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Information needs for the 2018 facilitative dialogue: issues and options

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FOREWORD

This document was prepared by the OECD and IEA Secretariats in response to a request from the Climate Change Expert Group (CCXG) on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The Climate Change Expert Group oversees development of analytical papers for the purpose of providing useful and timely input to the climate change negotiations. These papers may also be useful to national policy-makers and other decision-makers. Authors work with the CCXG to develop these papers. However, the papers do not necessarily represent the views of the OECD or the IEA, nor are they intended to prejudge the views of countries participating in the CCXG. Rather, they are Secretariat information papers intended to inform Member countries, as well as the UNFCCC audience.

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ABSTRACT

Information needs for the 2018 facilitative dialogue: issues and options

Decision 1/CP.21 adopting the Paris Agreement established a mandate for a facilitative dialogue to be convened among Parties in 2018. This mandate established two main objectives of the 2018 facilitative dialogue (FD2018): to take stock of collective progress made towards long-term climate goals and to inform preparation of nationally determined contributions. Proposal(s) from the COP22 and COP23 presidencies on how the dialogue should be conducted are expected to be made by COP23. This paper “unpacks” the two main objectives of the FD2018 into distinct components, and examines the implications of addressing different components on the information needs of the FD2018. The paper also examines different types of information that could be required for FD2018 and their availability. Finally, the paper looks at other collective review or stocktake processes that have been carried out under the U.N. to identify relevant lessons for the FD2018, particularly regarding inputs and associated outputs.

JEL Classification: F53, Q54, Q56, Q58

Keywords: 2018 facilitative dialogue, information needs, UNFCCC, climate

RÉSUMÉ

Information nécessaire pour le dialogue de facilitation en 2018 : questions et options

La Décision 1/CP.21 consacrant l'adoption de l'Accord de Paris prévoit la mise en place d'un dialogue de facilitation (DF) entre les Parties en 2018. Elle énonce les deux principaux objectifs de ce dialogue : faire le point sur les efforts collectifs entrepris en vue d'atteindre les objectifs climatiques à long terme et éclairer la préparation des contributions déterminées au niveau national. Les propositions de la présidence de la COP22 et COP23 sur la façon de conduire le dialogue devraient être présentées à la COP23. Ce rapport décompose en plusieurs éléments distincts les deux principaux objectifs du DF2018, et étudie comment le traitement de ces différents éléments influera sur les besoins d'informations du DF2018. Il examine en outre les différents types d'information que pourrait nécessiter le DF2018 et leur disponibilité. Pour finir, il s'intéresse aux autres procédures collectives d'examen ou d'inventaire mises en œuvre dans le cadre des Nations Unies afin d'en tirer les enseignements utiles pour le DF2018, en particulier en ce qui concerne les éléments apportés et les résultats produits.

Classification JEL : F53, Q54, Q56, Q58

Mots-clés : dialogue de facilitation 2018, besoin d'informations, CCNUCC, climat

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Executive summary

One of the outcomes of the Paris Agreement was the recognition for the need to regularly assess progress towards the goals in the Agreement. In Decision 1/CP.21, Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) decided “to convene a facilitative dialogue among Parties in 2018 to take stock of the collective efforts of Parties in relation to progress towards the long-term goal referred to in Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Agreement and to inform the preparation of nationally determined contributions pursuant to Article 4, paragraph 8, of the Agreement”.

The 2018 facilitative dialogue (FD2018) is an opportunity for the international community to increase momentum for climate action. The FD2018 could do this in several different ways e.g. by recognising collective efforts already made; by highlighting policies and measures that could be implemented to narrow the gap between current nationally determined contributions (NDCs) and the range of emissions pathways to limit temperature rises to below 2°C; by indicating possibilities for increased action and ambition for subsequent NDCs. The form, structure and content of the FD2018 are currently under discussion. Choices about the objectives of the FD2018, as well as possible inputs, outputs and/or outcomes will influence its utility, the scope and coverage of discussions, the extent and source of information inputs, and the time and resources needed to conduct the FD2018.

This paper highlights some questions that may need to be addressed in order to agree on the scope of and inputs to the FD2018. This paper also identifies information that is needed to take stock of progress of collective efforts towards the long-term goal referred to in Article 4.1 of the Paris Agreement, and provides possible options for the scope and information needs of the FD2018 (Table 1).

Agreement on the scope of the 2018 facilitative dialogue (FD2018) would help to ensure that discussions are focused and productive and that there is clarity on what inputs are needed, and from whom. For example, the two main objectives of the FD2018 are to take stock of collective progress by Parties towards the long-term goal referred to in Article 4.1 of the Paris Agreement, and to inform preparation of nationally determined contributions (NDCs). These two main objectives can be unpacked into several components that may (or not) be treated explicitly in the FD2018. These include, for example, the collective efforts of Parties; progress towards peaking of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions; progress towards achieving a balance of GHG emissions and sinks in the second half of the century; when GHG peaking is likely to occur.

Another key decision on the scope of the FD2018 relates to its focus. In particular, a balance may be needed between a focus on collective efforts (which are mentioned in the Paris Decision, and would involve judgements about counterfactuals, e.g. the level of a business-as-usual emissions scenario) as well as the outcome of these efforts (e.g. emission levels, which are objective, and mentioned in Article 4.1 of the Paris Agreement).

Decisions on the scope of what the FD2018 is going to address explicitly will have significant implications for the information needed to support the FD2018, and where this information can be gathered from. For example, to assess progress towards the long-term goal mentioned in Article 4.1 of the Paris Agreement, the FD2018 would need to include forward-looking information directly related to greenhouse gases (GHG), such as long-term emission targets or projections and expected impacts of mitigation policies. Such information is not systematically communicated to the UNFCCC by countries, rendering any bottom-up assessment based solely on Party submissions incomplete. Assessing such components in the context of the FD2018 is therefore likely to require information gathered from expert non-Party stakeholders (e.g. via IPCC assessment and special reports, UNFCCC Secretariat synthesis report etc.). There are also data constraints relating to the contextual elements (sustainable development, equity, poverty eradication) mentioned in Article 4.1, as well as significant differences between parties in how these issues are taken into account. This means that comparable information on these contextual elements is not available from Parties.

The mandate for the FD2018 has some similarities, as well as differences, with other collective review or stocktake processes undertaken under the auspices of the UN. This paper has examined four such processes to identify possible lessons for the FD2018. These include:

- **Structure:** the structure of other collective review or stocktake processes has varied widely. However, all those that have resulted in substantive outputs (e.g. key messages, a list of best practices, specific recommendations) have been from events where significant time has been devoted to such a review or stocktake.
- **Inputs:** previous collective stocktaking processes have been built on data and other information that is not always available or reported at the country level. Data availability can thus be a significant constraint, and so all four processes examined were informed by inputs from both Parties and non-Parties.
- **Outputs:** understanding the type of output aimed for will help to shape a focused dialogue. The type of output(s) from other collective review or stocktake processes has sometimes been included in their mandate. However, this is not the case for the FD2018.

