




International Migration Outlook 2021

45TH EDITION



International Migration Outlook 2021

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Foreword

This publication constitutes the 45th report of the OECD's Continuous Reporting System on Migration. The report is divided into six chapters plus a statistical annex.

Chapter 1 provides a broad overview of recent trends in international migration flows and policies up to 2020 and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on international movements. It also analyses recent changes on the labour market inclusion of immigrants in OECD countries. Chapter 2 monitors the recent changes in migration policies with a special focus on the implications of the execution of the Brexit Withdrawal Agreement. Chapter 3 looks at the recent changes in policies that support the integration of immigrants and their children with a particular attention to anti-discrimination policies and digitalisation of integration services.

Chapter 4 updates and further explores previous OECD estimates on the fiscal impact of immigrants. The increased pressure on public finances due to the COVID-19 pandemic brings back the question of the impact of immigration on the labour market and public finances to the forefront of the political debate. In this context, it is critical to have sound, updated and internationally comparable data on how much immigrants contribute and cost to receiving countries. This chapter estimates the yearly net fiscal impact of immigrants in 25 OECD countries over the 2006-18 period. It also provides a systematic analysis of the differences between the foreign and native-born populations in each item of government expenditure and revenue, as well as a detailed analysis of the socio-economic determinants of the fiscal position of immigrants.

Chapter 5 looks at the causes and consequences of residential segregation of immigrants in OECD countries. It shows that in all OECD countries, immigrants are concentrated in certain areas, especially in the poorer neighbourhoods and outskirts of the large metropolitan cities. However, not all immigrant groups tend to concentrate to the same extent, and concentration is shaped by both geography and historical settlement patterns. The effects of this concentration on integration are complex. On the one hand, arrival in an area with high concentration is often associated with better initial employment prospects for immigrants. On the other hand, in the longer run, immigrant concentration tends to hamper host-country language acquisition and, in many cases, educational advancement for children of immigrants.

Chapter 6 presents succinct country-specific notes and statistics on developments in international migration movements and policies in OECD and selected non-OECD countries in recent years. Lastly, the statistical annex includes a broad selection of recent and historical statistics on immigrant flows, asylum requests, foreign and foreign-born populations, and naturalisations.

This year's edition of the OECD International Migration Outlook is the collective work of the staff of the International Migration Division in the Directorate for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs. Chapter 2 contains important contributions from John Salt (University College London). Chapter 4 was prepared by Ana Damas de Matos (OECD). Chapter 5 was prepared by Thomas Liebig (OECD) and Gilles Spielvogel (OECD). Jean-Christophe Dumont edited the report. Research assistance and statistical work were carried out by Véronique Gindrey and Philippe Hervé. Editorial assistance was provided by Dominika Andrzejczak and Charlotte Baer as well as Liv Gudmundson and Lucy Hulett.

Editorial

Recovery efforts need to address structural obstacles to migrant integration

The decade prior to the COVID-19 pandemic has been one of significant progress in immigrant integration on many accounts. Relatively favourable labour market conditions in many countries and higher education levels of new arrivals have been coupled with further progress in reception policies for refugees and other migrant groups. Despite this progress, the country of birth remained a strong predictor of lasting inequalities, including across generations for native-born children of immigrants.

Then the COVID-19 pandemic arrived, disrupting our economies and societies, and widening pre-existing inequalities in the labour market virtually everywhere. Those between immigrants and the native-born are no exception. The latest labour market figures presented in this edition of the *International Migration Outlook* suggest that the pandemic has wiped out much of the progress in migrant integration seen in the past decade. While employment declined almost everywhere, the gap in the employment rate between foreign-born and native-born widened across OECD countries to reach 2 percentage points on average, while the difference in the unemployment rate is now more than 3 percentage points. Foreign-born workers have been disproportionately affected by job losses, given their generally more precarious labour contracts but also their strong concentration in deeply affected sectors, such as hospitality where they account for 25% of total employment OECD-wide.

Young people with migrant parents are also facing particular difficulties in dealing with the disruptions and challenges brought about by the pandemic. About one in two children of immigrants do not speak the host-country language at home. As their parents tend to be less well able to support learning in the host-country language – and as their homes tend to be less well adapted to provide an appropriate learning environment – children of immigrants have often been particularly hard hit by the interruption of in-person education. This risks widening the gaps in educational outcomes between children of immigrants and children of native-born, after almost two decades of progress. It will also translate into a more difficult school-to-work transition for children with migrant parents than for their classmates with native-born parents. Already prior to the pandemic, youth with migrant parents were more likely to be not in employment, education or training (NEET) in two-thirds of OECD countries.

The pandemic has also put further structural obstacles to migrant integration into the limelight. It notably led to a rise in anti-immigrant sentiment in some countries, with growing evidence pointing to an increase in discrimination. The “Black Lives Matter” movement and other events, notably in Europe, have also drawn new attention to the issue of racial discrimination, with which immigrant discrimination is strongly interlinked.


To address the many social and economic challenges brought by the pandemic, OECD countries have started to implement massive recovery plans. It is pivotal that these plans devote attention to immigrant integration, to avoid further exacerbating the many disadvantages migrants face in our labour markets and societies. Three points require specific attention in this context.

First, the focus of integration needs to go beyond *introduction* measures for new arrivals in order to address structural disadvantages faced by *settled* immigrants and their children. Four out of five immigrants have been in OECD countries for more than five years. This will require broadening the focus of integration policies as well as co-ordinated action across policy domains – notably health, labour, education, and housing – and levels of government. Given migrants' overrepresentation among those in low-skilled jobs, specific attention needs to be devoted to making sure that migrants have the skills to fill the jobs of the future. This requires addressing the training gap between migrants and native-born.

Second, more attention needs to be paid to the specific challenges in areas of high immigrant concentration. As this year's *International Migration Outlook* shows, migrants living in such neighbourhoods tend to accumulate disadvantages, including through poor housing and infrastructure. What is more, these disadvantages tend to reinforce one another. There is, for example, a further penalty for living in areas of high immigrant concentration, which results in fewer opportunities for language learning and lower education outcomes for children of migrants. Policy action should thus not only enhance integration offers in these neighbourhoods but also promote social and geographical mobility, which are closely interlinked. To enhance the opportunities of those who remain, improving housing and broader local infrastructure need to be an integral part of recovery programmes.

Finally, we need to address the root causes of discrimination, which is the source of many – though certainly not all – structural disadvantages faced by migrants. The good news is that the period 2020-21 has seen unprecedented policy action to address the issue of discrimination against migrants and other minorities. As Chapter 3 of the *Outlook* highlights, many OECD countries as well as the EU have put specific action plans in place. Many countries have also run information campaigns to tackle anti-migrant sentiment in the context of COVID-19. However, much more needs to be done to tackle the sources and consequences of discrimination and to provide equal opportunities for all.

Comprehensive and co-ordinated action is required to avoid that the pandemic leads to a lasting setback on migrant integration. Given the large numbers concerned, such a setback would not only entail negative economic consequences, but also threaten social cohesion at large. In contrast, improving migrant integration would also entail important fiscal gains, as our calculations in this *Outlook* show. There is thus no time to waste on this front.



Stefano Scarpetta,

Director for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs,

OECD

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Executive summary

Migration flows dropped by at least one-third in 2020, due to the COVID-19 pandemic

Permanent migration flows to OECD countries declined by more than 30% in 2020, to about 3.7 million – the lowest level since 2003. This drop could be as much as 40%, depending on which factors are taken into account.

All categories of permanent migration experienced a drop in 2020, with family migration showing the largest decline. Preliminary estimates suggest that intra-EU movements were slightly less affected, dropping 17%. Temporary labour migration also decreased sharply in 2020: the amount of working holidaymakers dropped, on average, by 58% and intra-company transfers by 53%, while the flow of seasonal agricultural workers only declined by 9% and even slightly increased in the main destination countries for such workers, e.g. the United States and Poland.

The number of new asylum applications in OECD countries fell by 31% in 2020; the sharpest drop since the end of the Balkan crisis in the early 1990s. However, the overall number remained above any year preceding 2014 except 1992. For the second consecutive year, Venezuela was asylum seekers' main country of origin, followed by Afghanistan and Syria. Only 34 400 refugees were resettled in 2020; this is two-thirds less than in 2019 and the lowest number on record.

The COVID-19 crisis ended 10 years of continuous progress for immigrants' labour market outcomes

In 2020, migrant employment rates declined in three out of five OECD countries, while migrant unemployment increased in three out of four countries. Gaps between foreign-born and native-born labour market indicators reached on average 2 percentage points for employment and more than 3 percentage points on unemployment. The labour market outcomes of immigrants have, however, not changed significantly in countries that used large job retention schemes during the crisis or in those with significant return migration. Immigrants from Latin America and the Middle East have been more negatively affected than other groups. On average in the OECD, more than two-thirds of immigrants were employed and one in ten migrants was unemployed in 2020.

Migration policy changes in 2020 were mostly driven by the pandemic

Throughout 2020 and into 2021, the majority of OECD countries have maintained travel restrictions and curtailed immigration services, due to COVID-19. Most used temporary measures to mitigate the pandemic's effects, including:

- Facilitating the entry of essential workers such as health care and seasonal agricultural workers

- Taking steps to ensure that migrants affected by the crisis could continue to stay legally
- Permitting international students to delay studies, begin coursework on line or work longer hours than usually allowed under student visas

Integration measures were also significantly impacted by COVID-19 throughout 2020. In many countries, integration obligations were relaxed or deadlines extended. The pandemic also fostered the use of digital tools for integration programmes, host-country language learning and outreach to migrant populations. Supports for vulnerable migrants were in place in most countries, with particular focus on encouraging migrants to access health care.

In the context of the pandemic and other events in 2020, many OECD countries and the European Union have implemented action plans to combat discrimination and its impact on those perceived to have a migrant background.

The fiscal impact of migration on OECD countries

In the 25 OECD countries with available data, on average during the 2006-18 period, immigrants contributed more in taxes and contributions than governments spend on their social protection, health and education. The contributions of immigrants generally fully cover their share of congestible public goods, and contribute to the financing of pure public goods, such as defence and public debt charges.

The total net fiscal contribution of immigrants was persistently small during 2006-18, between -1% and +1% of GDP for most countries. The situation is not the same in all countries, but this is often due to differences in the ages of their migrant populations: older migrants do not contribute at the same level as the working-age migrants.

Closing the employment gap between prime-age migrants and native-born of the same age, gender and education level could increase the total net fiscal contribution of migrants by over one-third of a GDP percentage point in about 30% of countries. The economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic calls for maintaining, if not increasing, investments in the labour market integration of recently arrived and settled migrants, as these programmes have a very high fiscal return.

The causes and consequences of migrant segregation

In all OECD countries, migrants are concentrated in certain areas, especially in the poorer neighbourhoods and the outskirts of large metropolitan cities. However, not all immigrant groups are concentrated to the same extent and this is shaped by both geography and historical settlement patterns.

The effects on integration are complex. On the one hand, arrival in high concentration areas is often associated with better initial employment prospects. On the other hand, in the longer run, immigrant concentration tends to hamper host-country language acquisition and, in many cases, educational advancement for immigrants' children. There is also some evidence that residential segregation has more negative effects on women than on men.

Policies should not primarily focus on preventing migrant residential segregation, but rather on enhancing mobility out of those areas. More attention should also be given to the quality and accessibility of housing for immigrants.


Key findings

- At about 3.7 million, permanent migration to OECD countries in 2020 was at its lowest level since 2003.
- Temporary labour migration declined in all OECD countries in 2020, most notably in Australia (-37%), Canada (-43%), Japan (-66%), Korea (-57%), and the United States (-37%).
- The number of study permits delivered in 2020 declined sharply, by 70%, in both the United States and Canada, and by -40% on average in OECD EU countries.
- The number of new asylum applications in OECD countries fell by 31% in 2020, resettlement by 65%.
- In 2017, the contribution of immigrants to the financing of pure public goods represented a total of USD 547 billion in the 25 countries included in the analysis.
- In most EU OECD countries, a concentration of migrants' children in schools is associated with a penalty in terms of their educational levels attained. In Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, and Sweden, this is more than a year less of schooling. Native-born descendants of immigrants living in segregated neighbourhoods also tend to have lower educational attainment levels.

Infographic 1. Key facts and figures

COVID-19 has led to a record drop in migration flows


Permanent migration to OECD countries dropped by over 30% in 2020, to about 3.7 million – the lowest level since 2003.



Despite a massive drop, asylum seeking remained at high levels

New asylum applications fell by 31% in 2020; the sharpest drop since the end of the Balkan crisis in the early 1990s. However, the number remained above any year before 2014 except 1992.


New asylum applications in OECD countries



Source: Eurostat, UNHCR

Migrant employment has bounced back


Employment rates of foreign-born, %



Source: National household and labour force surveys


Women account for more than half of resident migrants in most countries

% of female immigrants residing in selected countries




Migrants are concentrated in urban areas

% of foreign-born in working age population



Source: National household and labour force surveys

Migrants contribute more in taxes than they receive in benefits, health & education



*Total across 25 OECD countries, 2017

1 Recent developments in international migration movements and labour market inclusion of immigrants

This chapter provides an overview of recent developments in international migration movements and labour market inclusion of immigrants in OECD countries. The first section analyses the evolution of international migration flows over the last decade, up to the largest decline on record triggered by COVID-19. Both permanent and temporary migration flows by category of migration are addressed. The chapter then examines international student mobility and recent trends in asylum requests in OECD countries. It then looks at the composition of migration flows and the foreign-born population, as well as trends in acquisition of nationality. The second section of the chapter examines trends in labour market outcomes of immigrants over the past two decades, with particular attention to the economic crisis provoked by the pandemic. Detailed analysis by sociodemographic characteristics and region of origin is provided.

In Brief

Key findings

Migration trends

- The COVID-19 crisis caused the sharpest drop on record in migration flows to the OECD, of more than 30%. At about 3.7 million, permanent migration to OECD countries in 2020 stood at its lowest level since 2003.
- The real impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on permanent migration entries in 2020 is, however, expected to be much larger (above 40%) as OECD statistics include not only entries but also in-country status changes from temporary to permanent statuses.
- All categories of permanent migration experienced a decline in 2020. Family migration has shown the largest decline, falling by more than 35% according to preliminary estimates.
- Humanitarian migration flows were also severely affected, in particular to the United States and Canada. Labour migration and free mobility registered overall decreases of about 24% and 17%, respectively.
- All main origin countries saw double-digit declines in permanent migration in 2020, except for Mexico, which registered an increase in migration. Due to the importance of free mobility, the fall was less pronounced in most European destinations with the exception of Italy.
- Temporary labour migration declined sharply in most OECD countries in 2020. Australia (-37%), Canada (-43%), Japan (-65%), Korea (-57%), and the United States (-37%) have experienced some of the largest drops.
- Working holiday makers dropped on average by 59% in 2020. Intra-company transferees dropped by 53%.
- Entries of seasonal agricultural workers declined by only 10% overall, and even slightly increased in the main destination countries (e.g. United States and Poland).
- In 2019, 4.6 million posted workers were registered in the UE/EFTA, representing 0.8% of total employment.
- After many years of continuous growth, the number of study permits delivered in 2020 declined sharply (-70% in both the United States and Canada, -40% on average in OECD EU countries)
- The number of new asylum applications in OECD countries fell by 31% in 2020, the sharpest drop since the end of the Balkan crisis in the early 1990s. However, the overall number remained above any year preceding 2014 except 1992.
- Between 2010 and 2019, resettlement programmes have allowed more than 1 million people in need of international protection to be transferred to an OECD country. The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on these programmes has been very strong, with only 34 400 refugees resettled – two-thirds less than in 2019, and the lowest number on record.
- In 2019, men represented on average more than 56% of new migrants to the OECD area. Shares of men are highest in Central and Eastern European countries, and smallest in Australia and the United States (both 46%).
- Whereas men account for the bulk of new immigrants in the majority of OECD countries, the majority of settled immigrants in most OECD countries are women.

- On average, the foreign-born population accounted for 14% of the population in the OECD area in 2020, up from 11.9% in 2010.
- With the exception of the Baltic States and Israel, all OECD countries experienced an increase of their immigrant population. The highest growth over the decade relative to the total population was recorded in Luxembourg (up by 9 percentage points), Iceland (8 points) and Sweden (6 points).
- In 2019, 2.2 million people became citizens of an OECD country, the highest figure on record, and a 12% increase compared with 2018. Preliminary estimates for 2020 suggest a decrease by 17%, largely due to a major drop in the United States where naturalisation reached its lowest level since 2003.
- In 2019, the number of UK nationals who took up the citizenship of an EU country was the highest figure on record, 15 times the 2015 level before the vote on Brexit. The number of EU citizens who have obtained British nationality has also never been higher than in 2019.

Labour market inclusion

- The economic crisis triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic has ended 10 years of continuous progress in the labour market outcomes of immigrants. On average in the OECD, more than two-thirds of immigrants were employed in 2020, -2.1 percentage points compared to 2019. One in ten migrants was unemployed compared to one in fifteen native-born.
- In 2020, migrant employment rates declined in three out of five OECD countries, while unemployment increased in three in four countries. Labour market outcomes of immigrants have not, however, changed significantly in countries with the largest job retention schemes or with significant return migration.
- So far, the pandemic has not significantly affected the gender gap in labour market outcomes, as the employment rate has dropped as much for immigrant women as for immigrant men.
- Low- and medium-educated people, native- and foreign-born alike, have been more negatively affected. However, in most OECD countries, for all levels of education, immigrants' situation in the labour market has worsened more than for their native-born peers.
- The economic crisis has an important sectoral dimension. Immigrant employment declined more than for natives in the most affected sectors, while it has also increased more in sectors which have experienced overall employment growth.
- The labour market situation of immigrants is heterogeneous across region of origin. Immigrant groups that have been the most affected by the crisis are from Latin America and the Middle East.


Recent trends in international migration

Permanent-type migration to OECD countries registered a historic decline in 2020

Migration flows to OECD countries are at their lowest level since 2003

Permanent migration to OECD countries fell sharply in 2020, by more than 30%, and stood well below 4 million (Figure 1.1). This is the lowest level registered since 2003 and the largest drop on record, in both absolute and relative terms. Still, this figure only partially reflects the actual decline in international migration for two reasons. First, and most importantly, permanent migration includes not only new entries, but also changes of status from a temporary to a permanent status. These in-country transitions have been much less affected by the border closures and other measures related to the pandemic – such as the closing of visa offices abroad – than immigration from abroad. The actual drop in new entries was thus much higher than shown in the figure for overall permanent-type migration. Preliminary estimates suggest that the actual drop in permanent-type entries (not including status changes) could be above 40% on average.

Figure 1.1. Permanent migration flows to OECD countries, 2010-2020



Note: Data for 2010 to 2019 is the sum of standardised figures for countries where they are available (accounting for 95% of the total), and unstandardised figures for other countries (except Turkey). 2020 data are estimated based on growth rates published in official national statistics and include humanitarian flows.

Source: OECD International Migration Database, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00342-en>.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/5s6v9m>

Second, several OECD countries report their migration statistics using fiscal years, which do not correspond with calendar years. This is notably the case for Australia. As a result, the decline in migration flows in the calendar year 2020 is only partially mirrored in the 2020 migration statistics for these countries. For Australia, partial data suggest the year-to-year decline of new arrivals from abroad for 2020 was around two-thirds, more than four times the figure reported in Table 1.1, which is based on the 2020 fiscal year and includes onshore status changes.

With 576 000 new lawful permanent immigrants registered, 44% less than in 2019 and the lowest level in the millennium, the United States remains the number one immigration country in the OECD (Table 1.1).

On the basis of preliminary estimates, the drop in immigrant inflow was well above 50% when excluding status changes. Germany received 460 000 permanent migrants in 2020, a relatively modest drop compared with other OECD countries (-26%), partly explained by the large share of migration from other EU countries, which declined only by 15%.

The United Kingdom followed with a little less than 250 000 new permanent migrants, around 30% below the 2019 figure. Among the top five OECD countries of destination, France registered the smallest drop (-21%) and received 230 000 new migrants in 2020, putting it in fifth place among the main countries of destination. These figures were of a similar magnitude as the average annual inflows observed at the beginning of the 2010s. Migration to Spain, which had been steadily increasing between 2015 and 2019, suffered a sharp decline in 2020 and stood just above 200 000 (-38%).

Canada, which had reached an all-time high in terms of permanent immigration in 2019, witnessed one of the sharpest drops among OECD countries in 2020 (-46%), with just over 180 000 permanent resident admissions. According to preliminary figures, migration flows to Italy were almost halved, and stood at 100 000 in 2020, which corresponds to levels not seen since the end of the 1990s. The consequences of the measures against COVID-19 have also severely affected migration flows to Japan. They were booming until 2019, having doubled in five years, but the 37% decline reduced them to 86 000 in 2020.

The Netherlands saw a relatively modest decline of permanent inflows in 2020 (-20%, to 121 000), following a record high in 2019. Belgium and Luxembourg had a similar pattern; that is, a rather moderate decrease in 2020 following high immigration in 2019. In Sweden, only 80 000 new permanent migrants were registered in 2020, also a 21% decline compared to 2019. This was the fourth consecutive decline since 2016, suggesting it is also linked with other factors – notably a declining trend in humanitarian migration. Immigration flows to Switzerland have been particularly stable due to the importance of status changes in permanent flows. Since 2010, they have remained within a narrow range (115 000-135 000), and in 2020, they totalled 117 000, down only 4% compared with 2019. The same finding applies to New Zealand, which recorded only a moderate decline (-7% to 36 000), albeit starting from the lowest level in 20 years. After Italy and Canada, Israel recorded the third largest decline in permanent admissions (-41%, to 20 000).

Hungary, according to national data, received 44 000 new migrants in 2020. Despite the 21% decrease, this figure is well above any year prior to 2018. Migration flows to Chile dropped by 39% in 2020 to stand at 155 000.


The only OECD country that registered an increase in permanent migration in 2020 was Mexico. The country had more than 54 000 new permanent migrants, one of the highest figures on record, following a strong increase in humanitarian admissions.

Table 1.1. Inflows of permanent immigrants into selected OECD countries, 2011-20

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020 (estimates)	2019/20 change (%)
Standardised statistics											
United States	1 062.4	1 031.9	990.8	1 017.3	1 051.0	1 183.5	1 127.2	1 096.6	1 031.0	576.0	-44
Germany	295.8	404.9	473.8	580.4	692.9	1 063.8	872.3	644.4	620.4	458.6	-26
United Kingdom	339.8	287.0	295.1	350.0	369.9	351.0	342.2	342.8	345.7	243.6	-30
France	226.6	244.5	254.4	250.7	255.4	258.8	259.9	280.9	290.6	229.7	-21
Spain	265.0	220.1	274.3	264.3	264.2	284.5	305.0	319.3	337.3	209.2	-38
Canada	249.3	258.3	262.8	261.4	275.9	296.7	286.4	321.0	341.2	184.6	-46
Australia	219.5	245.1	254.4	231.0	226.2	227.0	218.1	191.4	193.0	163.4	-15
Italy	375.3	308.1	278.7	241.8	221.6	212.1	216.9	224.6	191.3	124.3	-35
Netherlands	89.9	88.5	92.8	104.0	111.3	125.1	128.2	136.3	153.2	121.1	-21
Switzerland	124.3	125.6	135.6	134.6	131.2	125.0	118.4	122.1	122.3	117.3	-4
Belgium	100.9	100.1	95.6	100.5	103.8	106.2	107.7	109.2	113.2	91.0	-20
Japan	59.1	66.4	57.3	63.9	81.8	95.2	100.6	116.4	137.8	86.3	-37
Sweden	87.6	99.5	108.9	118.0	121.1	154.9	132.9	123.7	102.0	80.4	-21
Austria	55.2	70.8	70.8	80.9	103.0	105.7	98.6	87.1	81.9	62.7	-23
Portugal	34.3	27.9	26.4	30.5	31.2	32.8	39.6	64.0	87.7	54.7	-38
Mexico	21.7	21.0	55.0	43.5	34.4	35.9	32.6	38.7	38.7	54.2	40
Czech Republic	20.7	28.6	27.8	38.5	31.6	34.8	43.5	55.9	63.3	53.4	-16
Korea	43.0	39.7	48.2	55.7	59.6	66.5	66.0	70.2	68.8	49.0	-29
Denmark	36.7	39.7	47.7	55.1	66.9	60.8	56.8	56.0	53.5	45.5	-15
New Zealand	44.5	42.7	45.1	49.9	54.6	55.7	47.2	45.0	38.3	35.7	-7
Ireland	26.3	24.3	28.2	30.5	35.5	41.9	40.2	45.1	48.6	30.1	-38
Norway	64.0	61.7	61.1	58.6	53.1	55.8	45.3	40.5	41.3	29.5	-28
Finland	23.6	21.4	27.3	23.7	23.1	24.2	23.3	-4
Israel	0.0	0.0	0.0	24.1	27.9	26.0	26.4	28.1	33.2	19.7	-41
Luxembourg	..	17.5	18.0	19.0	19.4	19.5	21.5	21.6	22.6	19.1	-16
Total	3 862.2	3 877.1	4 026.6	4 227.9	4 444.9	5 046.5	4 757.4	4 604.1	4 581.2	3 162.6	-31
EU included above	1 974.5	1 984.8	2 116.4	2 287.9	2 449.1	2 879.2	2 689.1	2 534.0	2 535.5	1 846.7	-27
Of which: free movements	1 034.9	1 140.4	1 201.6	1 344.8	1 359.8	1 361.8	1 296.7	1 266.9	1 247.4		
Annual percentage change (%)	-3	0	4	5	5	13	-6	-3	0	-31	
National statistics (unstandardised)											
Turkey	273.9	364.6	466.9	578.5	..	
Chile	50.7	65.2	84.4	83.5	101.9	135.5	207.2	339.4	254.1	154.6	-39
Colombia	148.6	245.2	206.7	91.1	-56
Poland	41.3	47.1	46.6	32.0	86.1	107.0	128.0	137.6	163.5	..	
Greece	23.2	17.7	31.3	29.5	34.0	86.1	80.5	87.3	95.4	..	
Hungary	22.5	20.3	21.3	26.0	25.8	23.8	36.5	49.3	55.3	43.8	-21
Slovenia	10.8	12.3	11.6	11.3	12.7	13.8	15.5	24.1	27.6	24.8	-10
Lithuania	1.7	2.5	3.0	4.8	3.7	6.0	10.2	12.3	19.7	22.3	13
Estonia	1.7	1.1	1.6	1.3	7.4	7.7	9.1	9.7	11.0	10.3	-6
Iceland	2.8	2.8	3.9	4.3	5.0	7.9	11.8	11.5	9.5	7.6	-21
Latvia	2.9	3.7	3.5	4.5	4.5	3.4	5.1	6.5	6.6	4.6	-31
Slovak Republic	3.8	2.9	2.5	2.4	3.8	3.6	2.9	2.9	2.5	..	
Total (except Turkey and Colombia)	161.2	175.8	209.7	199.7	284.8	394.8	506.7	680.6	645.1		


Note: Data refer to the fiscal year ending in the year of reference for Australia (Jul-Jun), Ireland (Apr-Mar), and for the United States from 2011 to 2018 (Oct-Sep). Includes only foreign nationals. The inflows include status changes, namely persons in the country on a temporary status who obtained the right to stay on a longer-term basis. Series for some countries have been significantly revised. EU averages cover countries stated in the table, including the United Kingdom.

Source: OECD International Migration Database, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00342-en>.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/d810nr>

With respect to inflows in per-capita terms, relatively small OECD countries remained on the top of the list (Figure 1.2). Following a high increase in recent years, a number of Central and Eastern European OECD countries are now well above the OECD average. In contrast, following the large decline, Canada was, for the first time ever, below the OECD average in terms of permanent admissions.

Figure 1.2. Inflows of permanent immigrants into OECD countries as a percentage of the total population, 2020 compared with 2010-19



Note: Only countries for which an estimate of 2020 inflows is available. Data for countries in light blue are not standardised. EU average is the average of EU countries presented in the chart. EU total represents the entries of third-country nationals into EU countries for which standardised data are available, as a percentage of their total population.

Source: OECD International Migration Database, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00342-en>.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/pwh21r>

The pandemic has shifted the composition of migration away from family and humanitarian migration to a higher share of free mobility

Family migration has long been the main category of immigration to OECD countries (Figure 1.3). However, it was the category that was most affected by the decline in permanent migration and dropped by more than 35%, according to partial data. In 2019, family migration was at a relatively high level, representing 36% of total migration flows to OECD, but the pandemic has taken this share down to around 31%. This overall drop is mainly due to the -50% fall recorded in the United States, which accounts for a large share of family migration flows to the OECD (43% of the total in 2019). Canada also admitted far fewer family migrants in 2020 than in 2019 (-46%). Against the overall trend of strong decline in family migration, a few countries registered significant increases, notably Denmark (+24%), Mexico (+21%) and New Zealand (+17%).


On the rise between 2015 and 2019 (Annex Table 1.A.1), labour migration to OECD countries dropped in 2020 but slightly less so than for family migration – partly because of in-country transitions of temporary migrants, which are particularly important for this migration category. While OECD countries received fewer migrant workers (-24%) in 2020 than in 2019, their share in overall migration flows increased by 1 percentage point to 15%. This global trend hides a wide variety of situations across countries. Indeed, in many countries, labour migration was hard hit by the COVID-19 crisis. For example, in the Netherlands, France and Norway, the number of labour migrants shrunk by around a third. In the United States, however, the number of new lawful permanent residents admitted based on work hardly dropped. This can

be explained by the fact that most of these permanent permits are delivered in-country, following a status change. For the same reason, the drop was also more modest among labour migrants than among other migrant groups in Australia and Canada.

Migration within free mobility areas has only moderately slowed down in 2020 (-17%). In the European Union, while all countries observed a reduction of this type of migration, this fall did not exceed the -24% registered in Austria. Despite a 15% decline, Germany remained by far the major destination country for EU migrants in 2020. Free mobility flows between Australia and New Zealand have been more severely affected than flows within the European free mobility zone.

According to partial and preliminary data, humanitarian migration to OECD countries fell sharply in 2020 (-23%) and has fallen to a level not seen since 2003. The share of humanitarian admissions among all permanent migration remained below 10% in 2020 (Figure 1.4). In most EU countries, the drop in the number of new admissions of humanitarian migrants remained more modest (less than 20%), as the bulk of admissions under this category are status changes of asylum seekers who were already in the country prior to the pandemic. Indeed, in the Netherlands, there were even more humanitarian admissions in 2020 than in 2019. This was also the case in Mexico. In contrast, the United States and Canada – two countries where the bulk of admissions on humanitarian grounds are from abroad through resettlement – saw a much more severe reduction of humanitarian migration (see further below on resettlement).

Figure 1.3. Permanent migration to OECD countries, by category of entry, 2009-20




Note: 2020 data are estimates on the basis of preliminary data covering 2/3 of OECD countries.

Source: OECD International Migration Database, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00342-en>.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/maeh1w>

Figure 1.4. Composition of permanent migration to OECD countries by category of entry, 2020 compared with 2019



Note: Includes only countries for which standardised data on permanent migration are available.

Source: OECD International Migration Database, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00342-en>.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/t7yf83>

Temporary labour migration: Contrasting trends

The pandemic has highlighted the key role played by migrant workers in industries and sectors that were called upon or bore the brunt of the crisis, but it has also revealed the importance of maintaining certain kinds of temporary worker migration. This applies, in particular, to the most significant category OECD-wide, namely seasonal worker migration. Before COVID-19, a sharp increase was also seen in the number of worker postings within the EU/EFTA.

Seasonal worker migration has continued during the pandemic, whereas other forms of temporary worker migration have dropped markedly

International seasonal workers meet temporary labour needs, especially in agriculture and tourism, but also in construction, care and the agri-food industry, depending on the national programmes in place. Within the EU/EFTA, labour needs are largely met through free movement, but, in the past few years, bilateral agreements on seasonal worker recruitment have been signed, for example between Germany and Georgia in 2020.


With the arrival of the COVID-19 pandemic and the ensuing partial closure of national borders and various lockdown measures, international recruitment was primarily needed for harvesting activities in OECD countries.

Overall, it is important to note that, in 2020, inflows of seasonal workers decreased by only 9%, in other words markedly less than permanent migration and all other categories of temporary migration (Figure 1.5). In the top destination countries, that is the United States (213 000 seasonal workers) and Poland (137 000 seasonal workers), there was even a slight increase. On the other hand, a drop in arrivals of seasonal workers was registered in Canada, Australia and Norway, even though, over the previous decade, flows had tended to increase in these countries (Annex Table 1.A.2). The drop was particularly marked in Mexico.

Working holidaymaker programmes for young people play a major role in meeting low-skilled labour needs in Australia and New Zealand, here again in tourism and agriculture. Inflows into Australia under this programme fell by 29% in 2020 (Annex Table 1.A.2). The United States was the second most popular destination country for working holidaymakers in 2019. Youth participating in the Summer Work Travel Program are less present in the agricultural sector and, because of the restrictions associated with the health crisis, only 5 000 young people were recruited in 2020, compared with 108 000 in 2019. In other destination countries, the number of participants in these programmes also fell by at least two-thirds in 2020.

There is a particularly large number of international trainees in Japan, occupying low- or medium-skilled jobs, primarily in industry. Here, new recruitments dropped from 187 000 in 2019 to 79 000 in 2020 (Annex Table 1.A.2). A similar contraction may be seen in other countries with specific international trainee recruitment programmes. There has also been a marked reduction in mobility within multinational corporations as a result of the pandemic: intra-company transfers fell by 53% in 2020, the sole exception being to Poland, where inflows were up by 14% in that year (Annex Table 1.A.2).

Figure 1.5. Inflows of temporary labour migrants (excluding posted workers) in 2019 and 2020, six main OECD receiving countries in 2020



Note: Excludes posted workers and accompanying family of temporary migrant workers.

Source: OECD International Migration Database, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00342-en>.

Other national programmes exist for recruiting foreign workers (Figure 1.5). Poland, for example, has signed bilateral simplified recruitment programmes with Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine. The great majority of workers employed in Poland under the simplified procedure, in particular in manufacturing, construction and agriculture, as well as administrative services, come from Ukraine. Two years running, the Polish economy recruited at least 1 million workers, and these flows have not been greatly affected by the pandemic.¹ Conversely, all other OECD countries registered a sharp reduction in their temporary labour migration, and in particular the biggest recruiters after Poland: the United States (-37%), Australia (-37%), Canada (-43%), Japan (-66%) and Korea (-57%) (Figure 1.5).

Sharp increase in the number of worker postings within the EU/EFTA in 2019

In 2019, almost 4.6 million² postings were registered in the EU/EFTA. At that time, in full-time equivalent terms, they amounted to nearly 0.8% of employment in the region. Posted workers are a special legal category among the temporary movements of workers within the EU/EFTA free movement area. These are employees or self-employed workers who go to another EU/EFTA country to work, while remaining affiliated to the social security system of the member country in which they generally carry out their activity (Regulation (EC) No. 987/2009). This exception aims to limit the administrative burden for employers, workers and social security bodies for short-term assignments. Employed workers may move from one branch to another within the same group or be employed by a temporary employment agency. The posting has to be registered in the country where the worker is affiliated, which means that statistics are available on this arrangement.

A distinction should be made between two different types of postings. Most postings (3.1 million, or 7 out of 10 in 2019) fall under Article 12 of the Regulation and take place in a single other member country, with 40% in the construction sector in 2019. They may not exceed 24 months and, on average, last 115 days, although there are wide variations from one country to another. Table 1.2 shows the trends in this type of posting over the past decade by destination country.

For all other postings, only the country of origin is known, as they either take place within at least two member countries (Article 13), as is the case for 1.3 million postings, or are governed by multilateral agreements (Article 16), for 80 000 postings in 2019 alone. Road transport accounts for 37% of Article 13 postings. This type of posting is not limited in time but, on average, lasts 312 days, or more than twice the length of Article 12 postings. In full-time equivalent terms, the economic importance to the European labour market of these workers, for whom there is no record of the country where they are working, exceeds that of the workers illustrated in Table 1.2.

There was an unprecedented increase in the use of postings in 2019 (+57%) as a result, in particular, of a sharp uptick in the number of postings under Article 12 (+77%). Previously the increase had come from an upward trend in the number of postings under Article 13. This upturn in postings may be explained by both greater familiarity with the procedure by labour-market actors and the introduction in various national legislations of sanctions for non-compliance with the law on posted workers.

As regards countries of origin, across all kinds of postings, Germany took first place in 2019 with 1.8 million postings, compared with less than half a million in the previous year. The upward trend is mainly due to the quadrupling of the number of Article 12 postings. Long the leading country of origin, Poland is now far behind Germany. It registered almost 650 000 postings in 2019, representing an annual increase of 7%. It is followed by Spain, Italy and Austria, from which there were between 200 000 and 250 000 postings each in 2019.

Table 1.2. Postings of workers active under Article 12 in the OECD countries of the EU/EFTA, by destination country, 2011-19

Thousands

Destination	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2018/2019 change (%)	Average duration (postings starting in 2019, in days)
Total OECD	1 191.1	1 173.4	1 275.6	1 365.9	1 425.2	1 539.1	1 639.1	1 718.2	3 076.3	+79	115
Germany	311.4	335.9	373.7	414.2	418.9	440.1	427.2	428.9	505.7	+18	..
France	162.0	156.5	182.2	190.8	184.7	203.0	241.4	262.1	450.2	+72	30
Austria	76.3	76.4	88.6	101.0	108.6	120.2	141.0	119.9	320.5	+167	..
Switzerland	62.6	64.9	78.1	87.5	97.7	104.3	105.7	113.8	247.0	+117	..
Netherlands	105.9	99.4	100.4	87.8	89.4	90.9	111.5	126.3	219.3	+74	..
Belgium	125.1	125.3	134.3	159.7	156.6	178.3	167.3	156.7	218.2	+39	48
Spain	47.6	46.1	46.5	44.8	47.4	52.4	60.5	63.9	177.1	+177	329
Italy	64.2	48.7	47.4	52.5	59.1	61.3	64.7	73.9	173.7	+135	47
United Kingdom	37.2	40.4	43.5	50.9	54.3	57.2	59.6	60.8	132.5	+118	166
Czech Republic	17.1	17.8	18.6	17.2	19.1	22.7	24.2	30.6	101.5	+232	155
Poland	16.0	16.0	14.4	14.5	17.9	17.8	20.6	26.7	93.6	+250	124
Sweden	24.4	26.1	29.4	33.0	37.4	39.1	44.0	53.8	85.5	+59	117
Luxembourg	24.3	19.7	20.5	21.8	21.7	26.6	32.7	36.5	52.9	+45	10
Portugal	13.3	11.4	10.7	12.8	15.4	18.1	22.6	29.0	50.5	+74	102
Denmark	11.0	11.0	10.8	10.9	13.4	15.7	15.6	20.3	46.3	+128	75
Norway	30.5	16.2	18.8	21.3	25.0	23.8	22.9	26.6	38.2	+44	161
Finland	22.2	22.5	19.9	6.6	18.6	21.0	22.3	19.6	35.5	+81	150
Slovak Republic	6.9	6.6	7.0	7.6	8.1	9.7	13.6	14.0	33.2	+137	107
Hungary	9.9	9.9	8.9	9.0	9.7	11.3	12.8	17.1	20.8	+22	244
Greece	7.8	6.8	4.8	4.7	5.7	6.4	8.1	11.2	17.4	+55	..
Slovenia	2.7	3.3	4.5	6.6	5.7	5.1	6.2	9.2	17.2	+88	54
Ireland	6.1	4.7	5.6	4.0	4.0	5.8	6.2	7.8	17.2	+120	228
Lithuania	2.2	3.5	2.3	1.9	2.4	2.0	2.3	3.0	10.1	+233	..
Latvia	1.8	1.5	1.2	1.5	1.4	1.1	1.4	2.2	5.2	+135	254
Estonia	1.9	2.3	3.0	3.0	2.3	3.7	3.0	3.2	5.0	+58	229
Iceland	0.6	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.6	1.4	1.7	1.0	2.1	+118	248

Note: The receiving country is unknown for 29% of the 4.6 million postings in 2019: when the posted workers is active in two or more member states and for postings originating from Norway and from part of Austria. In addition, in previous years, the receiving country is unknown for postings originating from Denmark, Finland, Switzerland and the United Kingdom; therefore, comparability over time is limited. Data for Greece refers to the year 2018.

Source: De Wispelaere, De Smedt and Pacolet – HIVA-KU Leuven (2020).

StatLink  <https://stat.link/mazue7>

Switzerland and Austria also saw a sharp increase in the numbers registered, albeit at levels far lower than Germany: +152% (72 000 postings), +88% (1900 postings) and +79% (198 000 postings), respectively. Only Ireland and the Slovak Republic saw a small drop in the number of postings from their labour markets in 2019.

Almost half of the EU/EFTA OECD countries saw the number of Article 12 postings in their territories double in 2019 (Table 1.2). Overall, the increase was 79%, compared with 5% in the previous year. Germany is still the top destination country for this category of posted workers, but the increase has not been as great as in other countries. The main posting corridors under Article 12 seen in 2019 were between Germany and Austria (262 000 postings), Germany and France (214 000 postings) and Germany and Switzerland (181 000 postings).

Interruption in the growth in the number of international students in 2020

After increasing by nearly 50% on average in the OECD countries over one decade, the number of new permits issued to international students dropped markedly in 2020. The number of first permits fell by nearly 70% in the United States and Canada and 51% in Mexico (Table 1.3). In the European countries for which data are available, the reduction was, on the other hand, close to 40% (excluding internal movements within the EU), with the exception of France, where inflows fell by 19%, and Switzerland, where the inflows were stable. In Australia, the reduction was limited to 29%, as the academic year began in February, before the start of the pandemic. The number of international students present in OECD countries, which was more than 4 million in 2019, is likely to be down in 2020.

The most attractive countries for students are still the United States, which, in 2019, hosted nearly 1 million international students in its higher education institutions, and Australia and the United Kingdom, with approximately half a million each (Table 1.3). In 2020, on the other hand, inflows of new students in the United Kingdom were double those in the United States.

