-	0.0	-	-	-	-	-
AsDB	93	5 402.1	5	73.3	70.6	79.3	47.8
Australia	44	632.3	6	64.2	67.3	67.5	55.0
Belgium	23	237.1	7	73.7	68.1	100.0	71.4
BOAD	4	65.4	10	40.0	40.0	100.0	50.0
Canada	98	780.1	6	46.8	44.1	77.6	50.0
China	17	898.5	3	100.0	66.7	86.7	86.7
Denmark	23	192.9	3	58.1	32.7	63.6	25.0
CAF	18	655.9	4	76.5	5.5	94.1	13.6
EU Institutions	223	3 190.5	5	74.1	63.2	87.8	94.1
Finland	9	67.7	30	74.6	37.5	57.1	56.9
FAO	53	83.4	6	66.5	52.0	28.3	42.9
France	62	2 138.3	7	53.8	35.7	81.0	20.8
Germany	173	1 623.9	6	54.7	50.9	94.2	46.6
GAVI	45	283.6	5	90.2	66.7	32.1	43.6
Global Fund	21	1 271.8	7	97.9	94.3	73.7	32.1
IFAD	14	562.0	7	74.8	48.3	100.0	73.7
IDB	51	4 325.1	7	28.1	45.1	92.2	92.9
ILO	16	24.0	7	79.0	40.0	77.8	54.9
IMF	20	85.2	3	100.0	100.0	9.1	33.3
IOM	26	72.1	4	51.9	40.7	50.0	0.0
Ireland	11	41.5	8	65.2	50.2	81.8	34.6
IsDB	31	1 876.2	2	100.0	100.0	100.0	45.5
Italy	36	226.5	8	54.8	43.0	84.4	10.0
Japan	213	9 243.9	5	70.4	63.2	85.8	78.1
Korea	52	758.0	4	61.1	58.1	73.9	71.6
Kuwait	5	148.5	1	50.0	50.0	66.7	52.2
Luxembourg	11	51.4	7	95.8	92.0	81.8	33.3
Netherlands	34	223.7	7	57.6	60.1	75.0	63.6
New Zealand	36	154.5	8	44.8	46.7	78.8	28.6
Norway	23	97.7	13	59.7	55.6	89.5	42.4
OFID	13	218.0	3	100.0	91.7	100.0	36.8
Portugal	2	3.2	9	27.9	92.3	100.0	100.0
Spain	29	52.2	11	92.5	79.7	57.7	50.0
Sweden	77	442.6	11	46.9	34.3	75.4	26.9
Switzerland	94	440.7	7	47.3	34.3	87.8	23.0
Chinese Taipei	4	14.7	2	100.0	100.0	25.0	45.1
UNDP	177	792.3	5	69.7	50.3	77.4	58.2
UNFPA	62	100.7	5	59.7	56.6	67.8	49.2
UNICEF	112	470.8	5	73.6	66.9	45.1	40.2
United Arab Emirates	-	0.0	-	-	-	-	-
United Kingdom	55	2 619.3	3	41.4	43.0	55.6	28.9
United States	194	5 896.3	6	39.7	27.9	73.4	11.3
WFP	18	198.2	14	45.8	50.4	61.1	38.9
World Bank	216	22 491.1	7	46.2	40.8	79.4	61.7
WHO	77	410.9	19	83.5	65.3	96.1	77.9
All others (78)	151	814	4	50.7	43.3	61.9	41.5
Total	2 819	72 839.6	6	61.5	52.4	76.6	47.8

"-" Data are not available.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933424118>

Table B.4. **Transparent information on development co-operation is publicly available**