It is not yet clear how the FD2018 can inform future rounds of NDCs pursuant to Article 4.8 of the Paris Agreement (on clarity, transparency and understanding). The FD2018 could however, inform future rounds of NDCs beyond the remit of Article 4.8. This includes influencing the structure and the type of information that is to be included in NDCs, for example, by requesting or recommending information to be provided by Parties on the expected time period for peaking of emissions, associated peak emission levels and expected subsequent emission reduction trends.

Table 1. Options relating to the objectives and the information needs of FD2018

	Topic	Options
Options relating to the scope of the FD2018	Scope and timeframe	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Focus on balance of sources and sinks by mid-century • In addition, include assessment of shorter-term indicators, i.e. progress towards global peaking of emissions; rapid reductions of emissions following peaking
	Focus	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Documenting collective efforts (i.e. cataloguing policies that are being implemented and are planned) • Assessing impacts of efforts taken so far • Assessing likely future impacts of collective efforts
	Which components to treat explicitly	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Long-term mitigation components (balance in sources and sinks) • All mitigation components (balance, peaking, rapid reductions) • Contextual components (equity, sustainable development, poverty eradication)
	Informing the preparation of NDCs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Make specific requests for what to include in NDCs • No specific requests
Options relating to information needs	Timeframe covered by information	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Historical/current • Short/medium/long-term projections
	Aggregation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Collective (global anthropogenic GHG emissions) • Other types of aggregation(s) including regional, sectoral etc.
	Assessment type	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Top-down assessment of progress • Bottom-up, i.e. aggregating individual or regional performance
	Request for certain information to be included/ referenced in future NDCs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Peaking timeframes • Mitigation effect of policies
	Source of information	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Parties • Expert NPS

1. Background

The Paris Agreement recognised the need for collective greenhouse gas emissions reductions in order to hold “the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C [...] and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C”. The Paris Agreement recognises the need to regularly assess progress towards the goals in the Agreement, which can serve as a useful opportunity for Parties to reflect upon how momentum for climate action can be increased. The 2018 facilitative dialogue (FD2018) is one such arrangement that has been agreed upon at COP21 to take stock of Parties’ collective efforts.

Three UNFCCC texts contain details relevant to the FD2018: Decision 1/CP.21, Article 4.1 and Article 4.8 of the Paris Agreement and Decision 1/CP.22. Decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 20 outlines the mandate and two main objectives for the facilitative dialogue.

“Decides to convene a facilitative dialogue among Parties in 2018 to take stock of the collective efforts of Parties in relation to progress towards the long-term goal referred to in Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Agreement and to inform the preparation of nationally determined contributions pursuant to Article 4, paragraph 8, of the Agreement”

Article 4, paragraph 1 of the Paris Agreement provides details on the first main objective.

“In order to achieve the long-term temperature goal set out in Article 2, Parties aim to reach global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible, recognizing that peaking will take longer for developing country Parties, and to undertake rapid reductions thereafter in accordance with best available science, so as to achieve a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century, on the basis of equity, and in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty.”

Article 4, paragraph 8 of the Paris Agreement is the reference for the second main objective on informing NDC preparation. This text primarily relates to the need for Parties to provide information for clarity, transparency and understanding (CTU).

“In communicating their nationally determined contributions, all Parties shall provide the information necessary for clarity, transparency and understanding in accordance with decision 1/CP.21 and any relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement.”

Finally, Decision 1/CP.22 provides some guidance on the future planning of the FD2018.

“Requests the President of the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-second session, in collaboration with the incoming President of the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-third session, to undertake inclusive and transparent consultations with Parties on the organization of the facilitative dialogue referred to in decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 20, including during the sessions of the subsidiary bodies to be convened in May 2017 and the twenty-third session of the Conference of the Parties, and to jointly report back to the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-third session on the preparations for this dialogue.”

At present, there have been few detailed discussions on how the 2018 facilitative dialogue could be conducted. These “how” issues include the structure, timing, level of discussion (e.g. political, technical) and duration of the FD2018. There has also been little discussion on what the focus of the FD2018 could be. These “what” issues, are the focus of this paper, and include the scope, inputs, outputs and outcome(s) of the FD2018. This paper raises questions and issues on the first three of these “what” items to help delegates identify the scope of the FD2018, and the implication that this would have on information

needs.¹ The paper also highlights four other collective review and stocktake processes that have been undertaken under the auspices of the UN, in order to identify possible lessons for the FD2018. This paper is composed of three further sections:

- Section 2 unpacks the two main objectives of the FD2018 into various components and identifies key questions about the information needed to address these components.
- Section 3 identifies information that could be relevant to informing the FD2018 and comments on the availability of such information.
- Section 4 examines the inputs and associated outputs of four review or stocktake processes carried out under the auspices of the UN to draw some lessons that may be relevant for the FD2018.

2. Unpacking the facilitative dialogue’s objectives and issues related to addressing them

The over-arching framework for the FD2018 has been established in the Paris Agreement, and contains two main objectives, which can be “unpacked” into a number of components. Decisions on how to treat these components have not yet been made, and could have significant implications that will affect the scope, inputs, outputs and outcomes of the FD2018 as well as the resource needs to carry it out, and where information is gathered from. Early agreement on whether to treat all components of the FD2018 objectives explicitly at the international level would help to ensure that the FD2018 is focused and productive.

2.1 Introduction

The Paris Agreement entered into force in 2016, several years earlier than originally anticipated. The accelerated timeline of entry into force means that the 2018 facilitative dialogue may have less impact on Parties’ initial NDCs than originally anticipated, as more than 120 of these have already been submitted.

The text agreed to in the Paris Agreement and Decision relating to the 2018 facilitative dialogue could potentially cover several components of the two main objectives of this dialogue. These components relate to different issues (e.g. progress towards a peak in emissions, equity, poverty eradication), different geographical levels (global, international, national (see Box 1)), and different timescales (near-term vs long-term; ex ante vs ex post assessment). The scope of the dialogue also includes objective climate-related information (e.g. rate of change of GHG emissions), information that may involve judgements about counterfactuals (e.g. collective efforts), as well as information not solely related to climate (e.g. equity, sustainable development). It is not yet clear whether all these issues will be addressed explicitly by the FD2018, and if so, how.

¹ Discussions on possible options for the process, format and potential output(s) of the FD2018 are ongoing. These “how” issues have been examined briefly but are not the focus of this paper. Further work on options for the “how” issues is ongoing.

Box 1. Different levels of aggregation of Parties



This paper uses several terms to describe aggregations of Parties. This includes global, collective, international and regional. The differences in these terms, as interpreted by the authors, are explained below:

- 'Global' encompasses all anthropogenic emissions
- 'Collective' refers to the sum of all Parties' national emissions, and thus, excludes sources not included in Party emission inventories (e.g. international bunkers).
- 'International', or 'regional', refers to a subset of Parties or their emissions (for example, developed or developing countries).