Germany, which saw a rapid increase in student flows in the past decade, now has one-third of a million international students, more than Canada – where inflows have, however, also grown – and France. Japan is the seventh biggest host country for international students.

On average in the OECD, international students accounted for 6% of tertiary students in 2019. The concentration of international students increases with level of study in all countries, with the exception of Australia, where international students account for 56% of Master-level students and 36% of doctoral-level students (Table 1.3). In Luxembourg, Switzerland and New Zealand, the majority of doctoral students are international students, compared with an average of 22% for the OECD.

In 2019, 60% of the 3.7 million holders of study permits in OECD countries came from Asia, particularly China (25%), India (9%) and Vietnam (3%) (Figure 1.6). In the European countries of the OECD, the share of European students among international students (45%) exceeds that of Asian students (29%). The most heavily represented nationalities are German (53 000 students), Chinese (52 000 students) and Ukrainian (40 000 students). France is the only OECD country where more than half of international students are from Africa.

Of the top 20 countries of origin of students registered in an OECD country in 2019, the nationalities that have increased the most since 2013 are Syrian (tenfold increase in numbers and the 20th nationality in 2019), Nepali (tripled, now the 6th nationality), Vietnamese (doubled, 3rd nationality), Indian (doubled, 2nd nationality) and Ukrainian (doubled, 12th nationality).

Table 1.3. International students enrolled in OECD countries, 2020


	Newly enrolled		Stocks					
	First permits issued in 2020 (thousands)	2019/20 change (%)	2019 (thousands)	Share of all students in 2019 (%)			First region of origin in 2019	Top three countries of origin in 2019
				Total tertiary education	Master level	Doctoral level		
Australia	122.6	-29	509	28	56	36	Asia	China, India, Nepal
Austria	2.2	-39	75	18	23	36	Europe	Germany, Italy, Bosnia and Herzegovina
Belgium	52	10	19	23	Europe	France, the Netherlands, Luxembourg
Canada	50.9	-70	279	16	19	34	Asia	China, India, France
Chile	10	1	3	18	LAC	Peru, Colombia, Venezuela
Colombia	5	0	1	3	LAC	Venezuela, Ecuador, Mexico
Costa Rica	2
Czech Republic	46	14	17	20	Europe	Slovak Republic, Russia, Ukraine
Denmark	5.0	-41	32	10	20	37	Europe	Germany, Norway, Romania
Estonia	5	11	16	22	Europe	Finland, Russia, Ukraine
Finland	3.2	-39	24	8	11	24	Asia	Viet Nam, Russia, China
France	70.1	-19	246	9	13	38	Africa	Morocco, Algeria, China
Germany	333	10	16	12	Asia	China, India, Austria
Greece	28	3	2	4	Asia	Cyprus, Albania, Germany
Hungary	35	13	20	23	Europe	Germany, China, Romania
Iceland	2	8	11	38	Europe	United States, Philippines, Germany
Ireland	25	11	23	33	Asia	India, China, United States
Israel	11	3	5	8	Europe	United States, Russia, France
Italy	55	3	4	16	Asia	China, India, Iran
Japan	49.7	-59	203	5	10	20	Asia	China, Viet Nam, Nepal
Korea	28.2	-20	99	3	10	14	Asia	China, Viet Nam, Uzbekistan
Latvia	8	6	12	10	Asia	India, Uzbekistan, Germany
Lithuania	7	10	23	11	Europe	India, Belarus, Ukraine
Luxembourg	0.2	..	3	44	82	93	Europe	France, Germany, Belgium
Mexico	2.8	-51	33	1	2	8	N. America	..
Netherlands	11.8	-42	108	..	19	..	Europe	Germany, Italy, China
New Zealand	6.0	-75	53	21	36	50	Asia	China, India, United States
Norway	2.0	-48	12	4	7	22	Europe	China, Sweden, Nepal
Poland	55	4	5	3	Europe	Ukraine, Belarus, India
Portugal	36	10	12	31	LAC	Brazil, Cabo Verde, Angola
Slovak Republic	13	9	11	10	Europe	Czech Republic, Ukraine, Serbia
Slovenia	5	7	8	19	Europe	..
Spain	77	4	11	18	LAC	France, Ecuador, Colombia
Sweden	31	7	12	35	Europe	China, India, Finland
Switzerland	11.4	0	56	18	29	56	Europe	Germany, France, Italy
Turkey	155	2	6	6	Asia	Syria, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan
United Kingdom	224.4	-40	489	19	36	41	Asia	China, India, United States
United States	111.4	-69	977	5	13	25	Asia	China, India, Korea
OECD Europe total	1 159	7	12	19	Europe	China, Germany, Ukraine
OECD total	4 050	6	14	22	Asia	China, India, Viet Nam

Note: Newly enrolled students: data refers to permits delivered to international tertiary-level students, including students enrolled in language courses. Students benefitting from free mobility (intra-EU and Australia-New-Zealand movements) are not included. Stocks of international students: Data for Colombia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Korea, the Slovak Republic and Turkey refer to foreign students instead of international students; excludes Erasmus students in European countries.

Source: Newly enrolled students: OECD International Migration Database, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00342-en>; Stocks of international students: *OECD Education at a Glance Database*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/edu-data-en>.

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Figure 1.6. Twenty main nationalities of international students enrolled in OECD countries, 2013 and 2019



Note: Statistics refer to stocks of international students and exclude Erasmus students in European countries.


Source: OECD Education at a Glance Database, <https://doi.org/10.1787/edu-data-en>.

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Asylum seeking registered a sharp drop with COVID-19

The COVID-crisis initially led to a sharp drop in asylum seeking. Indeed, the number of new asylum applications in OECD countries fell by 31% in 2020 and amounted to 830 000 (Figure 1.7). This is the sharpest drop since the end of the Balkan crisis in the early 1990s. However, the overall number remained above any year preceding 2014 except 1992. Preliminary data for the first months of 2021 for EU countries indicate that the level remains below the years preceding the pandemic (Box 1.1).

Figure 1.7. New asylum applications since 1980 in the OECD and the European Union



Note: (*) includes the United Kingdom.

Source: OECD Secretariat calculations based on data from UNHCR and Eurostat.

StatLink <https://stat.link/2r0ix5>


Box 1.1. Impact of the COVID-19 crisis on asylum applications in the EU

Over the course of 2018 and 2019, the number of first-time applicants in EU27 countries rose gradually from 45 000 per month to 55 000 per month. In 2020, from over 60 000 in January, it went down to a low in April during which only 8 000 requests were made, mostly in Germany (5 600), and in Sweden (850). The level remained extremely low in May and rebounded in June (28 400 requests) and July (37 600), after most strict lockdowns were lifted. However, since then, the number of new asylum seekers has remained significantly below the pre-COVID-19 level. At the end of April 2021, the monthly figure had still not reached the threshold of 40 000 applications in the EU.

Figure 1.8. Monthly asylum applications in the European Union, 2018-21



Source: Eurostat.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/59o18i>

The broad picture in terms of composition by origin countries of asylum seekers remained largely unchanged with the COVID-19 crisis (Table 1.4), suggesting that this crisis affected movements regardless of origin. In fact, the composition changed more between 2018 and 2019 than between 2019 and 2020. In 2020 as in 2019, Venezuela and Afghanistan continued to take the top spots in terms of origin and requests decreased for all countries of origin.

However, three countries witnessed a more moderate decline in 2020. Syria (-13%) is now third (previously fourth), Colombia (-12%) moved up from ninth to sixth position, and Cuba (-11%) has joined the top 10. It is worth noting that the number of applications by Colombians in Spain remained stable in 2020 and that requests by Cuban citizens in the United States increased in 2020 over 2019.

Among the ten main countries of origin in 2019, Nicaragua and Iran also registered sharp declines (-61% and -53%, respectively). Outside of the top 10, Haiti was the main country registering an increase in applications to OECD countries.

Table 1.4. Top 10 origin countries of asylum applicants in OECD countries, 2018-20

2018		2019		2020	
Afghanistan	95 689	Venezuela	93 305	Venezuela	70 928
Syria	82 681	Afghanistan	90 146	Afghanistan	66 031
Venezuela	65 201	Honduras	77 773	Syria	62 509
Iraq	59 449	Syria	71 611	Honduras	52 497
El Salvador	45 874	Guatemala	56 069	Guatemala	40 072
Honduras	41 336	El Salvador	53 566	Colombia	36 120
Nigeria	37 093	Iraq	46 980	El Salvador	32 986
Guatemala	34 835	Nicaragua	46 368	Iraq	24 952
Iran	33 508	Colombia	40 899	Cuba	19 677
Pakistan	30 559	Iran	30 587	Pakistan	18 467

Source: OECD Secretariat calculations based on data from UNHCR and Eurostat.

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Since 2017, the United States has been the OECD country receiving the largest number of asylum seekers. In 2020, more than 250 000 requests were made to the US authorities, down only 17% from 300 000 in 2019 (Annex Table 1.A.5). Over three-quarters of these requests were made by citizens of Latin American and Caribbean countries, in particular Guatemala (36 000), Honduras (31 000), Venezuela and El Salvador (23 000 each).

With 103 000 asylum seekers, Germany was the only other OECD country that received more than 100 000 requests in 2020. Asylum requests from Syrian citizens in Germany fell only slightly (-7%) and those from Afghanistan even increased by 4%. Spain was, for the first time on record, among the top three OECD destination countries, with more than 86 000 asylum seekers. Almost nine out of ten asylum seekers in Spain originate from Latin America and the Caribbean, mainly Venezuela and Colombia. In terms of numbers of asylum requests, France closely followed with 82 000. In France, requests from Albanian and Georgian citizens made up a quarter of those registered in 2019. At the same time, the number of asylum seekers from Afghanistan was stable (+2%). The other OECD countries with more than 20 000 asylum requests registered in 2020 were Mexico (41 200), Greece (37 900), the United Kingdom (36 000), Turkey (31 300), Italy (21 200) and Costa Rica (21 100). Among major recipient countries in 2019, Japan (-62%) and Korea (-57%) registered the strongest declines in 2020.

Overall, since 2008, only one-third of asylum seekers in the EU were women. The figure peaked at 38% in 2019 and declined slightly in 2020 to 36%. Elsewhere, the share of women tends to be higher; women comprise 46% of asylum seekers in Turkey and 41% in Mexico.

Only four OECD countries received more asylum seekers in 2020 than in 2019. The most prominent one is Austria (+20%), where the number of Syrian asylum seekers almost doubled. Colombia also registered an increase (+12%), driven by larger numbers of Venezuelans seeking asylum. Increases were also observed in Chile and the Slovak Republic, albeit with very low absolute numbers.

Nordic countries have long been top host countries of asylum seekers. However, in 2020, these countries received significantly fewer new asylum applications than in previous years. In fact, the year 2020 marks the lowest point in about 15 years for Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Norway. Sweden nevertheless received a significant number of asylum seekers in 2020, both in absolute and relative terms (1 350 per million inhabitants). The ratios recorded by Denmark (260), Finland and Norway (both at 250) are now well below the OECD average.


Relative to their total population, OECD countries altogether received 623 asylum seekers per million inhabitants in 2020 (Annex Table 1.A.5). With more than 4 000 new requests per million inhabitants, Costa Rica registered – as in 2019 – the highest ratio in 2020. Greece followed closely with 3 630, above Luxembourg (2 080), Spain (1 850), Slovenia (1 670) and Austria (1 440). Among the most important destination countries, some continued to register relatively high ratios, such as France (1 250), Germany (1 220) and the United States (750), while the United Kingdom (530), Canada (500) and Italy (350) stood below the OECD average. Ten OECD countries received fewer than 100 asylum seekers per million inhabitants. Apart from Slovenia, all Central and Eastern European countries are in this group, as well as New Zealand, Portugal, Chile and Japan.

The number of grants of international protection also fell sharply in 2020 (Table 1.5). However, at 18% over 2019, the decline was much more modest than for asylum. The decline was stronger outside of Europe, especially in Australia, Canada and the United States. The latter two countries accounted for more than half of the total decline in the OECD. At the same time, some countries saw a significant increase, especially Greece, Mexico and Spain. Indeed, for these three countries, the number of persons granted protection in 2020 was the highest ever recorded.

Between 2010 and 2019, resettlement programmes have allowed more than 1 million people in need of international protection to be transferred to an OECD country. The impact of the COVID-19 crisis on these programmes has been significant. Figure 1.9 shows that in 2020 only 34 400 refugees were resettled, two-thirds less than in 2019, and the lowest number on record.

The United States, by far the main country of resettlement, admitted only 9 600 refugees, a decline by almost two-thirds compared with 2019. Canada was second to the United States in 2020 with 9 200 resettlements (-69%). Despite a large drop (-80%), Australia remained the third destination with 3 700 arrivals, just above Sweden (3 200 resettled refugees, -39%). Among the countries with more than 1 000 resettled refugees in 2019, only Sweden and Norway managed to realise at least half of the resettlements achieved in 2019. The largest drops in relative terms were registered in the United Kingdom (-85%), Australia (-80%), and the Netherlands and France (both -78%).

Figure 1.9. Refugees admitted under resettlement programmes, 1981-2020




Note: Some data presented may differ from statistics published previously due to retroactive changes or the inclusion of previously unavailable data. More information about UNHCR's resettlement programme can be found at <http://www.unhcr.org/resettlement.html>.

Source: UNHCR.

Table 1.5. Positive decisions on applications for international protection and resettlements, 2011-20

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2019/20 change (%)
Australia	13 976	13 759	20 019	13 768	13 756	17 555	21 968	16 250	18 762	13 171	-30
Austria	5 870	6 000	6 345	10 425	18 510	31 950	29 510	20 700	13 730	12 985	-5
Belgium	5 575	5 880	6 810	8 560	11 175	15 850	14 205	11 130	7 180	6 205	-14
Canada	27 880	23 098	24 139	24 068	32 111	58 914	41 477	45 493	48 533	25 485	-47
Czech Republic	705	225	365	410	480	445	145	165	155	115	-26
Denmark	2 210	2 590	3 935	6 140	10 730	7 715	2 755	1 650	1 785	600	-66
Estonia	10	10	10	20	80	140	115	50	50	30	-40
Finland	1 925	2 600	2 550	2 585	2 815	8 320	5 475	4 565	3 770	2 705	-28
France	10 870	14 425	16 245	21 090	26 635	35 770	43 190	47 005	47 720	30 725	-36
Germany	13 190	22 470	26 360	47 835	148 730	446 455	328 400	142 760	121 120	99 720	-18
Greece	590	625	1 410	3 850	5 875	8 545	12 015	15 805	18 595	35 775	+92
Hungary	205	460	420	560	470	435	1 290	365	60	130	+117
Iceland	10	20	15	45	100	170	220	245	455	580	+27
Ireland	195	195	290	590	730	1 145	1 115	1 615	2 335	1 725	-26
Italy	7 480	22 820	14 465	20 625	29 730	41 220	36 645	49 065	32 365	21 625	-33
Japan	287	130	175	144	125	143	94	104	101
Korea	38	60	36	633	234	320	409	632
Latvia	30	30	35	25	30	155	310	30	55	25	-55
Lithuania	25	60	60	75	90	220	350	160	90	85	-6
Luxembourg	85	45	140	160	255	820	1 310	1 015	705	765	+9
Mexico	262	389	198	348	615	1 760	3 335	5 756	7 903	18 122	+129
Netherlands	8 925	6 820	7 355	14 040	17 495	22 520	11 355	6 020	7 720	10 125	+31
New Zealand	2 741	3 032	3 385	3 551	3 784	4 021	4 149	4 191	3 615	2 316	-36
Norway	5 995	7 355	7 730	7 155	9 525	16 485	8 085	4 220	4 800	2 840	-41
Poland	575	590	735	740	695	380	560	435	275	365	+33
Portugal	95	115	135	125	235	330	670	660	545	95	-83
Slovak Republic	120	200	75	175	80	215	60	50	40	45	+13
Slovenia	20	35	35	45	50	175	150	135	100	90	-10
Spain	1 010	645	555	1 725	1 030	7 250	5 610	3 795	38 525	51 190	+33
Sweden	12 250	16 975	28 220	35 080	36 470	71 940	34 770	24 635	16 840	10 815	-36
Switzerland	6 800	4 580	6 605	15 575	14 745	13 955	15 455	16 630	12 055	11 120	-8
United Kingdom	14 950	15 810	14 470	14 970	20 515	22 260	21 865	24 960	31 525
United States	168 460	150 614	119 630	134 242	151 995	157 425	146 003	185 909	107 057	63 888	-40
All countries	298 084	306 662	298 271	373 632	539 021	972 280	770 697	610 504	516 940	423 462	-18
All European countries	84 440	115 580	130 689	196 878	336 401	732 142	553 262	352 169	330 969	300 480	-9

Source: Eurostat, OECD International Migration Database, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00342-en>.


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Chinese and Indians have continued to be the largest groups of new immigrants to OECD countries


Data for 2020 are unfortunately not yet available, but pre-pandemic trends show interesting evolutions of the composition of migration to OECD countries by nationality. China reinforced its position as main nationality of origin of new migrants to OECD countries in 2019 (Figure 1.10). 465 000 Chinese migrants (+35 000 compared to 2018) arrived in OECD countries in 2019, which represents almost 7% of total

inflows. This increase is driven by significant growth in the number of Chinese migrants received by Japan and the United Kingdom just before the COVID-19 pandemic. In other main countries of destination, the numbers of new inflows remained stable, notably in Australia and Canada, or even fell slightly, as in the United States.

Figure 1.10. Top 20 nationalities of origin of new immigrants to the OECD, 2018-19



Source: OECD International Migration Database, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00342-en>.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/dbjo59>

Migration flows of Indians to OECD countries continued to increase in 2019 (+53 000) and amounted to nearly 400 000 persons. In particular, the number of new Indian migrants increased sharply in the United Kingdom (+30 000), in Canada (+15 000), and to a lesser extent in Germany (+5 000).

Romanians remained the third origin group in 2019 with generally stable migration flows to the main OECD countries of destination, that is Germany (110 000 new migrants) and Italy (39 000). Changes were observed in smaller destination countries like Switzerland (+86% to 4 500) and the Netherlands (+26% to 12 000). Overall, the 290 000 Romanian migrants accounted for 4% of total flows to OECD countries in 2019.

Ukrainians rose to fourth place, as 230 000 Ukrainians immigrated to OECD countries in 2019 (+21% compared to 2018), most of them to Poland (110 000), the Czech Republic (22 000) and Hungary (21 000). Venezuelan and Vietnamese migrants follow closely with respectively 227 000 and 225 000 departures to OECD countries, which corresponds to double-digit increases of emigration flows to OECD countries.

Lawful migration flows of Mexicans to the United States, which account for almost 90% of overall OECD immigration of Mexicans, declined for the third consecutive year and stood at 156 000. Migration of Filipinos to OECD countries increased only slightly (+2%), but Filipinos moved up three places in the ranking of the most important origin nationalities due to the drop in emigration of Italian (-5%), Polish (-8%) and Iraqi nationals (-28%).

Other significant trends in 2019 include the continued rise of migration flows of Brazilians, Moroccans, and Colombians, and the continued decrease of inflows of Syrians.


Most of the countries with high expatriation rates of their citizens to OECD countries are in South Eastern Europe (Annex Table 1.A.6). Albania (18 departures for 1 000 inhabitants), Romania (15), Bulgaria (13), Bosnia and Herzegovina (12), Croatia (11) and North Macedonia (11), all registered ratios above 10. Among countries with a population over 20 million, the highest ratios are observed for Venezuela (8), Ukraine (5) and Morocco (4).

Size and composition of foreign-born populations in OECD countries

The share of foreign-born continued to grow virtually everywhere

The total foreign-born population living in OECD countries rose to 136 million in 2020 (Figure 1.11). On average, this represents an increase of 2.5% per year since 2000. Of these 136 million foreign-born, a third live in the United States, and almost 50% live in a European OECD country. The growth rate has fluctuated over the past two decades. Between 2000 and 2005, the foreign-born population grew by around 4% annually, before slowing down to 3% between 2005 and 2010 and to around 2% per year between 2010 and 2015 in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. The growth rate has, however, rebounded in European OECD countries due to the increase of migrants arriving in the region in 2014-15. Since 2015, the foreign-born population in this region has grown by 3% per year. This corresponds to an increase of around 15% in the foreign-born population in 2020 compared with 2015.

Figure 1.11. Foreign-born population in the OECD area and Europe, 2000-2020



Note: Estimated 2020 data for Canada, Chile, Colombia, the Czech Republic, France, Greece, Ireland, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom and the United States. Data for the United States include an undetermined share of undocumented migrants. (*) includes the United Kingdom.

Source: OECD International Migration Database, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00342-en>; Eurostat; UNDESA.

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
Over the last decade, the foreign-born population has increased in most OECD countries. On average, the foreign-born population accounted for 14% of the population in the OECD area in 2020, up from 11.9% in 2010. With the exception of the Baltic States and Israel, all countries contributed to this growth, and five countries saw the share of their foreign-born population grow by more than 5 percentage points over the period. The highest growth was recorded in Luxembourg (up by 9 percentage points), Iceland (8 points) and Sweden (6 points). For Iceland, this meant that the foreign-born population almost doubled between 2010 and 2020.

Countries with historically small shares of foreign-born also experienced a growth in their foreign-born population. Indeed, relative to the initial foreign-born population, the growth tends to be much larger in these countries. For example, Chile saw its foreign-born population increase by four times between 2010 and 2019 (from 2% to 8% of the population). In Hungary, the share rose by 50% from 2010 to 2020 (from

4% to 6% of the population). Similar increases in relative terms were also observed in other Central and Eastern European countries.

As in previous years, the proportion of foreign-born is highest in Luxembourg (48% of the total population), followed by Australia and Switzerland (both 30%), and New Zealand (27%).

Figure 1.12. The foreign-born as a percentage of the total population in OECD countries, 2010 and 2020



Note: Data refer to 2010 or the closest available year, and to 2020 or the most recent available year. The OECD average is a simple average based on countries presented. For Japan and Korea, the data refer to the foreign population rather than the foreign-born population.


Source: OECD International Migration Database, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00342-en>; Eurostat; UNDESA.

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The gender composition of migrant inflows to OECD countries is divergent, although men continue to comprise the majority

Men have traditionally outnumbered women in migration flows and this continues to be the case even if the situation varies across OECD countries. In 2019, men represented on average more than 56% of new migrants to the OECD area (see Figure 1.13). The share was the same as the year before but slightly higher than what was registered over the period 2013-18 (+1.5 percentage points). Central and Eastern European countries, which already had a disproportionately high share of men among migrant inflows, saw the share of men rising further. At the same time, in 2019, the share of migrant women was higher than ever before in both Australia and the United States (both 54%). The share of women was also higher than before in the United Kingdom (52%).

Differences in the share of women in migration flows over time and across countries can partly be explained by the different categories of entry characterising the respective flows. Migration to the United States, for example, consists largely of family migration – a category among which women are overrepresented. About 60% of all family migrants to the OECD are women.

Figure 1.13. Share of men in overall migration flows to OECD countries, 2013-19

Note: The OECD average is the average of the countries featured in the figure above. For Chile, data refer to 2016 instead of 2019, for France to 2017 instead of 2019.

Source: OECD International Migration Database, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00342-en>.


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For many years, men had represented the large majority of new migrants to Italy. However, the share of men has been falling since 2017. In 2019, one in two migrants was female. The proportion of women has also increased in Poland and the Slovak Republic – countries which saw an increase of 3 percentage points from the 2013-18 average. Despite the increase in Poland, the share of women remains low (42%), reflecting the predominance of labour migration in sectors where men are largely overrepresented.

In 2019, the highest share of men was observed in Lithuania, where men constituted 90% of all new migrants. In many other Central and Eastern European countries, the proportion of men among new migrants exceeded 60%. This is the case of Slovenia and Latvia, where men's share was particularly high (74% and 76%, respectively), as well as in Hungary, the Czech Republic, Estonia and Germany. Apart from Germany, these are all countries which have not been longstanding countries of immigration. The high share of men among new migrants in Germany is linked with the fact that migrant flow statistics in Germany include many short-term movements, among whom men are overrepresented.

Overall, only six OECD countries received more migrant women than men: the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, Israel, Italy and Canada. Apart from Italy, the gender balance has been relatively stable in these countries for many years, again reflecting the importance of family migration to these countries (both accompanying family and family reunification).

Family migrants also tend to stay longer, which partly also explains why the share of women among the total immigrant population is higher in most countries than among the inflow of migrants; women also tend to live longer (Figure 1.14). Indeed, whereas men account for the bulk of new immigrants in the majority of OECD countries, the majority of resident immigrants in most OECD countries are women. Across countries, there is also much less disparity with respect to the gender composition among resident immigrants than among new migrants. With respect to resident migrants, all countries are in a relatively narrow range of 40%-60% for each gender.

Figure 1.14. Share of men in overall migration flows and stocks in selected OECD countries, 2020

Note: 2019 for flow data, 2020 or most recent available year for stock data.

Source: OECD International Migration Database, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00342-en>.

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
Acquisitions of citizenship in OECD countries saw a record high in 2019, but dropped in 2020

The annual global figure for acquisitions of citizenship has fluctuated around 2 million (Figure 1.15). In 2019, 2.2 million people became a citizen of an OECD country; this is more people than ever, representing a 12% increase compared to 2018. European OECD countries granted 42% of this total (918 000) and the United States 38% (843 000).

In 2019, the largest absolute increase in acquisition of citizenship was registered in the United States (+81 600 to 843 000). Among these newly naturalised Americans, 14% came from Mexico, followed by India, the Philippines and China. Canadian nationality was also granted in high numbers in 2019, with grants rising to 250 000 (+42%). The main countries of former nationality were the Philippines, India and Iran.


Increases in acquisitions of citizenship were also noticeable in Poland and Australia. In Poland, the number increased rapidly from 4 600 in 2018 to 12 900 in 2019. The majority were Ukrainian citizens. Acquisitions of Australian citizenship went up by 58% in 2019 to 127 700. Recent data shows that the highest level ever was reached in 2020 when 205 000 people became Australian (up by 60% from 2019). Of the new Australian citizens in 2019, 14% were born in the Philippines, 13% in India, and 5% each in Iran and China.

Figure 1.15. Acquisitions of citizenships in OECD countries, 2000-20




Note: The estimation for 2020 is based on preliminary data for 17 OECD countries accounting for 76% of the 2019 total.

Source: OECD International Migration Database, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00342-en>.

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Other notable increases occurred in Norway (+27%) and the Netherlands (+22%). In Norway, more than one in five new citizens were Somali citizens. Conversely, Chile and Greece registered the largest relative declines in 2019 (down by 80% and 41%, respectively). Over the past two decades, the granting of Danish citizenship has steadily declined in association with a tightening of access to citizenship. It fell to its lowest level on record in 2019.

Figure 1.16. Acquisitions of citizenship as a percentage of foreign population, 2018-19



Note: The OECD average is the average of the countries featured in the figure above.

Source: OECD International Migration Database, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00342-en>.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/3sv1lr>

Looking at acquisitions of citizenship as a percentage of the foreign population, Canada is the leading OECD country with more than 10% of its foreign residents being granted Canadian citizenship in 2019 (Figure 1.16). Sweden, ranked second in 2019 with 7.2%. With 5.4% of the foreign population acquiring citizenship during the year, Poland climbed from 14th to third place. At 5%, Portugal came in fourth, followed by Luxembourg at 4%.

For those countries for which 2020 data are already available, the numbers of acquisitions have decreased by 17% compared to 2019. This is, however, largely due to the major drop in absolute numbers in the United States, where naturalisations fell by 327 000 to reach their lowest level since 2003 at 520 000. Part of the decline seems due to delays in the administration of naturalisations due to COVID-19 – related office closures that led naturalisation interviews to be postponed. The numbers have also fallen in other longstanding migration destinations such as in Germany, France and the United Kingdom.


On the other hand, the acquisition of citizenship has risen by more than 25% in a third of the countries for which 2020 data are available, including Australia, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain and Sweden.

India was the main country of origin of naturalised OECD citizens in 2019, with about 156 000 cases. Four out of ten became US citizens, and around 20% became Canadian citizens and a further 20% British citizens.

The number of Mexican citizens who acquired the nationality of an OECD country has increased sharply from 71 000 in 2010 to reach 129 000 in 2019 (+ 81%). The overwhelming majority (95%) became US citizens. The Philippines, China and Morocco follow as the other main nationalities of origin (see Figure 1.17). These five countries were also among the top five origin countries in 2010. Slight changes have happened down the top 20 list since 2010. The number of naturalised Cubans has doubled since 2010, while the numbers have fallen for Turkish and Colombian nationals. In 2019, only 38 000 Turkish and 32 000 Colombian citizens naturalised (down by 35% and 37%, respectively, compared with 2010).

Following the large inflows of Syrians in light of the civil war in Syria and the following humanitarian migration around 2015, growing numbers are becoming eligible for citizenship of their OECD host countries. This has led to a sharp increase in the naturalisation of Syrian citizens. In 2019, around 41 000 Syrians became naturalised (one in two became Swedish citizens), compared with 6 200 in 2010.


Figure 1.17. Acquisitions of nationality in OECD countries: Top 20 countries of former nationality, 2019 and 2010



Source: OECD International Migration Database, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00342-en>.

In 2019, around 25 000 nationals of the United Kingdom obtained citizenship from an EU OECD country. That figure was the highest on record and 15 times higher than in 2015, the year before the Brexit vote (see Figure 1.18). The increasing trend accelerated between 2018 and 2019. For example, citizenship take-up more than doubled in Germany from 6 600 in 2018 to 14 600 in 2019. It also almost tripled in Sweden, to 5 000, and increased by more than 50% in Belgium, to more than 1 600. Finland and Austria, too, registered sharp increases, although at lower levels.

Figure 1.18. Naturalisation of UK citizens in EU and non-EU OECD countries, 2019 compared with 2015



Source: OECD International Migration Database, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00342-en>.



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Figure 1.19. Naturalisation of EU and non-EU citizens in the United Kingdom, 2019 compared with 2015



Source: OECD International Migration Database, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00342-en>.

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Concurrently, the number of EU citizens who have obtained British nationality has never been higher than in 2019 (48 500; Figure 1.19). This is four times higher than in 2015. For Italian and German citizens, the number of naturalisations was seven times higher in 2019 than in 2015; it was six times higher for Spanish and French citizens. Naturalisations of Polish and Romanian citizens also increased, but only by a factor of two and three, respectively – albeit from higher initial levels. The higher uptake among the former nationalities largely reflects their earlier period of immigration. While relative to the 2015 figures, the increase in UK citizenship take-up for EU nationals in 2019 was lower than the take-up of citizenship of an EU country in 2019 by UK nationals, it was higher in absolute terms.

Recent trends in labour market outcomes for immigrants in the OECD area

In 2020, the world had to deal with its most serious pandemic for a century. The public health measures taken by all OECD countries to limit the spread of COVID-19 produced a sharp contraction in economic activity (OECD, 2020^[1]), which affected the whole of the population, but in particular the most vulnerable groups, including migrants. For the latter, the economic crisis that began in 2020 put an end to a decade of progress on the labour market.

The long-term development of the situation of immigrants on the labour market


Labour market outcomes of migrants are more sensitive to cyclical variations than those of the native-born. In a period of expansion, the gap between the employment rate for migrants and the native-born tends to diminish. Conversely, during a period of economic contraction, migrants are often the first to lose their jobs and have more difficulty finding a new one.

Between 2000 and 2007-08, the migrant employment rate improved in all countries. In the EU27, for example, it increased from 57% in 2002 to 64% in 2008 (Figure 1.20), a level very close to that registered for the native-born (66%). The unemployment rate, which also dropped, nevertheless remained well above the native-born rate (12% compared with 7%, see Annex Figure 1.A.1).

Following the economic crisis of 2007-08, the employment situation deteriorated rapidly for both groups in most countries. The trend in the employment and unemployment rates was roughly of the same order for native-born people and migrants in the non-European countries and the United Kingdom. On the other hand, within the EU27, migrants suffered more from the economic crisis, because in general they are highly concentrated in industries that are most sensitive to business-cycle fluctuations (particularly construction and the manufacturing industry in 2007-08), more often under a fixed-term contract and with less job seniority (OECD, 2009^[2]). As a result, the gap between the employment rate for migrants and the native-born doubled between 2008 and 2012. Since then, it has remained at 4 to 5 percentage points, despite the upturn in employment from 2013 onwards.

From 2010-11 onwards, there was a steady improvement in employment in most of the OECD countries, together with a reduction in the gaps between migrants and the native-born. In Europe, the migrant employment rate touched 65% in 2019, a level unseen in decades. The same holds true for Australia, where the migrant employment rate reached 72% in 2019, and for Canada, where it was as high as 73%. In the United States, where, since 2004, the migrant employment rate has been higher than the rate for the native-born, the former returned to the record level of 2006 (72%). In the United Kingdom, the employment rate of both EU migrants (82%) and non-EU migrants (70%) reached their highest levels since the 2004 EU enlargement.

Figure 1.20. Employment rates by country of birth, 2002-2020



Note: Data for the United Kingdom refer to the first three-quarters for every year.

Source: European countries: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Australia, Canada: Labour Force Surveys; the United States: Current Population Surveys.

The economic crisis associated with the COVID-19 pandemic brought these trends to an abrupt halt. In the United States, the employment rate for migrants in 2020 is the lowest recorded since data on this indicator have been available (2002). In the EU, the migrant employment rate returned to the 2009 level, still higher than that of the early 2000s, when the immigrant population was characterised by a high level of inactivity among women. Only the United Kingdom bucks this trend, with an increase in employment rates in 2020 (based on provisional data),³ in essence due to selective departures (see below).

Immigrants' labour market outcomes worsened in most OECD countries in 2020

In 2020, labour market outcomes generally worsened in all OECD countries, both for the native-born and for migrants. However, the impact of the crisis differed widely from one country to another, depending on the success and extent of employment support mechanisms. On average, within the OECD area, the migrant employment rate fell from 69.2% to 67.34%, while their unemployment rate increased from 8.3% to 10% (Table 1.6). In the EU27, the migrant employment rate dropped from 65.2% to 63.1%, and their unemployment rate increased from 11.1% to 12.4%. On average in the OECD in 2020, the migrant employment rate was lower by 1.8 percentage points than the rate for the native-born, and the unemployment rate was 3.4 percentage points higher. The gap reached 5.2 percentage points and 6 percentage points, respectively, within the EU. However, these trends are less dramatic than those seen after the 2007-08 crisis, when, in 2009, the migrant employment rate dropped by 3 percentage points and the unemployment rate rose by 3 percentage points.

The migrant employment rate fell substantially in three out of five OECD countries, and the unemployment rate increased significantly for three out of four. The situation deteriorated most markedly in the Nordic countries (with the exception of Denmark and Finland), Southern Europe (apart from Greece), Hungary and the Slovak Republic, the Baltic countries and the OECD countries in the Americas (Table 1.6). In Mexico, Colombia, Costa Rica, the United States and Canada, where job retention schemes, if any, were modest (OECD, 2020^[3]), the migrant employment rate declined by 4.7 to 7.1 percentage points – figures notably higher than those for the native-born.

A clear increase in the gap in the unemployment rate according to place of birth may also be seen in Europe, particularly when migrants are heavily overrepresented in short-term contracts. This is the case, in particular, in Spain, where the migrant unemployment rate increased six times more than for the native-born. A similar situation is seen in Sweden, with an increase four times higher. The overexposure of migrants to cyclical variations in the labour market may be partly attributable to their concentration in specific sectors (Annex Table 1.A.6), in particular hospitality (hotels and restaurants), the sector most seriously affected by the economic crisis associated with the COVID-19 pandemic (Box 1.2).

Despite the COVID-19 pandemic, it should be noted that the migrant employment rate has not substantially changed in two out of five OECD countries (one-quarter of countries as regards the unemployment rate). In Poland and Greece, labour market indicators for migrants have actually improved. In Poland, however, the migrant employment rate increased even as total migrant employment fell by 15%, as a result of major outflows from the labour market or the country, or from a drop in temporary migration.

Table 1.6. Immigrants' labour market outcomes in OECD countries in 2020

	2020		Annual change		Gap with the native-born in 2020	
	Percentages		Percentage points		Percentage points	
	Unemployment rate	Employment rate	Unemployment rate	Employment rate	Unemployment rate	Employment rate
Australia	7.1	71.0	+1.6	-1.3	+0.7	-2.7
Austria	10.5	66.7	+2.2	-2.2	+6.6	-7.4
Belgium	10.7	57.8	+0.3	-0.9	+6.2	-8.6
Canada	10.8	68.5	+4.5	-4.7	+1.7	-2.1
Chile	7.5	76.9	-0.8	+16.7
Colombia	17.4	61.4	+2.6	-6.4	+1.2	+3.4
Costa Rica	20.5	60.2	+8.1	-7.1	+0.9	+6.0
Czech Republic	3.0	79.3	+0.1	+0.1	+0.4	+5.1
Denmark	8.6	66.7	+0.2	+1.0	+3.2	-8.8
Estonia	8.4	74.5	+2.2	-0.1	+1.6	+0.9
Finland	13.8	64.5	+1.8	+0.3	+6.3	-8.2
France	12.6	59.1	-0.5	+0.2	+5.2	-7.2
Germany	5.6	70.8	+3.0	-7.4
Greece	27.7	53.1	-0.9	-0.2	+12.2	-3.4
Hungary	5.6	74.3	+2.8	-3.1	+1.3	+4.8
Iceland	11.7	75.3	+7.0	-7.1	+6.9	-5.7
Ireland	7.2	68.6	+1.3	-2.9	+1.9	+1.2
Israel	4.2	78.3	+0.8	-0.8	-0.3	+14.2
Italy	12.5	58.4	-0.5	-3.0	+3.7	+0.4
Korea	7.4	66.3	+2.2	-1.8	+3.4	-0.2
Latvia	9.8	70.9	+2.8	+0.4	+1.5	-0.8
Lithuania	8.9	70.6	+3.3	-1.3	+0.1	-1.1
Luxembourg	8.2	71.0	+1.4	-1.0	+3.3	+8.5
Mexico	6.5	47.4	+1.1	-5.8	+1.9	-10.2
Netherlands	6.7	66.1	+0.7	-0.4	+3.3	-13.7
New Zealand	4.4	78.1	+0.8	+0.3	-0.5	+1.9
Norway	8.9	68.0	+1.4	-1.8	+5.5	-8.5
Poland	4.8	77.4	-0.9	+2.4	+1.6	+8.8
Portugal	8.9	74.2	+0.5	-2.1	+2.1	+5.8
Slovak Republic	6.2	71.2	..	-7.5	-0.6	+3.7
Slovenia	7.0	69.4	+1.1	+1.4	+2.2	-1.6
Spain	23.4	57.4	+4.5	-5.3	+9.7	-4.4
Sweden	19.0	63.5	+3.5	-2.3	+13.8	-15.9
Switzerland	7.5	77.0	+0.2	-0.1	+3.8	-4.4
Turkey	15.8	40.1	+1.2	-4.1	+2.5	-7.6
United Kingdom	5.0	75.5	+0.6	+1.0	+0.9	+0.9
United States	9.0	67.0	+5.9	-5.2	+1.0	+1.2
OECD average	10.0	67.3	+1.7	-1.9	+3.4	-1.8
OECD total	10.3	66.1	+3.4	-3.4	+2.6	+2.2
EU27	12.4	63.1	+1.3	-2.1	+6.0	-5.2

Note: Gap with the native-born refers to the difference between the corresponding rates of foreign-born and native-born. OECD total is a weighted average and OECD average a simple average. Data for the United Kingdom refers to the first three-quarters only of the periods of reference. Data for Germany refers to 2019 instead of 2020. Data for Chile refers to 2017. Data for Korea refer to the whole population aged 15-59 (for the native-born rates) and to the foreigners and the recently naturalised aged 15-59 (for the foreign-born rates). OECD average and OECD total exclude Chile and Germany (for which 2020 data are not available) and Costa Rica (that entered the OECD in 2021).

Source: European countries and Turkey: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Australia, Canada, Israel; New Zealand: Labour Force Surveys; Chile: *Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional (CASEN)*; Colombia: *Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares (GEIH)*; Costa Rica: *Encuesta Continua de Empleo (ECE)*; Korea: Foreign Labour Force Survey and National Labour Force Survey; Mexico: *Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo (ENOE)*; the United States: Current Population Surveys.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/bakvn6>

The situation is similar in the United Kingdom, where the migrant employment rate also increased by 1 percentage point in 2020 (Table 1.6), while migrant employment declined. In the United Kingdom, the increase in the employment rate is due, in particular, to an increase in departures by nationals of EU member countries against the background of an economic crisis and the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the EU. The employed population born in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe fell by 17% in 2020, compared with -4% for those born outside the EU. However, in the United Kingdom, the migrant unemployment rate was higher in 2020 than it was in 2019.

For other countries, such as France or Switzerland, on the other hand, stable labour market indicators reflect the absence of a major impact so far of the crisis on labour market integration of migrants. These two countries are among those that implemented the most far-reaching job retention schemes: at least 45% of employees were supported by these schemes during the pandemic (OECD, 2020^[3]). A similar situation may be seen in other contexts in the Czech Republic and Denmark.

In almost two out of five OECD countries, migrants are more likely to remain in employment than the native-born. This is particularly the case in countries where a large share of the flows is made up of labour migration from nearby countries and free movement, as in Central Europe (in particular Poland and the Czech Republic), Luxembourg and also Portugal, where the gap is greater than 5 percentage points in favour of migrants. This is also the case outside Europe, in Latin American countries and New Zealand.

Beyond the changes measured by the unemployment or employment rates, in highly unfavourable economic conditions and a difficult public health situation, some working age people may be discouraged or prevented from seeking employment and therefore be regarded as inactive. This “unemployment halo” effect (or involuntary inactivity) intensified during the lockdowns introduced to tackle the pandemic.

Along these lines, between 2019 and 2020, the participation rate fell significantly in half of all OECD countries. In one-third of these countries, most of the net job losses resulted in situations of inactivity and not of unemployment. This is the case, in particular, in the countries of Latin America, Southern Europe, Belgium and Ireland. This trend is especially marked in the case of immigrants in Italy, where there is a concurrent drop in the employment rate (-3 percentage points), the unemployment rate (-0.5 percentage points) and the participation rate (-3.9 percentage points).

