



States of Fragility 2016

UNDERSTANDING VIOLENCE



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Foreword

The OECD's Development Co-operation Directorate (DCD) has produced Fragile States reports since 2005. These reports explore trends and financial resource flows in fragile and conflict-affected states and economies. They respond to increasing concerns about the implications of fragility for stability and development, especially in the context of Agenda 2030 and the international promise to *leave no one behind*. The OECD remains one of only a handful of sources of aggregate data and analysis for fragile contexts as a group. In line with the new, multidimensional concept of fragility that began with the 2015 report, the OECD's annual publications are now referred to as States of Fragility.

The purpose of this series is to provide compelling evidence that can inform donor policies and underpin international debates. By doing so, the reports seek to ensure that issues driving fragility remain high on the international development agenda, while supporting better policy to drive better results where they count most: on the ground.

The States of Fragility series also seeks to shed light on a different key aspect of fragility every year. This year, *States of Fragility 2016: Understanding Violence* takes a long hard look at violence in the world – and what we should do about it. In line with the aims of the series, this report showcases emerging thinking about violence, presents a new risk-based approach to monitoring various dimensions of fragility, and looks at financial flows in support of fragile contexts.

In terms of process, the report combines research by leading specialists in violence and fragility with inputs from members of the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) and the wider fragility policy community. As part of this consultative process, in late 2015, the OECD held a series of expert workshops to refine its fragility framework. The workshops were held in Berlin on 15 October, in Abidjan on 19 October, in Washington, DC on 23 November, and in Paris on 16 December. INCAF members provided further inputs on the fragility framework at the meeting of their Knowledge and Policy Task Team on 22 January 2016, and feedback received at the World Bank's Fragility, Conflict and Violence Forum in March 2016 was also integrated. In parallel to this, the OECD hosted a series of blog posts from leading experts about measuring fragility, available at <http://g4dpblog.blogspot.fr>. The findings and recommendations related to violence were refined after the inputs of a range of experts and INCAF members at a meeting of their Task Teams on 27 June 2016. The overall research project was guided by a reference group made up of academic experts and practitioners in the fragility field.

With regard to the data used in the current volume, this report draws on 2014 official development assistance data, the latest available data at the time of writing. All amounts referring to 2014 are denoted in current 2014 USD, unless specified otherwise. For time series, constant 2014 USD prices are used. Figures reflect OECD statistics unless indicated otherwise. Further, data on concessional flows reflect the different donor interpretations and OECD-DAC adjustments, as explained at: www.oecd.org/dac/stats/concessional-note.htm.

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Acronyms and abbreviations

ACLED	Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project
AfDB	African Development Bank
BMZ	German Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development
CAR	Central African Republic
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (OECD)
DFID	Department for International Development
EUR	Euro
FDI	Foreign direct investment
GBV	Gender-based violence
GDP	Gross domestic product
GIS	Geographic information system
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH
GNI	Gross national income
IADB	Inter-American Development Bank
IED	Improvised explosive device
IEP	Institute for Economics and Peace
ILPI	International Law and Policy Institute
INCAF	International Network for Conflict and Fragility (an OECD-DAC network)
INFORM	Index for Risk Management
LAC	Latin America and the Caribbean
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NEET	Youth not in employment, education and training
ODA	Official development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OOF	Other official flows
PCA	Principal components analysis
PoC	Protection of civilians
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SGBV	Sexual and other forms of gender-based violence
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Institute
UCDP	Uppsala University Conflict Data Program
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNSOM	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
USAID	US Agency for International Development
USD	United States dollar
WHO	World Health Organization

Signs used:

- ()** Secretariat estimate in whole or part
- (Nil)
- 0.0** Negligible
- ..** Not available
- ...** Not available separately, but included in total
- x** Not applicable
- p** Provisional

Slight discrepancies in totals are due to rounding.

Editorial

For the past year, the world's policy makers and civil society have focused on two ambitious multilateral compacts – the climate change accord reached last December in Paris and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development approved last September at the United Nations General Assembly. Both of these agreements are critical to going from the world we have to the world we want.

The investment of so much human and capital resources in these historic efforts is essential. But at the same time, there is a very real risk that attention will be diverted from an equally pressing issue – the necessity of confronting the nexus of poverty, violence and fragility. Even the most well-meaning advocates can lose sight of the persistent vulnerabilities created by weak institutions, political violence, extremism and poverty in countries and regions prone to fragility, violence and conflict.

The central truth is that, if the challenges faced by these countries are not met, progress on combating climate change and achieving the Sustainable Development Goals will be stalled and millions of people will remain mired in poverty and conflict, the migration crisis will not be resolved, and violent extremism will continue to increase.


Figures from the new OECD report, *States of Fragility 2016: Understanding Violence*, tell the story. The data show that 2014 was the second-worst year for fatalities since the end of the Cold War; 2015 was the third worst. Conflict-related deaths totalled 167 000 in 2015, with 55 000 of those in the Syrian Arab Republic.

As anyone who follows the news from these regions knows, the most vulnerable people are civilians who live in weak states and those carrying out the violence are most likely to be militias of one stripe or another.

Breaking this deadly cycle requires nothing less than rethinking development assistance. What does that mean? It means developing a new, multidimensional model to measure and monitor fragility. The goal is to understand the forces behind the conflicts and poverty, from the rise of urban militias to widespread corruption. Only by analysing what is broken will we know how to fix it. And it means targeting development finance in fragile contexts and conflict zones across all sectors to fill gaps and concentrate efforts.

Only when policy makers and their partners in civil society and the private sector fully understand the risks will they be able to co-ordinate their efforts to reduce the gravest dangers and provide vital hope for populations who are at the biggest risk of being left behind.

Building a sustainable planet, from expanding education and closing the gap between the rich and poor to reducing the impact of climate change, is a vital goal. But it will not be accomplished unless equal attention is paid to the plight of people trapped in seeming intractable conflicts and fragile contexts that offer them no hope of a better life.



Douglas Frantz
OECD Deputy Secretary-General

Executive summary

Violence is one of many factors that can contribute to fragility. However, it is not the only factor, and the presence of violence does not automatically mean that a context is fragile. *States of Fragility 2016* places a spotlight on violence, in all its forms, to explore how violence can contribute to fragility, and examine what should be done about it.

Main findings: Violence

First, a disclaimer. Data on conflicts are contested, and the complex and changing nature of social violence makes its forms even more difficult to define and measure. More data on the gender dimensions of violence and conflict are also needed, given the disproportionate impact of violence on women.

Despite this, there is agreement that violence is on the rise. Almost half the world's people have been affected by some form of political violence over the last 15 years. However, globally, conflict is not the leading cause of violent death. In 2015, more people died violently in countries outside of conflict, including Brazil and India, than in the Syrian Arab Republic (hereafter “Syria”), in absolute numbers. Low- and middle-income countries bear a disproportionately high share of the burden of political and social armed violence, which often impedes development gains.

Violence is multidimensional, complex and evolving. Even in post-conflict contexts, violence can simply change its form as settings, actors and drivers change, challenging the international community's best intervention efforts. Political transitions, even towards democracy, can provoke violence, with competition over “who sits at the table” and “who gets what”. Armed agents who engage in political violence during wars or periods of domestic instability are highly likely to be involved in organised crime in more peaceful periods, including racketeering, mercenary activity and illicit trafficking.

Violence is increasingly a regional problem. Political armed violence spreads more easily as neighbours' domestic instability spills over borders, driven by linkages between aggrieved groups and facilitated by global communications, shared ideologies and financial flows. The organised crime-political violence nexus allows political armed groups to finance themselves through proceeds from criminal activities, with illegal resource exploitation, illicit financial flows and the drug trade providing revenue. Violence also drives millions of refugees from their homes, its impacts extending to overburdened neighbouring countries that often are already in distress.

Violence is increasingly driven by domestic political instability. Weak institutions or those with entrenched patronage systems can create vacuums in which elites are able to siphon off public resources with impunity while also perpetuating economic exclusion. Criminal networks and armed groups can also fill these vacuums. Members of excluded groups are more likely to engage in armed violence, particularly if they have recently lost access to power. Conversely, rivalry for inclusion can also be a problem: the distribution of positions, authority and resources among included elites can also drive domestic political instability.

In both political and social forms of violence, civilians are most at risk. Today 30% to 40% of political violence within states is directed against civilians. Weapons of armed violence designed to produce civilian casualties are increasingly available. In 2015, 43 786 people were killed or injured by improvised explosive devices (IEDs); 76% of those were civilians. Among civilians, women, youth and children in particular disproportionately bear both direct and indirect consequences of violence. Research shows that children who have been

subjected to violence are more likely to become violent themselves. Globally, an estimated 35% of women have experienced either physical and/or sexual intimate partner violence or non-partner sexual violence. Over half of the 21.3 million refugees in the world today are children under the age of 18.

Rapid and unregulated urbanisation, income and social inequality, concentrated poverty, youth unemployment, policing and justice deficits, and real and perceived insecurity can all contribute to urban violence. Within cities, violence is unevenly distributed, and particularly acute in lower income informal areas. In Bogota, for example, roughly 98% of all homicides occur in less than 2% of street addresses. Several contexts most affected by fragility and conflict will see rapid population growth in their cities before 2030.

Terrorism-related deaths rose by 61% in 2013, with 18 000 people killed in terrorist attacks globally. Most victims were in Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan and Syria. Women and girls are particular victims of this form of violence. The rise of violent extremist networks claiming Islamist ideology has led to politically motivated and criminal violence across a vast territory. However, extremist groups come in many forms, as evidenced by a surge in violent hate crimes across Europe and North America.

The global economic impact of violence was a daunting USD 13.6 trillion in 2015, equivalent to 13.3% of global gross domestic product (GDP) or USD 1 876 for every person in the world. Yet development assistance invests only marginally in violence reduction outside of conflict.

Violence is a behaviour reinforced by social norms, and it acts like a contagion. By using the same approach that the World Health Organization (WHO) uses to stop epidemics – interrupt transmission, change behaviour, change norms – policy makers can break the recurrent cycle of violence, stopping its “transmission”.

The fragility framework: Fragility in the world today

It is now widely recognised that fragility is multidimensional and its challenges are universal. The OECD is therefore committed to a universal, multidimensional fragility framework. Fragility is defined as the combination of exposure to risk and insufficient coping capacity of the state, system and/or communities to manage, absorb or mitigate those risks.

The new OECD fragility framework is built on five dimensions of fragility – economic, environmental, political, societal and security – and measures each of these dimensions through the accumulation and combination of risks and capacity.

Using the fragility framework, 56 contexts are identified as fragile in 2016, with 15 of those classified as extremely fragile. Over 1.6 billion people, or 22% of the global population, currently live in these fragile contexts. Of this group, 27 contexts are low income, 25 are lower middle income and 4 are upper middle income. While the number of people living in extreme poverty will fall globally, the number of extremely poor people living in fragile contexts will increase to 542 million in 2035 from 480 million in 2015.

There are interlinkages between the dimensions of fragility and violence in the world. Homicide rates and social violence rise as contexts become more economically fragile. Armed conflict and terrorism are more prevalent in moderate to highly environmentally fragile contexts. Contexts with high political fragility have high levels of all types of violence, and are often in conflict or have a recent history of conflict. Extremely fragile contexts in the security dimension are among the most violent places in the world. These include Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, South Sudan,

Sudan, Syria and Yemen. Contexts with high societal fragility experience higher battle related deaths and high homicide rates. Higher levels of gender equality are associated with a lower risk of civil conflict within a society.

Effective fragility programming requires effective financing

Total financial flows to fragile contexts including official development assistance (ODA), foreign direct investment (FDI) and remittances increased approximately 206% between 2002 and 2014 in constant terms. Remittances are the largest type of financial flow to fragile contexts followed by ODA and then FDI. Total remittances and FDI grew significantly faster than ODA for fragile contexts over 2002-14. Fragile contexts received the majority of ODA, or almost 64% of all ODA between 2011 and 2014, but the distribution of ODA within these fragile contexts is uneven on both an aggregate and per capita basis. Extremely fragile contexts are more dependent on aid than other fragile situations on average, but the extent of aid dependence varies significantly.

In addition, ODA is often targeted at the symptoms rather than the real drivers and root causes of fragility. Indeed, aid to fragile contexts is often for “firefighting” rather than for long-term structural change.

Recommendations

Fragility is a major issue on the global agenda, and the international community is united – most recently in the Stockholm Declaration – to address it more effectively.

Policy recommendations:

- recognise that fragility is multidimensional: this will help design better theories of change and programming in at-risk contexts
- address violence in all its forms: moving from interventions that are focused primarily on conflict and its aftermath to ones that systematically address violence, and its prevention
- challenge existing, simplistic paradigms about violence: avoid attributing labels of “good” and “bad” to violence, this will help with a better understanding of, and response to, violence
- invest in prevention: prevention saves lives, resources and money
- deliver on Stockholm Declaration commitments
- use domestic policy to promote global peace and security: this can make a real difference to the factors of power, marginalisation and capacity that enable violence around the world.

Programming recommendations:

- move towards a whole-of-society approach to fragility: better results will come from working with multiple types of actors – individual, community, municipal, provincial and national – and taking a multidimensional, multi-sector approach
- put people at the centre, recognising that a stable state and strong institutions do not automatically lead to a reduction in violence
- use the violence lens – power, capacity and marginalisation – to design and deliver programming

- prioritise reconciliation: to heal the social cleavages that perpetuate and exacerbate violence
- recognise the critical role of gender in addressing fragility: with tools that bring together gender, violence and fragility issues within one framework
- be open to experiment, remain flexible and take risks: becoming comfortable with a measure of well-calculated risk, and even programming failure, can have big payoffs
- learn and build the evidence base: bringing together a broad range of research and policy fields.

Financing recommendations:

- provide adequate, long-term ODA financing for fragile contexts, and focus funding on the real drivers of fragility: if ODA is to be most useful, it will need to be sufficiently predictable, flexible and long-term
- develop better financing strategies: the OECD will continue work to promote a better understanding of financial tools and portfolio management in fragile contexts during 2017.

Chapter 1

Overview: Violence, fragility and finance

by

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This chapter begins with an overview of the main trends and findings around violence – its scope, impact and cost. This is followed by a review of the OECD fragility framework, and its five dimensions of fragility, accompanied by an analysis of what the 56 countries deemed fragile under the framework tell us about fragility in the world today. The chapter continues with a review of the different financial flows – foreign investment, official development assistance (ODA) and remittances – to fragile contexts, casting a spotlight on how ODA is used to address fragility and violence, and how ODA relates to the different dimensions of fragility. The conclusion looks at opportunities for more effective programming, including recommendations in the area of policy, programming and financing.

A violent world

The world has become a more dangerous place. Although long-term trends suggest the world is more peaceful than in previous centuries, evidence also indicates violence is on the rise and increasingly complex (Box 1.1). Over the last 15 years, 53 countries have been or are now affected by some form of political violence. Nearly half the world's population, or 3.34 billion people, live in proximity to or feel the impact of political violence. High homicide rates in Central America, ongoing crises in Africa's Great Lakes region, state failure and human trafficking in North Africa – these and other forms of violence overlap and continuously shift among actors, means and objectives. Neither wealth nor development renders countries immune. High violence rates also affect those middle-income countries where political exclusion and unregulated urban growth have deepened horizontal inequalities, marginalising portions of the population and making them more vulnerable to exploitation, violent extremism or interpersonal violence. The unsettling reality is that the world is a more dangerous place than it has been for decades.

Box 1.1. Defining violence

Debates over typologies and categorisation of violence reveal the challenge in addressing its scope. Violence manifests itself in multiple forms, modalities and patterns. As a result, it can be difficult to define. The World Health Organization's broad, encompassing definition of violence captures this range of characteristics:

The intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation. It takes the forms of self-directed violence, interpersonal violence and collective violence.

Political violence: in this report, political violence describes the use of force towards a political end that is perpetrated to advance the position of a person or group defined by their political position in society. Governments, state militaries, rebels, terrorist organisations and militias engage in political violence, as well as actors who may adopt both political and criminal motives.

Social violence: the term social violence refers to a broader manifestation of grievances, criminal behaviours and interpersonal violence in society. These include multiple types of crime, homicides, and interpersonal and self-directed violence.

The Geneva Declaration Secretariat, in its Global Burden of Armed Violence series of reports, uses a “unified approach” to lethal violence to encompass conflict, criminal and interpersonal forms of violence. This permits the inclusion of global data on homicide, conflict and other forms of violence from a large variety of sources, thus a picture of lethal violence in both conflict and non-conflict settings.

Sources: WHO (2002) and Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2015).

By 2030, well over 60% of the global poor will be in fragile contexts (Box 1.2). The poorest people will be the first to directly confront the greatest challenges of our time. Vulnerability stems from a multitude of factors often including endemic poverty, weak government

capacity, poor public service delivery, and economic exclusion and marginalisation. Political instability, recurrent cycles of violence targeting civilians, and entrenched criminal networks are increasingly common where there are economic shocks, weak rule of law and flagging institutions unable to provide the most basic services to their people. The picture grows starker still when the impacts of environmental disasters, climate change and forced displacement are added. Threats may take on a more acute form when they happen together, creating a loop of cause and effect and compounding risks that contribute to fragility.

Box 1.2. What is fragility?

States of Fragility 2016 characterises fragility as the combination of exposure to risk and insufficient coping capacity of the state, system and/or communities to manage, absorb or mitigate those risks. Fragility can lead to negative outcomes including violence, the breakdown of institutions, displacement, humanitarian crises or other emergencies.

The OECD's fragility framework provides a comprehensive picture of fragility around the world. The calculations reflect a systems-based conceptualisation of fragility. Risks and capacities are measured in five dimensions: economic, environmental, political, security and societal. In addition, capacities are measured at state level, as well as incorporating the various formal and informal mechanisms societies can draw upon to cope with negative events and shocks. The choice of these dimensions, and the decision to take a whole of society approach to fragility, is based on expert judgement. It is one of the key outcomes of the consultation process underlying the new OECD fragility framework.

Violence is one of many factors that can contribute to fragility. However, it is not the only factor, and the presence of violence does not automatically mean that a context is fragile. *States of Fragility 2016* places a spotlight on violence, in all its forms, to explore how violence can contribute to fragility, and examine what should be done about it.

Violence is increasingly driven by domestic political instability. The prevalence of political violence can often be traced to structurally weak institutions led by governments that practice systemic economic and political exclusion of sections of society. This in turn deepens the state's legitimacy crisis, provokes the breakdown of the social contract between state and citizen, and can lead to continued cycles of poverty and other forms of violence, including conflict. Criminal networks can take root in these circumstances, where weak rule of law allows perpetrators of homicide and interpersonal violence to act with impunity against vulnerable citizens. This type of social or criminal violence that has no overt political agenda is widespread and has reached epidemic proportions in some regions, particularly in Latin America.

Most lethal violence occurs in the form of interpersonal violence, outside of conflict settings and away from international attention. The negative feedback loop of social violence, political instability and criminal networks deepens vulnerabilities in new ways and with higher costs than ever recorded. These different forms of violence feed off each other: breakdowns in rule of law institutions resulting from conflict pave the way for higher tolerance of interpersonal violence, increased weapons and drug trade, and political corruption. As the evidence in this report suggests, the international community must broaden its focus beyond conflict to understand the multiple risk factors and dynamics associated with violence at the subnational and local level as well as at the interpersonal level.

In fragile and conflict-affected societies facing the most extreme risks, new research on violence presents new threats that compound old ones by eroding coping mechanisms, functioning markets, access to public services and citizens' rights. Social violence and

drug trafficking drive homicide rates and political corruption, for example. The inability of weak states, and weak justice institutions, to control weapons or penalise violence further heightens these risks. Even what appear to be low levels of violence may be symptomatic of fragility, as in the case of a highly criminalised state (Gastrow, 2011).

Multiple threats often emerge together. Civilians – women, girls and youth in particular – are more at risk than ever. Different forms of violence plague societies at the same time, with actors wielding violence as a tool for power, profit and manipulation. Violence includes terror, which criminals, states and non-state armed groups are increasingly adopting as a tactic.

Unmanaged risks and untreated consequences have dangerous and far-reaching spillover effects. Most refugees and internally displaced persons are living in various regions of Africa. But 2015 and 2016 also witnessed unprecedented numbers of people fleeing violence and persecution in Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia, desperate to get to safety in OECD countries. Population movements not only demonstrate the complex risk landscape in conflict-affected areas, they have also created new dynamics, including deepening fragility, with global political repercussions. In 2016, the refugee and migration crisis became so divisive a political issue throughout Europe that it partly contributed to the decision of the United Kingdom to leave the European Union in the “Brexit” vote. The acts of terrorism that rocked Europe, the Middle East, North America and Africa this year also demonstrate, in the most dramatic terms, the transnational reach of ideologically driven violent extremism. As the *World Development Report 2014* succinctly concluded: “unmanaged risks do not respect boundaries, and no one country or agent acting alone can deal effectively with a risk that crosses a national border” (World Bank, 2013). The problem of fragility has global effects.

The complex interaction between fragility and violence requires a shift in the international approach. Understanding that violence has a “contagious” relationship will lead to better informed decisions about development, crisis management, humanitarian aid, conflict and violence prevention and mitigation, and global security. Drivers and impacts of violence – social, interpersonal, criminal, political or violent extremism – overlap. This needs to be acknowledged and reflected in international interventions. Development financing is out of touch with this new reality: interpersonal violence, the leading source of human insecurity, typically falls outside its scope. The primary focus on political conflict, and on the capacity of state institutions, treats only one part of a much larger problem and in consequence, may be doing more harm than good by empowering corrupt elites, deepening inequalities and/or perpetuating marginalisation.

Introducing the OECD fragility framework

It is now widely recognised that fragility is multidimensional and its challenges are universal. Fragility is not only relevant to developing countries; its challenges are universal, as cemented by the post-2015 development framework. The OECD is therefore now committed to a universal, multidimensional fragility framework. This new fragility framework was informed by a broad consultative process that took place over 2015 and 2016.

Fragility is defined as the combination of exposure to risk and insufficient coping capacity of the state, system and/or communities to manage, absorb or mitigate those risks. Fragility can lead to negative outcomes including violence, the breakdown of institutions, displacement, humanitarian crises or other emergencies.

Following on from this, the new OECD fragility framework represents a major shift in how fragility is conceptualised. The OECD characterises fragility as a mix of risk and capacities, over five different dimensions. The OECD’s fragility framework is built on


five dimensions (Table 1.1). Each of these dimensions is measured by calculating the accumulation and combination of risks combined with the capacity of the state, system and/or communities to manage, absorb or mitigate the consequences of those risks. The methodology is further defined in Annex A.

Table 1.1. Five dimensions of fragility

Dimension	Description
Economic	Vulnerability to risks stemming from weaknesses in economic foundations and human capital including macroeconomic shocks, unequal growth and high youth unemployment.
Environmental	Vulnerability to environmental, climatic and health risks that affect citizens' lives and livelihoods. These include exposure to natural disasters, pollution and disease epidemics.
Political	Vulnerability to risks inherent in political processes, events or decisions; lack of political inclusiveness (including of elites); transparency, corruption and society's ability to accommodate change and avoid oppression.
Security	Vulnerability of overall security to violence and crime, including both political and social violence.
Societal	Vulnerability to risks affecting societal cohesion that stem from both vertical and horizontal inequalities, including inequality among culturally defined or constructed groups and social cleavages.

On the resulting OECD fragility framework diagram (Figure 1.1), contexts are identified as fragile (in light blue) or extremely fragile (in dark blue), on the basis of a synthesis of results in the five dimensions of fragility (economic, environmental, political, security and societal). The ordering of countries provides an indication – rather than a precise measure – of overall fragility.

Figure 1.1. The 2016 OECD fragility framework diagram



StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933441642>

Over 1.6 billion people, or 22% of the global population, currently live in these fragile contexts. Population in these fragile contexts is anticipated to increase to 3 billion people, or 32% of the global population, by 2050.

The results of the OECD fragility framework show that fragility occurs across a range of income groups and at differing levels of economic development. Of the 56 fragile contexts, 27 are low income, 25 are lower middle income, and 4 (Angola, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela [hereafter “Venezuela”], Iraq and Libya) are upper middle income. Over half of these contexts have authoritarian governance structures, but there are also hybrid regimes and flawed democracies.

Fragility can exacerbate already volatile macroeconomic conditions, which in turn can contribute to increased or sustained fragility, perpetuating a vicious cycle that is hard to break. Fragile contexts experience higher rates of inflation and experience much higher inflation volatility than other contexts. This is particularly apparent in the period from 2002 through 2015.

Fragility intensifies poverty and undermines the opportunities for individuals and societies to escape poverty. Further, in fragile contexts where there is conflict or very high levels of violence, rates of extreme poverty can increase as individuals are displaced, livelihoods are destroyed, and the broader macroeconomic environment is severely damaged through dramatic falls in foreign direct investment (FDI), trade and economic growth. Most fragile contexts have significantly higher proportions of their populations living in extreme poverty, as compared to the rest of the world. While the number of people living in extreme poverty will fall globally, the number of extremely poor people living in these fragile contexts will increase from 480 million in 2015 to 542 million in 2035.

The relationship between fragility and poverty and extreme poverty is further entrenched by a reliance on agriculture in these fragile contexts as a significant means of income generation. The contribution of agriculture to GDP in these extremely fragile and fragile contexts is two to three times higher than in the rest of the world. On average these extremely fragile contexts are becoming more dependent on agriculture, as the proportion of their GDP generated from agricultural activity has increased by 19% since 2004.

The five dimensions of fragility and their relationship with violence

Conclusions can be drawn about the interlinkages between violence, and the different dimensions of fragility.

Economic fragility and violence. Homicide rates and social violence are highest in the group of highly economically fragile contexts. These contexts are typified by high levels of resource and aid dependence and constrained economic geography. There is a clear vicious cycle in the extremely economically fragile group; the absence of long-term drivers of economic growth and individual economic opportunity, coupled with high levels of resource and aid dependence, drive violence and conflict, which in turn reinforces economic fragility: and so the cycle continues.

Environmental fragility and violence. There does not seem to be a distinct relationship between differing levels of environmental fragility and interpersonal violence. However, armed conflict and terrorism are more prevalent in moderate to high environmentally fragile contexts.

Political fragility and violence. Rates of violent death vary across the spectrum of contexts with political fragility. Those with high political fragility have high levels of all types of violence, and are often in conflict or have a recent history of conflict. In terms of particular types of violence, deaths per capita from terrorism are highest in countries that have some legislative constraints on state power but also high levels of political violence. Such countries include Iraq, Mali, Nigeria and Pakistan. This highlights the strong link between political terror and violence by non-state actors using terrorist tactics. Between 1989 and 2014, almost 90% of all terrorist attacks occurred in countries where violent political terror was widespread (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015).

Security fragility and violence. The extremely fragile contexts in the security dimension include Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic (“hereafter Syria”) and Yemen, which are amongst the most violent countries in the world. However, rates of violence are almost as high in the next tier of high security fragile contexts, which tend to have a mix of weak rule of law, criminal activity and terrorist activity. This group includes countries such as Colombia and Nigeria. The spectrum of types of violence that occur in these places, and the overlaps between them, coincides with the link between conflict and crime, known as the conflict-crime nexus. It is also important to note that gender-based violence and gender inequality have been shown to have statistical relationships with security. Gender inequalities are a key manifestation of horizontal inequalities that lead to destabilised societal relations and make societies less resistant to shocks (Baranyi and Powell, 2005).

Societal fragility and violence. Battle-related deaths are higher in contexts in the extreme societal fragility category. These contexts are also typified by high horizontal inequalities and high homicide rates, and some high vertical inequalities as measured by income. Societal factors of gender inequality and gender-based violence (GBV) have been shown to influence overall levels of security. Research has found that contexts with higher levels of gender equality are less likely to initiate interstate conflict or escalate an interstate dispute once involved in one (Hudson et al., 2012). Similarly, higher levels of gender equality are associated with a lower risk of civil conflict within a society (Caprioli, 2005). GBV including intimate partner violence is often a pre-cursor to outbreaks of more endemic conflict. Rape and other forms of GBV are also often used as weapons of war during conflict, thus perpetuating societal instability.

Effective fragility programming requires effective financing

Total financial flows to fragile contexts including official development assistance (ODA), foreign direct investment (FDI) and remittances increased approximately 206% between 2002 and 2014 in constant terms. The total value of financial flows received over this period totalled more than USD 2.04 trillion (2014 constant prices). ODA made up 32% of that total amount.

Remittances are the largest type of financial flow to fragile contexts followed by ODA and then FDI. For the 56 contexts measured as fragile under the OECD fragility framework, remittances are the largest type of financial flow. Of the total aggregate flows to fragile contexts in 2002-14, 43% were remittances. Total ODA excluding debt was 32% of the total financial flows received. FDI accounted for the remaining 25%.

While ODA increased 98% in constant terms in 2002-14, ODA as a proportion of the total flows to fragile contexts actually fell in this period. This reflects the growing importance of FDI and remittances as part of the total financial mix for the fragile contexts.

These fragile contexts received the majority of total ODA, or almost 64% of all ODA between 2011 and 2014, but the distribution of ODA within these fragile contexts is uneven on both an aggregate and per capita basis.

Fragile contexts are more dependent on aid on average, but the extent of aid dependence varies significantly. Of the top 20 most aid-dependent countries in the world, 12 are considered fragile in the OECD fragility framework. However, the extent of aid dependency within the group of fragile contexts is highly unequal, ranging from an average of 41.5% of gross national income (GNI) in lesser developed countries like Liberia to 0.02% in the upper middle income Venezuela. Most highly fragile contexts with above average aid dependency (where net ODA as a percentage of GNI is greater than the average for the group of fragile contexts) have high levels of security fragility.

ODA is not evenly distributed among fragile contexts. The median per capita aid to these fragile contexts for the 2011-14 period was USD 57 per annum and the average was USD 80 per annum in constant 2014 USD prices. Fragile contexts such as the West Bank and Gaza Strip received the largest average ODA on a per capita basis, or USD 576, each year from 2011 to 2014. Venezuela, by comparison, received the smallest amount of ODA per capita during this time period, an average of USD 1.4 each year during the 2011-14 period.

Fragile contexts have higher chances of receiving aid. The analysis of ODA data and fragility profiles of recipient countries shows that the contexts classified as fragile in this report have benefitted from fast-increasing aid flows over the past 15 years, and that they have, on average, higher chances of receiving strong support from donors than other developing countries.

ODA is not always targeted at the real drivers of fragility. The types of fragility that are most frequently correlated with high levels of aid are weaknesses in the long-term drivers of economic growth and environmental vulnerability at household and community level. However, the types of aid that fragile contexts receive typically seek to address the symptoms of these fragilities – i.e. crises and emergencies – rather than their root causes.

Indeed, aid to fragile contexts is often for “firefighting” rather than for long-term structural change. From the standpoint of recipient countries, there are in fact two types of donor allocations: one geared towards long-term development, which focuses on infrastructures, utility sectors, agriculture and industry, as well as health and education; and one that can be characterised as “fire fighting”, which essentially consists in emergency response, food assistance and reconstruction. All too often, fragile contexts receive first and foremost “fire fighting” aid.

Recommendations

The forecast may be gloomy, but unprecedented opportunities have emerged. Global agreements set in place in 2015-16 offer real cause for optimism. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) set out in the *2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development* emphasise the risks of violence to human security as well as to global peace and security. Understanding the role of violence and fragility is crucial to realisation of the SDGs. SDG 16 in particular aims to course-correct for the evidence that a far greater number of people are exposed to violence than ever before and, as a foundation for all other SDGs, that sustainable development can only thrive where there is security (Box 1.3).

Box 1.3. Sustainable Development Goal 16 and violence

Sustainable Development Goal 16 aims to promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.

This is important because high levels of armed violence and insecurity have a destructive impact on a country's development, affecting economic growth and often resulting in long-standing grievances that can last for generations. Sexual violence, crime, exploitation and torture are also prevalent where there is conflict or no rule of law, and countries must take measures to protect those who are most at risk.

The SDGs aim to significantly reduce all forms of violence, and work with governments and communities to find lasting solutions to conflict and insecurity. Strengthening the rule of law and promoting human rights is key to this process, as is reducing the flow of illicit arms and strengthening the participation of developing countries in the institutions of global governance.

Sources: UN General Assembly (2015); UNDP (2016).

Fragility is a major issue on the global agenda, and the international community is united – most recently in the Stockholm Declaration (IDPS, 2016) – to address it more effectively.

Addressing violence – in all its complexity – is clearly a major part of delivering a better future for those left furthest behind. However, violence reduction is too rarely the primary aim of development co-operation, instead it is often seen as an advantageous by-product of other development programming. Perhaps most significantly, development programmes often treat the symptoms of violence rather than root causes. Breaking these entrenched patterns requires deeper understanding of the complexity of violence, a willingness to embrace measured risk and the courage to try new approaches.

It is impossible to provide an exhaustive list of specific recommendations for all the issues covered in this report. However, it is possible to highlight some areas where the development community can more effectively address fragility and violence. These areas have benefitted from the valuable insights of the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) and its members, as well as the wider community of practice.

Policy recommendations include a call to recognise that fragility is multidimensional; address violence in all its forms; challenge existing, simplistic paradigms about violence; invest in prevention; deliver on Stockholm Declaration commitments; and use domestic policy to promote global peace and security.

Recognising that fragility is multidimensional can help practitioners design better theories of change and programming in at-risk contexts. More effective treatment of violence must take into account the interconnected nature of different forms of violence, and their shared root causes. This will involve a shift in development practice – moving from interventions that are focused primarily on conflict and its aftermath, towards interventions that address violence, and its prevention, in all its forms. Adopting a broader definition of violence, one that explicitly avoids attributing labels of “good” and “bad” to populations and places, while also recognising the mutability of roles, actors and circumstances, will help provide a better understanding of, and response to, violence. Investing in prevention saves lives, resources and money. Making good on Stockholm Declaration commitments, and being held to account for progress, will also be an important task for the coming years. And,

importantly, domestic policies in donor countries, if enacted with a violence and fragility lens, can make a real difference to the factors of power, marginalisation and capacity that enable violence around the world.

Programming recommendations include moving towards a whole-of-society approach to fragility; putting people at the centre; using the violence lens – capacity, power and marginalisation – to design and deliver programming; prioritising reconciliation; recognising the critical role of gender in addressing fragility; being open to experiment, remain flexible and taking risks; learning; and building the evidence base.

Focusing on a single actor, or a single layer of society, or a single sector, will not be effective in a complex fragile context. Instead, better results will come from working with multiple types of actors, at different layers of society – individual, community, municipal, provincial and national – and taking a multidimensional, multi-sector approach. In this way the capacities of whole societies to respond to a volatile, risky and rapidly evolving context will be strengthened. A focus on violence in all its forms also means shifting towards an approach that puts people at its centre, recognising that a stable state and strong institutions do not automatically lead to a reduction in violence. Instead, focusing on stopping those individuals most likely to engage in violence can be a better strategy, by positively influencing social norms and behaviour change. Reconciliation is a critical part of healing the social cleavages that perpetuate and exacerbate violence, and can therefore help reduce a key driver of fragility. Without addressing these social cleavages the root causes of violence will remain, ready to flare up again at any moment. While gender discriminatory norms can be particularly harmful in fragile contexts, opportunities to shift such norms exist in fragile and post-conflict contexts. One way to help achieve a more cohesive approach would be to develop analytical tools that bring together gender, violence and fragility issues within one framework.

Becoming comfortable with a measure of well-calculated risk, and even programming failure, can have big payoffs. It is also important to find and test innovative approaches to understanding and responding to the drivers of violence, despite the data gaps. Because violence cuts across a broad spectrum of fields and institutions, key data for measuring trends and dynamics tend to remain inside professional silos. This disaggregation means it is difficult to ascertain the complex ways in which violence drives and contributes to fragility.

Financing recommendations include the need to provide adequate, long-term ODA financing for fragile contexts; to focus funding on the real drivers of fragility; and to develop better financing strategies for fragile contexts.