Table 2 “unpacks” the objectives of the FD2018 into different components. It also highlights key questions on the information that would need to be considered in order to assess progress towards the objectives.

Table 2. Unpacking the objectives of the 2018 facilitative dialogue

Components of objectives ²	Comments	Key Questions/Issues
A. Take stock of the collective efforts of Parties in relation to progress towards the long-term goal	The focus of discussions as well as information needed to take stock will vary depending to what extent the FD2018 addresses collective efforts as well as the collective outcome of these efforts in relation to the long-term goal. Assessing efforts could involve judgments about counterfactuals (e.g. comparing emission levels to a hypothetical counterfactual), that are not routinely established or reported.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Should FD2018 focus on the efforts themselves (e.g. policies, emissions reductions), or also relate the expected outcome of collective efforts (e.g. emissions levels) with progress toward the long-term goal? 2. How can such efforts be assessed?
B. Taking stock of collective efforts of Parties in relation to progress towards achieving a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of GHGs in the second half of this century	In order to provide an insight into collective long-term emission trends, the facilitative dialogue will need to take into account trends in GHG emissions, enacted and planned policies, technology trends, and other issues or actions that will have a longer-term effect on GHG emissions.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. What data/information is needed to a) take stock of current emission trends, and b) understand emission pathways that are consistent with the long-term goal? 2. Few NDCs or national reports to the UNFCCC contain GHG emission projections to the second half of the century. What role are emission projections expected to play in FD2018? If emissions projections are needed for the FD2018 but not available at national level, what implications does this have for information gathering? 3. What further information beyond recent GHG emission trends is needed to understand the possible timing of peaking and subsequent reductions (e.g. current and planned policies, national targets, locked-in infrastructure, technology and investment trends) at a national or international level? 4. Article 4.1 of the Paris Agreement refers to anthropogenic GHG emissions; assuming this includes those outside national boundaries (e.g. bunkers) and those not always included in national targets or systems for measuring and reporting GHG emissions (such as short-lived climate pollutants), what implications does this have for information gathering?
C. Taking stock of collective efforts of Parties' progress towards global peaking "as soon as possible, recognizing that peaking will take longer for developing	As seen in Figures 1 and 2, energy emissions have recently flattened. However, while this could imply (<i>ex ante</i>) that global emissions are about to peak, examination of NDCs actually indicates that collective GHG emissions are expected to rise, at least to 2030. A deeper understanding of Parties' targets, policies and their effects into the future could thus be	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. What are the emission trends implied in countries' initial NDCs? How does this compare with the timing for collective peaking and the consistency with a well below 2°C, or a 1.5°C scenario? 2. What is the current rate of change of global GHG emissions? What is the variation in different sectors? What are the trends for developed and developing country Parties? 3. What information can give insights into whether an observed flattening or decline in emissions will be sustained or reversed? (e.g. if trends are due to non-climate and reversible factors, such as an economic slowdown)


² The language of the components in this column is based on text contained in Decisions 1/CP.21, paragraph 20 and Articles 4.1 and 4.8 of the Paris Agreement

Components of objectives ²	Comments	Key Questions/Issues
country Parties”.	important in providing better estimates of future global GHG pathways. Clarity is needed on the sources of GHG to be considered in FD2018 (e.g. LULUCF, international bunkers).	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 4. Is there potential to accelerate implementation and bring forward the “as soon as possible” timing of collective peaking? 5. Have Parties whose emissions have not yet peaked indicated when they expect to do so? 6. What are the other non-GHG signals that could lead to future peaking? (e.g. the target of 100% renewables by 2050 for Climate Vulnerable Forum (CVF) countries, demonstration of promising low-GHG technologies, recent implementation of policies that may have a GHG impact over the long-term such as energy efficiency regulations for buildings)?
<p>D. Taking stock of progress of mitigation efforts</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • on the basis of equity • in the context of sustainable development • in the context of efforts to eradicate poverty 	National perspectives differ on priorities for sustainable development, and how this interacts with efforts to eradicate poverty. National perspectives also differ how to define equity. Given that there is no consensus on how to address these individual issues and their interactions with each other and with climate mitigation efforts, it is not clear how the FD2018 could explicitly take them into account.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Could the FD2018 address equity, poverty eradication and sustainable development explicitly, and if so, how? 2. How could these issues be addressed at an international level, given national sovereignty relating to the definition of sustainable development, national priorities for poverty eradication, and the potential subjectivity of different means of assessing “equity”? Would assessing progress in the context of these components be decided by Parties by aggregating information on a bottom-up basis? Would an option be to rely on more qualitative assessments? 3. Is there a role for progress under different SDGs to inform the FD 2018? If so, how? (Currently 21 targets and 24 indicators³, under seven of the Sustainable Development Goals, are influenced by mitigation action). How do the SDG and mitigation goals relate? 4. Would any taking stock of these components be done collectively, at the level of individual countries (e.g. to compare selected equity or sustainable development indicators) or at a regional or aggregated level (Europe, Asia; developed/developing)?
E. Informing NDC preparation pursuant to Article 4.8	The influence the facilitative dialogue can have on the preparations of NDCs relating to Article 4.8 (CTU) is unclear. This component of the objective is related more to the outputs of the FD2018, and the influence on informing NDC preparation on CTU or other matters is likely to be clearer when there has been agreement on what, if any, outputs the FD2018 will have.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. How can the facilitative dialogue influence NDC preparation? Over what timeframe? 2. Will the potential outputs from the facilitative dialogue need to be disaggregated to help inform NDCs? If so, would outputs be country-specific or sector-specific? 3. For future NDC rounds, should Parties be requested/required to include information on when they expect to peak emissions, and why this is equitable? 4. For future NDC rounds, should Parties be requested/required to include information on whether NDCs, mid-term strategies and Article 4.1 are consistent, why NDCs are equitable, the impact on sustainable development of their NDCs, and the effect of poverty eradication considerations on their emissions trajectory? 5. Could the FD benefit from Parties identifying any policy misalignments and/or other factors that would lead to greater levels of anthropogenic GHG emissions than would otherwise occur, and could potentially be removed or lessened for future NDCs?