By contrast, the sudden deterioration in the conditions on the labour market may prompt certain people who were previously unlikely to seek work to look for additional household income. This is why, during the economic crisis of 2007-08, an increase in the participation rate of immigrant women could be seen in several OECD countries (OECD, 2009^[2]). A similar trend seems to be emerging in several Nordic countries, some Baltic countries, the United Kingdom and Slovenia, where the participation rate for immigrant women increased from 1.8 to 3.5 percentage points in 2020, leading to an increase in both employment and unemployment.

Box 1.2. Job losses affected migrants more severely than the native-born in crisis-hit sectors but relatively less in growth sectors

There is a sectoral aspect to every economic crisis. For instance, the crisis of 2007-08, which had a serious impact on real estate, also hit the construction sector hard. The economic crisis associated with the COVID-19 pandemic is no exception, with a strong sectoral dimension. All activities related to tourism and hospitality were heavily affected, as were services regarded as non-essential.

In 2020, the sectors in which employment fell most sharply, irrespective of the country, were domestic services and hospitality, and also, to a lesser extent, administrative and support services (cleaning, security, etc.). It is precisely in these three sectors that migrants are most strongly concentrated (OECD, 2020^[4]). Relatively speaking, the economic crisis, on the other hand, spared other sectors, such as public administration, energy distribution and information and communication. Migrants are usually underrepresented in these sectors, with the exception of information and communication.

Aside from the composition effect, migrant employment may also be affected to a greater or lesser extent within each sector. Figure 1.21 shows that, in 2020, there were comparable trends in employment of migrant and native-born people in Europe in all sectors, but to varying degrees. In the sectors worst hit by the crisis, the fall in employment almost always affected migrants more severely than their native-born peers. In the EU27, the number of migrants employed in hospitality dropped by nearly 15% between 2019 and 2020, compared with 12.5% for the native-born. The drop in migrant employment was also twice that of native-born employment in construction. In this sector, migrants are more often employed as sub-contractors, who are the first to lose their jobs if the building site is temporarily or permanently shut down.

Conversely, in the sectors least affected by the crisis, migrants benefited more from the growth in employment than their native-born counterparts. This is the case in the sectors that, in the past few years, recruited heavily abroad. In the EU27, in scientific and technical activities (including research), for example, the growth in employment in 2020 was exclusively made up of migrants. Migrants also benefited more from growth in employment in the information and communication sector.

The situation is somewhat more mixed in the OECD countries outside the EU. In the United States, the fall in employment in domestic services was respectively -28% for migrants compared with -12% for the native-born. In the United Kingdom, there were two notable exceptions. In 2020, the finance sector saw a drop of 5% in its migrant staff, while the number of native-born workers increased by 4%. One explanation for this trend is the major role played by teleworking, including international telework, in this sector. Moreover, the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the EU may have led European migrant workers or those specialising in European finance to leave. Brexit and border closures may also have played a role in the fall in immigrant employment in transportation and storage (-12%), whereas there was an increase in this sector for the native-born.

Figure 1.21. Change in the population in employment by industry and country of birth, 2019-2020




Note: Data for the United Kingdom refer to the first three quarters for every year.

Source: European countries: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); the United States: Current Population Surveys.


Trends differ along sociodemographic lines

Figure 1.22 shows the changes in employment rates by gender, age, level of education and length of stay in the EU27, Australia, Canada and the United States. There is an apparent deterioration in the employment situation between 2019 and 2020 of all groups, but to different degrees.

Figure 1.22. Changes in employment rates by demographic group and country of birth, in selected OECD countries, 2020 compared to 2019



Note: The reference population is the working-age population (15-64). "Low-educated" refers to less than upper secondary attainment, "medium-educated" to upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary, "highly educated" to tertiary. "Recent migrants" refers to migrants who have been in the country for less than five years and "settled migrants" to migrants who have been in the country for five years or more.
 Source: European countries: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Australia, Canada: Labour Force Surveys; the United States: Current Population Surveys.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/o6var0>

Integration of immigrant women in the labour market

The lower employment rate observed in most OECD countries seems to have affected immigrant men and women in a relatively similar way, except in Canada, where the employment rate for immigrant women declined by more than half a percentage point more than for their male counterparts.

The structural difference in the male and female employment rates is much greater for migrants than for the native-born, with a gap of more than 10 percentage points in most OECD countries (Annex Figure 1.A.2). This is particularly so in the United States, where the employment rate for immigrant women is 22 percentage points lower than for their male counterparts (compared with 7 percentage points for the native-born). In Australia, although the gap in the male-female migrant employment rate has fallen to its lowest level for 20 years (14 percentage points), it is still almost three times higher than that of the native-born (a gap of 5 percentage points, halved in about 10 years). In the EU27, the male-female gap shrank to its lowest level for the native-born in 2020. It remains wide (9 percentage points), although not as wide as for migrants (16 percentage points). It should be noted that the COVID-19 pandemic did not disproportionately worsen the situation of immigrant women on the labour market.

Young migrants are often most exposed

In most of the OECD, migrants of all age groups suffered more from the deterioration in the employment situation than their native-born counterparts. Young people are often the first to be affected during a recession, not least because transitioning from the school system to employment becomes more difficult, but also because, at the start of their working life, they are more likely to be on a fixed-term contract. However, in Europe, the United States and Australia at least, the impact of the pandemic on the integration of young migrants into employment is dissimilar to that on prime-aged workers. In these countries, the labour market adjustment, however, partly occurred at the intensive (number of hours worked) rather than extensive (employment) margin: on average in the OECD, the number of hours worked by young people dropped by 26% in the second quarter of 2020, almost twice the decline of their prime-aged counterparts (OECD, 2021^[5]). As regards employment of young migrants, Canada stands out with a spectacular drop of nearly 8 percentage points in the employment rate, almost twice that for other workers. That said, there is no significant gap between young migrants and young native-born people.


For young people under 25 years old, the share of the population not in education, employment or training (NEET rate) is a useful additional indicator to assess the risk of exclusion from the labour market. In North America, the NEET rate for young migrants, which had been steadily declining since 2010, increased sharply following the deterioration in the employment situation between 2019 and 2020, rising from 13% to 18% in the United States and to 19% in Canada. These are the highest levels seen over the past 15 years (Figure 1.23).

By contrast, the NEET rate for young migrants in the EU27 (19%) and the United Kingdom (12%) increased only slightly, remaining well below its level at the start of the 2010 decade, when it rose as high as 23% in the EU and 15% in the United Kingdom. Although it is still high (+7 percentage points), the gap with young native-born people actually diminished slightly in 2020 in the EU27.

Unlike the countries of North America, where the increase in NEETs came primarily from job losses, in Europe young people were often able to benefit from job retention schemes (OECD, 2021^[6]). The increase in the NEET rate may also have been mitigated by a strong increase in enrolment for training or studies during the pandemic period.

Figure 1.23. NEET rates by place of birth in selected OECD countries, 2004-2020

Share of the population aged 15-24 that is not in employment, education or training



Note: Compulsory military service is excluded from the calculation. Data for EU27 exclude the United Kingdom, but also Cyprus and Malta for which data is not available for the whole period. Data for the United Kingdom for the year 2020 refers to the first three quarters only. FB: Foreign-born.

Source: European countries: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Canada: Labour Force surveys; the United States: Current Population Surveys.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/vbmf5>

A closer look at labour market outcomes between 2019 and 2020 also shows that older migrants (55-64) saw a deterioration in their situation as regards employment, but to a lesser extent than their younger counterparts (Figure 1.22). In this age group too, the fall in the employment rate was more marked for migrants than for the native-born, in particular in the United States and Australia.

Education provides only partial protection from the effects of the crisis

Labour market outcomes deteriorated across all levels of education, both for the foreign-born and for the native-born. The employment rate for medium-educated people, however, was the most severely affected. Overall, the employment rate declined less for tertiary graduates, the great majority of whom were able to continue with their employment by teleworking (Yasenov, 2020^[7]).

However, Figure 1.22 identifies disparities according to place of birth, irrespective of the level of education attained. In Canada, the decline in the employment rate proved slightly higher for migrants at all levels of education. The same findings apply, more markedly, within the EU. For instance, the employment rate for tertiary-educated migrants fell by 1.4 percentage points in 2020, whereas it remained more or less stable for native-born tertiary-educated. Conversely, in the United States, tertiary-educated migrants fared better on the labour market than their native-born counterparts (-3.1 percentage points compared with -3.6 percentage points).

Paradoxically, newcomers were less affected

Paradoxically, recent migrants (present in the host country for less than five years) suffered less from the deterioration in the employment situation than long-established migrants. Thus, within the EU27, the employment rate for these newcomers fell by 1 percentage point in 2020, while the rate for settled migrants decreased by 2.3 percentage points (Figure 1.22). The gap is of the same order of magnitude in the

United States, whereas in Canada, the decline in the employment rate for recent migrants (-1.3 percentage points) is one-quarter that of their counterparts who have been settled there for more than five years. The number of recent migrants in employment, on the other hand, dropped by nearly 10% in Europe in 2020, compared with -2% for settled migrants. These decreases were -36% compared with -5%, respectively, in the United States.

These trends should be interpreted cautiously, because they do not necessarily indicate greater resilience of new arrivals on the labour market but could, on the contrary, reflect higher, selective return rates in the event of job loss.

Labour market outcomes for migrants, highly variable according to region of origin, have, however, worsened for most

Labour market outcomes for migrants range widely depending on region of origin. There may be several reasons behind this. Characteristics of the migrant population vary depending on the region of origin: composition by gender, age, level of education and migratory categories is heterogeneous from one region to another (d'Aiglepiere et al., 2020^[8]). Further, geographical and sociocultural proximity and linguistic differences potentially have a major impact on migrant integration. According to the different indicators set out in Table 1.7, a large majority of migrants, irrespective of their regions of origin, saw their labour market outcomes worsen in 2020. However, the scale of the deterioration differs appreciably from one region to another.

Within the EU27, migrants from Latin America and the Caribbean and those from the Middle East saw a decline of at least 3 percentage points in their employment rates, largely as a result of an increase in unemployment, but also following a transition to inactivity. For nationals from the Middle East, whose employment rate was as low as 54% in 2020, efforts made in the past few years to facilitate the integration of recently arrived humanitarian migrants appear to have been hindered by pandemic-related difficulties.

Conversely, immigrants from North and sub-Saharan Africa have seen only a slight decline in employment, accompanied, moreover, by a reduction in the unemployment rate among immigrants from Africa. Most job losses in these groups have therefore led to people either leaving the labour market to become inactive, or returning to their country of origin.

However, along with immigrants from the Middle East, people originating from North Africa are still the group that has the greatest difficulty in accessing the labour market in the EU: just over half of them were in employment in 2020, compared with approximately two-thirds of immigrants as a whole. They are also more often inactive (38.1%) and more affected by unemployment (17.5%). In the United Kingdom, the migrant employment rate improved for most groups, except for Europeans (-0.7 percentage points) and for nationals of North Africa (-6 points). By contrast, the employment rate for South Americans and Asians increased by 4.8 and 3.6 percentage points, respectively. These contrasting trends are partly attributable to effects of the composition of the migrant population in the United Kingdom.

In the United States, migrants have seen their unemployment rate more than double over the 2019-20 period, irrespective of origin (Table 1.7). The unemployment rate for most migrants rose to a higher level than that of the native-born in the United States. The migrants who suffered most from the deterioration in the employment situation are those with the lowest education level on average, in particular people born in South America, the Caribbean and Africa. Migrants originating from Mexico lost 5.7 percentage points, falling to an employment rate of 65.3%. The drop was even more marked for migrants from Central America, South America and the Caribbean, and from Africa (-6.5 percentage points for the three groups). Only migrants originating from Canada and Europe, for whom the unemployment rate remained below 7.5% in 2020, held up relatively better. On average, Canadian immigrants in the United States even fare better than Canadians who stay in their own country.

Table 1.7. Employment, unemployment and participation rates by region of origin in selected OECD countries in 2019 and 2020

Percentages

	Region of birth	Employment rate		Unemployment rate		Participation rate	
		2019	2020	2019	2020	2019	2020
Australia	Other Oceania	76.9	75.5	5.9	6.8	81.7	80.9
	Europe	78.0	75.6	4.0	6.1	81.2	80.5
	North Africa and the Middle East	52.6	51.6	10.9	11.8	59.0	58.5
	Sub-Saharan Africa	76.2	78.8	6.1	5.8	81.1	83.6
	Asia	69.8	68.9	5.7	7.4	74.0	74.4
	Americas	80.0	76.8	4.5	7.5	83.8	83.0
	Foreign-born (total)	72.3	71.0	5.5	7.1	76.5	76.4
Native-born	75.7	73.7	5.2	6.4	79.9	78.8	
Canada	Sub-Saharan Africa	72.2	69.3	8.7	11.9	79.1	78.7
	North Africa	70.1	66.3	9.6	13.5	77.6	76.6
	Middle East	63.4	58.3	9.0	15.0	69.6	68.6
	Asia	73.3	67.4	5.9	11.0	77.9	75.7
	Europe	77.8	74.7	4.5	8.7	81.5	81.8
	Oceania	82.3	80.0	3.2	9.5	85.0	88.4
	Other North America	69.9	65.0	6.7	8.8	74.9	71.3
	Central and South America and Caribbean	74.7	71.5	6.6	10.1	80.0	79.5
	Foreign-born (total)	73.2	68.5	6.3	10.8	78.1	76.8
Native-born	74.9	70.6	5.5	9.2	79.3	77.7	
EU27	EU28 + EFTA	72.4	71.0	7.5	8.2	78.2	77.3
	Other European countries	66.0	63.6	9.2	10.1	72.6	70.8
	North Africa	50.5	50.0	19.6	19.3	62.8	61.9
	Sub-Saharan Africa	61.3	61.0	16.7	15.8	73.6	72.5
	Middle East	57.3	54.3	14.4	17.5	66.9	65.8
	North America	69.2	66.9	6.8	7.6	74.2	72.4
	Central and South America and Caribbean	65.9	60.8	15.1	19.4	77.6	75.4
	Asia	64.1	62.3	8.6	9.9	70.2	69.1
	Other regions	69.3	65.3	8.2	11.2	75.5	73.6
	Foreign-born (total)	65.2	63.1	11.1	12.4	73.3	72.1
	Native-born	68.8	68.3	6.2	6.4	73.4	73.0
United Kingdom	EU28 + EFTA	81.9	81.2	3.0	4.4	84.4	84.9
	Other European countries	77.0	74.9	3.4	4.9	79.7	78.8
	North Africa	69.8	63.7	3.6	5.7	72.3	67.5
	Sub-Saharan Africa	73.1	73.9	6.3	7.4	78.0	79.8
	Middle East	51.1	54.7	12.5	9.2	58.4	60.2
	North America	76.2	78.7	3.2	4.0	78.8	82.0
	Central and South America and Caribbean	75.3	80.1	6.4	5.0	80.5	84.3
	Asia	65.6	69.2	5.0	4.8	69.0	72.7
	Other regions	85.8	81.3	2.0	2.4	87.6	83.3
	Foreign-born (total)	74.5	75.5	4.4	5.0	77.9	79.5
Native-born	75.2	74.6	3.8	4.1	78.1	77.8	
United States	Mexico	71.0	65.3	3.5	8.8	73.6	71.6
	Other Central American countries	74.0	67.4	3.3	10.0	76.5	75.0
	South America and Caribbean	74.8	68.3	3.5	10.6	77.5	76.4
	Canada	76.2	73.4	2.2	5.9	78.0	78.0
	Europe	74.2	71.2	2.8	7.3	76.3	76.8
	Africa	72.9	66.3	3.7	10.3	75.7	74.0
	Asia and the Middle East	70.6	66.3	2.6	8.3	72.5	72.2
	Other regions	67.5	60.0	2.7	9.4	69.4	66.3
	Foreign-born (total)	72.2	67.0	3.1	9.0	74.6	73.6
	Native-born	69.8	65.8	3.9	7.9	72.7	71.4

Note: The population refers to working-age population (15-64) for the employment and participation rates and to active population aged 15-64 for the unemployment rate. EU27 does not include the United Kingdom. The regions of birth could not be made fully comparable across countries of residence because of the way aggregate data provided to the Secretariat are coded. Data for the United Kingdom refers to the first three-quarters only.

Source: European countries: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Australia, Canada: Labour Force Surveys; the United States: Current Population Surveys.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/x5beow>

Unlike their counterparts living in the United States, migrants from South America and the Caribbean in Canada were less severely affected by the consequences of COVID-19. Like them, migrants from sub-Saharan Africa saw a less severe drop in their employment rate than people born in Canada (-2.9 percentage points compared with -4.4 percentage points). Conversely, migrants from the Middle East and Asia saw the sharpest deterioration in their employment situation. In the end, in 2020, the employment rate for the native-born remained higher than for most migrant groups, with the exception of Europeans and people born in South America and the Caribbean (Table 1.7).

In Australia, migrants of all origins have relatively similar or even better labour market indicators than the native-born. The only exception to this finding are migrants from the Middle East and North Africa, for whom the employment rate was barely over 50% – more than 20 percentage points lower than for other migrants and the native-born. The employment rate for migrants from Europe, the Americas and Oceania, for their part, stayed above 75% (or, at least 2 percentage points higher than for the native-born), despite the effects of the crisis.

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Annex 1.A. Supplementary tables and figures

Annex Table 1.A.1. Permanent flows to OECD countries by category, 2019

Thousands and percentage change compared to 2018

	Work		Accompanying family of workers		Family		Humanitarian		Other		Free movements	
	2019	%	2019	%	2019	%	2019	%	2019	%	2019	%
Australia	50.7	1	59.0	-3	50.5	2	18.8	15	0.1	-51	13.9	-2
Austria	6.1	8	2.0	30	8.5	10	7.4	-51	0.4	2	57.5	1
Belgium	5.1	2	0.0	..	32.3	9	6.7	-36	0.1	-18	69.0	8
Canada	103.3	8	93.3	3	91.3	7	48.5	7	4.7
Denmark	8.9	7	4.9	-5	3.3	-30	1.8	8	5.4	-1	29.2	-5
Finland	2.2	30	0.0	..	11.3	8	4.0	1	0.1	23	6.6	-6
France	51.4	15	101.6	0	33.3	9	25.9	21	78.4	-6
Germany	71.6	10	96.6	-1	74.3	-5	7.2	0	359.2	-7
Ireland	12.7	30	0.2	-68	3.7	32	0.9	16	31.1	0
Israel	6.4	2	26.8	23
Italy	6.9	-17	0.0	..	101.7	-17	18.4	-40	5.2	3	59.2	2
Japan	82.8	25	36.1	13	0.1	-3	18.9	2
Korea	0.6	-3	0.0	..	14.8	5	..	-100	52.8	-4
Luxembourg	2.3	29	0.0	..	2.3	14	0.8	-34	0.1	-5	17.1	4
Mexico	6.0	3	0.0	..	16.9	-12	7.9	37	7.8	1
Netherlands	23.6	12	0.0	..	34.3	10	4.8	34	0.0	..	90.5	13
New Zealand	8.8	-5	11.5	6	10.5	-31	3.6	-14	4.0	-29
Norway	4.4	16	11.8	8	5.1	32	20.0	-9
Portugal	34.6	73	30.0	43	0.2	-72	6.2	8	27.3	64
Spain	34.5	16	0.0	..	132.5	6	3.2	-34	27.8	10	151.8	4
Sweden	16.8	1	1.0	1	38.1	-25	19.2	-24	27.0	-11
Switzerland	..	7	19.0	-8	6.4	-4	3.7	9	90.9	2
United Kingdom	51.6	42	29.3	35	80.3	19	17.7	-30	22.8	-30	143.9	-10
United States	72.3	11	67.0	-8	709.2	2	107.1	-42	75.4	-2
OECD	659.5	15	268.2	1	1 642.8	1	390.7	-22	313.7	-1	1 278.4	-1

Source: OECD International Migration Database, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00342-en>.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/46vfgh>

Annex Table 1.A.2. Inflows of temporary labour migrants for selected categories, 2011-20

Destination	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2020/2019 change (%)
	Thousands										
International seasonal workers											
Total OECD	(201.0)	(187.7)	(192.4)	(186.4)	(206.5)	(238.7)	(270.2)	(315.5)	469.2	(427.3)	-9
United States	55.4	65.3	74.2	89.3	108.1	134.4	161.6	196.4	204.8	213.4	+4
Poland	131.4	137.4	+5
Canada	25.1	25.7	27.6	29.8	30.8	34.2	35.2	35.9	36.9	31.5	-15
New Zealand	7.8	8.2	8.4	9.4	9.8	11.1	11.7	13.1	14.4
Australia	0.4	1.1	1.5	2.0	3.2	4.5	6.2	8.5	12.2	9.8	-19
Spain	4.5	3.8	3.1	3.1	2.9	2.8	5.7	13.8	11.8
Finland	12.0	14.0	14.0	14.0	12.0	14.0	14.0	7.7	11.5	13.3	+16
France	6.3	6.4	6.1	6.6	6.7	6.8	7.2	8.1	10.3	10.5	+2
Mexico	27.6	21.7	15.2	14.7	15.9	14.9	12.4	10.7	10.0	3.7	-63
Austria	17.5	13.2	15.1	7.2	6.9	6.7	6.9	7.6	9.4
Sweden	3.8	5.7	6.2	2.9	4.1	3.3	3.1	5.0	6.3	3.6	-43
Italy	15.2	9.7	7.6	4.8	3.6	3.5	3.6	5.6	4.2	1.8	-57
Norway	2.5	2.3	2.5	2.5	2.3	2.4	2.6	2.9	3.4	2.4	-31
United Kingdom	16.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.5
Working holidaymakers											
Total OECD	380.8	422.5	473.3	467.1	465.2	469.6	480.0	475.3	(418.4)	(175.4)	-58
Australia	192.9	223.0	258.2	239.6	226.8	214.6	211.0	210.5	209.0	149.2	-29
United States	97.6	79.8	86.4	90.3	95.0	101.1	104.9	104.5	108.3	5.0	-95
New Zealand	43.1	48.7	54.7	61.4	65.3	70.1	67.3	63.2
Canada	13.6	36.3	36.6	36.0	33.4	38.5	48.2	48.6	47.5	13.6	-71
United Kingdom	20.7	19.6	20.9	23.5	25.3	22.3	21.6	20.9	20.2
Japan	7.5	9.3	9.1	8.1	10.4	11.9	13.8	15.9	18.0	3.3	-82
France	2.2	2.4	2.7	2.9	3.0	3.8	4.3	5.0	5.2	2.0	-61
Denmark	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.8	1.2	1.5	1.8	3.7	1.3	-64
Korea	0.8	1.0	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.6	1.9	2.4	2.7	0.9	-67
International trainees											
Total OECD	99.8	103.5	101.5	115.7	130.8	139.3	162.4	175.2	201.0	(84.1)	-58
Japan	82.3	85.9	83.9	98.7	112.7	121.9	144.1	157.8	186.9	79.0	-58
Germany	4.9	4.1	3.9	3.8	4.3	3.9	4.0	4.6	5.1
France	1.0	1.2	2.0	2.2	2.5	2.6	2.5	3.1	4.2	2.5	-41
Denmark	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.1	1.3	1.9	2.3	2.4	1.6	-30
Intra-company transferees											
Total OECD	138.3	135.0	141.2	(144.3)	158.4	159.7	159.0	159.6	156.1	(72.7)	-53
United States	70.7	62.4	66.7	71.5	78.5	79.3	78.2	74.4	77.0	35.9	-53
United Kingdom	29.7	29.3	33.2	36.6	36.4	36.0	32.8	31.7	27.2	9.3	-66
Canada	11.1	12.4	11.5	11.4	9.8	9.8	11.0	12.8	14.6	6.1	-59
Poland	0.5	1.5	1.8	2.2	3.4	4.1	5.2	9.6	11.3	12.9	+14
Japan	5.3	6.1	6.2	7.2	7.2	7.7	8.7	9.5	10.0	3.2	-68
Germany	7.1	7.2	7.8	9.4	9.3	7.5	7.3	8.0	6.7	2.9	-56
Australia	8.2	10.1	8.9	..	7.8	8.1	7.6	4.7	2.8	1.8	-35
Ireland	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.9	0.8	0.7	0.8	1.1

Note: For each type of permit, the table presents only the countries for which inflows exceed one thousand in 2019. Numbers in brackets indicate that the series is incomplete. The number of seasonal workers refers to the number of permits granted or work authorisations granted in France. The series on seasonal workers exclude Germany, as no recent data is available.

Source: OECD International Migration Database, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00342-en>.

Annex Table 1.A.3. Permits considered in the statistics on temporary migration of workers and their characteristics

Country	Name of the programme	Duration of stay / renewability of the contract	Existence of a quota
Australia (Temporary visas granted, fiscal years; excludes New Zealand citizens)	Seasonal workers: Seasonal Worker Programme (within subclass 416 replaced by subclass 403 from Nov 2016)	From 4 to 7 months.	Uncapped.
	Working holidaymakers: subclasses 417 and 462	Up to 1 year.	Subclass 417: uncapped; Subclass 462: capped except for the United States.
	Trainees: The Training visa (subclass 407) introduced in 2016. Former Temporary Work (Training and Research) visa (subclass 402) streams – ‘Occupational trainee’ and ‘Professional development’, closed to new applications from 2016; and the following visas closed to new applications from 24 November 2012: Visiting Academic visa (subclass 419), Occupational Trainee visa (subclass 442), Professional Development visa (subclass 470); and the Trade Training Skills visa (subclass 471) which was repealed in September 2007.	Up to 2 years.	
	Intra-company transferees: subclass 457 visas granted (primary applicants)	Up to 4 years.	
	Other workers: other temporary work (Short Stay Specialist); International relations (excl. seasonal workers); Temporary Activity; Temporary work (Skilled) (excl. ICTs)		
Austria	Seasonal workers: Winter and Summer tourism; Agriculture; Core seasonal workers; Harvest helpers (number of persons estimated based on the number of permits delivered).	Up to 12 months.	
	Intra-company transferees		Uncapped.
	Other workers: Researchers, Artists (with document or self-employed), Self-employed workers; Au pair; Other specific paid jobs.		Uncapped.
Belgium	Working holidaymakers: top 10 countries of origin (estimation)		
	Trainees (estimation)		
	Other workers: Au Pair; Artists; Sports(women); Invited Professors or trainers; Other temporary workers (estimation)		
Canada (TFWP & IMP programmes – initial permits)	Seasonal workers: Seasonal Agricultural Workers Programme (TFWP): effective entries	Not renewable.	
	Working holidaymakers: International Experience Canada Working Holiday and International Youth Program (IMP)	Not renewable.	Uncapped.
	Intra-company transferees: International Mobility Program (IMP) Work Permit Holders by year in which Initial Permit became effective (Trade – ICT; NAFTA – ICT; GATS professionals; significant benefits ICT)	Varies.	
	Other workers: International Mobility Program (IMP): Agreements (excl. ICT); Canadian Interests (excl. working holidaymakers, spouses and ICT); Self-support; Permanent residence applicants in Canada; Humanitarian reason; Temporary Foreign Worker Program: Live-in caregivers; agricultural workers (non seasonal); other TFWP	IMP: varies; Live-in caregivers: unlimited; other TFWP: not renewable.	Uncapped.
Colombia	Working holidaymakers		
	Intra-company transferees		
	Other workers		
Denmark	Working holidaymakers		
	Trainees		

Country	Name of the programme	Duration of stay / renewability of the contract	Existence of a quota
	Other workers: De facto status; Au Pair; Volunteers.		
Finland	Seasonal workers: Seasonal work visas	Up to 9 months	
	Trainees		
France (first permits issued)	Other workers	Up to 12 months	
	Seasonal workers: work authorisations issued for each seasonal work contract, including renewals – OFII statistics	Up to 9 months per year (3-year authorisation).	
	Working holidaymakers: <i>Programme vacances Travail</i>	Up to 12 months.	
	Trainees: <i>Stagiaires</i>	Up to 1 year initially (extension up to 3 years in total).	
	Intra-company transferees: <i>Salarié en mission / Salarié détaché ICT</i>	Up to 3 years.	
	Other workers: Temporary economic migration (visa “ <i>salarié</i> ” < 12 months)	Up to 12 months (renewable).	
Germany (grants of work permits)	Seasonal workers		
	Trainees		
	Intra-company transferees: § 8 BeschV (Praktische Tätigkeiten als Voraussetzung für die Anerkennung ausländischer Berufsqualifikationen), § 10 BeschV (Internationaler Personalaustausch, Auslandsprojekte), § 10a BeschV (ICT-Karte / Mobiler-ICT-Karte)		
	Other workers: § 8 Abs. 2 BeschV (Anerkennung ausländischer Berufsqualifikationen – § 17a AufenthG bis zu 18 Monate), § 8 Abs. 3 BeschV (Anerkennung ausländischer Berufsqualifikationen – sonstige), § 11 Abs. 1 BeschV (Sprachlehrerinnen und Sprachlehrer), § 11 Abs. 2 BeschV (Spezialitätenköchinnen und Spezialitätenköche), § 12 BeschV (Au-Pair-Beschäftigungen), § 13 BeschV (Hausangestellte von Entsandten), § 19 Abs. 2 BeschV (Werklieferverträge), § 25 BeschV (Kultur und Unterhaltung), § 27 BeschV (Grenzgängerbeschäftigung), § 29 Abs. 1 BeschV (Internationale Abkommen – Niederlassungspersonal), § 29 Abs. 2 BeschV (Internationale Abkommen – Gastarbeitnehmer), § 29 Abs. 3 – 4 BeschV (Internationale Abkommen), § 29 Abs. 5 BeschV (Internationale Abkommen – WHO/Europaabkommen)		
Ireland	Working holidaymakers: Working holidaymaker visas		
	Trainees: Internship employment permit		
	Intra-company transferees		
	Other workers: Contract for Services; Exchange Agreement; Sport and Cultural Employment Permits		
Israel (entries excl. Palestinian workers, and stock of Jordanian daily workers working in uncapped sectors)	Working holidaymakers		
	Other workers:		
	Construction: Jordanian workers (daily workers in capped sectors); Tel Aviv city rail project; Sea ports projects; Jordan Valley irrigation project; Foreign Construction Workers (bilateral agreements with Bulgaria, China, Moldova, Romania, Turkey, Ukraine)	Daily workers: unlimited; other workers: renewable up to 63 months.	Capped.
	Tourism: Jordanian daily workers in hotel industry and construction in Eilat	Unlimited.	Capped.
	Agriculture	Not renewable.	Capped.
	Home care	Renewable up to 63 months (or up to 7 years if no employer change between 5 and 7 years of stay).	Uncapped.
	Specialists and skilled (experts working visa)	Unlimited.	Uncapped.

Country	Name of the programme	Duration of stay / renewability of the contract	Existence of a quota
Italy	Seasonal workers		
	Working holidaymakers		
	Other workers	Up to 12 months	
Japan (New visas, excl. re-entry)	Working holidaymakers: Working holidaymaker visas		
	Trainees: Trainees and Technical intern training		
	Intra-company transferees		
	Other workers: Professor; Artist; Religious Activities; Journalist; Researcher; Instructor; Entertainer; Cultural Activities; Designated activities (including some permanent workers and their spouses, such as highly skilled professionals)	1 to 5 years, renewable	Uncapped.
Korea (Visas issued)	Industrial trainees: D-3		
	Working holidaymakers: H-1		
	Intra-company transferees: D-7		
	Other workers: visas D-6; D-9; E-1 to E-9; H2		
Luxembourg	Trainees		
	Intra-company transferees		
	Other workers	Up to 12 months.	
Mexico	Seasonal workers: Cards of visiting border-worker (<i>Tarjetas de Visitante Trabajador Fronterizo</i>)	Up to 5 years.	
	Other workers: Temporary residence permit (<i>Tarjetas de Residente Temporal</i>) for work		
New Zealand (excludes Australian citizens)	Seasonal workers: Recognised Seasonal Employer Limited Visa; Supplementary Seasonal Employment (extensions)	Up to 7 months (or 9 months for citizen-residents of Tuvalu and Kiribati); extensions possible up to 6 months.	Capped.
	Working holidaymakers: Working Holiday Scheme	Up to 12 months (or 23 months for citizens of the United Kingdom or Canada).	Capped for some countries.
	Trainees: Work experience for student; Medical & dental trainee; NZ racing conference apprentice; Religious Trainees	Practical training for students not enrolled in New Zealand (or enrolled for 3 months maximum): up to 6 months; Religious trainees: up to 3 years; Apprentice jockeys: up to 4 years.	Uncapped.
	Other workers:		
	Essential skills	Up to 5 years.	Uncapped.
	Entertainers and Associated Workers	Contract duration.	Uncapped.
	Talent (Accredited Employer)	Up to 30 months.	Uncapped.
	Exchange Work	Up to 12 months.	Capped.
	Long Term Skill Shortage List Occupation	Up to 30 months.	Uncapped.
	China Special Work	Up to 3 years.	Capped.
Norway (non EU/EFTA nationals)	Skilled Migrant and Specialist skills	No limit.	Uncapped.
	Talent – Arts, Culture and Sports	No limit.	Uncapped.
	Seasonal workers	Not renewable	
	Working holidaymakers		
	Trainees		
	Intra-company transferees		
	Other workers: Unskilled non-seasonal temporary workers		

Country	Name of the programme	Duration of stay / renewability of the contract	Existence of a quota
Poland	Seasonal workers: seasonal work permits (including non-agricultural activities)		Uncapped.
	Intra-company transferees	Renewable.	
	Other workers:		
	Estimates based on administrative forms from employers for recruiting workers from six countries of origin (Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine) under simplified procedures.	Up to 9 months.	
	New residence permits (A permits) granted on the ground of work.	6 to 11 months.	Uncapped.
Portugal	Other workers	Up to 12 months.	
Slovenia	Seasonal workers		
	Other workers	Up to 12 months	
Spain	Seasonal workers: Authorisations for temporary employment		
	Intra-company transferees		
	Other workers: Permits for employees with contracts of limited duration; Permits for international service providers; Temporary residence permits for specific professions not requiring a work authorisation; Researchers; Trainees and workers in Research and development		
Sweden	Seasonal workers: Berry pickers		
	Working holidaymakers: Working holiday visas		
	Trainees		
	Other workers: Athletes and coaches; Au Pair; Intra-company transferees; Performers; Visiting researchers.		
Switzerland	Trainees	Up to 18 months.	Capped.
	Other workers (excluding detached workers):		
	Employed with work permits	Up to 12 months.	Capped (contracts of 4 to 12 months duration) or uncapped (permits < 4 months).
	Musicians and artists	Up to 8 months.	Uncapped.
United Kingdom (Entry clearance visas granted)	Working holidaymakers: Tier 5 – pre PBS Youth Mobility	Up to 24 months (multi-entry visa).	
	Intra-company transferees:		
	Tier 2 – Intra Company Transfers Short Term (closed on 6 April 2017)		
	Tier 2 – Intra Company Transfers Long Term	Maximum 5 years (9 years if salary > GBP 120 000 per year).	
	Other workers:		
	Tier 5 – pre PBS Charity Workers	Up to 12 months or the time given on the certificate of sponsorship plus 28 days, whichever is shorter.	
	Tier 5 – pre PBS Creative and Sporting	Maximum of up to 12 months, or the time given in the certificate of sponsorship plus up to 28 days, whichever is shorter.	


Country	Name of the programme	Duration of stay / renewability of the contract	Existence of a quota
United States (non-immigrant visa statistics)	Tier 5 – pre PBS government Authorised Exchange	Up to 12 or 24 months (depending on the scheme) or the time given on the certificate of sponsorship plus 28 days, whichever is shorter.	
	Tier 5 – pre PBS International Agreement	Maximum 2 years, or the time given on the certificate of sponsorship plus up to 28 days, whichever is shorter.	
	Tier 5 – pre PBS Religious Workers	Maximum of up to 3 years and 1 month, or the time given on the certificate of sponsorship plus 1 month, whichever is shorter.	
	Non-PBS – Domestic workers in Private Households	Up to 6 months.	
	Seasonal workers: H-2A – Temporary worker performing agricultural services	Up to 3 years.	Uncapped.
	Working holidaymakers: J-1 – Exchange visitor, Summer Work Travel Programme	Up to 4 months.	Capped.
	Trainees: H3	Up to 2 years.	
	Intra-company transferees: L-1 – Intracompany transferee (executive, managerial, and specialised personnel continuing employment with international firm or corporation)	Maximum initial stay of one year (3 years for L-1A employees). Extended until reaching the maximum limit of seven years (5 years for L-1B).	
	Other workers:		
	H-2B – Temporary worker performing other services	Up to 3 years.	Capped.
	H-1B – Temporary worker of distinguished merit and ability performing services other than as a registered nurse	Up to 3 years initially. Maximum limit of six years in total (with some exceptions).	
	H-1B1 – Free Trade Agreement worker (Chile/Singapore)		
	H-1C – Nurse in health professional shortage area (expired in 2009)	Up to 3 years.	
	O-1 – Person with extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education, business, or athletics	Up to 3 years (extension up to 1 year).	
	O-2 – Person accompanying and assisting in the artistic or athletic performance by O-1	Up to 3 years (extension up to 1 year).	
	P-1 – Internationally recognised athlete or member of an internationally recognised entertainment group	Up to 5 years (1 year for athletic group). Maximum limit of 10 years (5 years for athletic group).	
	P-2 – Artist or entertainer in a reciprocal exchange programme	Up to 1 year initially (extension up to 1 year).	
	P-3 – Artist or entertainer in a culturally unique programme	Up to 1 year initially (extension up to 1 year).	
	R-1 – Person in a religious occupation	Up to 30 months initially.	
	TN – NAFTA professional	Up to 3 years.	

Annex Table 1.A.4. New asylum applications by country where application has been filed, 2014-20

	2014-17 annual average	2018	2019	2020	2020/19 absolute change	2020/19 change (%)	Asylum seekers per million population (2020)	Top three origins of the asylum seekers (2020)
Australia	20 314	28 830	27 400	19 220	- 8 180	-30	754	Malaysia, China, India
Austria	45 462	11 610	11 010	12 930	1 920	+17	1 436	Syria, Afghanistan, Morocco
Belgium	20 748	18 160	23 140	12 930	- 10 210	-44	1 116	Afghanistan, Syria, Eritrea
Canada	24 166	55 370	58 340	19 050	- 39 290	-67	505	Mexico, India, Haiti
Chile	1 988	5 780	770	1 680	910	+118	88	Colombia, Cuba, Venezuela
Colombia	..	2 680	10 620	11 920	1 300	+12	234	Venezuela, Cuba, Ecuador
Costa Rica	..	27 980	59 180	21 130	- 38 050	-64	4 148	Nicaragua, Cuba, Venezuela
Czech Republic	1 132	1 360	1 580	800	- 780	-49	75	Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus
Denmark	11 892	3 500	2 650	1 440	- 1 210	-46	249	Syria, Eritrea, Morocco
Estonia	156	90	100	50	- 50	-50	38	Russia, Syria, Eritrea
Finland	11 830	2 960	2 460	1 460	- 1 000	-41	264	Afghanistan, Turkey, Iraq
France	72 818	126 580	138 290	81 790	- 56 500	-41	1 253	Afghanistan, Guinea, Bangladesh
Germany	396 286	161 930	142 510	102 580	- 39 930	-28	1 224	Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq
Greece	30 230	64 990	74 920	37 860	- 37 060	-49	3 632	Afghanistan, Syria, Pakistan
Hungary	65 584	640	470	90	- 380	-81	9	Pakistan, Afghanistan, Syria
Iceland	654	730	810	630	- 180	-22	1 846	West Bank and Gaza Strip, Iraq, Venezuela
Ireland	2 438	3 660	4 740	1 540	- 3 200	-68	312	Nigeria, Somalia, Pakistan
Israel	6 642	16 260	9 440	1 890	- 7 550	-80	218	Russia, Ukraine, India
Italy	97 048	53 440	35 010	21 220	- 13 790	-39	351	Pakistan, Bangladesh, El Salvador
Japan	10 114	10 490	10 380	3 940	- 6 440	-62	31	
Korea	6 292	16 120	15 430	6 670	- 8 760	-57	130	Russia, Egypt, Kazakhstan
Latvia	352	180	180	150	- 30	-17	80	Belarus, Russia, Syria
Lithuania	376	390	630	260	- 370	-59	96	Russia, Belarus, Tajikistan
Luxembourg	1 858	2 230	2 200	1 300	- 900	-41	2 077	Syria, Eritrea, Afghanistan
Mexico	6 584	29 610	70 370	41 200	- 29 170	-41	320	Honduras, Haiti, Cuba
Netherlands	25 978	20 470	22 540	13 720	- 8 820	-39	801	Syria, Algeria, Turkey
New Zealand	384	420	540	440	- 100	-19	91	Indonesia, China, India
Norway	13 038	2 550	2 210	1 340	- 870	-39	247	Syria, Eritrea, Turkey
Poland	7 778	2 410	2 770	1 510	- 1 260	-45	40	Russia, Belarus, Afghanistan
Portugal	956	1 240	1 740	900	- 840	-48	88	Gambia, Angola, Guinea-Bissau
Slovak Republic	192	160	220	270	50	+23	49	Afghanistan, Morocco, Syria
Slovenia	792	2 800	3 620	3 470	- 150	-4	1 669	Morocco, Afghanistan, Pakistan
Spain	15 578	52 750	115 190	86 390	- 28 800	-25	1 848	Venezuela, Colombia, Honduras
Sweden	72 174	18 110	23 150	13 630	- 9 520	-41	1 350	Syria, Uzbekistan, Ukraine
Switzerland	26 294	13 540	12 600	9 770	- 2 830	-22	1 129	Eritrea, Afghanistan, Turkey
Turkey	104 520	83 800	56 420	31 330	- 25 090	-44	371	Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran
United Kingdom	36 196	37 450	44 470	36 030	- 8 440	-19	531	Iran, Iraq, Albania
United States	214 572	254 300	301 070	250 940	- 50 130	-17	758	Guatemala, Honduras, Venezuela
OECD total	1 353 416	1 135 570	1 289 170	853 380	- 435 790	-34	623	Venezuela, Afghanistan, Syria
<i>Selected non-OECD countries</i>								
Bulgaria	14070	2470	2080	3460	1 380	+66	498	Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq
Romania	2004	1950	2460	6030	3 570	+145	313	Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq

Note: Figures for the United States refer to “affirmative” claims submitted to the Department of Homeland Security (number of cases, multiplied by 1.5 to reflect the estimated number of persons) and “defensive” claims submitted to the Executive Office for Immigration Review (number of persons). “.” means that figures are not available.