States of Fragility 2016 shows that ODA remains a stable flow to fragile contexts that complements private sector investment, often highly volatile and concentrated in only a few fragile contexts, and remittances, which are difficult to channel to specific development programmes because they are flows to friends and families. However, the report also demonstrates that in many cases ODA supports immediate or short-term remedies rather than measures that require a longer time frame. This is as true for development ODA as it is for humanitarian aid. If ODA is to be most useful, it will need to be sufficiently predictable, flexible and long term; enabling multi-annual responses that address the underlying drivers of fragility – across all its dimensions. Strategic patience is required for sustainable results in fragile contexts.

Development actors will also need to gain a broader understanding of the development financing landscape for fragile contexts, and address the gaps in their financing toolbox. They will also need to better prioritise, quantify, sequence and layer different types of financial tools, and develop more coherent and forward-looking financing strategies for fragile contexts. The OECD will continue to work to promote a better understanding of financial tools and portfolio management in fragile contexts in 2017-18.

Conclusion

Patterns and manifestations of violence globally offer a new path for policy makers. This report traces the current findings in violence and fragility globally. It also reflects on the manner in which aid is provided to states and societies affected by fragility, and how aid could be reformulated to better advance development, prevent crises and build resilience. In the process it may offer a fresh perspective on the role played by violence, which is often coupled with protracted political crises and underdevelopment, in causing fragility. It also may help find ways to support and bolster local forms of resilience and manage risks differently.

Violence and fragility wreak destruction on human lives and societies, preventing people from fully achieving their potential. Violence obstructs development, stalls recovery from conflict, compounds the risks of fragility and feeds devastating new cycles of violence. Indeed, this fragile world could become more so in an exponential way, given that it will likely face more stresses from climate change, fragile cities, and the regionalisation of violence and conflict. Getting it wrong will not just leave the unsatisfactory *status quo* in place. It could well make matters worse. This opportunity to alleviate the toll of violence and fragility must not be missed.

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Chapter 2

Violence today

by

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This chapter provides an overview of the main findings about the complex violence landscape in the world today. After a brief discussion of the issues involved in the measurement of violence and conflict, it outlines how violence is increasing, and shows that violence is occurring in surprising places. The chapter then looks at the complexities of violence, its multidimensional nature, and how violence evolves and adapts to changing contexts. There is discussion of violence as a regional issue, including as people are forced from their homes and across borders, and how it is often also an urban problem. The chapter looks at the role of domestic political instability in driving violence, and outlines how civilians, especially civilian women and children, are most at risk. It concludes by outlining the escalating cost of violence, and investigates opportunities in treating violence as a behavioural problem. There are case studies on the Central African Republic and Kenya.

Of all victims of lethal violence, 83% lived outside of conflict zones.

Violence is one of many factors that can contribute to fragility. However, it is not the only factor, and the presence of violence does not automatically mean that a context is fragile. *States of Fragility 2016* places a spotlight on violence, in all its forms, to explore how violence can contribute to fragility, and examine what should be done about it.

Ten findings show a broader, more complex violence landscape than has been considered in development policy to date. States and societies can experience multiple forms of violence simultaneously, each caused by related issues but with different locations, triggers and impacts on fragility. Across this landscape, variables may include increases in lethal violence, the adaptability and networking capacities of organised criminal networks, deepening political instability, the emergence of fragile cities, and the rise of violent extremism. These factors can combine in a sort of “contagion” effect that has complicated the way in which the international development community must view the effects of violence in every dimension of fragility. The following findings demonstrate the complex violence landscape that has emerged, offer insights that can usefully inform analysis and provide key elements of a roadmap for building an effective set of policies in response.

Finding One: Debates over how violence should be measured distract from a better understanding of the broader violence landscape

The way violence is assessed offers only a glimpse of the problem’s scale. By most measures global violence has become markedly worse. But the debate about how to measure violence, and thus define its severity, often focuses on conflict-related violence and thus misses the most important point. The vast majority of lethal violence victims, 83%, died outside of conflict according to the definition accepted in international humanitarian law (Box 2.1). Indeed, direct conflict deaths account for only 17% of the global total (Small Arms Survey, 2016) (Figure 2.1). Therefore, focusing analysis and programming primarily on conflict violence may mean turning a blind eye to the major part of the global violence problem.

Violence manifest in armed conflict, fatalities and refugees flows is at its highest level in over two decades.

Properly measuring violence will require a broad lens and systemic data. Standard measures often fail to capture violence in all its forms, and fail to recognise how different forms and manifestations of violence are interconnected. This is particularly the case regarding large-scale criminal violence and low-level armed conflict, which may have similar levels of intensity and casualties, but are not considered within a single set of measurements (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2015). For example, the World Health Organization reports that more than 1.3 million people worldwide die each year as a result of self-directed, interpersonal or collective violence, accounting for 2.5% of global mortality (WHO, 2014). Other research concludes that armed conflict fatalities are at their highest numbers in over two decades (Gates et al., 2016; Uppsala University, 2016; ICG, 2016). The International Institute for Strategic Studies found that conflict-related deaths totalled 167 000 in 2015, with 55 000 of those in the

Syrian Arab Republic (hereafter “Syria”) (IISS, 2016). “Battle deaths” also tripled since 2003 (Gates et al., 2016; Uppsala University, 2016). These different measurements provide at best a fragmented set of statistics and at worst a distorted picture of the reality on the ground. A coherent framework for bringing these different measures together is needed.

Box 2.1. Defining conflict

Researchers use a variety of criteria to define conflict including the nature of the conflict, the type of actors, the number of deaths and the parties’ level of organisation. In this report, while every effort has been made to provide consistent data, results cited will depend on the different definitions of conflict that are used by the different researchers.


International humanitarian law differentiates international armed conflicts between states using armed force from non-international armed conflict where hostilities reach “a minimum level of intensity” and parties show “a minimum” of organisation.

The Uppsala University Conflict Data Program (UCDP) defines armed conflict as meeting a threshold of 25 battle deaths per calendar year; it can be state-based, involving at least one state party, or non-state based. A variant is what the UCDP calls “one-sided violence”, where an organised group deliberately kills at least 25 civilians in a year.

The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) project uses subnational data to analyse “political violence” or “civil conflict”, which encompass “diverse but recurrent forms of violence between individuals and groups” including “organized violent crime, gang warfare, terrorism, religious and sectarian rebellions, and spontaneous riots or violent protest over state failures such as poor or absent service delivery”.

Sources: ICRC (2008); Uppsala University (n.d), ACLED (2015a).

Figure 2.1. Violent deaths, by category, 2010-15



Source: Small Arms Survey (2016).

Even data on conflicts are contested. There is debate today over whether the world is seeing fewer but more deadly armed conflicts (IISS, 2015; Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2015) or more conflicts overall (ICG, 2016; Uppsala University, 2016). Research into conflict-related violence produces wide-ranging results, mainly due to difficulties in comparing data (Box 2.2). One set of research, for example, concludes the number of active civil and transnational wars has declined (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Human Security Centre, 2005; Newman, 2009; Straus, 2012); other research concludes that civil conflicts¹ almost tripled from 2007 through 2013² (Gates et al., 2016; Uppsala University, 2016), with an increase to 50 in 2015 compared to 41 in 2014. Similarly, while there is general consensus that traditional interstate conflicts are decreasing, there is equally strong consensus that violence driven by domestic political instability³ and social violence is increasing (Uppsala University, 2016).

Box 2.2. Difficulties in comparing and consolidating violence data

Measuring levels and dynamics of violence remains a challenge. Data may be unreliable due to underreporting and misreporting, and so require serious scrutiny. There is an urgent need for consistent, systematic and comprehensive data to reliably track variations in exposure, risk and harm across contexts and over time. This would facilitate greater comparability and analysis of trends and patterns.

Some conflict monitoring is done by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and the Small Arms Survey, among others, and is also done in country-specific datasets such as Syria Tracker and Nigeria Watch. Social violence is often measured using homicide or violent crime statistics, with global monitoring carried out by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the World Health Organization (WHO), and country and regional violence observatories, such as the Igarapé Institute.

Discrepancies in definitions of violence across datasets limit opportunities to combine them because they differ in the time periods covered, on fundamental definitions, on inclusion criteria and in the structure of analytical units. In addition, there is very little disaggregation of violence, and of conflict in particular, at the subnational level. Carayannis et al. (2014), in a recent literature review, found that only a small portion (3.1%) of studies on conflict included local-level empirical data. These data problems perpetuate limited understanding of the different impacts of violence across individuals, groups and communities.

The “unified approach” to measuring lethal violence, used by the Geneva Declaration Secretariat in the *Global Burden of Armed Violence* reports, takes a broad view in how it calculates violent deaths, consolidating normally disparate data sources on conflict, crime, homicide, interpersonal and other forms of violence together into a composite whole. In addition to offering clear advantages in overcoming data challenges, this approach also facilitates a better-informed analysis, as well as a clearer basis for monitoring indicators and identifying trends and risks over time and across contexts. It also enables a more holistic programmatic response and therefore increases prospects for effectiveness. By including a fuller range of risks, this approach facilitates the risk management approach called for in the *World Development Report 2014*.

Sources: Carayannis et al. (2014); World Bank (2013).

The complex and changing nature of social violence makes its forms even more difficult to define and measure. Social violence can often include a broad manifestation of some form of grievance, criminal behaviour and interpersonal violence such as homicide, gender-based violence and self-directed violence (WHO, 2002). It can be collective, for instance gangs, or individual, such as intimate partner violence. These multiple shapes of social violence make it especially difficult to measure. The Small Arms Survey has made some good progress on this issue, multisourcing a time series database on violent deaths, which informs the *Global Burden of Armed Violence* report (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2015). These data are producing a global baseline of violent deaths for Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16.1. Importantly, this analysis focuses on global trends in violent deaths as a composite indicator that brings together data on homicide and direct conflict deaths (Box 2.3).

A lack of systematised data makes it difficult to assess and compare the severity of concurrent violence across the world. A broad lens is needed to capture the spillover and interactions among different types of violence and in different contexts. More data on the gender dimensions of violence and conflict are also needed, given the disproportionate impact of violence on women.

Box 2.3. Small Arms Survey data on violence

- Over 2010-15, an average of 535 000 people were killed violently every year.
- The number of people in conflict is growing. The annual average of recorded deaths in 2010-15 rose to 90 000 from 70 000 deaths in 2007-12. Armed conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria are responsible for a large proportion of these deaths.
- The global homicide rate continues to decrease, but not enough to offset the increase in conflict deaths in 2010-15.
- The vast majority (83%) of victims of lethal violence do not die in conflict zones.
- The global distribution of violence is becoming increasingly unequal. Fewer countries are registering high violent death rates (above 20 per 100 000 population), but their average violent death rates are on the rise.
- In absolute numbers, more lives were lost to violence in 2015 in large countries such as Brazil and India, which were not experiencing conflict, than in war-torn Syria.
- Of the 20 countries with high violent death rates in 2015, 11 were not affected by armed conflict.


Source: Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2015).

Finding Two: There is more violence, and it is occurring in surprising places

Violence has been on the rise in recent years. The world has become more violent over the last decade, interrupting a long-term trend of increasing peace (IEP, 2016), and with a significant increase since 2014. In terms of fatalities, 2014 and 2015 were the second-worst and third-worst years since the Cold War (Uppsala University, 2016; Melander, 2015). Over the last 15 years, 53 contexts have been or are now affected by some form of political violence. These comprise 3.34 billion people, or almost half of the world's population.

The emergence of violence in certain locations can surprise. Many contexts now experiencing conflict fatalities have only recently become considered as fragile (e.g. Syria) (Figure 2.2).

Figure 2.2. Political violence event levels and average micromort (likelihood of violent death) selected countries, 2014




Sources: Africa and Asia data (ACLED, 2016); and ACLED Asia Version 1, 2016; Syrian Arab Republic data from Syria Tracker through 2015; Ukraine data, UN.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933441656>

Violence in various forms has also reached epidemic proportions in contexts unaffected by political armed violence and not typically considered fragile (Figure 2.3). According to 2015 figures, 11 out of the 20 contexts with high lethal violence rates were not affected by armed conflict. While fewer countries show high violent death rates (above 20 per 100 000 population), average violent death rates in these countries are on the rise. This widening disparity leads to some surprising results. In 2015, more people died violently in countries outside of conflict, such as Brazil and India, than in Syria in absolute numbers (Small Arms Survey, 2016). The highest homicide and violent crime rates in the world are found in Central America and the Caribbean where urban gang violence and drug-related crime are features of everyday life (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2015).

Figure 2.3. Where is the risk of lethal violence highest?

Contexts where the risk of death from terrorism, conflict and homicide was highest in 2014




Source: Muggah (2016).

Globally, conflict is not the leading cause of violent death. Social violence in the form of homicide can be more deadly than war in some contexts. Of the 37 countries most affected by lethal violence in 2012, 83% were not emerging from or recently experiencing conflict (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2015). The sub-region⁴ most affected by lethal violence is Central America (with a rate of 33.6 violent deaths per 100 000 population), followed by Southern Africa⁵ (31.2), the Caribbean (20.5) and South America (17) (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2015). In fact, one-third of all homicides in the world occur in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), home to just 8% of the world's population (Vilalta, 2015; Szabó de Carvalho and Muggah, 2016). In 2015, El Salvador's murder rate climbed to 103 per 100 000 (ICG, 2016). LAC is the only region in the world where rates of lethal violence have increased since 2000 (UNDP, 2014) and where homicide rates continue to increase (Vilalta, 2015) (Figure 2.4).

A cluster of global murder "hotspots" are found in the Americas, where 46 out of the 50 most violent cities are concentrated. Beyond pockets of extreme homicidal violence, the risk of murder is also more widely distributed than violent deaths associated with terrorism or war. In fact, in the past decade, terror and conflict represented only a portion of all violent deaths: 9 out of every 10 violent deaths were homicides (Muggah, 2016).

Figure 2.4. Average homicide rates per region, 2000 and 2012



Source: Vilalta (2015).

Development and violence are not mutually exclusive. Low- and middle-income countries bear a disproportionately high share of the burden of political and social armed violence, which often impedes development gains (De Martino, 2012). In these contexts, violent conflict and political instability prevent progress towards development targets, such as in South Sudan or Yemen. However, higher-income countries are also affected by high levels of social violence including intimate partner violence, crime and organised crime (such as narcotics and trafficking). Indeed, against a 5% declining global trend in intentional homicide,⁶ the Americas was the only region to show a significant increase (nearly 10%) in a comparison of data for the periods of 2004-09 and 2007-12 (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2015). A major social issue in the United States is the high number of deaths and injuries related to armed violence. These bleak facts suggest that neither development nor wealth assures an escape from violence.

Finding Three: Violence is multidimensional, complex and evolving

Violence is shape-shifting. Even in post-conflict contexts, violence can simply change its form as settings, actors and drivers change. Its versatility in the face of shifting risk landscapes, and ranges of non-state actors, challenges the international community's best intervention efforts. Armed groups and militia organisations, often operating on behalf of political elites, are responsible for an increasing proportion of armed violence. Often they also engage in criminal and social forms of violence, spreading fear and instability while consolidating their own power in the process. A report recently published by the UN University advised the UN to "recognize the political power of criminal groups" in order to limit the influence of organised crime in transitional political processes (Bosetti, Cockayne and de Boer, 2016). The compounding of these security risks, and their continuity in one form or another, challenge the coping capacity of states and societies.

Violence is complex, and responses should not be based on simplistic narratives. Violence does not fit neatly into customary security frameworks or conflict narratives, and is often treated subjectively within different organisations. Approaches that view violence in terms of "perpetrators versus victims" and "criminals versus innocent citizens" are not helpful for understanding the complexity of violence (Adams, 2012). Violence is tremendously

versatile, transforming itself according to changing circumstances and contexts. Responses to violence, then, can inadvertently compound it. Broad punitive measures can sweep up non-violent individuals or fail to account for social norms, motivations and other factors. As a result, they can deepen marginalisation, foster mistrust for the rule of law or incite more violence.

Political transitions, even towards democracy, can provoke violence. As a state moves towards or away from democracy or devolution, the risk of different forms of violence also changes. Civil war violence often emerges from exclusive politics, where large sections of the population are disenfranchised or marginalised. In transitioning and democratising states, competition over “who sits at the table” and “who gets what” can also become violent. The risk of overlapping forms of violence also may increase during transition. The political violence of the Arab Spring was accompanied by sexual and other forms of gender-based violence (SGBV) and gendered repression. In Tunisia, for example, women protesters became the victims of sexual harassment or rape at the hands of security forces (Johansson-Nogués, 2013); in Egypt, politically motivated acts of sexual assault were witnessed in protest spaces (Tadros, 2015; Amar, 2013). Even where the trend is towards democracy, there may be an increased risk of domestic political instability (Choi and Raleigh, 2014). Both decentralisation and power distribution across parliaments, judiciaries and the military tend to increase the number and power of non-regime elites shaping government policy. They also lead to high levels of elite competition and fragmentation over access to state resources and power (Brancati, 2011). In the redistribution of political power, incumbents and opponents have incentives to design forms of violence to assure access to power (Schedler, 2006; Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009; Arriola and Johnson, 2012). Many agents in new democracies depend on violence to create cleavages in society, which elites can manipulate. The transition to democracy can thus dramatically increase the risk of violence, even while lowering the chance of interstate conflict. Studies looking solely at conflict ignore this.

Drivers of violence do not disappear when conflict is over. Political violence has a cyclical nature if the factors that provoked it remain unaddressed. Recent research suggests that factors affecting and producing the likely onset of civil war also influence other forms of non-political violence such as social violence (Rivera, 2016). Armed agents who engage in political violence during wars or periods of domestic instability are highly likely to be involved in organised crime in more peaceful periods, including racketeering, mercenary activity and illicit trafficking. These patterns are evident across both Africa and Asia. Violent actors in conflicts reconstitute themselves in post-conflict periods to take economic and political advantage of fragile and new political environments (von Einsiedel et al., 2014; de Boer and Bosetti, 2015).

The Central African Republic provides a good example of the complexity of violence (Box 2.4).

Box 2.4. Violence and fragility case study: Central African Republic

The Central African Republic (CAR) serves as an example of an acutely fragile state. It experiences long-running and cyclical waves of violence. As most political violence has occurred in rural locations, it has received comparatively little international attention. Conflict levels in 2015 have declined from the most intense periods during 2013 and 2014, and recent political developments (i.e. the holding of elections) may signify a move toward securing more lasting peace. Nevertheless, the underlying dynamics, drivers and agents of recent and ongoing conflict demonstrate key characteristics of violence and its associated challenges.

Box 2.4. Violence and fragility case study: Central African Republic (cont.)

A wide range of violent actors and the many simultaneous forms of violence intersect to create conditions of acute instability, civilian vulnerability and sexual violence in the CAR. Actors include groups such as the Anti-Balaka and Séléka militias that mobilised domestically, as well as the regionally active Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and a host of communal militia groups (Figure 2.5). In 2014, ACLED recorded over 40 discrete non-state conflict agents active in the CAR (ACLED, 2015b). Violent actors include not only rebel groups and militias, but also armed criminal elements, known as zaraguinas. Such groups are not directly party to political negotiations, but have nevertheless severely affected civilian vulnerability and protection (HRW, 2009). This proliferation is a testament to the overlapping forms of violence and conflict affecting the state, and the multidimensional nature of the crisis.

A rise in diverse forms of sexual and gender-based violence by armed groups, intimate partners and international forces is further testament to the multidimensional nature of fragility in the CAR and the overlapping forms of violence there. All parties to the conflict are reported to have used sexual violence to subjugate and humiliate opponents (UN Security Council, 2016). Women and girls have been systematically targeted, with the International Rescue Committee reporting that sexual violence is the biggest fear of women in the CAR (IRC, 2014). There have also been cases of conflict-related sexual violence against men and boys. In addition, women have reported increases in domestic violence. A series of allegations of sexual and abuse and exploitation have also been made against UN and non-UN forces tasked with maintaining peace and security in the CAR, which the UN is investigating (Deschamps, Jallow and Sooka, 2015).

Violence changes form as conditions and actors change. Over time, some of the CAR's violent actors have disbanded and reconstituted themselves. An example is the Séléka coalition. Associated conflict patterns show that violence changed considerably with these transformations. Séléka violence, for instance, has been both more frequent, and more directed at civilians, than the violence attributed to its historical predecessors (Duffy, 2015). These patterns suggest that analyses of violence in Africa need to be more sensitive to complex and evolving conditions on the ground, rather than focusing on religious or ethnic identities as drivers.

A non-neutral and weak state perpetuates fragility. Historically, the state in CAR has struggled to exert its control outside the capital (Bierschenk and de Sardan, 1997). However, fragility should not be seen simply in terms of weak state capacity but also in terms of how particular interests in the conflict benefit from that weakness. The illicit and unregulated exploitation of resources, particular in the extractive sector, has flourished, in part because the state has limited capacity to control such activities. Elites have profited directly (Dalby, 2015; Smith, 2015). The state and its elites should therefore be understood as non-neutral actors. Fragility can serve their economic interests, which in turn may result in the diversion of resources to fund anti-state violence.


Competing militia groups exacerbate fragility and weak state capacity. State security forces have been largely absent in the conflict in the CAR in recent years. In 2013, state forces were reported to be involved in just over 5% of all recorded political violence events; in 2014, they were involved in fewer than 2%, and despite a general increase in insecurity, state forces were involved in just over 3% of conflict events in 2015 (ACLED, 2016). Throughout this time, rebels, militias and international forces played a more significant role. The emergence of local vigilante or so-called "defence" militias like the Anti-Balaka is due in part to the absence or weakness of the state. But the actions of these non-state actors also speak to a wider context of impunity, elite-sponsored violence, and the targeting of civilians in the CAR and other acutely fragile contexts.

Box 2.4. Violence and fragility case study: Central African Republic (cont.)

Conflict in the CAR is highly localised. The geographic profile of violence in the CAR attests to the multiple and localised dynamics of insecurity experienced within a single state. Political violence has been concentrated in the south and west of the country, primarily involving state, international, and Séléka and Anti-Balaka forces. The more limited violence in the north and east has been largely attributed to the Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), which has preyed on populations in eastern CAR, leveraging the limited state presence in this relatively remote region (Cakaj, 2015).

Figure 2.5. Who commits acts of violence in the Central African Republic, and where?

Number of conflict events by actor in the Central African Republic, 2013-15



Source: ACLED (2016).

The CAR conflict has impacts across the region. The successive crises in the CAR have a strong regional dimension, as do the conflicts that affect several other fragile states and contexts in Africa. Regional interest in and influence over domestic CAR politics have shaped the outcome of political contests; neighbouring powers played the role of king maker and regional stakeholders offered support to political actors within the CAR (Marchal, 2015). Additionally, over the past 15 years, the interplay of overlapping crises in the CAR, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan and Sudan has created a dynamic, regional conflict system. The impact of population displacement, in particular, is regional. People, including combatants and former combatants, have sought refuge in the CAR from various crises in Chad, South Sudan and Sudan. As well, persistent cyclical crises in the CAR have resulted in regional and international interventions on numerous occasions (Kilembe, 2015; Olin, 2015).


The effects of the CAR crises also spillover to other countries in the region: more than half of the almost 500 000 people fleeing the most recent conflict in the CAR fled to Cameroon and more than one-fifth fled to other fragile contexts such as Chad and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (WFP, 2015).

Sources: ACLED (2015b; 2016); Bierschenk and de Sardan (1997); Cakaj (2015); Dalby (2015); Duffy (2015); HRW (2009); IRC (2014); Kilembe (2015); Marchal (2015); Olin (2015); Smith (2015); Deschamps, Jallow and Sooka (2015); UN Security Council (2016); WFP (2015).

Finding Four: Violence is increasingly a regional problem

Political armed violence can more easily spillover between states. Global communications and transboundary criminal networks connect armed actors more easily than ever before, allowing for co-operation in motives and resources. Several of the world's most persistent conflicts are regional (Figure 2.6). These include historical conflicts in the Great Lakes region of Africa; Pakistan, India and Afghanistan; and Syria and Iraq, as well as the networked transnational diffusion of violence in northern Nigeria, Cameroon and Chad across the Sahel. Violence affects regional stability, as neighbours' domestic instability spills over borders, driven by linkages between aggrieved or armed groups that may share a common identity, loyalty or objective. Shared ideologies also bond groups across regions. Flows of financial, logistical and troop resources facilitate the linkages, extending the reach and consequences of violence. They also prompt states and armed actors to disregard boundaries, inciting intervention in one another's domestic politics and wreaking devastating havoc on civilians in their wake.

Figure 2.6. Conflict events, Africa 1997-2015



Source: ACLED (2015b).

Violence is networked and knows no borders. The organised crime-political violence nexus allows political armed groups to finance themselves through proceeds from criminal activities, with illegal resource exploitation and the drug trade providing revenue (Hansen, 2014). Even informally organised groups engaging in targeted, armed competition and committing violence for political elites often engage in crime to sustain their own activities. Many of these criminal networks, particularly those engaged in organised illicit trafficking, cross borders. Violence in various forms crosses borders with them. Organised criminal groups, within and among states, exploit networks to corrupt politicians and influence domestic politics. Illicit financial flows also travel across these networks, feeding this negative feedback loop, for example in West Africa (OECD, forthcoming). Connections among types of networked violence enable the continued presence of violence in a variety of contexts. For example, Mali's political violence creates a governance and rule of law vacuum which South American drug cartels exploit for trafficking to European counterparts, prompting an increase in cocaine trafficking through the Sahel as a transit route (Ellis, 2009). This activity ignites local grievances, which Islamist extremists also exploit in the security vacuum, creating a deeper negative spiral of violence (Box 2.5). In this context, nascent lucrative "business opportunities" for violence emerge, such as human trafficking along established drug trafficking routes (Shelley, 2014).

Box 2.5. The globalisation of local conflict: The case of ISIS

The emergence of the subnational movement known as the so-called Islamic State, also referred to as "ISIS", was made possible by pre-existing conflict and the collapse of state control in parts of Iraq and Syria. ISIS has quickly expanded its reach on a regional and international scale. The extremist group exploited possibilities to move fighters, money, oil, supplies and other lucrative resources across borders, which also led to a fundamental change in its strategy. Not only are cross-border activities essential to the group's ability to fund its operations, but borderless information technology allows it to recruit new activists from across the world.

ISIS also strategically spread its attacks to targets outside its region of origin. The group has claimed responsibility for attacks by individuals and affiliates in Belgium, Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, France, Lebanon, Libya, Nigeria, Tunisia, Turkey and the United States, among other places. In addition to this transnational activity, ISIS continues to control parts of Iraq and Syria, and engages in kidnappings and executions of civilians of many nationalities.

Source: Glenn (2016).

Violence drives millions from their homes, thereby extending its impacts to often overburdened neighbouring countries already in distress. Forced displacement is one of the most profound non-lethal impacts of violence. It is a direct consequence of violence in the form of war and persecution. In 2015, 65.3 million people were forcibly displaced worldwide, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); that was the highest level recorded since the refugee organisation was established in 1950, and the figure continues to rise. On average, every minute 24 people had to flee their homes in 2015 (UNHCR, 2016a). Internal displacement associated with conflict and violence has been on an upward trend since 2003. There were 8.6 million new cases during 2015, or an average of 24 000 a day (IDMC, 2016). While the last two years have seen unprecedented numbers of refugees and migrants fleeing fragile and conflict-affected countries to Europe, most refugees are hosted in developing countries, straining these countries' already overburdened capacities. Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, hosts more than 26% of the world's refugees (UNHCR, 2016b). Many refugees flee to countries that are already fragile.

Finding Five: Violence is increasingly driven by domestic political instability

State legitimacy, authority and capacity are primary root causes of political violence. Domestic political factors are among the most challenging causes of violence to effectively analyse and address. Yet the evidence suggests that domestic political dynamics determine whether a society tips into political violence. These may include corruption, financing opportunities, and external and internal shocks such as elections and demographic shifts (Clapham, 1996; Englebert, 2000). Along with poor governance, breakdown of order (Reno, 2011) and weak institutions (Sobek, 2010; Hendrix, 2010; Thies, 2010) these factors interact, creating openings for collective armed violence.

Politically motivated violent conflict has distinct and varied manifestations which differ according to who fights, which political issues are contested, the vulnerability of governments and civilians, the feasibility of long-running conflict, and how likely conflict is to persist, recur and diffuse. Examples of active conflicts reveal significant variations:

- An active civil and transnational war in Syria, where multiple, unaffiliated rebel organisations seek to replace the current regime. In neighbouring Iraq, political elites' create militias to compete with other political agents. These same militias act as both security forces for some communities, and predatory forces in others.
- Multiple, clustered political challenges in countries such as India and the Philippines, where organised armed agents fight the state, but other forms of violence are common and widespread, including local communal conflicts, organised criminal violence, and widespread rioting and protests.
- Challenges to central government legitimacy and capacity in Pakistan and Yemen that stem from a breakdown in the political settlement⁸ between central government and opposition groups.
- Violent stalemates in the Central African Republic and South Sudan, where no single territorial authority exists or has widespread control over multiple armed, organised groups.
- Intractable conflicts including Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where fighting has persisted for decades, and dozens of armed groups compete for local control while co-ordinating, temporarily allying or competing with larger groups.

Weak state structures are a source of violence, potentially leading to a negative feedback loop between political fragility and violence. Weak institutions or those with entrenched patronage systems can create vacuums in which elites are able to siphon off public resources with impunity while also perpetuating economic exclusion. Criminal networks and armed groups can also fill these vacuums, exploiting local grievances while enabling other forms of social violence to spread. In fragile contexts, poor or unequal service provision may fuel unrest or violent crime, particularly when coupled with economic deprivation. Weak governance can also allow non-state actors to create parallel structures, increasing the risk of widespread criminality and related violence. The nature of local authorities differs. Conflicts such as the Chad Basin (Roitman, 2001), the Ituri province conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers, 2004), and the onset of the crisis in northern Mali in 2011 all followed similar trajectories where the withering away of the state allowed local elites to replace state authority (Blattman and Miguel, 2010; Justino, 2012; Justino, Brück and Verwimp, 2013; Kalyvas, 2003, 2008). In parts of Africa and the Middle East, a “rentier political marketplace”, as described by de Waal, is a particular challenge (de Waal, 2014). In these instances, violence, or the threat of violence, is used as a means of political bargaining when the government or political elites do not have a monopoly on the legitimate use of force.

States can use identity politics to incite and exploit sectarian divisions. In fragile contexts, distinctions of ethnicity, religion or livelihood can be more pronounced and are often a source of political identity. As these identities are flexible, allegiances of convenience can form in a changing context, and can transfer long-standing grievances into new causes, and thereby serve as a driver of new forms of violence (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004).

Political inequalities drive violence. A persistent problem is the tension between “excluded” and “included” groups that have different access to, and exercise of, power, with consequences for government policies and related socio-economic inequalities (Stewart, 2011). Exclusion along ethnic lines leads to limited representation in public offices (Bangura, 2006); poorer levels of health and education; greater income inequalities (Stewart, 2008); and limited public good provision (La Porta et al., 1999).⁹ Members of excluded groups are more likely to engage in civil war, particularly if they have recently lost access to power (Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010).

Yet the terms of inclusion can also drive violence. Increasingly, the terms of inclusion within governments – that is, the distribution of positions, authority and resources among included elites – can drive domestic political instability (Fischer, 2008; Lindemann, 2008) and violence. The extent to which the state is a non-neutral, politicised and active agent in conflict is often underestimated. A focus on achieving stability through the inclusion of violent elites can reduce violence levels in the short term, but may increase incentives for violent competition in the longer term. However, new evidence suggests that the effective participation of women in peace processes has increased the likelihood that agreements are reached and maintained over time (UN Women, 2015).

Kenya provides a useful case study of national violent political competition and social violence (Box 2.6).

Box 2.6. Case study on national violent political competition and social violence in Kenya

Kenya illustrates the phenomenon of multiple, interrelated and networked forms of violence. Kenyans overwhelmingly approved a new constitution in 2010, paving the way for political devolution to redress regional inequalities and historic marginalisation as well as to, ultimately, reduce violent competition over the presidency. The country’s post-election violence in late 2007 and early 2008, which brought it to the brink of civil war, influenced the design of the new constitution. However, violence has continued to flare up in many areas of the country.


Spatial variation in subnational politics. Broadly, there are four main types of violence in Kenya: national political violence following ethno-regional splits; subnational political violence and competition around county-level political offices; political violence associated with transnational Islamist groups; and social violence manifest in endemic crime and interpersonal violence that disproportionately affects poor urban neighbourhoods. The map in Figure 2.7 illustrates that communal violence, typically associated with mobilisation along ethno-regional identities, is particularly prevalent in the far north, west and central regions of the country. It also shows that political militia violence is highly centralised, with sporadic violence along the coast. Rebel violence, associated with a violent Islamist insurgency, is primarily concentrated in the eastern region, the coastal areas and the Somali border area. Rioters and protesters are also clustered in the Nairobi area and in central and western parts of the country. State forces’ activity is dispersed throughout the country, but with a markedly lower profile in the far northwest and rural inland areas.

Box 2.6. Case study on national violent political competition and social violence in Kenya (cont.)

National-level political violence centres on competition to control the presidency. It corresponds to Kenya's election cycles, peaking in the build-up to national elections that are held every five years. In the 1990s, officials affiliated with the former ruling party played on long-existing ethno-regional divisions to orchestrate violence designed to intimidate political opponents. A presidential commission of inquiry established to investigate so-called "tribal clashes" in the lead-up to the 1992 and 1997 elections, the Akiwumi Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes (Akiwumi Commission), detailed how the government helped provoke ethnic violence for political purposes and failed to prevent it from escalating into wider conflict (JCITCK, 1999). These ethno-regional tensions came to the fore in Kenya's 2007-08 post-election violence, in which rival coalitions mobilised support from ethnically-rooted political constituencies. The widespread violence over the contested presidential result resulted in more than 1 000 deaths, the displacement of over 500 000 civilians and widespread sexual violence. According to a national, population-based, cluster survey of adults conducted in 2011, compared to pre-election, sexual violence incidents increased over 50-fold during that post-election violence period (to 1 671.8 incidents per 100 000 population from 33.3 per 100 000 population). The incidents included a sharp increase in intimate partner sexual violence, opportunistic sexual violence and, above all, politically motivated sexual violence designed to humiliate, terrorise and break ties to rival groups (Johnson et al., 2014).

Much of the post-election violence was premeditated and mobilised by political and community leaders. Kenyan police were also implicated in approximately 40% of civilian deaths (ICRtoP, n.d.). Evidence from the Commission to Investigate Post-Election Violence (Waki Commission) suggests that at least 26 % of women raped during post-election violence were raped by police officers (HRW, 2011).

Figure 2.7. Violent events by type of actor in Kenya, 2014



Source: Conflict and violence data, ACLED (2015b); crime data, Kenya Police Service (2014); population data, Kenya Bureau of National Statistics (2009).

Box 2.6. Case study on national violent political competition and social violence in Kenya (cont.)

Political violence is rooted in competition over subnational political offices, and access to economic rents associated with these offices. Kenya's constitutional reforms in 2010 laid the groundwork for political devolution. Elections in March 2013 for new county governors, deputy governors and assembly positions then paved the way for devolved administration and governance. The political reforms were meant in part to reduce the potential for political violence concentrated around control of the presidency. However, violence has since flared in the northern and coastal areas of Kenya. The number of conflict events in northern Kenya in 2013 (176) was nearly three times the number recorded (63) for 2007 (ACLED, 2015b). Spikes of high-intensity violence in recent years have further reflected ongoing instability associated with subnational political competition. For example, in August 2012, 118 people were killed and more than 6 000 displaced by violent clashes between Pokomo farmers and Orma herders in Tana River County (HRW, 2012). It was the worst violence to affect Kenya since the 2007-08 post-election violence.