³ Includes SDG targets and indicators that are also related to finance


Components of objectives ²	Comments	Key Questions/Issues
		<p>6. Can the experience of those Parties whose GHG emissions have already peaked provide insight into future decoupling between emissions, GDP growth and peaking in GHG emissions for other Parties; if so, how?</p> <p>7. Several NDCs indicate a conditional component (dependent on means of implementation received) as well as an unconditional component. Should the FD2018 take into account conditionality within NDCs while examining progress towards objectives, and if so, how?</p>
<p>F. Provide information necessary for clarity, transparency and understanding (CTU) in the preparation and communication of NDCs</p>	<p>The parallel timing of discussions under CTU and the FD2018 means that it is unclear whether and what kind of influence discussions on CTU (as mentioned in Article 4.8 of the Paris Agreement) and the FD2018 can have on one another.</p>	<p>1. How could discussions prior or in parallel to FD2018 on CTU take the needs of the FD2018 into account, and vice-versa?</p>

Figure 1. Global CO₂ emissions from fossil fuel and industry



Note: The disaggregated data is available only until 2014. The 2015 and 2016 global emissions are preliminary figures.
 Source: Authors, based on IEA (2016) for the disaggregated data and IEA (2017) for the 2015 and 2016 global emissions data.

Figure 2. Expected global GHG emission trajectories to 2030 taking into account combined effect of INDCs, and other scenarios



Source: UNFCCC (2016)

The first graph shows that global emissions of CO₂ from energy, the major source of total GHG emissions, have flattened over the last few years. However, as seen in the second graph, global GHG emissions are expected to rise subsequently.

2.2 Initial insights

Objective(s) of the FD2018

- There are many potential components of the two main objectives of the FD2018. In order to ensure that discussions at the FD2018 are focused and productive, it would be helpful to identify up front which of the six components of the two main objective(s) the FD2018 will focus on and/or treat explicitly.
- It is not clear if the FD2018 is to focus solely on collective **efforts** (which are mentioned in the Paris Decision and would involve judgements about counterfactuals), or also on the **outcome** of these efforts (e.g. emission levels, which are objective, and mentioned in Article 4.1 of the Paris Agreement). The information needed to support the FD2018 would differ, depending on its focus. A focus on efforts could require information on mitigation actions, their status of implementation and expected effects as well as projected emissions and trends whereas a focus on outcome would require information on historical GHG emissions.
- Decisions are also needed on how to address the different timeframes implied by Article 4.1 (“as soon as possible” and “in the second half of this century”). In particular, all NDCs cover the time period to at least 2025, some extend to 2030 and a few countries have developed longer-term low-emission strategies or GHG budgets. It is not clear how the FD2018 (where emissions data to no later than 2016 are likely to be available) can explore collective progress to long-term goals if looking only at outcomes. Assessing efforts in the context of the FD2018 could explore the expected collective trajectory of emissions to 2025/30 (if based only on NDCs) or potentially beyond (if using information from expert non-Party stakeholders).

Treatment of contextual topics in the FD2018

- It is not clear if the issues of equity, poverty eradication and sustainable development are to be treated explicitly under the FD2018, and if so, how. For example, there are different approaches to treat equity, and different indicators that can be used to measure it, so addressing this issue in an objective manner in the FD2018 could be challenging. Explicitly treating the issue of equity could greatly expand the scope of the FD2018, as it could mean examining specific issues (e.g. timing of peaking) at the level of individual Parties. It is also not clear how to explicitly treat the issue of poverty eradication in the FD2018, without recourse to information from non-Party stakeholders, as countries are not explicitly asked to provide information on this issue in their various national reports to the UNFCCC. Further, (under the Clean Development Mechanism), the UNFCCC has indicated that it is up to individual countries to indicate what they assess as sustainable development. Early guidance on whether these three issues are to be treated explicitly in FD2018, and how, would help to focus discussions at the FD2018 itself, as well as country preparations for such a discussion.

Informing NDCs

- The earlier-than-expected entry into force of the Paris Agreement means that the majority of Parties have already submitted their first NDCs (to 2025 or 2030). The FD2018 could potentially influence Parties to revise their initial NDCs (as per Article 4.11 of the Paris Agreement), as well as subsequent rounds of NDCs.
- FD2018 could influence future rounds of NDCs by influencing their structure and the type of information that is to be included, e.g. by requesting or recommending information on the target time

period for peaking of emissions, subsequent target trajectories for emission reductions, information on how subsequent NDCs represent a progression.

- FD2018 could contribute to raising the ambition of future individual NDCs by highlighting areas of untapped mitigation potential (e.g. at sectoral level), co-operation or technological progress that Parties might wish to consider when establishing subsequent NDCs.
- The proposed timeline for finishing the Paris rulebook, including information to facilitate clarity, transparency and understanding (CTU), means that work on this issue may progress before, or in parallel with, discussions under the FD2018. It is therefore not clear how discussions under the FD2018 could influence CTU discussions, unless the FD2018 involved multiple events over the course of 2018.

The table below presents a set of possible options for the scope of the FD2018 in line with its two main objectives contained in Articles 4.1 and 4.8.

Table 3. Options for the scope of the FD2018 in line with Articles 4.1 and 4.8 of the Paris Agreement

	Options	Comments and implications
Scope and timeframe	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Focus on balance of sources and sinks by mid-century • In addition, include assessment of shorter-term indicators, i.e. progress towards global peaking of emissions; rapid reductions of emissions following peaking 	<p>Expanding the scope and including more than one timeframe in the FD2018 (e.g. timeframe for peaking, timeframe for balancing emissions and sinks) would increase the information needs for the FD. This would have implications for the resource needs and complexity of the FD2018.</p> <p>As NDCs extend only to 2025/30, assessing longer-term GHG emission trends or mitigation efforts in the FD2018 would need information from other sources – potentially from non-Parties, as not all Parties have GHG targets or projections to 2050.</p>
Focus	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Documenting collective efforts (i.e. cataloguing policies that are being implemented and are planned) • Assessing impacts of efforts taken so far • Assessing likely future impacts of collective efforts 	<p>Documenting and assessing the impact of current and planned collective efforts requires information such as hypothetical counterfactuals relating to emission levels or policy responses. Assessing collective efforts could be developed at a top-down level (e.g. from non-Party stakeholders) or at a bottom-up level (e.g. from Party information).</p> <p>As information at the level of individual Parties is not comparable, it may be difficult to aggregate in a meaningful manner.</p>
Which components to treat explicitly	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Long-term mitigation components (balance in sources and sinks) • All mitigation components (balance, peaking, rapid reductions) • Contextual components (equity, sustainable development, poverty eradication) 	<p>Different Parties have historically used different nationally-determined approaches to treat contextual information on sustainable development, equity, poverty eradication. If the FD2018 assumes that NDCs have taken contextual information into account, they would not need to be treated explicitly in the FD2018.</p>
Informing the preparation of NDCs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Make specific requests for what to include in NDCs • No specific requests 	<p>Making specific (voluntary) requests for information could help to improve comparability of information provided in future rounds of NDCs, as well as improving clarity, transparency and understanding of the NDCs.</p>

3. Possible information needs to assess progress towards specific components of the FD2018 objectives

Various types of information could be relevant to facilitate taking stock of progress towards the FD2018's objectives. Inputs could include information that takes stock of current progress as well as forward-looking indicators that may indicate progress in the short, medium and long-term. Information types vary in availability and could rely on data and information from Parties, UNFCCC reports as well as non-Party stakeholders.