Source: UNHCR; Eurostat; OECD International Migration Database, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00342-en>.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/vprch6>


Annex Table 1.A.5. Top 50 nationalities of origin of new immigrants to the OECD, 2018-19

	Thousands 2018	Thousands 2019	Share in 2019 (%)	2019/18 absolute change	2019/18 change (%)	Difference with 2018 rank	Expatriation rate (per '000 population) in 2019
China	430	466	6.9	+36	+8	+0	0.3
India	341	394	5.8	+53	+16	+0	0.3
Romania	283	288	4.2	+5	+2	+0	14.9
Ukraine	191	230	3.4	+39	+21	+2	5.2
Venezuela	197	227	3.4	+30	+15	-1	8.0
Viet Nam	191	225	3.3	+34	+18	-1	2.3
Mexico	180	176	2.6	-4	-2	+0	1.4
Philippines	158	162	2.4	+4	+2	+3	1.5
Italy	168	159	2.3	-9	-5	-1	2.6
Brazil	123	155	2.3	+32	+26	+6	0.7
Poland	163	150	2.2	-14	-8	-1	3.9
Morocco	125	148	2.2	+24	+19	+3	4.1
United Kingdom	128	139	2.0	+10	+8	+1	2.1
Colombia	114	135	2.0	+22	+19	+5	2.7
Syria	151	124	1.8	-26	-17	-3	7.3
Iraq	164	118	1.7	-45	-28	-7	3.0
United States	119	113	1.7	-6	-5	+0	0.3
Germany	117	111	1.6	-6	-5	+0	1.3
France	104	109	1.6	+4	+4	+1	1.7
Afghanistan	100	99	1.5	-1	-1	+1	2.6
Russia	98	98	1.4	+0	+0	+1	0.7
Pakistan	86	92	1.4	+6	+8	+3	0.4
Bulgaria	87	91	1.3	+4	+5	+1	13.0
Iran	78	85	1.3	+6	+8	+2	1.0
Spain	77	82	1.2	+4	+5	+2	1.7
Turkmenistan	36	81	1.2	+45	+127	+23	13.6
Korea	73	77	1.1	+4	+6	+1	1.5
Turkey	69	70	1.0	+1	+2	+3	0.8
Dominican Republic	73	65	1.0	-7	-10	+0	6.1
Peru	63	65	1.0	+2	+3	+2	2.0
Cuba	96	64	0.9	-33	-34	-8	5.6
Portugal	58	64	0.9	+5	+9	+1	6.2
Nigeria	72	56	0.8	-16	-22	-3	0.3
Haiti	135	54	0.8	-81	-60	-21	4.8
Albania	42	51	0.8	+9	+21	+3	17.8
Bangladesh	50	50	0.7	-0	-0	+0	0.3
Honduras	42	50	0.7	+8	+19	+3	5.1
Egypt	47	48	0.7	+1	+3	-1	0.5
Hungary	58	46	0.7	-12	-21	-5	4.8
Algeria	42	46	0.7	+4	+10	-1	1.1
Croatia	52	45	0.7	-7	-13	-6	11.0
Indonesia	36	43	0.6	+7	+19	+5	0.2
Argentina	26	40	0.6	+14	+53	+20	0.9
Bosnia and Herzegovina	35	40	0.6	+4	+13	+6	12.1
Serbia	37	39	0.6	+2	+5	+0	4.5
Thailand	37	39	0.6	+2	+4	+0	0.6
Nepal	39	38	0.6	-1	-2	-3	1.3
Uzbekistan	26	36	0.5	+10	+38	+13	1.1
Canada	40	36	0.5	-4	-9	-7	1.0
Australia	32	36	0.5	+4	+13	+2	1.4

Source: OECD International Migration Database, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00342-en>.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/uq0256>


Annex Figure 1.A.1. Unemployment rates by country of birth, 2002-2020



Note: The reference population is the active population aged 15-64. Data for EU exclude the United Kingdom, as well as Cyprus and Malta for which data is not available for the whole period. Data for the United Kingdom refer to the first three-quarters only for all years.


Source: European countries: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Australia, Canada: Labour Force surveys; the United States: Current Population Surveys.

Annex Figure 1.A.2. Change in the gap between male and female employment rates, by place of birth, 2002-2020



Note: The reference population is the working-age population (15-64). Data for EU exclude the United Kingdom, as well as Cyprus and Malta for which data is not available for the whole period. Data for the United Kingdom refer to the first three-quarters only for all years.

Source: European countries and Turkey: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Australia, Canada: Labour Force surveys; the United States: Current Population Surveys.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/znox9y>

Annex Table 1.A.6. Employment rates of the persons aged 25-64 by place of birth and education level in OECD countries, 2020

Education level	Foreign-born			Native-born		
	Low	Medium	High	Low	Medium	High
Austria	53.0	72.2	77.1	54.7	77.4	88.8
Belgium	43.8	64.7	76.3	48.6	75.3	88.4
Canada	52.0	66.3	76.3	54.8	71.3	81.2
Chile	73.7	81.7	85.1	61.2	74.1	82.2
Czech Republic	76.5	84.8	81.7	55.4	83.5	85.9
Denmark	54.9	72.2	79.6	61.2	81.7	88.7
Estonia	64.0	74.7	77.7	62.9	80.1	86.5
Finland	53.8	69.2	76.8	54.0	75.5	87.1
France	51.4	62.2	73.4	54.0	73.7	86.8
Germany	62.8	83.6	91.4	61.2	79.1	80.0
Greece	56.2	53.1	56.8	49.2	63.2	76.2
Hungary	71.6	78.1	81.5	55.2	79.3	86.1
Iceland	79.8	73.6	79.7	71.9	84.5	90.3
Ireland	53.9	67.7	79.7	52.1	73.1	86.7
Israel	65.8	76.7	85.0	41.9	69.2	87.4
Italy	59.3	64.5	66.0	49.8	71.4	82.4
Latvia	54.6	69.1	78.7	63.6	76.1	87.6
Lithuania	49.1	66.9	83.5	52.2	73.1	90.2
Luxembourg	61.7	72.5	83.8	55.0	74.3	86.5
Mexico	70.1	64.1	71.2	65.6	71.6	79.7
Netherlands	51.3	72.3	78.9	66.5	83.7	91.4
New Zealand	66.4	79.5	86.3	71.9	83.0	89.3
Norway	54.4	70.2	81.8	62.2	81.3	91.3
Poland	-	77.8	84.2	46.9	71.5	89.1
Portugal	74.7	77.2	83.6	69.3	82.5	88.7
Slovak Republic	-	76.3	78.3	36.2	76.8	82.8
Slovenia	53.7	74.5	85.6	46.5	75.9	90.7
Spain	55.4	63.7	67.9	56.7	70.8	82.1
Sweden	49.8	75.5	79.5	71.3	86.7	92.5
Switzerland	71.2	78.0	84.2	66.3	83.3	91.8
Turkey	35.3	42.8	53.2	44.2	57.8	72.0
United Kingdom	63.6	78.7	84.6	65.1	80.2	86.8
United States	60.8	66.7	76.1	45.3	66.6	80.5
EU27	56.2	69.9	75.2	55.5	76.4	87.0
OECD average	59.5	70.9	78.2	57.7	76.1	86.0

Note: Data for Germany and Mexico refers to 2019. Data for the United Kingdom refers to the first three-quarters only. Data for Chile refers to 2017. The OECD average excludes Poland and the Slovak Republic as data are not available for all levels of education in these countries.

Source: European countries and Turkey: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Canada, Israel; New Zealand: Labour Force Surveys; Chile : *Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional (CASEN)*; Mexico: *Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo (ENOE)*; the United States: Current Population Surveys.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/sh6fdp>

Annex Table 1.A.7. Employment of foreign-born persons by industry, 2020

	Agriculture and fishing (%)	Mining, manufacturing and energy (%)	Construction (%)	Wholesale and retail trade (%)	Hotels and restaurants (%)	Education (%)	Health (%)	Activities of households as employers (%)	Admin. and ETO (%)	Other services (%)	Total (%)	Total foreign-born employed (thousands)	Foreign-born % of total employment
Australia	1.3	11.0	7.4	11.8	9.0	6.7	14.8	-	9.0	29.1	100	14	30.3
Austria	0.9	17.5	10.3	14.5	10.9	4.7	11.1	0.2	9.8	20.1	100	883	21.5
Belgium	0.4	13.5	8.2	11.7	6.4	6.0	13.6	0.2	20.1	19.9	100	796	17.4
Czech Republic	2.8	33.1	10.8	11.4	5.6	4.1	6.6	0.4	5.8	19.5	100	214	4.4
Denmark	2.5	13.0	3.1	12.0	9.0	7.9	16.5	0.0	10.8	24.9	100	287	10.4
Estonia	1.2	27.2	9.1	11.2	4.4	9.5	5.9	-	6.7	24.9	100	67	11.4
Finland	1.8	13.3	7.5	9.3	8.0	7.4	17.5	0	10.8	24.0	100	160	6.9
France	1.0	10.3	11.8	11.4	7.5	6.8	13.0	3	13.3	22.2	100	2 997	11.9
Germany	0.6	22.3	8.1	13.5	8.4	4.6	11.9	0.9	9.6	20.0	100	7 704	18.8
Greece	10.5	14.7	12.1	14.7	20.5	2.2	4.2	5	6.2	10.1	100	264	7.2
Hungary	4.6	15.9	10.3	13.6	6.4	8.8	9.4	0	8.7	22.1	100	121	2.9
Iceland	2.1	15.6	6.8	9.9	11.4	11.6	13.2	-	9.4	20.2	100	21	11.9
Ireland	1.2	13.7	5.2	13.5	12.5	4.7	13.4	0.0	9.0	26.3	100	569	25.5
Israel	0.5	15.5	3.7	10.6	3.2	8.5	16.1	5.3	10.6	26.0	100	801	27.8
Italy	6.4	21.0	9.4	10.4	8.5	2.4	5.6	16	6.8	14.0	100	3 063	14.2
Latvia	4.2	16.3	11.8	13.8	4.3	7.6	5.7	0	4.6	31.1	100	71	8.7
Lithuania	2.9	18.9	8.9	13.4	4.4	11.7	5.9	1	10.0	23.3	100	55	4.4
Luxembourg	0.3	5.5	8.0	10.4	6.1	4.3	7.2	2.6	18.5	37.2	100	149	57.7
Netherlands	1.1	14.4	4.9	15.2	6.0	6.4	14.4	1	15.3	21.8	100	851	11.5
Norway	0.9	11.7	8.4	13.1	7.5	6.8	21.8	0	11.7	18.0	100	483	19.4
Portugal	1.7	13.5	7.2	12.6	11.2	7.9	9.0	4.7	10.9	21.4	100	515	11.1
Slovak Republic	1.0	21.4	8.0	19.5	6.1	4.0	7.7	-	9.3	22.9	100	23	1.
Slovenia	0.9	30.6	18.9	10.4	5.2	4.2	7.1	-	8.1	14.6	100	105	11.4
Spain	5.7	11.1	8.6	15.9	16.1	2.9	6.5	9.4	8.5	15.3	100	3 263	17.8
Sweden	0.5	10.7	4.9	10.8	6.0	13.0	20.2	0	12.0	21.8	100	945	20.8
Switzerland	0.6	15.9	8.0	12.3	7.0	6.3	14.7	1.6	8.9	24.7	100	1 360	32.
United Kingdom	0.4	10.5	5.4	11.9	8.5	9.7	16.1	0	10.8	26.2	100	5 052	17.
United States	1.9	12.6	11.1	12.8	7.6	6.0	13.2	1.1	9.1	24.6	100	24 332	18.2
EU 27	2.5	17.6	8.4	12.9	9.2	5.2	10.7	4	10.5	18.7	100	22 702	12.4

Note: Bold indicates that foreign-born are over-represented in the sector compared to the native-born. A dash indicates that the estimate is not reliable enough for publication. ETO stands for extra-territorial organisations. The population refers to the employed population aged 15 to 64. Data for Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Portugal and Turkey refers to 2019; data for Australia refers to 2017; data for the United Kingdom refers to the first three quarters of 2020.

Source: Australia, Israel: Labour Force Surveys; European countries: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); the United States: Current Population Surveys.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/g0ftkx>

Annex Table 1.A.8. Quarterly employment rates by place of birth in OECD countries, 2016-20

Percentage of the population aged 15-64

Total	AUS	AUT	BEL	CAN	CHE	CHL	COL	CZE	DEU	DNK	ESP	EST	FIN	FRA	GBR	GRC	HUN	IRL	ISL	ISR	ITA	LTU	LUX	LVA	MEX	NLD	NOR	NZL	POL	PRT	SVK	SVN	SWE	TUR	USA
2016 Q1	73.6	72.4	63.5	71.2	82.8	..	65.7	71.0	75.5	75.7	59.1	70.7	68.2	65.1	73.6	50.8	64.9	63.6	84.7	65.5	56.0	68.4	60.1	68.5	60.5	76.1	75.1	75.0	63.7	63.6	64.2	64.6	78.1	49.7	67.3
2016 Q2	74.0	73.2	63.7	73.4	82.5	..	67.6	71.6	75.7	76.7	59.8	73.1	70.7	65.7	73.8	52.1	66.2	64.5	87.4	66.1	57.4	69.7	62.0	69.3	61.0	76.8	75.4	75.7	64.4	64.6	64.9	66.7	79.9	52.1	68.0
2016 Q3	73.4	74.5	64.1	73.6	82.6	..	66.9	72.2	76.7	76.8	60.4	73.5	71.2	65.9	74.0	52.7	67.0	65.3	88.2	66.1	57.2	69.9	61.7	69.6	61.5	77.3	75.6	75.8	64.9	65.5	65.1	66.9	80.4	51.3	68.1
2016 Q4	73.8	73.8	65.1	73.1	83.5	..	68.6	72.8	77.0	75.8	60.4	71.9	69.2	65.5	74.2	51.9	67.3	65.6	86.1	66.0	57.1	69.7	63.2	69.5	61.4	77.3	74.9	76.7	65.1	65.3	65.3	66.7	78.9	50.2	68.0
2016	73.7	73.4	64.1	72.8	82.9	..	67.2	71.6	76.2	76.3	59.9	72.3	70.0	65.6	73.9	51.9	66.4	64.8	86.6	65.9	56.9	69.4	61.8	69.2	61.1	76.9	75.2	75.8	64.5	64.7	64.9	66.2	79.3	50.8	67.9
2017 Q1	73.5	73.0	64.1	71.9	81.5	..	65.6	72.7	76.2	74.6	60.2	73.4	68.7	65.3	74.3	52.2	66.9	66.6	85.4	66.1	56.9	69.2	60.9	69.2	61.0	77.1	74.6	77.2	65.4	65.6	65.8	67.8	78.8	49.6	67.7
2017 Q2	74.5	74.1	64.4	74.0	81.8	..	67.5	73.1	76.6	76.0	61.4	73.2	71.2	66.3	74.5	53.9	67.9	67.0	87.8	66.6	57.8	70.6	59.2	70.1	61.1	77.9	75.4	75.9	66.2	66.8	66.1	69.4	80.2	52.3	68.6
2017 Q3	74.3	74.6	64.9	74.6	81.7	..	66.9	74.0	77.4	76.3	62.0	75.1	71.6	66.3	74.5	54.5	68.6	67.5	86.2	66.7	57.9	70.9	63.2	71.2	61.2	78.3	75.4	77.3	66.5	68.0	66.4	70.7	81.1	52.8	69.0
2017 Q4	75.1	74.4	65.5	74.1	82.2	..	67.8	74.2	77.8	76.3	61.8	76.0	71.0	66.3	74.8	53.6	68.8	67.9	84.4	66.5	58.0	71.0	61.3	71.4	61.4	78.4	75.0	78.1	66.3	68.3	66.4	70.5	79.8	52.0	68.7
2017	74.3	74.0	64.7	73.7	81.8	60.2	66.9	73.5	77.0	75.8	61.4	74.4	70.6	66.0	74.5	53.6	68.1	67.2	85.9	66.5	57.6	70.4	61.2	70.5	61.2	78.0	75.1	77.1	66.1	67.2	66.2	69.6	79.9	51.7	68.5
2018 Q1	74.5	73.5	65.5	73.2	81.6	..	64.8	74.0	77.1	76.2	61.5	74.4	70.8	65.9	74.8	53.6	68.7	67.3	83.9	66.5	57.4	70.8	61.0	71.5	61.0	78.3	75.9	77.7	66.5	68.4	67.0	70.1	79.5	51.1	68.5
2018 Q2	75.0	74.3	65.2	74.8	81.7	..	66.7	74.5	77.0	77.3	62.6	75.4	73.8	66.6	74.8	55.4	69.2	67.8	85.9	66.7	58.6	72.2	61.8	72.0	61.7	79.0	76.7	77.5	67.7	69.3	67.1	71.6	81.1	52.8	69.4
2018 Q3	74.9	75.2	66.4	75.1	82.1	..	66.6	74.8	77.9	77.2	63.1	75.2	73.9	66.8	74.9	55.9	69.4	68.5	86.8	67.0	58.4	74.1	61.6	72.9	61.8	79.6	76.8	77.8	67.9	69.5	67.9	72.5	81.9	53.2	69.5
2018 Q4	75.3	74.8	66.8	74.4	82.1	..	67.1	75.2	78.2	77.2	63.0	76.2	72.8	66.5	75.2	55.5	69.4	68.4	84.8	66.3	58.3	72.9	62.8	71.9	61.9	80.0	76.4	77.6	67.3	69.3	68.1	72.4	80.8	51.3	69.5
2018	74.9	74.5	66.0	74.4	81.9	..	66.3	74.6	77.5	77.0	62.6	75.3	72.8	66.5	74.9	55.1	69.2	68.0	85.4	66.6	58.1	72.5	61.8	72.1	61.6	79.2	76.5	77.6	67.3	69.1	67.5	71.7	80.8	52.1	69.2
2019 Q1	75.2	74.2	66.2	73.2	81.9	..	64.4	74.8	77.8	75.5	62.7	74.2	71.9	66.2	75.2	55.5	69.7	68.6	84.2	66.8	57.9	72.5	63.2	71.3	61.7	79.7	76.1	77.3	67.2	69.3	68.5	72.0	79.9	49.4	69.1
2019 Q2	76.0	74.7	67.0	75.5	82.1	..	65.1	74.8	78.0	76.5	63.5	74.5	74.4	64.2	75.2	57.4	69.9	68.4	85.5	66.8	59.0	73.1	63.2	72.1	62.3	72.1	76.2	77.2	68.2	69.7	68.0	73.0	80.9	50.9	69.7
2019 Q3	75.9	75.6	67.6	76.1	82.1	..	64.8	75.0	78.4	76.8	63.6	76.4	74.8	66.6	75.1	57.5	70.0	68.9	84.3	66.6	58.8	73.3	63.7	73.2	62.4	80.5	77.5	77.2	68.8	70.2	68.3	72.5	81.7	51.1	70.3
2019 Q4	75.8	75.2	66.8	74.9	82.8	..	66.2	75.1	78.6	76.4	63.9	76.4	73.4	67.0	75.6	56.8	70.1	69.7	83.2	65.9	58.9	73.2	62.2	73.2	62.7	80.5	76.9	77.3	68.4	69.9	68.5	71.7	80.5	50.4	70.2
2019	75.7	74.9	66.9	74.9	82.2	..	65.1	75.0	78.2	76.3	63.4	75.4	73.6	66.6	75.3	56.8	69.9	68.9	84.3	66.5	58.7	73.0	62.9	72.5	62.3	80.2	76.8	77.3	68.2	69.8	68.3	72.3	80.7	50.5	69.8
2020 Q1	75.2	74.0	66.6	72.1	82.1	..	61.8	74.6	..	75.7	63.1	74.7	72.6	66.7	75.2	56.3	69.5	69.4	82.7	65.9	58.3	73.0	61.5	72.0	62.1	80.5	76.9	77.6	68.3	69.1	67.9	71.8	79.2	47.8	69.3
2020 Q2	71.9	73.0	66.0	66.0	80.5	..	50.7	73.9	..	75.0	60.2	72.0	72.4	65.5	74.5	56.2	68.5	65.7	80.2	64.1	57.5	71.5	61.8	71.6	51.8	79.1	76.2	76.2	67.9	67.5	66.8	70.3	79.3	46.1	61.7
2020 Q3	72.9	74.9	66.9	71.8	81.1	..	55.9	74.1	..	75.5	61.6	73.4	73.4	66.3	74.1	56.9	70.1	67.2	83.7	63.5	57.8	70.8	62.9	71.4	56.9	79.7	76.5	74.8	68.9	68.3	67.4	71.0	80.1	48.9	65.4
2020 Q4	74.8	74.5	66.1	72.2	82.1	..	61.2	74.1	..	75.7	62.2	74.4	72.4	66.5	..	56.6	70.1	67.5	77.3	63.0	58.4	71.4	63.8	71.7	59.5	80.1	76.3	76.1	69.3	68.9	67.8	71.1	79.1	48.0	66.7
2020	73.7	74.1	66.4	70.6	81.4	..	57.4	74.2	..	75.5	61.8	73.6	72.7	66.3	..	56.5	69.5	67.4	81.0	64.1	58.0	71.7	62.5	71.7	57.6	79.8	76.5	76.2	68.6	68.4	67.5	71.0	79.4	47.7	65.8
2016 Q1	70.1	63.2	52.8	70.8	76.2	..	66.7	62.6	68.0	67.0	55.6	67.8	57.4	54.6	70.9	52.1	70.3	63.5	87.7	77.5	58.2	67.4	70.2	65.0	55.9	61.1	69.7	74.2	63.5	67.7	58.0	60.4	63.1	41.2	69.3
2016 Q2	70.2	64.9	54.4	71.8	76.9	..	66.0	74.4	67.8	66.9	57.4	75.4	58.7	55.7	71.9	55.6	74.8	65.1	88.3	78.8	59.4	66.8	68.2	66.6	53.4	62.2	68.7	74.5	57.7	70.8	63.8	61.8	64.8	44.6	70.2
2016 Q3	70.2	65.5	53.5	72.2	76.4	..	62.3	73.5	67.8	65.8	58.8	70.8	60.9	56.0	72.3	55.8	74.2	66.0	87.1	79.3	60.0	71.7	68.2	63.1	55.8	62.2	70.1	74.6	62.2	71.4	70.1	62.4	66.0	44.3	70.4
2016 Q4	70.6	64.6	55.9	71.9	76.8	..	65.3	75.4	68.2	67.4	58.4	69.3	57.8	54.8	72.4	51.2	76.0	65.8	87.0	78.8	59.2	69.8	69.6	62.8	55.0	62.3	68.4	76.8	67.0	71.7	68.6	65.3	65.5	45.4	70.0
2016	70.3	64.6	54.1	71.7	76.6	..	64.8	73.5	68.0	66.8	57.6	70.8	59.0	55.3	71.9	53.7	73.8	65.1	86.6	78.6	59.2	68.9	69.0	64.4	55.0	62.0	69.2	75.0	62.6	70.4	64.7	62.4	64.9	43.9	70.0
2017 Q1	70.1	63.5	54.1	72.2	74.7	..	64.1	76.1	68.0	65.5	58.0	71.0	58.2	54.9																					

Annex Table 1.A.9. Quarterly employment rates by place of birth and gender in OECD countries, 2016-20

Percentage of the population aged 15-64

Men	AUS	AUT	BEL	CAN	CHE	CHL	COL	CZE	DEU	DNK	ESP	EST	FIN	FRA	GBR	GRC	HUN	IRL	ISL	ISR	ITA	LTU	LUX	LVA	MEX	NLD	NOR	NZL	POL	PRT	SVK	SVN	SWE	TUR	USA		
Native-born	2016 Q1	77.5	75.1	66.6	72.1	85.3	78.2	78.4	78.5	77.6	64.1	73.1	68.6	67.6	77.7	59.5	71.2	68.0	86.8	69.3	64.6	68.6	65.4	69.6	77.9	80.4	75.9	79.5	69.9	66.2	70.5	67.3	78.6	68.7	70.7		
	2016 Q2	77.8	76.3	67.6	74.9	85.4	79.2	78.8	78.8	78.9	64.8	76.0	72.1	68.3	77.7	60.8	72.7	69.0	90.7	70.1	66.2	70.1	66.6	70.0	78.4	81.0	76.3	80.1	70.6	67.8	71.6	69.4	80.3	71.4	71.9		
	2016 Q3	77.1	77.8	67.7	76.2	85.7	79.1	79.5	79.7	79.4	65.6	78.2	72.3	68.7	77.8	61.6	73.4	70.2	91.6	70.6	66.3	70.4	64.8	70.6	79.0	81.4	76.4	80.2	71.6	68.8	71.6	70.0	80.9	70.9	72.4		
	2016 Q4	77.6	77.2	67.7	74.7	86.1	80.5	79.9	79.8	78.2	65.3	74.9	70.1	68.2	77.7	60.6	73.8	70.4	88.8	70.1	65.8	70.1	66.8	69.8	79.1	81.5	75.5	80.9	71.8	68.4	71.7	68.6	79.4	69.5	71.6		
	2016	77.5	76.6	67.4	74.5	85.6	79.2	79.1	79.2	78.5	65.0	75.5	70.8	68.2	77.7	60.6	72.8	69.4	89.5	70.0	65.7	69.8	65.9	70.0	78.6	81.1	76.0	80.2	71.0	67.8	71.4	68.8	79.8	70.1	71.6		
	2017 Q1	77.3	75.7	67.6	72.9	84.2	78.2	79.8	78.9	76.5	65.3	75.8	69.1	68.0	77.5	60.9	73.7	71.2	87.6	69.8	65.5	69.2	62.8	70.5	78.8	81.3	75.5	82.0	71.8	68.8	71.5	70.2	79.0	68.1	71.1		
	2017 Q2	78.0	77.4	67.8	75.8	85.1	79.0	80.4	79.5	78.1	66.6	76.4	72.1	69.1	77.9	62.7	75.0	71.7	90.9	70.8	66.4	70.4	60.9	71.0	79.0	81.9	76.4	79.9	72.5	70.1	72.0	72.9	80.7	71.3	72.3		
	2017 Q3	77.5	78.1	68.0	77.2	84.7	78.9	81.2	80.5	78.4	67.7	78.6	73.3	69.4	77.9	63.8	75.8	72.6	89.2	70.9	66.9	71.2	65.6	73.0	79.2	82.1	76.6	81.3	73.5	71.3	72.1	73.7	81.6	72.7	73.0		
	2017 Q4	78.0	77.8	68.6	75.8	84.8	79.5	81.3	80.6	78.6	66.9	78.9	71.8	69.1	78.1	62.9	76.1	72.5	86.8	70.2	66.5	71.5	64.4	73.1	79.1	82.2	76.0	82.1	73.3	71.5	72.2	73.1	80.3	70.9	72.2		
	2017	77.7	77.2	68.0	75.4	84.7	71.4	78.9	80.7	79.9	77.9	66.6	77.4	71.5	68.9	77.8	62.6	75.1	72.0	88.6	70.4	66.3	70.6	63.4	71.9	79.0	81.9	76.1	81.3	72.8	70.4	72.0	72.5	80.4	70.8	72.2	
	2018 Q1	77.8	76.3	68.7	74.2	84.2	77.4	81.0	80.0	78.0	66.7	76.9	71.1	68.6	78.2	63.0	75.9	72.4	86.0	69.6	65.9	71.2	62.2	73.6	72.2	76.2	78.8	82.1	77.1	81.6	73.1	71.4	72.9	72.4	80.1	69.8	72.3
	2018 Q2	78.1	78.2	68.5	76.4	84.9	78.4	81.5	80.0	79.0	67.9	78.6	74.4	69.1	78.3	64.5	76.0	72.4	88.2	69.6	67.0	73.4	65.5	73.1	79.0	82.5	77.9	81.3	74.0	72.0	73.5	74.7	81.6	71.7	73.2		
	2018 Q3	78.1	78.9	68.9	77.6	84.9	78.6	81.6	81.0	79.4	68.6	78.5	75.6	69.6	78.5	65.4	76.6	73.5	89.3	69.9	67.3	74.9	63.7	75.2	79.5	83.2	78.4	80.8	74.5	72.5	74.3	75.7	82.8	72.7	73.4		
	2018 Q4	78.5	78.8	69.2	76.0	85.1	79.5	81.9	80.8	79.6	68.2	80.3	73.8	69.0	78.7	65.1	76.5	73.0	86.7	69.3	66.8	73.7	66.8	72.7	79.1	83.5	77.6	81.2	74.3	72.3	74.2	74.8	81.5	69.6	72.9		
	2018	78.1	78.0	68.8	76.0	84.8	78.5	81.5	80.4	79.0	67.8	78.6	73.7	69.1	78.4	64.5	76.2	72.8	87.6	69.6	67.7	73.3	64.8	73.4	79.1	82.8	77.8	81.2	74.0	72.1	73.7	74.4	81.5	71.0	72.9		
	2019 Q1	78.5	77.6	68.8	74.3	85.1	76.9	81.4	80.8	78.2	67.6	77.2	72.5	68.5	78.4	64.5	77.1	73.1	85.7	69.4	65.9	73.0	66.6	73.2	78.9	83.3	77.2	80.9	74.1	72.3	74.4	74.8	80.3	66.7	72.7		
	2019 Q2	79.3	78.8	69.7	77.3	84.8	77.0	81.7	81.0	78.7	68.4	77.9	75.2	69.0	78.1	66.3	77.0	73.2	87.9	69.8	67.1	73.8	66.0	73.3	78.8	83.8	78.0	80.6	75.0	72.2	74.0	75.6	81.4	68.5	73.3		
	2019 Q3	78.9	79.5	70.4	78.5	84.6	76.8	81.7	81.1	79.0	68.8	80.5	75.9	69.2	78.5	66.5	77.3	74.0	86.9	69.9	67.6	73.6	67.6	74.7	79.1	83.8	79.2	80.5	76.0	73.5	74.2	74.8	82.4	69.6	74.2		
	2019 Q4	78.5	79.0	69.0	76.2	85.4	78.5	81.8	81.2	79.0	68.5	79.0	73.8	69.2	78.8	65.6	77.4	74.5	84.5	68.6	67.2	73.3	65.1	74.6	78.9	83.8	78.7	80.5	76.0	72.7	74.4	72.9	80.7	68.7	73.3		
	2019	78.8	78.7	69.5	76.6	85.0	77.3	81.7	81.0	78.7	68.3	78.6	74.3	69.0	78.4	65.7	77.2	73.7	86.2	69.4	67.0	73.4	66.3	73.9	78.9	83.7	78.3	80.6	75.3	72.7	74.3	74.5	81.2	68.4	73.4		
2020 Q1	77.9	77.0	69.3	73.5	84.8	74.5	81.3	...	78.4	67.8	76.7	72.9	69.0	77.9	64.8	76.7	74.2	84.9	68.3	66.4	73.8	63.5	73.4	78.3	84.0	78.8	81.3	75.5	72.0	73.7	73.0	80.2	65.5	72.3			
2020 Q2	74.8	76.4	68.4	68.3	83.3	62.7	80.8	...	77.6	65.1	75.2	73.6	67.6	72.2	64.6	75.8	70.5	83.7	66.9	65.8	72.1	63.1	72.7	65.6	82.5	77.7	80.0	75.2	69.9	72.4	72.6	80.1	62.7	65.6			
2020 Q3	75.4	78.6	69.5	74.3	83.7	69.7	81.4	...	78.0	66.6	76.9	74.7	68.8	76.9	65.9	77.4	72.0	86.6	65.9	66.7	70.9	62.9	72.7	73.3	83.0	77.9	78.6	76.2	70.1	73.2	73.0	80.4	67.0	69.2			
2020 Q4	77.5	77.8	68.6	74.0	84.3	74.7	81.0	...	78.1	66.7	76.6	73.7	68.6	...	65.1	77.6	72.0	79.3	65.1	66.5	71.6	65.1	73.3	75.5	83.2	78.0	79.7	76.4	71.3	73.6	73.3	79.8	66.0	69.6			
2020	76.4	77.4	69.0	72.5	84.0	70.4	81.1	...	78.0	66.5	76.3	73.7	68.5	...	65.1	76.9	72.2	83.7	66.5	66.3	72.1	63.6	73.0	73.2	83.2	78.1	79.9	75.8	70.8	73.2	73.0	80.1	65.3	69.2			
Foreign-born	2016 Q1	79.0	68.4	60.0	77.2	81.6	79.2	83.3	75.5	72.2	61.6	73.3	64.7	61.9	80.2	62.9	80.9	71.5	89.5	79.4	70.7	67.6	75.5	71.2	71.3	70.4	74.2	81.1	79.0	71.8	65.6	65.7	66.1	61.5	80.9		
	2016 Q2	78.7	71.5	62.3	78.3	84.0	73.4	85.3	75.2	71.5	63.1	81.8	65.4	64.1	81.0	66.9	84.6	73.2	87.7	80.9	72.2	70.3	74.9	74.3	67.4	69.8	72.7	81.4	68.4	74.2	74.6	66.7	68.6	67.9	82.3		
	2016 Q3	78.5	72.9	61.1	79.4	83.5	72.3	85.8	75.0	72.5	65.0	76.8	68.8	64.4	81.5	66.4	83.3	74.7	90.1	80.9	72.3	80.5	74.6	66.8	72.1	70.0	75.7	81.3	72.1	74.6	76.4	70.7	70.7	66.6	82.6		
	2016 Q4	78.9	70.2	64.8	79.4	84.2	80.3	85.3	75.5	73.8	64.7	75.1	66.8	63.9	82.0	62.9	81.6	74.2	89.8	80.2	71.6	72.2	74.9	65.9	69.3	69.2	73.6	83.7	72.6	73.3	77.7	74.9	69.4	67.7	81.3		
	2016	78.8	70.8	62.1	78.6	83.4	76.5	84.9	75.3	72.5	63.6	76.7	66.4	63.6	81.2	64.8	82.6	73.4	89.3	80.3	71.7	72.9	75.0	69.6	70.1	69.8	74.1	81.9	72.6	73.4	73.3	69.4	68.7	65.9	81.8		
	2017 Q1	78.6	69.0	63.0	78.5	81.0	80.9	86.0	74.4	70.5	64.1	79.1	64.6	63.1	81.2	62.6	79.2	76.0	93.1	81.5	71.8	66.9	75.6	69.7	66.4	69.1	72.9	82.9	66.6	75.0	83.4	68.2	64.2	81.4			
	2017 Q2	79.2	72.0	64.3	79.0	83.8	81.4	86.7	74.7	69.7	65.8	80.1	69.3	65.8	81.6	66.3	80.9	76.0	92.5	81.1	72.5	72.3	77.1	75.0	64.9	69.6	72.9	83.7	72.6	78.7	80.5	72.3	70.5	69.9	83.0		
	2017 Q3	79.2	73.7	66.3	79.8	85.0	80.4	87.5	74.3	71.1	66.5	78.1	69.4	66.5	82.6	67.7	82.4	77.1	89.5	81.4	73.5	74.5	73.7	72.3	67.1	72.1	74.0	82.4	81.1	78.8	81.9	75.7	72.1	66.8	82.8		
	2017 Q4	80.0	74.2	68.5	79.0	84.7	81.1	87.5																													

	AUS	AUT	BEL	CAN	CHE	CHL	COL	CZE	DEU	DNK	ESP	EST	FIN	FRA	GBR	GRC	HUN	IRL	ISL	ISR	ITA	LTU	LUX	LVA	MEX	NLD	NOR	NZL	POL	PRT	SVK	SVN	SWE	TUR	USA
2016 Q1	69.7	69.6	60.4	70.4	80.4	..	53.8	63.4	72.4	73.6	53.9	68.2	67.9	62.7	69.6	42.3	58.7	59.3	82.6	61.6	47.3	68.1	54.7	67.5	44.5	71.7	74.2	70.7	57.4	61.1	57.7	61.8	77.5	30.4	64.0
2016 Q2	70.3	69.9	59.7	71.8	79.6	..	56.5	64.2	72.6	74.5	54.6	70.2	69.2	63.2	70.0	43.5	59.9	60.1	83.8	62.0	48.5	69.2	57.2	68.6	45.0	72.5	74.5	71.5	58.1	61.6	58.1	63.9	79.4	32.7	64.3
2016 Q3	69.6	71.0	60.4	71.0	79.5	..	55.3	64.6	73.7	74.1	55.1	68.8	70.0	63.1	70.2	44.0	60.7	60.4	84.5	61.3	47.9	69.5	58.6	68.6	45.5	73.2	74.7	71.6	58.3	62.3	58.5	63.6	79.9	31.4	64.0
2016 Q4	70.1	70.2	62.4	71.5	80.7	..	57.2	65.6	74.2	73.3	55.4	69.0	68.2	62.9	70.7	43.3	61.0	60.7	83.2	61.9	48.2	69.3	59.6	69.2	45.3	72.9	74.2	72.6	58.4	62.4	58.9	64.7	78.3	30.8	64.6
2016	69.9	70.2	62.4	71.2	80.0	..	55.7	64.5	73.2	73.9	54.7	69.1	68.8	63.0	70.1	43.3	60.1	60.1	83.5	61.7	48.0	69.0	57.5	68.5	45.1	72.6	74.4	71.6	58.1	61.9	58.3	63.5	78.8	31.3	64.2
2017 Q1	69.7	70.3	60.6	70.9	78.9	..	53.6	65.3	73.4	72.7	55.0	71.1	68.3	62.6	71.2	43.6	60.3	62.0	83.0	62.4	48.1	69.1	59.1	68.0	44.8	72.9	73.5	72.4	58.9	62.6	59.9	65.3	78.6	30.9	64.4
2017 Q2	70.9	70.7	60.9	72.2	78.4	..	56.5	65.6	73.6	73.7	56.1	70.1	70.3	63.6	71.1	45.3	61.0	62.2	84.5	62.3	49.1	70.8	57.5	69.2	44.9	73.8	74.3	72.0	59.9	63.7	60.1	65.8	79.6	33.1	65.0
2017 Q3	71.1	71.2	61.8	71.8	78.5	..	55.4	66.6	74.3	74.1	56.3	71.7	70.0	63.4	71.0	45.1	61.6	62.5	82.9	62.3	48.8	70.6	60.9	69.5	44.8	74.4	74.2	73.4	59.5	64.8	60.6	67.4	80.5	32.6	65.1
2017 Q4	72.1	71.0	62.3	72.4	79.6	..	56.6	66.9	74.9	74.0	56.4	73.1	70.2	63.5	71.5	44.4	61.6	63.3	81.9	62.7	49.3	70.6	58.2	69.9	45.3	74.5	73.9	74.1	59.4	65.2	60.5	67.9	79.2	32.9	65.2
2017	70.9	70.8	61.4	71.8	78.9	50.2	55.5	66.1	74.1	73.7	55.9	71.5	69.7	63.3	71.2	44.6	61.1	62.5	83.1	62.4	48.8	70.3	58.9	69.1	45.0	73.9	74.0	73.0	59.4	64.1	60.3	66.6	79.4	32.4	64.9
2018 Q1	71.2	70.6	62.3	72.1	78.9	..	52.7	66.8	74.2	74.5	56.1	71.9	70.4	63.3	71.4	44.2	61.6	62.3	81.7	63.3	48.7	70.4	58.9	70.4	44.8	74.4	74.7	73.8	60.0	65.6	61.1	67.6	78.9	32.3	64.9
2018 Q2	71.9	70.4	61.9	73.2	78.4	..	55.5	67.3	74.0	75.5	57.3	72.2	73.2	64.1	71.3	46.4	62.5	63.3	83.4	63.6	50.0	71.0	58.0	70.9	45.9	75.4	75.4	73.8	61.4	66.7	60.6	68.4	80.6	33.8	65.7
2018 Q3	71.7	71.4	63.9	72.6	79.1	..	55.1	67.8	74.8	74.9	57.4	71.9	72.1	64.1	71.2	46.4	62.4	63.5	84.1	63.9	49.2	73.2	59.4	70.6	45.6	76.0	75.2	74.8	61.4	66.8	61.4	69.2	81.0	33.4	65.7
2018 Q4	72.2	70.8	64.3	72.8	79.1	..	55.3	68.3	75.5	74.7	57.8	72.2	71.8	64.1	71.7	46.0	62.4	63.9	82.7	63.3	49.6	72.1	58.4	71.2	46.2	76.3	75.1	74.0	60.3	66.5	62.0	69.8	80.0	32.8	66.2
2018	71.8	70.8	63.1	72.7	78.9	..	54.7	67.5	74.6	74.9	57.1	72.0	71.9	63.9	71.4	45.8	62.3	63.2	83.0	63.5	49.4	71.7	58.7	70.8	45.6	75.5	75.1	74.1	60.8	66.4	61.3	68.7	80.1	33.0	65.6
2019 Q1	71.8	70.7	63.6	72.1	78.6	..	52.6	68.1	74.7	72.6	57.6	71.2	71.3	64.0	72.0	46.6	62.4	64.1	82.6	64.1	49.6	72.1	57.7	69.5	45.9	76.1	74.8	73.9	60.3	66.5	62.5	69.1	79.4	32.0	65.6
2019 Q2	72.7	70.4	64.2	73.8	79.3	..	53.8	67.7	75.0	74.2	58.5	71.1	73.7	64.6	72.3	48.6	62.8	63.6	82.9	63.6	50.8	72.3	60.2	71.1	47.2	76.6	75.2	73.9	61.5	67.4	61.9	70.3	80.4	33.1	66.2
2019 Q3	72.9	71.7	64.7	73.6	79.5	..	53.3	68.1	75.7	74.5	58.3	72.1	73.7	64.1	71.7	48.5	62.8	63.8	81.6	63.2	49.9	73.1	59.6	71.7	47.2	77.0	75.8	74.1	61.6	67.1	62.4	70.1	81.0	32.5	66.5
2019 Q4	73.1	71.4	64.6	73.7	80.1	..	54.3	68.1	75.8	73.8	59.1	73.8	73.0	64.8	72.4	48.0	62.8	65.0	81.7	63.1	50.3	73.2	59.2	71.9	47.9	77.0	75.0	74.1	60.9	67.2	62.4	70.4	80.2	31.9	67.2
2019	72.6	71.1	64.3	73.3	79.4	..	53.5	68.0	75.3	73.8	58.4	72.0	72.9	64.4	72.1	47.9	62.7	64.1	82.2	63.5	50.2	72.7	59.2	71.0	47.1	76.7	75.2	74.0	61.1	67.1	62.3	70.0	80.3	32.4	66.4
2020 Q1	72.5	70.9	63.8	70.7	79.3	..	49.7	67.7	..	73.0	58.3	72.6	72.2	64.5	72.6	47.8	62.3	64.6	80.2	63.4	50.1	72.2	59.4	70.7	47.4	76.9	75.0	73.9	61.2	66.4	62.1	70.4	78.2	29.9	66.4
2020 Q2	69.1	69.6	63.6	63.8	77.6	..	39.2	66.6	..	72.3	55.1	68.7	71.2	63.5	71.8	47.8	61.2	61.0	76.3	61.3	49.1	70.8	60.5	70.6	39.1	75.6	74.6	72.4	60.5	65.1	60.9	67.9	78.5	29.3	57.8
2020 Q3	70.4	71.3	64.2	69.3	78.4	..	42.5	66.6	..	72.9	56.3	69.9	72.1	63.9	71.2	48.0	62.7	62.5	80.6	61.1	48.8	70.7	62.9	70.2	41.8	76.3	74.9	71.1	61.7	66.6	61.6	68.8	79.8	30.6	61.7
2020 Q4	72.1	71.2	63.6	70.4	79.9	..	48.4	66.9	..	73.2	57.5	72.3	71.0	64.5	..	48.2	62.7	63.2	75.3	60.7	50.2	71.2	62.4	70.1	44.8	77.0	74.5	72.4	62.3	66.6	61.9	68.8	78.4	29.7	64.0
2020	71.0	70.7	63.8	68.5	78.8	..	45.0	66.9	..	72.8	56.8	70.9	71.6	64.1	..	48.0	62.2	62.8	78.1	61.6	49.5	71.2	61.3	70.4	43.3	76.4	74.7	72.5	61.4	66.2	61.6	69.0	78.7	29.9	62.5
2016 Q1	61.5	58.6	45.9	64.7	70.7	..	53.4	61.8	60.7	62.6	50.1	64.4	51.3	48.3	62.3	42.1	61.0	56.2	77.8	75.7	47.7	67.2	64.8	60.9	40.3	53.2	65.2	67.5	51.1	64.4	54.4	54.9	60.3	24.3	57.9
2016 Q2	61.9	58.8	46.8	65.7	69.7	..	58.5	63.4	60.7	62.8	52.4	70.2	52.7	48.3	63.2	45.4	65.9	57.5	91.4	77.0	48.6	63.8	61.2	60.9	39.9	55.8	64.0	67.7	47.6	67.9	54.1	56.5	61.3	26.3	58.4
2016 Q3	62.1	58.9	46.3	65.5	69.2	..	51.5	61.7	60.2	59.4	53.4	65.9	53.7	48.8	63.6	46.2	64.9	57.9	84.9	78.0	49.8	63.4	62.2	60.2	38.5	55.6	64.5	68.1	51.4	68.7	64.6	54.0	61.7	25.7	58.6
2016 Q4	62.6	59.5	47.5	65.1	69.4	..	48.4	66.1	60.6	61.1	52.8	63.5	49.8	47.1	63.4	41.0	70.5	57.9	86.3	77.7	48.9	67.7	64.4	60.5	40.8	56.4	63.7	70.2	62.7	70.3	60.4	55.3	61.8	26.4	59.0
2016	62.0	58.9	46.6	65.3	69.8	..	52.3	63.3	60.5	61.5	52.2	66.0	51.9	48.1	63.1	43.7	65.5	57.4	85.3	77.1	48.8	65.5	63.1	60.6	39.9	55.2	64.3	68.4	53.4	67.8	58.1	55.2	61.3	25.7	58.5
2017 Q1	61.8	58.3	45.6	66.4	68.3	..	41.9	66.1	61.3	60.2	52.6	63.9	52.2	47.7	62.2	39.8	72.7	60.3	86.7	..	48.9	66.8	65.3	57.8	39.2	56.8	64.0	69.7	65.0	71.2	62.8	57.5	61.7	25.8	59.5
2017 Q2	62.6	59.0	48.3	67.7	67.8	..	51.8	68.6	60.7	58.3	53.7	67.3	51.8	49.6	63.5	44.9	68.0	62.7	90.4	..	49.5	68.8	65.8	61.8	39.2	55.7	64.5	69.0	67.9	72.5	61.5	60.0	63.1	27.7	59.6
2017 Q3	62.7	59.9	48.2	66.8	67.8	..	60.6	68.5	60.9	62.0	55.4	65.5	54.6	48.2	64.9	45.5	66.3	61.9	85.6	76.5	50.7	69.1	66.7	65.1	38.5	56.3	66.0	69.6	66.1	70.4	62.2	59.7	63.2	25.8	60.1
2017 Q4	63.5	59.8	49.2	66.7	67.8	..	52.6	68.3	61.4	58.0	55.3	68.2	52.9	49.4	64.2	39.8	65.6	62.7	86.8	76.7	48.9	70.3	65.2	63.6	38.7	56.5	66.2	71.4	60.5	71.2	63.2	61.7	61.5	27.6	59.3
2017	62.7	59.3	47.8	66.9	67.9	68.8	53.0	67.9																											