Violence from a localised, transnational insurgency is increasing. Attacks by Al-Shabaab, a Somalia-based militant Islamist organisation, and affiliated groups in Kenya have increased since Kenyan military personnel were deployed to southern Somalia in late 2011. They have killed hundreds of people, mainly in the northeast of the country and coastal areas. The April 2015 siege of the Garissa University College campus, when Al-Shabaab gunmen killed 148 students and faculty members, was Kenya's deadliest attack since the 1998 bombing of the US Embassy in Nairobi. Al-Shabaab has shown itself adept at stoking deeply entrenched grievances among Kenya's ethnic Somali, Muslim and coastal populations, in effect localising its transnational conflict in Kenya.

High levels of urban and social violence manifest in endemic criminal and interpersonal violence. Much of the violence in Nairobi is concentrated in its densely populated informal settlements where an estimated 60% of the city's poorest people live on just over 8% of its land area (UNEP, 2009). Up to two-thirds of the population of these settlements and slums report that they do not feel safe in their neighbourhoods (Goodfellow and Taylor, 2009). The city's wealthier enclaves employ as many as 100 000 private security guards; in the poor areas criminal organisations and vigilante groups purporting to offer protection have become commonplace (Ruteere et al., 2013).

State responses to violence take place in a context in which violence itself has become political currency. Different forms of violence interact in a self-reinforcing chain (Omenya and Lubaale, 2012), meaning that responses to a particular form of violence may be undermined by the persistent use of violence as a negotiation and competition strategy in the wider political environment. This is evident in proliferating subnational political violence that could lead to a worrying mobilisation of militias and gangs by political actors in the lead up to the 2017 elections. While Kenya has enacted laws related to sexual violence and protection orders in cases of domestic violence, incidents are rarely reported or investigated. The Waki Commission received evidence that 82% of victims of sexual violence did not file reports with the police. Thirty-two per cent of these victims cited as a reason that the police themselves were the perpetrators (CIPEV, 2008). Indeed, Human Rights Watch reports that perpetrators have only been prosecuted in a handful of the killings committed during the violence, and that victims of rape, assault, arson and other crimes also await justice (HRW, 2011)

Sources: ACLED (2015b); CIPEV (2008); HRW (2011, 2012); ICRtoP (n.d.); JCITCK (1999); Johnson et al. (2014); Kenya Police Service (2014); Kenya Bureau of National Statistics (2009); Omenya and Lubaale (2012); Goodfellow and Taylor (2009); Ruteere et al. (2013), UNEP (2009).

Finding Six: Civilians, and especially civilian women and children, are most at risk


In both political and social forms of violence, civilians are most at risk.¹⁰ Today 30% to 40% of political violence within states is directed against civilians (ACLED, 2015b). In political armed violence, militias are particularly likely to target civilians. These armed groups are responsible for the majority of fatal attacks on civilians (von Einsiedel et al., 2014). This violence is most acute during periods of domestic political instability

A range of politically motivated actors target civilians with violence. Domestic political instability is often dominated by militias, which seek to renegotiate or change the distribution of political power across elites but not entirely supplant the sitting regime. These differences produce divergent patterns in the targeting and nature of violence across different groups. Labelling a conflict as “ethnic”, “religious” or “resource-based” often diminishes the complexity of these collective groups. It also obscures important similarities and differences across agent type. For example, agent type affects how likely a group is to engage with state forces, target civilians or clash with other non-state groups. Across Africa and select Asian states in 2015, rebel forces typically engaged with the state in over half of their attributed violence, and targeted civilians in just over 20% of actions. In analysing patterns of violence against civilians comparatively, more than half (50.2%) of all anti-civilian violence recorded in 2015 was attributed to political militias, and just 16% of events attributed to rebel groups (ACLED, 2015b).

However, the incidence of interpersonal violence against civilians in many non-conflict contexts can be higher than in countries at war. For example, trade and turf wars between criminal gangs in cities in Brazil, El Salvador, Jamaica and South Africa result in a disproportionately high number of civilian fatalities among the high annual death toll (Banfield, 2014).


Weapons of armed violence designed to cause higher civilian casualties are increasingly available. Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have caused more civilian deaths and injuries than any other type of explosive weapon in the last five years. In 2015, 43 786 people were killed or injured by IEDs; of those 33 307, or 76%, were civilians (Figure 2.8). This percentage rises in populated urban areas, where 92% of those killed or injured by IEDs are civilians. IED attacks are also becoming more lethal. The number of IED incidents decreased by 20% in 2015 (as compared with 2014), meaning fewer IEDs are causing more lethal casualties (AOAV, 2016). These weapons are used in 64 contexts, although their most prevalent use is in Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan and Syria. For example, in Nigeria’s violent landscape, many more civilians are killed and injured by IEDs than armed actors, and the numbers are growing (AOAV, 2016) (Figure 2.9).

Figure 2.8. People killed or injured by improvised explosive devices, 2015



Source: AOAV (2016).

Figure 2.9. Improvised explosive devices deaths and injuries by year in Nigeria, 2011-15



Source: AOAV (2015).

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933441669>

As these types of violence grow more lethal, they disproportionately affect women, youth and children. Adult and young men are predominantly both perpetrators of violence and its main victims. But among civilians, women and children in particular are disproportionately affected by both direct and indirect consequences. The effects of violence on women are different, which must be taken into account. More than half of all global homicide victims are under 30 years old. Much of this violence takes place in urban areas (UNODC, 2013) where poverty and marginalisation are concentrated, and more means for exploitation and violence exist.

Every five minutes, somewhere in the world, a child dies as a result of violence.

Among the most insidious forms of violence is that committed against children. Children experience multiple forms of violence inside and outside the home, with dire consequences. Every five minutes, somewhere in the world, a child dies as a result of violence (UNICEF, 2016a). According to one estimate, at least 275 million children worldwide are exposed to violence in the home with resulting physical injuries, disability or premature death (UNICEF, 2006). Research shows as many as half of all sexual assaults globally are perpetrated against girls under the age of 16 (UNFPA/UNICEF, 2011). Almost one-quarter of 15-19 year-olds have been victims of physical violence (UNICEF, 2016a).

Children bear the longest lasting, and often most severe, consequences of violence. In addition to injuries that affect millions of children and youth directly each year, murder ranks as the fourth leading cause of death among youth globally. Approximately 200 000 young people aged 10-29 years old are victims of homicide (WHO, 2015). The mental and physical health of children exposed to violence and exploitation (at home, school or work or in the community) suffers, and that deeply impacts their overall well-being and future opportunities (Box 2.7). Research shows that children who have been subjected to violence are more likely to become violent themselves (Spano, Rivera and Bolland, 2010). For these reasons, young people also hold the key to ameliorating the inter-generational effects of the same chronic violence that they witness or perpetrate (Batmanglich, 2015).

Box 2.7. The new mental health crisis among displaced Syrian children

More than half of Syrians displaced by the violent upheaval in their country are children, many experiencing mental trauma with long-lasting effects. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has found that among the anxiety disorders caused by exposure to violence, post-traumatic stress disorder was most common in children and affects more than 50% of them. A study for International Medical Corps found 54% of the displaced had severe emotional disorders and 27% of these children faced developmental challenges.

Source: Karasapan (2016); Save the Children (2014); UNHCR (2015a); Weissebecker and Leichner (2015).

Protracted conflicts have a profound impact on children. The escalation of conflicts in Afghanistan, Somalia, South Sudan and Syria has been especially devastating to children (UN General Assembly, 2016). In Yemen child recruitment is becoming a problem; children are often the victims when schools and hospitals are attacked. Children also are increasingly being recruited as suicide bombers. The Iraqi Independent Commission for Human Rights, for example, found that in the six months from November 2014 to May 2015, extremists trained 1 000 Iraqi children to be suicide bombers (AOAV, 2015; UNICEF, 2016b). A similar trend is seen in Syria where over half the verified cases of children recruited in 2015 were under 15 years old, some as young as 7 (UNICEF, 2016c).

Intimate partner violence is estimated to cost USD 4.4 trillion or, 5.18% of world GDP – more than political violence and interpersonal violence (homicides) combined.

Sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), and especially intimate partner violence, is extremely prevalent across conflict, non-conflict, low- and high-income contexts. It poses an immense burden across conflict-affected contexts and societies considered “peaceful”. Globally, an estimated 35% of women have experienced either physical and/or sexual intimate partner violence or non-partner sexual violence in their lifetime (WHO, 2016). Regarding intimate partners, little change in prevalence has been observed over time and regions, although it is not reliably tracked. In countries with low rates of female homicide, intimate partners make up the majority of perpetrators, in some cases over 60% (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2015). Intimate partner violence is estimated to cost USD 4.4 trillion, or 5.18% of world GDP – more than political violence and interpersonal violence (i.e. homicides) combined. Interpersonal violence is estimated to cost USD 1.245 trillion, or 1.44% of world GDP (Hoeffler and Fearon, 2014).


The impact of violence on civilian women is particularly striking in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). The Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2015) reported that five of the seven countries with “very high” rates of homicide against women are in LAC. Most violence against women in the region is at the hands of intimate partners, and is often non-lethal but sustained over long periods of time. A comparative analysis of data from 12 countries in LAC found that 17% to 53% of women, depending on the country, experienced intimate partner sexual and physical violence. Key risk factors include controlling behaviour by the partner, alcohol consumption and experiences of domestic violence in childhood, meaning that violence begets violence (Bott et al., 2012) The Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) estimates that in countries throughout LAC, violence against women is associated with a loss of between 1.6% and 3.7% of GDP (IADB, 2016).

While sexual and gender-based violence is prevalent across “peaceful” societies, political violence can further aggravate it. Sexual violence can be employed as a weapon of war – a deliberate strategy by armed groups to torture and humiliate opponents; terrify individuals; destroy societies; incite flight from a territory; and reaffirm aggression, brutality and domination (Bastick, Grimm and Kunz, 2007). Gender norms also drive SGBV and contribute to other forms of violence and conflict (Saferworld, 2014). Although men comprise most of homicide victims (by predominantly male perpetrators), women are the majority of victims of intimate partner homicide. By highlighting these dynamics, a gender perspective points to the connections between political and social violence, between violence in times of peace and conflict, and between violence at all levels of society.

Over half of the 21.3 million refugees in the world today are children under the age of 18. In 2015, unaccompanied or separated children, many fleeing violent conflict, submitted 98 400 asylum requests – the largest number ever recorded (UN General Assembly, 2016). Displaced children are vulnerable to sexual violence, forced marriage, abduction and human trafficking (UN General Assembly, 2016). Every day children around the world are exposed to some form of violence with long-term and devastating consequences, affecting their physical and mental health, their education and their overall well-being. The effects are lasting for the child and the family. It may take generations for the family to recover.

Youth violence is driven by an interplay of risk factors most prevalent in fragile communities with the highest concentrations of poverty. Those factors include the presence of local trade in small arms and drugs, organised violent groups (e.g. gangs), high unemployment rates, and economic and political marginalisation (WHO, 2015). Youth recruitment into criminal, terrorist or armed political groups tends to be based on similar factors. It is more often a result of unemployment, self-protection, lack of respect or idleness (World Bank, 2011a) than ideology, belief in a cause or revenge. For example, research by the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) revealed religion and ideology are not the main drivers for recruits to Al-Shabab in Somalia; rather it is the promise of a good salary (Anyadike, 2016). As a livelihood coping strategy, this can be directly linked to poverty but also to other forms marginalisation (Figure 2.10).

Figure 2.10. Youth violence risk factors



Source: US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2015).

Violent extremism and radicalisation are attributed to a combination of factors. On the one hand, there are “push” factors including unemployment, poverty, clan/social/political marginalisation, corruption and youth frustration. On the other hand, “pull” factors appeal to the individual and include access to material resources, weapons and protection, a sense of belonging and empowerment and strong governance (Glazzard et al., 2016).


Finding Seven: Urban violence is becoming the new norm

The rise in urban violence will continue. Over the past 20 years, rural violence has been declining while violence is becoming increasingly concentrated in urban areas (Raleigh, 2015). Governance, security and services have not kept pace with rapid population growth in urban areas, providing opportunity, means and space for non-state actors to vie for political power and patronage. Criminal networks can then take root more easily, enabling illicit flows of arms or drugs. Concentrated pockets of violence can appear as youth criminal gangs or militias emerge. Together, they can cause localised social discord, increased interpersonal violence, heightened risk of youth recruitment, and deteriorating overall safety and security.

Various forms of violence most strikingly collide in cities, creating a negative cycle of mutually reinforcing factors that pose the greatest risks to civilians. Political violence is more prevalent where it coincides with poverty, inequality and poor rule of law, and where its implications and risks can multiply. For example, densely populated urban areas in Africa experience almost twice the rate of political violence than rural areas and other towns. However, when factoring in social, interpersonal and criminal-related violence, 45 of the top 50 most violent cities are actually found in North, Central and South America (Muggah, 2015).

The biggest cities in fragile contexts are likely to be the world’s most vulnerable (de Boer, 2015). But the world’s biggest cities are not necessarily the most fragile (Igarapé Institute, 2016). Many cities with rapid growth rates may be at higher risk than the 35 “megacities” and 600 “large cities”. Research finds that properties of risk and resilience are present in all cities, irrespective of location; this intensifies when risks and stresses accumulate (Igarapé Institute, 2016). A map of the world’s major cities is shown in Figure 2.11.

Figure 2.11. Global city distribution, populations over 500 000, 2015



Source: Satterthwaite and McGranahan (2014); International Institute for Environment and Development (2016); IIED interactive at www.iied.org/cities-interactive-data-visual.

Violence is especially visible in cities where a lack of growth, security and welfare is associated with higher levels of conflict and violence (Muggah, 2015; Vidal, 2015). Rapid and unregulated urbanisation, income and social inequality, concentrated poverty, youth unemployment, policing and justice deficits, and real and perceived insecurity are all factors (Muggah, 2015). Countries in Latin America and the Caribbean are among the most urbanised in the world, with more than 80% of the region's population living in cities. This contributes to the region's high homicide rates. The vast majority of homicides globally are concentrated in fast-growing mid- and large-sized cities of the Americas.

Individual and collective forms of violence co-exist in urban areas. This is most evident where the capacity gaps in providing basic and accountable security services are a key determinant in shaping urban violence. For example, Soares and Naritomi (2010) observed the influence of low incarceration rates, among other factors, in shaping "cultures of impunity". Riots and protests also overwhelmingly occur in urban contexts (ACLEd, 2015b), where population, power and wealth are most concentrated and municipal authorities are often ill-equipped to cope. In addition, states and cities that have failed to reform their security sectors after conflicts are exposed to complex forms of violence.


Urbanisation can act as a trigger for violence. Economic development brings rural poor to cities where they often live in slums. In the Sustainable Development Goal period a huge demographic shift will occur towards urban areas. The most populated cities in the world are also likely to be where structural inequalities and social exclusion become more apparent.

Within cities, violence is unevenly distributed, and particularly acute in lower-income informal areas (Muggah, 2012). In Bogota, for example, roughly 98% of all homicides occur in less than 2% of street addresses (Igarapé Institute, 2015). By contrast, the middle and upper classes more commonly experience abductions and disappearances, even though they often resort to private security for self-protection (Alvarado and Santiso, 2015).

Economic, political and social violence also occur in large towns and on the edges of cities. Upwardly mobile populations and marginalised social groups, breaking free of village hierarchies and gaining access to urban and peri-urban employment, often come into conflict with traditional urban elites whose dominance is threatened. In India, for example, riots and protests account for over 75% of the country's violence (ACLEd, 2016). Incidents of social instability are geographically widespread, but are especially prevalent in Jammu and Kashmir, as well as Gujarat, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. A significant proportion of these incidents occur in cities with a population of larger than 1 million people.

Politically violent actors take advantage of geography for attacks, retribution and recruitment. Political violence tends to cluster in strategic and target areas where opposing forces can openly contest each other, such as large towns and cities and areas with high road mass and dense populations (Raleigh and Hegre, 2009). Cities have large, potentially aggrieved populations available to participate in and potentially support conflict (Goldstone, 2002; Urdal and Hoeschler, 2012). Peripheral and distant areas are more likely to experience the emergence of insurgent and separatist actions (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Armed battles are also more common in rural areas, while urban areas see more riots and protests (Figure 2.12). New spaces of violence are the result of new agendas, actors (e.g. gangs and militias) and organised responses to violence (Rodgers, 2009).

Figure 2.12. Political violence and protest data by urban and rural location



Source: ACLED (2015b).

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Several countries most affected by conflict will see rapid population growth in their cities before 2030. According to some projections, the urban populations of Bangladesh, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia and Pakistan will grow by up to 50 million by 2030 (UN DESA, 2014). Traditional aid approaches focused on armed conflict at the national level need to realign accordingly. In light of these stark assessments, it appears likely that future crises in the SDG era will be more likely to occur in cities.

Finding Eight: Violent extremism and terrorism are on the rise

Forms of terrorism or extremist acts against civilians are increasingly common features of violent conflict. Terrorism occurs far more often within established conflicts and as such, these are where most terrorism victims are found. Terrorism-related deaths rose by 61% in 2013, encompassing 18 000 victims of terrorist attacks globally; most victims were in Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan and Syria (IEP, 2015). Women and girls are particular victims of this form of violence: religious extremist groups attack the rights of women and girls, and have been associated with notable increases in forced marriage, restrictions on education and participation in public life, and systematic sexual and gender-based violence (UN Women, 2015).

The global scale of Islamist extremism is also of concern. The outbreak of violent extremist networks claiming Islamist ideology has led to politically motivated and criminal violence across a vast region of territory in the Sahel region of Africa, North Africa and the Middle East in particular. In Iraq and Syria, as well as in Mali, northern Nigeria, Somalia and the Sahel, religious extremists are sowing widespread violence, frequently using terror tactics. Although the underlying drivers of violent conflict may not be new, this ideology-based violence reflects recent shifts and adaptations (Dowd, 2015). These extremist groups have been able to mobilise large numbers of fighters under a transnational Islamist identity rather than a narrower communal, national or ethnic identity. This, in turn, has improved their ability to attract financial, logistical and troop support for global violent actions. Claiming opportunities to create alternative governance structures under Islamist rule in collapsing or profoundly fragile contexts has also been a useful mobilisation strategy.

Violence also stems from other forms of extremist ideology. Extremist groups come in many forms, whether nationalist, right wing or left wing, religious, racist or based in other ideology. They can all spread and promote hatred, and may contribute to violence by condoning it or directly advocating it. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, citing lessons of history, warned in September 2016 of the danger of xenophobia and bigotry becoming “weaponized” as “bigots, populists and political fantasists” use “half-truths and oversimplification to spread toxic hatred” (OHCHR, 2016).

Terror is increasingly a tactic to further a range of political aims and not a separate form of violence. While terrorism is often considered a separate and distinct form of political violence, it is more accurately understood as a tactic employed within and across different forms of conflict. Any armed, organised agents can engage in the use of terror to mount large-scale attacks on civilians. Terror tactics are commonly used in contexts where violence is already present. In spaces and periods of domestic political instability, agents employ terror tactics against local populations; in civil and transnational wars, the use of terror tactics against transnational or global targets and populations is common.

Extremist groups such as Boko Haram and the so-called Islamic State rebrand pre-existing local conflicts or grievances as global causes. The reach of extremist groups is expanding, but there is no global consensus on whether or how to engage these groups in negotiations about peaceful means of addressing grievances.

Finding Nine: The cost of violence is rising

Beyond mortality and physical injury, the effects of violence are far-reaching and can have devastating impact (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2015). Its costs also continue to manifest over time. The immediate consequences are mortality, injury and displacement. In the medium term violence affects the health and viability of individuals and their productive capacity. Over the longer term it throws up obstacles to social and economic development and overall well-being. Moreover, the psychological wellness of individuals and households is severely compromised with exposure to violence, as vulnerabilities are transferred to the broader society. Violence threatens the resilience capacity of a society by sapping social capital (e.g. through forced displacement) and economic capital (e.g. financial losses and security costs, damage to infrastructure). Although violence may disproportionately affect fragile contexts with high poverty rates, its high costs are also borne by middle- and high-income contexts not considered fragile.

However, poverty does have a relationship with conflict. Some evidence shows that violent conflict is most likely to break out in low-income areas, even if the state overall is not particularly poor, and in areas that diverge significantly from national income averages (Buhaug et al., 2011). Poorer areas are more likely to witness increased conflict-related deaths (Do and Iyer, 2010); and higher levels of poverty lead to higher rates of homicide (Chon, 2011; Pridemore, 2008; Moser and McIlwaine, 2006). Some studies have found a close relationship between certain forms of conflict (for example, lower-intensity conflict) and poverty, for example in Indonesia (Pradhan, Barron and Kaiser, 2004); as well as variation in the significance of poverty at various stages of conflict (Sánchez and Chacón, 2005, Murshed and Gates, 2004).

Economic opportunities and individual-level inequality show a stronger relationship in incentivising social violence participation. Evidence from Central and South America suggests that crime and theft are driven by economic motivations (Moser and Winton, 2002), and that high levels of grievances linked to economic opportunities lead to increased gang violence (Sizemore, 2014). There is also a higher likelihood that individual-level inequality is related to social violence or violent crime (Chon, 2011; Fajnzlyber, Lederman and Loayza, 2000, 2002).

The global cost of violence is staggering. The Institute of Economics and Peace (IEP), which provides a global aggregate of the costs of violence containment, reports the global economic impact of violence was a daunting USD 13.6 trillion in 2015, equivalent to 13.3% of global GDP or USD 1 876 for every person in the world (IEP, 2016) (Figure 2.13). In its *World Development Report 2011*, the World Bank found that “poverty reduction in countries affected by major violence is on average nearly a percentage point lower per year than in countries not affected by violence” (World Bank, 2011b). It has been estimated that the global cost of homicide in 2010 was USD 171 billion and that roughly USD 2 trillion in global violence-related economic losses could have been saved had homicides rates dropped to what are termed “normal” levels (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2015).

Figure 2.13. Economic cost of violence



Source: IEP (forthcoming).


Individual social forms of violence cost the world more than collective political violence. Writing for the Copenhagen Consensus, Hoeffler and Fearon (2014) estimated interpersonal violence (e.g. homicides) at USD 1.245 trillion; intimate partner violence USD 4.4 trillion; and reported sexual violence against women as USD 66.7 billion. Strikingly, intimate partner violence alone carries a greater global cost than collective political violence and homicides combined (Hoeffler and Fearon, 2014). This evidence makes a clear case for focusing on prevention, and on intimate partner violence in particular, as a development priority. Development policies and violence intervention measures without a gender component will ultimately fail to make any meaningful differences in the incidence and consequences of this costliest form of violence.

Yet development assistance invests only marginally in violence reduction outside of conflict. Programmes aimed at preventing conflict and building and sustaining peace are chronically under-prioritised and underfunded (Hoeffler and Fearon, 2014). Social violence faces even greater gaps, in part because, as Cockayne (2013) describes it, “its heaviest costs fall on those furthest from the outsiders’ gaze: the children who are killed working corners for drug gangs, and the wives and women terrorized by the violent male criminal culture”.

The long-term cost of violence far exceeds the estimated cost of prevention. Violence is costly – in terms of conflict-related GDP loss; military spending; aid to displaced people and refugees; private security for businesses and individuals; and spending on law enforcement and internal security. A recent study estimates the consolidated costs associated with

various forms of violence against children, for example, to be as high as USD 7 trillion (Pereznieta et al., 2014). This startling figure reveals the magnitude of the toll incurred by children due to physical, psychological and sexual violence.¹¹ The annual global costs from children's association with armed forces or groups can be up to USD 144 million (Pereznieta et al., 2014). These costs far exceed the estimated investments believed necessary for the prevention of that violence. If global violence were to decrease by 10% uniformly, an additional USD 1.43 trillion would effectively be incorporated into the world economy each year. This is more than six times the total value of Greece's bailout and loans (IEP, 2015).

Box 2.8 shows some of the key numbers involved in violence and conflict.



Finding Ten: Violence is a behaviour reinforced by social norms which acts like a contagion


Violence is an epidemic and is contagious. Research reveals that violence behaves like an epidemic, sharing the same characteristics of clustering, spread and transmission (Slutkin et al., 2015). Violence clusters occur in “hot spots” where people have been exposed to violence – just as cholera typically clusters around water sources where people are exposed to bacteria that cause the disease. It can mimic epidemic spread across time or geographically across space, and has a transmission mechanism in which exposure correlates to risk: those exposed to violence are at increased risk of perpetuating it themselves (Spano, Rivera and Bolland, 2010).

Recurring cycles of violence persist because of regular exposure to violence. Violence of all types increases immediately following conflict when community violence and spouse and child abuse are higher (Dubow, Huesmann and Boxer, 2009). Children who are exposed to violence are more likely to engage in violence than children who have not been exposed, and the likelihood of involvement in violence increases when exposed to higher amounts of violence (i.e. “dose dependence”) (Spano, Rivera and Bolland, 2010). Because all behaviour is contagious, exposure to violence leads to unconscious modelling and adoption of like behaviour (DuRant et al., 1994; Kelly 2010). Repeated over multiple exposures and viewed collectively, this raises the risk. At the same time it creates social norms in which social pressure and a permissive environment condone, and even encourage, violent responses to even minor disagreements, particularly in areas of chronic violence (Slutkin et al., 2015). These social norms reinforce this contagion by encouraging violent behaviour to spread (Cure Violence, 2016).

Drawing insights and lessons from the health approach may be useful in guiding violence prevention efforts in conflict and non-conflict settings. Strategies associated with disease control have yielded dramatic results, detecting and “interrupting” conflicts, identifying and treating the highest risk individuals, and changing social norms in violence hotspots in North, Central and South America (Slutkin, 2015). Independent evaluations have demonstrated reductions in shootings and killings in a range of 41% to 73%. These contributed to gradual shifts in social norms and expectations (Skogan et al., 2009). The approach to violence programmes can benefit from applying the knowledge that relationships between perpetrator and victim can shift, and that violence is a learned behaviour reinforced by norms. Where perpetrators are the products of a learned undesirable behaviour in contexts where violence may have come to be accepted as “normal”, it can be effective to shift responses to treat the causes and means of its transmission, rather than its manifestations and symptoms.

Understanding violence in epidemiological terms may unlock new insights and solutions. By using the same approach that the WHO uses to stop epidemics – interrupt transmission, change behaviour, change norms – policy makers can gain more traction upstream before the violence is able to manifest. This breaks the recurrent cycle of violence, stopping its “transmission”. Treating violence with a health approach shifts the optimal point of intervention where prevention is viable and enables mitigation efforts to intercept the contagion immediately (Figure 2.14). This represents a paradigm shift in thinking about violence as an inevitable condition; as only a domestic law enforcement, political or international security problem; or as related only to underlying causes or under-development. The strategy is relevant for political or social violence contexts where community and individual resilience to violence is made possible.

Figure 2.14. Violence in disease – a control model



Source: Adapted from Cure Violence (n.d).

Notes

1. Characterised by those with over 1 000 battle deaths per year.
2. From 4 to 11. These are: Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Libya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria and Ukraine.
3. In this chapter, domestic political instability refers to the contest among elites, their respective agents or non-governmental insurgent groups that seek to strengthen their position within a domestic political system.
4. The Geneva Declaration Secretariat defines sub-regions in line with the UN Statistics Division classification: Eastern, Middle, Northern, Southern and Western Africa; Caribbean, Central America and South America; Northern America; Central, Eastern, Southern, South-Eastern and Western Asia; Eastern, Northern, Southern and Western Europe; Australia and New Zealand, Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia. See <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm>.
5. The Southern African countries are Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland.
6. In this report, homicide refers to “intentional homicide”, which UNODC defines as “unlawful death purposefully inflicted on a person by another person”. See, for example, www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/IHS-rates-05012009.pdf.
7. A political elite is a group of people that represents an important political, social or economic interest. Their types and number vary across political contexts, and include formal government figures such as national representatives (e.g. senators and cabinet members), regional governors, mayors of large cities, traditional authorities of large ethnic communities, leaders of militias or rebel groups, top military personnel, representatives from resource wealthy areas and business leaders, and opposition party leaders. The identification of elites is possible through multiple metrics including the effective political parties, cabinet positions, traditional authorities and veto players. This information can be leveraged to determine the distribution of power and influence of subnational and regime authorities throughout the state.
8. A political settlement refers to the agreed power distribution between elites. It is also commonly called the “elite bargain”.
9. Contrary to perceptions of state inclusion, favouritism and nepotism, communities with co-ethnics in power do not consistently have disproportionate access to powerful positions or public goods over other areas without such standing (Kasara, 2007; Arriola, 2009; Francois, Rainer and Trebbi, 2014). Hence, the “exclusion” argument can be quite difficult to prove.
10. The international community has increasingly focused on protection of civilians (PoC) as a priority, and the UN Security Council (2015) confirmed it intends to build PoC into its mandates in contexts of political violence where civilians are at significant risk. PoC featured in UN deployments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan and Darfur, and in the NATO intervention in Libya, as well as in the failure of intervention in Syria (Wilmot et al., 2016).
11. Other associated social service, judicial or health costs are excluded from this estimate due to lack of data.

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Chapter 3

The OECD fragility framework

by

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This chapter outlines the OECD’s multidimensional fragility framework, and reviews the results for 2016. After a brief discussion of the background to the framework, and the consultative process undertaken, the chapter outlines the purpose and intended use of the fragility framework. Next is a discussion of the dimensions of fragility – economic, environmental, political, security and societal – and an overview of the methodology involved in the calculations, with cautions over data constraints. The 2016 results, those 56 contexts identified as fragile or extremely fragile on the basis of a synthesis of results in the 5 dimensions, are presented. Following on from this, the chapter looks at the group of 56 in terms of population, regional clustering, macroeconomic conditions (GDP, inflation, poverty and extreme poverty), and in relation to urbanisation rates. Together, this overview provides a snapshot of fragility in the world today.

Background to the OECD fragility framework

In keeping with the OECD mission to provide “better policies for better lives”, the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) aims to help design the best policies to advance development in fragile contexts and therefore to enable a sustainable exit from poverty and insecurity. To inform this effort, the OECD has, since 2005, monitored development progress and resource flows in fragile contexts.

Until 2014, the OECD used a “fragile states list” to distinguish “fragile” and “other” developing countries and territories. The list combined the Harmonized List of the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the African Development Bank, and the Fragile States Index of the Fund for Peace. This binary approach offered several advantages. It allowed for comparisons between fragile and other developing countries and made it possible to draw attention to the fragile group’s specific needs and challenges.

The limitations of using a list, however, have become evident over time. Firstly, there is a growing recognition that fragility is multidimensional. Further, fragility is not only relevant to developing countries; its challenges are universal, as recognised in the post-2015 development framework, which provided an important impetus to reconsider and reassess how fragility should be framed and monitored. The OECD is therefore now committed to a universal, multidimensional fragility framework.

The working model published in the 2015 *States of Fragility* report was a first step. It was built on five dimensions that were drawn in part from the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The model presented fragility as multidimensional, and existing in many different “shades” or “states” and potentially in all contexts. The working model was welcomed as an innovative and timely move towards a more nuanced understanding of fragility.

At the same time, more thought needed to be given to the dimensions of fragility and the ways in which they are measured. Further, some in the international community raised concerns that eliminating the list would cause practical problems for donor agencies that use it in connection with aid programmes and policy making. In consideration of these concerns, the OECD sought guidance from a range of experts on refining the model (Box 3.1). The outcome of that process of in-depth consultations is the revised 2016 fragility framework used in this report. This framework also forms the basis for the analysis of fragility and of financial flows to fragile contexts.

Box 3.1. Consultations on the OECD fragility framework

The OECD held a series of expert workshops to refine its fragility framework in late 2015. The workshops were held in Berlin on 15 October, in Abidjan on 19 October, in Washington, DC on 23 November, and in Paris on 16 December 2015. The International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) provided further input at the meeting of its Knowledge and Policy Task Team in January 2016, and feedback received at the World Bank’s Fragility, Conflict and Violence Forum in March 2016 was also integrated. As part of the consultative process, the OECD also hosted a series of blog posts about measuring fragility, available on its Institutions and Stability website at <http://g4dpblog.blogspot.fr>.

A framework to support advocacy, monitoring and reporting, and policy response

Unlike the World Bank with its Harmonized List of Fragile Situations or the African Development Bank with its list of “transition countries”, the OECD does not use the fragility framework to determine funding of any specific programmes. Nor do the OECD Development Assistance Committee members tend to use the OECD framework for financing decisions. In addition, the framework is not intended to displace the important role of the g7+ group of fragile contexts, a strong and respected platform working in concert with international development partners, the private sector, civil society, the media and people across countries, borders and regions to reform international engagement in development in their member countries (Box 3.2)

Box 3.2. The g7+ group of fragile contexts

The g7+ is a group of 20 fragile contexts whose collective mission is to support members to achieve transitions towards resilience and next stages of development, by engaging with actors at both the national and international level. Drawing on shared experiences, the g7+ comes together to form one united voice to advocate for country-led and country-owned peacebuilding and statebuilding processes to address conflict and fragility. In doing so, the g7+ envisages the development of capable, accountable and resilient states that respond to the expectations and needs of their populations. The group’s priorities are articulated by the five Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs), which were outlined in the 2010 Dili Declaration of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding. By prioritising these goals with the support of the international community, the g7+ aims to bid goodbye to conflict, and welcome development.

Source: g7+ website at www.g7plus.org.

Many of those who participated in the consultations leading to this report saw one of the OECD’s comparative advantages as acting as a broker of an independent, data-driven approach to describing fragility. The experts consulted expect the OECD fragility framework to serve three purposes:

1. **Advocacy:** to help policy makers to raise the profile of a group of countries, or contexts, and of specific issues pertinent for fragility on the global stage.
2. **Monitoring and reporting:** to identify a pool of fragile or high-risk contexts that should be monitored in terms of development outcomes, financing and policies, etc.
3. **Policy response and risk management:** to guide policies at the macro level, disseminate policy ideas and help move from risk avoidance to better risk management.

Overall, the framework should be a driver of change. It should also have an incentivising effect for those contexts affected by, or at risk of, fragility and for their partners committed to addressing fragility.

It is not expected, however, that the framework will become an operational tool (e.g. to provide detailed context analysis for programming decisions, determine hazard payment levels for staff or to orient travel restrictions). Most OECD member countries have their own assessment methods for this more detailed planning, often involving in-depth country assessments.

A model expected to be universal, transparent, responsive and simple

There are many measures of peace, stability, democracy, well-being, conflict, risk and livelihoods that can complement the fragility framework. Consultations that the OECD undertook showed that experts expect the OECD fragility framework to:

- **Be universal, not taking income levels as an input, or distinguishing between developing and other countries.** Other models tend to be blind to fragility in higher capacity middle-income countries, even though some of the largest and longest-standing subnational armed conflicts and violence occur in such contexts.
- **Be public, transparent and replicable through the availability of underlying data.** Many donors use their own models to assess fragility and do not share them publicly for reasons of political sensitivity.
- **Use terminology that is better adapted to its various audiences.** There is no commonly agreed definition of fragility, and countries often object to being labelled “fragile”.
- **Be responsive.** The model should capture a snapshot in time but also allow regular updates through the tracking of improvements or deteriorations in individual contexts.
- **Be global in coverage, but rely on complementary analyses for more detail.** The framework should allow for a global overview and for a certain degree of cross-country comparability.
- **Be multidimensional yet simple.** It should take account of the complex factors contributing to fragility, but remain simple and understandable by focusing on the most significant dimensions of fragility.
- **Be built on expert judgement informed by empirical research rather than political goals.** A clear outcome of the consultations was a common view that the OECD fragility framework should derive from expert observations and empirical research, rather than a political agenda such as the Sustainable Development Goals or the Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals.

The new fragility framework

The new OECD fragility framework represents a major shift in how fragility is conceptualised (Box 3.3). Previous approaches framed fragility as a state’s weak capacity to carry out basic governance functions and to develop mutually constructive relations with its citizens. Critics say this state-centric approach focused too strongly on Western concepts of formal governance. While formal governance is necessary, many argue that the state of governance is not – by itself – sufficient to determine fragility. For example, informal institutions and hybrid forms of governance can provide resilience in the absence of a fully functioning state (Boege et al., 2008; Kaplan, 2008; Menkhaus, 2010).