3.1 Introduction

The broad nature of the FD2018's objectives means that a wide variety of information may be needed to inform the facilitative dialogue. This information may include assessments of current emissions and trends; possible future scenarios and how they deviate from pathways needed to limit temperature increases to well below 2°C; mitigation potential; technology, R&D and investment trends; as well as countries' national circumstances and views regarding contextual elements. Depending on decisions on the scope of the FD2018, this information may be needed for multiple timeframes.

Table 4 identifies possible categories of information and indicators that could be relevant to informing the FD2018. The table also summarises the extent to which this information is available via national and international reporting processes or reporting by non-Party stakeholders.

Table 4. Possible information needs to assess the different components of the objectives of the FD2018

Possible information needed to assess progress towards components of the FD2018 objectives	Comment on availability
<p><i>Objective components A, B and C on progress towards mitigation goals referred to in Article 4.1</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - GHG emissions time series (historical, cumulative) from all sectors (including those outside national boundaries e.g. bunkers) and climate forcers (short-lived climate pollutants) - projections of emissions (to different timeframes) - Kaya equation indicators including emissions intensity, carbon intensity of energy consumption, per capita emissions, GDP and population growth - Aggregate emissions gap to and global emissions pathways consistent with the long-term temperature goal (well below 2°C and below 1.5°C) - Parties' peaking pledges and other commitments that may imply progress towards peaking, along with intended timeframes - mitigation policies and expected reductions (short, medium and long-term) - Parties' mitigation-relevant targets (including renewables, energy efficiency, forestry) - information communicated to UNFCCC or elsewhere regarding the implementation of national climate plans - progress in uptake of net-negative emissions technologies such as bio-energy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) and natural carbon sinks - R&D and investment expenditures towards decarbonisation, and expected deployment - current investment patterns and implications for lock-in of long-lived infrastructure 	<p>GHG emissions: Historical estimates of anthropogenic emissions covered by the UNFCCC are widely available from official sources for Annex I countries, widely available for energy-related CO₂ emissions for many countries (from NPS such as IEA), available for total emissions (NPS sources). Projected emissions are not routinely available at country level (and not calculated on a comparable basis for different national estimates), but are available from NPS sources. Emissions from gases not covered by UNFCCC, and non-anthropogenic emissions not widely available. Country-specific data on Kaya equation indicators are not always available from national sources but can be sourced from various NPS (e.g. IEA, IMF, and UN). Aggregated emissions gap, emissions pathways and timeframes for peaking and net-zero emissions consistent with long-term temperature goals are calculated by NPS such as UNEP (e.g. emissions gap report) and will also be included in the forthcoming IPCC Special Report on 1.5°C.</p> <p>National plans and targets: Some short to medium-term national plans and targets are communicated to the UNFCCC (e.g. via national communications or other national reports) and often contain information on progress in achieving the goals in these plans. However, few longer-term plans have been communicated.</p> <p>Peaking timelines: Many countries have not yet established or communicated an explicit timeline for peaking of GHG emissions. Country-specific information on the expected GHG mitigation effect of specific policies over time is often not available.</p> <p>Sectoral, aggregated and other information not provided in national plans: Information on specific mitigation policies' and their effects, aggregated information on sectoral emissions trends, policy options and their implications are more often provided by non-Party expert organisations (e.g. IEA tracking energy sector transitions, OECD work on policy misalignments, IRENA etc.).</p> <p>Investment: For some countries, public expenditures are tracked systematically, although spending relevant to GHG mitigation may not be clearly separated. Private sector investment patterns are more difficult to track.</p>
<p><i>Objective component D on equity, e.g.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Information on how mitigation responses have been undertaken on the basis of equity <p>Some potential indicators could include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - emissions per capita - cost-effective abatement potential - mitigation costs, mitigation costs per GDP, per capita - emissions intensity - indicators not primarily related to climate, e.g. human 	<p>Information of indicators such as emissions intensity, GINI index are widely available for many countries in publications produced by NPS such as World Bank</p> <p>Information on cost-effective mitigation potential can help in estimating whether peaking of emissions could be brought forward. However, information on mitigation potentials are not routinely reported by countries to the UNFCCC, vary widely by country, and are not estimated in a comparable manner between different countries. Sector-specific mitigation potential is available, often at an aggregated level, from NPS.</p>

Possible information needed to assess progress towards components of the FD2018 objectives	Comment on availability
development index, GINI index	
<p><i>Objective component D on sustainable development</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - information on what each country considers as sustainable development and how this interacts with the SDGs and the country's mitigation component of its NDC (e.g. sustainable development co-benefits) - information on progress towards individual SDGs and associated indicators such as access to reliable, affordable, modern and sustainable energy (SDG goal 7); sustainable infrastructure etc. 	<p>Information on how countries interpret sustainable development in relation to mitigation is not routinely communicated to the UNFCCC. Several countries had agreed on national-level sustainable development indicators in the 2005-2010 period in the context of approving Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects (Government of Malawi, 2011; Government of Republic of Rwanda, 2010; Government of South Africa, 2004). Analysis of these indicators (TERI, 2012) has highlighted differences between countries in the type and level of detail of indicators, as well as linkages to broader development goals. Some countries do communicate sustainable development co-benefits in e.g. their National Communications.</p> <p>Aggregated performance (e.g. at global and regional levels) towards SDG targets and indicators are available through the SDG annual reports. Country performance is reported separately, although the information is often incomplete.</p>
<p><i>Objective component D on poverty eradication</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - current level and trends in national poverty levels - national or other relevant policies aiming to reduce poverty, and the GHG-implications of such policies - poverty reduction co-benefits of mitigation policies (for example, job creation in low-carbon sectors) 	<p>Indicators and information related to poverty levels are widely available in databases maintained by NPS. Many, but not all, Parties communicate the importance of poverty reduction with respect to mitigation and ambition (e.g. South Africa, in its NDC, emphasises that addressing poverty and inequality is “its overriding priority” in the context of short-term, policy-driven transitions). Information on poverty reduction co-benefits of mitigation policies is not widely available. The GHG implications of national policies are also not often communicated by Parties.</p> <p>Aggregated performance on poverty reduction targets and indicators are available through the SDG annual reports. Country performance is reported separately, although the information is often incomplete.</p>
<p><i>Objective component E on informing preparation of NDCs</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - identifying mitigation potential as well as technological advancements in the short, medium or long-term, in various sectors - identifying successful mitigation actions, including policies that selected countries have used to reduce emissions - identifying measures to reduce any policy misalignments (e.g. fossil fuel subsidies) that could increase GHG emissions - reviewing experiences in NDC development and implementation to inform future preparation of NDCs 	<p>Many reports by NPS identify effective mitigation action, untapped mitigation potential and technological advances on a global, regional or national level, in various sectors (financial, forestry, energy etc.). Some of this information is also covered in UNFCCC processes, such as the Technical Examination Process whose Summary for Policymakers provides examples of good mitigation practices by Parties', in various sectors. Various NPS have published work or created other tools aimed at improving NDC planning and implementation (e.g. OECD, World Bank).</p> <p>Policy misalignments: Within their national communications, Annex I countries are asked to report on actions undertaken to identify and update policies that could increase emissions (UNFCCC, 1999) but this is not obligatory.</p> <p>By FD2018, many countries should be in a position to share their experiences with NDC development. However, information on NDC implementation is likely to be less available.</p>
<p><i>Objective component F on communicating information necessary for CTU</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - mandate of CTU discussions and any interactions with the FD2018 	<p>This information and the potential influence of CTU discussions on the FD2018 and vice versa, are not yet understood, and may be further clarified in May 2017 Bonn discussions. Some Party submissions on CTU have indicated that CTU may help in assessments of collective progress (Moarif, 2017).</p>