	OECD Creditor Reporting System	Trend	OECD Survey on Forward Spending Plans	Trend	International Aid Transparency Initiative
AfDB	Good	○	Good	▲	Fair
Arab Fund	Good	○	-	-	-
AsDB	Excellent	○	Excellent	▶	Fair
Australia	Needs Improvement	▶	Needs Improvement	▼	Fair
Austria	Excellent	▶	Good	▼	-
Belgium	Good	▶	Excellent	▲	Good
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation	Good	○	-	-	Fair
Canada *	Excellent	▶	Excellent	▶	Good
CarDB	-	-	Fair	▼	-
Czech Republic	Excellent	▲	Excellent	▲	-
Denmark	Needs Improvement	▶	Good	▼	Good
Estonia	Good	○	Good	○	-
EU Institutions *	Good	▶	Excellent	▲	Good
EBRD	-	-	-	-	Fair
EIB	-	-	-	-	Good
Finland	Fair	▶	Good	▼	Needs Improvement
France *	Good	▶	Good	▲	Needs Improvement
Germany	Excellent	▶	Good	▼	Needs Improvement
GAVI	Good	○	Fair	▼	Excellent
Global Fund	-	-	-	-	Needs Improvement
Global Partnership for Education	-	-	-	-	Needs Improvement
Greece	Needs Improvement	▶	Not participating	▶	-
Iceland	Good	▶	Fair	○	-
IFAD	Good	○	Needs Improvement	▼	Needs Improvement
IDB	Excellent	○	Fair	▼	Good
ILO	-	-	-	-	Needs Improvement
Ireland	Needs Improvement	▶	Excellent	▶	Needs Improvement
IsDB	Good	○	Fair	▶	-
Italy	Fair	▶	Good	▶	-
Japan	Excellent	▶	Needs Improvement	▼	Needs Improvement
Korea	Excellent	▶	Good	▲	-
Kuwait	Good	○	-	▶	-
Lithuania	Good	○	-	▶	Needs Improvement
Luxembourg	Good	▶	Excellent	▲	-
Netherlands	Needs Improvement	▶	Fair	▶	Excellent
New Zealand	Fair	▶	Excellent	▶	Needs Improvement
NDF	Excellent	○	Excellent	○	-
Norway	Good	▶	Fair	▶	Needs Improvement
OFID	-	-	-	-	Needs Improvement
Poland	Good	○	Good	▲	-
Portugal	Excellent	▶	Fair	▼	-
Romania	-	-	-	-	Needs Improvement
Slovak Republic	Fair	○	Excellent	○	-
Slovenia	Good	○	Good	○	-
Spain	Good	▶	Needs Improvement	▶	Needs Improvement
Sweden	Good	▶	Excellent	▶	Excellent
Switzerland	Fair	▶	Excellent	▶	Fair
UN Habitat	-	-	-	-	Needs Improvement
UN Women	-	-	-	-	Needs Improvement
UNDCF	-	-	-	-	Needs Improvement
UNDP	Good	○	Good	▲	Excellent
UNESCO	-	-	-	-	Needs Improvement
UNFPA	Fair	○	Good	▲	Good
UNICEF	Good	○	Excellent	▲	Good
United Kingdom *	Needs Improvement	▶	Good	▲	Good
UNOPS	-	-	-	-	Needs Improvement
UN OCHA	-	-	-	-	Needs Improvement
United States	Fair	▶	Needs Improvement	▶	Fair
WFP	Good	○	Needs Improvement	○	Excellent
World Bank	Good	○	Excellent	▲	Good
WHO	Good	○	Fair	○	-

Legend: ▲ positive trend; ▶ no change; ▼ negative trend; ○ first time reporting; - not assessed

Note: Transparency assessments provided by the OECD DAC and IATI Secretariats, using a four-category scale. The underlying methodologies to assess transparency differ, in line with the specific purpose of disclosure in each of these global repositories of information on development co-operation.

For details on the methodology to report on transparency of development partners, please consult OECD/UNDP (2016). "Indicator 4: Revised Methodology". Accessed on 8 August 2016: <https://www.unteamworks.org/node/521314>

* The IATI assessment for Canada, EU Institutions, France, and the United Kingdom is a weighted average of their relevant publishers. For Canada: Department of Finance ("Fair"); Global Affairs Canada ("Excellent"); International Development Research Centre ("Fair"). For EU Institutions: European Commission (EC) - Development and Cooperation-EuropeAid ("Good"); European Commission (EC) - DG Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO) ("Good"); European Commission (EC) - DG Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations ("Good"); European Commission (EC) - Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) ("Fair"). For Canada: Department of Finance (Fair); Global Affairs Canada | Affaires mondiales Canada ("Excellent"); Canada - International Development Research Centre/Centre de recherches pour le développement international (IDRC) ("Fair"). For France: Agence Française de Développement (AFD) ("Needs Improvement"); Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development ("Needs Improvement"). For the United Kingdom: UK - Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC) ("Needs Improvement"); UK - Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) ("Needs Improvement"); UK - Department for International Development (DFID) ("Excellent"); UK - Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) ("Needs Improvement"); UK - Department of Health ("Needs Improvement"); UK - Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) ("Needs Improvement"); UK - Home Office ("Needs Improvement"); UK - Medical Research Council (MRC) ("Needs Improvement"); UK - Ministry of Defence (MoD) ("Needs Improvement"); UK - Scottish Government ("Needs Improvement"); UK - Welsh Government's Wales for Africa Programme ("Needs Improvement").