The new OECD framework links fragility with a combination of risks and coping capacities rather than focusing primarily on weak governance. Risks are hazards, threats and vulnerabilities that are generated within a society or polity and/or are driven by external factors or events. Coping capacities refer to mechanisms that can help absorb, withstand or prevent shocks from setting off a negative chain reaction (World Bank, 2013) host of opportunities arise constantly. With them, however, appear old and new risks, from the possibility of job loss and disease to the potential for social unrest and environmental damage. If ignored, these risks can turn into crises that reverse hard-won gains and endanger the social and economic reforms that produced these gains (World Bank, 2013). As such, fragility is defined as:

Fragility is the combination of exposure to risk and insufficient coping capacity of the state, system and/or communities to manage, absorb or mitigate those risks. Fragility can lead to negative outcomes including violence, the breakdown of institutions, displacement, humanitarian crises or other emergencies.

The OECD fragility framework considers not only current exposure to negative events such as natural disasters and armed conflict but also capacity to cope with likely future negative events. This multidimensional framework is consistent with recent work regarding the conceptualisation of fragility and risk (de Boer, 2015; World Bank, 2013) and offers the advantage of a more comprehensive perspective. Coping capacities, for instance, encompass the functioning of the state as well as informal mechanisms within a community or society. The framework is relevant universally. Each context experiences its own unique combinations of risks and coping capacities.

The new framework considers five dimensions of fragility based on classic contextual risk typology. The choice of these dimensions, which are listed in Table 3.1, is based on expert judgement and is one of the key outcomes of the consultation process reflected in this report.

Table 3.1. Five dimensions of fragility

Dimension	Description
Economic	Economic fragility is vulnerability to risks stemming from weaknesses in economic foundations and human capital including macroeconomic shocks, unequal growth and high youth unemployment. Risk factors measured include resource rent dependence; the number of vulnerably employed as a proportion of total employment; government debt; the number of youth not employed or in education or training; aid dependency; GDP growth; and the rate of unemployment. Coping capacity indicators include education levels, government regulatory ability, the extent of remoteness from world markets, and the number of men and women in the labour force. Food security is also important to support the broader economic environment.
Environmental	Environmental fragility is vulnerability to environmental, climatic and health risks that affect citizens' lives and livelihoods. Risk factors can be external or internal, including exposure to natural disasters; air, water and sanitation quality; prevalence of infectious disease; number of uprooted people; and vulnerability of household livelihoods. Climate change increases vulnerability to environmental risks in many fragile contexts. Risks are mitigated by coping capacities in the form of strong civil society, strong rule of law and governance, and food security.
Political	Political fragility is vulnerability to risks inherent in political processes, events or decisions; political inclusiveness (including of elites); and transparency, corruption and society's ability to accommodate change and avoid repression. Risk factors include regime persistence, state-sponsored violence or political terror, and levels of corruption. Coping capacities that mitigate risks broadly relate to institutions of governance such as elections, judicial and legislative constraints on power, and government accountability. The legislative framework for rape and domestic violence is also an important measure reflecting the responsiveness of the polity to a major source of fragility.
Security	Security fragility is the vulnerability of overall security to violence and crime, including both political and social violence. Risks are measured by the homicide rate, level of violent organised crime, number of deaths from non-state actors or terrorism, number of battle deaths from conventional warfare, and levels of domestic violence. Indicators of coping capacity include the number of police and armed security officers as a proportion of population, the presence of the rule of law, the extent to which the state has control over territory, and the presence of formal alliances associated with lower interstate conflict.
Societal	Societal fragility is vulnerability to risks affecting societal cohesion that stem from both vertical and horizontal inequalities, including inequality among culturally defined or constructed groups and social cleavages. Risk indicators include income inequalities (vertical) and social inequalities related to gender, growth in urbanisation and numbers of displaced people. Important societal coping-capacity variables include the robustness of civil society, the extent to which citizens have access to justice to address grievances and a voice, and state-society accountability.

Box 3.3. The OECD fragility framework: What it is and what it is not

The OECD fragility framework is the second version of a new conceptual approach to understanding fragility. It revises the working model that was presented in the 2015 *States of Fragility* report, a model that – for the first time – presented a nuanced view of fragility, departing from previous approaches that quantitatively categorised states and territories in black and white, either as fragile or non-fragile. The 2015 model resulted in a Venn diagram that ranked fragile contexts across multiple dimensions.

While the 2015 model was a positive step, it had drawbacks. In the absence of a fragile states list, interpretability became a challenge. Determination of which contexts to include on the Venn diagram still required setting an arbitrary “fragile” vs. “non-fragile” contexts threshold (set in 2015 as the 50 most fragile across each of 5 fragility dimensions). While intuitive and to some extent true, the arbitrary cut-off introduced a problem: a country that was the 50th most fragile in two dimensions would be interpreted as being worse than another country that was the most fragile in the world in one dimension.

The new OECD fragility framework aims to address the limitations of the previous model. By characterising fragility as combinations of risks and coping capacities the framework can be applied to all contexts. It is applied in two stages whereby quantitative analysis provides the input for more qualitative descriptions of fragility profiles. The initial analysis looks at each of the five dimensions of the framework (economic, environmental, political, security and societal); in the second stage all dimensions are aggregated. All contexts that have above moderate fragility – in 2016, 56 countries and territories – are then shown on the fragility diagram.

It is important to note that although the OECD considers the *concept* of risk as central to fragility, and uses it as part of the methodology, the fragility framework should not be interpreted as predictive. Rather, the fragility framework has been designed as a tool to analyse the current state of fragility. A more detailed discussion of the methodology is presented in Annex A.

Methodology at a glance

The OECD fragility framework considers fragility to be multidimensional, measurable on a spectrum of intensity and expressed in different ways across five dimensions. It uses robust quantitative approaches to measure the magnitude of fragility, and it compares and contrasts different types of fragility descriptively. This mixed approach allows the analysis to extract the best value from the quantitative methods but address their limitations through qualitative descriptions.

The methodology is based on a two-stage process that first examines contexts in each of five dimensions and then aggregates this information to obtain an overall picture of fragility. For each dimension, principal components analysis (PCA) is used to combine the risk and coping capacity indicators into two statistically derived components. Deriving two measures per dimension has distinct advantages over creating one composite index. First, using two measures allows for a greater understanding of the differences among contexts that would score equally when using a single measure. Second, using the first two principal components allows contexts to be broadly grouped based on their similarities in all of the input variables. Third, each indicator is weighted by the amount of new information it brings to the data rather than on a set of normative judgements on their relative importance. With the components of each dimension calculated, contexts are then grouped on similarities and classified descriptively. This mix of both quantitative and qualitative methods therefore offers a more flexible approach to describing the diversity of fragility.

With contexts classified into groups within each dimension, the second part of the methodology aggregates this information to arrive at an overall picture of fragile contexts. To achieve this, the components of each dimension provide inputs to a second aggregate PCA. This is then used to produce a list of the 56 most fragile contexts. A full methodological description is provided in Annex A.

The methodology is ambitious in its objectives, but has limitations. By using PCA, the range of indicators can be reduced to two core components, thereby explaining most of the variance in the original data. However, in doing so invariably information is lost. The second stage of PCA (PCA Stage 2) exacerbates this loss of information. In short, the results of this approach are a summary of the initial indicators, which is then interpreted in terms of fragility. Despite these limitations, this summary is both more informative and less arbitrary than any composite index based on the initial indicators.

Aside from the technical limitations, there are also certain practical limitations to what can be captured in any quantitative approach. The unit of analysis for the OECD fragility framework is country-level, which makes it unable to capture macro-level drivers of fragility – drivers that spill over borders – or micro-level drivers that lead to localised pockets of fragility within states. Going forward, it would be useful to find ways to draw on subnational data and to link up regional and global data. Further, while data on governance is widely available, data on informal institutions are less so. While every effort has been made to include indicators of both, at this point the lack of quality data is a limiting factor for the model. Finally, the calculations exclude 28 countries and territories where there was insufficient data to feed into the analysis (Box 3.4).

Box 3.4. Countries and territories not included in the fragility framework

Data availability is a key issue in calculating the OECD fragility framework. As the unit of analysis is the state or territory it is important to select indicators that are comparable across those states and territories. Statistical imputation methods can be used to fill data gaps, but that approach is best used sparingly; preference should always be given to real-world data, even if it means dropping indicators or countries and territories that otherwise would have been included. The fragility framework methodology aims to strike a balance between the number of indicators, the contexts covered and the amount of imputation that would be required to build a complete data set. A criterion for inclusion in the OECD framework was that a country or context had to have at least 70% of the required data. As a result, only 171 contexts could be included in the calculations.

This does not mean that the excluded contexts are not fragile. Indeed, many of those excluded are small island developing states that are measured as fragile in other fragility methodologies (ADB, 2012) and face their own unique challenges. In addition, the final list also excluded two territories with UN peacekeeping missions (“Kosovo” and Western Sahara) and several Pacific Island countries with well-known high levels of interpersonal violence.

The countries and territories excluded in 2016 due to insufficient data are:

Anguilla	Kiribati	Nauru	Samoa
Antigua and Barbuda	“Kosovo”	Niue	Tokelau
Belize	Malta	Palau	Tonga
Cook Islands	Marshall Islands	Saint Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha	Turks and Caicos Islands
Dominica	Mayotte	Saint Kitts and Nevis	Tuvalu
Equatorial Guinea	Federated States of Micronesia	Saint Lucia	Wallis and Futuna
Grenada	Montserrat	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	Western Sahara

Overview of results from the fragility framework


Fragility occurs over a spectrum of intensity, and all countries and societies are fragile to some extent. While fragility is a multidimensional phenomenon that does not lend itself to simple explanation, there is a clear practical need to highlight those contexts that are especially fragile and that require specific attention from the international community. In 2016, the OECD fragility framework calculations result in 56 contexts. This group of 56 has been divided into two categories: “extremely fragile” and “fragile”. Broadly speaking, extremely fragile means high fragility in all of the five dimensions, as well as widespread armed conflict or very significant levels of collective and social violence. The remaining fragile contexts also have fragility in all dimensions; however, the level of violence is generally lower than in the extremely fragile category.

Figure 3.1 presents contexts identified as fragile (in light blue) and extremely fragile (in dark blue), on the basis of a combination of their results in the five dimensions of fragility (economic, environmental, political, security and societal). It incorporates two pieces of critical information for these fragile contexts:

1. the intensity of fragility from extremely fragile to fragile
2. the results of each dimension of fragility for those contexts

The contexts are listed counterclockwise by increasing level of fragility. While the ordering is indicative, contexts next to each other face different types of fragilities and should not necessarily be compared to each other directly. Shadings in each of the five dimensions indicate the fragility profile of a given country or context and the dimensions in which it is relatively more fragile. Further details on the methodology are provided in Annex A.


Figure 3.1. Fragile contexts – the 2016 OECD States of Fragility diagram



The diversity of these 56 contexts further highlights the benefits of a typology of fragility rather than a list of fragile contexts.

Over 1.6 billion people, or 22% of the world's population, live in these fragile contexts – and this figure is expected to rise to 3 billion people, or 32% of the global population, by 2050. Population growth in these fragile contexts is among the fastest in the world (Figure 3.2). The majority of these fragile contexts (35) are in sub-Saharan Africa; 7 are from East Asia and the Pacific, 6 are in the Middle East and North Africa, and the remaining 8 are elsewhere in the world (Figure 3.3).


Figure 3.2. Global population grouped by fragility groups, by proportion, 1950-2050



Sources: Population data from UNDESA (2015) available at <https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Download/Standard/Population/>; author calculations.

StatLink <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933441689>

Figure 3.3. Number of people living in these fragile contexts, number of fragile contexts by region



Sources: Population data from UNDESA (2015) available at <https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Download/Standard/Population/>; regions based on World Bank categories of regions; author calculations.


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The 2016 results of the OECD fragility framework show that fragility occurs across a range of income groups and at differing levels of economic development. Of the 56 fragile contexts, 27 are low income, 25 are lower middle income, and 4 (Angola, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela [hereafter “Venezuela”], Iraq and Libya) are upper middle income (Figure 3.4).

Similarly, governance type is closely related to fragility. Of the 56 fragile contexts identified, 29, or more than half, have authoritarian forms of governance. But fragility also occurs in contexts where there are elements of democratic governance: 17 have hybrid regimes (e.g. where elections take place but the quality of democracy is low, and political suppression and some authoritarianism are present) and 5 are flawed democracies (where free and fair elections may take place and basic civil liberties are respected, but political culture is undeveloped and levels of political participation are low).

This underlines an important descriptive characteristic of fragility – its universality – showing that fragility does exist even in the presence of democratic institutions and moderately advanced levels of economic development.

Figure 3.4. Number of fragile contexts by income and government type



Sources: Income levels for 2016 from World Bank (2016a) available at <https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519>; government type categorisations from Economist Intelligence Unit (2016) available at www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx?campaignid=DemocracyIndex2015. Author calculations.


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Macroeconomic fundamentals and fragility

Fragility can exacerbate already volatile macroeconomic conditions, which in turn can contribute to increased or sustained fragility, perpetuating a vicious cycle that is hard to break (Loayza et al., 2007). This is particularly the case in fragile contexts that have weak institutions and are economically dependent on revenue from natural resources and/or on aid. In these contexts, global economic shocks can have a reverberating and disproportionate effect on economic fundamentals such as economic growth, inflation and government revenues.

Fragile and extremely fragile contexts experienced much more volatility in annual inflation, as seen in Figure 3.5. Inflation volatility has been found to negatively affect economic growth, thus worsening the poor economic outlook for many fragile contexts (Judson and Orphanides, 1999). These contexts are also more likely to experience periods of chronic inflation and hyperinflation, which can also lead to political destabilisation.

Figure 3.5. Average annual inflation rate by level of fragility, 2002-15



Sources: Inflation data from the World Bank (2016b), with outliers removed. Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) available at <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG>. Author calculations.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933441711>

Poverty and fragility

Approximately 836 million people live in extreme poverty, defined by the World Bank as less than USD 1.90 a day (World Bank, 2016a). While the number of extremely poor people is projected to fall over the next 20 years, they will be increasingly concentrated in these fragile contexts. Indeed, the number of extremely poor people living in these fragile contexts is projected to grow from 480 million in 2015 to 542 million in 2035, an increase of 13%. Put another way, approximately half of the people living in extreme poverty today live in these fragile contexts. By 2035, it is estimated that 80% of extremely poor people will live in the 56 contexts identified as fragile in 2016 (Figure 3.6).

Fragility intensifies poverty and undermines the opportunities for individuals and societies to escape poverty. Further, in fragile contexts where there is conflict or very high levels of violence, rates of extreme poverty can increase as individuals are displaced, livelihoods are destroyed, and the broader macroeconomic environment is severely damaged through dramatic falls in foreign direct investment (FDI), trade and economic growth.

Figure 3.6. Extreme poverty defined at less than USD 1.90 per day, by fragility group




Sources: Poverty data from World Bank (2014a) available at <http://data.worldbank.org/topic/poverty>; population data from UNDESA (2015) available at <https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Download/Standard/Population>; poverty projection data from International Futures (IFs) modelling system, Version 7.15. Author calculations.

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The impact of extreme poverty is projected to be higher in “extremely fragile” contexts than in the “fragile” group. This is because the absolute number of people living in extreme poverty is projected to grow most in the extremely fragile group of contexts (Figure 3.7). Indeed, the data show that the number of extremely poor people living in these conditions of extreme fragility will increase from 92 million in 2015 to 116 million in 2035.

Figure 3.7. Index trend in the number of people in extreme poverty, by fragility group, 2014-35




Sources: Population data from UNDESA (2015) available at <https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Download/Standard/Population>; poverty projection data from International Futures (IFs) modelling system, Version 7.15. Author calculations.

StatLink <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933441733>

The relationship between fragility and poverty and extreme poverty is further entrenched by a reliance on agriculture in these fragile contexts as a significant means of income generation. Because income from agricultural production is so dependent on external factors such as weather and global commodity prices, a heavy reliance on agriculture may entrench low rates of income generation (UNDP, 2011). Figure 3.8 shows agriculture as a percentage of GDP based on fragility level; it shows stark differences between these fragile and other non-fragile contexts on this front, although some of this may be due to missing data for some fragile contexts.

Figure 3.8. Agricultural value added as a percentage of GDP by fragility level, 2002-15



Sources: Agricultural data from the World Bank (2014b) available at <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS>. Author calculations.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933441744>

Urbanisation and fragility

Trends in violence and fragility can help guide development priorities and the understanding of future threats and opportunities. Demographic changes, for example, have clear long-term ramifications that can be both positive and negative for fragility. Findings in Chapter 2 highlight how urban violence is increasing, particularly in places where urban governance, security and public services have not kept pace with rapid population growth. Increased risk factors in urban settings combined with the absence of adequate coping capacities provide opportunities for non-state actors to compete politically. They also provide the enabling environment for criminal networks to more easily take root, enabling illicit flows of arms or drugs. The pace of urbanisation is a risk factor within the OECD fragility framework in the societal dimension, but urbanisation alone is not an indicator of fragility. It is a significant factor only when present in combination with other risk factors and in the presence of low coping capacity. Urbanisation is a characteristic of highly developed countries. Of the 3.9 billion people living in urbanised settings in the world today, 620 million are living in these fragile contexts. It is expected that the same cohort of contexts that are measured fragile in 2016 will grow to 1.68 billion people by 2050.

This means that while 16% of the world's urban population today live in these fragile or extremely fragile contexts, this rate of growth will mean that by 2050 27% of the world's urban population will be living in those contexts measured fragile in 2016 (Figure 3.9).

Figure 3.9. Urban versus rural global population grouped by these fragility groups, 1950-2050



Sources: Urbanisation data from UNDESA (2015) available at <https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Download/Standard/Population>; Author calculations.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933441758>

Fragility is also an important consideration in the Sustainable Development Goals (Box 3.5).

Box 3.5. The Sustainable Development Goals and fragility

The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) recognise that violence and fragility are major obstacles to development. In line with this, the SDGs address fragility in several cross-cutting ways. Goal 16 on peace, justice and strong institutions most specifically addresses many of the direct and indirect manifestations of fragility, especially the security and political dimensions. However, each of the 17 goals either directly or indirectly seek to address fragility's many risk factors and coping capacities.

Economic fragility is addressed mostly through its close link to poverty alleviation, for example through Goal 8.5 on full and productive employment; Goal 8.6 on youth employment, education and training; and Goal 8.7 on forced labour, modern slavery, human trafficking and child labour.

Environmental fragility is addressed in Goals 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15. Goal 11 specifically addresses disaster risk reduction (Goal 11.5), complemented by Goal 11.b, that aims for greater inclusion, resource efficiency, mitigation and adaptation to climate change, and resilience to disasters in cities and human settlements.

Political fragility is addressed in Goal 16.4, which aims to reduce illicit financial flows, arms flows, organised crime and return stolen assets; and in Goal 16.5 on corruption and bribery; Goal 16.6 on effective, accountable and transparent institutions; Goal 16.7 on responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision making; and Goal 16.8 on the participation of developing countries in institutions of global governance.

Box 3.5. The Sustainable Development Goals and fragility (cont.)

Security fragility, especially around direct forms of violence, is addressed through Goal 16.1, which includes measures of the number of violent deaths, and Goal 16.2, which measures levels of abuse and violence against children. Other targets focus on security-related capacities, such as Goal 16.3 that aims to promote rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all, and Goal 16a that aims to strengthen relevant national institutions and to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime.

Societal fragility is embedded in the SDGs in multiple ways. Goal 10 is entirely focused on reducing social inequalities, including income growth for the bottom 40% (Goal 10.1); social, economic and political inclusion for all (Goal 10.3); and equal opportunity and countering discrimination (Goal 10.4). Gender equality is addressed under Goal 5, particularly Goal 5.2, which aims to eliminate all forms of violence against women and girls; and Goal 5.3, which aims to eliminate all harmful practices, such as child, early and forced marriage, and female genital mutilations. In addition, Goals 1, 2, 3 and 4 broadly tackle the human capital aspects that are important capacities for reducing fragility, with their focus on poverty reduction, zero hunger, good health and well-being, and quality education.

Source: UN General Secretariat (2015).

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Chapter 4

Fragility and violence

by

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This chapter provides an overview of the results in the individual dimensions of fragility – economic, environmental, political, security and social. The overview starts by setting out the different degrees of fragility within each dimension, including a map of fragility in each dimension in the world today, and an analysis of the links between each dimension and the manifestation of different types of violence. The chapter continues with discussion of the overall statistical correlation between violence and different aspects of fragility, and an examination of the co-existence, linkages and contradictions between fragility and resilience.

Direct forms of political and social violence have formed the basis of indicator selection for the security dimension in the OECD fragility framework. While these forms of violence have clear implications for fragility, focusing on them exclusively provides an incomplete picture. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), violence also includes acts of deprivation and neglect.¹ Such violence, often termed structural violence, includes any form within a social structure that prevents some of its members from meeting basic needs (Galtung, 1969). Taking this broader view, structural inequality as a form of violence therefore needs to be included in any measure of fragility. In the OECD framework such forms of violence are included in the economic, political and societal dimensions. The following sections explore each of the five fragility dimensions individually, detailing the typology of fragility within each.

Economic dimension

The economic dimension in the OECD fragility framework is determined by risk factors that can either be structural or of a more temporary nature. These include resource rent dependence, the number of vulnerably employed as a proportion of total employment, aid dependence, and the number of youth not employed or in education or training. More traditional macroeconomic variables such as the size of government debt, the GDP growth rate and the rate of unemployment are also important risk factors of economic fragility.

The coping capacity factors that mitigate these economic risks include human capital (levels of education and employment), the ability of the government to regulate policies to support private sector development and the extent of remoteness from world markets. Food security is also important to support the broader economic environment.

The two principal components that summarise these risk and coping capacity factors can be broadly described as *long-term drivers of economic growth* and *labour market imbalances* (Table 4.1). They measure two prominent types of economic fragility related to weaknesses in a country's development capacity and to the lack of economic opportunities for certain groups of population. The combination of these components leads to the highest levels of economic fragility.

Table 4.1. Components of economic fragility

Main contributions to the first component of economic fragility: <i>Long-term drivers of economic growth</i>	Main contributions to the second component of economic fragility: <i>Labour market imbalances</i>
Education measured by mean of years of schooling for adults aged 25 years and more, and expected years of schooling for children of school-entering age.	Unemployment rate refers to the share of the labour force that is without work but available for and seeking employment.
Men in the labour force is a measure of the percentage of male participation in the labour force.	Youth not in education, employment or training , measured as the proportion of young people who are not in education, employment or training within the population of all youth in the same age group.
Regulatory quality measures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations promoting private sector development.	Women in the labour force is the percentage of female participation in the labour force.
Remoteness is the trade-weighted average distance from world markets.	
Food security measures include the prevalence of undernourishment, average dietary supply adequacy, domestic food price index and domestic food price volatility.	


Table 4.2 shows the summary characteristics of the economic dimension.

Table 4.2. Summary characteristics of fragility categories in the economic dimension

Fragility group	Descriptive title
Extreme economic fragility	Absence of long-term drivers of economic growth, absence of individual economic opportunity, and high levels of resource and aid dependence.
High economic fragility	High levels of resource and aid dependence and economic geography creating difficult conditions for long-term sustainable growth, but moderate levels of individual economic opportunity.
Moderate economic fragility	One of three types of situation: high levels of resource and aid dependence and economic geography creating difficult conditions for long-term sustainable growth, but high levels of individual economic opportunity; or low levels of individual economic opportunity and moderate levels of economic independence; or a subset of developed countries (mostly in Europe) with high rates of unemployment and government debt but low levels of economic dependence on resources and aid.
Low economic fragility	Two types of situation: mostly developing countries with good long-term growth prospects and low levels of unemployment; or developed countries with low levels of unemployment, strong economic regulation, low levels of resource dependence and the foundations for long-term economic growth.

Sub-Saharan Africa has the highest levels of contexts with economic fragility, often high economic dependence, low individual economic opportunity and weak long-term drivers of economic growth (Figure 4.1).


Figure 4.1. Economic dimensions of fragility



Note: See Annex A for further details of the methodology.

Economic fragility determined by risk factors involving high economic dependence and low individual economic opportunity in combination with poor conditions for economic growth, is correlated with higher levels of violence (Figure 4.2).

Figure 4.2. Economic dimension, major types of violence by fatality rate per 100 000 population



Sources: Homicide data from United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 2013), *Global Study on Homicide 2013*, with intentional homicide count and rate per 100 000 population, by country/territory (2000-12). Terrorism data from START *Global Terrorism Database* (2016), and retrieved from www.start.umd.edu/gtd. Battle-related deaths and non-state actor data from Uppsala University (2016), Conflict Data Program (UCDP), UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2015, 1946-2014 at <http://ucdp.uu.se/>. Author calculations.

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Figure 4.2 shows distinct trends in different groups of economically fragile settings. Homicide rates or social violence are highest in the group of highly economically fragile contexts. These are typified by high levels of resource and aid dependence and constrained economic geography, but some have relatively moderate levels of individual economic opportunity. There is a clear vicious cycle in the extremely economically fragile group; the absence of long-term drivers of economic growth and individual economic opportunity, coupled with high levels of resource and aid dependence drive violence and conflict, which in turn reinforces economic fragility, and so the cycle continues.

The links between economic conditions and violence in any society are well researched and, like fragility, are highly context specific. The 2011 *World Development Report* demonstrated that drivers of recruitment to criminal organisations are very similar to those for recruitment to rebel groups and terrorist organisations (World Bank, 2011). A survey in six fragile contexts showed recruits for both rebel and criminal organisations are largely young people driven to join for a combination of economic and identity linked reasons such as unemployment, idleness, lack of respect and self-protection. These reasons typically outnumbered reasons of revenge, injustice or belief in the cause (World Bank, 2011).²

Economic conditions, human capital and expectations also interact in important ways. Motive-based push factors for violence are exacerbated in contexts where youth are highly educated and able to critically analyse the gap between how things are and how they feel things should be. A study by Urdal (2012) suggests that an influx of university graduates into a labour market that cannot absorb them can contribute to the radicalisation effect and recruitment of youth into militant organisations in the Middle East and North Africa (Urdal, 2012). Young people also make up the vast majority of migrants to urban areas, leading to overcrowded schools and saturation of the labour market. In the presence of weak social, political and security coping capacities, these factors can become drivers of political violence.

Environmental dimension

The environmental dimension of fragility is determined by external and internal risk factors including vulnerability to natural disasters risk such as earthquakes, floods, droughts, cyclones or tsunamis. Environmental risk is also measured by the quality of air, water and sanitation, as well as by the prevalence of infectious diseases, the number of uprooted people and the vulnerability of household livelihoods. Coping capacities mitigating these risks include strong civil society, rule of law and government effectiveness, and food security.

The principal components that best summarise these risks and coping capacity indicators can be described as **household, community and state vulnerability** and **natural disaster risks**. In many contexts, it is the frequent occurrence of natural hazards combined with high household, community and state vulnerability that increase environmental fragility (Table 4.3).

Table 4.3. Components of environmental fragility

Main contributions to the first component of environmental fragility: <i>Household, community and state vulnerability</i>	Main contributions to the second component of environmental fragility: <i>Natural disaster risks</i>
Socio-economic vulnerability measures the ability of individuals and households to afford safe and resilient livelihood conditions and well-being.	Natural disaster risk measures the likelihood of exposure to earthquake, tsunami, flood, cyclone drought and other such events.
Environmental health measures health impacts including quality of air, water and sanitation.	
Food security measures the prevalence of undernourishment, average dietary supply adequacy, domestic food price index and domestic food price volatility.	


Table 4.4 shows the summary characteristics of the environmental dimension.

Table 4.4. Summary characteristics of fragility clusters in the environmental dimension

Fragility group	Descriptive title
High environmental fragility	High risk of natural disasters, prevalence of infectious diseases with low community and state coping capacity.
Moderate environmental fragility	Moderate risk of natural disasters, prevalence of infectious diseases with moderate community and state coping capacity.
Low environmental fragility	Generally lower risk of natural disasters, low prevalence of diseases, high community and state coping capacity.

Figure 4.3 shows the fragility in the environmental dimension around the world.


Figure 4.3. Environmental dimension of fragility



Note: See Annex A for further details on the methodology.

The relationship of violence to environmental fragility is complex (Figure 4.4).

Figure 4.4. Environmental dimension, major types of violence by fatality rate per 100 000 population



Sources: Homicide data from UNODC (2013) with intentional homicide count and rate per 100 000 population, by country/territory (2000-12). Terrorism data from START *Global Terrorism Database* (2016), www.start.umd.edu/gtd. Battle-related deaths and non-state actor data from Uppsala University (2016) Conflict Data Program (UCDP), UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2015, 1946-2014 at <http://ucdp.uu.se>. Author calculations.

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Figure 4.4 shows that homicide and battle deaths are largely the same in contexts with moderate and high environmental fragility, and that there is no distinct relationship between differing levels of environmental fragility and interpersonal violence. However, armed conflict and terrorism are more prevalent in moderate and high environmentally fragile contexts.

It is not surprising that violence can manifest where environmental risks such as infectious disease or natural disasters are present, along with low community and state capacity. However, the relationship between environmental risks and fragility related to violence can be complicated. This is seen in the literature on the link between climate change and conflict. One such study, based on meta-analysis of over 60 studies, finds that the magnitude of climate change's influence on conflict is substantial and statistically significant at many levels of geographical aggregation. According to this study, one standard deviation increase in temperature or extreme rainfall increases the frequency of interpersonal violence by 4% and increases inter-group conflict by 14% (Hsiang, Burke, and Miguel, 2013). But other studies question this research, underlining the mixed and inconclusive results from scientific research on climate change and conflict (Buhaug et al., 2014).

Climate change is an important factor for environmental fragility, however, as it is closely linked with an increased likelihood of natural environmental threats and hazards. Thus climate change should not be seen as a singular driver of conflict but rather a stressor that may lead to heightened risk of violence and conflict in an already fragile setting. The intersection of weak institutions and social fragility with climate change vulnerability is what is referred to as the climate-conflict nexus. More directly, changing and severe weather patterns multiply the threat of conflict in at least two ways. The first is interruption of resource supply leading to greater resource scarcity (Theisen, Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013). The second is increased natural disaster risk and its potential to trigger population displacement (IPCC, 2012). Contexts with weak institutions, high levels of poverty and agricultural-based economies are particularly vulnerable to these conflict threat multipliers, and are at an increased risk of falling into the climate-conflict nexus.

A 2016 UNOCHA occasional paper on the climate-conflict nexus identified 20 countries which fall into this gap: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Haiti, Kenya, Lao People's Democratic Republic (hereafter Lao PDR), Madagascar, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Niger, Pakistan, Somalia, Sudan and Zimbabwe (Bodanac, Hyslop, and Valente, 2016). This paper describes a situation where social unrest, intergroup grievances and gender-based violence can increase if government is unable to provide the resources needed to cope with a changing environment or destruction from extreme weather conditions, or if international climate change adaptation support is insufficient. This, in turn and in combination with political-economic and societal fragilities, may contribute to violent conflict.

Political dimension

Political fragility in the OECD fragility framework is determined by risk factors such as regime persistence and instability, the presence of state-sponsored violence or political terror, and the levels of corruption. These risks are moderated by coping capacities broadly relating to the quality of political institutions and protections of human rights including, importantly, the legal environment around the protection and rights of women. Combinations of these factors increase instability in political processes, events or decisions and affect the ability to accommodate change and avoid oppression.

The two principal components of political fragility that best summarise these indicators can be broadly described as *checks and balances present in political institutions and protection of human rights* and *political stability*. Political fragility thus captures the main drivers of political violence, as well as the mechanisms of accountability and restraint that help prevent the emergence of violence and mitigate its consequences (Table 4.5).

Table 4.5. Components of political fragility

Main contributions to the first component of political fragility: <i>Checks and balances present in political institutions and protection of human rights</i>	Main contributions to the second component of political fragility: <i>Political stability</i>
Voice and accountability measures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association and a free media.	Decentralised elections are measured in terms of whether there are subnational elections, and to what extent regional authorities can operate without interference from the centre.
Judicial constraints on executive power are measured as the extent to which the executive respects the constitution and complies with court rulings, and independence of the judiciary.	Regime persistence is measured by the number of years a polity has persisted, and is used as a measure of instability.
Perceptions of corruption are measured by perceived levels of corruption, as determined by expert assessments and opinion surveys.	
Legislative constraints on executive power are measured as the extent to which legislature and government agencies are capable of questioning, investigating and exercising oversight over the executive.	
Political terror is measured by the levels of state-sanctioned or -perpetrated violence such as assassinations of political challengers and police brutality.	


Table 4.6 shows the summary characteristics of the resulting categories of political fragility.

Table 4.6. Summary characteristics of political fragility categories

Fragility group	Descriptive title
Extreme political fragility	Very low democratic accountability and weak political institutions, low levels of human rights protection, high levels of political terror.
High political fragility	One of two types of situations: either low democratic accountability with centralised political institutions and low levels of human rights protection, or weak democratic institutions and low levels of human rights protection.
Centralised state leadership fragility	Low democratic accountability but strong and centralised political institutions, low levels of human rights protection, high levels of political terror.
Moderate political fragility	Moderate democratic accountability and levels of human rights protection but sources of political instability present.
Low political fragility	Strong to moderately robust decentralised democratic institutions, moderate to relatively high levels of protection of human rights.

Figure 4.5 shows the resulting political dimensions of fragility.

Figure 4.5. Political dimension of fragility




Note: See Annex A for further details on methodology.

Contexts with centralised state leadership fragility have very low levels of violence, and include the People's Republic of China (hereafter "China"), Cuba, Lao PDR, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Thailand and Zimbabwe. The low levels of violence could be statistical distortions; the size of China's population, for example, has a distorting effect on the rate derived from a per-100 000 population calculation. Despite this, this group's levels of terrorism, battle deaths and deaths from non-state actors are still low relative to the other categories of political fragility. The presence of strong and centralised political institutions and high levels of state-perpetrated political terror can serve to suppress violence through mechanisms and resources not available to moderately fragile contexts with weaker political institutions. Despite relatively low violence in some forms, these contexts also experience fragility. The centralisation of power can produce systems that are limited in their ability to adapt to evolving situations (Taleb and Treverton, 2015). Further state-sanctioned violence against its citizens is a manifestation of a collapse of state legitimacy, which research has identified as one critical measure of fragility. Furthermore, state repression often forces opposition groups toward other means of expressing dissent including violence (Regan and Norton, 2005).

Figure 4.6 shows that rates of violent death vary across the spectrum of contexts with political fragility. Those with high political fragility have high levels of all types of violence and are in conflict or have a recent history of conflict. In terms of particular types of violence, deaths per capita from terrorism are highest in countries that have some legislative constraints on state power but also high levels of political violence. Such countries include Iraq, Mali, Nigeria and Pakistan. This highlights the strong link between political terror and violence by non-state actors using terrorist tactics. Between 1989 and 2014, almost 90% of all terrorist attacks occurred in countries where violent political terror was widespread (IEP, 2015).

Figure 4.6. Political dimension, major types of violence by fatality rate per 100 000 population



Sources: Homicide data from UNODC (2013) with intentional homicide count and rate per 100 000 population, by country/territory (2000-12). Terrorism data from START Global Terrorism Database (2016), www.start.umd.edu/gtd. Battle-related deaths and non-state actor data from Uppsala University (2016) Conflict Data Program (UCDP), UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2015, 1946-2014 at <http://ucdp.uu.se>. Author calculations.

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Regimes in fragile contexts can be broadly classed into three types: common interest, redistributive, and weak or failing (Anten, Briscoe and Mezzera, 2012). In the common interest contexts, governments may be willing to increase provision of services but lack the resources to do so. In the redistributive contexts, they may invest in capacity building, but taxes and other resources are collected and redistributed to a select group. Governments in weak or failing contexts lack the ability to build capacity and also do not serve any particular group. As discussed in Chapter 2, conventional indicators of development, such as poverty and inequality, are not on their own predictors of violence. Indeed, many poor contexts are not violent. Large-scale violence, however, does tend to stem from the politicisation of factors such as poverty and inequality (Ncube, Jones and Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 2013; Vallings and Moreno-Torres, 2005). Fragility can manifest in contexts where leaders, elites, and non-state groups and violent actors fall into a cycle of conflict in which violence becomes profitable (Muggah, 2010).