3.2 Initial insights

Role of information required

- Information requirements and resource needs of the FD2018 could vary widely depending on the number of component(s) the FD2018 addresses, whether these objective(s) are addressed explicitly, at what level of geographical aggregation (e.g. collective, international, other), and over what time period.
- The FD 2018 is likely to need information that takes stock of current progress (e.g. GHG emissions time series), in order to facilitate ex post analysis. For the FD2018 to take stock, ex ante, of progress towards long-term goals, it will need forward-looking indicators (such as projected or target emission levels).

Source of information

- Collective progress could either be assessed in a bottom-up manner (which would require timely, complete and transparent information submission from countries), or in a top-down manner (which would require information from non-Party stakeholders).
- Country-specific information on goals or expected long-term emission trends is available from only a sub-set of countries. For example, six countries have communicated long-term strategies to the UNFCCC Secretariat. However, information on emissions projections and pathways at the global or regional level are available from some expert non-Party stakeholders. For example, the IPCC's special report on 1.5°C to be released in 2018 on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels will include an assessment of related global greenhouse gas emission pathways. Information on poverty eradication, sustainable development, equity is not routinely communicated to the UNFCCC, although information relevant to these themes is available from expert non-Party stakeholders.
- Information on climate policies and their current and expected implementation, effects, and policy misalignments is available for a sub-set of countries at a national level, and at an aggregated level by some expert non-Party stakeholders.
- The majority of Parties have not mentioned peaking timeframes in their current (I)NDCs (UNFCCC, 2016). In order to take stock of progress towards peaking as soon as possible, it would be helpful if Parties included in their NDCs or national reports to the UNFCCC, information on when they expect to peak emissions, what the corresponding emissions level is, and how Parties plan to progress towards peaking.
- Information from NPS may provide useful inputs to estimate current and future levels of progress as well as to assess how mitigation gaps can be reduced (e.g. as in the TEP and TEM processes highlighted in Table 6).

The following table provides options regarding information needs for the FD2018.

Table 5. Options to determine the information needs of the FD2018

	Options	Comments and implications
Timeframe covered by information	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Historical/current • Short/medium/long-term projections 	<p>Focusing only on historical/current information and trends will provide limited insights relating to potential progress towards the long-term goal. Projections will be needed in order to assess future technology development, uptake, associated emissions trajectories and other indicators to help assess potential progress.</p> <p>The timeframes for such projections will need to reflect the timeframes covered in the FD2018.</p>
Aggregation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Collective (global anthropogenic GHG emissions) • Other types of disaggregation(s). 	<p>Article 4.1 mentions that peaking will take longer for developing country parties. If the FD2018 is to take stock of peaking timeframes for developed and developing countries, then data would be needed at this level of disaggregation.</p> <p>Other types of disaggregation, such as sectoral/regional mitigation potentials, could be helpful in informing future NDCs.</p>
Assessment type	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Top-down assessment of progress • Bottom-up, i.e. aggregating individual or regional performance 	<p>Top-down assessments of progress and/or pathways are available from non-Party stakeholders.</p> <p>A meaningful bottom-up assessment (i.e. aggregating individual or regional performance) would require timely, complete and comparable information submission by individual Parties.</p>
Request for certain information to be included/referenced in future NDCs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Peaking timeframes • Mitigation effect of policies 	<p>Information on expected peaking timeframes will be needed to assess global progress towards peaking as soon as possible, and could potentially be useful for other processes under the UNFCCC, such as the global stocktake. Estimating the timeframe for global peaking could help understand compatibility of current emission pathways and those needed for below 2°C scenarios.</p> <p>Information on the current and future mitigation effects of policies that are part of NDCs could help assess countries' efforts and expected future rates of emission reductions. It could help demonstrate that subsequent NDCs represent a progression of effort.</p>
Source of information	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Parties • Expert NPS 	<p>Sourcing information solely from Parties would make it difficult to obtain a complete picture and to aggregate information on a comparable basis.</p>

4. Inputs to selected collective review or stocktake processes under the auspices of the UN

This section examines four review or stocktake processes, which each have similarities and differences compared to the FD2018, to highlight potentially relevant lessons for the FD2018. Unlike the FD2018, the mandate for some of these processes mentioned the types of input, sources of information, and types of outputs. None of these processes took place as a single event (even though one was initially set up as such). The processes varied in terms of their mandates, the types of inputs used, and outputs (e.g. recommendations vs key findings). All four processes examined were informed by both Party and non-Party stakeholder input.

4.1 Introduction

Several other collective review or stocktake processes inside or outside the UNFCCC process have been undertaken in recent years. Four of these processes, held under the auspices of the UN, are examined in this section: the UNFCCC's Structured Expert Dialogue (SED) under the 2013-2015 review, the UNFCCC's Technical Examination Process (TEP), the UN-led process of selection of indicators for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement review conference assessing the effectiveness of the Agreement. These processes were chosen as they are a collective review or stocktake process, assessing common, international goals.⁴ For example, one of the primary objectives of 2013-2015 review was to analyse progress towards long-term global goals⁵ (see Box 2). The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks (UN FSA) also includes a provision for "a review conference" that examines collective performance.

Examining the information sources, inputs and outputs from these review and stocktake processes could highlight issues and lessons learned which may be relevant for the FD2018. Table 6 briefly introduces the mandate of these processes and highlights similarities and differences to the FD2018. It then examines the inputs and outputs of the four processes (assessing the outcomes of the outputs is beyond the scope of this section).

⁴ The CCXG has also examined multilateral review processes in the past, although these were individual and not collective review processes (Ellis et al, 2011).

⁵ The other primary objective was to assess the "adequacy of the long-term global goal in the light of the ultimate objective of the Convention".

Box 2. How did the SED assess the overall progress towards the long-term global goal of limiting the increase in average global temperature below 2°C?