Annex Table 1.A.10. Quarterly unemployment rates by place of birth in OECD countries, 2016-20

Percentage of the active population aged 15-64

Total	AUS	AUT	BEL	CAN	CHE	CHL	COL	CZE	DEU	DNK	ESP	EST	FIN	FRA	GBR	GRC	HUN	IRL	ISL	ISR	ITA	LTU	LUX	LVA	MEX	NLD	NOR	NZL	POL	PRT	SVK	SVN	SWE	TUR	USA
2016 Q1	6.4	5.0	6.4	7.6	3.2	..	11.2	4.4	4.1	5.6	19.5	6.4	9.3	9.8	4.9	24.2	6.0	8.1	3.2	5.3	11.7	8.5	3.8	10.4	4.2	6.2	4.1	5.9	7.1	12.4	10.4	8.3	5.6	11.0	5.5
2016 Q2	5.8	4.9	6.6	6.8	3.0	..	9.5	3.9	3.7	5.4	18.8	6.5	9.7	8.8	4.8	22.6	5.1	8.4	3.8	4.9	11.3	8.1	3.1	9.8	4.1	5.7	4.0	5.2	6.2	11.2	9.7	7.6	5.6	9.5	5.1
2016 Q3	5.7	4.7	6.3	7.0	3.7	..	9.6	4.0	3.5	5.7	17.9	7.2	7.2	8.8	5.0	22.1	4.9	7.7	2.3	5.5	10.7	7.6	5.1	9.6	4.2	5.0	4.1	5.2	6.0	10.9	9.6	7.1	4.2	11.4	5.3
2016 Q4	5.5	4.3	5.6	6.3	2.9	..	8.8	3.6	3.3	5.4	17.6	6.5	7.7	9.5	4.6	22.8	4.4	6.7	2.6	5.0	11.9	7.8	3.6	9.5	3.7	4.9	3.5	5.7	5.6	10.7	9.2	8.0	4.3	12.2	4.8
2016	5.8	4.7	6.3	6.9	3.2	..	9.8	4.1	3.6	5.5	18.5	6.7	8.7	9.2	4.8	23.0	5.1	7.7	3.0	5.2	11.4	8.0	3.9	9.8	4.0	5.4	3.9	5.5	6.2	11.3	9.7	7.7	4.9	11.0	5.2
2017 Q1	6.3	4.4	6.2	7.2	3.5	..	11.2	3.5	3.6	5.7	17.6	6.0	9.2	9.2	4.4	22.6	4.5	6.9	3.2	4.5	11.9	8.4	4.8	9.5	3.5	4.9	3.6	5.7	5.4	10.3	8.8	7.5	5.0	12.8	5.0
2017 Q2	5.6	4.0	5.6	6.4	3.1	..	9.6	3.0	3.3	4.9	16.1	7.3	9.8	8.4	4.2	20.6	4.3	6.9	3.6	4.4	10.6	7.3	4.9	9.3	3.6	4.5	3.4	5.0	5.0	9.2	8.2	6.5	5.2	10.3	4.5
2017 Q3	5.4	4.4	5.9	6.2	3.9	..	9.8	2.8	3.1	5.5	15.3	5.2	7.2	8.5	4.4	19.6	4.1	6.6	2.2	4.6	10.4	6.6	3.9	9.0	3.7	4.0	3.2	4.8	4.8	8.6	8.0	6.2	4.0	10.6	4.7
2017 Q4	5.4	4.0	5.4	5.3	3.4	..	9.1	2.4	3.0	4.4	15.4	5.1	7.2	8.5	4.1	20.4	3.8	5.6	2.3	4.4	10.9	6.8	3.5	8.3	3.5	3.8	3.0	4.9	4.5	8.3	7.8	5.6	3.8	10.4	4.1
2017	5.7	4.2	5.7	6.3	3.5	8.3	9.9	2.9	3.3	5.1	16.1	5.9	8.4	8.6	4.3	20.8	4.2	6.5	2.8	4.5	11.0	7.3	4.3	9.0	3.6	4.3	3.3	5.1	4.9	9.1	8.2	6.5	4.5	11.0	4.6
2018 Q1	6.2	3.9	4.8	6.2	3.6	..	11.2	2.4	3.1	4.5	15.5	6.5	8.5	8.8	4.1	20.4	3.9	5.2	2.9	3.7	11.3	7.3	3.9	8.4	3.3	3.9	2.8	4.9	4.2	7.9	7.2	5.8	4.3	10.7	4.5
2018 Q2	5.5	3.4	4.9	5.9	3.1	..	9.9	2.2	3.0	4.0	14.2	4.7	8.0	8.0	3.9	18.4	3.6	5.7	3.2	4.1	10.5	6.1	3.8	7.8	3.5	3.4	3.0	4.6	3.6	6.9	6.7	5.2	4.4	9.8	4.1
2018 Q3	5.2	3.8	5.0	5.9	3.5	..	9.8	2.4	2.8	4.3	13.7	5.5	6.1	8.2	4.1	17.7	3.8	5.7	1.7	4.6	9.1	5.7	5.5	7.1	3.6	3.2	3.0	4.2	3.9	6.9	6.4	4.9	3.6	11.3	4.1
2018 Q4	4.9	3.5	4.3	5.0	3.3	..	9.6	2.1	2.7	4.4	13.5	4.0	5.7	8.4	3.8	17.8	3.6	5.1	2.2	4.6	10.4	6.0	4.6	7.1	3.4	3.0	2.8	4.8	3.9	6.7	6.1	4.3	3.2	12.5	3.8
2018	5.4	3.7	4.7	5.7	3.4	..	10.1	2.3	2.9	4.3	14.2	5.2	7.1	8.3	4.0	18.6	3.7	5.4	2.5	4.3	10.3	6.3	4.5	7.6	3.4	3.4	2.9	4.6	3.9	7.1	6.6	5.1	3.9	11.1	4.1
2019 Q1	5.5	3.7	4.4	6.1	3.4	..	12.2	2.1	2.8	5.2	13.7	4.5	7.0	8.4	3.7	18.0	3.6	4.6	2.9	4.0	10.7	6.7	3.7	7.1	3.5	3.2	2.9	5.1	4.0	6.6	5.9	4.6	5.0	15.0	4.3
2019 Q2	5.2	3.4	4.2	5.4	3.0	..	10.5	1.9	2.6	4.3	13.0	5.2	7.4	7.5	3.6	15.8	3.4	5.3	4.5	3.9	9.4	6.5	3.2	6.5	3.7	2.9	2.9	4.2	3.3	6.2	5.8	4.0	4.9	13.0	3.8
2019 Q3	5.2	3.5	4.2	5.6	3.4	..	10.9	2.1	2.6	4.8	13.0	3.9	5.8	7.7	4.0	15.6	3.5	5.2	3.3	4.2	8.9	6.3	4.3	6.2	3.9	2.9	2.9	4.4	3.2	6.3	6.0	4.7	4.2	14.3	4.0
2019 Q4	5.0	3.4	4.3	5.0	2.8	..	10.0	2.0	2.6	4.7	12.7	3.9	5.7	7.7	3.6	15.9	3.4	4.2	3.3	4.0	9.6	6.6	4.9	6.0	3.5	2.9	2.8	4.6	2.9	6.8	5.8	4.1	3.8	13.5	3.6
2019	5.2	3.5	4.3	5.5	3.2	..	10.9	2.0	2.6	4.7	13.1	4.4	6.5	7.8	3.7	16.3	3.5	4.8	3.5	4.0	9.6	6.5	4.1	6.5	3.6	3.0	2.9	4.6	3.3	6.5	5.9	4.3	4.5	13.9	3.9
2020 Q1	5.6	3.5	4.2	6.7	3.2	..	13.2	2.0	..	5.1	13.1	4.8	6.9	7.4	3.9	15.2	3.7	4.4	2.9	3.5	9.1	7.4	4.1	7.5	3.6	2.9	2.8	4.8	3.2	6.7	6.1	4.4	4.7	13.9	4.3
2020 Q2	6.7	4.0	3.8	12.7	3.5	..	20.8	2.4	..	5.1	13.5	7.4	8.7	6.3	3.8	15.5	4.7	4.9	6.5	4.2	7.6	8.8	5.5	8.7	4.9	3.4	3.5	4.1	3.2	5.3	6.7	5.0	6.3	13.1	12.5
2020 Q3	7.0	4.4	5.1	9.7	4.2	..	18.3	2.9	..	6.1	14.4	7.6	7.3	8.3	4.7	15.7	4.4	6.7	4.5	5.3	9.7	9.6	5.7	8.7	5.3	3.9	4.1	5.6	3.3	7.9	7.3	4.8	5.4	13.4	8.6
2020 Q4	6.3	3.9	4.7	7.6	3.8	..	14.4	3.1	..	5.5	14.0	7.4	7.0	7.7	..	15.6	4.2	5.1	5.5	5.1	9.0	9.4	4.4	8.1	4.7	3.5	3.4	5.4	3.1	7.4	7.0	5.0	4.8	13.0	6.4
2020	6.4	3.9	4.5	9.2	3.7	..	16.5	2.6	..	5.4	13.8	6.8	7.5	7.4	..	15.5	4.3	5.3	4.8	4.5	8.8	8.8	4.9	8.3	4.6	3.4	3.4	5.0	3.2	6.8	6.8	4.8	5.3	13.3	7.9
2016 Q1	6.3	11.6	17.7	8.1	9.5	..	13.6	6.7	7.2	12.0	28.9	8.9	18.6	18.1	6.1	33.3	7.3	10.0	-	4.6	15.9	9.2	7.5	11.3	3.3	11.9	9.8	5.4	12.7	16.7	-	14.2	16.9	13.0	4.8
2016 Q2	5.8	11.2	14.4	7.7	7.5	..	12.7	5.9	6.7	10.9	26.8	6.7	18.8	16.0	5.5	29.0	5.3	10.0	-	3.6	14.6	10.4	8.4	8.9	4.6	10.5	10.0	5.0	13.6	12.0	-	9.8	16.5	10.2	4.0
2016 Q3	5.8	11.9	15.9	7.6	7.9	..	12.5	5.7	7.0	11.5	24.5	12.0	15.4	15.6	5.5	28.6	4.8	9.6	5.0	3.9	13.7	8.4	8.6	11.5	5.9	10.3	9.5	4.9	10.9	12.0	-	11.0	15.1	14.2	4.3
2016 Q4	5.9	11.1	15.0	6.9	7.9	..	11.9	5.2	6.5	11.3	24.4	8.1	16.4	17.1	5.1	32.0	5.6	7.7	-	3.9	15.4	7.4	7.8	10.2	4.3	9.6	9.6	4.7	-	12.5	-	9.5	15.1	12.6	4.3
2016	6.0	11.4	15.7	7.6	8.2	..	12.6	6.1	6.8	11.4	26.1	9.0	17.6	16.7	5.5	30.7	5.8	9.3	4.1	4.0	14.9	8.8	8.1	10.5	4.5	10.6	9.7	5.0	10.2	13.3	6.2	11.1	15.9	12.6	4.3
2017 Q1	6.7	12.3	15.1	7.1	9.4	..	14.1	3.8	6.7	12.5	25.3	4.3	14.5	16.4	5.8	32.8	5.2	8.3	-	3.8	15.3	7.1	11.2	11.2	4.6	10.5	9.9	4.9	11.7	11.7	-	11.2	16.1	16.0	4.8
2017 Q2	5.8	10.7	13.8	6.7	7.5	..	14.4	2.3	6.3	10.3	23.6	6.7	16.7	14.7	5.3	28.2	3.2	7.6	-	3.9	14.1	5.7	6.7	6.7	4.5	9.2	10.0	4.6	10.9	9.0	-	6.9	15.7	9.3	3.7
2017 Q3	6.0	9.8	13.5	7.2	7.7	..	12.2	3.4	6.5	9.1	22.2	7.9	16.6	15.3	4.6	27.5	1.8	8.6	2.7	3.3	13.1	6.8	6.0	6.0	3.3	8.0	8.6	4.7	-	10.2	-	8.2	15.0	12.3	4.0
2017 Q4	5.3	10.0	11.2	6.2	7.4	..	13.5	2.6	6.1	10.5	22.6	6.8	15.3	15.3	4.8	31.3	3.0	8.1	6.1	3.8	14.3	6.6	8.3	8.3	4.4	8.0	7.8	4.1	-	9.1	-	7.6	15.0	10.0	3.7
2017	5.9	10.7	13.4	6.8	8.0	7.5	13.4	3.0	6.4	10.6	23.4	6.4	15.8	15.4	5.1	29.9	3.4	8.2	2.8	3.7	14.2	6.5	8.0	8.0	4.2	8.9	9.1	4.6	8.3	10.0	5.2	8.4	15.4	11.9	4.0
2018 Q1	6.1	10.5	12.2	6.5	9.0	..	16.4	3.0	6.2	10.8	23.5																								

Annex Table 1.A.11. Quarterly unemployment rates by place of birth and gender in OECD countries, 2016-20

Percentage of the active population aged 15-64

Men	AUS	AUT	BEL	CAN	CHE	CHL	COL	CZE	DEU	DNK	ESP	EST	FIN	FRA	GBR	GRC	HUN	IRL	ISL	ISR	ITA	LTU	LUX	LVA	MEX	NLD	NOR	NZL	POL	PRT	SVK	SVN	SWE	TUR	USA
2016 Q1	6.7	5.4	6.7	9.2	3.4	..	8.4	3.8	4.3	5.7	18.1	7.1	10.1	10.4	5.2	20.4	6.0	9.9	4.0	5.1	11.4	9.8	3.1	11.5	4.2	5.9	4.9	5.4	7.1	12.8	9.4	7.8	6.1	10.1	5.9
2016 Q2	5.7	5.4	6.7	8.0	2.9	..	7.3	3.5	4.0	5.2	17.2	7.8	9.9	9.2	5.1	18.8	5.3	9.8	3.2	4.9	10.6	9.6	..	10.9	4.1	5.4	5.2	4.8	6.4	11.3	8.6	7.0	5.9	8.7	5.3
2016 Q3	5.9	4.9	6.2	7.4	3.5	..	7.4	3.4	3.8	5.2	16.4	7.1	7.3	8.6	5.3	18.2	4.9	9.2	2.1	5.1	10.1	8.9	5.8	11.3	4.1	4.6	4.6	5.1	5.8	10.7	8.7	6.6	4.5	9.5	5.3
2016 Q4	5.8	4.6	6.1	7.1	2.8	..	6.6	3.0	3.6	5.3	16.3	7.3	8.2	9.7	5.0	19.0	4.4	7.8	2.4	4.6	11.2	9.2	3.7	11.1	3.6	4.5	4.2	5.4	5.5	10.7	8.6	8.0	4.6	10.3	5.1
2016	6.0	5.1	6.5	7.9	3.2	..	7.4	3.4	3.9	5.3	17.0	7.3	8.9	9.5	5.2	19.1	5.2	9.2	2.9	4.9	10.8	9.4	3.9	11.2	4.0	5.1	4.7	5.2	6.2	11.4	8.8	7.4	5.3	9.7	5.4
2017 Q1	6.4	5.1	6.0	8.7	3.8	..	8.4	2.8	4.0	5.8	16.0	6.2	9.9	9.2	5.0	19.0	4.4	7.4	3.5	4.4	11.1	10.5	5.9	10.6	3.4	4.5	4.4	4.9	5.5	10.0	8.8	7.6	5.5	11.8	5.5
2017 Q2	5.8	4.7	5.5	7.4	3.1	..	7.3	2.4	3.7	4.8	14.5	7.9	10.1	8.6	4.7	17.1	4.0	7.6	3.7	4.3	10.0	8.9	6.1	10.8	3.5	4.0	3.9	5.0	5.2	8.8	8.0	5.7	5.6	9.0	4.7
2017 Q3	5.9	4.6	6.1	6.3	3.9	..	7.4	2.2	3.3	5.4	13.7	5.8	7.2	8.5	4.8	15.9	3.7	7.2	2.0	4.4	9.6	7.8	3.6	9.6	3.5	3.7	3.5	4.3	4.7	7.9	7.8	5.3	4.2	8.4	4.6
2017 Q4	5.8	4.3	5.5	5.8	3.5	..	7.0	2.0	3.2	4.1	13.9	5.3	7.9	8.5	4.4	16.6	3.3	6.3	2.3	4.2	10.3	7.9	3.4	8.8	3.4	3.6	3.6	4.5	4.4	8.1	7.3	5.2	4.0	8.9	4.4
2017	5.9	4.7	5.8	7.0	3.6	7.6	7.5	2.4	3.5	5.0	14.5	6.3	8.8	8.7	4.7	17.1	3.9	7.1	2.9	4.3	10.3	8.8	4.7	10.0	3.5	4.0	3.8	4.7	4.9	8.7	8.0	5.9	4.8	9.5	4.8
2018 Q1	6.4	4.4	5.1	7.3	3.5	..	8.5	2.0	3.5	4.4	14.0	7.1	8.8	8.8	4.4	16.5	3.5	5.8	3.3	3.7	10.4	8.9	4.4	9.3	3.2	3.8	3.2	4.5	4.1	7.8	7.0	5.5	4.6	9.4	5.0
2018 Q2	5.9	3.6	4.6	6.6	3.0	..	7.7	1.8	3.4	4.2	12.8	4.9	8.4	8.1	4.1	14.8	3.5	6.2	3.7	4.1	9.9	6.8	3.9	9.5	3.5	3.4	3.6	4.5	3.8	6.8	6.3	4.9	4.7	8.5	4.4
2018 Q3	5.6	3.8	5.3	5.8	3.5	..	7.7	1.9	3.0	4.2	12.2	5.1	5.9	8.3	4.3	13.8	3.4	6.0	1.5	4.6	8.5	6.1	5.3	8.1	3.4	3.2	3.4	4.5	4.0	6.5	6.1	4.4	3.7	9.4	3.9
2018 Q4	5.4	3.6	4.6	5.5	3.0	..	7.1	1.6	2.9	4.4	12.0	3.4	6.2	8.4	4.1	13.9	3.6	5.4	2.4	4.6	9.8	6.4	5.0	7.8	3.3	3.1	2.9	5.0	3.7	6.3	5.6	4.0	3.2	11.4	4.0
2018	5.8	3.8	4.9	6.3	3.3	..	7.8	1.8	3.2	4.3	12.7	5.1	7.3	8.4	4.2	14.8	3.5	5.8	2.7	4.2	9.7	7.0	4.7	8.7	3.3	3.4	3.3	4.6	3.9	6.9	6.2	4.7	4.0	9.7	4.3
2019 Q1	5.8	3.9	4.9	7.2	3.0	..	9.3	1.9	3.0	4.8	12.1	4.5	7.9	8.5	4.1	14.3	3.6	5.0	3.6	4.1	10.3	7.3	4.3	7.8	3.4	3.2	3.1	4.8	3.5	6.2	5.8	4.0	5.0	13.9	4.8
2019 Q2	5.4	3.5	4.5	6.2	3.2	..	8.2	1.7	2.8	4.3	11.6	4.6	8.1	7.8	4.1	12.8	3.5	5.8	5.0	3.8	9.0	7.2	4.0	8.2	3.7	3.0	3.1	4.0	3.2	6.0	5.8	3.6	4.9	12.0	4.1
2019 Q3	5.7	3.7	4.4	5.7	3.5	..	8.5	1.8	3.0	4.7	11.4	3.3	6.0	7.9	4.3	12.3	3.3	5.6	3.3	3.8	8.3	7.2	4.3	6.7	3.9	3.0	3.1	4.3	2.9	5.8	5.8	4.5	4.0	12.5	4.0
2019 Q4	5.5	3.7	5.2	5.8	2.7	..	7.6	1.8	3.0	4.5	11.4	3.4	6.4	7.9	3.9	13.0	3.2	4.7	3.5	3.7	8.7	7.7	4.7	6.2	3.5	3.1	3.1	4.6	2.6	6.2	5.4	3.7	4.1	11.9	3.8
2019	5.6	3.7	4.7	6.2	3.1	..	8.4	1.8	2.9	4.6	11.6	4.0	7.1	8.0	4.1	13.1	3.4	5.3	3.9	3.8	9.0	7.4	4.3	7.3	3.6	3.1	3.1	4.4	3.1	6.1	5.7	4.0	4.5	12.6	4.1
2020 Q1	6.1	3.9	4.4	7.6	3.5	..	10.3	2.0	..	4.9	11.8	5.5	7.4	7.4	4.3	13.0	3.6	4.8	2.9	3.4	8.5	8.3	4.9	8.6	3.6	2.9	3.0	4.8	3.0	6.3	5.9	4.3	4.9	13.0	4.8
2020 Q2	7.0	4.2	4.1	13.3	4.1	..	17.9	2.2	..	4.7	12.5	7.4	8.9	6.7	4.2	13.2	4.4	5.0	6.4	4.5	7.3	10.0	6.6	10.2	5.5	3.5	3.8	3.9	3.2	5.4	6.8	4.6	6.5	12.9	11.7
2020 Q3	7.5	4.6	5.0	9.9	4.1	..	14.7	2.5	..	5.9	12.9	7.3	7.6	8.3	5.3	12.7	4.3	6.7	4.4	5.4	8.7	10.3	6.8	9.5	5.5	3.7	4.5	5.4	3.0	7.9	6.8	4.4	5.7	12.1	8.5
2020 Q4	6.6	4.2	4.8	8.3	3.7	..	10.7	2.5	..	5.4	12.6	7.7	7.2	7.8	..	12.9	4.0	5.3	5.9	5.0	8.6	10.2	5.1	8.6	4.9	3.4	3.7	5.2	3.1	7.4	6.4	4.9	5.0	12.0	7.0
2020	6.8	4.2	4.6	9.8	3.9	..	13.3	2.3	..	5.2	12.5	7.0	7.8	7.6	..	12.9	4.1	5.5	4.9	4.6	8.3	9.7	5.9	9.2	4.8	3.4	3.7	4.8	3.1	6.8	6.5	4.5	5.5	12.5	8.0
2016 Q1	5.5	13.0	18.8	8.7	9.5	..	11.9	5.4	7.7	9.7	27.4	..	16.3	18.3	5.3	29.5	5.7	11.5	..	5.1	14.3	..	6.9	..	3.3	10.6	9.9	5.2	..	14.8	..	14.1	18.2	14.3	4.4
2016 Q2	5.3	12.0	13.5	7.4	6.3	..	11.3	4.6	7.1	10.9	25.7	..	17.2	16.1	4.6	26.1	4.7	10.7	..	3.2	12.5	..	7.3	10.2	6.0	9.6	11.0	4.5	..	11.5	..	9.1	17.3	9.8	3.3
2016 Q3	5.4	12.8	16.1	6.9	7.2	..	11.5	2.7	7.4	9.8	23.1	11.6	12.8	15.2	4.7	26.2	..	9.4	..	4.2	12.5	..	7.7	12.6	5.0	9.8	8.6	4.8	..	12.7	..	7.7	15.3	14.1	3.5
2016 Q4	5.3	11.7	15.2	6.6	7.2	..	7.9	5.0	7.0	9.3	22.8	..	14.0	16.0	4.1	28.8	6.1	7.5	..	4.3	13.7	..	7.5	..	5.4	8.1	9.3	4.2	..	13.5	..	6.8	15.9	10.4	3.8
2016	5.4	12.4	15.9	7.4	7.6	..	10.3	4.5	7.3	9.9	24.7	9.9	15.1	16.4	4.7	27.6	5.1	9.8	4.5	4.2	13.2	8.2	7.3	10.5	4.9	9.6	9.7	4.7	..	13.1	..	9.4	16.6	12.2	3.8
2017 Q1	5.9	12.8	14.5	6.9	9.1	..	6.7	3.2	7.7	12.1	24.3	..	15.2	15.7	4.3	29.0	..	7.7	..	4.1	13.8	7.2	12.9	12.9	5.6	10.3	9.8	4.1	..	12.2	..	7.5	16.8	15.4	4.7
2017 Q2	4.9	10.3	13.6	6.4	6.3	..	11.9	1.8	7.1	9.5	22.4	..	15.3	14.2	4.2	25.0	..	8.1	..	4.3	12.4	5.2	..	4.3	8.8	10.0	4.2	..	8.9	..	5.0	16.4	8.7	3.0	
2017 Q3	5.3	10.5	13.3	6.2	6.4	..	10.6	2.4	7.1	8.0	21.2	..	14.7	14.7	3.6	24.0	..	7.9	..	3.1	11.4	6.4	..	3.3	7.4	8.7	4.3	..	9.2	..	4.4	15.1	11.5	3.4	
2017 Q4	4.6	10.0	10.8	5.8	6.2	..	7.1	1.8	6.7	9.8	21.0	..	12.3	15.0	3.5	26.7	..	8.0	..	3.6	12.6	6.2	11.8	..	3.8	6.8	7.6	3.6	..	7.7	..	5.2	14.9	9.6	3.0
2017	5.2	10.9	13.1	6.3	7.0	5.8	9.0	2.3	7.1	9.9	22.2	6.7	14.3	14.9	3.9	26.2	3.0	7.9	..	3.8	12.6	6.2	8.8	8.8	4.2	8.3	9.0	4.1	6.9	9.5	..	5.5	15.8	11.2	3.5
2018 Q1	5.3	10.5	12.6	6.5	8.6	..	12.7	1.9	7.1	9.2	22.0	..	12.0	14.8	3.9	26.8	..	6.4	..	3.4	14.0	7.7	5.4	..	3.1	6.6	9.5	3.7	..	9.5	..	5.8	15.6	13.3	3.8
2018 Q2	4.7	9.4	13.4	6.0	6.7	..	9.1	2.1	6.6	9.0	19.0	..	12.2	13.4	3.5	21.0	..	7.0	..	3.3	11.3	4.7	6.5	8.1	4.6	6.1	7.4	4.1	..	6.1	..	4.8	16.5	9.5	2.7
2018 Q3	4.7	8.3	10.9	6.0	6.0	..	8.4	1.8	7.0	8.9	18.3	..	12.4	13.4	4.4	20.4	5.6	6.2	..	3.7	10.1	8.5	6.6	..	4.4	5.8	7.6	2.9	..	6.1	..	3.6	14.3	8.8	2.7
2018 Q4	4.2	10.1	12.5	5.7	6.6	..	7.5	1.5	5.8	8.8	17.4	..	11.2	13.4	3.7	23.8	..	5.8	..	3.6	12.2	11.3	5.3	..	4.5	5.9	5.6	4.2	..	6.1	..	4.2	15.3	12.7	2.8
2018	4.7	9.6	12.4	6.0	7.0	..	9.1	1.8	6.6	9.0	19.1	7.9	11.9	13.8	3.9	22.9	4.3	6.4	5.2	3.8	11.9	8.0	5.9	7.1	4.2	6.1	7.5	3.7	4.2	6.9	..	4.6	15.4	11.1	3.0
2019 Q1	4.7	10.4	12.1	6.6	8.0	..	12.2	1.0	6.8	9.1	17.2	..	9.3	13.3	3.4																				

Women	AUS	AUT	BEL	CAN	CHE	CHL	COL	CZE	DEU	DNK	ESP	EST	FIN	FRA	GBR	GRC	HUN	IRL	ISL	ISR	ITA	LTU	LUX	LVA	MEX	NLD	NOR	NZL	POL	PRT	SVK	SVN	SWE	TUR	USA
2016 Q1	6.1	4.5	6.1	5.9	2.9	..	14.9	5.0	3.8	5.5	21.3	5.7	8.3	9.2	4.5	28.8	6.0	6.0	2.4	5.6	12.2	7.3	4.7	9.3	4.2	6.6	3.1	6.4	7.0	12.0	11.6	9.0	5.1	12.9	5.0
2016 Q2	5.8	4.4	6.5	5.6	3.1	..	12.2	4.6	3.4	5.6	20.7	5.2	9.4	8.4	4.4	27.3	4.9	6.6	4.5	4.8	12.1	6.7	-	8.7	4.1	6.0	2.8	5.6	6.0	11.1	11.0	8.3	5.2	11.3	4.9
2016 Q3	5.5	4.6	6.4	6.6	3.9	..	12.5	4.8	3.2	6.3	19.6	7.3	7.1	9.1	4.6	27.0	4.9	6.0	2.6	6.0	11.5	6.4	4.4	7.9	4.4	5.4	3.7	5.4	6.2	11.0	10.7	7.6	3.9	15.3	5.2
2016 Q4	5.1	4.0	5.1	5.4	3.0	..	11.5	4.3	2.9	5.6	19.1	5.6	7.1	9.2	4.0	27.6	4.5	5.3	2.9	5.4	12.8	6.5	-	7.8	3.7	5.3	2.6	6.0	5.8	10.7	10.0	7.9	4.0	16.1	4.4
2016	5.6	4.4	6.0	5.9	3.2	..	12.8	4.7	3.3	5.7	20.2	5.9	8.0	9.0	4.4	27.7	5.1	6.0	3.1	5.4	12.2	6.7	4.0	8.4	4.1	5.8	3.0	5.9	6.3	11.2	10.8	8.2	4.5	13.9	4.9
2017 Q1	6.2	3.7	6.4	5.6	3.2	..	14.9	4.3	3.2	5.5	19.4	5.9	8.5	9.1	3.7	27.1	4.7	6.2	2.8	4.5	12.8	6.3	3.5	8.4	3.7	5.4	2.8	6.5	5.4	10.7	8.8	7.4	4.4	14.8	4.5
2017 Q2	5.5	3.3	5.7	5.4	3.1	..	12.4	3.8	2.8	5.0	17.9	6.5	9.4	8.1	3.7	25.0	4.7	6.0	3.5	4.6	11.5	5.6	3.5	7.7	3.8	4.9	2.9	4.9	4.8	9.6	8.3	7.4	4.9	13.2	4.3
2017 Q3	5.0	4.0	5.6	6.1	3.9	..	13.0	3.5	2.9	5.7	17.2	4.5	7.3	8.5	4.1	24.4	4.7	5.9	2.3	4.9	11.4	5.5	4.3	8.3	3.9	4.4	3.0	5.4	5.0	9.3	8.3	7.2	3.9	15.1	4.7
2017 Q4	4.9	3.7	5.2	4.7	3.3	..	11.8	2.9	2.8	4.6	17.1	4.9	6.5	8.4	3.8	25.3	4.5	4.9	2.3	4.7	11.8	5.8	3.6	7.7	3.7	4.0	2.3	5.3	4.6	8.4	8.5	6.2	3.5	13.6	3.7
2017	5.4	3.7	5.7	5.4	3.4	9.2	13.0	3.6	2.9	5.2	17.9	5.4	8.0	8.5	3.8	25.4	4.6	5.8	2.8	4.7	11.9	5.8	3.7	8.0	3.7	4.7	2.7	5.5	4.9	9.5	8.5	7.1	4.2	14.2	4.3
2018 Q1	5.9	3.3	4.5	5.0	3.6	..	14.7	2.9	2.7	4.6	17.2	5.8	8.1	8.8	3.8	25.3	4.3	4.6	2.4	3.7	12.4	5.8	7.4	3.3	3.9	2.3	5.4	4.3	8.1	7.4	6.2	4.0	13.6	4.0	
2018 Q2	5.0	3.2	5.2	5.1	3.2	..	12.7	2.8	2.5	3.9	15.9	4.5	7.5	7.8	3.6	22.9	3.6	5.2	2.7	4.1	11.3	5.4	3.7	5.9	3.4	3.5	2.4	4.8	3.5	7.0	7.2	5.5	4.1	12.6	3.8
2018 Q3	4.7	3.9	4.6	6.0	3.5	..	12.6	3.0	2.5	4.5	15.4	5.8	6.4	8.1	3.9	22.6	4.4	5.4	1.9	4.6	10.0	5.2	5.8	6.1	3.9	3.2	2.5	3.9	3.7	7.2	6.8	5.5	3.5	15.1	4.3
2018 Q4	4.4	3.4	3.9	4.4	3.6	..	12.9	2.6	2.4	4.4	15.2	4.6	5.2	8.4	3.5	22.6	3.7	4.7	2.0	4.6	11.2	5.6	4.0	6.5	3.5	2.9	2.6	4.6	4.1	7.1	6.8	4.5	3.2	14.8	3.6
2018	5.0	3.5	4.5	5.1	3.5	..	13.2	2.8	2.5	4.3	15.9	5.2	6.8	8.3	3.7	23.3	4.0	5.0	2.3	4.3	11.2	5.5	4.2	6.5	3.6	3.4	2.5	4.7	3.9	7.3	7.0	5.4	3.7	14.0	3.9
2019 Q1	5.2	3.4	3.9	4.8	3.9	..	15.9	2.2	2.5	5.7	15.6	4.6	6.0	8.4	3.2	22.5	3.6	4.0	2.1	4.0	11.4	6.2	-	6.4	3.6	3.2	2.8	5.4	4.6	7.0	6.0	5.2	5.0	17.1	3.8
2019 Q2	4.9	3.3	3.8	4.5	2.8	..	13.4	2.3	2.3	4.3	14.7	5.8	6.6	7.3	3.1	19.6	3.3	4.7	3.8	4.0	9.9	5.7	-	4.7	3.6	2.7	2.7	4.3	3.3	6.4	5.8	4.4	4.9	15.1	3.6
2019 Q3	4.7	3.3	4.1	5.5	3.4	..	14.0	2.5	2.2	4.8	14.8	4.6	5.5	7.6	3.6	19.6	3.8	4.8	3.4	4.7	9.7	5.4	4.3	5.6	3.9	2.8	2.7	4.5	3.4	6.8	6.2	4.9	4.5	18.0	4.1
2019 Q4	4.4	3.1	3.3	4.3	2.9	..	13.1	2.3	2.2	4.9	14.2	4.3	5.1	7.4	3.4	19.4	3.6	3.5	3.0	4.3	10.8	5.4	5.2	5.8	3.5	2.7	2.4	4.6	3.2	7.3	6.2	4.5	3.5	16.8	3.4
2019	4.8	3.3	3.8	4.8	3.3	..	14.1	2.3	2.3	4.9	14.8	4.8	5.8	7.7	3.3	20.3	3.6	4.3	3.1	4.3	10.5	5.7	3.8	5.6	3.7	2.8	2.6	4.7	3.6	6.9	6.0	4.8	4.5	16.7	3.7
2020 Q1	5.2	3.0	4.0	5.7	2.8	..	17.1	2.1	..	5.2	14.7	3.9	6.4	7.3	3.4	18.1	3.8	3.9	2.9	3.6	9.9	6.4	-	6.4	3.6	2.9	2.5	4.9	3.3	7.1	6.3	4.6	4.5	15.7	3.8
2020 Q2	6.3	3.7	3.5	12.2	2.9	..	24.9	2.6	..	5.4	14.8	7.4	8.4	5.9	3.4	18.4	5.1	4.7	6.5	3.8	7.9	7.6	4.2	7.2	4.0	3.3	3.2	4.3	3.1	5.2	6.7	5.4	6.1	13.4	13.4
2020 Q3	6.5	4.2	5.2	9.5	4.4	..	23.3	3.5	..	6.3	16.2	8.0	7.0	8.3	4.0	19.5	4.6	6.8	4.6	5.3	11.0	9.0	4.5	7.9	5.0	4.0	3.6	5.7	3.7	7.9	7.9	5.2	5.0	16.1	8.8
2020 Q4	6.0	3.6	4.5	6.8	3.8	..	19.3	3.8	..	5.6	15.6	7.1	6.7	7.6	..	18.9	4.3	4.9	4.9	5.2	9.5	8.5	3.6	7.7	4.4	3.6	2.9	5.5	3.2	7.4	7.7	5.1	4.5	15.0	5.9
2020	6.0	3.6	4.3	8.5	3.5	..	21.0	3.0	..	5.6	15.3	6.6	7.2	7.3	..	18.7	4.5	5.1	4.7	4.5	9.6	7.9	3.9	7.3	4.2	3.5	3.1	5.1	3.3	6.9	7.2	5.1	5.0	15.1	7.9
2016 Q1	7.3	10.0	16.2	7.5	9.5	..	16.2	8.4	6.5	14.2	30.5	-	20.9	17.8	7.1	37.8	9.2	8.1	-	4.1	17.7	-	8.3	12.9	3.5	13.3	9.3	5.6	-	18.3	-	14.3	15.7	10.2	5.5
2016 Q2	6.5	10.2	15.5	8.1	8.7	..	14.4	7.5	6.1	11.0	27.9	-	20.4	15.8	6.5	32.5	5.9	9.1	-	3.9	17.1	-	9.8	7.7	2.1	11.4	8.9	5.5	-	12.4	-	10.6	15.5	11.1	4.8
2016 Q3	6.4	10.8	15.6	8.5	8.8	..	14.1	9.3	6.5	13.4	25.9	12.5	18.2	16.1	6.4	31.4	6.2	9.9	-	3.7	15.1	-	9.7	10.5	7.8	10.8	10.4	5.0	-	11.5	-	15.1	14.8	14.4	5.4
2016 Q4	6.7	10.4	14.7	7.4	8.6	..	18.6	5.5	5.9	13.7	28.0	-	19.2	18.1	6.4	35.7	5.0	7.9	-	3.5	17.5	-	7.1	10.5	2.4	11.0	9.2	5.3	-	11.7	-	13.1	14.3	16.4	4.9
2016	6.7	10.4	15.5	7.9	8.9	..	16.0	7.6	6.2	13.0	27.6	8.3	19.7	17.0	6.6	34.4	6.6	8.8	-	3.8	16.9	9.5	8.7	10.4	3.9	11.6	9.5	5.3	14.2	13.5	-	13.3	15.1	13.2	5.2
2017 Q1	7.7	11.6	15.9	7.3	9.7	..	28.5	4.6	5.5	12.9	28.2	-	13.7	17.2	7.6	37.4	5.6	9.1	-	3.5	17.0	7.0	9.6	-	2.9	10.7	10.1	5.8	-	11.3	-	15.1	15.3	17.2	5.0
2017 Q2	6.8	11.2	13.9	7.1	8.9	..	17.6	2.9	5.3	11.3	24.7	-	18.3	15.3	6.6	31.8	-	7.1	-	3.5	16.1	6.3	-	4.9	9.7	10.0	4.9	-	9.1	-	9.1	15.0	10.5	4.5	
2017 Q3	6.8	9.0	13.8	8.3	9.2	..	14.5	4.7	5.7	10.2	23.2	-	18.8	15.9	5.8	31.3	-	9.5	-	3.4	15.1	7.3	7.9	-	3.2	8.6	8.4	5.1	-	11.1	-	12.6	14.8	13.9	4.8
2017 Q4	6.1	10.0	11.6	6.7	8.8	..	22.2	3.6	5.2	11.3	24.2	-	18.7	15.6	6.2	36.5	-	8.2</																	