Security dimension

The security dimension aims to capture both the presence of direct violence as well as institutional coping capacities to prevent and mitigate violence. The risk or presence of direct violence is measured by the homicide rate, the level of violent organised crime, the number of deaths from non-state actors, the impact of terrorism, the number of battle deaths from conventional warfare and levels of domestic violence. The coping capacity indicators for security involve the number of police and armed security officers in combination with the presence of the rule of law, and the extent to which the state has control over territory. Also considered is the presence of formal international security alliances, which are associated with lower levels of interstate conflict (Table 4.7).

Table 4.7. Components of security fragility

Main contributions to the first component of security fragility: <i>Rule of law and state control of territory</i>	Main contributions to the second component of security fragility: <i>Armed conflict, terrorism, organised crime and interpersonal violence</i>
Conflict risk measured by the statistical risk of violent conflict in the next 1-4 years based on 25 quantitative indicators from open sources.	Homicide rate per 100 000 population.
State control over territory measured as the percentage of territory over which the state has effective control.	Number of formal alliances between countries.
Level of violent criminal activity by criminal organisations (drug trafficking, arms trafficking, prostitution, etc.).	Battle-related deaths per capita , measured on log basis.
Rule of law measured as perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police and the courts.	Impact of terrorism measured by the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) capturing the number of deaths, attacks, incidents and property damage from terrorism.


The statistical analysis of these indicators helps to summarise them into two principal components of security fragility, which can be broadly described as *rule of law and state control of territory* and *armed conflict, terrorism, organised crime and interpersonal violence*. The first component is a measure of the level of security fragility; the second distinguishes countries according to their predominant type of fragility. By combining these two aspects, security fragility thus captures citizens' and society's security vulnerability that emanate from different forms of violence and crime, including political and social violence (Table 4.8).

Table 4.8. Summary characteristics of fragility categories in the security dimension

Fragility group	Descriptive title
Extreme security fragility	Presence of armed conflict, significant terrorist activity, high numbers of violent deaths per capita, presence of criminal networks, state lacks control of territory, weak rule of law.
High security fragility	Weak rule of law, criminal activity, high homicide rate, terrorist activity, poor legislative frameworks against gender-based violence, in some cases the presence or recent history of armed conflict.
Low security fragility	Low levels of state and interpersonal violence and organised crime, moderate to high coping capacity.

Figure 4.7 shows that the extremely fragile contexts in the security dimension include Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic (hereafter "Syria") and Yemen, which are amongst the most violent countries in the world. However, rates are almost as high in the next tier of high security fragile group of contexts, which tend to have a mix of weak rule of law, criminal activity and terrorist activity. This group includes countries such as Colombia and Nigeria. The spectrum of types of violence, and the overlaps between them, coincides with the link between conflict and crime, known as the conflict-crime nexus.


Figure 4.7. Security dimensions of fragility



Note: See Annex A for further details on methodology.

Figure 4.8 shows that deaths per 100 000 population from all types of violence are notably higher in extreme security fragility contexts; these situations typify what is described as conflict-crime nexus contexts.

Figure 4.8. Security dimension, major types of violence by fatality rate per 100 000 population



Sources: Homicide data from UNODC (2013) with intentional homicide count and rate per 100 000 population, by country/territory (2000-12). Terrorism data from START Global Terrorism Database (2016), www.start.umd.edu/gtd. Battle-related deaths and non-state actor data from Uppsala University (2016) Conflict Data Program (UCDP), UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2015, 1946-2014 at <http://ucdp.uu.se>. Author calculations.

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Crime and criminal violence can pose as great a threat to government stability as rebel and armed violence (Stepanova, 2010a). Traditionally within the research literature, crime and armed conflict have been differentiated by their motive, with armed violence considered through a political lens and crime associated with a profit motive (Stepanova, 2010b; de Boer, 2015a). However, in recent years there has been growing recognition that this distinction in many cases is artificial; understanding and addressing the conflict-crime nexus has become an important goal for violence prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding.


The overlap of motivations for conflict and crime is an acute source of fragility in post-conflict situations. Profiteers from armed conflict in these situations often transition into crime. Individuals involved in conflict have an especially difficult time reintegrating into normal life once fighting ceases. For generations that grew up during civil war, violence has become normalised, making it difficult to shift away from it (USAID, 2015). Conflict often leads to a breakdown in education, which has carryover effects in post-conflict societies, in that people who lack formal schooling have few opportunities to lead normal lives outside violent or criminal networks even if they want to do so (Özerdem and Podder, 2011).

The presence of crime during violent conflict also has a number of effects on the conflict itself. The presence of illicit trade allows for a steadier flow of funds, stocks and arms that prolongs the violence. It also has an impact on the intensity of violence (de Boer, 2015a). For politically violent groups, access to illicit flows can reduce the need for public support in order to operate, thus allowing rebel organisations to concern themselves less with the consequences of civilian casualties and to engage in more indiscriminate forms of violence (de Boer, 2015a).

The conflict-crime nexus also poses some serious challenges to conflict prevention, resolution and post-conflict peacebuilding. In many cases, the threat posed to fragile contexts from violent crime is outside of the scope of international humanitarian law, limiting the international community's ability to respond to ensuing crises (de Boer, 2015a). In post-conflict situations, the separation historically made between conflict and crime has meant that criminal factions that may have played critical roles during the conflict are not included in peacebuilding negotiations (de Boer, 2015a). This lack of acknowledgement offers few alternatives to violent criminal organisations in the post-war period.

The amount of resources devoted to internal security varies widely among fragile contexts; the gap is particularly great between extremely fragile contexts and the rest of the world. This has an impact on their effectiveness and capacity in addressing the conflict-crime nexus. Within fragile contexts there is also variance as some authoritarian countries purchase significantly larger amounts of internal security in order to suppress dissent. While security expenditures must be considered within a broader context, low spending on security is correlated to weak rule of law and impunity and the crime-conflict nexus present in many of the fragile contexts identified in the OECD framework (Figure 4.9).

Figure 4.9. Average public order and safety expenditure (internal security expenditure), latest available year



Source: Internal security expenditure data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Author calculations.

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What is also typical of both the extremely fragile and fragile group of contexts is the presence of weak legal frameworks against gender-based violence. This is important because gender-based violence and gender inequality have been shown to have statistical relationships with security. Gender inequalities are a key manifestation of horizontal inequalities that lead to destabilised societal relations and make societies less resistant to shocks (Baranyi and Powell, 2005). During conflict and/or crisis, the survival of a household can often depend on women's work in and outside the home.

Societal dimension

The societal dimension in the OECD fragility framework is determined by vulnerability to risks affecting societal cohesion that stem from both vertical (for instance, income inequalities) and horizontal inequalities (inequality among different ethnic, religious, racial or caste groups). Social inequalities related to gender, high urbanisation and large numbers of displaced people in the presence of poor coping capacities also increase societal fragility.

The important variables of societal coping capacity to deal with social and horizontal inequalities are the robustness of civil society, the extent to which citizens have access to justice to address grievances as well the perception of citizen's access to voice and accountability, meaning the extent to which they can participate in sections of their government, their freedom of expression and the freedom of the media.

The statistical analysis of these indicators generates two principal components of societal fragility, namely *access to justice, accountability and horizontal inequality* and *vertical and gender inequalities*. The first component points towards institutional sources of social inequalities, related to the unequal treatment of citizens and discrimination based on ethnicity and other differences between social groups. The second component is determined by inequalities engendered in the economic and/or private spheres, in particular gender-based segregation and income disparities (Table 4.9).

Table 4.9. Components of societal fragility

Main contributions to the first component of societal fragility: <i>Access to justice, accountability and horizontal inequality</i>	Main contributions to the second component of societal fragility: <i>Vertical and gender inequalities</i>
Voice and accountability measures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association and a free media.	Gini coefficient as an index measure of income inequality.
Access to justice measures the extent to which citizens enjoy secure and effective access to justice.	Gender inequality measures gender inequalities in three important aspects of human development: reproductive health, empowerment and economic status.
Horizontal inequality measures whether all social groups, as distinguished by language, ethnicity, religion, race, region or caste, enjoy the same level of civil liberties.	
Core civil society index measures of the overall robustness of civil society.	


Table 4.10 shows the summary characteristics of the societal dimension.

Table 4.10. Summary characteristics of fragility clusters in the societal dimension

Fragility group	Descriptive title
Extreme societal fragility	High levels of vertical, horizontal and gender inequalities; extremely low levels of accountability and rule of law; very weak civil society; poor access to justice; high numbers of displaced people.
High societal fragility	High levels of vertical, horizontal inequality with high gender inequality in the context of fast urbanisation and low levels of accountability and rule of law.
Moderate societal fragility	Vertical inequality with high gender inequality in the context of fast urbanisation, moderate access to justice and presence of civil society.
Low societal fragility	Presence of but relatively lower levels of vertical, horizontal and gender inequalities; robust civil society, voice and accountability, and access to justice.

The results of the societal dimension of fragility are shown in Figure 4.10.


Figure 4.10. Societal dimension of fragility



Note: See Annex A for further details of the methodology.

Rates of violence are lowest in the low societal fragility group. Homicide rates are on average five times lower in the low societal fragility group than in the high societal fragility group (Figure 4.11).

Figure 4.11. Societal dimension, major types of violence by fatality rate per 100 000 population



Sources: Homicide data from UNODC (2013) with intentional homicide count and rate per 100 000 population, by country/territory (2000-12). Terrorism data from START *Global Terrorism Database* (2016), www.start.umd.edu/gtd. Battle-related deaths and non-state actor data from Uppsala University (2016), Conflict Data Program (UCDP), UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2015, 1946-2014 at <http://ucdp.uu.se>. Author calculations.

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Contexts categorised with low societal fragility have lower levels of inequalities (vertical, horizontal and gender), and robust civil society, voice and accountability, and access to justice. Extreme societal fragility sees higher levels of armed conflict fatalities than any other grouping. Many of the contexts that show high fragility in the societal dimension also have fast urbanisation in combination with low levels of accountability and rule of law. This group includes mostly fast-growing sub-Saharan African countries.

Battle-related deaths are higher in contexts in the extreme societal fragility category. These contexts are also typified by high horizontal inequalities and high homicide rates, and high vertical inequalities as measured by income. The correlation between violence and extreme societal fragility is shown in many studies. Horizontal inequality is linked to a number of types of violence (Stewart, 2010; Langer and Stewart, 2013; Brown and Langer, 2010), including communal violence (Mancini, 2005; Fjelde and Østby, 2014); inter-regional inequality and separatist conflict (Bakke and Wibbels, 2006); group mobilisation in civil war (Langer, 2005); the spatial distribution of high-intensity fighting in civil war (Murshed and Gates, 2005); and urban unrest (Østby, 2015; Raleigh, 2015).

Societal factors of gender inequality and gender-based violence (GBV) have been shown to influence overall levels of security. Empirical findings show that levels of domestic gender inequality in political, economic and social spheres are linked to state-level variables concerning security. Research has found that contexts with higher levels of gender equality are less likely to initiate interstate conflict or escalate an interstate dispute (Hudson et al., 2012). Similarly, higher levels of gender equality are associated with a lower risk of civil conflict within a society (Caprioli, 2005). Gender-based violence including intimate partner violence is often a pre-cursor to outbreaks of more endemic conflict. Rape and other forms of GBV are also often weapons of war during conflict, thus perpetuating societal instability. In contexts where GBV and gender inequalities are high, women are also likely to have higher distrust of political institutions and political processes, perpetuating the participation problem (Dryzek, 2014).

Correlates of violence

The links between violence and the other dimensions of fragility are shown in Figure 4.12. While correlations are instructive to form a descriptive, rather than causal, point of view, some broad theories of change are reflected in the pairwise relationships between indicators of fragility and particular types of violence. For instance, as discussed in Chapter 2, homicide is linked more with vertical inequalities (measured by the Gini coefficient), while political violence tends to be more linked to horizontal inequalities (measured by the V-Dem dataset capturing whether social groups distinguished by language, ethnicity, religion, race, region or caste enjoy the same level of civil liberties). Broader patterns are also apparent. For example, organised crime, as a form of violence, and gender physical restrictions (measuring domestic violence and the legislative framework to prevent it) are the most correlated to indicators of fragility in other dimensions.

Figure 4.12. Violence and fragility correlations ($r > 0.3$)StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933441825>

Fragility and resilience

Early research in the resilience field conceptualised fragility and resilience as “opposite ends of a spectrum”. However, more recent work has emphasised that fragility and resilience actually “co-exist” and their relationship is complex and dynamic, with changes in one not necessarily leading to a commensurate change in the other (de Boer, 2015b).

While resilience has had a long etymological history in fields such as ecology, psychology and engineering, it is a relatively nascent field in its application to social systems, cities or states (Muggah, 2014). Normatively, resilience is used as a positive term used to describe a system’s ability to absorb disturbance and still retain its basic function (Rodin, 2014). The positive implication of the term is reflected in the OECD description of resilience as “the ability of households, communities and nations to absorb and recover from shocks, whilst positively adapting and transforming their structures and means for living in the face of long-term stresses, change and uncertainty” (OECD, 2014).

Increasing resilience would seem, by definition, to always decrease fragility. But increasing resilience could potentially in some cases also increase fragility. A common example of this dynamic occurs in fragile contexts where they receive limited essential services from the state. In such circumstances non-state actors may necessarily perform core state functions. While such informal structures increase the coping capacities of the communities involved, the diversity of service provision without integration within a larger state structure can make response and recovery in the aftermath of a negative shock more challenging. More saliently, these situations can potentially introduce opportunistic competition within the state system, with organisations vying for the monopoly on violence. The rise of so-called violence entrepreneurs not only increases the immediate fragility of the community, but also further erodes the authority and legitimacy of the state (Brock et al., 2012).

With respect to violence, the same measure of fragile contexts can be considered positive or negative, depending on the situation. For example, the presence of state forces can build resilience by maintaining law and order, and their absence could be considered an indicator of a government’s ability to provide security to its citizens. However, the impact on violence is dependent on how state force is applied. Indeed, the politicisation of the provision of security may actually increase the likelihood of violence. There are many such cases where it is unclear whether one factor represents a net positive or negative, thus making analysis of fragility and resilience a challenge.

The relationship between fragility and large so-called “black swan” events is also interesting. Black swan events are large, infrequent and unpredictable events; the 11 September 2001 attacks and the wave of Arab revolutions that started in December 2010 are prominent examples. Such events can be taken as a sign of fragility, but a counter-argument is that the ability to withstand large devastating events is evidence of robustness (Taleb and Treverton, 2015). According to this view, Lebanon, for example, experienced 15 years of civil war and sporadic eruptions of violence and conflict for decades since, but has evolved robust systems in the face of competing claims to power. Proponents of this theory describe a system that benefits from volatility as “anti-fragile” (Taleb and Treverton, 2015).

Indicators of fragility and resilience should not be treated as existing in a vacuum; their net effect can be positive or negative depending on combinations of country-contextual factors. The link between fragility and resilience will continue to be a developing field for researchers and practitioners.

Notes

1. Violence is defined by the World Health Organization as “the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation” (WHO, 2002).
2. Aggregates of the most common responses to two questions: “what is the main reason why young people join rebel groups?” and “what is the main reason why young people join gangs?”, in surveys conducted in Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, Sierra Leone, and the West Bank and Gaza Strip. For details on the survey methodology, see Bøås, Tiltnes and Flatø (2010).

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Chapter 5

Measuring financial flows to fragile contexts

by

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This chapter provides a review of overall financial flows – official development assistance (ODA), foreign direct investment and remittances – to fragile contexts. The review includes trends and analysis of aggregate financial flows, an in-depth review of ODA and aid dependency in fragile contexts, and analysis of the links (or lack of) between ODA and severity of fragility.

The 2015 *States of Fragility* report highlighted the ongoing need for donors to address imbalances in official development assistance (ODA) allocations and to ensure that no country is underfunded and that aid orphans are addressed. The analysis of fragility in 2015 showed that development finance needs to be better monitored and targeted at reducing fragility. It also showed that existing resources are not always well aligned to fragile contexts. Now, with the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and newly defined international goals and targets that broaden the traditional development agenda, it will be more important than ever to assess and monitor development aid to ensure that *no one is left behind*.

The findings of the analysis on development aid and international flows in this report reinforce several key messages and recommendations from previous OECD annual reports on fragility. While ODA is critical for fragile contexts, analysis of aggregate external financial flows shows that remittances are the largest type of external flow for fragile contexts, followed by ODA and then foreign direct investment (FDI). Remittances and FDI have both outpaced growth in ODA over the last 13 years.

Other official flows (OOF) and flows from private philanthropic sources can also support development and complement domestic revenue sources. However, these other flows often have a complex relationship to development and fragility, and thus they need to be interpreted carefully. It is also important to note that FDI and remittances are categories of finance that cannot be directly compared for a range of conceptual and technical reasons. Ultimately, while FDI and remittances are important for economic demand in many fragile settings and are important sources of financing, their impact and relationship to fragility can be either negative or positive depending on the context.

This chapter assesses financing to the 56 contexts determined as fragile under the OECD fragility framework (Chapter 3), in terms of its magnitude, specificity and alignment to the different dimensions of fragility. The chapter is divided into two parts focusing on (1) aggregate financial flows to fragile contexts and composition of these flows, and (2) analysis of ODA flows to fragile contexts. To analyse the aggregate flows that fragile contexts receive, *States of Fragility 2016* looks at both a longer time series (the 13 years between 2002 and 2014) and a shorter time series (the 4 years between 2011 and 2014).¹

The key findings of the analysis of flows are as follows. All figures presented here are in constant 2014 USD prices, and show net ODA excluding debt relief as the basis for ODA, unless otherwise stated.

Highlights: Aggregate financial flows and fragility

- Total financial flows to fragile contexts including ODA, FDI and remittances increased approximately 206% between 2002 and 2014 in constant terms. The total value of financial flows received over this period totalled more than USD 2.04 trillion (2014 constant prices). ODA made up 32% of that total amount.

- Remittances are the largest type of financial flow to fragile contexts followed by ODA and then FDI. For the 56 contexts measured as fragile under the OECD fragility framework, remittances are the largest type of financial flow. Of the total aggregate flows to fragile contexts in 2002-14, 43% were remittances. FDI accounted for 25% and total ODA excluding debt was 32% of the total financial flows received.
- Total remittances and FDI grew significantly faster than ODA for fragile contexts over the 2002-14 period. As a consequence, remittances significantly increased as a proportion of the total financial flows for fragile contexts in this period. The data show that remittances increased 334% from 2002 to 2014 in constant terms.
- While ODA increased 98% in constant terms between 2002 and 2014, ODA as a proportion of the total flows to fragile contexts actually fell in this period. This reflects the increasing importance of FDI and remittances as part of the total financial mix for the fragile contexts.

Highlights: Official development assistance and fragility

- Fragile contexts received the majority of ODA, 64% of all ODA between 2011 and 2014, but the distribution of ODA within these fragile contexts is uneven on both an aggregate and per capita basis.
- Fragile contexts are more dependent on aid on average, but the extent of aid dependence varies significantly. Of the top 20 most aid-dependent contexts in the world, 12 are considered fragile by the OECD fragility framework. However, the extent of aid dependency within the group of fragile contexts is highly unequal, ranging from an average of 41.5% of gross national income (GNI) in lesser developed countries like Liberia to 0.01% in the upper middle-income Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (hereafter “Venezuela”). Most aid-dependent fragile contexts (where net ODA as a percentage of GNI is greater than the average for the group of fragile contexts) have high levels of security fragility.
- ODA is not evenly distributed among fragile contexts. The median per capita aid to these fragile contexts for the 2011-14 period was USD 57 per annum and the average was USD 80 per annum in constant 2014 USD prices. Fragile contexts such as the West Bank and Gaza Strip received the largest average ODA on a per capita basis, or USD 576, each year from 2011 to 2014. Venezuela, by comparison, received the smallest amount of ODA per capita during this time period, an average of USD 1.4 each year during the 2011-14 period.

Aggregate financial flows to fragile contexts

In 2016, the OECD has identified 56 fragile contexts around the world. While the extent, intensity and typology of their fragility varies significantly, they all have one point in common: external revenue sources are important sources of finance.

Between 2011 and 2014, external financial flows including FDI, remittances and ODA to fragile contexts, totalled more than USD 829 billion (2014 constant prices). Remittances were the most significant portion, making up 48% of total external flows. ODA excluding debt comprised the second largest flow, at 32% of the total amount. FDI, the third largest part of external financial flows to these contexts, increased by 19% over the 2011-14 period.

As has been established, most recently in the OECD *Development Co-operation Report 2014*, remittances are growing faster than other categories of external financing, and are resilient in the face of economic shocks. While remittances cannot be directly equated to ODA, they are an important source of economic demand to support household income in fragile contexts.

Total external flows to fragile contexts in 2011-14 increased by 19.5%, as opposed to a 0.2% increase in non-fragile contexts (Table 5.1). Most of the growth in external flows to fragile contexts can be attributed to the increases in FDI and remittances; these grew slightly faster than ODA over the 2011-14 period.

Table 5.1. Total flows to fragile contexts, percentage change, FDI, remittances and ODA excluding debt relief, 2011-14, constant 2014 USD prices


	Fragile contexts 2011-14, percentage change	Other contexts 2011-14, percentage change
Foreign direct investment	19.4	-1.9
Remittances	21.8	6.1
Official development assistance excluding debt	15.8	2.8
Total	19.5	0.2

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933442130>

Figure 5.1 presents trends in the three major types of external financing over the longer time period of 2002 to 2014. It shows that remittances increased 334% for fragile contexts, while FDI saw impressive 235% growth. ODA was the slowest growing category of external financing for fragile contexts, at 124% growth. When comparing fragile to non-fragile contexts, the most significant trend is in the difference between growth in remittances: remittances to the 56 fragile contexts identified in the OECD fragility framework grew 200% more than remittances to non-fragile contexts.

Figure 5.1. Flows to these fragile contexts: FDI, remittances and ODA excluding debt relief, 2002-14

Remittances have made up the largest proportion of flows to these fragile contexts almost every year since 2002



Sources: FDI and remittances data from World Bank (2016a), "Foreign direct investment, net inflows (Current USD)", World Development Indicators (database), <http://data.worldbank.org/indicators>, converted to USD, 2014 constant prices; World Bank (2016b), "Personal remittances received (current USD)", World Development Indicators (database), <http://data.worldbank.org/indicators>, converted to USD, 2014 constant prices; ODA data from OECD (2016a), "Aggregate DAC statistics table DAC2a: ODA official development assistance: Disbursements", OECD International Development Statistics (database), <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>. Author calculations.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933441834>

While there is significant variation among different contexts measured as fragile within the OECD framework, the evolving mix of external financing reflects the increasing importance of remittances in these contexts. This trend can be interpreted in both positive and negative ways. On the one hand, growth in remittances can be interpreted as a positive trend, as they are a stable source of external financing that can help plug the gap of volatile FDI flows and help support livelihoods in economically fragile settings. On the other hand, remittances can also result in other negative externalities depending on the country and context.


There is evidence to show remittances can increase income inequality (Hinojosa Ojeda and Takesh, 2011) and have significant impacts on the labour supply in post-conflict situations (Justino and Shemyakina, 2012). At a macroeconomic level, there is scattered evidence that remittances in developing contexts predominately flow into non-tradable goods, leading to an appreciation of the exchange rate and subsequent hollowing out of manufacturing and other productive sectors of a national economy (sometimes called “Dutch disease”). In these situations, remittances could be conceived as a threat or hazard that exacerbate fragility rather than as a mitigating or coping variable.

Research in the case of El Salvador has demonstrated a more explicitly negative relationship between remittances and the country’s conflict setting. Large migration to the United States from El Salvador has led to a heavy dependence on remittances and subsequent distortions in local price mechanisms and increases in land and health care prices, especially in remittance receiving communities. The increases in land values have been associated with distorted incentives for earning livelihoods, lowering productivity and creating dependence on food imports, and thus increasing exposure to international price shocks and food insecurity in poor parts of the country. This has led in turn to a negative cycle of low productivity and economic growth that has increased incentives to migrate, further undermining the aspirations of young people (Boston University, 2013). The link to increased violence and organised criminal activity in the country can also be seen through this relationship.

Given that remittances represent the fastest growing category of external financing, the complex relationship between this financial flow and development demands more attention. Partly because the beneficiaries are largely individuals, remittances should not be compared in direct terms to ODA and the effects of remittances need to be examined individually.

Changes in the composition of flows to these fragile contexts are shown in Figure 5.2. In global absolute terms, FDI is by far the largest type of external financial flow, but fragile contexts only attract approximately 5% of the global total despite accounting for 22% of the global population. As FDI is highly sensitive to conflict, violence and political instability, it is often also volatile in fragile contexts.

Figure 5.2. Changes in the composition of flows to these fragile contexts, 2011-14




Sources: FDI and remittances data from World Bank (2016a), "Foreign direct investment, net inflows (Current USD)", World Development Indicators (database), <http://data.worldbank.org/indicators>, converted to constant 2014 USD prices; World Bank (2016b), "Personal remittances received (current USD)", World Development Indicators (database), <http://data.worldbank.org/indicators>, converted to constant 2014 USD prices; ODA data from OECD (2016a), "Detailed aid statistics: ODA official development assistance: Disbursements", OECD International Development Statistics (database), <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>. Author calculations.

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ODA plays a critical role in plugging the gap in fragile contexts, especially those characterised by armed conflict, civil war and widespread collective violence. This in part explains why the 56 fragile contexts attracted the majority of ODA distributed globally over the 2011 to 2014 period (Figure 5.3 and 5.4). It should be noted that while the aggregate analysis presented here shows a global trend, deeper analysis of the data on a context-by-context level shows that the distribution of financial flows varies not only between fragile contexts when compared to other contexts, but within fragile contexts as well.

Figure 5.3. Total flows, fragile compared to other contexts, FDI, remittances and ODA excluding debt, 2011-14



Sources: FDI and remittances data from World Bank (2016a), "Foreign direct investment, net inflows (Current USD)", World Development Indicators (database), <http://data.worldbank.org/indicators>, converted to constant 2014 USD prices; World Bank (2016b), "Personal remittances received (current USD)", World Development Indicators (database), available at: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicators>, converted to constant 2014 USD prices; ODA data from OECD (2016a), "Detailed aid statistics: ODA official development assistance: Disbursements", OECD International Development Statistics (database), available at: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>. Author calculations.

StatLink <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933441850>


Official development assistance to fragile contexts

Globally, ODA has grown steadily since 2000, and, since 2011, fragile contexts have received 64% of the total. Of the 20 largest recipients of total ODA between 2011 and 2014, only 6 are not fragile contexts as defined by the OECD fragility framework: Ghana, India, Jordan, Morocco, Turkey and Viet Nam. On a per capita basis, fragile contexts and extremely fragile situations receive more ODA than other contexts.

Fragile low-income contexts in 2014 received just under USD 44 billion of ODA. On a per capita basis, however, fragile low-income countries received 12% more ODA than other low-income contexts. Fragile contexts that are not low income, however, received less on a per capita basis than other low-income countries, reflecting the fact that levels of economic development significantly influence levels of ODA flows.

This is important because, as shown in Figure 5.5, fragility is not synonymous with low levels of economic development. Of the 56 countries that are fragile under the OECD fragility framework, 25 are lower middle-income countries, and 4, the oil-exporting countries of Angola, Iraq, Libya and Venezuela, are upper middle income.


Figure 5.4. Total ODA received 2011-14, fragile versus other contexts



Sources: ODA data from OECD (2016a), "Detailed aid statistics: ODA official development assistance: Disbursements", OECD International Development Statistics (database), <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>; Fragility calculations. Author calculations.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933441865>

Figure 5.5. Total ODA received 2011-14, extremely fragile versus moderately fragile, low-income versus not low-income contexts, per capita basis




Sources: ODA data from OECD (2016a), "Detailed aid statistics: ODA official development assistance: Disbursements", OECD International Development Statistics (database), <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>; income category data from World Bank (2016c), "Income levels for 2016", <https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519>; population data from World Bank (2016d), "Population totals", <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>; author calculations.

StatLink <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933441870>

In terms of the trend of ODA flows at the aggregate level, Figure 5.6 shows increasing flows to low-income contexts regardless of their levels of fragility.

Figure 5.6. ODA excluding debt 2002-14, extremely fragile versus fragile, low-income versus not low-income contexts, per capita basis



Sources: ODA data from OECD (2016a), "Detailed aid statistics: ODA official development assistance: Disbursements", OECD International Development Statistics (database), <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>; income category data from World Bank (2016c), "Income levels for 2016", <https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519>; population data from World Bank (2016d), "Population totals", <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>; author calculations.

StatLink <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933441888>

As Table 5.2 shows, fragile low-income contexts saw a decrease in their per capita ODA between 2011 and 2014.

Table 5.2. Changes in per capita ODA excluding debt relief to fragile and low-income contexts, constant 2014 USD prices


	2011	2014
Fragile, low income	46.2	45.7
Fragile, not low income	24.8	33.9
Not fragile, low income	56.8	52.7
Not fragile, not low income	8.0	7.9

Sources: ODA data from OECD (2016a), "Detailed aid statistics: ODA official development assistance: Disbursements", OECD International Development Statistics (database), <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>; income category data from World Bank (2016c), "Income levels for 2016", <https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519>; author calculations.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933442144>

The flow of ODA to extremely fragile contexts increased significantly, more than doubling, between 2002 and 2005. This was largely due to ODA flows to Afghanistan and Iraq. Since then, flows to extremely fragile contexts have remained constant while the remaining fragile contexts have (on average) seen only gradual ODA increases (Figure 5.7).

Figure 5.7. Total ODA per capita to fragile contexts by level of fragility, 2002-14



Sources: ODA data from OECD (2016a), "Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements", OECD International Development Statistics (database), <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>; population data from World Bank (2016d), "Population totals", <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>; author calculations.

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There is large variation in ODA flows among the top 20 aid recipients (Table 5.3).

Table 5.3. Top 20 total aid recipients, 2011-14

Fourteen of the top 20 aid recipients are fragile according to the 2016 fragility framework.


Country	Income group	Level of fragility	Total ODA excluding debt, 2011-14 (USD billions)	Average ODA per capita, 2011-14 (USD)
Afghanistan	Low income	Extreme fragility	23 401	194
Viet Nam	Lower middle income	Rest of world	15 317	43
Ethiopia	Low income	Extreme fragility	14 280	38
Turkey	Upper middle income	Rest of world	12 815	42
Tanzania	Low income	Fragile	11 297	57
Pakistan	Lower middle income	Fragile	11 236	16
Kenya	Lower middle income	Fragile	11 159	65
Egypt	Lower middle income	Fragile	11 024	32
India	Lower middle income	Rest of world	10 037	2
Syrian Arab Republic	Lower middle income	Extreme fragility	9 728	124
West Bank and Gaza Strip	Lower middle income	Fragile	9 561	582
Democratic Republic of the Congo	Low income	Extreme fragility	9 244	32
Nigeria	Lower middle income	Fragile	8 769	13
Bangladesh	Lower middle income	Fragile	8 670	14
Mozambique	Low income	Fragile	8 559	82
Morocco	Lower middle income	Rest of world	7 185	54
Uganda	Low income	Fragile	6 589	46
Jordan	Upper middle income	Rest of world	6 326	223
Ghana	Lower middle income	Rest of world	6 068	59
Iraq	Upper middle income	Extreme fragility	5 997	45

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933442158>

Within this group of fragile contexts, there is a large variation in terms of ODA per capita (Figure 5.8).

The differences between individual fragile contexts can be very large. Venezuela received the smallest amount of ODA per capita, at an average of USD 2 each year during the 2011-14 period. There are four fragile contexts that could be considered outliers on a per capita basis. These are Afghanistan, the Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, and the West Bank and Gaza Strip; all are conflict-affected or post-conflict countries. The average per capita ODA for all fragile contexts between 2011 and 2014 was USD 75. Of the 56 fragile contexts identified, 34 attracted less than the average ODA per capita. Seventeen received less than half the average per capita ODA for fragile contexts.

Figure 5.8. Total net ODA per capita for fragile contexts, 2011-14




Sources: ODA data from OECD (2016a), "Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: Disbursements", OECD International Development Statistics (database), <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>; population data from World Bank (2016d), "Population totals", <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>; author calculations.

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Measuring aid dependence based on average net ODA as a percentage of GNI from 2011 to 2014, 12 of the top 20 most aid-dependent contexts have been identified as fragile by the OECD fragility framework. However, the extent of aid dependency, both across highly fragile and less fragile contexts, and also within the group of fragile contexts, is unequal.

The average aid dependency among fragile contexts was 10.5% of GNI between 2011 and 2014, compared with 2.5% for other contexts. Within those contexts classified as fragile, aid dependency in this period ranged from 41.5% of GNI in Liberia to 0.01% in Venezuela.

Figure 5.9. Average net ODA as a percentage of GNI for fragile contexts, 2011-14



Sources: OECD (2016b), "Creditor Reporting System: Aid activities", OECD International Development Statistics (database), <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00061-en> (ODA as a percentage of GNI). No data available for Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic and Democratic People's Republic of Korea; author calculations.

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Note

1. It should be noted the trend analysis for the longer-term 13-year period is based on the same cohort of fragile situations defined in this report.

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Chapter 6

Relations between aid and fragility

by

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
This chapter examines the statistical relationships between official development assistance (ODA) and fragility. It begins by examining ODA flows to fragile contexts historically and projections of future aid disbursements. It then presents an analysis of the relationship between ODA inflows, both in absolute levels and as a percentage of the recipient context's gross national income, and measures of fragility. This analysis first looks at the relationship between ODA flows and multidimensional fragility. Second, it looks at the relationship between ODA and the individual dimensions of fragility – economic, environmental, political, security and societal – to determine whether aid is addressing the root causes of fragility. The chapter concludes with a review of the quality of finance to fragile contexts.

This chapter examines the statistical relationships between aid and fragility. The focus is on the significance of aid from the standpoint of the recipients and how aid corresponds to their particular forms of fragility. For this, ODA is calculated including debt relief and alternatively considered in per capita terms and as a fraction of the recipient's gross national income (GNI).¹

ODA flows to contexts considered fragile have increased

Taken as a whole, the contexts classified as fragile in the 2016 fragility framework (Chapter 3) received 33% less aid than other developing countries in 2000. In 2014, they received 29% more than other developing countries (Figure 6.1). Part of this increase is attributable to the surge in ODA flows to Iraq between 2003 and 2005 and to Afghanistan between 2006 and 2009. But aid flows to other fragile contexts have also risen substantially. According to the OECD-DAC 2016 Forward Spending Survey, which captures country programmable aid projections, the difference in favour of fragile contexts is expected to stabilise in the coming years.

Figure 6.1. Aid to fragile contexts compared to other developing countries



Source: OECD-DAC statistics and 2016 Forward Spending Survey, OECD calculations.

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ODA has not targeted fragility in per capita terms

ODA has targeted fragile contexts in recent years when absolute levels are considered, but not if the recipient's national income or population size are taken into account.

On average, developing countries benefitted from net inflows of ODA equivalent to 5.3% of their GNI between 2011 and 2014. Of these, 39 contexts received more than this average, among them Kenya (5.4%) and Liberia (41.5%). Together, these 39 contexts have 10% of the total population of all ODA recipients, 2% of their aggregate GNI and 43% of the total ODA flows between 2011 and 2014.

Fragility is not equivalent to high levels of aid dependence. Of the 39 largest recipients of ODA relative to their GNI, 8 are classified in this report as extremely fragile and 22 as fragile. This means that 7 extremely fragile and 19 fragile contexts – nearly half of the world's most fragile contexts – are not among the major aid recipients as a percentage of GNI.

But the picture is even more contrasted when aid is considered in per capita terms.