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Table B.5a. **Development co-operation is predictable (annual)**

	No. of countries reporting on the development partner	Total direct disbursements in the country/territory (USD m)	Disbursement for the public sector (USD m)	Scheduled disbursements for the public sector (USD m)	Indicator 5a			
					2015 *		2010 **	
					a = "as scheduled" (%)	b = "beyond scheduled" (%)	"as scheduled" (%)	"beyond scheduled" (%)
AfDB	23	1 271.93	1 252.57	1 993.10	54.0	14.1	69.0	19.7
Arab Fund	2	116.22	116.22	4.66	85.6	96.6	-	-
AsDB	22	3 564.83	3 445.68	3 434.37	91.9	8.4	87.0	26.4
Australia	28	1 201.51	476.36	465.60	95.9	6.2	68.9	9.7
Belgium	13	277.30	157.95	213.78	63.4	14.0	79.6	4.8
BOAD	4	188.64	172.18	153.75	61.4	45.2	-	-
Canada	39	887.77	352.12	341.51	82.9	19.0	81.6	14.0
China	12	813.80	803.37	871.06	78.3	15.1	100.0	27.9
Denmark	16	334.01	204.75	206.88	77.1	14.1	92.1	10.6
CAF	4	716.18	634.98	541.24	99.9	14.8	-	-
EU Institutions	64	3 047.93	2 017.65	2 531.77	72.6	7.6	87.3	21.7
Finland	10	152.97	134.86	110.85	92.7	23.8	82.8	2.4
FAO	26	84.44	75.50	68.80	77.7	29.2	-	-
France	29	1 005.27	863.93	814.17	80.3	24.3	86.1	14.4
Germany	43	1 371.14	1 265.75	1 299.88	79.8	17.6	92.8	12.3
GAVI	14	282.61	223.98	286.23	63.5	18.8	78.0	5.2
Global Fund	15	717.61	687.41	771.32	79.2	11.1	90.1	26.9
IFAD	25	182.17	177.59	219.07	70.4	17.9	69.5	7.6
IDB	9	2 615.61	2 323.17	2 075.47	98.3	12.2	90.7	1.0
ILO	13	45.57	27.39	24.29	97.7	13.4	-	-
IMF	15	569.07	469.75	509.43	84.7	8.2	89.5	31.6
IOM	19	59.55	20.94	11.75	74.7	58.1	98.2	44.0
Ireland	8	179.34	105.78	85.40	88.7	28.4	91.7	15.2
IsDB	12	849.78	591.95	667.86	73.8	16.7	56.7	23.4
Italy	13	157.32	90.53	134.64	57.8	14.0	56.6	7.9
Japan	61	4 264.16	4 105.83	3 972.61	98.4	4.0	99.8	2.2
Korea	19	556.51	490.62	470.80	92.8	10.2	73.6	30.6
Kuwait	15	116.57	45.66	29.64	94.2	38.8	1.6	0.0
Luxembourg	8	74.01	68.28	72.15	88.1	6.9	74.0	8.0
Netherlands	14	241.98	121.28	205.21	58.9	0.0	68.5	7.5
New Zealand	16	124.27	73.07	77.77	83.7	10.9	78.6	9.8
Norway	16	355.86	137.41	78.96	85.4	50.7	85.5	3.6
OFID	25	182.72	147.52	88.81	65.5	26.3	35.1	64.0
Portugal	2	73.39	71.47	68.52	100.0	4.1	100.0	37.9
Spain	14	86.91	44.29	30.73	87.0	39.7	87.5	16.1
Sweden	22	566.49	268.65	334.25	75.7	2.8	78.7	3.2
Switzerland	31	477.26	235.16	285.28	77.3	6.2	75.7	12.4
Chinese Taipei	6	65.61	58.69	53.87	90.3	15.8	89.4	18.9
UNDP	52	822.09	726.79	921.61	56.0	13.6	-	-
UNFPA	41	187.18	127.63	158.73	71.4	9.0	-	-
UNICEF	41	819.86	583.44	848.73	58.1	14.8	-	-
United Arab Emirates	6	73.74	73.74	14.54	97.6	80.8	-	-
United Kingdom	20	2 809.35	897.52	645.61	65.3	53.1	79.2	13.5
United States	45	6 526.58	3 600.67	2 618.49	91.7	33.2	81.7	5.9
WFP	21	242.26	180.30	244.50	69.6	5.6	-	-
World Bank	69	14 788.52	14 342.78	12 589.25	86.1	18.1	86.9	16.7
WHO	59	489.43	466.80	432.01	92.0	14.9	-	-
All others (78)	16	515.52	383.81	414.73	78.4	21.8	34.1	7.4
Total	81	55 152.81	43 943.77	42 493.65	83.2	16.8	85.2	13.4