Annex Table 1.A.12. Quarterly participation rates by place of birth in OECD countries, 2016-20

Percentage of the population aged 15-64

Total	AUS	AUT	BEL	CAN	CHE	CHL	COL	CZE	DEU	DNK	ESP	EST	FIN	FRA	GBR	GRC	HUN	IRL	ISL	ISR	ITA	LTU	LUX	LVA	MEX	NLD	NOR	NZL	POL	PRT	SVK	SVN	SWE	TUR	USA
2016 Q1	78.6	78.2	67.9	77.1	85.6	..	74.0	74.2	78.7	80.2	73.4	75.5	75.2	72.2	77.4	67.1	69.1	69.3	87.6	69.2	63.4	62.4	74.7	76.5	63.1	81.1	78.2	79.7	68.5	72.6	71.6	70.5	82.7	55.8	71.2
2016 Q2	78.6	78.9	68.2	78.8	85.1	..	74.6	74.6	78.7	81.1	73.6	78.2	78.2	72.1	77.5	67.3	69.8	70.4	90.8	69.5	64.7	64.0	75.8	76.8	63.6	81.4	78.6	79.8	68.6	72.7	71.9	72.3	84.6	57.6	71.7
2016 Q3	77.8	78.2	68.4	79.2	85.8	..	74.0	75.2	79.5	81.5	73.6	79.1	76.7	72.3	77.9	67.7	70.5	70.8	90.3	69.9	64.0	65.0	75.7	77.0	64.2	81.4	78.9	80.0	69.1	73.5	72.1	71.9	84.0	57.8	71.9
2016 Q4	78.1	77.1	69.0	78.0	86.0	..	75.2	75.5	79.6	80.1	73.3	76.9	74.9	72.4	77.7	67.2	70.5	70.3	88.4	69.5	64.7	65.5	75.6	77.0	63.7	81.3	69.0	73.1	72.0	72.5	82.5	57.2	71.4		
2016	78.3	77.1	68.4	78.3	85.6	..	74.5	74.7	79.1	80.7	73.5	77.4	76.7	72.2	77.6	67.3	70.0	70.2	89.3	69.5	64.2	64.3	75.5	76.8	63.6	81.3	78.3	80.2	68.8	73.0	71.9	71.8	83.4	57.1	71.5
2017 Q1	78.4	76.4	68.4	77.5	84.5	..	73.9	75.3	79.1	79.1	73.1	78.1	75.7	71.9	77.7	67.4	70.1	69.9	88.2	69.2	64.5	64.0	75.5	76.5	63.2	81.1	77.4	81.8	69.1	73.2	72.1	73.4	82.9	56.9	71.3
2017 Q2	78.9	77.2	68.2	79.1	84.4	..	74.6	75.4	79.2	79.9	73.2	78.9	78.9	72.4	77.8	67.9	71.0	69.9	91.0	69.7	64.7	62.2	76.2	77.2	63.4	81.6	78.1	79.9	69.7	73.5	72.0	74.2	84.6	58.3	71.9
2017 Q3	78.5	78.0	68.9	79.4	85.0	..	74.1	76.1	79.9	80.8	73.3	79.2	77.2	72.5	78.0	67.8	71.6	72.3	88.1	69.9	64.6	65.8	76.0	78.2	63.5	81.6	77.9	81.2	69.9	74.3	72.2	75.3	84.5	59.1	72.4
2017 Q4	79.3	77.5	69.2	78.2	85.1	..	74.6	76.0	80.2	79.8	73.0	80.1	76.6	72.4	78.0	67.4	71.5	71.9	86.4	69.6	65.1	63.6	76.2	77.9	63.6	81.5	77.3	82.1	69.5	74.4	72.0	74.8	82.9	58.1	71.6
2017	78.8	77.3	68.7	78.6	84.8	65.7	74.3	75.7	79.6	79.9	73.1	79.1	77.1	72.3	77.9	67.6	71.1	71.9	88.4	69.6	64.7	63.9	76.0	77.5	63.4	81.5	77.7	81.2	69.5	73.9	72.1	74.4	83.7	58.1	71.8
2018 Q1	79.4	76.5	68.8	78.0	84.6	..	73.0	75.8	79.6	79.8	72.7	79.6	77.3	72.3	78.0	67.3	71.5	71.1	86.4	69.1	64.7	64.3	63.5	78.0	63.1	81.5	78.1	81.7	69.4	74.3	72.2	74.4	83.1	57.3	71.8
2018 Q2	79.3	77.0	68.6	79.4	84.4	..	74.0	76.2	79.4	80.5	73.0	79.1	80.2	72.3	77.8	67.9	71.8	72.0	88.7	69.5	65.5	76.9	64.2	78.1	63.9	81.8	79.1	81.3	70.2	74.4	71.9	75.6	84.9	58.6	72.3
2018 Q3	79.0	78.2	69.3	79.8	85.1	..	73.9	76.7	80.1	80.7	73.1	79.5	78.7	72.8	78.1	67.9	72.2	72.6	88.3	70.2	64.2	78.5	65.2	78.4	64.1	82.3	79.2	81.2	70.7	74.7	72.5	76.3	85.0	59.9	72.4
2018 Q4	79.2	77.6	69.8	78.3	84.9	..	74.2	76.8	80.3	80.7	72.9	79.4	77.2	72.6	78.2	67.5	72.0	72.1	86.7	69.6	65.0	77.6	65.7	77.5	64.0	82.5	78.6	81.4	70.0	74.3	72.6	75.6	83.4	58.6	72.2
2018	79.2	77.3	69.3	78.9	84.7	..	73.8	76.4	79.9	80.5	72.9	79.4	78.3	72.5	78.0	67.7	71.9	71.9	87.6	69.6	64.8	77.3	64.7	78.0	63.8	82.0	78.7	81.4	70.1	74.4	72.3	75.5	84.1	58.6	72.2
2019 Q1	79.5	77.0	69.3	78.0	84.7	..	73.4	76.4	80.0	79.6	72.6	77.7	77.3	72.3	78.1	67.7	72.3	71.8	86.8	69.6	64.8	77.8	64.7	76.7	63.9	82.3	78.4	81.5	70.0	74.2	72.8	75.5	84.1	58.1	72.2
2019 Q2	80.2	77.3	69.9	79.9	84.7	..	72.8	76.3	80.1	79.9	73.0	78.6	80.4	72.2	78.0	68.2	72.3	72.2	89.5	69.5	65.1	78.1	65.3	77.2	64.7	82.6	78.9	80.6	70.5	74.4	72.2	76.1	85.1	58.5	72.5
2019 Q3	80.1	78.4	70.6	80.6	85.0	..	72.8	76.7	80.5	80.6	73.1	79.5	79.3	72.2	78.2	68.1	72.6	72.7	87.2	69.5	64.6	78.3	66.6	78.0	64.9	82.9	79.9	80.8	71.1	75.0	72.7	76.1	85.3	59.7	73.3
2019 Q4	79.8	77.9	69.8	78.9	85.2	..	73.5	76.7	80.7	80.2	73.2	79.5	77.9	72.6	78.5	67.5	72.6	72.8	86.0	68.7	65.1	78.4	65.4	77.9	64.9	82.8	79.1	81.0	70.5	74.9	72.6	74.7	83.6	58.3	72.8
2019	79.9	77.6	69.9	79.3	84.9	..	73.1	76.5	80.3	80.1	73.0	78.8	78.7	72.3	78.2	67.9	72.4	72.4	87.4	69.3	64.9	78.1	65.5	77.5	64.6	82.7	79.1	81.0	70.5	74.6	72.6	75.6	84.5	58.6	72.7
2020 Q1	79.7	76.7	69.5	77.3	84.8	..	71.3	76.2	..	79.8	72.6	78.4	78.0	72.0	78.3	66.4	72.1	72.6	85.1	68.3	64.1	78.8	64.1	77.9	64.5	82.9	79.1	81.6	70.6	74.1	72.3	75.1	83.1	55.5	72.4
2020 Q2	77.1	76.1	68.7	75.7	83.4	..	64.0	75.7	..	79.0	69.6	77.7	79.3	69.9	77.5	66.5	71.9	69.1	85.7	66.9	62.2	78.4	65.4	78.5	54.4	81.9	78.9	79.4	70.1	71.2	71.6	74.0	84.6	53.1	70.5
2020 Q3	78.4	78.4	70.5	79.5	84.6	..	68.3	76.4	..	80.4	71.9	79.4	79.2	72.3	77.7	67.5	73.3	72.0	87.6	67.1	64.0	78.4	66.7	78.2	60.1	82.9	79.7	79.2	71.3	74.2	72.8	74.6	84.6	56.5	71.6
2020 Q4	79.9	77.5	69.4	78.2	85.4	..	71.5	76.4	..	80.0	72.3	80.4	77.8	72.1	..	67.1	73.2	71.2	81.8	66.4	64.2	78.8	66.7	78.0	62.4	83.0	78.9	80.4	71.6	74.3	72.9	74.8	83.1	55.1	71.3
2020	78.8	77.2	69.5	77.7	84.6	..	68.8	76.2	..	79.8	71.6	79.0	78.6	71.6	..	66.9	72.6	71.2	85.1	67.2	63.6	78.6	65.7	78.2	60.4	82.7	79.2	80.1	70.9	73.5	72.4	74.6	83.9	55.1	71.4
2016 Q1	74.8	71.5	64.1	77.0	84.2	..	77.2	77.8	73.3	76.1	78.1	74.4	70.5	66.6	75.5	78.0	75.8	70.6	88.2	81.2	69.2	75.9	74.2	73.3	57.9	69.3	77.3	78.4	72.7	81.3	68.0	70.4	76.0	47.3	72.9
2016 Q2	74.5	73.1	63.5	77.8	83.1	..	75.6	79.1	72.7	75.1	78.5	80.8	72.2	66.3	76.0	78.3	79.0	72.4	91.5	81.7	69.5	74.4	74.6	73.0	55.9	69.5	76.3	78.4	66.8	80.4	69.5	68.5	77.6	49.7	73.1
2016 Q3	74.5	74.4	63.6	78.2	83.0	..	71.2	77.9	72.9	74.3	77.9	80.4	71.9	66.4	76.5	78.2	77.9	73.0	91.7	82.6	69.6	74.6	78.3	71.4	59.3	69.4	77.4	78.4	69.8	81.1	70.1	70.2	77.8	51.6	73.6
2016 Q4	75.0	72.7	65.7	77.3	83.4	..	74.1	79.5	73.0	76.1	77.2	75.5	69.1	66.1	76.3	75.3	80.5	71.2	89.6	82.0	70.1	75.4	75.4	70.0	57.4	69.0	75.7	80.6	70.4	81.9	68.6	72.2	77.1	51.9	73.1
2016	74.7	72.9	64.2	77.6	83.4	..	74.2	78.3	73.0	75.4	74.9	77.8	71.6	66.4	76.1	77.5	80.3	71.8	90.3	81.9	69.6	75.1	75.6	71.9	57.6	69.3	76.7	79.0	69.8	81.2	69.0	70.3	77.1	50.2	73.2
2017 Q1	75.1	72.3	63.7	77.8	82.5	..	74.6	79.1	72.9	74.8	77.6	74.1	68.1	65.7	78.8	74.9																			

Annex Table 1.A.13. Quarterly participation rates by place of birth and gender in OECD countries, 2016-20

Percentage of the population aged 15-64

Men	AUS	AUT	BEL	CAN	CHE	CHL	COL	CZE	DEU	DNK	ESP	EST	FIN	FRA	GBR	GRC	HUN	IRL	ISL	ISR	ITA	LTU	LUX	LVA	MEX	NLD	NOR	NZL	POL	PRT	SVK	SVN	SWE	TUR	USA
2016 Q1	83.1	79.4	71.4	79.4	88.3	...	85.3	81.5	82.0	82.3	78.3	78.7	76.4	75.4	82.0	74.7	75.8	75.4	90.4	73.0	72.9	67.5	76.1	78.7	81.3	85.4	79.9	84.1	75.2	75.9	77.9	72.9	83.6	76.5	75.2
2016 Q2	82.5	80.7	72.5	81.4	87.9	...	85.4	81.6	82.1	83.1	78.2	82.4	80.1	75.2	81.9	74.9	76.7	76.6	93.7	73.7	74.1	68.6	77.6	78.6	81.7	85.6	80.4	84.1	75.4	76.4	78.3	74.6	85.3	78.2	75.9
2016 Q3	82.0	81.8	72.2	82.2	88.8	...	85.3	82.3	82.8	83.8	78.5	84.2	78.0	75.2	82.1	75.3	77.2	77.3	93.6	74.5	73.7	68.8	77.2	79.7	82.4	85.4	80.1	84.5	76.0	77.1	78.5	74.9	84.8	78.3	76.5
2016 Q4	82.4	80.9	72.1	80.4	88.6	...	86.1	82.3	82.8	82.6	78.1	80.8	76.4	75.5	81.8	74.9	77.2	76.4	91.0	73.4	74.1	69.4	77.2	78.5	82.1	85.4	78.9	85.6	76.0	76.6	78.4	74.6	83.3	77.5	75.4
2016	82.5	80.7	72.0	80.9	88.4	...	85.6	81.9	82.4	83.0	78.3	81.5	77.7	75.3	82.0	74.9	76.7	76.4	92.2	73.7	73.7	68.6	77.0	78.9	81.9	85.5	79.8	84.6	75.7	76.5	78.3	74.3	84.2	77.6	75.7
2017 Q1	82.6	79.7	71.9	79.9	87.5	...	85.4	82.1	82.2	81.3	77.7	80.8	76.7	74.9	81.5	75.1	77.1	77.0	90.8	73.0	73.7	66.7	77.3	78.9	81.6	85.1	79.0	86.3	76.0	76.5	78.4	76.0	83.6	77.3	75.3
2017 Q2	82.8	81.2	71.9	81.9	87.8	...	85.2	82.4	82.6	82.1	77.9	82.9	80.2	75.6	81.7	75.6	78.2	77.6	94.4	73.9	73.8	64.8	77.3	79.6	81.9	85.4	79.4	84.1	76.5	76.8	78.3	77.3	85.5	78.3	75.9
2017 Q3	82.3	81.9	72.4	82.4	88.2	...	85.2	83.0	83.2	82.9	78.4	83.4	78.9	75.8	81.8	75.9	78.7	78.2	91.0	74.2	74.1	68.0	77.2	80.7	82.1	85.3	79.3	84.9	77.1	77.5	78.3	77.8	85.2	79.4	76.5
2017 Q4	82.8	81.3	72.6	80.5	87.9	...	85.5	83.0	83.3	82.0	77.7	83.3	78.0	75.6	81.7	75.4	78.7	77.3	88.8	73.2	74.1	66.7	77.6	80.2	81.8	85.3	78.9	86.0	76.7	77.9	77.9	77.1	83.7	77.9	75.5
2017	82.6	81.0	72.2	81.1	87.8	77.4	85.3	82.6	82.8	82.1	77.9	82.6	78.4	75.5	81.7	75.5	78.2	77.5	91.3	73.6	73.9	66.5	77.4	79.9	81.8	85.3	79.2	85.3	76.6	77.1	78.2	77.0	84.5	78.2	75.8
2018 Q1	83.0	79.8	72.4	80.0	87.2	...	84.7	82.7	82.9	81.5	77.5	82.8	78.0	75.2	81.8	75.4	78.6	76.9	88.9	72.5	73.5	78.2	66.1	80.0	81.5	85.4	79.7	85.5	76.2	77.5	78.3	76.6	84.0	77.1	76.1
2018 Q2	83.0	81.1	71.8	81.7	87.6	...	84.9	82.9	82.7	82.4	77.8	82.7	81.2	75.3	81.6	75.7	78.8	77.1	91.6	72.6	74.3	78.7	68.1	80.8	81.8	85.4	80.8	85.1	76.9	77.3	78.5	78.6	85.7	78.4	76.5
2018 Q3	82.7	82.0	72.7	82.4	88.0	...	85.2	83.2	83.5	82.9	78.1	82.8	80.3	75.8	82.1	75.9	79.2	78.1	90.7	73.1	73.6	79.8	67.3	81.8	82.3	85.9	81.2	84.6	77.6	77.6	79.1	79.2	86.0	80.3	76.4
2018 Q4	83.0	81.7	72.6	80.4	87.8	...	85.5	83.3	83.2	83.3	77.5	83.1	78.6	75.3	82.1	75.6	79.3	77.2	88.9	72.5	74.1	78.7	70.4	78.9	81.8	86.2	80.0	85.4	77.2	77.2	78.7	78.0	84.1	78.5	75.9
2018	82.9	81.1	72.4	81.1	87.7	...	85.1	83.0	83.1	82.5	77.7	82.8	79.5	75.4	81.9	75.6	79.0	77.3	90.0	72.7	73.9	68.0	80.4	81.8	85.7	80.4	85.2	77.0	77.4	78.6	78.1	84.9	81.9	78.6	76.2
2019 Q1	83.3	80.7	72.4	80.1	87.7	...	84.8	83.0	83.3	82.1	76.9	80.9	78.7	74.8	81.7	75.3	80.0	76.9	88.9	72.4	73.5	78.7	69.5	79.4	81.7	86.0	79.7	84.9	76.7	77.1	79.0	77.9	84.5	77.4	76.3
2019 Q2	83.8	81.7	73.0	82.4	87.7	...	83.9	83.1	83.3	82.2	77.4	81.7	81.8	74.8	81.4	76.0	79.8	77.7	92.6	72.6	73.7	79.6	68.8	79.8	81.8	86.4	80.5	84.0	77.4	76.9	78.6	78.4	85.6	77.9	76.4
2019 Q3	83.7	82.5	73.6	82.2	87.7	...	84.0	83.2	83.6	82.8	77.6	83.3	80.7	75.1	82.0	75.9	80.0	78.4	89.8	72.7	73.7	79.3	70.7	80.1	82.3	86.4	81.7	84.1	78.3	78.1	78.8	78.3	85.9	79.5	77.2
2019 Q4	83.1	82.0	72.8	80.9	87.7	...	84.9	83.3	83.7	82.7	77.3	81.7	78.8	75.2	82.0	75.5	80.0	78.2	87.6	71.3	73.6	79.4	68.3	79.5	81.8	86.5	81.2	84.4	78.1	77.5	78.7	75.7	84.1	77.9	76.2
2019	83.5	81.7	72.9	81.6	87.7	...	84.4	83.2	83.5	82.5	77.3	81.9	80.0	75.0	81.8	75.7	79.9	78.7	89.7	72.2	73.6	79.2	69.3	79.7	81.9	86.3	80.8	84.4	77.6	77.4	78.8	77.6	85.0	78.2	76.5
2020 Q1	83.0	80.2	72.5	79.6	87.9	...	83.0	82.9	...	82.5	76.9	81.2	78.8	74.6	81.4	74.4	79.6	78.0	87.4	70.7	72.5	80.5	66.8	80.3	81.2	86.5	81.2	85.4	77.9	76.9	78.2	76.2	84.3	75.3	76.0
2020 Q2	80.5	79.7	71.4	78.7	86.9	...	76.3	82.6	...	81.5	74.3	81.2	80.9	72.5	80.5	74.5	79.4	74.2	89.5	70.0	71.0	80.2	67.5	80.9	69.4	85.5	80.8	83.2	77.7	73.9	77.7	76.1	85.7	72.0	74.3
2020 Q3	81.5	82.4	73.2	82.5	87.3	...	81.7	83.4	...	82.8	76.5	82.9	80.8	75.0	81.3	75.5	80.9	77.1	90.5	69.6	73.0	79.0	67.5	80.3	77.5	86.2	81.6	83.0	78.6	76.1	78.5	76.4	85.3	76.2	75.6
2020 Q4	83.0	81.2	72.1	80.7	87.6	...	83.6	83.0	...	82.5	76.3	83.0	79.4	74.4	...	74.7	80.8	76.0	84.3	68.6	72.7	79.7	68.6	80.2	79.4	86.1	81.0	84.1	78.8	76.9	78.6	77.0	84.0	75.0	74.8
2020	82.0	80.9	72.3	80.4	87.4	...	81.2	83.0	...	82.3	76.0	82.1	80.0	74.1	...	74.8	80.2	76.3	88.0	69.7	72.3	79.9	67.6	80.4	76.9	86.1	81.1	83.9	78.2	76.0	78.3	76.4	84.8	74.6	75.1
2016 Q1	83.6	78.6	73.9	84.6	90.2	...	89.8	88.1	81.9	80.0	84.9	83.1	77.3	75.8	84.7	89.2	85.8	80.8	94.5	83.7	82.5	81.1	75.9	78.3	73.7	78.7	82.4	85.6	79.0	84.3	65.6	76.4	80.8	71.7	84.6
2016 Q2	83.1	81.3	72.1	84.6	89.7	...	82.8	89.5	80.9	80.2	84.9	89.8	79.0	76.5	84.9	90.6	88.8	82.0	91.4	83.5	82.5	80.8	79.8	82.7	71.7	77.2	81.7	85.3	74.7	83.9	74.6	73.3	83.0	75.3	85.1
2016 Q3	83.0	83.6	72.9	85.3	90.0	...	81.7	88.2	81.0	80.4	84.6	86.8	78.8	76.0	85.6	90.0	86.6	82.4	94.7	84.5	82.6	80.8	84.9	76.5	75.9	77.6	82.9	85.3	77.4	85.4	76.4	76.6	83.5	77.5	85.6
2016 Q4	83.3	79.5	76.4	85.0	90.7	...	87.1	89.7	81.2	81.4	83.8	81.0	77.7	76.1	85.5	88.3	86.8	80.2	93.3	83.8	82.9	81.0	76.3	73.1	73.3	75.3	81.1	87.3	77.5	84.7	77.7	80.4	82.6	75.6	84.5
2016	83.2	80.8	73.8	84.9	90.2	...	85.3	88.9	81.2	80.5	84.5	85.1	78.2	76.1	85.2	89.5	87.0	81.4	93.4	83.9	82.6	80.9	79.4	77.7	73.7	77.2	82.0	85.9	77.1	84.6	73.3	76.6	82.5	75.0	84.9
2017 Q1	83.5	79.1	73.7	84.4	89.1	...	86.8	88.8	80.6	80.2	84.7	83.8	76.2	74.9	84.9	88.2																			

Notes

¹ Across all programmes, Poland recruited 980 000 workers from abroad in 2019 and 2020. This figure does not include permit renewals from one year to the next. Certain categories of persons who may go to work in Poland without needing to apply for a permit, such as people of Polish origin holding the Polish Card (Karta Polaka), are also not registered.

² See De Wispelaere, De Smedt and Pacolet (2020^[9]) for a full set of statistics on postings in the EU/EFTA.

³ Labour Force Survey data for the United Kingdom uses weights provided to Eurostat in October 2020. The population data used to produce labour market estimates are being updated by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) to better reflect changes in international migration and other impacts as a result of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic. A model has therefore been developed, using information from the payroll tax system, to provide improved population weights for labour market estimates from 2020. The model has been tested against existing data and will be applied in labour market publications on the second half of 2021. See Office for National Statistics (United Kingdom) (2021^[10]) for more details.

2 Recent developments in immigration policy

This chapter provides an overview of the changes in the immigration policies in OECD countries during the period 2020-21, with a particular focus on pandemic responses. It takes an in-depth look at the most significant shifts wrought by the execution of the Brexit Withdrawal Agreement.

In Brief

Key findings

- COVID-19 occupied significant policy space throughout 2020 and into 2021, with the majority of countries maintaining travel restrictions and curtailing provision of immigration services both domestically and at overseas consulates. Many OECD countries began allowing non-essential travel in 2021, although others, notably Australia and New Zealand, have maintained tight restrictions.
- Few changes were made to regulations on international protection. The United Kingdom presented a notable exception with the implementation of its post-Brexit asylum regime. Targeted measures for British Overseas Nationals were also developed in response to changing circumstances in Hong Kong, China.
- While entries fell across the board in 2020, countries varied in their approach to target setting for 2021. Canada will increase targets for 2021, whereas Australia will keep the number steady. Finland announced an intention to set targets for certain categories of immigrants for the first time.
- Digitalisation remains an attractive tool to reduce processing times and check worker status. Several OECD countries have launched online platforms for visa applications.
- With the recent rise in telework, some countries, notably Costa Rica and Estonia, have developed novel “digital nomad” schemes.
- Some countries launched regularisation efforts to allow migrants access to the labour market. In the case of Colombia and Chile, large-scale regularisations are underway in 2021 to meet the demand created by the circumstances in Venezuela.
- Recognising the continued need for high- and medium-skilled migrant workers, some countries have implemented changes to facilitate their entry, including for the purpose of job seeking.
- Throughout 2020, the majority of OECD countries used temporary measures to mitigate the effect of COVID-19, including:
 - specific measures to facilitate the entry of health care and seasonal agricultural workers.
 - temporary measures to ensure continued legality of stay for migrants impacted by COVID-19 (e.g. automatic visa extensions, tolerated stays, and/or extension of procedural deadlines). Some countries also allowed temporary foreign workers to change employers.
 - permission for international students – who have been particularly affected by COVID-19-related restrictions – to delay studies, to begin coursework online, or to work longer hours than usually allowed under student visa schemes.
- The Withdrawal Agreement governing the terms by which the United Kingdom left the European Union entered into force on 1 February 2020. A transition period in place throughout 2020 allowed countries to introduce and streamline necessary post-Brexit immigration measures. With Brexit, the United Kingdom also announced a new point-based labour immigration policy.

Introduction

The impact of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic on cross-border movement has been undeniable. Not only were legal channels of migration effectively closed across the OECD for the majority of 2020, but few major immigration policy overhauls were proposed. Delays bled into 2021, as many countries had not fully reopened their economies and administrative services, but resumption of policy change is likely, especially as countries grapple with their post-COVID-19 circumstances. Additionally, some of the COVID-related changes, particularly regarding protection of temporary workers, may be expected to become permanent.

Large-scale immigration policy actions were rare in 2020

While the need to develop a response to COVID-19 occupied much of the policy space throughout the OECD, halting other reform, several notable policy movements unrelated to the pandemic went ahead. This section briefly reviews the most notable changes in international protection, digitalisation, labour migration management, and regularisation programmes.

International protection and geopolitical considerations

The United States has announced several policy changes since 20 January 2021. The United States reinstated a parole option for children under the Central American Minors programme to facilitate family reunification of migrants from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Qualifying parents must be lawfully present in the United States at the time of application. The Department of Homeland Security suspended the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP), or the Remain in Mexico policy, for asylum seekers.

The United Kingdom introduced significant changes to its asylum law (discussed further below), and asylum-related policy shifts occurred in other countries. On 3 June 2021, the Danish legislature passed a law authorising the removal of asylum seekers to third countries to await processing of their requests, with the stated motivation of deterring asylum seekers from traveling to Denmark. In 2019, Denmark expanded its Repatriation Act to allow repatriation to Syria, and in 2020, the Ministry of Immigration and Integration established The Danish Return Agency, to assume responsibility for individuals refused asylum. In March 2020, Norway implemented a new regulation concerning assisted return support and support for forced returns. The regulation defines who may be granted assistance and which amount. The assistance is standardised, but the regulation leaves room for flexibility based on needs. Returnees with special medical needs may be provided with in-kind assistance up to EUR 18 200.

Some significant actions responded to geopolitical issues. The United Kingdom (UK), for example, announced measures to respond to the changing situation in Hong Kong, China (Box 2.1). Since September 2020, citizens of Belarus may seek a 6-month multiple-entry national visa to Lithuania under facilitated conditions. Family members of Belarusian nationals who are in possession of a national visa or a temporary residence permit may also obtain a national visa under the same facilitated conditions.

Targets and quotas set by countries

Visa and travel restrictions severely limited countries' ability to meet immigration targets. Still, they took different approaches to planning for the following year. Australia maintained the same ceiling for 2020-21 (160 000) as in 2019-20. Canada, in contrast, has chosen to increase targets for 2021. They will increase from 341 000 for 2020 to 401 000 for 2021.

Italy modified its quota decree in 2020. As in previous years, the maximum admissions quota is 30 850 places, 18 000 of which are reserved for seasonal work. Within this 18 000, 6 000 are reserved for the

agricultural workers requested by professional organisations. Among non-seasonal workers, 6 000 places are reserved for road haulage, building and tourism-sector workers from countries that have signed agreements with Italy. Korea has kept its quota stable, expanding utilisation of existing workforce rather than increasing the number of foreign workers. However, places available for Specially Designated Profession (E-7, non-professional skilled workers) were increased for 2021. In 2020, admissions under the annual quota fell short of the target of 56 000 new workers by more than 30 000, with the arrival of these workers deferred to 2021. While Israel has announced a policy of quota reduction and elimination, quotas have been increasing since 2014. In 2020, additional quotas were announced for the nursing and construction sectors, and in 2021, a quota of 9 161 was allocated to workers in private nursing homes. Utilisation rates declined in the first half of 2020, but growth resumed by the third quarter of the year.

In its mid-term review in April 2021, the Finnish Government decided to set, for the first time ever, quantitative targets for education and work-based immigration. Finland aims to triple the annual number of new international degree students to 15 000 by 2030, with the goal to retain 75% of these graduates. For labour migration, the goal is to at least double the number of persons by 2030 and then, increase the number of incoming persons annually by at least 10 000.

Box 2.1. Migration from Hong Kong, China is likely to increase in the coming years

As some destination countries loosen restrictions specifically for migrants from Hong Kong, China, a shift in outflow is expected. From February 2021, the United Kingdom plans to offer “leave to remain” to anyone aged 18 and over with a British National Overseas (BNO) passport and their dependents. After five years, they can then apply for citizenship. Successful application allows a person to work (except as a professional sports person or sports coach) and study. However, they are ineligible for most benefits and must show they are able to provide accommodation and financial support for themselves and any dependants for at least six months. BNOs and their family pay an international health surcharge. The British Government estimates 5.4 million Hong Kong residents are eligible for the scheme, about 72% of its 7.5 million population, but the number of eligible residents who apply may depend on exit restrictions. A government impact assessment published in 2020 estimated between 123 000 and 153 700 BNO status holders and their dependants would avail themselves of the visa in the first year and between 258 000 and 322 400 over five years. The government estimates the net benefit for the United Kingdom will be between GBP 2.4 and 2.9 billion over five years (United Kingdom Home Office, 2020^[1]).

Several other OECD countries, including Australia, Canada, and Japan, have made or are considering small-scale changes to their immigration regulations in order to allow for greater immigration from Hong Kong, China. Australia has relaxed restrictions on temporary migration. Students from Hong Kong, China in Australia will receive a five-year post-graduate extension, and temporary skilled visa holders will be able to stay for five years, allowing application for permanent residence.

Even if only a small share of those eligible take advantage of these opportunities, migration patterns may shift. Countermeasures to discourage departure are possible. Changing circumstances may also affect immigration into Hong Kong, China, although with small impact on regional flows of high-skilled labour.

Countries have picked up the pace of digitalisation

Across OECD countries, governments increasingly rely on digital platforms for visa applications. Canada implemented analytics technology to process temporary resident visitor applications from India and China, in some cases improving processing times by up to 87%. Australia, Chile, Colombia, Hungary, Korea, and Lithuania have all launched online platforms for visa applications. Spain expanded digital processing to

work visas in December 2020. Sweden opened digital applications for migrants applying within Sweden or from the Swedish Embassy in Bangkok on 16 March 2021. As of 6 April 2021, France has used an online platform for applications for work authorisation and is progressively transitioning to the use of digitalised documents for visa applications and residence permits. The United Kingdom publishes instructions for employers on how to check a migrant's right to work online via a share code, as well as how to request and verify digital documents.

Additionally, the European Commission has announced the preparation of a proposal on the digitalisation of visa procedures for applications for visas to the EU. Public consultation for the project concluded 3 June 2021. Digital procedures are expected to reduce costs for visa applicants and facilitate decision-making for countries, but these advantages must be carefully balanced with the need to protect individual data and systems security. While this may explain the relatively slow pace of digitalisation of immigration services, the trend is likely to gain speed as countries develop appropriate tools.

Emergence of digital nomads

With the recent rise in telework, some countries have seized the opportunity to build a reputation as centres for technical innovation by developing “digital nomad” visa schemes. Estonia launched a digital nomad programme in August 2020, allowing a stay of up to one year. Digital nomads become tax residents of Estonia after stays of 183 days. Greece is considering a similar scheme. In Costa Rica, a short-term visa for remote workers is in the final stages of approval. The proposed law requires that the foreign national provide stable average monthly income of at least USD 3 000 (USD 4 000 if accompanied by dependents) and hold private medical insurance. Another law, recently approved by the Costa Rican Government, relaxes the requirements for temporary residence for foreign retirees and investors.

Temporary workers have received increased attention

In 2019, Canada launched several pilot programmes to support regional employers with immigration needs, including the Atlantic Immigration Pilot for skilled foreign workers, and the Rural and Northern Immigration Pilot. The Agri-Food Pilot, launched on 15 May 2020, is designed to address persistent labour shortages, particularly in meat processing, crop production, and livestock raising. In April 2021, Canada authorised 90 000 additional spots for health care workers and international graduates, plus additional streams with no intake caps for francophone or bilingual candidates.

Germany implemented the Skilled Immigration Act in March 2020. The act is designed to open up the labour market to highly qualified workers and those with recognised vocational training without a labour-market priority test. While a job offer is essential, people with vocational training can enter Germany to seek a job for a period of six months and may work for up to ten hours per week or complete an internship with a potential employer. Implementation of the Act was slowed by COVID-19, but Germany does not anticipate a change in the need for skilled workers. From 1 March 2020 to 31 December 2020, 30 000 visas were issued, comparable to the total number in 2017, 2018, and 2019, respectively.

France lowered processing criteria for work authorisations, focusing on enforceability of the employment situation, the employer's compliance with its legal obligations, and verification of the remuneration offered. The Shortage Occupation List was updated in 2021 with some regional specificities, and interregional platforms are now used for application processing in the place of labour authorities.

Poland undertook changes to facilitate migrants' access to the Polish labour market beginning in 2019. Applicants in 289 priority professions may seek special temporary residence and work permits without a labour-market test. Poland also launched the programme “Poland. Business Harbour” to support entrepreneurs from Belarus. These visa holders may, along with humanitarian visa holders, work in Poland without seeking a work permit. Poland extended the catalogue of minimum employment conditions in host countries to be guaranteed to posted workers, covering all remuneration components under labour law. In

response to COVID-19, all foreigners who had access to the Polish labour market on 13 March 2020 gained access to seasonal work in Poland without the need for a new permit. Employers were empowered to change the conditions of work for foreigners (including working time or remuneration) without the need for new permits.

Israel has signed bilateral labour agreements (BLAs) regarding temporary workers with several countries in recent years. In 2020, Israel entered agreements with Thailand in agriculture, Ukraine in construction, and with both Georgia and Nepal for auxiliary workers for work in nursing homes and institutions. Spain signed a BLA with Honduras in May 2021. The agreement regulates the procedure for selection of workers at source, governs working conditions and social rights of workers, and provides for obligation of readmission. Specific provisions on seasonal workers are included.

Pathways to permanence for temporary workers

In general, access to permanent residence across the OECD has opened up over the last decade. Timelines and requirements (such as host-language level) vary significantly, but measures are in place to ensure such a path exists. Canada has recently taken action to increase pathways to permanent residence. The Home Child Care Provider and Home Support Worker pilots, commenced in June 2019, test a two-step process for caregivers with minimum education and language proficiency to reach permanent residency. Japan's programme for specified skilled workers, introduced in 2019, allows interns to extend their stay in Japan to work for an additional five years. As this programme is renewable, it opens up an opportunity for more migrants to reach eligibility for permanent residence. The United States has seen some increased restrictions on pathways to permanence in the last five years, though this is due more to a reduction in processing than a significant policy change. An April 2020 ban on issuance of permanent immigrant visas by consulates furthered a decline in the numbers of new US permanent residence holders, but this change is expected to be temporary.

Regularisation adapted to meet changed circumstances

Colombia worked to develop regularisation procedures for Venezuelan migrants. The Colombian president signed a decree on 1 March 2021 to create a 10-year Temporary Protection Permit for Venezuelan migrants resident in Colombia on 31 January 2021. Migrants arriving after 31 January 2021 are eligible if they enter Colombia via legal channels within the next two years. Implementation consists of an online registration phase, followed by the issuance of a regularisation and identification document. In April 2021, Chile launched a regularisation process to benefit migrants who entered Chile through authorised crossing points before 18 March 2020. Migrants who entered Chile unlawfully may leave the country to apply for a consular visa without sanctions for the unlawful entry.

Certain irregular workers present in Italy before 8 March 2020 were regularised by the government. The policy was designed to encourage employers to declare their ongoing employment relationship or to employ new workers in the sectors of domestic work, caregiving, agriculture, and fisheries. Greece and Portugal also permitted temporary regularisation of third-country nationals employed in key sectors. Several countries, including Belgium, Finland, Greece, and Sweden, introduced measures to facilitate access to the labour market for foreigners having already legally entered the country. Japan encouraged *ad hoc* residence status applications through the public employment service, especially for students and intern trainees dismissed by their employers.

The majority of changes in 2020 reflect a response to COVID-19

Due to imposed restrictions on travel, migration flows declined dramatically in 2020. However, as countries allowed various exceptions to these restrictions, they did not cease entirely. OECD countries were relatively consistent overall in their response to these changes.

Countries have been hesitant to lift COVID-related travel restrictions

Suspending migration was an understandable response to stop the spread of COVID-19. Borders closed to nearly all travellers, with most countries making exceptions for their own nationals and permanent residents in addition to some essential workers, notably in the health care sector. Even these individuals were often required to justify the need for travel, and travel options were limited. In early 2020, most countries also temporarily restricted lodging of new visa applications at missions abroad. While nearly all countries imposed some restrictions, some enforced border control more strictly than others.

Australia and New Zealand imposed strict restrictions on entry. Travel to Australia is only possible with an individual exemption. Temporary visa holders may depart Australia freely but generally may not return. Australia imposed an outbound travel ban for its citizens and permanent residents beginning 25 March 2020, with limited exemptions and has also periodically imposed state-level border closures. New Zealand created a quarantine-free travel zone for individuals coming from Australia, the Cook Islands, and Niue. Only New Zealand citizens and immediate family could travel from very high-risk countries. Exemptions were not granted, even on humanitarian grounds.

The United States and Canada halted most non-essential travel. Canada closed its borders to all countries except the United States (although the land border was briefly closed). The United States initially imposed a travel ban upon individuals arriving from China, but later extended the restrictions to 33 countries, with the latest addition (India) occurring in May 2021. Both countries also temporarily ceased processing asylum seekers. The United Kingdom developed a green/amber/red list based on circulation of the virus that governs whether non-essential travel is permitted. The majority of countries have been placed on the “amber” list, for which quarantine is required. Chile has prohibited entry from all countries with community transmission as designated by the World Health Organization.

Most, but not all, European OECD countries have been more likely to adapt their responses in an attempt to balance the changing epidemiological situation with the principle of open borders. Internal European Union (EU) movement was in flux, with countries responding to a periodic need for national lockdowns. The EU initially closed its external borders in March 2020 for 30 days. This was extended until late June 2020, when the EU approved a list of 14 countries (plus China, on the condition of reciprocity) considered safe for travel. The majority of EU/Schengen countries adopted EU recommendations on reopening. However, individual countries retained the choice to implement the recommendations, and some divergence was evident. Belgium, France, Hungary, and the Netherlands did not open borders to the countries on the list. Germany allowed entry from five low-risk countries. The EU targeted summer 2021 for resumption of international travel for vaccinated individuals. Some member states, notably Italy and Greece, reopened earlier. On 20 May 2021, the European Parliament and Council reached a provisional agreement on the EU Digital COVID-19 Certificate to facilitate internal travel.

Japan has also periodically restricted and relaxed entry from 159 countries since April 2020, based on the evolution of the pandemic. In October 2020, Japan partially reopened borders to international business travel and long-term residence seekers. In December 2020, concerns related to new variants led to a tightening of restrictions, with only citizens and residents allowed entry. As of May 2021, re-entry is refused for foreign nationals with Japanese residency who have travelled to a country with high concern of coronavirus variant Delta.