On average, net ODA inflows to all developing countries represented USD 77.7 per inhabitant between 2011 and 2014.² Of these, 43 developing country recipients received more than the average ODA inflows; these countries were home to 4% of the population of all developing country recipients, 2% of their GNI and 31% of total ODA flows. Thus, the contexts that have benefitted from high levels of support per capita typically have small populations and low levels of income per capita. However, they are generally not fragile: only 11 of the 43 developing countries receiving above average inflows of ODA are classified as fragile, of those only 4 are amongst the extremely fragile contexts.

Table 6.1 presents these results in terms of proportions, and provides a breakdown by type of ODA.

The 43 main recipients in per capita terms have strong chances of receiving high levels of support in sectors such as health, education, and support to government and civil society (as well as agriculture, water and sanitation, transport, and energy). For instance, 70% of those 43 countries receive higher than average health ODA per capita. Indeed, ODA expenditure in the areas of health, education, transport, agriculture and energy tends to be concentrated in these same contexts.

With regard to fragile contexts, the general pattern discussed above – namely that fragile and extremely fragile contexts are not particularly favoured in terms of ODA per capita – also applies to a majority of these important aid sectors. Extremely fragile contexts that receive higher than average ODA per capita receive only 20% for government and civil society support (compared to 24% for all recipients), 20% for education (compared to 29%) and 20% for budget support (compared to 27%).

In a number of other sectors such as energy, water and sanitation, transport, communications, disaster prevention, and banking and finance, extreme fragility is an even stronger handicap. No extremely fragile context is a major recipient of ODA to banking and finance in per capita terms. However, extremely fragile contexts receive proportionately higher ODA flows than the average of all recipients in emergency response, food assistance and health.³

Table 6.1. ODA recipients with above average levels of ODA per capita in different sectors

Context categories	Emergency response	Government/ civil society	Budget support	Education	Health	Banking/ finance
43 main recipients in per capita terms	30% receive above average ODA per capita in this sector	60%	44%	67%	70%	40%
Extremely fragile contexts	80%	20%	20%	20%	47%	0%
Other fragile contexts	20%	20%	44%	20%	49%	10%

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It appears, therefore, that ODA in general targets fragile contexts, but not when the size of the population or the level of income is taken into account. Extremely fragile contexts have a handicap in that attracting large amounts of aid to some sectors requires reasonably developed public institutions (budget support, government and civil society) or economies (communications, banking and finance), which are often not available in these places. Instead, donors as a whole seem to specifically target extremely fragile contexts with emergency response ODA.

Aid does increase with fragility, however all fragile contexts and all dimensions of fragility are not treated in the same way


This section considers the relations between ODA inflows, in absolute levels, in per capita terms and as a percentage of the GNI of the recipient, and measures of fragility including those that are multidimensional and specific to the security, political, economic, social and environmental dimensions of fragility.

It should be emphasised that statistical correlations, which are used here, are not a measure of causality. The analysis in this section therefore should not be interpreted as a claim that a particular form of fragility is the cause for a particular type of aid, but rather that the logic of aid disbursements, whatever its actual determinants, leads to providing more of a particular type of aid to contexts characterised by a particular form of fragility.⁴

Aid and multidimensional fragility

The amount of aid received by a context is positively correlated to its degree of fragility (Figure 6.2). Of the 15 contexts classified as extremely fragile in this report, only 5 received less than USD 1 billion in ODA on average between 2011 and 2014: Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad, Eritrea and Yemen. Four countries received more than USD 2.4 billion a year: Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (mostly because of debt relief), Ethiopia and the Syrian Arab Republic (hereafter “Syria”).

Figure 6.2. ODA inflows and multidimensional fragility




Source: OECD (2016), “Creditor Reporting System: Aid activities”, OECD International Development Statistics (database), <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00061-en> and authors’ calculations (first principal component of multidimensional fragility).
Author.

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In order to measure the importance of the support received through aid from the standpoint of recipient countries, it is useful to consider incoming ODA flows relative to the recipient’s GNI.⁵ The relationship between ODA and fragility then appears even more clearly (Figure 6.3). The situations of Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Ethiopia appear very different when the size of their economies is taken into account. Burundi and Ethiopia are in fact large receivers of ODA *given their level of fragility*, while the latter two are close to the average. Afghanistan and, at lower levels of fragility, Liberia, Malawi and the Solomon Islands, are the countries that receive the highest levels of ODA support relative to their levels of income.


Figure 6.3. ODA as a percentage of gross national income and multidimensional fragility



One of the interesting features of the figures above is that aid recipients are distributed inside a cone, signalling that the dispersion of aid by level of fragility increases with fragility. In other words, extremely fragile contexts receive very different levels of support through ODA in proportion to their income, while non-fragile contexts are treated in a very homogenous way.

The picture changes radically when ODA is considered in per capita terms. The general relation between aid and fragility then becomes negative (although not in a statistically significant manner), with extremely fragile contexts all receiving moderate levels of support (Afghanistan being the only exception) compared to other countries (Figure 6.4).

Figure 6.4. ODA per capita and multidimensional fragility




Aid and economic fragility

Among all measures of dimensional fragility, weakness in the long-term drivers of growth is the most strongly correlated with aid inflows in percentage of GNI (Figure 6.5). It is also the dimensional measure that best reproduces the cone-shaped distribution observed in Figure 6.2 for cross-dimensional fragility. In other words, both the average support received through ODA and disparities in that support among recipients increase with the severity of fragility, from less fragile to more fragile contexts, with respect to their economic fundamentals.

The fragility of long-term drivers of growth provides a possible explanation for the fact that countries with moderate to low levels of fragility in other dimensions, such as Liberia, Malawi and the Solomon Islands, still receive high levels of ODA in proportion to their GNI.

Figure 6.5. ODA as a percentage of gross national income and fragility in the long-term drivers of economic growth




Source: OECD (2016), "Creditor Reporting System: Aid activities", OECD International Development Statistics (database), <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00061-en>, World Bank (GNI) and authors' calculations (first principal component of economic fragility).

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As mentioned previously, however, the positive relationship between aid and fragility is lost when the former is measured as ODA inflows per capita. Some of the extremely fragile contexts with respect to the long-term drivers of growth receive fairly high levels of ODA per capita (Liberia, the Solomon Islands and South Sudan), but others do not (Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad and the Democratic Republic of the Congo). In some specific sectors, ODA per capita is even negatively correlated to fragility in the long-term drivers of growth. This is the case, for instance, for industry, mining and construction ODA (Figure 6.6), which tends to privilege non-fragile contexts with relatively sound economic fundamentals (such as Mauritius, Serbia and Tunisia).

Figure 6.6. Industry, mining and construction ODA per capita and fragility in the long-term drivers of economic growth



Source: OECD (2016), "Creditor Reporting System: Aid activities", OECD International Development Statistics (database), <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00061-en>; World Bank (GNI) and authors' calculations (first principal component of economic fragility).


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By contrast, fragility in the long-term drivers of growth is positively correlated (although not significantly) with emergency response ODA per capita. This underscores an interesting paradox: while some contexts that are fragile with respect to their economic fundamentals do receive higher levels of aid per capita, the type of aid that they receive is geared towards the handling of crises rather than the strengthening of their economic structures. In these contexts, donors therefore seem to respond to the dramatic manifestations of economic fragility (or of other types of fragility) rather than address its root causes.

Aid and environmental fragility

Household and community-level vulnerability is the dimensional fragility measure the most strongly correlated to aid flows as a percentage of GNI after fragility in the long-term drivers of growth (Figure 6.7). ODA inflows as a share of GNI increase regularly with environmental vulnerability. Afghanistan, Liberia and the Solomon Islands are the main examples on one side, with higher aid inflows than average given their level of vulnerability while on the other side, Chad and Eritrea have lower receipts than average given their level of environmental fragility.

Figure 6.7. ODA as a percentage of gross national income and fragility due to household and community-level vulnerability




Source: OECD (2016), "Creditor Reporting System: Aid activities", OECD International Development Statistics (database), <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00061-en>; World Bank (GNI) and authors' calculations (first principal component of environmental fragility).

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The positive correlation is also lost when ODA is considered in per capita terms. However, among the sectors of ODA, emergency response is correlated to environmental vulnerability. Some of the largest recipients of emergency response aid per capita also rank highest on household and community-level vulnerability: the Central African Republic, Somalia and South Sudan (Figure 6.8).

Figure 6.8. Emergency response ODA per capita and fragility due to household and community-level vulnerability




Source: OECD (2016), "Creditor Reporting System: Aid activities", OECD International Development Statistics (database), <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00061-en>; World Bank (GNI) and authors' calculations (first principal component of environmental fragility).

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By contrast, disaster prevention ODA is statistically uncorrelated with environmental vulnerability, both in per capita terms and as a percentage of GNI (Figure 6.9). This reinforces the general finding that fragile contexts are primarily receivers of humanitarian assistance rather than support oriented towards the causes of their fragility.

Figure 6.9. Disaster prevention ODA as a percentage of GNI and fragility due to household and community-level vulnerability




Source: OECD (2016), "Creditor Reporting System: Aid activities", OECD International Development Statistics (database), <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00061-en>; World Bank (GNI) and authors' calculations (first principal component of environmental fragility).

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Aid and political fragility

Political fragility appears to be almost totally uncorrelated with the amount of aid received in the years 2011-14 relative to the recipient's GNI (Figure 6.10). This means that the index of political fragility, which measures the lack of checks and balances in political institutions and weaknesses in the protection of human rights, does not in itself explain the level of ODA support. Contexts with weak accountability and limited restraints on the powers of the executive can receive high levels of ODA (Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Central Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan) or very low levels of ODA (Cameroon, Chad, Egypt, Eritrea, Sudan and Yemen). At the other end of the spectrum, contexts with fairly strong norms of accountability and restraints on executive powers can also receive strong support (Cabo Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, and the Solomon Islands) or almost none (Botswana, Mauritius, Serbia and Suriname).


Figure 6.10. ODA as a percentage of gross national income and political fragility



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The correlation between political fragility and aid per capita is negative, both for total ODA and in specific relevant sectors such as support to the government and civil society (Figure 6.11). The very few contexts that receive non-negligible support in this sector have a wide range of levels of accountability and protection of human rights: from very low (e.g. Afghanistan) to average (e.g. Timor-Leste) or fairly high (e.g. the Solomon Islands).

Figure 6.11. Government and civil society ODA per capita and political fragility




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Aid and security fragility

Fragility in the security dimension is measured by weaknesses in the rule of law and the extent to which the state controls its territory. The relative magnitude of ODA flows as a percentage of GNI is not significantly correlated with this measure of security fragility (Figure 6.12). This is due to the presence of two groups of contexts. The first comprises those that receive high levels of aid and have weak to moderate levels of security fragility, such as Burundi, Liberia, Malawi and the Solomon Islands. The second group of these contexts receive very limited amounts of aid relative to their GNI, and includes Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, Sudan, Ukraine and Yemen.

Figure 6.12. ODA as a percentage of gross national income and security fragility




Source: OECD (2016), "Creditor Reporting System: Aid activities", OECD International Development Statistics (database), <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00061-en>; World Bank (GNI) and authors' calculations (first principal component of security fragility).

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The picture is different, however, when the focus is placed on peacebuilding ODA, and particularly on the subcategory of conflict prevention, peace and security ODA. The amounts at stake are of course very limited (less than 0.5% of the recipient's GNI in most cases), but they tend to increase with fragility, even when considered in per capita terms (Figure 6.13). Among the group of extremely fragile contexts with regard to security, Afghanistan, Libya, Somalia, and the West Bank and Gaza Strip, receive particularly high levels of aid per capita while Iraq, Libya, Sudan and Yemen receive negligible levels.

Figure 6.13. Conflict prevention, peace and security ODA per capita and security fragility




Source: OECD (2016), "Creditor Reporting System: Aid activities", OECD International Development Statistics (database), <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00061-en>; World Bank (GNI) and authors' calculations (first principal component of security fragility).

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Aid and societal fragility

The first measure of societal fragility, namely the lack of access to justice and accountability, and horizontal inequalities, is not significantly correlated to aid as a percentage of GNI; with ODA per capita, the correlation is negative (Figure 6.14).

Figure 6.14. ODA per capita and fragility due to lack of access to justice and accountability and to horizontal inequalities



Source: OECD (2016), "Creditor Reporting System: Aid activities", OECD International Development Statistics (database), <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00061-en>; World Bank (GNI) and authors' calculations (first principal component of societal fragility).

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Fragile contexts tend to receive “firefighting” support and to be left out of long-term development support


Several important sectors of ODA such as agriculture, education, transport and health are correlated across the range of recipients. This means that often, when a context receives aid in one sector, e.g. health, it tends to also have inflows of aid to others such as agriculture, etc.

The most salient aspect of sectoral ODA per capita is indeed that some recipients tend to receive limited aid support and others strong aid support across the range of sectors. This is captured by the first axis of Figure 6.15, which ranks contexts according to the amount of an “average aid basket” that they receive per capita.⁶

Given this general pattern, the second most salient feature of analysis of sectoral ODA flows is the opposition between aid to long-term development sectors such as energy, communications, tourism, environmental protection, water and sanitation, industry and disaster prevention, and so-called “firefighting” aid for conflict prevention, reconstruction and emergency response. Contexts with higher values on the vertical axis of Figure 6.15 receive predominantly “firefighting” aid, while those with lower values receive comparatively more aid with long-term development potential.

As the figure shows, the vast majority of ODA recipients can be characterised as small recipients with fairly balanced structures of ODA between “firefighting” and “long-term development” (dense group of points at the centre-left of the figure). As the amount of aid per capita increases, non-fragile contexts tend to diverge towards long-term development aid, while fragile contexts are very often on the firefighting side of the figure.

Figure 6.15. Principal component analysis of ODA sectors per capita



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Notes

1. To relate the two indicators, note that ODA as a fraction of GNI is also equal to ODA per capita as a fraction of GNI per capita – so that if two countries receive the same level of aid per capita, the richer (in terms of income per capita) has a lower ODA/GNI ratio.
2. All ODA amounts are expressed in constant 2014 USD in this chapter.
3. Emergency response is one of the subcategories of humanitarian assistance ODA, together with reconstruction relief and rehabilitation and disaster prevention and preparedness.
4. Aid dependence, measured variously as net ODA as a percentage of GNI, total ODA per capita and total humanitarian aid per capita, is used as an indicator in the fragility framework. The presence of the aid dependence indicator is, however, unlikely to play a significant role in the observed relationship between fragility and net ODA inflows because aid dependence only has limited influence on the measures of economic fragility (namely, long-term drivers of economic growth and labour market imbalances), and even more so on the multidimensional measure of fragility (see Annex A).
5. Four countries do not appear in the analyses of ODA relative to GNI because of the lack of data regarding their national income: Djibouti (non-fragile), Democratic People's Republic of Korea (fragile), Somalia and Syria (extremely fragile).
6. Annex A provides the detailed results of the principal components analysis of sectoral ODA per capita.

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Chapter 7

The violence lens and final recommendations

by

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This final chapter of States of Fragility 2016 describes a tool for understanding violence better, and makes recommendations addressed at the broader fragility and violence community. The violence lens, a tool first presented by the OECD in 2009, is updated to better understand violence today. The report then highlights some areas where the development community can more effectively address fragility and violence. These are grouped as policy, programming and financing recommendations. The report concludes with a call to alleviate the toll of violence and fragility on those who are most left behind.

Understanding the findings through the violence lens

Violence – in all its complexity – is clearly a major issue. A better understanding of its trends and manifestations will help policy makers and practitioners design more effective approaches to reducing the fragility of states and societies. The violence lens, developed by the OECD in 2009 (Box 7.1), is an analytical tool that helps to frame the cause and effect relationship between the different factors influencing the emergence and persistence of violence, in order to identify options for violence prevention and reduction. It is updated here to reflect new research findings.

Box 7.1. The OECD’s 2009 armed violence lens

The 2009 armed violence lens captures key features and levels of armed violence. Its various components have been developed in consultation with development practitioners, and are grounded in the armed violence reduction programming lessons learned in conflict, post-conflict and crime-violence-affected contexts. The lens offers a flexible and unified framework for thinking about the context-specific drivers, risk factors, protective factors and effects. It is also unconstrained by preconceived assumptions regarding donor-imposed categories such as “conflict”, “crime” or “fragile”.

The armed violence lens underscores the way violence transcends separate development sectors, and highlights the potential for cross-sector and integrated responses. It also highlights the potential connections between different elements and levels: these are often treated separately due to disconnected sector or thematic programming streams. The lens encourages development practitioners to think outside their particular programming mandates and to consider the entirety of the challenges at hand.

A unified analysis of armed violence can help bring together a diverse array of actors who are otherwise working on different aspects of the issue. For example, it can assist practitioners working on criminal justice reform to consider how their programming efforts and objectives are potentially connected to interventions focused on community security, crime prevention, restorative justice, small arms and light weapons control or initiatives targeting at-risk youth. It can also encourage improved whole-of-government responses.

It is important to note that the armed violence lens should not supplant existing assessment and programming tools such as conflict or stability assessments; drivers of change, governance and criminal justice assessments; or a public health approach. Rather, it serves as a complementary framework that can help to identify how different tools and data sources can be combined to enhance existing diagnostics and formulate more strategic or targeted interventions.


Source: OECD (2009).

The updated violence lens (Figure 7.1) includes:

- societal power dynamics and the domestic political context
- the various kinds of marginalisation including exclusion and horizontal inequalities
- the capacity and means both to commit violence and make it feasible, but also to absorb and mitigate its harmful effects.

A geographic dimension provides scope. But at the centre of the lens are people: the vulnerable individuals, families, communities and societies who bear the greatest consequences of violence, and are also the agents of violence. Together, these conditions for violence become a risk framework, which can act to detect and predict trends, and can offer clues for more effective prevention efforts.

Figure 7.1. The violence lens



Power

Much of the conflict and violence experienced today is a function of “competition” politics, corruption and poor state-society relationships. The sources of power within any given society can often be varied, and do not necessarily coexist harmoniously. The tensions between different sources of power, and among those who are excluded from the benefits of power, can be important drivers of violence. As outlined in Chapter 2, violence is increasingly fuelled by domestic political instability. The terms of access to power, including among elites and their proxies, often perpetuate risks of violence, even in countries and societies considered to be at peace. This competition can play out at regional, state and/or local level.

Power sharing and inclusion do not automatically eliminate or lessen these tensions and, in fact, can exacerbate them.

Marginalisation

Inequality and division deepen social cleavages and increase the propensity for violence. Socio-economic marginalisation derived from horizontal inequalities, uneven development and economic exclusion can lead to multiple forms of interpersonal, criminal

and social violence as well as collective armed political violence. Power dynamics, as outlined above, can deepen the marginalisation of individuals and communities, creating a negative feedback loop of grievances that lasts for generations and leaves marginalised groups vulnerable to exploitation by political or criminal actors. Marginalisation can also play out in social violence, such as in North, South and Central America where there are higher rates of homicide and crime among disadvantaged communities (Hagedorn, 2008).

Other push and pull factors can trigger violence among marginalised communities. Several socio-economic factors can stoke violence – unemployment, poverty, clan/social/political marginalisation, corruption and youth frustration. Other factors can pull marginalised individuals towards violence – access to material resources, weapons and protection, a sense of belonging and empowerment, strong governance – leading to violent extremism and radicalisation (Glazzard et al., 2016). Urbanisation can also act as a trigger for violence by marginalised people (Østby, 2015; Raleigh, 2015). Urban economic development brings rural poor to cities, where they often live in slums. Research has shown that when this occurs, violence increases (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2011). The Sustainable Development Goal period will see huge demographic shifts that concentrate the world’s poorest people in urban areas, thereby creating hotspots of marginalised communities. The most populated cities in the world are also likely to be the most fragile as structural inequalities and social exclusion become more prevalent. The connection between violent conflict and horizontal inequalities is applicable to a variety of contexts and types of violence (Langer and Stewart, 2013; Brown and Langer, 2010), including communal violence (Mancini, 2005; Fjelde and Østby, 2014), inter-regional inequality and separatist conflict (Bakke and Wibbels, 2006); and group mobilisation in civil war (Langer, 2005).

Capacity

The feasibility of violence and conflict is an important determinant for their emergence. The availability of weapons and ammunition, and access to money through such means as natural resource exploitation and organised crime, do not in themselves cause violence. But they are risk factors that enable its emergence. Added to this, the capacity of groups to mobilise human and financial resources, logistics, and military capability also heighten the risk of armed violence.

People

The complexity of violence leads to dominant narratives that can impede understanding and the effectiveness of interventions.

Violence does not fit neatly into customary security frameworks or conflict narratives, and is often treated subjectively within different organisations. As mentioned in Chapter 2, approaches that reduce violence to “perpetrators versus victims” or “criminals versus innocent citizens” ignore how chronic violence actually pushes everyone affected into a complex violence situation. For instance, in societies that have been afflicted by violence for many years, victims can become perpetrators and perpetrators can become victims, demonstrating the shape-shifting nature of violence.

The tremendous versatility of violence to transform in changing circumstances and contexts, as well as the complexity of drivers and motivations for individual behaviour, make it tempting to homogenise actors and simplify programmatic responses. However, this can compound risks. Non-selective targeting or broad punitive measures can inadvertently sweep up non-violent individuals in their wake, or fail to account for social

norms, motivations and other factors. As a result, they may deepen marginalisation, foster mistrust for the rule of law or provide motives for violent behaviour.

Power, marginalisation and capacity interact with one another – and with the normative environment in which they coexist – to form a risk context in which violence may emerge or subside. People in turn interact with the risk environment they find themselves in and may become perpetrators and/or victims of violence depending on the dynamics of these interrelationships. A full picture of the complexity of violence emerges only by closely analysing these interactions on multiple levels.

States of Fragility 2016 – final recommendations

By 2030, it is estimated that more than 60% of the global poor will be living in states of fragility. It is our collective goal to ensure that these people – those left furthest behind – are part of our shared tomorrow.

Given the breadth of *States of Fragility 2016*, it is impossible to provide an exhaustive list of specific recommendations. However, it is possible to highlight some areas where the development community can more effectively address fragility and violence. Good practice does exist; these examples need to be shared, discussed and improved upon. The following recommendations benefit from the valuable insights of the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) and its members, as well as the wider community of practice.

BETTER POLICY

Recognise that fragility is multidimensional

States of Fragility 2016 recognises that fragility has many dimensions with many aspects and facets. These dimensions – both the exposure to different types of risks and the lack of capacity to absorb them or to adapt – can affect developing and richer countries alike. States and societies face an accumulation or combination of risks – and if that state, society or system cannot manage, absorb or mitigate the consequences of those risks, then it shows signs of fragility.

The OECD fragility framework has highlighted five dimensions of fragility: economic, environmental, political, security and societal. The resulting multidimensional model provides an important new framework to consider how fragility is framed and assess how it is monitored.

Recognising that fragility is multidimensional can help practitioners design better theories of change and programming in at-risk contexts. To start with, practitioners need to at the very least invest in a better, more holistic analysis of the context. In turn, a better analysis will help support better programme design, ensuring that programmes support the capacity of state and society systems to manage, absorb and mitigate potential risks across all the different dimensions of fragility. Using a multidimensional framework will also help different actors in a particular context understand how their individual actions and programmes are interdependent. If all the facets of fragility are to be addressed, different actors will need to plan, design and implement programmes in a more collaborative way.

Take violence seriously – in all its forms

More attention must be paid to the important impact of violence, in its many forms, on fragility.

States of Fragility 2016 reframes fragility as a combination of risks, with violence as perhaps its most frequent driver and its most frequent outcome. The report findings – that violence is increasing, it is complex and shape-shifting, and it is extremely costly – demonstrate that the international community needs to dedicate more resources and attention to this important area.

The treatment of violence must take into account the interconnected nature of different forms of violence, and their shared root causes. This will involve a shift in development practice – moving from interventions that are focused primarily on conflict and its aftermath to interventions that address violence, and its prevention, in all its forms. It will also require closer collaboration, at least at the analysis stage, between different policy communities working at different layers of society – especially between development, stabilisation and humanitarian actors.

Challenge existing paradigms

Dominant narratives about violence can oversimplify what are inherently complex multi-causal dynamics, leading to facile assumptions about how to most appropriately respond. This will entail adopting a broader definition of violence, one that explicitly avoids attributing labels of “good” and “bad” to populations and places, while also recognising the mutability of roles, actors and circumstances.

Conflict areas are not necessarily anarchic, disordered or ungoverned. Civilians are not just victims – they can also be active participants in, and enablers for, violent acts. Peace does not necessarily follow conflict. Domestic politics, even in times of peace, can also cause political violence.

In addition, not all development work has an impact on violence. The international community should thus better distinguish between programmes for broader development gains (e.g. education and jobs) that have potential long-term yields for violence prevention, on the one hand, and other targeted interventions that lead to more immediate, significant and measurable reductions in violence, on the other hand. Both are necessary in order to foster a context in which sustainable development can take hold, and in which societal norms evolve to eventually discourage violence. Indeed, the first step to better addressing violence is to frame it in a way that takes full account of its complexity.

Challenging the dominant paradigm opens entry points for interventions, and empowers people to change those roles, and norms, in positive ways.

Invest in prevention

Investing in prevention saves lives, resources and money. It is not only logical; it is simply more effective. A prevention culture must permeate all levels of aid planning and decision making, including investment in resolving the root causes of conflict.

An important determinant of success is early engagement in emerging crises; this is key to prevention and to the protection of civilians affected by violence and fragility. Both are cyclical in nature, and evidence shows that exposure to violence often leads to more violence down the line. Early intervention, focusing on changing behavioural and societal norms, is therefore essential to break this cycle of violence before it picks up unstoppable momentum (UNODC, 2013). Young people, with the most to lose and gain, are the key to realising these generational shifts.

Sustained and committed political diplomacy for prevention and resolution must also be part of a more comprehensive package of responses, dealing with the underlying factors that led to fragility and violence in the first place (UNOCHA, 2016).

Deliver on the Stockholm Declaration and the New Deal

The Stockholm Declaration outlines how to revive commitment to the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States and take it the next level, so that the ambitions of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development can be realised in fragile and conflict affected environments (IDPS, 2016).

In Stockholm, the members of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding committed to: accelerate and improve their efforts to address the root causes of fragility and violence, using the New Deal's Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals to guide their interventions; strengthen women's active participation in the process; build stronger partnerships, including multi-stakeholder dialogue at country level, and with the humanitarian community; build effective structures for conflict management and reconciliation, and to make politics more inclusive; increase political and financial efforts, in line with the New Deal principles, to address the special needs of fragile contexts; strengthen national public financial management systems to reduce fiduciary risks; and to scale up programmes to support domestic resource mobilisation.

Making good on these Stockholm Declaration commitments, and being held to account for progress, will be an important task for the coming years.

Use domestic policy to promote global peace and security

Action against violence and fragility can also start at home. Domestic policies, if enacted with a violence and fragility lens, can make a real difference to the factors of power, marginalisation and capacity that enable violence around the world.

There are a number of ways this could be done. Transparency about the purchase and sale of resources, including oil and minerals, by domestic citizens and companies, could be improved. This would help limit the resulting flows to proponents of violence. Investing and trading with fragile contexts – providing predictable, long-term access to markets – could help promote economic growth, stability and jobs, and thus mitigate the incentives for violence. Shutting down tax havens and financial secrecy jurisdictions could create more tax resources in fragile contexts and promote a social contract between citizens and state. Tackling environmental issues at home, for example reducing deforestation and climate change, and protecting biodiversity, could help reduce the environmental factors that disproportionately impact fragile societies. Increasing economic opportunities for migrants from fragile contexts – for example through seasonal worker visas, and in areas where skills are in short supply such as care for the elderly – would increase the flow of remittances, spread democratic ideas and values, and also provide value for domestic economies. Other global norms and values can also be promoted – for example through rules regarding landmines and small arms, war crimes and against the use of torture; arms sales, protecting freedom of the press and the rights of minorities; and furthering the fight against corruption (Barder, 2016).

BETTER PROGRAMMING

Develop a whole-of-society approach

Positive and sustainable outcomes in fragile contexts depend on multiple and interconnected factors. Focusing on a single actor, or a single layer of society, or a single sector, will therefore be insufficient. Instead, better results will come from working with multiple types of actors, at different layers of society – individual, community, municipal, provincial and national – and taking a multidimensional, multi-sector approach. In this way the capacities of whole societies to respond to volatile, risky and rapidly evolving contexts will be strengthened. Like other development efforts, multi-year financing that allows for longer-term strategic theories of change will go a long way to facilitating this work. Additionally, investing in context and problem analysis as core donor behaviour will help ensure this targeting is systematically used and is based on the best available evidence (OECD, 2016).

Likewise, the teams and disciplines tackling the many dimensions of violence and fragility must be as diverse and robust as the challenges they face. Better collaboration among those engaged in tackling social, criminal and interpersonal violence and those working on the issues of conflict, peace and security will provide valuable synergies. Such cross-fertilisation can draw on an immense evidence base of global experience connecting different approaches and streams of violence programming.

One important lesson is that effective policies and strategies must not only target at-risk young people, but also promote young people and local communities working together to break the cycle of violence (UNODC, 2013). Community mobilisation programmes, when combined with support services and media outreach, have had success in changing social norms in high-violence areas, as evidenced by greater reporting of violence and reduced impunity (WHO, 2016).

This type of multidimensional, systems-based approach starts with whole-of-society analysis and planning, resulting in shared strategic goals and more coherent programming and results.

Put people at the centre

Agenda 2030, and its theme to “leave no one behind”, aims to ensure that marginalised, excluded and vulnerable groups are prioritised. A focus on violence in all its forms also means shifting towards an approach that puts people at its centre, recognising that a stable state and strong institutions do not automatically lead to a reduction in violence. Instead, focusing on those individuals most likely to engage in violence can be a better strategy, one that positively influences social norms and behaviour change. Once such example is focused deterrence, which places high-risk people at the centre, and uses strategies such as direct communication of community standards against violence, prior notice from law enforcement about the legal consequences of further violence, and a tailored offer of help (Locke, 2016). However, a more focused approach requires a great deal of care, and a strong understanding of how individuals and communities perceive issues such as legitimacy, trust and the existing provisions of security, and it therefore will be highly context-specific.

In practice, however, structural responses to fragility tend to be favoured over societal ones. This is because they are more visible, easier to manage and measure, and may yield more immediate results. However, development actors who favour central capacity building must recognise that the state is often a non-neutral actor and that enhanced state capacity could – perversely – also increase economic exclusion, and increase marginalisation and

insecurity. For example, where strong law enforcement is not accompanied by commensurate social investments, communities may feel persecuted and even empathise with criminals. In addition, a more sophisticated approach to engagement with elites is needed, as they can have vested interests in perpetuating fragility. Investing in community capacity and mobilisation can help counter these effects.

Indeed, local actors have the knowledge and legitimacy to handle sensitivities, and are best positioned to address societal violence where they too see that as a priority. In fragile contexts where risks of violence are greater, involving local actors in the programming cycle will ensure that assessments, planning, data collection and research, and evaluation reflect their particular needs.

Use the violence lens to design and deliver programming

States of Fragility 2016 proposes an updated violence lens to help practitioners better understand the drivers of violence in all its forms (Figure 7.1).

The violence lens shows that power, marginalisation and capacity interact with each other to create an environment that either leads to or, in its positive form, reduces, violence. People interact with that environment to become perpetrators or victims of violence, or both.

Using the updated violence lens to help analyse contexts, and deliver and monitor results, will help foster a greater understanding of violence in societies, design better programmes that either directly or indirectly reduce the drivers of violence, and thus deliver more effective results.

The OECD will further develop the violence lens, as well as guidance on its use, over the coming year.

Prioritise reconciliation

Dialogue and reconciliation in post-conflict societies, with the support and commitment of the international community, can help support sustainable peace. For example, the g7+ is using fragile-to-fragile co-operation to share experiences of transitions to peace by supporting dialogue and reconciliation. It has established Councils of Eminent Persons to promote dialogue.

Reconciliation is a critical part of healing the social cleavages that perpetuate and exacerbate violence, and can therefore help reduce a key driver of fragility. Without addressing these social cleavages the root causes of violence will remain, ready to flare up again at any moment, or embed grievances and inequalities. However, the international community has difficulty funding reconciliation programmes. Results are hard to capture and prove, and programmes take a long time, meaning that the case for reconciliation can be difficult to make in project proposals, especially for programmes at the community level where reconciliation is arguably most needed. In addition, given the unpredictability of human behaviour and the complex incentives involved in violent and fragile environments, reconciliation programmes cannot be guaranteed to work for everyone. However, when reconciliation is effective, it can have a multiplier effect on other development programming in fragile environments and enable a more inclusive peace, especially in contexts that are experiencing severe violence and mistrust – including contexts that are feeding the fires of violent extremism.

Therefore, more sustained international support for reconciliation processes, and integration of reconciliation into peacebuilding programming, would be useful.

Recognise the critical role of gender in addressing fragility

OECD research on gender and fragility shows that international support in areas such as gender reforms or women's participation will have limited impact when powerful societal norms and structures are left unaddressed. While discriminatory norms can be particularly harmful in fragile contexts, opportunities to shift such norms do exist in fragile and post-conflict contexts (OECD, forthcoming). Programming in fragile contexts therefore needs to go beyond a focus on reform and strengthening of formal institutions. It should also recognise the importance of informal power structures and institutions, social norms, and behaviours in shaping both gender inequality and their follow-on impacts on states of fragility. However, at present, development actors often analyse gender and fragility in separate processes, and fail to link their findings.

Therefore, one way to help achieve a more cohesive approach would be to develop tools that bring together gender, violence and fragility issues within one analytical framework.

Experiment, remain flexible and take risks

People are at the centre of violence-related threats and solutions – and yet human behaviour is often difficult to foresee and anticipate. Therefore, programming to address violence, and the budgets that support it, will need to remain flexible enough to allow programmes to be adapted or dropped if they are not working, and/or to be scaled up when showing signs of success (OECD, 2016, 2012; European Commission, 2015). Becoming comfortable with a measure of well-calculated risk, and even programming failure, can have big payoffs. This includes learning from, rather than penalising, failure as well as incentivising innovation and marginal risk acceptance.

A strategy with high potential for success and, often, cost savings is one that emphasises learning by doing; piloting and incubating various experimental approaches; monitoring and collecting feedback; and growing an evidence base and then gradually scaling up. Courageous leadership is also important, helping leverage multi-sector investments and draw on shared resources, including strategic partnerships with the private sector (World Economic Forum, 2016). Lessons from the Latin American “citizen security” model are relevant here. First, a clear strategy is critical. Second, these interventions are successful when they are tightly focused on high-risk places and behaviours, and set short- and long-term horizons (Abt and Winship, 2016; Muggah et al., 2016).

Learn and build the evidence base

Investments to counter fragility must be built on a foundation of both qualitative and quantitative evidence and real data, rather than assumptions (OECD, 2011). Surprisingly, this is not the case today. A recent study for the World Economic Forum, for example, concludes that fewer than 6% of public security and justice measures undertaken across Latin America and the Caribbean have any evidentiary base (Szabó de Carvalho and Muggah, 2016). A broad foundation is required: analyses should include information related to individuals, organisational dynamics and local political economies. Much of this is difficult to measure, and thus understand, because rates of reporting non-lethal violence are low. Better outreach to produce and use such data – particularly at the local level – would help fill these critical gaps. It is important to find and test innovative approaches to understanding the drivers of violence, and how to respond to violence, despite the data gaps. Because violence cuts across a broad spectrum of fields and institutions, key data for measuring

trends and dynamics tend to remain inside professional silos. This disaggregation means it is difficult to ascertain the complex ways in which violence drives and contributes to fragility. A common database allowing for information sharing on the range of violence related to fragility could be considered a public good (OECD, 2016). Furthermore, there may be more effective ways to gather data using existing tools, if international donors are willing to be flexible and innovative. Even well-known technology, like geographic information systems (GIS), can be leveraged in new ways, such as for geo-referenced violence “hot spots”. Qualitative measures like perception-based surveys are also becoming common and could be repurposed to reflect the violence-fragility nexus. Strategic partnerships should therefore be built on an interdisciplinary approach that utilises the full range of tools available, and does not limit fragility to a single field of study.