* Ratio a shows the proportion of total scheduled disbursements across all countries, that was actually disbursed as scheduled. In cases where providers' disbursements for the government sector were greater than their scheduled disbursements, ratio b shows the sum of those disbursements beyond the schedule as a proportion of scheduled disbursements.

** In 2010 the numerator was the disbursements recorded by the government, whereas now it is the disbursements as reported by the development partners to the government. Reference figures for 2010 have been revised to correspond to the 2013 methodology.

"-" Data are not available.

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Table B.5b. **Development co-operation is predictable (medium-term)**

	No. of countries reporting on the development partner	One year ahead (2016)	Two years ahead (2017)	Three years ahead (2018)	Indicator 5b 2015
		a	b	c	d = (a+b+c)/3
		(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
AfDB	23	96.7	56.1	41.2	64.7
Arab Fund	2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
AsDB	22	96.5	92.1	92.1	93.5
Australia	28	87.3	85.1	67.3	79.9
Belgium	13	95.9	42.0	41.7	59.8
BOAD	4	33.8	33.8	33.8	33.8
Canada	39	67.3	55.1	55.1	59.2
China	12	95.3	69.2	50.3	71.6
Denmark	16	86.6	62.8	50.8	66.7
CAF	4	99.4	80.3	80.3	86.7
EU Institutions	64	91.4	85.2	77.3	84.6
Finland	10	62.1	57.1	12.0	43.7
FAO	26	51.1	50.6	49.8	50.5
France	29	79.2	61.5	35.3	58.7
Germany	43	65.8	61.2	59.2	62.1
GAVI	14	40.6	40.6	39.4	40.2
Global Fund	15	87.4	60.3	52.6	66.8
IFAD	25	76.7	38.6	34.1	49.8
IDB	9	83.4	82.4	76.8	80.9
ILO	13	9.4	3.9	3.9	5.7
IMF	15	49.9	43.5	27.3	40.2
IOM	19	36.0	15.8	8.3	20.1
Ireland	8	64.1	45.5	45.5	51.7
IsDB	12	87.8	66.8	66.8	73.8
Italy	13	66.3	59.4	56.2	60.6
Japan	61	64.5	63.4	61.1	63.0
Korea	19	82.0	81.0	72.5	78.5
Kuwait	15	66.9	62.7	62.7	64.1
Luxembourg	8	88.6	82.4	82.4	84.5
Netherlands	14	76.2	75.1	67.6	73.0
New Zealand	16	87.2	75.8	75.8	79.6
Norway	16	68.7	56.1	38.7	54.5
OFID	25	77.8	69.8	46.6	64.8
Portugal	2	27.5	27.5	0.0	18.3
Spain	14	55.7	36.6	25.8	39.4
Sweden	22	69.6	69.1	69.1	69.2
Switzerland	31	75.1	70.5	50.6	65.4
Chinese Taipei	6	100.0	83.6	42.8	75.5
UNDP	52	57.2	49.6	43.0	49.9
UNFPA	41	59.1	50.0	33.2	47.4
UNICEF	41	65.5	56.6	34.1	52.1
United Arab Emirates	6	14.4	0.0	0.0	4.8
United Kingdom	20	78.3	60.1	35.2	57.9
United States	45	83.9	71.2	66.0	73.7
WFP	21	34.1	29.2	27.4	30.3
World Bank	69	92.5	72.2	69.9	78.2
WHO	59	26.7	25.0	18.3	23.3
All others (78)	16	57.1	34.3	27.6	39.7
Total *	81	82.3	69.2	62.5	71.3

* Estimated proportion of total funding covered by forward spending plans.