Ireland, Korea, Luxembourg, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Bulgaria have kept borders relatively open, allowing entry by third-country nationals subject to sanitary requirements and health screenings. Mexico's initial ban on non-essential travel applied only to land-border crossings.

Where travel was possible, most countries imposed an obligation for COVID-19 testing (typically a negative polymerase chain reaction (PCR) test taken 72 hours prior to arrival). The United States began requiring PCR tests in January 2021. Some also required a quarantine, although in many cases this was not mandatory. France asked travellers to make a solemn declaration to isolate. Austria mandated a 10-day quarantine, which could be shortened by a negative test on the fifth day. With few exceptions, quarantines in Australia and New Zealand were obligatory and required a managed stay for 14 days, usually at the traveller's expense.

Efforts to keep migrants from falling out of status

Throughout 2020, the majority of OECD countries used temporary measures to ensure continued legality of stay for migrants affected by restrictions on travel and immigration services. Contingency measures such as introduction of electronic or postal communication also helped mitigate the impact of reduction of in-person immigration services on migrants.

Sweden maintained in-person immigration services, albeit with reduced hours, throughout 2020. As most applications for migration were already online, processing continued as normal.

Most other European OECD countries, including Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, and Spain, used automatic extension of residence permits, tolerated stays, and the suspension or extension of procedural deadlines. The majority of these policies were in force throughout 2020, although some (for example Hungary, Ireland, and Portugal) extended into 2021. Korea granted repeated three-month extensions for foreigners with expiring visas. Bulgaria provided for automatic extensions and added protections to reduce the impact of absences from the country.

Austria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, The Netherlands and Slovenia did not process automatic renewals but applied a policy of leniency for third country nationals unable to depart due to the pandemic, temporarily forgiving visa overstay. The Netherlands also allowed an extended period of 6-9 months to collect an approved visa in case of embassy closure. Latvia considered tolerated stays on a case-by-case basis, issuing a long stay visa or extending a Schengen 'C' visa on humanitarian grounds where applicable. Residence permit holders who experienced delay in renewing or registering a permit could pay a fee to have their documents examined in an accelerated procedure.

In the United States, since March 2020, most non-immigrants could mitigate the impact of COVID-19 by filing a timely request for extension of stay. Effects of COVID-19 were also considered as exceptional circumstances to excuse late requests for extension of stay or change of status. Regarding requests for evidence or notices of appeal dated from 1 March 2020 to 30 September 2021, deadlines for responding and/or filing were extended from 30 to 60 days.

New Zealand developed a renewable COVID-19 short-term visitor visa. Australia also created a temporarily activity visa for migrants working in critical sectors, giving individuals unable to depart the country a path to remain in Australia legally during the pandemic.

COVID-19 delays affect eligibility or likelihood to migrate...

For migrants seeking to travel under specific categories, COVID-19 caused not only delays, but in some cases, the need to rework long-term plans. Visa expiration or the impossibility to collect an approved visa can cause significant difficulty for the applicant, as it is often not an option simply to reapply.

Prior to the addition of diversity-lottery visa (DV) holders to the National Interest Exception (NIE, categories for which travel to the United States is permitted), a class-action lawsuit was filed in the United States to prevent DV-2020 visas from expiring before their beneficiaries could travel. In granting emergency relief, a court ruled that the government must treat all visas issued or renewed as having been issued as of the date of the eventual final judgement. Additionally, 9 095 visas have been reserved for DV-2020 lottery winners should the case be fully resolved in their favour.

In Israel, hotels holding permits to hire foreign workers were offered reimbursement of permit fees if they asked to cancel permits for foreign workers unable to enter Israel up to 21 March 2021.

Travel restrictions particularly affected students. Most OECD countries processed applications for study permits as consulates reopened, but distance-learning plans caused complications for eligibility. In the United States, international students may not take a full course load online. Active students enrolled in a programme brought fully online had to leave the country. F-1 visa holders could take only one online course per semester. Many countries implemented measures to mitigate delays, such as prolongation of enrolment deadlines. Others, for example the Slovak Republic, allowed students to postpone studies to the following year. Australia announced that remote courses would meet the study requirement for students seeking to enter in the future and waived the application fee for those needing to apply for a new visa. Canada allowed international students to begin studies online from abroad prior to the approval of a study permit. Studies taking place up to 31 December 2021 count toward a future post-graduate work permit. Other countries, including Estonia, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Portugal, declined to make such accommodations. In April 2021, the US State Department announced the expansion of the NIE to cover students and academics worldwide from 1 August 2021. Even so, students applying to study for the first time in 2021 may find international destinations less attractive, given uncertainty surrounding shifting restrictions. Aggressive recruitment in the face of any signs of declining enrolment is likely given the value of international students as a revenue source for universities in certain OECD countries.

... with temporary workers particularly affected

Temporary workers, especially those in sectors impacted by containment measures, felt the shock of the COVID-19 pandemic acutely. Most governments took action to mitigate COVID-related pressures, with many noting that these workers were more likely than other workers to lose employment in 2020 as short-term contracts declined significantly. The largest drops in migrant employment occurred in countries that did not implement job protection schemes. Some of these schemes may endure beyond the crisis, to the benefit of those migrants who often find themselves in precarious situations. In some cases, these changes had been underway even prior to and were unaffected by COVID-19, which speaks to the growing understanding that temporary workers are essential to many immigration systems.

Government approaches have varied according to type of worker and national needs

Most OECD countries identified specific occupational sectors considered as essential or “key”, thus justifying continued admission of these workers during the COVID-19 crisis. Primary sectors were health (Box 2.2), agriculture, and transport. The United States, Canada, and Israel specifically identified workers in support of critical infrastructure.

France entered into agreements with Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, and Luxembourg to allow “exceptional” COVID-19 home working for cross-border workers. Frontier workers could benefit from tolerance regarding the threshold of days of work outside their habitual work country for the purposes of taxation.

Many countries facilitated labour market access for foreigners already residing in their territory to address labour shortages. Belgium, Finland, Greece, and Sweden, facilitated entry of seasonal workers. Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia introduced special quarantine rules. Germany implemented a temporary policy

allowing asylum seekers without a work permit to work on farms from 1 April 2020 to 1 October 2020. France and Spain also relaxed work rules for asylum seekers. German farmers were permitted to organise and pay for charter flights for up to 40 000 migrant workers, provided they developed hygiene plans. At the same time, not all countries reported labour shortages. Austria, Hungary, Latvia, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Bulgaria all reported the ability to meet labour needs with the existing population.

Box 2.2. Specific accommodations facilitate migration of health care workers

Recognising their importance in the fight against COVID-19, several countries took steps to facilitate entry for health care professionals, even where visa processing otherwise stalled. Belgium and Ireland continued to prioritise visa applications for medical professionals into 2021. Belgium (Wallonia) also accelerated processing times. Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain eliminated the work permit requirement for medical workers. Nearly all OECD countries exempted health care workers from restrictions on international travel. Canada exempted emergency and medical service providers, along with other individuals performing an essential service, from its mandatory 14-day quarantine period.

Italy, several provinces in Canada, and several states in the United States enabled temporary licensing for doctors with foreign medical degrees. Belgium, Germany, Ireland, and Luxembourg expedited recognition of foreign qualifications of health professionals, and France allowed foreign-trained health workers to work in non-medical occupations in the health sector.

Prioritisation of health care workers is likely to continue even as countries exit states of crisis. Health care workers continue to be prioritised in quota regimes. Of the 19 occupations on Australia's Priority Migration Skilled Occupation List, 11 are for health professionals. Austria includes health professionals in the 2021 Regulation for skilled workers in shortage occupations. Germany estimates that over 20% of doctors working in Germany were born abroad. Countries facing a shortage of medical professionals must continue to consider ways to increase their attractiveness by facilitating the immigration process.

Source: OECD (2020^[2]), "Contribution of migrant doctors and nurses to tackling COVID-19 crisis in OECD countries", <https://doi.org/10.1787/2f7bace2-en>.

In countries with a total ban on migration, labour market pressures have appeared regarding seasonal workers. Korea instituted a policy to expand the utilisation of the existing foreign workforce rather than admit additional foreign workers by allowing changes and extensions of status for manufacturing and seasonal work. Additionally, Korea reduced the mandatory three-month period of return to the home country prior to reemployment to one month. Australia used temporary activity visas to support critical sectors and created working holidaymaker initiatives to fill labour gaps in agriculture. Family members could be included on the visa application. New Zealand implemented a Supplementary Seasonal Employment Work visa to fill horticulture and viticulture roles where not enough New Zealanders were available.

Worker protections need to be strengthened further

Work permits are often restricted to a specific sector or employer. The inability to change employers represents a major barrier in times of economic stress. In light of the pandemic, some countries have taken steps to ease these restrictions. In Japan, concern that foreign workers would lose employment due to the COVID-19 pandemic led the government to allow foreign workers to change employers and maintain status. In the Czech Republic, migrant workers who lost their job could change employer as well as sector. Korean Employment Permit System (EPS) workers were allowed to change status to become seasonal workers. While the United States tightened restrictions on some types of temporary and permanent

employment visas (typically for highly skilled workers), a temporary rule was put in place on 18 December 2020 to allow agricultural workers to change employers and to start work prior to official approval of their new visa. The temporary measure should remain in place until 18 December 2023.

The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the need for national governments to consider how best to codify and enforce labour standards for migrant workers. Laws requiring swift repatriation of workers whose permits have expired or been cancelled due to job loss may undermine the right of the migrant worker to seek fair remuneration or redress for wage-related violations or to access benefits to which they may be entitled. This need to protect workers predated the crisis, though COVID-19 underscored the urgency. Many of the measures put into place in 2020 were temporary. Finland, for example, allowed foreign workers with a valid residence permit to change employers or field until the end of October 2020. However, the vulnerability associated with an inability to change employers will remain a salient concern, and countries should consider how to make worker protections a part of their long-term labour migration structure. For instance, Canada's Open Work Permit for Vulnerable Workers, introduced in June 2019, enables workers with an employer-specific work permit to leave quickly in situations of abuse, transition to a new job, and maintain their work authorisation in Canada.

Brexit shifts the immigration landscape in Europe (and beyond)

After several years of negotiations, the Withdrawal Agreement governing the terms by which the United Kingdom left the EU entered into force on 1 February 2020. Given the complications of managing implementation of new immigration systems and negotiations of items such as a UK-EU free trade deal, the Withdrawal Agreement provided for a transition period. During this time, the United Kingdom remained bound by EU rules, including around freedom of movement. Free movement between the EU and the United Kingdom ended along with the transition period on 31 December 2020.

British and European Union citizens feel the impact of Brexit

Following Brexit, the United Kingdom and the EU reached an agreement guaranteeing the rights of EU, European Economic Area (EEA), and Swiss citizens living in the United Kingdom and of UK nationals living in those countries.

Rights of UK citizens in the EU

The Withdrawal Agreement protects the rights of UK nationals and their close family members who live in EU countries. It covers UK nationals who were living in an EU country by 31 December 2020 and who are either: 1) a worker or self-employed person in that country, or 2) a student or self-sufficient person who can show enough money to live on and have comprehensive sickness insurance. Family members living with an eligible person in an EU country by 31 December 2020 are also covered. Individuals who already have the right of permanent residence retain their status. The Withdrawal Agreement also protects frontier workers – UK citizens who live in the United Kingdom or another EU country and work in a different EU country.

In 13 EU countries, UK nationals must register or apply for a new residence status to be able to stay. Fourteen, including Greece, Cyprus, and Spain, have chosen a declaratory system where UK nationals have an option to get a new document declaring their rights under the Withdrawal Agreement. Those who have lived in an EU country for fewer than five years are able to stay as long as they meet one of the residence conditions. Residence rights are contingent on six months of physical presence per year. After living continuously in an EU country for five years, UK nationals can obtain permanent residence, after which residence can only be lost if they live outside the EU country for more than five consecutive years. In some countries, the permit duration is ten years, renewable thereafter.

Residence rights under the Withdrawal Agreement confer a right to equal treatment with nationals of the country, including the same entitlements to work, study, and access benefits and services as before the United Kingdom left the EU. Existing EU social security co-ordination rules will also apply to those with residence rights, who remain covered by reciprocal health care arrangements. Social security contributions paid in different EU countries can be used to help meet the entitlement conditions for certain benefits and state pensions.

British citizens arriving in an EU country after the Brexit transition period are not entitled to residency rights under the Withdrawal Agreement but can still apply for residency as third country nationals.

Europeans may receive EU Settled Status (EUSS)

EU, EEA, and Swiss citizens and their family members who wish to remain in the United Kingdom after the end of the transition period must have applied for the EU Settlement Scheme by 30 June 2021. Irish citizens are exempted, as their current rights to live and work in the United Kingdom will be preserved. Citizens who hold Indefinite Leave to Remain (settled status) do not need to register under the scheme.

The EUSS scheme enables EU, EEA, and Swiss citizens and their family members who have been continuously resident in the United Kingdom for five years by 31 December 2020 to receive 'settled status', enabling indefinite stay. Those who arrived before 31 December 2020 but have not been continuously resident in the United Kingdom for five years may seek 'pre-settled status', enabling them to stay until reaching the five-year threshold, when they can then apply for settled status. Individuals with settled status or pre-settled status will have the same access as they currently do to health care, pensions, and other benefits in the United Kingdom.

Close family members (defined as a spouse, civil partner, durable partner, dependent child or grandchild, and dependent parent or grandparent) living overseas are able to join the eligible resident in the United Kingdom after the end of the implementation period, where the relationship existed on 31 December 2020 and continued to exist at time of migration. Future children are also protected. Cross-border commuters (typically from Belgium or France) are not eligible for EUSS, but the United Kingdom introduced a Frontier Worker Permit Scheme for EU, EEA, and Swiss citizens who worked in the United Kingdom on or before 31 December 2020 and who will continue in their roles. Work beginning 1 January 2021 requires a visa.

Movement between Ireland and the United Kingdom

The Irish border is now the only external land border between the United Kingdom and the European Union. It is also, under the terms of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, an invisible one, with little to no physical infrastructure or checkpoints. To avoid the creation of a hard border in potential violation of treaty, specific Brexit protocols were designed to govern the freedom of movement between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. The Common Travel Area (CTA) between the two countries predates both Irish and UK membership in the EU and will remain in force. British, Irish, and EEA citizens with settled status may move freely between the countries to live, work, and access education. They may access health care and social services in each other's country as before. However, from January 2021, UK immigration officials are required to check that non-Irish EU citizens are not moving across the border to work.

Non-EEA family members or dependents of UK nationals who were living in Ireland at the end of the transition period continue to hold the same residence permit as before, but require a new Irish Residence Permit card indicating that they benefit from the Withdrawal Agreement. They must apply for the card before 31 December 2021. Ireland also created a new pre-clearance scheme for UK nationals coming to Ireland after 31 December 2020 wishing to sponsor eligible non-EEA family members to join them.

EEA citizens living in Ireland and working in Northern Ireland must apply for a Frontier Worker Permit to continue working there from 1 July 2021. Non-EEA citizen workers, many who have lived in Ireland for

years while traveling back and forth to the United Kingdom for work, must apply for a visa to work in Northern Ireland or Britain. This could result in a significant reduction in the large number of low-skilled workers who have moved between Ireland and Britain since 2004.

With Brexit, the United Kingdom announced a new labour immigration policy

In February 2020, the UK Government published a Policy Statement on its Points-Based Immigration System (PBS), introducing a single, global immigration system for skilled workers, students, and a range of specialist work routes. Online applications for the new skilled worker visa opened on 1 December 2020, allowing work in the United Kingdom from 1 January 2021. Applicants must show they have a job offer from an approved sponsor. Points are granted for a job offer at the appropriate skill level, English knowledge, and a minimum salary, with visas awarded to those who gain enough points. Applicants must normally be self-supporting and paid at least GBP 25 600 per year (lowered from GBP 30 000) unless the market rate for the job is higher. However, they can trade points for characteristics such as their specific job offer and qualifications against a salary lower than the market rate. The visa lasts for up to five years and is extendable. Changes to the Immigration Rules in March 2021 made it easier for key foreign workers in health and care roles to enter the country. Additions to the shortage occupation list included pharmacists, laboratory technicians, senior care workers and nursing assistants, public health and domiciliary managers.

There are several other routes alongside the skilled worker visa. The Global Talent visa is for people who can show they have exceptional talent or promise in the fields of science, engineering, humanities, medicine, digital technology, or arts and culture. Innovator and Start-up visas are available for those seeking to establish a business in the United Kingdom. Employers may use an Intra-company Transfer visa to move established workers to the United Kingdom. The Student route and Child Student route opened on 5 October 2020.

There is no route for lower-skilled workers. The government noted in February 2020 that there were an estimated 170 000 recently arrived non-EU citizens in lower-skilled occupations. It assumes that this supply, which includes people such as the dependents of skilled migrants, would continue to be available under the EU Settlement Scheme, allowing employers flexibility to meet labour market demands. In response to complaints of labour shortages, the government quadrupled a pilot scheme for seasonal workers in agriculture to 1 000 places. An extension of the pilot in December 2020 created a quota of 30 000 places. In addition, youth mobility arrangements with eight countries and territories bring around 20 000 young people to the United Kingdom each year, many in lower-skilled roles.

Brexit will likely have a trickle-down impact on the entire migration framework

The United Kingdom has developed its own approach to asylum claims

The United Kingdom has left the Dublin regulation, which allows reciprocal arrangements between countries for the return of asylum claimants. The new plan relies on acceptance of returned asylum claimants by the countries from which they travelled, but the United Kingdom has made no return arrangements with EU countries to date. Attempted Channel crossings remain a significant concern for the United Kingdom. In 2020, more than 8 400 people reached the United Kingdom by boat. As of 28 April 2021, the number of crossings for the year was already more than 1 850. In March 2021, the UK Home Secretary announced planned reforms of the asylum system, designed to streamline the process and deter smuggling. For the first time, whether people enter the United Kingdom legally will have an impact on how their asylum claim progresses and on their status in the United Kingdom if that claim is successful. The Plan proposes that any asylum seeker arriving illegally, even with a successful claim, will have limited family reunion rights and limited access to benefits. Unaccompanied minors may only reunite with a parent, whereas under the Dublin regulation, they can be reunited with close family, including adult siblings, aunts

and uncles, and grandparents. Migrants who enter the United Kingdom via a legal resettlement route will receive indefinite leave to remain immediately upon arrival. The Plan involves making quicker removal decisions for failed asylum seekers and makes legal appeals procedures more difficult.

Student tuition fees and post-study work eligibility

Before Brexit, EU students undertaking study in the United Kingdom were subject to the same rules and fee structures as UK nationals. Those arriving in the United Kingdom beginning January 2021 and whose course begins after July 2021 must now be sponsored by a licensed educational institution and pay international tuition fees, visa fees and a health care surcharge (at a discounted rate). The rules on post-study work are relaxed for all international students in the United Kingdom, with a two-year period of post-study work, or three years upon completion of a PhD, during which there are no restrictions on salary or occupation. Employer sponsorship is not required. A Graduate route opens in July 2021 for international students who complete an eligible course at a UK higher education institution and have a record of compliance with immigration requirements. These students can work or look for work after their studies for two years (three years for Doctoral students).

Following withdrawal from the Erasmus+ programme, which allows students to spend time at universities in other EU countries, the UK Department for Education established the Turing scheme to provide grants to help cover travel and living costs for students to study abroad, including outside the EU. Educational institutions must make the applications. Participating universities are expected to waive student tuition fees. As of 1 January 2021, UK students who seek to complete an entire degree course in the EU may be required to pay non-EU third-country national rates.

Economic impact by sector

A survey of employers by the Migration Advisory Committee found that in 2018-19, 21% of employers had at least one EEA employee; a similar proportion had at least one non-EEA migrant employee (Migration Advisory Committee, 2020^[31]). In recent years, the proportion of employers with at least one EEA employee has grown faster than the proportion of employers with at least one non-EEA employee, indicating a growing reliance on the EEA. It is too early to know how the new immigration system will affect this trend. However, with the UK global talent scheme opened up to include EU, EEA, and Swiss citizens, potential workers must now compete with third-country nationals. The same holds true of UK nationals, who must now participate in the non-EU immigration system to live and work in Europe. The United Kingdom has been the destination country of the largest number of Irish emigrants for many years, accounting for 21% of emigrants from Ireland in 2019. However, the numbers have been trending downwards, which, though possibly tied to economic recovery in Ireland, may also be an early indication of the impact of Brexit.

What is more, changes to the immigration system will have a differential affect across the economy. Certain sectors are more dependent on EEA workers than non-EEA workers and may face larger recruitment problems. This is particularly the case in transportation and storage, construction, and agriculture. In contrast, the information and communication sector and the human health and social work activities sector employ more non-EEA migrants. The introduction of salary thresholds for EEA migrants in the future immigration system is likely to have the greatest impact on small employers, which often do not hit the salary threshold for any of their EEA employees. Although changes to the visa system will affect larger employers, their reliance on EEA workers is relatively low. Overall, employers are less impacted where salaries tend to be higher, such as in the information, financial, and insurance sectors. In the accommodation and food services sectors, a high proportion of employees fail to meet the threshold. In the human health and social work sectors, most, but not all, employees meet the general salary threshold. Further, regulations and programmes that were not previously necessary had to be developed regardless of any changes in underlying demand. This is the case notably for seasonal agriculture workers, as demand may remain even if applying for these visas now represents an increased cost and administrative burden.

Communication regarding policy changes both in country and abroad

Because the United Kingdom was not a member of the Schengen free movement zone, Brexit has few direct impacts for non-European migrants. However, Brexit does provide an example to countries outside Europe of how to conduct a large-scale information campaign. In the event of a policy shift affecting large numbers of migrants, governments need to communicate complex information to a wide range of people, including vulnerable persons, about their rights and obligations in order to prevent them from falling into irregularity.

Other countries have recently tackled this communication challenge. For example, the United States has considered how best to address the questions of eligible migrants as it resumes processing of new applications for Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), which had been halted from September 2017 to December 2020.

On 6 March 2020, the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office announced a GBP 3 million UK Nationals Support Fund for organisations providing practical support to UK nationals for their residency applications. In July 2020, the United Kingdom launched a tailored information campaign across 30 countries to inform UK nationals of the changes taking place after the transition period and actions needed to secure rights in their country of residence. This campaign encouraged UK nationals to visit the “Living in” guide on the Gov.uk website and to sign up for email updates. The British Embassy in many EU countries launched joint events with host country officials. For EU citizens with settled or pre-settled status (or who have applied for a visa), the Gov.uk site also provides a way to view immigration status in the United Kingdom online and to share that status with employers. The site also provides guidance to employers on how to conduct right-to-work checks and information on the new points system.

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3

Recent developments in migrant integration policy

This chapter provides an overview of the changes in the integration policies in OECD countries during the period 2020-21. Digitalisation of integration systems has been a notable change as countries have worked to respond to substantial restrictions on gatherings imposed due to COVID-19. The chapter also examines how countries have recognised and responded to the need to improve diversity measures, specifically concerning the migrant community.

In Brief

Key findings

- Integration measures were, in most respects, significantly impacted by COVID-19 throughout 2020. In many countries, obligations for integration were relaxed or timelines extended. In some countries, notably the Netherlands, obligatory examinations were paused during the crisis.
- Most countries increased their use of digital tools to conduct outreach to migrant populations about COVID-19-related measures. Some countries have also implemented platforms and applications to inform and prepare migrants for integration measures.
- COVID-19 increased the pace of an ongoing trend of using digital tools for host-country language learning and other trainings.
- In recognition of the fact that not all migrants have the same level of access to or literacy in digital tools, several countries offered exceptions to online integration and language courses during COVID-19. Some, including Australia and Finland, have taken action to help migrants build digital literacy to transition to distance learning as needed.
- Supports for vulnerable migrants, including workers and international students, were in place in most OECD countries. Particular focus was placed on encouraging migrants to access health care systems. In some cases, these supports extended into 2021.
- Many OECD countries (and the European Union) have implemented action plans to combat discrimination in light of heightened public awareness of the issue and the specific impact of discrimination on those perceived to have a migrant background. On the local level, online anti-discrimination campaigns have been a popular tool.
- Given the pandemic, broad integration overhauls have been rare, though Australia, Luxembourg, and Norway made significant changes to their integration measures. Luxembourg and Norway reorganised their co-ordination mechanisms. Australia and Norway both extended their target language levels while shifting away from hours-based models for language courses.
- Some countries moved to streamline naturalisation processes while others added requirements.
- Integration of immigrant women remains high on the policy agenda. Germany, Sweden, and Austria have taken specific actions toward gender mainstreaming in project design.
- The trend of decentralisation of integration measures has continued, although COVID-19 highlighted the limitations of that approach and the importance of a clear co-ordination mechanism.

Introduction

Throughout 2020 and into 2021, two major trends, born from largely external factors, have left a profound imprint on integration policy in OECD countries. The first is a shift toward digitalisation of integration programmes and services, which, while underway prior to 2020, accelerated significantly in response to periodic confinement or lockdown periods tied to the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic. The second, which responds to societal reactions to acts of racial or ethnic violence, is a focus on policy measures regarding antidiscrimination, antiracism, and diversity. Other important policy changes to integration policies in OECD countries are considered in the last section of this chapter.

Digitalisation may be the most durable change wrought by COVID-19

While the world is in the midst of a digital transformation, countries have been slow to replace in-person and in-country services with online systems in their contacts with migrants. Digitalisation of integration service provision has been ongoing, but COVID-19-related restrictions on gatherings have accelerated the pace. The disruption of services in 2020 required many countries to adapt their integration offerings – across OECD countries, digital tools have been used for information sharing, for language learning, and even for naturalisation ceremonies. This section will consider the increasing use of digital tools for dissemination of information, language courses, and skills development in addition to examining emerging challenges associated with the increasing use of technology in integration policies.

OECD countries increased their use of digital tools to disseminate information

Many OECD countries used online tools to communicate with migrants in 2020, both about public health measures tied to COVID-19 and about integration resources. The majority of OECD countries provided translated content related to COVID-19 on their official websites. Several countries, including Denmark, Germany, and New Zealand, provided information in more than 20 languages. The German Commissioner for Migration, Refugees and Integration also developed the online platform “Handbook Germany” to present information and videos on a Facebook page, enabling the government to respond to questions and correct misinformation. Finland followed a similar approach with the platform, infoFinland.fi, providing translations of official information on COVID-19 in 12 different languages on its social media channels. The Finnish Government also launched a nation-wide campaign to tackle misconceptions about COVID-19 using social media influencers. France made information on COVID-19 available to migrants in nine languages on the Ministry of Interior’s website. In Portugal, the High Commission for Migration (ACM) created a dedicated page on its website providing information to migrants in Portuguese and English. Additionally, it provided translations of official documents from different public and non-governmental entities in nine different languages, giving migrants access to information on legislative measures, public services, social support measures, lockdown measures, and sanitary rules. The Romanian Government used a variety of targeted social media campaigns, and the Romanian Digitisation Authority developed several new IT systems to provide information and allow for upload of registration documents.

Given the clear benefits of online platforms for widespread information sharing, digital tools will likely outlast the COVID-19 pandemic in their use as communication channels for migrants. In addition to information on the coronavirus, the Swedish information website, Information Sverige, publishes information and preparation materials for the civic integration course. Norway’s Directorate of Integration and Diversity’s website served as an information hub for COVID-19 in different languages, but it is also a repository for collected information on language training, the introduction programme, and other practical information from Norwegian public offices. In the United States, the Office of Refugee Resettlement provided funding for the International Rescue Committee to develop an online portal of services called Switchboard. OECD countries are also pursuing application-based platforms for communication, reflecting awareness of the most common devices used by migrants. Austria and Germany both have smartphone apps (“Meine Integration Österreich” and “Ankommen”, respectively) used to communicate information about available integration services.

Countries have increasingly used digital tools for education and language learning

In the context of education and language learning, digital tools represent an opportunity for governments, and their use has been increasing, even prior to the pandemic. The use of Information and Communications Technology (ICT) tools has potential to expand both the reach and the cost-effectiveness of language learning for newcomers. Digital platforms offer flexibility to migrants with competing schedules, and digital tools may increase capacity for differentiation in the classroom. Video- and audio-based

resources can help improve the skills of illiterate or early learners. Digitalisation also offers opportunities for governments with decentralised systems for integration service provision, as digital offerings may reduce inequality and provide greater access. ICT tools are also used as a supplement for in-person classes.

Norway has invested in bilingual and online resources for schools and newly arrived children, with materials available in Norwegian and six other languages. They are designed to aid in learning not only Norwegian language, but also math, science, and English. In some countries, such as Australia and Finland, digital classrooms allow countries to reach migrants living in diffuse or remote geographies. In 2020, Japan's Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology began developing and providing Japanese language learning materials using ICT for foreign nationals living in areas where it is difficult to set up language classes. Canada's LearnIT2teach project has supported blended learning since 2010 through hosting of courseware and training teachers on adapting the tools for their learners. In 2020, IRCC launched an enhanced site for language training providers, Avenue.ca, an internet-based system for the planning, delivery, and management of settlement language training. The new platform allows attendance tracking, a virtual space to store resources, and electronic learner portfolios.

The recent experience of the COVID-19 pandemic has made evident the need for reliable distance learning in situations where in-person learning is impossible. Countries that had not developed distance courses found themselves faced with the need to identify partners and ramp up such programmes rapidly. The alternative was to halt language-learning opportunities and postpone proficiency examinations, a policy that could have negative impacts on migrants' learning trajectory. In response, several OECD countries have taken steps to extend and improve upon their use of digital tools in language learning, including by enacting policies to make digital offerings more accessible.

With in-person meetings impossible, Germany brought its Network IQ support services online, offering email, phone, and video calls for job counselling and training. Qualification and introduction courses were also offered online. Skills Norway has been developing open educational resources for enhanced digital skills since 2017, when it launched the Digidel programme. In 2020, Norway offered funding in some localities to expand the programme for digital training to compensate for temporary unemployment.

To ensure continuity of integration offerings in 2020, France provided 15-24 hours of distance learning per week to those migrants who had already begun French courses under their integration contract. Distance training was targeted to 100-hour courses (for migrants closest to the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages (CEFR) A1 level during initial placement) with groups of 6-10 participants, and 200-hour courses with groups of 3-5 participants. Based on lessons learned, France plans to integrate e-learning modalities into their general course offerings in the future.

Germany, which offered online language options through its Volkshochschul-Verband (Adult Education Association centres) prior to the pandemic, invested EUR 20 million and approved nearly 9 300 online classes to avoid disruption of courses due to suspension of government services during spring 2020 and winter 2020-21. Approximately 66 000 migrants (plus about 8 600 course repeaters) transitioned to the online classes, which were offered free of charge during this period. The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees determined that online courses taken during the confinement period would be a "bonus" that would not count against the migrant's language learning entitlement. At the same time, Germany also increased efforts to support regular courses in their online transition, providing additional funding since 1 July 2020 to education centres to purchase devices needed for online teaching.

During coronavirus-related lockdown, Austria's Österreichischer Integrationsfonds (OIF) provided free online language courses for CEFR levels A1-B1, and 75 000 eligible migrants participated. Additionally, in December 2020 – during lockdown of the hospitality industry – the OIF and the Viennese Economic Chamber provided tailored online language courses for employees of the hospitality and catering industry.

Korea and Switzerland were among OECD countries that moved their language and integration programmes onto digital platforms due to COVID-19. Estonia launched the Volunteer Language Friends project, advertised through social media, which linked volunteer mentors to language learners through e-channels. Estonian Language House teachers from the Integration Foundation provided short trainings to volunteers. Such online programmes provided a way for migrants to continue their learning with minimal disruption while also maintaining important social contacts in their host country.

Countries must recognise the challenges and limitations associated with increased digitalisation

In spite of the high potential of digitisation, countries must also face the potential risks and design their digitalisation policy accordingly. Steps to improve digital offerings in integration may have significant benefits in terms of flexibility and cost, but if not carefully considered, digitalisation increases the risk of leaving behind a significant portion of the migrant population. Transition towards such tools was relatively smooth for higher-educated migrants with at least basic levels of language proficiency. However, many countries experienced challenges reaching low-educated migrants, especially those with low levels of host-country language proficiency. In the context of pandemic information dissemination, some countries addressed this through neighbourhood-based information initiatives, for example, in some parts of Germany and in Scandinavian OECD countries. Recognising that digitalisation of integration measures may present a particular challenge for entry-level language learners, Switzerland made an exception to the “COVID-19 Special Situation Ordinance” that prohibited face-to-face courses. Those learners unable to participate in online education due to very low language level or lack of digital literacy or connectivity could attend in-person courses up to CEFR level A2. Group sizes were limited to 15 people.

Countries pursuing the use of ICT for integration measures should consider the simplicity of the tools. Instructions should assume low prior technical knowledge, and the interface should avoid distracting material. For migrants who are building digital skills, Australia initially provides books and CDs, encouraging a transition to online tools as students progress. Finland allows distance learners to return homework and other materials by mail. Helping migrants gain digital literacy within the context of integration programmes may have a dual advantage, as this can play the role of upskilling to reflect the digital transformation of the workplace. Quebec (Canada) now considers migrants with low digital literacy as a group of migrants in need of additional support (alongside those in need of alphabetisation) in its governmental programme of French language education.

Related to the challenge of digital literacy is the challenge of digital access. While schools are better equipped with digital tools today than ever before, access to digital learning opportunities remains unequal outside the classroom. In most OECD countries with significant shares of children of immigrants, students with immigrant parents are less likely than students with native-born parents at the age of 15 to have access to a computer and an internet connection at home (OECD, 2020_[1]). To mitigate the adverse impact on such children, many OECD countries distributed computers to students in need during COVID-19 school closures. In Belgium, adult migrants who did not have access to the necessary equipment to follow online integration courses received devices from the responsible agencies. Switzerland adapted its rules to allow cantons to use federal funding to acquire computer equipment to lend to learners studying remotely. Canada developed a Citizenship Modernization Plan aimed to improve service delivery and leverage digital processes wherever possible. To avoid going forward on an *ad hoc* basis, countries that have not been active in increasing digital uptake will need to consider how to develop a coordinated approach to digitalisation that meets the needs of both their governments and their migrant populations.

Programme and software design are also key considerations. The effectiveness of digital tools lies in their ease of use, so it is important to develop programmes that are relatively simple in interface. Countries must also consider hesitancy of migrants to use digital tools and include measures to educate migrants of their benefits. Data security is an additional issue that will become increasingly salient as digitalisation of

integration services increases. Additionally, countries must determine whether fully digitalising integration services would meet their integration goals, considering, for example, the potential loss of social aspect of integration measures when programmes transition to an online setting. Countries should consider each of these elements carefully when formalising their digital policy.

While digitalisation was important, most policy responses to COVID-19 were not driven by technology

In addition to information and training, digital solutions were also used for other aspects of integration programmes in response to COVID-19 pandemic. Australia, Canada, and Norway, for example, conducted naturalisation ceremonies online throughout 2020, and Lithuania introduced a service wizard for submission of e-applications for 32 citizenship-related application forms. Canada also provided settlement and integration services online or by telephone whenever possible.

However, shutdowns due to the pandemic also led to the temporary reworking or pause of integration measures in many OECD countries and to the provision of specific supports for those impacted by the pandemic. Most adjustments during the pandemic consisted of relaxing some rules and obligations for recently arrived immigrants. Several countries, such as Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway, for example, postponed obligatory examinations or extended timelines for eligibility for integration programmes while such programmes were paused.

Many OECD countries also implemented measures to provide support for vulnerable migrants and extended COVID-19-related mainstream financial supports to foreign nationals throughout 2020. In New Zealand, foreigners had access to the same wage subsidy schemes available to New Zealanders. Additionally, Immigration New Zealand provided loans to people who required financial assistance to repatriate from New Zealand.

Canada made income support available to individuals residing in Canada who were not entitled to Employment Insurance. The government did not consider the benefit to be social assistance when assessing eligibility to sponsor family members (from which social assistance recipients are generally barred). New benefits schemes, including a benefit for caregivers and for individuals with children, were available from 27 September 2020 to 25 September 2021. The Canada Recovery Sickness Benefit (CRSB) gave income support to employed and self-employed individuals who were unable to work due to COVID-19 or who had an underlying health condition putting them at greater risk of getting COVID-19. Between 27 September 2020 and 25 September 2021, migrants could apply for up to two weeks of support (CAD 500 before tax per week). In Belgium, third-country nationals authorised to stay on force majeure grounds were not entitled to unemployment benefits but provisions were made to allow receipt of social aid.

In the Netherlands, where some residence permits do not allow recourse to public funds, exceptions were made to allow for access during the COVID-19 crisis. Latvia temporarily suspended rules regarding minimum income requirements or maintenance of economic activity in 2020 when examining registration of permit applications or withdrawal cases. However, this derogation did not apply to first-time permit applications submitted after 10 June 2020. In Slovenia, the minister for the Interior instructed administrative units to apply flexibility in relation to the usual rules for assessing sufficient means of subsistence for granting a residence permit. The period of time during which the third-country national was waiting for employment or ordered to quarantine was not considered.

Special considerations were also made regarding access to health care. In Austria, tolerated migrants, who are not eligible for health insurance, were covered for COVID-19 care. In Estonia, regulations were amended on 26 June 2020 so that COVID-19 diagnosis and treatment could be provided free of charge to uninsured persons. In Lithuania, a decision was made not to terminate the validity of the compulsory health

insurance during the quarantine period for those individuals unable to continue to pay. Israel allowed Palestinian day labourers who remained in Israel overnight to access the employer-based health insurance programme beginning in May 2020.

Some OECD countries created arrangements around working conditions for migrants during 2020. Germany mandated arrangements that facilitated separation between teams of workers, including for their living areas. Employers were obligated to inform local health authorities about new arrivals and keep contact details for tracing in case of infection. In August 2020, Spain introduced extensive guidelines on the prevention and control of COVID-19 on farms that employ seasonal workers, requiring each employer to conduct a risk assessment and to adapt the workplace and accommodations to meet the guideline provisions. In Poland, seasonal workers were subject to a mandatory 10-day home quarantine.

Several OECD countries enacted additional measures to support international students whose financial situation was impacted by COVID-19. France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland, and Portugal introduced some state-funded support and scholarships. In Germany, international students received access to interest-free study loans and were eligible for a special aid grant. Preliminary data suggest that they accounted for about a third of the recipients of the grant scheme. International students who had been working in Australia longer than 12 months were able to access their Australian superannuation fund. Canada doubled its need-based Student Grant (up to CAD 6 000) for full-time students, including international students, for 2020 and 2021. In Hungary and Portugal, international students were entitled to accommodation. Latvia and the Czech Republic both provided accommodation support.

Addressing discrimination has become a high priority for integration

Negative sentiment toward minority populations, including certain groups of migrants, is not a new phenomenon. However, as societies have become more diverse, many countries have implemented diversity measures to reduce or remove obstacles for perceived disadvantaged groups, particularly along racial or ethnic lines. Attitudes to diversity throughout the OECD have largely improved over the past decade, but the same cannot be said of attitudes toward migrants, where negative attitudes have remained high in a number of countries and increased elsewhere (OECD, 2020^[2]).

The year 2020 marked a shift in polarisation around the question of belonging and the need for more policy action to address the issue of discrimination. The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed and exacerbated existing economic and social inequalities in OECD countries. High-profile events occurring in early 2020, which quickly emerged as symbols of enduring discrimination, touched off both global protests and debate, which have in turn led policy makers to enact a variety of new laws or enhance existing measures. An attack in Hanau, Germany on 19 February 2020 that left nine people with a migrant background dead was acknowledged by the state as a racist attack. In the United States, the murder of George Floyd, an African-American man, on 25 March 2020 led to an expansion of the *Black Lives Matter* movement that came into existence in 2013. Mr. Floyd's death sparked global protest demanding more be done to combat racial discrimination and violence, even in countries without large black populations. In the United Kingdom and Belgium, authorities removed statues of individuals with controversial colonial legacies in response to local protests.

Increasing or ignored violence toward migrants and their descendants is a concern, but many antidiscrimination measures have a broader focus, seeking also to address persistent economic discrimination. For example, in most, but not all, OECD countries, migrants have lower employment rates than the native-born population and wage gaps are common. At the same time, clearly not all observed persistent disadvantages faced by migrants and their children are due to discrimination. While skills differences account for only a part of observed disadvantage, other structural obstacles include lack of networks and knowledge of the functioning of the labour market. Many countries have thus concluded that broader equal employment or “diversity” policies (with diversity encompassing a range of disadvantaged

minority groups) can provide more equal opportunities. Understanding this policy space is complicated by the need to define who is a minority, particularly where countries create policies that are broadly tailored to cover multiple groups. In some countries, inclusion of long-standing ethnic minorities may be perceived as in competition or tension with the interests of more recent migrants. Defining migrant status as distinct from ethnic minority status raises complicated questions around the degree of implied belonging or “otherness.”

The minority population that receives primary focus under antidiscrimination measures differs across OECD countries. In most English-speaking OECD countries, the focus is on race or skin colour, although migration background is also relevant, especially for specific groups like Asians or Hispanics, where the majority are immigrants and their native-born children. Statistics Canada reported an increase in racial or ethnic harassment of Canadians with Asian background in 2020 that has been interpreted as rising from the emergence of the coronavirus in China. In the United States, 2021 protests highlighted anti-Asian-American violence. In Central and Eastern European countries, the Roma people are considered the most visible minority. There is also intersectionality with religion, especially in European OECD countries with large immigrant groups from predominately Muslim countries.

Heightened awareness of the issue of discrimination is the impetus for policy change

Many OECD countries have monitored attitudes of the native population toward migrants, but an increased focus on migrants’ perception of discrimination has also added weight to the momentum for policy change. Survey research among immigrants, their children, and ethnic minorities in the EU show that nearly one in four respondents felt discriminated against in the 12 months prior to the survey due to their ethnic or immigrant background (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2017[3]). Across the OECD countries with available data, nearly one in five immigrants and native-born children of immigrants report to have been subjected to discrimination (OECD/European Union, 2018^[4]). At the same time, while all OECD countries have legislation to protect from discrimination (OECD, 2020^[2]), only one-quarter of immigrants are aware there is a legal framework to protect them from discrimination (Eurobarometer, 2015^[5]).