In addition, where impacts and/or causes are comparable, lessons and methodologies from other fields (e.g. rule of law, social violence, criminal and behavioural science, health, and anthropology) can be useful references.

FINANCING

Provide adequate, long-term ODA financing

States of Fragility 2016 highlights the continued importance of ODA in fragile contexts. ODA remains a growing, stable flow that complements private sector investments, which are often highly volatile and concentrated in only a few fragile contexts, as well as remittances, which are difficult to channel to specific development programmes because they are flows to friends and families. The report also shows that fragile contexts are often more aid-dependant than other developing countries.

However, *States of Fragility 2016* also demonstrates that in many cases ODA supports immediate or short-term remedies but not measures that require a longer time frame. This is as true for development ODA as it is for humanitarian aid. If ODA is to be most useful, it will need to be sufficiently predictable, flexible and long-term to enable multi-annual responses that address underlying drivers of fragility – across all its dimensions. Strategic patience is required for sustainable results in fragile contexts.

Fund the real drivers of fragility

States of Fragility 2016 shows there is at best limited correlation between the main risks of fragility in a given context and funding to help that context build resilience to those risks. For example, contexts that are fragile in the economic dimension currently receive more ODA for crisis management than for strengthening their underlying economic structures, and therefore resilience. Similarly, higher exposure to political fragility does not necessarily correspond to greater ODA flows for building government and civil society capacity, although this could help to strengthen institutions and improve state-society relations.

While the OECD’s fragility framework should not be seen as a resource to help make programming decisions on the ground, this lack of correlation between the dimensions of fragility and the direction of funding is a cause for concern. It is important that thorough, systemic analyses of risk and capacity are undertaken in fragile contexts, and that funding allocations target the highest risks, across all layers of society (OECD, 2014).

Develop better financing strategies

The availability of sufficient, appropriate financial resources will be critical to addressing the root causes and drivers of violence and fragility, and to deliver Agenda 2030 in fragile contexts. In order to meet these ambitious goals, development actors will need to seek greater efficiency and impact from their existing financial resources and tools.

This new efficiency will necessarily take place in a dynamic and evolving international financing environment. Traditional international financial tools including ODA are increasingly called on to engage with a more diverse cast of actors and meet a wider range of ambitions than ever before – to catalyse technical solutions, influence policy, invest in new capabilities, underwrite public goods, incentivise and leverage investment, and stimulate financing flows from other public and private sources in support of better results in fragile contexts. In addition, the economic, environmental, political, security and social effects of fragility have shifted into new environments, notably towards middle-income countries, and are also increasingly understood as having country, regional and global impacts and solutions. The international community's existing toolbox of financing instruments is under pressure to adapt to this new reality (OECD, forthcoming).

The ambitious new global development goals, dynamic and emerging states of fragility, and calls for more suitable financing mechanisms, present challenges for the international community. Development actors will need to gain a broader understanding of the development financing landscape for fragile contexts and address gaps in their financing toolbox. They will also need to better prioritise, quantify, sequence and layer different types of financial tools, and develop more coherent and forward-looking financing strategies for fragile contexts.

The OECD will continue work to promote a better understanding of financial tools and portfolio management in fragile contexts in 2017.

Conclusion

The stakes have never been higher. Violence and fragility wreak destruction on human lives and societies, preventing people from fully achieving their potential. Violence obstructs development, stalls recovery from conflict, compounds the risks of fragility, and feeds devastating new cycles of violence. The international policy response to violence must recognise the varied risks, impacts and causes. Unless the international community rises to this challenge – adapting traditional approaches where feasible, embracing risk, testing innovative models, working across boundaries and disciplines, and building evidence – then the trend of ever more costly violence will continue. Indeed, this fragile world could become more so in an exponential way, given that it will likely face more stresses from climate change, fragile cities, and the regionalisation of violence and conflict. Getting it wrong will not just leave the unsatisfactory *status quo* in place. It could well make matters worse. This opportunity to alleviate the toll of violence and fragility must not be missed.

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Annex A: Methodological annex

Existing measures of fragility

The academic and policy world has been grappling for some time with methods and measures for best conceptualising states of fragility. That fragility is a multidimensional concept is now well accepted in both spheres, although there is still debate over defining those dimensions.

One conceptualisation of a multidimensional framework for fragility proposes a disaggregation based on a conception of statehood as the antithesis to fragility. Statehood in turn is defined by effectiveness and legitimacy (Goldstone et al., 2000; Marshall and Cole, 2014; Rice and Patrick, 2008); a three-dimensional conception of state authority, state legitimacy and state capacity; or some variation on this theme (Carment, Samy and Landry, 2013; Call, 2010; Grävingholt, Ziaja and Kreibaum, 2015). Empirical assessments of fragility tend to try to measure these dimensions of statehood based on domains such as political performance, economic performance and social performance. The George Mason University State Fragility Index, for example, has indicators of effectiveness and legitimacy across four domains: security, political, economic and social. The scores from the individual domains are combined to provide overall effectiveness and legitimacy scores, which are in turn combined to give an overall state fragility score. Data are available for 167 contexts as of 2014, with a historical time series going back until 1995. Because the index is aggregated based on concepts of effectiveness and legitimacy, it is difficult to analyse variations in the four domains. This potentially hides some significant differences between developed and developing countries, for example, or within the group of developed countries, which may face differing challenges.

The Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) fragility index assesses state performance in terms of authority, capacity and legitimacy in six dimensions: governance, economics, security and crime, human development, demographics, and environment. It uses 75 indicators. Data have been made available for 2010, 2011 and 2012, but it is unclear whether the index has been calculated in subsequent years. Although separate scores for authority, capacity and legitimacy are calculated, it is unclear which indicators contribute to each of the three dimensions.

Moving away from a definition of fragility associated with statehood, the Fragile States Index measures fragility as a combination of pressures and capacity to respond to those pressures in three dimensions: social, political and economic. The 3 primary dimensions are further deconstructed to 12 sub-dimensions, which are defined by 88 indicators. The methodology involved in generating the dimension scores is highly sophisticated and based on triangulating three primary sources of data, using the Conflict Assessment System Tool analysis platform. Data are available for 178 contexts and the index has been calculated on an annual basis since 2005. While novel in its conceptualisation of fragility as a combination of pressure and capacity to respond, the index itself does not distinguish

between these two sets of drivers of fragility, conflating indicators for both into the same score. It is thus difficult to establish whether fragility in one dimension is more a function of high pressures or low capacity to respond. This in turn has implications for policy making and donor assistance.

The Index of State Weakness in the Developing World is a fragility assessment based on four domains: security, political, economic and social. The 4 domains are measured with 20 individual indicators, and data are available for 141 developing countries, defined as those with a gross national income per capita below USD 11 115 and with a population above 100 000. The index was designed to help policy makers identify countries at risk of violence or conflict including terrorism (Rice and Patrick, 2008). The elegance of this index lies in its simplicity. However, it does not advance thinking on conceptualising fragility beyond existing indicators, and was only measured in 2008. Furthermore, it focuses only on developing countries, so a holistic view of fragility around the world is not possible.

A number of other indices attempt to capture concepts related in some degree to fragility, or at least to some component of fragility. The Global Peace Index (GPI) of the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), for example, measures internal and external peace based on political and security domain indicators. The GPI covers 163 contexts from 2008 onwards. The Worldwide Governance Indicators project (WGI) calculates indicators for 215 economies from 1996 to 2014 on 6 dimensions of governance, including political stability and the absence of violence (Kaufmann and Kraay, 2015). The Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) measures 4 domains of state capacity – economic management, structural policies, policies for social inclusion and equity, and public sector management and institutions – for 95 economies from 2005 to 2014 (World Bank, 2015). None of these indices or indicators alone comprehensively addresses fragility.

The OECD's move towards a risk-based approach to fragility is a significant departure from these previous attempts to measure fragility. Although there are extant measures of "risk", these measures are not directly coupled to the concept of fragility as defined by the OECD. For example, the Global Conflict Risk Index (GCRI), the Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger, the Index for Risk Management (INFORM), and the World Risk Index are all empirical measures of various risks.

The GCRI measures the risk of conflict and conflict intensity with respect to five risk domains: political, social cohesion and public security, conflict prevalence, geography and environment, and economy. It uses 22 indicators to measure the risk of conflict in the near future as well as the intensity of ongoing conflict for 137 contexts, going back to 1989 (De Groot, Vernaccini and Hachemer, 2014). Although the index uses the same domains as the OECD fragility framework used in this report, it is one step removed from a measure of fragility in that it looks at risk but not explicitly at coping capacity.

The Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger is a ranking of 163 contexts based on their estimated risk of experiencing major political instability or armed conflict. It is calculated biannually based on five indicators representing four risk domains: political, economic, social and security. The results are presented as a risk ratio, which is interpreted as the relative risk of instability in a country or context, compared to the average estimated likelihood of instability for 28 of the member countries of the OECD. The estimated likelihood of instability for these average OECD countries between 2010 and 2012, for example, was 0.008. For this same period, Afghanistan, which was ranked at the top of the instability ranking, was 36 times more likely to experience conflict or political instability. Similarly to the GCRI, this index has been calculated to measure risk alone, rather than a holistic conception of fragility.

The INFORM index is an attempt to measure disaster risk as an interaction of hazard and exposure, vulnerability, and lack of coping capacity. These 3 dimensions of risk are measured by 21 indicators in the social, economic, political, security and environmental domains. The index has been calculated since 2012, and covers 194 contexts. Although the INFORM index is intended to measure risk, the methodology also includes measures of coping capacities.

The World Risk Index calculates the risk of experiencing an extreme natural disaster for 171 contexts. A country or context faces a high risk if it is highly exposed to natural hazards and if its society is highly vulnerable, i.e. risk is calculated as exposure multiplied by susceptibility. While exposure mainly relates to environmental events such as earthquakes and flooding, sustainability includes indicators of social and economic domains (United Nations University, 2014).

While the OECD fragility framework has some overlap in terms of the multidimensionality of fragility, specifically in five domains, the conceptualisation of fragility as being a combination of high risk and low coping capacity necessitates a methodology that, for each domain, selects indicators of both risk and coping capacity. This is a key distinguishing feature of the OECD fragility framework from both existing measures of fragility, and existing measures of risk.

Conceptualising fragility as risks and coping capacities

The OECD formally defines fragility as:

Fragility is a combination of exposure to risk and insufficient coping capacity of the state, system, and/or communities to manage, absorb or mitigate those risks. Fragility can lead to negative outcomes, including violence, the breakdown of institutions, displacement, humanitarian crises, or other emergencies.

The OECD fragility framework looks at current exposure to natural disasters or violence, for example, as well as the ability of a country or context to deal with future negative events. It is the combination of risks and coping capacities.

The understanding of fragility as a manifestation of risk is not new. The African Development Bank (AfDB) defines fragility as a “condition of elevated risk of institutional breakdown, societal collapse, or violent conflict” (AfDB, 2014). Similarly, the World Bank is currently adapting its approach to fragility to reflect multidimensional risks, in line with its 2014 *World Development Report: Risk and Opportunities*. The notion of risk also corresponds to previous work by the International Network on Conflict and Fragility stressing the vulnerability of fragile contexts to external shocks and their weak governance and response capacity (OECD, 2011). This reflects a broader effort by development actors to invest in risk management that flows from international policy agreements made in 2015, including the Sustainable Development Goals, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda and the Paris Agreement. All of these stress the need to identify, reduce, manage and prepare for risk.

However, risk is a complex area of practice and theory with competing schools of thought (Box A.1). Risks in the OECD framework are interpreted as hazards, threats and vulnerabilities that can be both internally generated within a society or polity as well as externally driven threats, hazards or vulnerabilities from either other countries or from external environmental events. Fragility manifests in the presence of low or poor coping

capacities to mitigate the threat from these risks. However, the OECD framework does not attempt to calculate risk by calculating the probability of an event occurring and the impact that it would have. Instead, it uses different indicators as proxies for risk and considers their levels in relation to the coping capacities of 171 contexts.

Box A.1. The terminology of risk

The concept of risk is shared across many sectors – economic, financial, business, political, health and so on. Risk has thus been defined in varying ways, although most definitions refer to likelihood and impact. The OECD 2013 High Level Risk Forum called risk “the potential damage caused by a single event or a series of events” and “a combination of two factors”. Those two factors are the “probability of the occurrence of a hazard”, with hazard defined as a “potentially harmful event”, and vulnerability, which is defined as “a measure of the exposure of human lives, health, activities, assets or the environment to the potential damage caused by such hazards occurring” (OECD, 2011). Similarly, in the humanitarian community, the risk of disaster is often referred to as a combination of hazard and/or exposure and vulnerability. For example, the IFRC defines disaster as an occurrence “when a hazard impacts on vulnerable people” (IFRC, 2016).

Other definitions also point to the potentially negative outcome and its impact. The World Economic Forum describes a global risk as an “an uncertain event or condition that, if it occurs, can cause significant negative impact for several countries or industries within the next 10 years” (WEF, 2016). Leading the social risk management work for the World Bank, Holzmann and Jørgensen defined risk as “uncertainty or unpredictability that results in welfare losses” (Holzmann and Jørgensen, 2000).

The *World Development Report 2014* takes an action-oriented approach, arguing that taking on risk, “the possibility of loss” is necessary to pursue development opportunities or “the possibility of gain”. This requires a shift from ad hoc responses to proactive, systematic and integrated risk management (World Bank, 2014). Analysing avenues towards “reducing the risks of violence”, the *World Development Report 2011* had already advocated a move “from sporadic early warning to continued risk assessment wherever weak institutional legitimacy, and internal or external stresses indicate a need for attention to prevention” (World Bank, 2011).

Risks can be categorised in different ways. The World Economic Forum distinguishes different categories of risk (economic, environmental, geopolitical, societal and technological) and grades their severity according to their likelihood and impact on a global scale. Holzmann and Jørgensen list natural, health, life cycle, social, economic, political and environmental risks and classify them as micro-, meso- and macro-level risks depending on the number of people they potentially affect (Holzmann and Jørgensen, 2000).

Regardless of the definition selected, the ability of any quantitative measure to estimate the probability of any event is highly contested and criticised (Taleb and Treverton, 2015). Prediction is hard (Berdal and Wennmann, 2010). In building the methodology for the OECD fragility framework, the possibility of developing new quantitative risk measures across five dimensions capable of being accurate, justifiable, sufficiently different from existing established measures, and strong enough to obtain agreement throughout the community was considered not only unlikely, but unobtainable. Instead, the approach developed selects risk indicators based on research that has discussed each one of the indicators as representing an increased likelihood or impact of a negative event. These are not used to build a purely quantitative measure of risk *per se*. Rather the intent is to develop a typology of fragility where each cluster is created quantitatively but analysed qualitatively. This innovative mixed-methodology, multidimensional approach builds on the strengths of qualitative and quantitative analysis to better understand fragility.

Sources: Berdal and Wennmann (2010); IFRC (2016); OECD (2013); Taleb and Treverton (2015); WEF (2015); World Bank (2000).

Indicator selection

The choice of indicators has been driven by a selection criteria in line with the OECD's fragility concept of high risk and low coping capacity. In addition to the normal technical criteria for selecting good indicators, of particular importance was the selection of indicators based on their relationship to fragility: are they a *cause* of fragility or an *outcome* of fragility? Indicators that represent outcomes of fragile contexts do not offer clear guidance as to policies that can reduce fragility. For example, infant mortality is an indicator used in several fragility measures. However, infant mortality is arguably more of an outcome of a fragile health context than a cause of it. To decide on the selection of indicators, the following criteria was used:

- **Risk:** do the indicators alter either likelihood or impact *ex ante*?
- **Coping capacity:** what indicators would stop the risk cascading *ex post* if the risk occurred?

Using these criteria does not eliminate the challenge of separating some indicators into either a risk or a coping capacity category. For example, levels of armed personnel can be thought of as a coping capacity for dealing with insurgencies. It can also be thought of as contributing to the risk of violence. Methodological decisions have been made to account for this to produce the best approximation given such limitations.

Further, some coping capacity indicators have been used in more than one dimension. This introduces an unintended issue in aggregating the dimensions to provide the final 56 contexts used for analysing flows by fragility. Using indicators more than once in effect weights these indicators more than others. While statistical measures have been employed to minimise the effect of this, this method was still chosen as an alternative to dividing some of these indicators into one and only one dimension. For example, government effectiveness and rule of law are important not only for the security dimension, but also the environmental dimension. Forcing these into one or the other dimension arbitrarily creates an incomplete picture of the interconnectedness of coping capacities. Furthermore, while these are in effect weighted more highly as a result, this was believed to be justifiable given their cross-dimensional importance. Table A.1 lists the indicators of fragility used in the States of Fragility 2016 methodology.

Table A.1. Indicators of fragility

Dimension	Type	Indicator name	Source	Description
Economic	Risk	Resource rent dependence	WB	Total natural resource rents are the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents (hard and soft), mineral rents, and forest rents.
	Risk	General government gross debt	IMF	General government debt as a percentage of GDP.
	Risk	Youth not in education, employment or training (NEET)	WB	The proportion of young people who are NEET in relation to the population of the corresponding age group: youth (aged 15 to 24); persons aged 15 to 29; or both age groups.
	Risk	Aid dependency	INFORM	Combination of net ODA as a percentage of GNI, total ODA per capita in the last two years and total humanitarian aid in last two years per capita.
	Risk	GDP growth rate	WB	Annual growth rate of GDP.
	Risk	Unemployment rate	WB	Unemployment rate.
	Risk	Socio-economic vulnerability	INFORM	A combination of indicators related to development and deprivation, inequality, and aid dependency.
	Coping	Education	HDI	Measured by the mean of years of schooling for adults aged 25 years and over and expected years of schooling for children of school age entering school.
	Coping	Regulatory quality	WGI	Reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.
	Coping	Remoteness	EVI	Trade-weighted average distance from world markets.
	Coping	Men in the labour force	UNDP	Percentage of male participation in the labour force.
	Coping	Women in the labour force	UNDP	Percentage of female participation in the labour force.
Coping	Food security	INFORM	Prevalence of undernourishment, average dietary supply adequacy, domestic food price index, domestic food price volatility.	
Environmental	Risk	Natural disasters risk	INFORM	Includes earthquake, tsunami, flood, tropical cyclone and drought.
	Risk	Environmental health	Yale	Measure of health impacts, quality of air, water and sanitation.
	Risk	Prevalence of infectious disease (deaths per 100 000 population)	GBD and CSIS	Infectious disease deaths per 100 000 population.
	Risk	Uprooted people	INFORM	A combination of the number of refugees, number of returned refugees and number of internally displaced people.
	Risk	Socio-economic vulnerability	INFORM	Measures the (in)ability of individuals or households to afford safe and resilient livelihood conditions and well-being. Combines indicators of development and deprivation, inequality and aid dependency.
	Coping	Rule of law	WGI	Reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police and the courts as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.
	Coping	Core civil society index	V-DEM	How robust is civil society?
	Coping	Government effectiveness	WGI	Captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.
Coping	Food security	INFORM	Prevalence of undernourishment, average dietary supply adequacy, domestic food price index, domestic food price volatility.	
Political	Risk	Regime persistence	Polity IV	Number of years polity has persisted (as measured by no change in any of the Polity IV measures).
	Risk	Political terror	PTS	Levels of state-sanctioned or state-perpetrated violence (e.g. political violence such as assassinations of political challengers and police brutality).
	Risk	Perception of corruption	TI	Transparency International (TI) Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) ranks countries annually by their perceived levels of corruption, as determined by expert assessments and opinion surveys". The CPI generally defines corruption as "the misuse of public power for private benefit".
	Coping	Decentralised elections	V-DEM	Are there elected regional governments and, if so, to what extent can they operate without interference from unelected bodies at the regional level?
	Coping	Restricted gender physical integrity value	OECD	Measures prevalence of laws on rape and domestic violence. Experience of violence is also captured.
	Coping	Voice and accountability	WGI	Reflects perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association and a free media.
	Coping	Judicial constraints on executive power	V-DEM	To what extent does the executive respect the constitution and comply with court rulings, and to what extent is the judiciary able to act in an independent fashion?
Coping	Legislative constraints on executive power	V-DEM	To what extent are the legislature and government agencies (e.g. comptroller general, general prosecutor or ombudsman) capable of questioning, investigating and exercising oversight over the executive?	

Table A.1. Indicators of fragility (cont.)

Dimension	Type	Indicator name	Source	Description
Security	Risk	Homicide rate	UNODC	Intentional homicide rate per 100 000 population.
	Risk	Level of violent criminal activity	IPD	Intensity of violent activities by underground political organisations: by criminal organisations (e.g. drug trafficking, arms trafficking, prostitution, etc.).
	Risk	Deaths by non-state actors per capita	UCDP	Total of one-sided and non-state actor datasets – average per capita rate of 2011-14.
	Risk	Impact of terrorism	IEP/START	The Global Terrorism Index score for a context in a given year accounts for the relative impact of incidents in the year. Four factors are counted: number of terrorist incidents; number of fatalities caused by terrorism; number of injuries caused by terrorism; and approximate level of total property damage from terrorist incidents in a given year. It is a five-year weighted average to capture lingering fear effects.
	Risk	Conflict risk	GCRI	The statistical risk of violent conflict in the next 1-4 years based on 25 quantitative indicators from open sources.
	Risk	Battle-related deaths per capita (log)	UCDP-BD	Total of battle deaths.
	Risk	Restricted gender physical integrity value	OECD	Measures prevalence of laws on rape and domestic violence. Experience of violence is also captured.
	Coping	Police officers per 100 000 population	GPI	Police officers per 100 000 population.
	Coping	Armed security officers per 100 000 population	GPI	Armed security officers per 100 000 population.
	Coping	Rule of law	WGI	Reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.
Coping	Control over territory	V-DEM	Over what percentage of the territory does the state have effective control?	
Coping	Formal alliances	COW	Formal alliance between at least two states that fall into the classes of defence pact, neutrality or non-aggression treaty, or entente agreement.	
Societal	Risk	Gini coefficient	UNU-WIDER	Distribution of income expressed as a Gini coefficient.
	Risk	Gender inequality	UNDP/HDRO	Measures gender inequalities in reproductive health (maternal mortality ratio and adolescent birth rates); empowerment (proportion of parliamentary seats occupied by females and proportion of adult females and males aged 25 years and older with at least some secondary education); and economic status (expressed as labour market participation and measured by labour force participation rate of female and male populations aged 15 years and older).
	Risk	Horizontal inequality	V-DEM	Do all social groups, as distinguished by language, ethnicity, religion, race, region or caste, enjoy the same level of civil liberties, or are some groups generally in a more favourable position?
	Risk	Uprooted people	INFORM	A combination of the number of refugees, number of returned refugees and number of internally displaced people.
	Risk	Urbanisation growth	WB	Annual urban population growth.
	Coping	Core civil society index	V-DEM	How robust is civil society?
	Coping	Access to justice	V-DEM	The extent to which citizens enjoy secure and effective access to justice.
	Coping	Voice and accountability	WGI	Reflects perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association and a free media.

The relationship between selected indicators and fragility

Economic dimension

Resource rent dependence: resource dependence leaves an economy open to shocks in the global system as oil and mineral prices fluctuate. Resource dependence has also been found to increase the propensity for violence through greed and grievance mechanisms (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). The USAID Fragile States Indicators list views primary export dependence as a measure of economic effectiveness.

General government gross debt: poverty and economic decline put extra pressures on a state in terms of service delivery, and can cause or exacerbate frictions between those who “have” and those who “have not”. People in situations of vulnerable employment tend to be hardest hit in economic crises, and countries facing high levels of sovereign debt tend to be most exposed during times of economic crises. In fragile economies especially, economic grievances can often result in protest, violence and conflict.

Youth not in education, employment or education (NEET): when youth, especially young men, are not engaged in productive activity such as employment, education or training, they may pose a threat to social stability and conflict. Youth are more likely to be recruited as fighters and take up arms when their expected incomes from the formal labour market or agriculture are less than their expected incomes from fighting (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). Moreover, low levels of secondary education, again particularly in males, is strongly correlated with the outbreak of civil war.

Aid dependency: aid dependency can increase risk of conflict – severe aid shocks (i.e. decreases in aid) have been found to alter the domestic balance of power and induce violence (Nielsen et al., 2011).

GDP growth rate: an economy growing strongly is less likely to see economic tensions leading to violence. Economies that go through periods of negative growth and growth shocks have an increased likelihood of conflict (Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti, 2004). High rates of economic growth that result in increased economic inequality tend to exacerbate underlying tensions and may lead to an increased likelihood of conflict over the distribution of resources.

Unemployment rate: high rates of unemployment, particularly among males, may lower the opportunity cost of joining an armed rebellion that may offer enticing alternative income through looting and pillaging. High rates of unemployment may also breed or further grievances among ethnic groups or among opposition groups and government, further contributing to social and political discontent (Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000).

Education: low levels of education can lead to dependence on low-skilled work, which tends to be the most vulnerable employment in an economy. High levels of education combined with low levels of economic opportunity, however, are also a dangerous mix, acting as a catalyst for violent conflict.

Regulatory quality: if governments have good regulatory quality – the ability to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development – economic shocks are more easily contained (Dorsch, Dunz and Maarek, 2015).

Remoteness: contexts located far from major world markets face a series of structural handicaps, such as high transportation costs and isolation that render them less able to respond to shocks in an effective way. They also have greater difficulty diversifying their economies, even with globalisation and the Internet. Remoteness increases the costs of acquiring necessary imports, thus creating vulnerability to price shocks on global markets as well as to domestic shocks (including, e.g. natural disasters). Remoteness is a structural

obstacle to trade and growth and is particularly harmful in the case of many lower income small island developing states and landlocked developing countries.

Men and women in the labour force: labour force participation is an indirect measure of economic human capital, which in the long term is needed to ensure sufficient coping capacity in the economy.

Food security: food security is a fundamental indicator of a country's resilience to both environmental and economic shocks. Lack of food insecurity has been identified as a link between social and economic tensions and the spillover into violence and conflict (Brinkman and Hendrix, 2011).

Environmental dimension

Natural disasters risk: the INFORM natural disasters index captures the risk of some commonly occurring natural disasters, which in turn are a measure of environmental risk. The CIFP also uses a disaster risk measure for environmental fragility.

Environmental health: environmental health measures the protection of human health from environmental harm. The component indicators measure air and water quality, pollution levels, and safe sanitation.

Prevalence of infectious diseases: research suggests that the prevalence of infectious diseases can increase the risk of violent conflict outbreak. Infectious diseases can lead to the emergence of ethnocentric cultural norms, which coupled with resource competition among ethnic groups can lead to an increased frequency of civil wars (Letendre, Fincher, and Thornhill, 2010).

Uprooted people: the presence of refugees and displaced populations can increase the risk of subsequent conflict in host and origin countries. A majority of refugees never directly engage in violence but refugee flows facilitate the transnational spread of arms, combatants and ideologies conducive to conflict, and also alter the ethnic composition of the state. They can also exacerbate economic competition (Salehyan, 2008). Some measure of refugee burden on a host setting or country is also used in GCRI, INFORM, CIFP indices.

Socio-economic vulnerability: vulnerable populations are less able to cope with hazardous environmental and economic shocks such as natural disasters or economic collapse. Socio-economic vulnerability can stem from various sources, such as inequalities and dependencies as well as fundamental levels of development or deprivation.

Core civil society index: social capital has been defined as “the set of rules, norms, obligations, reciprocity, and trust embedded in social relations, social structures, and society's institutional arrangements which enables its members to achieve their individual and community objectives”. Social capital reduces the risk of social instability spilling over into social violence and conflict by allowing groups to overcome differences and resolve problems (Lederman, Loayza and Menendez, 2002).

Government effectiveness: perceptions of government effectiveness reflect a population's underlying level of discontent or satisfaction with the political status quo. Low levels of perceived government effectiveness can lead to social discontent, political protest and ultimately political violence.

Food security: food security is considered a fundamental indicator of a country's resilience to both environmental and economic shocks. At the same time, food insecurity has been identified as a link between social and economic tensions and the spillover into violence and conflict: thus, food security can be considered a buffer between tension and violence (Brinkman and Hendrix, 2011). The Fragile States Index and the CIFP use measures of food insecurity in their calculations.

Political dimension

Regime persistence: both entrenched democracies and entrenched autocracies can be considered politically stable in the sense that there is a low probability of regime breakdown. Transitions between regime types are a manifestation of political instability, and which provide opportunities for political violence (Hegre et al., 2001). The State Fragility Index uses regime durability as a measure of government effectiveness.

Political terror: state-sanctioned violence against its citizens is a manifestation of a collapse of state legitimacy, which research has identified as one critical measure of fragility. Furthermore, state repression often forces opposition groups towards other means of expressing dissent including violence (Regan and Norton, 2005). The GCRI and State Fragility Index use repression indicators in their calculations.

Perception of corruption: corruption can increase grievances and demands for political change that may trigger political violence and social unrest. Corruption can also fuel greed, which may provide motivations for opposition groups to try and capture the state through violent means, and for the state to use violent means to repress opposition (Le Billon, 2003). High levels of corruption increase the risk of political violence and instability. The Fragile States Index, CIFP and USAID Fragile States Indicators all use some measure of corruption in their index calculations.

Decentralised elections: a highly centralised state suffers bigger consequences when political and sectarian turmoil occur than those contexts that have managed to decentralise power. Many highly centralised states mask a suppression of sectarian tensions, which, when they do erupt, can result in violence and conflict, as seen in the Syrian Arab Republic (hereafter “Syria”) and Iraq. Centralisation also may increase the probability of a military coup leading to further political instability (Taleb and Treverton, 2015).

Restricted gender physical integrity value: in the absence of good global level data on gender-based violence (GBV), the restricted gender physical integrity value captures the extent to which GBV issues are considered in law and attitudes in any country. The index captures laws on domestic violence, rape and sexual harassment, as well as attitudes toward violence and prevalence of violence, prevalence of female genital mutilation, and reproductive autonomy. Many components of the index relate to the legal environment in a country and therefore reflect a component of political fragility. Restricted physical integrity has effects on women’s health outcomes, but spills over into economic and social outcomes as well.

Voice and accountability: a mechanism for channelling grievances and participating in the political process provides an outlet for pressures that may otherwise boil over into violence.

Judicial and legislative constraints on executive power: conflicts are more likely to erupt in political systems that suffer from a lack of rule of law and of checks and balances. By preventing action that oversteps legitimate boundaries of the state, checks and balances contain spillover effects from political instability (Grant and Keohane, 2005). The executive is less likely to be able to take control of the state, or to co-opt the military into performing actions which may lead to a cascading effect on violence.

Security dimension

Homicide rate: high homicide rates reflect a diminished capacity of government to perform its duties to protect people within its borders.

Level of violent criminal activity: violent criminal activity may undermine a state’s ability to exercise its monopoly on violence and increase risks to public security of persons and property (Tilly, 1985). Furthermore, organised crime undermines a state’s capacity and

legitimacy by undermining its ability to provide public goods and services and making corruption the norm (van Dijk, 2007). When a state's capacity and legitimacy are eroded, the potential for an outbreak of violent conflict either internally, or externally through transnational organised criminal activities, increases (Miraglia, Ochoa and Briscoe, 2012).

Deaths by non-state actors per capita: armed non-state actors undermine the state's monopoly on the use of force and are drivers of security fragility (Schneckener, 2006).

Impact of terrorism: terrorism is intrinsically linked to the environment of safety and security. Terrorist attacks can cause already unstable situations to fall further into the precipice of violence.

Conflict risk: the GCRI is an index of the statistical risk of violent conflict in the next 1-4 years based on 25 quantitative indicators from open sources.¹ The GCRI measures this with respect to five risk domains: political, social cohesion and public security, conflict prevalence, geography and environment, and economy. Twenty-two indicators are used to measure the risk of conflict in the near future as well as the intensity of ongoing conflict for 137 countries, going back to 1989. Although the index uses the same domains as the States of Fragility framework, the index is one step removed from a measure of fragility in that it looks at risk but not explicitly at coping capacity.

Battle-related deaths per capita: high levels of battle-related deaths indicate high security fragility and can contribute to further conflict and instability.

Restricted gender physical integrity value: in the absence of good global level data on GBV, the restricted gender physical integrity value captures the extent to which gender-based violence issues are considered in law and attitudes in any country. The index captures laws on domestic violence, rape and sexual harassment, as well as attitudes toward violence and prevalence of violence, prevalence of female genital mutilation, and reproductive autonomy. Many components of the index relate to the legal environment in a country and therefore reflect a component of political fragility. Restricted physical integrity has effects on women's health outcomes, but spills over into economic and social outcomes as well.

Police officers per 100 000 population and armed security officers per 100 000 population: a state's security apparatus ensures its monopoly over violence and control over territory, as well as public safety. With adequate police and security personnel, a state that is experiencing security instability will be able to respond quickly and in a way that can make further cascading effects – for example full-scale civil war – less likely to break out.

Rule of law: the rule of law provides a means of addressing grievances through means other than violence and conflict. In ethnically heterogeneous societies in particular, it has been found that a strong rule of law is associated with enduring peace (Easterly, 2001).

Control over territory: states that control their territory, however fragile the security situation has become, are resilient to total state collapse and failure (Rotberg, 2002).

Formal security alliances: countries that are members of formal security alliances are more resilient to conflicts spilling over from neighbouring countries, and tend to honour alliances including defence pacts, thereby reducing the effects of conflicts (Leeds, 2003).

Societal dimension

Gini coefficient: although the causal relationship between vertical inequality and conflict is debated (Stewart, 2010), high levels of income inequality can cause or exacerbate underlying social tensions as well as overall levels of poverty in the general population.

Gender inequality: research has found that countries characterised by gender inequality are more likely to be involved in interstate disputes and more likely to rely on violence to settle those disputes. It has also been found that high levels of gender inequality may lead to a greater propensity for intrastate conflict (Caprioli, 2005).

Horizontal inequality: horizontal inequalities within a society may affect social cohesion. Kaplan (2008) and others argue that state fragility is caused not only by weak institutions, but also by a lack of social cohesion that leads to the erosion of intergroup trust and an increased risk of conflict. Many post-conflict development programmes now have one component focused on rebuilding social cohesion to reduce the likelihood of relapse into conflict.

Uprooted people: the presence of refugees and displaced populations can increase the risk of subsequent conflict in host and origin countries. A majority of refugees never directly engage in violence but refugee flows facilitate the transnational spread of arms, combatants and ideologies conducive to conflict, and also alter the ethnic composition of the state. They can also exacerbate economic competition (Salehyan, 2008). Some measure of refugee burden on a host country is also used in the GCRI, INFORM, CIFP indices.

Urban growth rate (percentage): urbanisation and the speed of urbanisation have a positive relationship with crime rates (Muggah, 2014). Urbanisation has also been found to have a direct effect on levels of political protest, which heighten the risk of political conflict (Auvinen, 1997). The CIFP and USAID Fragile States indicators both use some measure of urbanisation.

Core civil society index: social capital has been defined as “the set of rules, norms, obligations, reciprocity, and trust embedded in social relations, social structures, and society’s institutional arrangements which enables its members to achieve their individual and community objectives”. Social capital reduces the risk of social instability spilling over into social violence and conflict by allowing groups to overcome differences and resolve problems (Lederman, Loayza and Menendez, 2002).

Access to justice: if citizens have mechanisms to resolve disputes in a peaceful manner using the legal system, grievances induced by social risk factors can be diverted from violent action and conflict, containing the effects of any realised risks.

Voice and accountability: a mechanism for channelling grievances and participating in the political process provides an outlet for pressures that may otherwise boil over into violence.

Indicator coverage and missing data

The 43 indicators selected do not cover all contexts and imputation techniques have been used to fill in data gaps. Lack of data is the primary reason why a context may not be included. The OECD fragility framework inclusion threshold is that at least 70% of data had to be available for a context for it to be included. In 2016, this yields a list of 171 contexts.

For some indicators it is possible to assume that contexts missing from the dataset have a certain value. For example, those missing from the battle deaths and deaths by non-state actors datasets can be assumed to have a value of 0. Where no reasonable assumption could be made, data are imputed using k-nearest neighbour (KNN) imputation that uses statistical inference to fill in missing data from the k most similar contexts. In the OECD fragility framework, this has been done using the 15 most similar contexts for each missing data point.