"-" Data are not available.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933424144>

Table B.6. **Development co-operation is on budget**

	No. of countries reporting on the development partner	Funds recorded in government annual budget (USD m)	Scheduled disbursement for the public sector (USD m)	Indicator 6. Development co-operation on budget			
				2015 (for reference)		2010 (for reference)	
				a = "of scheduled" (%)	b = "beyond scheduled" (%)	a = "of scheduled" (%)	b = "beyond scheduled" (%)
AfDB	23	1 446.58	1 993.10	69.6	30.9	66.4	21.8
Arab Fund	2	112.23	4.66	0.0	100.0	-	-
AsDB	22	3 396.96	3 434.37	83.2	16.1	78.0	12.7
Australia	28	650.27	465.60	50.2	65.7	34.8	2.5
Belgium	13	66.12	213.78	35.3	17.1	30.3	14.7
BOAD	4	217.89	153.75	100.0	29.4	-	-
Canada	39	325.60	341.51	68.3	16.1	73.4	27.8
China	12	743.47	871.06	72.6	15.0	57.3	36.7
Denmark	16	296.66	206.88	86.3	39.8	55.8	0.4
CAF	4	1 187.30	541.24	100.0	54.4	-	-
EU Institutions	64	1 503.56	2 531.77	60.2	13.3	67.8	14.5
Finland	10	89.51	110.85	60.7	24.9	63.3	10.1
FAO	26	35.52	68.80	37.0	32.8	-	-
France	29	520.50	814.17	63.9	12.5	57.1	22.8
Germany	43	712.09	1 299.88	47.7	11.9	44.8	9.5
GAVI	14	186.87	286.23	58.1	12.6	7.8	44.0
Global Fund	15	445.80	771.32	49.5	9.1	59.2	26.9
IFAD	25	101.62	219.07	45.7	14.7	38.8	13.6
IDB	9	1 825.42	2 075.47	86.3	18.4	71.4	55.8
ILO	13	0.50	24.29	2.1	0.0	-	-
IMF	15	274.38	509.43	63.2	0.0	83.6	17.2
IOM	19	6.00	11.75	39.2	24.8	2.6	0.0
Ireland	8	108.95	85.40	90.7	30.3	75.5	20.0
IsDB	12	465.04	667.86	60.8	18.6	56.5	33.3
Italy	13	76.26	134.64	52.9	20.4	32.9	0.8
Japan	61	3 548.12	3 972.61	83.0	15.3	64.9	7.1
Korea	19	396.42	470.80	60.0	30.2	52.5	38.3
Kuwait	15	66.63	29.64	87.7	61.6	1.6	0.0
Luxembourg	8	71.16	72.15	79.0	19.9	33.1	3.1
Netherlands	14	97.57	205.21	71.7	8.5	48.9	10.8
New Zealand	16	109.91	77.77	91.7	42.2	39.0	12.0
Norway	16	222.17	78.96	85.7	68.1	68.0	17.2
OFID	25	97.05	88.81	80.6	18.2	12.7	62.0
Portugal	2	96.75	68.52	82.6	41.5	75.9	52.6
Spain	14	71.02	30.73	88.7	65.8	76.8	24.0
Sweden	22	283.85	334.25	59.6	13.5	73.8	23.2
Switzerland	31	129.07	285.28	44.6	5.3	35.6	28.7
Chinese Taipei	6	49.62	53.87	90.4	0.0	100.0	28.6
UNDP	52	197.05	921.61	21.8	15.4	-	-
UNFPA	41	35.36	158.73	21.4	3.1	-	-
UNICEF	41	412.68	848.73	46.0	5.2	-	-
United Arab Emirates	6	75.78	14.54	93.1	82.1	-	-
United Kingdom	20	902.70	645.61	77.6	43.7	70.5	14.1
United States	45	1 510.98	2 618.49	36.6	41.2	32.5	35.8
WFP	21	87.78	244.50	8.6	66.6	-	-
World Bank	69	11 683.39	12 589.25	69.5	27.5	80.1	13.0
WHO	59	62.91	432.01	12.6	20.3	-	-
All others (78)	16	353.69	414.73	53.7	12.8	8.8	4.4
Total	81	35 356.80	42 493.65	66.1	25.8	58.4	17.5