The SED (under the 2013-2015 review), similar to the FD2018, was charged with assessing collective or overall progress towards the long-term temperature goal of limiting global average temperature rise to below 2°C above pre-industrial levels. The SED facilitated an exchange of scientific and technical information between non-Party experts and Parties in order to make this assessment. The SED examined progress in relation to emissions trends, policy effects and means of implementation including technology trends, finance and capacity-building. Some details on what was assessed and the conclusions, based on information presented by participating experts during the SED, have been provided below (UNFCCC, 2015):

- **Emissions trends:** Trends in GHG stocks and flows, associated uncertainties, and the issues in measuring this information were examined by the IPCC. The required global pathways through 2050 to hold average global temperature rise to below 2°C was addressed as well as the estimated emission gaps considering current trajectories and trajectories associated with a full implementation of Parties' Cancun pledges. Scenario analysis presented in the SED highlighted that reaching limiting temperature rise to below 2°C would "require large global emission reduction in the short to medium term, and near-zero or negative global emissions in the second half of the twenty-first century".
- **Policy effects:** Parties' past mitigation policies were examined and found to be more consistent with a 3°C pathway rather than a 2°C pathway. Questions on the effectiveness of certain mitigation-related policies such as carbon taxes, emissions trading and elimination of fossil fuels were also addressed by NPS such as the World Bank. Difficulties related to the availability of up-to-date national information provided under the Convention were also highlighted.
- **Technology trends:** The progress in deploying required technologies that were available and able to facilitate meeting a 2°C pathway was acknowledged by experts as being insufficient. Barriers to enhancing technology transfer were identified by NPS such as TEC, UNEP and World Bank. Uncertainties associated with negative emissions technologies and sinks were addressed along with the potential need for these solutions in future scenarios to stay below the 2°C temperature rise limit. Innovation required in key technology areas (for example, renewable energy, energy efficiency and end-use fuel switching) was addressed by NPS like IEA.
- **Finance and capacity-building:** The need for scaling up of current levels of climate finance was highlighted by the Standing Committee on Finance (SCF) and the IPCC. Challenges in estimating climate finance levels, addressing barriers to scaling up of climate finance and the need for collaboration between capacity-building programmes were discussed.

As per its mandate, the 2013-2015 review was to "be guided by the principles of equity, and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities". These topics were addressed across various themes in presentations by IPCC and different ways to approach these issues were highlighted.

Table 6. Lessons learned from other collective review or stocktake processes under the auspices of the UN

Collective review or stocktake process and Mandate	Inputs	Outputs	Similarities with the FD2018	Differences with the FD2018
<p>UNFCCC Structural Expert Dialogue (SED) conducted under the 2013-2015 review</p> <p>Mandate of the 2013-2015 review and the SED (Decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 138, 139 and Decision 1/CP.18, paragraph 86): To assess the adequacy of long-term global goals and the overall progress towards achieving it. The SED was to support this review by organising scientific workshops with the participation of Parties and expert non-Party stakeholders.</p>	<p>The inputs of the review, described under Decision 2/CP.17, included:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - IPCC assessment and special reports along with other technical papers. The AR5*, specifically mentioned in the mandate for the SED, was a key input to the SED sessions as it was considered “the most comprehensive and robust assessment of climate change to date”, - submissions from Parties, including their national communications, biennial update reports (BURs) and other reports under the UNFCCC, - work of processes under the Convention including CTCN*, GCF*, TEC* among others, as well as work of SBI*, - other relevant reports from UN agencies and other international organisations, including the IEA*, WMO*, FAO*, World Bank as well as reports of certain regional organisations including CGIAR, CCCCC*. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - A final report of the SED, prepared by the co-facilitators of the SED with the UNFCCC Secretariat’s assistance, which included a technical summary of the work conducted by the SED and ten key messages that highlight the main conclusions from the review process - The relevant experience of the 2013-2015 review, which will be considered by the SBSTA* and SBI, in their 46th session, to discuss the scope for the next periodic review 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The 2013-2015 review’s mandate was to analyse progress towards long-term global goals, and was to be guided by principles of equity (UNFCCC, 2011). - The review was also asked to take into consideration the aggregate effect of Parties’ actions (towards achieving the Convention’s ultimate objective). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The review was mandated to assess adequacy of the long-term global goals whereas the FD2018 is not specifically asked to address the adequacy of progress towards goals in its mandate. - In addition to equity, the review is mandated to be guided by principles of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC). In contrast, the FD2018 assessments are to be carried out on the basis of equity (CBDR-RC was in a draft version of the relevant paragraph in the Paris Agreement, but subsequently removed). - The SBSTA and SBI guided the SED process whereas initial consultations on the FD process are to be done by the Presidents of

* AR5 (Fifth Assessment Report), CTCN (Climate Technology Centre and Network), GCF (Green Climate Fund), TEC (Technology Executive Committee), SBI (Subsidiary Body for Implementation), IEA (International Energy Agency), WMO (World Meteorological Organization), FAO (Food and Agricultural Organization), CCCCC (Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre), SBSTA (Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice)

Collective review or stocktake process and Mandate	Inputs	Outputs	Similarities with the FD2018	Differences with the FD2018
				<p>COP22 and COP23.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Review was a process over three years, with an information gathering phase and a later phase to produce a synthesis report, as an output of the review.
<p>UNFCCC Technical Examination Process (TEP) and Technical Expert Meetings (TEMs) conducted under the TEP</p> <p>Mandate (Decision 1/CP.19, paragraph 5): To examine technical “opportunities of actions with high mitigation potential”, including policies and practices that could raise the ambition of pre-2020 mitigation action.⁶</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Submissions from Parties and observers as well as other sources of information on policy options and cooperative actions, relevant to the themes of the TEP (renewable energy, energy efficiency, land use, non CO₂ GHGs, carbon capture, urban environment, value of carbon and transport) - Information presented during the TEMs by different partnerships and organisations including the UN, UNFCCC, Parties and Party agencies, private sector and intergovernmental organisations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Technical papers, prepared by the UNFCCC Secretariat, provide a summary of the implemented mitigation policies, practices and technologies from different countries in the thematic areas, considered to be examples of best practices. The technical papers are not developed and agreed by Parties but represent an overview of discussions and submissions on relevant policies and approaches. - The Summary for Policymakers prepared by the UNFCCC Secretariat, to inform governments, provides general recommendations to facilitate implementation of policies in the pre-2020 period. - A list of 517 ‘Policy Options’, identified in the TEP, assembling potentially replicable and scalable good practices that could facilitate pre-2020 mitigation action 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The process of aggregating information through organisation of submissions and dialogues could potentially be similar 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - TEP does not have explicit stock-taking (progress tracking) objectives. - The TEMs were open to Parties as well as NPS, including subnational governments, private sector and international organisations. The possible role of NPS is not clear for the FD2018, as Decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 20 mentions that the FD2018 is to be convened “among Parties”. - The mandate of the TEP was to focus on more short-term mitigation options focusing on the pre-2020 implementation time period.