Table A.2. Indicator coverage

Indicator	Minimum year of data used	Maximum year of data used	Number of contexts	Imputation technique used
Access to justice	2012	2015	164	KNN imputation
Aid dependency	2016	2016	171	KNN imputation
Armed security officers per 100 000 population	2016	2016	160	KNN imputation
Battle-related deaths per capita (log)	2014	2014	171	Missing countries assigned 0
Control over territory	2012	2015	164	KNN imputation
Core civil society index	2012	2015	164	KNN imputation
Deaths by non-state actors per capita	2014	2014	171	Missing countries assigned 0
Decentralised elections	2012	2015	163	KNN imputation
Education	2013	2013	168	KNN imputation
Environmental health	2016	2016	168	KNN imputation
Food security	2016	2016	171	KNN imputation
Formal alliances	2012	2016	171	KNN imputation
GDP growth rate	2014	2014	161	KNN imputation
Gender inequality	2014	2014	150	KNN imputation
General government gross debt	2008	2015	163	KNN imputation
Gini coefficient	2012	2012	144	KNN imputation
Government effectiveness	2014	2014	171	KNN imputation
Homicide rate	2010	2012	171	KNN imputation
Horizontal inequality	2012	2015	164	KNN imputation
Impact of terrorism	2014	2014	171	KNN imputation
Judicial constraints on executive power	2012	2015	164	KNN imputation
Legislative constraints on executive power	2012	2015	164	KNN imputation
Level of violent criminal activity	2012	2012	140	KNN imputation
Males in labour force	2014	2014	153	KNN imputation
Natural disasters risk	2016	2016	171	KNN imputation
Youth not in employment, education and training (NEET)	1995	2014	140	Sources: World Bank with additional contexts added from OECD and ILO datasets, KNN imputation for the remaining contexts
Perception of corruption	2015	2015	164	KNN imputation
Police officers per 100 000 population	2016	2016	160	KNN imputation
Political terror	2013	2014	171	KNN imputation
Prevalence of infectious disease (deaths per 100 000 population)	2013	2013	171	KNN imputation
Regime persistence	2015	2015	163	KNN imputation
Regulatory quality	2014	2014	171	KNN imputation
Remoteness	2005	2013	154	OECD countries assigned 0, KNN imputation for the remainder
Resource rent dependence	2003	2014	168	KNN imputation
Restricted gender physical integrity value	2014	2014	144	OECD countries given OECD average, KNN imputation for the remainder
Rule of law	2014	2014	171	KNN imputation
Socio-economic vulnerability	2016	2016	171	KNN imputation
Unemployment rate	2014	2014	166	KNN imputation
Uprooted people	2016	2016	171	KNN imputation
Urbanisation growth	2014	2014	171	KNN imputation
Violent conflict risk	2016	2016	171	OECD countries given OECD average, KNN imputation for the remainder
Voice and accountability	2014	2014	171	KNN imputation
Women in labour force	2014	2014	169	KNN imputation

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OECD approach compared to existing approaches to measuring fragility

Until 2015, the OECD had been using a “fragile states list”. However, the use of a list as the sole indicator of fragility has become increasingly incongruent with the growing recognition that fragility is a multidimensional issue (Grävingholt, Ziaja and Kreibaum, 2015). In addition, composite indices have a number of conceptual, methodological and practical drawbacks:

- There is little agreement in the literature as to drivers of fragility, making any particular measure open to debate (Mack, 2010).
- In general, composite indices require a judgement on whether indicators are good or bad. While there are methods of dealing with more complicated dynamics in composite indices, it has been noted that such approaches are seldom used (Grävingholt, Ziaja and Kreibaum, 2015).²⁰ However, as understanding of fragility and resilience progresses so too does recognition that this is an oversimplification. For example, increasing resilience sometimes increases fragility.
- The additive nature of composite indices implies that poor performance in one of the indicators selected can be offset by strong performance in another. While compensation between factors may be realistic in some cases, in general it is hard to justify.
- Composite indices lists can be good for vertical comparisons of contexts, i.e. whether Country A is more fragile than Country B. However, they are limited in horizontal comparisons. For example, if two contexts score 0.5 in some measure of fragility, this does not provide any information about the composition of this score. This is problematic as it is recognised that certain combinations of weaknesses may pose larger threats than others though quantitatively they produce the same score.
- Using a list conveys the impression that “fragile states” can be thought of as a homogenous group when in reality fragility is highly contextualised and can manifest in many varied and different ways (Gould and Pate, 2016).
- Lists alone make it difficult to cluster contexts into sensible and cohesive groups, making them of limited use for the “operational task of crafting policies to counter state fragility” (Grävingholt, Ziaja and Kreibaum, 2015). For example, a fragility index could rank Haiti, Pakistan and Zimbabwe together masking the stark differences in their risk exposure and capacities.
- Finally, and perhaps most troublesome, the OECD Fragile States List was developed as a tool for tracking support and aid flows. However, it was often misunderstood as a definitional tool and had a stigmatising effect. Use of such lists can result in negative outcomes for the contexts named as fragile, introducing the risk of donors entering into a damaging pro-cyclical aid flow cycle (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004).


To address these issues, and while recognising the usefulness of a list for donors, the OECD developed a multidimensional approach. Its aim is to provide a deeper understanding of fragility and be valuable for high-level analysis. By defining fragility as combinations of risks and coping capacities, the new framework is applicable globally. It is an approach where quantitative analysis provides the input for more qualitative descriptions of global fragility profiles.

The methodology of the fragility framework is based on a two-stage process that first examines countries in each of the five dimensions and then aggregates this information to obtain an aggregate picture of fragility. For each dimension, principal components analysis (PCA) is used to combine the risk and coping capacity indicators into two statistically

derived components. Deriving two measures per dimension has distinct advantages over creating one composite index. First, using two measures allows for a greater understanding of the differences between contexts that would score equally when using a single measure. Second, using the first two principal components allows countries to be broadly grouped based on their similarities in all of the input variables. Third, each indicator is weighted by the amount of new information it brings to the data rather than on a set of normative judgements on their relative importance. With the components of each dimension calculated, countries are then clustered on similarities and classified descriptively. This mix of both quantitative and qualitative methods appropriately offers a more flexible approach to describing the diversity of fragility.

With contexts classified into groups within each dimension, the second part of the methodology aggregates this information to arrive at an overall picture of combinations of fragilities. To achieve this, the components of each dimension provide inputs to a second aggregate PCA. This is then used to produce a list of the 56 most fragile contexts. The broad approach is shown in Figure A.1.

Figure A.1. The 2016 OECD fragility framework methodology



The methodology is ambitious in its objectives, but is not without limitations. PCA allows a reduction of indicators into two core components that explain most of the variance in the original data. However, in doing so, invariably information is lost. The Stage 2 PCA exacerbates this loss of information. In short, the results of this approach are a summary of the initial indicators that is then *interpreted* in terms of fragility. However, this summary is both more informative and less arbitrary than any composite index based on the initial indicators.

Aside from the technical limitations, there are also certain practical limitations to what can be captured in any quantitative approach. For example, at the micro-level, fragility is not only a context-level risk, but can manifest in *pockets* of fragility at the subnational level. At the macro level, drivers and effects of fragility can be transnational, either through local spillovers or via interstate spillover. However, the unit of analysis for all datasets used for this report is at the country level, which limits the ability to capture such scale and dynamics. Going forward, it would be useful to define entry points for drawing on subnational data or linking up the global scan with regional and local exercises or concepts. Further, while data on governance are widely available, data on informal institutions are less so. While every effort has been made to include indicators of both, at this point the lack of quality data is an issue.

The differences between other types of composite indices and the OECD fragility framework are summarised in Table A.3.

Table A.3. Differences between traditional composite indices and the OECD mixed methods multidimensional approach.

Issue	Composite index/list	OECD framework 2016
Weighting indicators	Derived through consultation or statistical processes.	Derived to represent the amount of unique information each indicator adds to the model.
Relationship among indicators	Assumes a level of interchangeability, i.e. more of one factor can compensate for lack of another.	Does not assume compensation between indicators, analyses combinations of factors.
Polarity of indicators	Requires normative judgements to be made on whether more of any indicator is good or bad.	Analysis does not require indicators to either be good or bad, focuses instead on combinations of factors as good or bad.
Universality of Indicators	Aims to collect data that are universally applicable across all contexts.	Allows for inclusion of indicators that may only be important in some contexts.
Defining fragile contexts	Requires setting of arbitrary threshold.	Clustering requires arbitrary choices, but results are based on similarity measures and "natural breaks" in the data. Clusters treated individually within their own context to decide qualitatively whether they have high, medium or low fragility.
Disputes over results	Revisit indicators, discuss the weighting scheme.	Arguments over clusters revisited and debated.

Results


The OECD fragility framework uses PCA to reduce the number of indicators and create two non-correlated components to analyse fragility. It is multidimensional, but visualising the results past three dimensions is challenging. In presenting the results it is therefore necessary to describe the visualisations used and how to interpret them.

A standard visualisation of the results of a PCA is a biplot. Biplots are a type of exploratory graph used in statistics, a generalisation of the simple two-variable scatterplot. A biplot allows information on both samples and variables of a data matrix to be displayed graphically. Biplots have been used to visualise the results of the 2016 OECD fragility framework.

Contexts are plotted on a scatterplot of the first two principal components. The x-axis represents the first principal component, which accounts for the largest proportion of variance in the data. The y-axis represents the second principal component, which accounts for the second largest proportion of variance in the data. Vectors are also plotted on the graphs that describe how much each indicator contributes to each principal component. The length of the vector represents the variance of the particular indicator it represents – the longer the vector, the higher the variance of the indicator observed in the data. The direction in which the vector is pointing represents the loading (or weighting) of the represented indicator on the first and second principal components. The angle between the vectors (the cosine of the angle between the vectors) represents the correlation between the indicators the vectors represent: the closer the angle is to 90 or 270 degrees, the smaller the correlation between the indicators. Angles of 0 or 180 degrees represent correlations of 1 and -1 respectively.

Figure A.2 is provided to assist in interpreting the following biplots.

Figure A.2. Interpreting biplots



Biplot interpretation:

- because the arrows for Indicator 1 and Indicator 2 run more along the x-axis, the first principal component (x-axis) is most closely related to a combination of Indicator 1 and Indicator 2
- the second principal component (y-axis) is most closely related to Indicator 3 because the vector for indicator 3 is closest to the y-axis
- Indicator 3 contributes to both principal components
- Countries A, B and C are similar because they are close to each other
- Countries D, E and F are similar because they are close to each other
- Country G is an outlier in its characteristics.

Biplots can be difficult to interpret for non-statisticians. To assist, countries have been clustered based on the first two principal components and qualitatively described. The approach uses hierarchical clustering, a statistical technique that groups contexts to maximise similarity among contexts within a group based on how similar they are in terms of their values on indicators (Wolfson, Madjd-Sadjada and James, 2004). As the number of contexts within any cluster is dependent on how many clusters are used, the boundaries of any cluster do not represent a real world property. As such, the OECD only uses these as an indicative aid to assist in the qualitative assessment of different types of fragility.

Stage 1: Dimensional fragility analysis

Economic dimension

The economic dimension in the fragility framework aims at capturing the vulnerability to risks stemming from the weaknesses in economic foundations and human capital including macroeconomic shocks, unequal growth, high youth unemployment, etc. Selected indicators in this dimension are presented in Table A.4.

Table A.4. Economic dimension indicators

Main contributions to the first component of economic fragility: <i>Long-term drivers of economic growth</i>	Main contributions to the second component of economic fragility: <i>Labour market imbalances</i>
Education measured by mean of years of schooling for adults aged 25 years and over, and expected years of schooling for children of school-entering age.	Unemployment rate refers to the share of the labour force that is without work but available for and seeking employment.
Men in the labour force is a measure of the percentage of male participation in the labour force.	Youth not in education, employment or training , measured as the proportion of young people who are not in education, employment or training within the population of all youth in the same age group.
Regulatory quality measures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations promoting private sector development.	Women in the labour force is the percentage of female participation in the labour force.
Remoteness is the trade-weighted average distance from world markets.	
Food security measures include the prevalence of undernourishment, average dietary supply adequacy, domestic food price index and domestic food price volatility.	

The indicators from Table A.4 that contribute the greatest to the first two principal components are:

First principal component (x-axis): Long-term drivers of growth

- Aid dependence and resource dependence, lack of economic interconnectedness, education, males in the labour force, regulatory quality, and food security.


Second principal component (y-axis): Labour market imbalances

- Unemployment rate, NEET (youth not in employment, education and training), and females in the labour force.

Based on these two components, Figure A.3 and Table A.5 describe the economic fragilities of each cluster.

Figure A.3. Economic dimension typology

Economic dependence and individual economic opportunity



StatLink <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933442072>

Table A.5. Summary characteristics of fragility clusters in the economic dimension

Cluster	Category	Description
A	High economic fragility	High levels of resource and aid dependence, economic geography creating difficult conditions for long-term sustainable growth, but moderate levels of individual economic opportunity.
B	High economic fragility	
C	Extreme economic fragility	Absence of long-term drivers of economic growth, absence of individual economic opportunity and high levels of resource and aid dependence.
D	Moderate economic fragility	An alternative of three types of situation – either high levels of resource and aid dependence, economic geography creating difficult conditions for long-term sustainable growth, but high levels of individual economic opportunity OR situations predominately characterised by low levels of individual economic opportunity and moderate levels of economic independence OR a subset of developed countries mostly in Europe with high rates of unemployment and government debt but low levels of economic dependence on resources and aid.
E	Moderate economic fragility	
F	Low economic fragility	Two groupings of situation, either mostly developing countries with good long-term growth prospects and low levels of unemployment OR developed countries with low levels of unemployment, strong economic regulation, low levels of resource dependence and the foundations for long-term economic growth.
G	Moderate economic fragility	An alternative of three types of situation – either high levels of resource and aid dependence, economic geography creating difficult conditions for long-term sustainable growth, but high levels of individual economic opportunity OR situations predominantly characterised by low levels of individual economic opportunity and moderate levels of economic independence OR a subset of developed countries mostly in Europe with high rates of unemployment and government debt but low levels of economic dependence on resources and aid.
H	Low economic fragility	Two groupings of situation, either mostly developing countries with good long-term growth prospects and low levels of unemployment OR developed countries with low levels of unemployment, strong economic regulation, low levels of resource dependence and the foundations for long-term economic growth.

Environmental dimension

The environmental dimension in the OECD fragility framework aims at capturing the vulnerability to environmental, climactic and health risks to citizens' lives and livelihoods. This includes exposure to natural disasters, pollution and disease epidemics. The environmental domain indicators are presented in Table A.6.

Table A.6. Components of environmental fragility

Main contributions to the first component of environmental fragility: <i>Household, community and state vulnerability</i>	Main contributions to the second component of environmental fragility: <i>Natural disaster risks</i>
Socio-economic vulnerability measures the ability of individuals and households to afford safe and resilient livelihood conditions and well-being.	Natural disaster risk measures the likelihood of exposure to earthquake, tsunami, flood, cyclone drought and other such events.
Environmental health measures health impacts including quality of air, water and sanitation.	
Food security measures the prevalence of undernourishment, average dietary supply adequacy, domestic food price index and domestic food price volatility.	

The indicators from Table A.6 that contribute the greatest to the first two principal components are:

First principal component (x-axis): Household level, community and state vulnerability

- Socio-economic vulnerability, environmental health and food security.

Second principal component (y-axis): Natural and man-made environmental threats and hazards

- Disaster risk.

Based on these two components, Figure A.4 and Table A.7 describe the environmental fragilities of each cluster.

Figure A.4. Environmental dimension typology




Table A.7. Summary characteristics of fragility clusters in the environmental dimension

Cluster	Category	Description
A	High environmental fragility	High risk of natural disasters, prevalence of infectious diseases with low community and state coping capacity.
B	Moderate environmental fragility	Moderate risk of natural disasters, prevalence of infectious diseases with moderate community and state coping capacity.
C	High environmental fragility	High risk of natural disasters, prevalence of infectious diseases with low community and state coping capacity.
D	Moderate environmental fragility	Moderate risk of natural disasters, prevalence of infectious diseases with moderate community and state coping capacity.
E	Low environmental fragility	
F	Low environmental fragility	Generally lower risk of natural disasters, low prevalence of diseases, high community and state capacity.
G	Low environmental fragility	
H	Low environmental fragility	

Political dimension

The “political” dimension in the 2016 OECD fragility framework aims to capture the vulnerability to risks inherent in political processes, events or decisions; to its political inclusiveness (including elites) and transparency (corruption), and to its ability to accommodate change and avoid oppression. Selected indicators in this dimension are presented in Table A.8.

Table A.8. Components of political fragility

Main contributions to the first component of political fragility: <i>Checks and balances present in political institutions and protection of human rights</i>	Main contributions to the second component of political fragility: <i>Political stability</i>
Voice and accountability measures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association and a free media.	Decentralised elections are measured in terms of whether there are subnational elections, and to what extent regional authorities can operate without interference from the centre.
Judicial constraints on executive power are measured as the extent to which the executive respects the constitution and complies with court rulings, and independence of the judiciary.	Regime persistence is measured by the number of years a polity has persisted, and is used as a measure of instability.
Perceptions of corruption are measured by perceived levels of corruption, as determined by expert assessments and opinion surveys.	
Legislative constraints on executive power are measured as the extent to which legislature and government agencies are capable of questioning, investigating and exercising oversight over the executive.	
Political terror is measured by the levels of state-sanctioned or -perpetrated violence such as assassinations of political challengers and police brutality.	

The indicators from Table A.8 that contribute the greatest to the first two principal components are:

First principal component (x-axis): Checks and balances present in political institutions and protection of human rights

- Voice and accountability, judicial constraints on executive power, perception of corruption, legislative constraints on executive power and political terror.

Second principal component (y-axis): Political grievances

- Regime persistence, decentralised elections.

Based on these two components, Figure A.5 and Table A.9 describe the profiles of each political fragility cluster.

Figure A.5. Political dimension typology



Table A.9. Summary characteristics of fragility clusters in the political dimension

Cluster	Category	Description
A	Extreme political fragility	Very low democratic accountability and weak political institutions, low levels of human rights protection and high levels of political terror.
B	Centralised state leadership fragility	Low democratic accountability but strong and centralised political institutions, low levels of human rights protection and high levels of political terror.
C	High political fragility	An alternative of two types of situation – either low democratic accountability but centralised political institutions, low levels of human rights protection or weak democratic institutions and low levels of human rights protection.
D	High political fragility	
E	Moderate political fragility	Strong to moderately robust decentralised democratic institutions, moderate to relatively high levels of protection of human rights.
F	Moderate political fragility	
G	Low political fragility	
H	Low political fragility	

Security dimension

The security dimension in the 2016 OECD fragility framework aims to capture the vulnerability of citizen security emanating from social and political violence. As such it includes indicators of citizen exposure to direct political and social violence. Selected indicators in this dimension are presented in Table A.10.

Table A.10. Components of security fragility

Main contributions to the first component of security fragility: <i>Rule of law and state control of territory</i>	Main contributions to the second component of security fragility: <i>Armed conflict, terrorism, organised crime and interpersonal violence</i>
Conflict risk measured by the statistical risk of violent conflict in the next 1-4 years based on 25 quantitative indicators from open sources.	Homicide rate per 100 000 population.
State control over territory measured as the percentage of territory over which the state has effective control.	Number of formal alliances between countries.
Level of violent criminal activity by criminal organisations (drug trafficking, arms trafficking, prostitution, etc.).	Battle-related deaths per capita , measured on log basis.
Rule of law measured as perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police and the courts.	Impact of terrorism measured by the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) capturing number of deaths, attacks, incidents and property damage from terrorism.

The indicators from Table A.10 that contribute the greatest to the first two principal components are:

First principal component (x-axis): Rule of law and state control of territory

- Violent conflict risk, control over territory, level of violent criminal activity, rule of law and restricted gender physical integrity.

Second principal component (y-axis): Armed conflict, terrorism, organised crime and interpersonal violence

- Homicide rate, formal alliances, battle-related deaths per capita and the impact of terrorism.

Based on these two components, Figure A.6 and Table A.11 describe the security fragilities of each cluster.

Figure A.6. Security dimension typology




Table A.11. Summary characteristics of fragility clusters in the security dimension

Cluster	Category	Description
A	Extreme security fragility	Presence of armed conflict, significant terrorist activity, high numbers of violent death per capita, presence of criminal networks, state lacks control of territory, weak rule of law.
B	Extreme security fragility	Presence of armed conflict, significant terrorist activity, high numbers of violent death per capita, presence of criminal networks, state lacks control of territory, weak rule of law.
C	High security fragility	Weak rule of law, criminal activity, high homicide rates, terrorist activity, poor legislative frameworks against gender-based violence, in some cases, the presence or recent history of armed conflict.
D	High security fragility	Weak rule of law, criminal activity, high homicide rates, terrorist activity, poor legislative frameworks against gender-based violence, in some cases, the presence or recent history of armed conflict.
E	High security fragility	Weak rule of law, criminal activity, high homicide rates, terrorist activity, poor legislative frameworks against gender-based violence, in some cases, the presence or recent history of armed conflict.
F	High security fragility	Weak rule of law, criminal activity, high homicide rates, terrorist activity, poor legislative frameworks against gender-based violence, in some cases, the presence or recent history of armed conflict.
G	Low security fragility	Low levels of state and interpersonal violence and organised crime, moderate to high coping capacity.
H	Low security fragility	Low levels of state and interpersonal violence and organised crime, moderate to high coping capacity.

Societal dimension

The societal dimension in the OECD 2016 fragility framework aims at capturing the vulnerability to risks affecting societal cohesion that stem from both vertical and horizontal inequalities (inequality among culturally defined [or constructed] groups), social cleavages, etc. Selected indicators in this dimension are presented in Table A.12.

Table A.12. Components of societal fragility

Main contributions to the first component of societal fragility: <i>Access to justice, accountability and horizontal inequality</i>	Main contributions to the second component of societal fragility: <i>Vertical and gender inequalities</i>
Voice and accountability measures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association and a free media.	Gini coefficient as an index measure of income inequality.
Access to justice measures the extent to which citizens enjoy secure and effective access to justice.	Gender inequality measures gender inequalities in three important aspects of human development: reproductive health, empowerment and economic status.
Horizontal inequality measures whether all social groups – as distinguished by language, ethnicity, religion, race, region or caste – enjoy the same level of civil liberties.	
Core civil society index measures the overall robustness of civil society.	

The indicators from Table A.12 that contribute the greatest to the first two principal components are:

First principal component (x-axis): Access to justice and accountability, and horizontal inequalities

- Voice and accountability, access to justice, horizontal inequality, core civil society index.


Second principal component (y-axis): Vertical and gender inequalities

- Gini coefficient, gender inequality and urbanisation.

Based on these two components, Figure A.7 and Table A.13 describe the societal fragilities of each cluster.

Figure A.7. Societal dimension typology

Vertical, horizontal and gender inequalities



StatLink <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933442110>

Table A.13. Summary characteristics of fragility clusters in the societal dimension

Cluster	Category	Description
A	Extreme societal fragility	High levels of vertical, horizontal and gender inequalities, extremely low levels of accountability and rule of law, very weak civil society, poor access to justice. High numbers of displaced people.
B	High societal fragility	High levels of vertical and horizontal inequality with high gender inequality in the context of fast urbanisation and low levels of accountability and rule of law.
C	High societal fragility	
D	Moderate societal fragility	Vertical inequality with high gender inequality in the context of fast urbanisation, moderate access to justice and presence of civil society.
E	Moderate societal fragility	
F	Low societal fragility	Presence of, but relatively lower levels vertical, horizontal and gender inequalities, robust civil society, voice and accountability and access to justice.
G	Low societal fragility	
H	Low societal fragility	

Overall principal component statistics

Table A.14 breaks down the contribution of each indicator within each domain to both the first and second principal components in terms of variance of the data explained, as well as how each indicator correlates with each of the first two principal components. It is clear that there is substantial variation in the extent to which indicators contribute to the reduction of each fragility dimension, and how well each indicator correlates with the principal components.

Table A.14. Principal components statistics

Dimension	Indicator	First principal component			Second principal component		
		Contribution	Correlation	Cos2	Contribution	Correlation	Cos2
Environmental	Core civil society index (C)	4.76	0.43	0.19	18.78	0.51	0.26
Environmental	Environmental health (R)	21.05	0.91	0.83	0.39	-0.07	0.01
Environmental	Food security (C)	18.93	0.86	0.75	0.33	-0.07	0
Environmental	Natural disasters risk (R)	0.01	0.02	0	45.52	0.79	0.62
Environmental	Prevalence of infectious disease (deaths per 100 000 population) (R)	14.95	0.77	0.59	14.4	-0.44	0.2
Environmental	Rule of law (C)	15.95	0.79	0.63	8.5	0.34	0.12
Environmental	Socio-economic vulnerability (R)	21.16	0.91	0.83	2.46	-0.18	0.03
Environmental	Uprooted people (R)	3.2	0.35	0.13	9.61	0.36	0.13
Economic	Aid dependency (R)	9.79	0.65	0.43	1.81	0.19	0.03
Economic	Education (C)	19.18	0.91	0.83	0.13	0.05	0
Economic	Food security (C)	14.78	0.8	0.64	0.16	-0.06	0
Economic	GDP growth rate (R)	1.08	-0.22	0.05	10.98	0.46	0.21
Economic	General government gross debt (R)	3.54	-0.39	0.15	3.72	0.27	0.07
Economic	Males in labour force (C)	17.52	0.87	0.76	0.21	0.06	0
Economic	Youth not in employment, education and training (NEET) (R)	1.98	0.29	0.09	26.44	0.71	0.5
Economic	Regulatory quality (C)	15.13	0.81	0.66	1.27	0.16	0.02
Economic	Remoteness (C)	11.43	0.7	0.5	1.25	-0.15	0.02
Economic	Resource rent dependence (R)	4.45	0.44	0.19	0	0.01	0
Economic	Unemployment rate (R)	0.12	-0.07	0.01	28.02	0.73	0.53
Economic	Women in labour force (C)	1.01	-0.21	0.04	26.01	0.7	0.5
Security	Armed security officers per 100 000 population (C)	0.02	0.03	0	10.62	0.46	0.21
Security	Battle-related deaths per capita (log) (R)	11.44	0.68	0.47	12.41	-0.49	0.24
Security	Control over territory (C)	15.09	0.78	0.61	0.78	-0.12	0.02
Security	Deaths by non-state actors per capita (R)	5.6	0.48	0.23	8.51	-0.41	0.17
Security	Formal alliances (C)	3.99	0.4	0.16	14.35	0.53	0.28
Security	Homicide rate (R)	1.46	0.24	0.06	15.07	0.54	0.3
Security	Impact of terrorism (R)	11.85	0.69	0.48	8.01	-0.4	0.16
Security	Level of violent criminal activity (R)	13.43	0.74	0.55	6.16	0.35	0.12
Security	Police officers per 100 000 population (C)	0.14	0.07	0.01	5.82	0.34	0.11
Security	Restricted gender physical integrity value (C)	7.38	0.55	0.3	6.27	0.35	0.12
Security	Rule of law (C)	12.45	0.71	0.51	8.45	0.41	0.17

Table A.14. Principal components statistics (cont.)

Dimension	Indicator	First principal component			Second principal component		
		Contribution	Correlation	Cos2	Contribution	Correlation	Cos2
Security	Violent conflict risk (R)	17.16	0.84	0.7	3.55	-0.26	0.07
Political	Decentralised elections (C)	6.25	0.55	0.31	30.09	0.51	0.26
Political	Judicial constraints on executive power (C)	16.4	0.9	0.8	5.42	0.22	0.05
Political	Legislative constraints on executive power (C)	13.49	0.81	0.66	16.63	0.38	0.14
Political	Perception of corruption (R)	16	0.88	0.78	8.95	-0.28	0.08
Political	Political terror (R)	12.33	0.78	0.6	6.35	-0.23	0.05
Political	Regime persistence (R)	8.73	0.65	0.43	26.1	-0.47	0.23
Political	Restricted gender physical integrity value (C)	8.67	0.65	0.42	5.3	-0.21	0.05
Political	Voice and accountability (C)	18.13	0.94	0.89	1.15	0.1	0.01
Societal	Access to justice (C)	19.34	0.88	0.78	4.62	-0.25	0.06
Societal	Core civil society index (C)	13.87	0.75	0.56	18.86	-0.5	0.25
Societal	Gender inequality (R)	13.56	0.74	0.55	20.49	0.52	0.27
Societal	Gini coefficient (R)	5.72	0.48	0.23	31.54	0.64	0.41
Societal	Horizontal inequality (R)	13.86	0.75	0.56	2.95	-0.2	0.04
Societal	Uprooted people (R)	3.88	0.4	0.16	2.17	-0.17	0.03
Societal	Urbanisation growth (R)	9.59	0.62	0.39	16.41	0.46	0.21
Societal	Voice and accountability (C)	20.18	0.9	0.82	2.97	-0.2	0.04

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Stage 2: Aggregate fragility analysis

Once contexts are classified into groups within each dimension, the second stage of the methodology aggregates this information to arrive at an overall picture of combinations of fragilities. To achieve this, the components of each dimension provide inputs to a second aggregate PCA. That is, the ten principal components derived across all five dimensions are used as the indicators in the second-tier PCA. The results from this second-tier aggregate analysis produce the list of the 56 most fragile contexts, classified as “extremely fragile” and “fragile”.

The second-tier PCA produces ten fragility clusters of contexts, shown in Figure A.8, which are differentiated not only by the extent of fragility, but also in the dominant characteristics of that fragility. The first dimension of the PCA represents coping capacities and the second dimension represents the types of fragility. To arrive at the 56 fragile contexts, two arbitrary cut-offs have been made. In order for a context to be classified as “extremely fragile” it must score less than -2.5 on the first principal component of the aggregate PCA shown in Figure A.8. In order to be “fragile” a context must score between -1.2 and -2.5 on the first principal component.

Note

1. While there are methods of dealing with more complicated dynamics in composite indices, it has been noted that such approaches are seldom used (Grävingsholt, Ziaja and Kreibaum, 2015).

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Annex B: Methodological notes on financial flows to fragile contexts

Official development assistance

Like the 2015 report, this report uses official development assistance (ODA) excluding debt relief as its primary metric in examining aid flows. This choice allows the study of flows that enter developing countries, instead of debt that has been forgiven on a country's balance sheet. The total ODA is shown for all donors, not just Development Assistance Committee members.

It was decided for this report to convert current USD figures into constant 2014 USD using the corresponding US GDP deflator to show financial flows over time in real terms. However, it should be noted that using this methodology to convert the flows into constant USD is intended to capture the scale of the amount of flows from the development assistance provider's perspective and may or may not be an accurate representation of the scale of the amount from the recipient country's perspective.

Chapter 5 analyses Official Development Assistance in the context of overall financial flows towards fragile contexts. It is interesting, in this context, to exclude debt relief from ODA and focus on actual inflows between donor countries and fragile contexts. Chapter 6, by contrast, scrutinises the relations between ODA and the fragility profiles of recipients, and debt relief was deemed relevant to this analysis.

Remittances

Remittances are shown net. Data are sourced from World Bank (2016a), "Personal remittances received (current USD)", *World Development Indicators* (database), <http://data.worldbank.org/indicators>, converted to constant 2014 USD prices.

Foreign direct investment

Foreign direct investment is shown net. Data are sourced from World Bank (2016b), "Foreign direct investment, net inflows (Current USD)", *World Development Indicators* (database), <http://data.worldbank.org/indicators>, converted to constant 2014 USD prices.

Data availability

In examining financial flows in aggregate, per capita and percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), data for these flows in one or more years were missing for many fragile contexts.

Beyond the question of data gaps in financial flows data, there is a more fundamental issue of missing data in population and GDP and gross national income (GNI) estimates. As a consequence, some fragile contexts that have data on financial flows cannot be counted in per capita or percentage GDP calculations. This further complicates the task of finding per capita and percentage GDP figures that are truly representative of all fragile contexts.

Care must also be taken as the group of donors reporting to the OECD has expanded over time, and thus ODA figures in particular may have increased solely because of better reporting.

As a result of all of these issues, the figures presented in this report should be taken as approximations using the best available data sources but may deviate, in some cases potentially significantly, from the actual true values of the financial flows to fragile contexts. Better data quality in this area would greatly help to improve confidence and resulting policy recommendations on financial flows to fragile contexts in the future.

Principal component analysis of aid and fragility

Table B.1 summarises the results of the principal components analysis of ODA sectors per capita (Figure 6.15).

Table B.1. Principal component statistics for ODA sectors per capita

ODA sector	First principal component: Magnitude of aid			Second principal component: Type of aid (long-term development vs. firefighting)		
	Contribution	Correlation	Cos2	Contribution	Correlation	Cos2
Business	7.31	-0.73	0.53	0.37	0.10	0.01
Agriculture, forestry, fisheries	7.39	-0.73	0.54	0.02	-0.02	0.00
Industry, mining, construction	2.48	-0.42	0.18	1.24	-0.18	0.03
Population policies	1.07	-0.28	0.08	0.38	-0.10	0.01
Water and sanitation	7.40	-0.73	0.54	2.94	-0.27	0.07
Emergency response	1.84	-0.37	0.13	12.37	0.56	0.31
Budget support	3.36	-0.49	0.24	0.82	-0.14	0.02
Banking and finance	1.52	-0.33	0.11	0.36	-0.10	0.01
Energy	4.48	-0.57	0.33	13.26	-0.58	0.33
Environmental protection	2.65	-0.44	0.19	7.73	-0.44	0.20
Reconstruction and rehabilitation	3.46	-0.50	0.25	11.88	0.55	0.30
Conflict prevention, peace and security	4.71	-0.59	0.34	12.87	0.57	0.33
Government and civil society	6.39	-0.68	0.46	3.76	0.31	0.10
Trade	5.97	-0.66	0.43	1.22	0.18	0.03
Health	8.36	-0.78	0.61	0.90	0.15	0.02
Food	3.49	-0.50	0.25	1.42	0.19	0.04
Disaster prevention	5.86	-0.65	0.43	1.56	-0.20	0.04
Transport	7.56	-0.74	0.55	0.05	-0.04	0.00
Education	9.76	-0.84	0.71	1.39	0.19	0.04
Tourism	2.41	-0.42	0.18	14.32	-0.60	0.36
Communication	2.52	-0.43	0.18	11.14	-0.53	0.28

Source: Author calculations.

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The OECD is a unique forum where governments work together to address the economic, social and environmental challenges of globalisation. The OECD is also at the forefront of efforts to understand and to help governments respond to new developments and concerns, such as corporate governance, the information economy and the challenges of an ageing population. The Organisation provides a setting where governments can compare policy experiences, seek answers to common problems, identify good practice and work to co-ordinate domestic and international policies.

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States of Fragility 2016

UNDERSTANDING VIOLENCE

The world is getting more violent, and violence is occurring in surprising places. Over the past 15 years, 3.34 billion people, or almost half of the world's population, have been affected by violence. The number of violent conflicts is decreasing, but conflicts are killing more people: violence manifest in armed conflict, fatalities and refugee flows are at their highest level in over two decades. Violent extremism and terrorism are also on the rise. The economic cost of violence is rising too: the global economic impact of violence is a staggering USD 13.6 trillion, equivalent to 13.3% of Global GDP. And civilians, especially children and women, are most at risk.

States of Fragility 2016: Understanding Violence takes a long hard look at violence in the world – and what we should do about it. The report showcases emerging thinking about violence, presents a new risk-based approach to monitoring various dimensions of fragility, and looks at financial flows in support of fragile contexts. Understanding Violence finds that development, peace and security efforts in the developing world have not kept pace with the new reality of violence. We need to dedicate more resources and attention to violence. And to be effective, we need put people – especially youth – at the centre of our efforts.

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- Annex B. Methodological notes on financial flows to fragile contexts

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