"-" Data are not available.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933424151>

Table B.9b. **Development partners use country systems**

	No. of countries reporting on the development partner	Disbursements for government sector					Indicator 9b	
		Disbursements for government sector	Budget execution	Financial reporting	Auditing	Procurement systems	2015 avg (b,c,d,e)/a	2010 (for reference)
		a	b	c	d	e	(%)	(%)
		(USD m)	(USD m)	(USD m)	(USD m)	(USD m)		
AfDB	23	1 252.57	768.27	892.16	875.66	673.37	64.1	43.1
Arab Fund	2	116.22	3.87	3.87	3.87	3.87	3.3	-
AsDB	22	3 445.68	1 896.41	3 153.64	2 471.15	1 840.34	67.9	74.5
Australia	28	476.36	184.32	192.06	167.36	81.62	32.8	23.5
Belgium	13	157.95	36.77	91.24	89.23	118.85	53.2	23.2
BOAD	4	172.18	94.40	94.40	94.40	94.40	54.8	-
Canada	39	352.12	190.87	188.09	149.09	200.41	51.7	64.5
China	12	803.37	426.15	426.15	426.15	103.10	43.0	0.0
Denmark	16	204.75	190.56	188.77	186.67	164.01	89.1	65.7
CAF	4	634.98	633.06	633.06	633.06	505.00	94.7	-
EU Institutions	64	2 017.65	1 011.03	977.12	868.61	774.70	45.0	47.9
Finland	10	134.86	57.57	49.98	49.98	43.60	37.3	56.7
FAO	26	75.50	2.52	2.52	1.17	0.94	2.4	-
France	29	863.93	664.48	496.65	497.56	666.17	67.3	70.3
Germany	43	1 265.75	285.02	498.50	359.47	426.59	31.0	47.9
GAVI	14	223.98	42.07	30.78	28.39	16.84	13.2	0.1
Global Fund	15	687.41	290.19	287.75	470.77	293.44	48.8	51.7
IFAD	25	177.59	125.85	122.64	107.98	125.17	67.8	78.6
IDB	9	2 323.17	2 310.87	1 613.32	1 231.23	156.64	57.2	10.0
ILO	13	27.39	8.05	8.05	6.68	6.60	26.8	-
IMF	15	469.75	443.47	430.57	356.47	282.37	80.5	75.0
IOM	19	20.94	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.01	0.7	0.5
Ireland	8	105.78	76.94	54.10	73.14	58.34	62.0	82.2
IsDB	12	591.95	510.24	507.37	507.37	19.75	65.2	48.5
Italy	13	90.53	61.45	44.14	35.36	43.10	50.8	38.4
Japan	61	4 105.83	2 799.58	2 799.05	2 794.64	2 761.91	67.9	68.8
Korea	19	490.62	227.96	227.96	227.96	209.40	45.5	16.2
Kuwait	15	45.66	28.35	25.79	17.64	25.71	53.4	0.0
Luxembourg	8	68.28	24.55	23.70	23.84	26.67	36.2	7.3
Netherlands	14	121.28	56.98	49.74	50.88	57.75	44.4	64.9
New Zealand	16	73.07	44.89	44.89	25.10	34.35	51.1	36.1
Norway	16	137.41	63.29	89.80	77.39	79.32	56.4	62.4
OFID	25	147.52	84.33	74.96	73.80	74.20	52.1	49.4
Portugal	2	71.47	0.86	0.86	0.86	46.34	17.1	21.1
Spain	14	44.29	16.95	11.69	9.60	23.44	34.8	69.1
Sweden	22	268.65	172.76	163.47	165.28	170.90	62.6	65.9
Switzerland	31	235.16	98.60	94.00	92.35	67.21	37.4	27.1
Chinese Taipei	6	58.69	27.98	27.98	19.83	13.65	38.1	51.9
UNDP	52	726.79	75.67	102.28	86.64	135.91	13.8	-
UNFPA	41	127.63	25.50	24.52	12.64	13.03	14.8	-
UNICEF	41	583.44	64.28	37.77	143.58	134.40	16.3	-
United Arab Emirates	6	73.74	2.93	2.93	0.00	2.93	3.0	-
United Kingdom	20	897.52	310.48	725.49	672.83	609.11	64.6	66.7
United States	45	3 600.67	759.74	743.07	818.78	637.91	20.5	11.1
WFP	21	180.30	12.22	12.22	0.00	12.22	5.1	-
World Bank	69	14 342.78	7 681.86	7 814.86	9 245.36	4 286.40	50.6	66.4
WHO	59	466.80	184.45	99.86	60.41	71.10	22.3	-
All others (78)	16	383.81	88.25	80.56	69.46	49.05	18.7	30.6
Total	81	43 943.77	23 167.11	24 264.56	24 379.89	16 242.14	50.1	48.7