⁶ A TEP stream for adaptation has also been created which has not been covered in this table

Collective review or stocktake process and Mandate	Inputs	Outputs	Similarities with the FD2018	Differences with the FD2018
<p>UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) indicator selection process carried out by the Inter-Agency and Expert Group (IAEG)⁷</p> <p>Mandate (Terms of Reference established in 46th session of the UN Statistical Commission): To develop a global indicator framework to measure progress made in implementing the SDGs and its targets, provide technical support for the implementation framework, review methodological developments related to indicators, report on progress towards SDGs and targets (among other elements in the mandate).</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - A preliminary proposal of indicators was prepared by the UN Statistical Commission based on analysis by national statistical offices. - Input from observers (national statistical offices not members of the IAEG and regional and international organisations) was received during IAEG meetings. - Inputs from Parties, civil society, regional and international agency, academia and the private sector were also received through open consultations. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - A final list of indicators prepared by the IAEG. These indicators were chosen based on level of related methodological developments and overall data availability (to fulfil the mandate of being “simple yet robust” (UN General Assembly, 2015)). - Summary of inputs and compilation of detailed inputs, made available online - A work plan to review indicators that required more in-depth discussions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The annual reports, which rely on the indicators, are assessing aggregated progress towards the SDGs. - The indicators used to assess progress include multiple timeframes (most indicators focus on existing action, with a few on identifying planned action in the longer-term). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The SDGs are disaggregated into specific targets, and the mandate explicitly mentioned developing indicators to identify progress towards these targets.
<p>UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks (UN FSA)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Informal consultations are held (amongst Parties to the agreement) to identify areas of focus and possible priorities for the review conference. - Substantive background document on the state of play of fisheries is prepared for the review conference by the FAO under the authority of the UN SG. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To date, three one-week reviews have taken place, as the initial “review conference” was suspended in 2006, and reopened in 2010 and 2016. A further review conference is planned for 2020. - Each review conference has resulted in a series of recommendations for action, e.g. to adopt appropriate 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The mandate comes from an agreement under the UN. - The mandate is for “a” conference that examines collective performance. - Data from key parties or groups of parties is 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Mandate included assessing effectiveness (of the related Agreement), making specific recommendations and strengthening implementation. - Participation: FD2018 is to take place “among Parties”, whereas UN FSA’s mandate

⁷ The IAEG was charged with developing the indicator framework and comprised of 28 nominated representatives from national statistical offices from different geographical regions

Collective review or stocktake process and Mandate	Inputs	Outputs	Similarities with the FD2018	Differences with the FD2018
Mandate (Article 36 of UNCLOS): To assess the effectiveness of the UN Fish Stock Agreement in reaching its aims, the adequacy of provisions in the agreement “and, if necessary, propose means of strengthening the substance and methods of implementation of those provisions...”		conservation and management measures, to improve data collection, “prohibit certain forms of fisheries subsidies”. - Summaries of the informal consultations held prior to the review conference are published (following a two-week period for Parties to comment on the draft report).	lacking.	specifically included Parties, “states ... entitled to become Parties” and observers.

4.2 Initial Insights

Process, scope and frequency

- Some review and assessment processes have been designed as a one-off exercise (e.g. UN FSA) and others have been designed as a periodic review (e.g. the SED). In practice, review processes designed as a single review (e.g. UN FSA) have been held multiple times.
- None of the four review or stocktake processes explored above agreed on how to explicitly address the issue of equity.

Inputs

- All of the review and assessment processes examined in Table 6 were informed by inputs and/or other information by non-Party stakeholders (e.g. the role of IPCC reports was explicitly recognised in the 2013-2015 review (UNFCCC, 2011), the FAO provides a background paper on the state of fisheries for the UN FSA), as well as by information from and/or views of Parties.

Outputs

- The mandate for different review and assessment processes examined provided for different types of outputs. Some reviews (e.g. UN FSA) identify explicit recommendations, whereas others highlight good practices (e.g. TEP) or key findings (e.g. SED). Up-front agreement on the output(s) or outcome(s) that the FD2018 is to aim for, would help to focus discussions at the FD2018 itself.
- The outputs from these processes also vary in terms of who these outputs are aimed towards (e.g. governments, specific bodies within a processes, regional organisations), and whether there is any subsequent follow-up from the output (e.g. one of the review conferences held under the UN FSA examined progress towards recommendations previously made).
- Some outputs were designed to inform and influence high-level and political decision making (for example, the TEP Summary for Policymakers and the UN FSA's recommendations for action). Decision 10/CP.21 highlights the role of the 2013-2015 review in influencing the strengthening of the long-term global temperature goal to limit the rise of average global temperatures to well below 2°C.
- Some of the conclusions or recommendations for these collective processes were disaggregated. For example, the UN FSA review conferences provided recommendations for actions for States to be undertaken on an individual basis and collectively through regional fisheries management organisations. Particular recommendations and considerations were noted for developing States as well. The TEP process groups its recommendations (for example, in the Summary for Policymakers) according to thematic areas or sectors.

Challenges in measuring progress towards goals

- Lack of data availability means that some review processes use proxies to identify progress. For example, SDG indicator 7.1.1 identifies the proportion of the population with access to electricity, whereas indicator 7.1.2 identifies the primary reliance on clean fuels and technology. Both of these are proxies for indicator 7.1 on ensuring universal access to affordable, reliable and modern energy services.

Challenges to achieving progress towards global goals

- Some of the review and stocktake processes provide information on general obstacles impeding the progress in achieving the global objectives. For example, the UN FSA conference identified issues faced by Parties and regional organisations in implementing the Agreement while the TEM technical papers identify barriers to implementing certain mitigation actions that could facilitate meeting pre-2020 ambition objectives.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

BECCS	Bio-Energy with Carbon Capture and Storage
BUR	Biennial Update Report
CBDR-RC	Common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities
CCCCC	Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre
CCXG	Climate Change Expert Group
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
COP	Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC
CTCN	Climate Technology Centre and Network
CTU	Clarity, transparency and understanding
CVF	Climate Vulnerable Forum
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GHG	Greenhouse Gas
IAEG-SDG	Inter-Agency and Expert Group on SDG Indicators
IEA	International Energy Agency
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization
FD2018	2018 Facilitative Dialogue
LULUCF	Land use, land-use change and forestry
NPS	Non-Party Stakeholders
(I)NDC	(Intended) Nationally Determined Contributions
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
SB	Subsidiary Body
SBI	Subsidiary Body for Implementation
SBSTA	Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice
SCF	Standing Committee on Finance
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
SED	Structured Expert Dialogue
TEC	Technology Executive Committee
TEM	Technical Expert Meetings
TEP	Technical Expert Process
UN	United Nations
UNCLOS	UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UN FSA	United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
WMO	World Meteorological Organization

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