"-" Data are not available.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933424164>

Table B.10. **Aid is untied**

	Total bilateral aid as reported to the DAC in 2014*		Indicator 10	
			Share of untied aid b/a	2010 (for reference)
	a	b	(%)	(%)
Australia	3 226.22	2 874.82	89.1	98.5
Austria	526.38	253.60	48.2	57.9
Belgium	1 179.47	1 140.52	96.7	94.9
Canada	3 078.45	2 861.66	93.0	86.7
Czech Republic	47.05	15.25	32.4	-
Denmark	1 684.10	1 601.27	95.1	103.3
EU Institutions	17 697.37	11 607.59	65.6	47.7
Finland	715.27	646.86	90.4	89.4
France	8 037.31	7 418.51	92.3	95.0
Germany	17 171.50	14 361.68	83.6	75.3
Greece	17.54	3.85	22.0	47.9
Iceland	25.90	25.90	100.0	-
Ireland	491.17	482.45	98.2	100.0
Italy	646.04	604.31	93.5	58.3
Japan	15 605.38	12 182.44	78.1	78.6
Korea	2 321.42	1 234.47	53.2	32.3
Luxembourg	276.62	269.60	97.5	99.2
Netherlands	2 800.36	2 755.05	98.4	105.3
New Zealand	503.80	412.23	81.8	81.1
Norway	3 684.71	3 708.43	100.6	102.1
Poland	301.34	32.06	10.6	-
Portugal	269.96	93.13	34.5	42.6
Slovak Republic	14.25	0.16	1.2	-
Slovenia	15.28	0.00	0.0	0.0
Spain	745.54	623.20	83.6	64.4
Sweden	3 037.37	2 607.44	85.8	93.6
Switzerland	2 635.02	2 475.49	93.9	84.8
United Kingdom	8 078.66	8 073.83	99.9	99.9
United States	25 056.28	15 650.29	62.5	56.7
Total	119 889.73	94 016.09	78.4	74.2

* Excludes donor administrative costs and in-donor refugee costs.

Note: Shares that exceed 100% indicates that the country does not report tying status items on revisions made to previously reported commitments.

"-" Data are not available.

Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933424175>

Annex C

Coverage of monitoring data

Table C.1. **Countries and territories participating to the 2016 monitoring round**

Africa	Angola	Benin	Burkina Faso	Burundi
	Cameroon	Central African Republic	Chad	Comoros
	Congo	Côte d'Ivoire	Democratic Republic of the Congo	Egypt
	Ethiopia	Gabon	Gambia	Guinea
	Kenya	Liberia	Madagascar	Malawi
	Mali	Mauritania	Mozambique	Niger
	Nigeria	Rwanda	Sao Tome and Principe	Senegal
	Sierra Leone	Somalia	South Sudan	Sudan
	Tanzania	Togo	Uganda	Zimbabwe
East Asia	Cambodia	Lao People's Democratic Republic	Mongolia	Myanmar
	Philippines	Timor-Leste	Viet Nam	
Eastern Europe and Central Asia	Albania	Armenia	Belarus	Kosovo
	Kyrgyzstan	Moldova	Tajikistan	
Latin America & the Caribbean	Bolivia	Colombia	Costa Rica	Dominican Republic
	El Salvador	Guatemala	Honduras	Paraguay
	Peru	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	Uruguay	
Pacific	Cook Islands	Fiji	Kiribati	Marshall Islands
	Micronesia	Nauru	Niue	Palau
	Papua New Guinea	Samoa	Solomon Islands	Tonga
	Tuvalu	Vanuatu		
South Asia	Afghanistan	Bangladesh	Bhutan	Nepal
	Pakistan	Yemen		

Table C.2. **Development partners included in the 2016 monitoring round reporting**

Bilateral partners DAC	Australia	Austria	Belgium	Canada
	Czech Republic	Denmark	EU Institutions	Finland
	France	Germany	Iceland	Ireland
	Italy	Japan	Korea	Luxembourg
	Netherlands	New Zealand	Norway	Portugal
	Slovak Republic	Slovenia	Spain	Sweden
	Switzerland	United Kingdom	United States	
Other bilateral partners	Angola	Brazil	China (People's Republic of)	Colombia
	Congo	El Salvador	Equatorial Guinea	Gabon
	India	Iran	Iraq	Kuwait
	Lithuania	Mexico	Monaco	Morocco
	Panama	Papua New Guinea	Romania	Russian Federation
	Saudi Arabia	Chinese Taipei	Turkey	United Arab Emirates
Multilateral development banks	African Development Bank (AfDB)	Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA)	Asian Development Bank (AsDB)	Caribbean Development Bank (CarDB)
	Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI)	Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB)	Development Bank of Latin America (CAF)	ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID)
	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)	European Investment Bank (EIB)	Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)	International Finance Corporation (IFC)
	International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)	International Monetary Fund (IMF)	Islamic Development Bank (IsDB)	West African Development Bank (BOAD) World Bank
UN agencies	United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)	UN Habitat	UN Joint Programme on Local Governance (JPLG)	United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
	UN Peacebuilding Fund (UNPBF)	UN Volunteers	UN Women	UNAIDS
	United Nations Development Cooperation Forum (UNDCF)	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)	United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE)
	United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)	UNESCO	United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
	UNICEF	United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)	United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI)
Vertical funds and initiatives	Adaptation Fund	African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF)	Arab Fund	Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI)
	Global Environment Facility (GEF)	Global Fund	Nordic Development Fund (NDF)	OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID)
	Pacific Environment Community Fund	Pacific Regional Infrastructure Facility (PRIF)	SAARC Development Fund	South Pacific Regional Environment Program (SPREP)
Other international organizations	African Union	Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)	Forum Fisheries Agencies	International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO)
	International Organization for Migration (IOM)	International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN)	Organization of American States (OAS)	OEI
	Pacific Community (SPC)	Southern African Development Community (SADC)	West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA)	Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)
	International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)			
Foundations	Aga Khan Development Network	Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation	Carter Center	Christoffel Blindenmission
	Heinrich Boll Foundation	Rosebud Trust, Deakin		

Making Development Co-operation More Effective

2016 PROGRESS REPORT

This report draws on the results of the 2016 global monitoring exercise carried out under the auspices of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation. It offers a snapshot of progress on internationally agreed principles aimed at making development co-operation more effective.

The provision of data and information for the monitoring exercise was led by 81 countries, with the participation of more than 125 bilateral and multilateral development partners, as well as hundreds of civil society organisations, private sector representatives and other relevant development stakeholders in the participating countries. This report presents the findings from the exercise, based on careful analysis and aggregation of this information. It is intended to stimulate and inform policy dialogue at the country, regional and international levels, generating an evidence-base for further collective action to strengthen the contribution of effective development co-operation to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals.

The report confirms the importance of principles and commitments to strengthen the focus on development results, ensure country ownership of the development process and the inclusiveness of development partnerships, and enhance transparency and mutual accountability around development efforts.

Contents

- Chapter 1. Overview of the 2016 Global Partnership monitoring round
- Chapter 2. Focus on development results
- Chapter 3. Country ownership of development co-operation
- Chapter 4. Inclusive partnerships for effective development
- Chapter 5. Transparency and accountability for effective development

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