Native-born children of immigrants are more likely to be aware of and unwilling to accept discrimination. This advocacy and willingness to call out injustice, which may be seen as a sign of successful integration into the host country, has heightened awareness amongst policy makers of the issue of discrimination against migrants.

OECD countries have enhanced their actions to address discrimination, often through dedicated action plans

Throughout 2020 and into 2021, many OECD countries, as well as the European Union, have taken a variety of actions to address discrimination and develop plans to reduce unequal treatment.

Australia has launched several budget initiatives to enhance the existing Multicultural Access and Equity Policy. Funds include AUD 17.7 million to enhance engagement with multicultural communities and AUD 7.9 million to establish a research programme to inform inclusion initiatives. Additional allocations include AUD 3 million over four years from 2020-21 to the Islamic Museum of Australia to develop educational resources and online learning platforms to support social cohesion. Further, AUD 37.3 million is allocated over four years to promote Australian values, identity, and social cohesion and to counter online misinformation.

Austria continues to monitor indicators on public opinion toward migrants through its National Action Plan for Integration. In 2020, perception of integration by Austrians was almost evenly divided between positive evaluations (54.7% felt integration worked very well or well) and negative opinions (45.3% not so good or not at all). In December 2020, the Constitutional Court lifted a legislative reform that forbade girls in primary

school to wear a headscarf in school. The government programme for 2020-24 explicitly states that freedom from discrimination is an important concern for Austria; however, unequal treatment based on nationality is not prohibited where not used as a pretext for ethnic or racial discrimination.

Belgian authorities renewed their focus on anti-racism after a xenophobic arson at a planned asylum centre in Bilzen in November 2019. In February 2020, the Inter-Ministerial Conference Against Racism was established, providing federal and federated entities a forum for co-ordinating racial discrimination, antisemitism, faith-based discrimination, and intersectional discrimination measures. Following this Conference, in September 2020, the federal government committed to co-ordinate the inter-federal development of a national action plan against racism and related intolerance and discrimination. One of the goals of this action plan will be improvement of data collection to better inform decisions on hate speech and hate crimes policy. Belgium also created a special parliamentary commission in July 2020 to examine Belgium's colonial past and its consequences in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Rwanda. The police also launched pilot projects to develop a policy to prevent ethnic profiling. In September 2020, Belgium's Federal Human Rights Institute held its inaugural meeting.

In late 2020, Canada's Federal Anti-Racism Secretariat launched the 50-30 challenge, a joint initiative with civil society and the private sector that aims to attain 30% representation of under-represented groups on boards and senior management positions in Canada. Additionally, the two-year budget announced by the government in April 2021 allocates an additional CAD 11 million to expand the activities of the Canadian Race Relations Foundation, a non-profit Crown corporation tasked with combating racial discrimination.

The French Government launched several initiatives in early 2021, including an online antidiscrimination platform and a two-month citizen consultation to encourage dialogue and proposals for concrete solutions to combat discrimination. Additionally, in March 2021, a report listing the findings of a parliamentary mission on the emergence and evolution of racism (created in December 2019) was published, listing 57 concrete proposals to address racism and antisemitism in France.

In 2020, the German Federal Government established the "Committee to combat right-wing extremism and racism" to counter anti-Semitism, anti-Gypsyism, anti-black racism, hostility towards Muslims, and other forms of group-related enmity. Germany expanded its support for those affected by racial discrimination and invested in effective victim protection as well as in improvement of sustainable structures for combating racism. Germany further announced an intention to invest EUR 1 billion from 2021-24 (with the option to add a further EUR 150 million in 2022). With the "Our Work: Our Diversity" initiative, launched in spring 2021, the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs will fund 30 projects to develop and test innovative forms of combatting racism and right-wing extremism in the world of work. Several German states also increased their anti-discrimination budgets.

Ireland's Minister for Justice and Equality, together with the Minister of State with responsibility for Equality, Immigration and Integration, established an Anti-Racism Committee in June 2020 to draw up a New Action Plan Against Racism. Public consultation on the plan opened on 21 April 2021.

Latvia's Diversity Promotion project (2016-22) allocated EUR 6.8 million to the "Openness is a Value" campaign to sponsor educational activities on social inclusion and discrimination prevention, with 2019 dedicated to people of different ethnic origin. In 2020, the Society Integration Foundation invited employers to conduct a self-assessment to receive recommendations and a package of support measures.

In Norway, a new Action Plan against Racism and Discrimination on the Grounds of Ethnicity and Religion for 2020-23 entered into force in January 2020. In response to an August 2019 terrorist attack against an Islamic centre, Norway launched an Action Plan against Discrimination of and Hate Against Muslims in September 2020. The plan contains 18 measures focusing on research and education, dialogue across religious communities, and police initiatives such as registration of hate crimes towards Muslims as a separate category in the crime statistics.

The EU announced its Action Plan Against Racism 2020-25 on 18 September 2020 calling for fair policing and protection, disaggregation of equality data by race, better enforcement of the Decision on combatting racism and xenophobia, and closer co-ordination. In this context, the European Commission organised a Summit Against Racism on 19 March 2021 to address implementation, involving EU Institutions, Member States, civil society, and grassroots organisations. This plan, which was not initially foreseen by the Commission's work plan, responds to the events of 2020 and represents the highest level of institutional recognition of structural racism and its impact in the EU. Also in line with this plan, the Commission appointed its first co-ordinator for anti-racism, whose role is to liaise with members of minority racial and ethnic communities and relay their concerns to the Commission. The co-ordinator will also work with Member States, the EU Parliament, and institutions of higher education to develop anti-racism policies.

In a number of countries, the focus has extended beyond anti-discrimination measures toward broader measures on diversity and equal opportunities for migrants. This is the case, for example, in the Netherlands, which made several changes in 2020 within the scope of its Action Plan against Labour Market Discrimination 2018-21, including establishment of a programme to improve the labour-market position of Dutch residents with a migration background. As of July 2020, individual employers could access a barometer by which to benchmark their inclusion of migrants against employers in the same sector. The government also announced an amendment to the Health and Safety law extending competence to monitor employer recruitment and selection procedures to the Inspectorate SZW (for fair, healthy and safe working conditions).

In July 2020, the United Kingdom established the independent Commission on Race and Ethnic Disparities. The Commission released its report on 28 April 2021, laying out 24 recommendations intended to promote greater fairness and build trust between communities and the government while also highlighting progress made toward inclusion and integration.

In the United States, President Joseph Biden signed two executive orders in January 2021 on advancement of racial equity and support for underserved communities, directing the Domestic Policy Council to include racial equity as part of its mission and setting up the COVID-19 Health Equity Task Force. A main identified priority is the collection of racial data, which states do not consistently collect at present. Further, in March 2021, the Department of Justice announced a cross-agency initiative to combat anti-Asian violence and the National Science Foundation announced USD 33 million in grants for anti-racism research.

Finally, several OECD countries, notably Germany, Italy, and Spain, launched online initiatives to combat anti-migrant sentiment related to COVID-19. On the local level, the city of Barcelona launched the "StopRacism" campaign in March 2020 and Prague launched an anti-prejudice campaign in February 2021. In New York, the city government instituted a "COVID-19 and Human Rights" campaign to provide information for services to support victims of harassment and discrimination. International organisations assisted with campaign development in some cases. The International Organisation for Migration collaborated with the Mexican authorities on a campaign entitled "COVID-19 does not discriminate, why do you?" The United Nations delivered information to combat xenophobic stereotypes against migrants through the "Verified" campaign, and the UNHCR implemented targeted campaigns through its country offices.

Other recent changes to integration policies in OECD countries

While large-scale reform was rare in 2020, with most countries reacting to circumstances caused by the pandemic, some countries did push forward on major overhauls of integration policy in 2020 and early 2021. Others have announced more targeted interventions. Even those countries that planned large-scale modifications acknowledged the challenges created by COVID-19. The Netherlands, for example, postponed implementation of its new Civic Integration Act (that was to take effect on 1 July 2021) to 1 January 2022. It will, among other things, introduce three separate civic integration routes and an increased target Dutch language level.

Broad integration programme overhauls have been rare

Norway and Luxembourg worked toward fundamental reform of their integration measures in 2020. Norway implemented a new Integration Act in January 2021. One of the main goals of the new act is that more migrants will gain access to formal education. To prepare participants for employment or further education, Norway shifted its language requirement from an hours-based model to a target level model, having determined that reaching CEFR level B1 was important for full participation but recognising that not all migrants will reach this level at the same rate. Norway also raised the threshold age for the target group for the integration programme from 16 to 18 years of age to avoid confusion for minors who are still in school. Migrants will now be eligible for career counselling within three months of entry in addition to the previously existing skills assessment. Norway also made modifications to facilitate co-ordination of integration programmes, implicating county-level actors that have responsibility over upper secondary education in organisation of integration measures. Counties and municipalities will share responsibility for integration.

In Luxembourg, changes took the form of a rearrangement of competencies intended to delineate between reception and integration. With the Law of 4 December 2019, Luxembourg created a new National Reception Office (ONA) within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Beginning in January 2020, the ONA took charge of organising reception and managing accommodation for refugees and asylum-seekers. The law created a Department of Integration within the Ministry of Family Affairs, Integration and the Greater Region (MFAMIGR), which has signed an agreement with 18 municipalities to develop local plans for integration with the support of national integration counsellors. The MFAMIGR was charged with developing a new law on integration for 2021. In this context, the main national and local stakeholders participated in a large consultation. An overhaul of the reception programme for newcomer pupils in the education system is planned for 2021. On the co-ordination side, Luxembourg changed the format of its Interministerial Committee on Integration, which now includes civil society organisations.

Australia announced significant reforms to the Adult Migrant English Program (AMEP), removing the previous cap on the number of free English tuition hours and extending target English levels from functional to vocational level. For migrants in Australia on or before 1 October 2020, the reform also removed time limits for beginning and completing English classes. These reforms entered into effect on 19 April 2021.

While some countries streamline naturalisation, others add requirements

Citizenship legislation and accompanying measures continue to be an area of high policy action across the OECD. Canada's Citizenship Modernization Plan of 2019-20 called for digitalisation where possible, and the government began offering online citizenship testing and e-applications. For 2021-22, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada announced the intended elimination of citizenship fees, along with an amendment of the Oath of Citizenship to reflect Indigenous treaty rights, and the revision of the citizenship guide to reflect Canada's diverse society. Norway amended the Nationality Act to allow dual citizenship from January 2020. Norway also raised the naturalisation requirement for skills in oral Norwegian from CEFR level A2 to level B1. An amendment to Austria's Citizenship Act allows direct descendants of individuals persecuted under Austrofascism and National Socialism to acquire citizenship more easily. Italy, which in 2018 had increased the processing time for citizenship to 48 months, reduced it again in December 2020 to 24 months, with a possible extension to a maximum of 36 months. Portugal and Latvia introduced extensions of their principle of *jus soli*. Latvia now automatically confers citizenship on children born in Latvia unless the parents have agreed proactively on another citizenship. In Portugal, children born in Portugal acquire nationality at birth if one parent was residing legally in the country at the time of birth or if one of the parents (regardless of residence status) has been residing in Portugal for at least a year at the time of birth.

In recognition of their role in the response to the pandemic, France created a fast-track naturalisation programme for health care workers in 2020, allowing them to apply after two years in France, rather than five.

In Denmark, the spread of COVID-19 led to the temporary lifting of a rule requiring all future citizens to shake hands with a representative of the public authorities to become Danish citizens. Denmark did introduce, however, some limitations to automatic granting of Danish nationality to children in January 2020. In Greece, March 2020 amendments to the Citizenship Code now require migrants to demonstrate sufficient integration through language and knowledge of Greek political life through a written test. The amended legislation increases the period after which refugees may seek citizenship from three to seven years, in line with other categories of migrants residing in Greece. Refugees must also pay a fee of EUR 100.

Integration increasingly includes a gender perspective

Integration of immigrant women is another issue that continues to be high on the integration policy agenda. High migrant-gender gaps in employment are persistent, and empowerment of migrant women also affects the integration of their children. Recognising this, countries have increasingly developed policies and programmes to facilitate better integration of migrant women, particularly into the labour market. In Germany, since May 2020, the project “Fem.OS”, funded by the Federal Government Commissioner for Migration, Refugees and Integration, has offered legally certified counselling and proactive information through social media in ten languages. There are also various other ongoing programmes, including “Stark im Beruf” (Strong at Work) by the Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Women, Senior Citizens, and Youth, to support migrant women in their job-search. Sweden extended a 2019 directive on inclusion of a gender perspective in all measures of the integration programme to remain valid for Public Employment Service appropriations in 2020. This includes new funding for Swedish language training for foreign-born parents who are away from the labour market taking care of children. On 29 January 2020, the Austrian Federal Chancellery assumed responsibility for Austria’s integration agenda, appointing a Federal Minister of Women and Integration in the Federal Chancellery. Other countries have acknowledged the disproportionate impact of COVID-19 on migrant women and are beginning to view integration policy with a gender lens. However, this policy trend is still nascent, as is gender mainstreaming in project design and funding.

Decentralisation continues, but the pandemic further exposed its limitations

For countries that have increasingly decentralised their services, the challenges of COVID-19 revealed the limitations of the approach. Systems that manage the organisation of introduction activities on the local level have faced more difficulties in adapting to rapid shifts, such as the need for physical distancing and online learning. For example, a report by the Norwegian Research Institute FAFO on how municipalities adapted their introduction activities – chief among which is language learning – during the pandemic showed that one in two municipalities faced difficulties managing the situation (Kavli and Lillevik, 2020^[6]). In particular, digitalisation of services often proves challenging in a decentralised setting due to lack of economies of scale. Strengthening integration at the local level has often been a first step for countries that do not yet have a national policy on integration. Some longer-standing immigration countries, including Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, in addition to Japan have also largely devolved integration to the local level. It may be too early to say whether countries with localised strategies will continue to operate in a decentralised manner. However, it is clear that policy makers, having seen how these systems respond to periods of great stress, will need to consider whether the approach is sustainable without a clear co-ordination mechanism. Stronger oversight with guidelines and appropriate incentives can facilitate consistent implementation and mainstreaming of good practices, two policy challenges that decentralised systems will need to rise to meet.

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4

The fiscal impact of immigration in OECD countries since the mid-2000s

Ana Damas de Matos

The fiscal impact of immigrants, that is whether immigrants are net contributors or a burden to the public finances, is regularly at the centre of the public debate on migration. The increased pressure on public finances due to the COVID-19 pandemic will inevitably bring back the question of the impact of immigration on the labour market and public finances to the forefront of the political debate. In this context, it is critical to have sound, updated and internationally comparable data on how much immigrants contribute and cost to receiving countries. This chapter estimates the yearly net fiscal impact of immigrants in 25 OECD countries over the 2006-18 period. It also provides a systematic analysis of the differences between the foreign and native-born populations in each item of government expenditure and revenue, as well as a detailed analysis of the socio-economic determinants of the fiscal position of immigrants.¹

In Brief

Key findings

- This chapter provides a comparison of the fiscal impact of immigrants in 22 European OECD countries, Australia, Canada and the United States, over a 13-year period, from 2006 to 2018, using a common methodology.
- **In all countries, immigrants contribute more in taxes and contributions than governments spend on their social protection, health and education.**
- The contributions of immigrants are large enough to fully cover their share of government expenditure on *congestible* public goods, and contribute to the financing of *pure* public goods, such as defence and public debt charges, in a vast majority of countries. In 2017, the contribution of immigrants to the financing of pure public goods represented a total of USD 547 billion in the 25 countries included in the analysis.
- When all public expenditure is included, the total net fiscal contribution of immigrants remains positive in about a third of the countries covered by the study. Larger per capita contribution for immigrants compared to the native-born are recorded in approximately half the countries.
- **The total net fiscal contribution of immigrants is persistently small during the 2006-18 period, between -1% and +1% of GDP for most countries.** This total net fiscal contribution depends on the size and composition of the immigrant population, the structure of the host country's public budget, and varies over the business cycle.
- Including the native-born children of immigrants in the calculation adds a relatively large education cost. The total net fiscal contribution of immigrants decreases by half a percentage point of GDP on average. However, these results are biased as they do not account for the taxes and social contributions paid by the adult native-born children of immigrants.
- In almost all countries, governments spend less on immigrants per capita than on the native-born. However, immigrants contribute less per capita than the native-born in practically all countries. The expenditure per capita on the foreign-born is lower than on the native-born on old age and survival, sickness and disability, education and health, on average across countries. Conversely, the expenditure per capita on family and children, unemployment, social exclusion and housing is on average larger on the foreign-born.
- Differences in the composition of immigrant populations across OECD countries explain a large part of the cross-country differences in the fiscal position of immigrants relative to the native-born. Differences in the age distribution of immigrants, relative to the native-born, alone account for 60% of the cross-country differences in relative fiscal position of immigrants. Furthermore, immigrants have a more positive fiscal position in countries where the immigrant population consists mainly of recent labour migrants, than in countries who host mainly humanitarian immigrants.
- In European OECD countries, prime-aged (25-54) immigrants born in other EU countries have a more favourable fiscal position than immigrants born outside the EU.
- In almost all countries, more than half of the immigrants are prime aged – the age group with the most favourable net fiscal contribution. However, the net fiscal contribution of prime-aged immigrants lags behind that of prime-aged native-born.

- **The fiscal gap between prime-aged immigrants and natives is driven by immigrants' lower contributions rather than by higher government expenditure on the foreign-born**, and is larger for the highly educated.
- Immigrants' lower employment rates are key in explaining the gap in contributions. Closing the employment gap between the prime-aged foreign and native-born of the same age and education could increase the total net fiscal contribution of immigrants by over 0.5% of GDP in Belgium and Sweden, and over a third of a percentage point in Austria, Denmark, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.
- Over the 2006-18 period, the net fiscal contribution of immigrants declined most in countries where the share of older immigrants has increased the most during this time, such as Lithuania or Latvia. Conversely, the improvement in the fiscal position of immigrants was largest in countries that received large recent inflows of highly skilled labour migrants, such as the United Kingdom.
- The total net fiscal contribution of immigrants, similarly to that of the native-born, is strongly procyclical. While immigrants lost their jobs at a higher rate during the global financial crisis in many OECD countries, their fiscal position deteriorated similarly to that of the native-born.
- The economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic are putting at risk the improvements observed recently regarding the labour market inclusion of immigrants. This calls for maintaining, if not increasing, investments in the labour market integration of recently arrived and settled migrants as these programmes have a very high fiscal return.

Introduction

The fiscal impact of immigrants, that is whether immigrants are net contributors or a burden to the public finances, is regularly at the centre of the public debate on migration. During the humanitarian migration crisis in 2015/16 in Europe, the issue of the fiscal cost of receiving and integrating large inflows of refugees drew a lot of attention. Although the salience of migration issues has decreased due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the economic crisis and the increased pressure on public finances will inevitably bring back the question of the impact of immigration on the labour market and public finances to the forefront of the political debate. In this context, it is critical to have sound, updated and internationally comparable data on how much immigrants contribute and cost to receiving countries.

The first OECD comparative study on the fiscal impact of immigrants, (OECD, 2013^[1]), showed that, before the 2008/09 economic crisis, immigrants contributed more in taxes and social contribution than they received in social benefits in most OECD countries, and that the net effect of immigrants on the public budget was small everywhere. The net fiscal contribution of immigrants was however generally lower than that of the native-born due to lower contributions rather than higher benefits received. The chapter highlighted the role of immigrants' labour market integration in improving their fiscal contribution.

In the past ten years, the composition of immigrants in OECD countries has changed significantly. Recent immigrants are more educated and come from countries that are more diverse (d'Aiglepiere et al., 2020^[2]). The share of refugees among the immigrant population has increased in many countries. The demographic and economic context has also changed. Ageing populations put increasing pressure on the fiscal budget of most OECD countries through higher expenditure on old age benefits and health. Finally, the current economic downturn due to the COVID-19 crisis puts OECD countries under great fiscal pressure and renews the importance of understanding the fiscal impact of immigrants.

This chapter estimates the net fiscal impact of immigrants in 25 OECD countries over the period between 2006-2018. It uses a *top-down* accounting approach in which all categories of expenditure and revenue of the public budget, as reported in the national accounts, are attributed to the native-born and immigrant populations.

This chapter contributes to the literature in three ways. First, it is the first study to provide a broad comparative overview across the OECD by covering both European OECD countries and *settlement* countries, namely Australia, Canada and the United States. Second, by covering 13 years, the estimations incorporate changes in immigrant populations and show how the fiscal impact of immigrants changes over a longer period and over the business cycle. Third, the chapter provides a systematic analysis of the differences between the foreign and native-born populations in each item of government expenditure and revenue, as well as a detailed analysis of the socio-economic determinants of the fiscal position of immigrants.

The first section of the chapter reviews recent studies on the fiscal impact of immigrants in OECD countries. The second section introduces the methodological approach. The third section presents the estimations of the net fiscal impact of immigrants. The first set of results looks at the overall fiscal contribution of immigrants over the whole period of analysis, 2006 to 2018. The second set focuses on the differences in the fiscal contribution of immigrants depending on their age, education and employment status. The last set of results studies the changes over the period in the fiscal contribution of immigrants.

Recent evidence on the fiscal impact of immigration in OECD countries

This section focuses on the literature on the fiscal impact of immigration of the last ten years. A detailed review of the methods and literature until the early 2000s is available in the previous OECD publication on this topic (OECD, 2013^[1]).

There are two main types of studies on the fiscal impact of immigration: static and dynamic. Static studies evaluate the net fiscal contribution of immigrants to the public finances at a given point in time, typically a year, using an accounting approach. Dynamic studies measure the fiscal impact of immigrants throughout their entire lifecycle.

The static accounting approach seeks to apportion all revenue and expenditure items of the public budget to the immigrant and native-born population. A main result of this literature is that the net fiscal contribution of immigrants is small. In line with the literature, OECD (2013^[1]) estimates the net fiscal contribution of migrants to be between plus and minus 0.5% of GDP for most OECD countries in 2006 to 2018.

Recent accounting studies have estimated the fiscal impact of immigrants over longer periods and in some cases focussed on specific immigrant groups, such as intra-EU immigrants, following EU-enlargement, or refugees, following the 2015/16 humanitarian crisis. Some of these recent studies also present an estimation of the Net Present Value (NPV) of the fiscal impact of an immigration cohort over their lifecycle. The results of such forward-looking analysis are sensitive to the discount rate used and to assumptions on immigrants' integration including the taxes they will pay over their lifetime, the benefits they will receive, and how long they will live in the host country.

Recent studies for European OECD countries find small fiscal contributions of immigrants but a more positive contribution for EU migrants. This is the case in Belgium (National Bank of Belgium, 2020^[3]), Denmark (Danish Ministry of Finance, 2020^[4]), the United Kingdom (Oxford Economics, 2018^[5]) for the years 2016/17. A report from the National Bank of Belgium (2020^[3]) showed that the lower fiscal contribution of non-EU immigrants is due to their lower employment rates. In the United Kingdom, EU immigrants are shown to contribute more than the native-born due to higher taxes and contributions. Despite lower yearly fiscal contributions of non-EU migrants, all immigrants arrived in 2016 in the

United Kingdom are expected to have a positive net fiscal contribution over their lifetime (Oxford Economics, 2018^[5]).

EU immigrants also had a positive net fiscal contribution in Denmark and Sweden in the post-enlargement period. Martinsen and Pons Rotger (2017^[6]) show that EU immigrants were not a burden to the welfare state over the years 2002-13, and in fact made a significant positive net contribution to the Danish public budget. Ruist (2014^[7]) estimates that the net fiscal contribution of post-enlargement immigrants to the Swedish public finances in 2007 was small and positive. They generated less public revenue than the population on average, but also costed less. Their total fiscal contribution over their lifecycle is also shown to be positive under reasonably weak assumptions.

Studying over 30 years of immigration to France, Chojnicki, Ragot and Sokhna (2018^[8]) showed that the net fiscal contribution of immigrants to the primary budget was negative but small, between plus and minus 0.5% of GDP, over 1979-2011. The net fiscal contribution of EU immigrants decreased over the period, due to the ageing of this population. Furthermore, the study shows that the fiscal contribution of immigrants decreased after the global financial crisis.

Using data from 1995-2011, Dustmann and Frattini (2014^[9]) show that in the United Kingdom, recent immigrants, arrived in 2000 and later, had a positive net fiscal contribution over ten years, irrespective of their country of origin. Using a similar period for the United States, 1994-2013, Blau and Mackie (2017^[10]) show that while the net fiscal contribution of immigrants is lower than that of the native-born, controlling for education and ethnicity eliminates a significant part of the difference. Immigrants from more recent cohorts tend to have a more positive fiscal contribution due to higher educational attainment.

A main determinant of the fiscal impact of immigrants is their category of immigration. Labour immigrants are expected to have larger fiscal contributions than family or humanitarian immigrants do. Data by category of migration is only available in a few countries, such as Canada. Zhang, Zhong and de Chardon (2020^[11]) model the NPV of the fiscal impact of the 2016 immigrant cohort. They show that the present lifetime net direct fiscal contribution of economic immigrants is positive as long as immigrants arrive in Canada before age 49. In contrast, the net direct fiscal contribution of refugees is negative.

Despite lower fiscal contributions than other immigrants, the fiscal cost of refugees is shown to be relatively small in recent literature. Ruist (2015^[12]) estimates the cost of refugees at 1% of GDP to the Swedish public finances in 2007. Ruist (2020^[13]) presents estimates that if the European Union received all refugees currently in Asia and Africa, the implied average annual fiscal cost over the lifetime of these refugees would be at most 0.6% of the EU's GDP.

The fiscal gains of integrating refugees are also put forward in recent studies for European countries, such as Bach et al. (2017^[14]) and European Commission (2016^[15]). For Germany, Bach et al. (2017^[14]) explicitly model the integration of refugees arrived in 2015 until 2030 and show how the fiscal balance improves with efficient language and skill training.

The vast majority of recent studies are country studies. An exception is a study of the fiscal impact of European migrants within the European Economic Area countries over the period 2004-15 (Nyman and Ahlskog, 2018^[16]). Most countries (21 out of 29) benefited from a positive tax impact of intra-European migration. The net fiscal contributions are estimated to be between plus and minus 0.4% of GDP.

Another recent cross-country study for European countries shows that immigrants had a more positive net fiscal contribution in 2015 than the native-born (Christl et al., 2021^[17]). However, the fiscal contribution over their lifecycle was estimated to be larger for the native-born than for immigrants, and larger for EU immigrants than non-EU immigrants. The contribution of non-EU immigrants is shown to be lowest relative to the native-born in traditional welfare states.

In the last ten years, there was also a significant development of Dynamic Applied General Equilibrium Models (DAGEM) to study the fiscal impact of immigration. These models incorporate general equilibrium

effects such as the impact of an increase of immigration on the labour supply and wages of natives, and hence on their fiscal contributions.

Chojnicki, Docquier and Ragot (2011^[18]) found that post-war immigration (1945-2000) to the United States, was found that beneficial for all cohorts of natives and for all skill levels. This is the result of a large positive fiscal impact and moderate labour market impact of immigration. The post-war immigration, compared to a zero immigration scenario, is estimated to have reduced the share of public transfers in GDP by 0.3 percentage points.

Chojnicki and Ragot (2015^[19]) show that immigration contributes to reducing the tax burden related to the ageing of the French population. However, the financial gains are relatively moderate in comparison to the implied demographic changes. A 20 to 30% fiscal burden reduction would imply a two-fold increase in the current immigrant share of the population by the end of the century, holding the age and qualification of the immigrant population fixed.

Hansen, Schultz-Nielsen and Tranæs (2017^[20]) take a similar approach and look at the contribution of immigration to lower the tax burden of ageing in Denmark. Immigrants from Western countries have a positive impact on Danish public finances, while those from non-Western countries have a significant negative impact. The lower employment rate of non-Western immigrants explains the difference in the fiscal impact between the two groups of immigrants.

Berger et al. (2016^[21]) calibrated and simulated an identical DAGEM for four European countries (Austria, Germany, the United Kingdom and Poland). They found that the contribution of future immigration is equivalent to 2.1 percentage points labour income taxes in the United Kingdom, 3.9 points in Poland, 5.7 points in Austria and 7.3 points in Germany in 2060. These heterogeneous impacts are explained by differences in expected size and composition of immigration flows but also by cross-country differences in the pension systems.

Colas, Sachs and Weizsäcker (2021^[22]) estimate the indirect fiscal benefits of low-skilled immigration in the United States to be positive and large enough that they partly, or completely, offset the estimated negative direct fiscal impact of low-skilled immigrants estimated in the literature.

Finally, some recent papers present a dynamic *model-free* approach by estimating VAR (vector autoregressive) models. D'Albis, Boubtane and Coulibaly (2019^[23]) estimate a VAR model on a panel of 19 OECD countries for 1980-2015. In this set up, increased migration has a positive impact on the fiscal balance, through its increase of the working-age population and consequently of GDP per capita, and through a decrease in per capita net transfers from the government.

Measuring the fiscal impact of immigration

How much do immigrants contribute to government revenue in the host country and how much do they cost in terms of government expenditure? To answer this question, this chapter estimates for each country and each year the net fiscal contribution of immigrants, that is the difference between the tax contributions made by immigrants and the government expenditure on public benefits and services they receive.

This accounting approach provides a snapshot of the contribution to the fiscal balance of all immigrants living in the host country in a given year. However, the accounting approach in this chapter is not fully static. The chapter uses over ten years of data to show the evolution of the fiscal contribution of immigrants over the 2006-18 period.

The target group are all foreign-born residents of the host country

The analysis focuses on foreign-born individuals living in the host country in each year.² It uses labour force surveys for the different countries as a representative base of the resident population.³ These data

contain basic demographic information (age, gender, country of birth), relevant variables to disaggregate the immigrant population (region of origin, immigration cohort), as well as information on skills and labour market status shown to be important determinants of the individual's net fiscal contribution.

A question in the literature is whether the native-born children of immigrants – the so-called second generation – should be included in the target population. While some studies define immigrants as the foreign-born, including foreign-born children, others argue that the costs and revenue of the native-born children of immigrants are directly attributable to their parents.

This chapter focuses on the foreign-born. This choice is driven by data availability. Indeed, in most surveys, there is no direct information on the country of origin of the parents, which prevents us from identifying the children of immigrants once they leave parents' household.

However, Box 4.1 presents estimations in which the native-born children of immigrants are considered part of the immigrant population as long as they are aged 15 or younger, and are part of their immigrant parent's household.⁴ The estimations of the net fiscal contribution of immigrants are a lower bound as the costs of the “second generation” early in their lifecycle, which are health and education costs, are attributed to immigrants, whereas their contributions in taxes later in life are attributed to natives.

Several strategies are used to apportion each expenditure and revenue item of the public budget to the foreign or native-born populations

Data on the public budget of OECD countries over time comes from the OECD National Accounts Statistics database (OECD, 2021^[24]). Data are internationally comparable by following the System of National Accounts 2008 (SNA 2008). The level of analysis used is that of the general government. This includes not only the central government but also consolidated accounts that include state and local government, as well as social security funds.

Four main expenditure items considered in the analysis are expenditure on public goods, health, education and social protection. These four main items are further split into 15 items, which are the items that are apportioned to the foreign and the native-born. Annex 4.B describes all the expenditure items used in the analysis in more detail.

The revenue items considered in the analysis are direct taxes (taxes on wealth and income), indirect taxes (taxes on products and production), capital taxes, social contributions and other revenue.⁵ The main taxes on products are VAT, excises, and taxes on imports. Taxes on production are taxes on land, use of fixed assets, professional licenses, etc. Capital taxes exist only in some of the countries and are exceptional taxes such as taxes on inheritances.

Education and health expenditures are demographically modelled

Expenditure on education for the different levels (pre-primary and primary, secondary, post-secondary, and tertiary) is attributed per capita to each immigrant and native-born individual attending the corresponding education levels. Similarly, health expenditure is also apportioned based on the age distribution of the immigrant and native-born populations. The estimation strategy consists in applying the OECD's estimates of cost-age curves⁶ by country (Lorenzoni et al., 2019^[25]) to the immigrant and native-born population in the (Labour Force Survey) LFS to apportion the total expenditure on health reported in the national accounts.

A limitation of this approach is that the health costs of same age immigrant and native-born are assumed the same. This is due to the lack of cross-country data on the relative use of public health services. However, it is likely that immigrants and the native-born of the same age represent a different cost for the health system. The literature has emphasised different reasons for potential cost differences. For example, immigrants tend to be positively selected and hence in better health than the average population.

Immigrants also tend to use health services less than the native-born, sometimes due to lack of knowledge of the health system, lack of language skills or other barriers. Similarly, the education costs of immigrants and natives may also differ given that immigrant and native-born families may have different propensities to enrol their children in public versus private education.

Survey data on income is used to apportion social protection expenditure as well as taxes and social contributions

The apportionment of all categories of social protection, as well as that of direct taxes and social contributions, is based on survey data on income. The surveys used are the European Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) for European OECD countries, the Household Expenditure Survey (HES) and the Survey of Income and Housing (SIH) for Australia, the Current Population Survey (CPS) for the United States, the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID) and the Canadian Income Survey (CIS) for Canada.

In a first step, the host country's population is divided into 14 groups based on country of birth (foreign and native-born), age and education.⁷ For each group, in each year and in each country, mean values of the different types of benefits, taxes and contributions are estimated using the surveys on income. For example, we estimate the mean unemployment benefits received by prime-aged immigrants (25-54 years old) with tertiary education in Italy in 2016.

In a second step, each revenue and expenditure item in the government's budget is apportioned to the population sub-groups using the estimated means from the income surveys and the population counts from the LFS⁸⁹.

Following this approach implies that the national account items are apportioned to immigrants and natives (of different age and education groups) proportionally to the observed mean differences in the income surveys. However, the population totals for each subgroup used are those from the LFS. This strategy overcomes the limitation of income surveys, in particular of EU-SILC, that they may not be fully representative of the immigrant population.¹⁰ For the United States, the CPS directly contains information on benefits and taxes. Only the CPS is used to apportion the national account items in this case.

Indirect taxes, which are taxes on products and production, are apportioned based on individualised household disposable income information available in the income surveys. The apportionment of taxes on products would ideally be based on survey data on consumption baskets of immigrants and the native-born. Unfortunately, cross-country survey data with this level of detail is not available. Instead, the apportionment done in this chapter assumes that consumption baskets do not differ between immigrants and the native-born, and that total consumption expenditure is linear in disposable income. Under these assumptions, taxes on products can be apportioned to immigrants and the native-born based on their relative disposable incomes.¹¹

Taxes on production are apportioned in the same way as taxes on products, i.e. proportionately to each group's disposable income. Ideally, taxes paid by companies would be apportioned to company holders and stockholders. There is currently no cross-country data available to support such an analysis. In any case, taxes on production represent a small share of indirect taxes (an average across countries of approximately 15%).

How should expenditure on public goods be apportioned?

Expenditure on public goods represents an average across countries of 40% of total expenditure and varies widely across countries, from 31% in Denmark to 48% in Latvia and the United States. In line with the literature on the fiscal impact of immigration, the expenditure on public goods is divided into expenditure on *congestible* public goods and *pure* public goods.

Congestible public goods are public goods for which the cost of provision increases with population size. Examples of congestible public goods are the provision of water and utilities, police services or public transports. For simplicity, the assumption in most studies is that the marginal cost of provision equals the average cost so that the government's expenditure on congestible public goods is apportioned per capita to the native-born and immigrants alike. This is also the approach taken in this chapter.

Pure public goods are public goods for which the marginal cost is zero. The cost of providing pure public goods does not change with population size. Examples of pure public goods are defence services, interest on public debt, or running executive and legislative organs.

How public goods are apportioned to the foreign and the native-born is a key factor in understanding estimations of the fiscal impact of immigrants. In a cross-country analysis, this is even more important given the differences across countries in the shares of expenditure allocated to items such as defence or public debt transactions.

Given that an inflow of immigrants should not change the government's expenditure on pure public goods, many studies apportion this expenditure per capita to the native-born only (Rowthorn, 2008^[26]). Alternatively, others consider that the average cost of what are usually classified as pure public goods may be correlated with the country's GDP and population size, particularly so when the analysis covers a long period. Hence, they apportion all public goods, congestible and pure, per capita to the native-born and immigrants alike.

The empirical analysis in this chapter presents results with and without taking into account pure public goods. The comparison of the different sets of results is insightful into the role immigrants play in the fiscal balance in different countries.

A limitation of the analysis is that some of the services classified under public goods are in reality targeted at specific population groups. Ideally, these items would be identified in the national accounts and apportioned to the relevant sub population, instead of per capita. Unfortunately, the expenditure data in the national accounts is not detailed enough to do so. For example, integration programmes for immigrants (including language training) are not separately identified in the data and hence cannot be attributed to immigrants only. In this setting, they are classified under congestible public goods. Similarly, active labour market policies (including lifelong learning), firm support (including for small and medium enterprises and micro enterprises), and other programmes are not specifically allocated to their target populations.

The fiscal impact of immigrants in OECD countries, 2006-18

The net fiscal contribution of the immigrant population, 2006-18

Immigrants pay more in taxes and social contributions than they receive in benefits and services

The first part of the results in this chapter look at the fiscal contribution of the overall immigrant population in each country on average over the 13 years for which data is available. Table 4.1 presents the estimated net fiscal contribution of both immigrants and natives in percentage of the host country's GDP under different specifications. The net fiscal contribution of a group is the difference between their taxes and contributions and the costs of the benefits and public services they receive.

Specification A in Table 4.1 includes only government expenditure and revenue items that are apportioned to different individuals based on their personal characteristics. These are expenditure on health, education and social protection, as well as revenue from direct and indirect taxes, and social contributions. The items excluded are those that are apportioned per capita.

Table 4.1. The net fiscal contribution of the foreign and native-born

In percentage of GDP, 2006-18 average

	Foreign-born			Native-born			
	A	B/C1	C2	A	B	C1	C2
	Items at the individual level only	With congestible public goods apportioned per capita to all		Items at the individual level only	With congestible public goods apportioned per capita to all		
No pure public goods		Pure public goods apportioned to the foreign and native-born	No pure public goods		Pure public goods apportioned to the native-born only	Pure public goods apportioned to the foreign and native-born	
AUS	3.46	1.52	-0.41	6.02	1.84	-4.24	-2.31
AUT	1.67	0.83	-0.50	8.76	4.76	-2.93	-1.60
BEL	1.38	0.12	-1.28	13.56	6.68	-2.57	-1.16
CAN	2.16	0.73	-1.19	9.62	5.41	-2.17	-0.25
CHE	3.18	2.46	0.84	5.63	3.85	-1.79	-0.17
CZE	0.37	0.13	-0.04	11.35	3.71	-1.77	-1.60
DEU	1.54	0.93	-0.28	9.24	6.11	-1.18	0.02
DNK	0.87	0.71	-0.08	9.51	8.09	-0.54	0.25
ESP	1.70	0.79	-0.15	6.55	0.69	-6.22	-5.29
EST	0.05	-0.66	-1.53	9.86	6.16	0.66	1.53
FIN	0.13	0.18	-0.18	7.16	8.47	-0.66	-0.30
FRA	1.02	0.25	-0.85	9.31	4.17	-4.35	-3.25
GBR	2.02	1.20	0.23	5.33	0.24	-6.68	-5.71
GRC	1.24	1.05	0.04	7.25	4.87	-8.55	-7.54
IRL	1.57	0.62	-0.21	2.87	-2.00	-6.95	-6.12
ITA	1.87	1.48	0.57	9.91	5.85	-4.54	-3.63
LTU	0.23	-0.03	-0.31	8.16	3.23	-2.49	-2.21
LUX	7.64	5.21	2.89	4.47	1.38	-3.92	-1.59
LVA	0.28	-0.72	-1.58	9.54	3.95	-1.79	-0.92
NLD	0.85	0.38	-0.36	7.87	4.24	-2.15	-1.42
NOR	1.34	1.91	1.22	10.80	15.67	9.30	9.99
PRT	1.79	1.56	0.89	5.36	2.39	-6.85	-6.18
SVN	0.68	0.22	-0.43	7.69	3.04	-3.99	-3.34
SWE	1.00	0.68	-0.83	10.00	8.51	-0.30	1.21
USA	1.00	1.00	-0.68	1.91	1.86	-7.92	-6.25
Average	1.56	0.88	-0.16	7.90	4.64	-2.93	-1.90

Source: Secretariat calculations based on Annual National Accounts data set OECD, income and labour force surveys. See Annex 4.B for details.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/1jovf5>

Specification B adds all remaining items in the public budget, except pure public goods. These are mainly *congestible* public goods, such as provision of water and utilities, police services or public transports, and revenue items classified under *other government revenue*, described in detail in Annex 4.B. These expenditure and revenue items are apportioned per capita to foreign and native-born adults. Specification C adds expenditure on *pure* public goods, apportioned per capita to native-born adults only (Column C1) or to both foreign and native-born adults (Column C2).¹²

Once all items of the government's budget are taken into account (Columns C1 and C2), the net contribution of immigrants plus that of the native-born add up to the government's budget balance. Apportioning pure public goods also to the foreign-born (Column C2) shifts part of the expenditure from the native-born to immigrants relative to when pure public goods are apportioned to the native-born only (Column C1). The net fiscal contribution of the native-born improves once *pure* public goods are apportioned to immigrants also, because the cost of *pure* public goods, such as defence or public debt transactions, are split over a larger population.

The individualised net fiscal contribution of immigrants is positive for all countries in column A. This means that immigrants contribute more in taxes and social contributions than they receive in benefits and services. The magnitude of this net fiscal contribution varies significantly across countries, from zero in Estonia to 7.7% of GDP in Luxembourg, where over 40% of the population is foreign-born.¹³


Immigrants contribute to the financing of pure public goods

The net fiscal contribution of immigrants remains positive in all countries, with the exception of the Baltic countries, once expenditure on *congestible* public goods and the remaining items of the government's revenue are included (Column B). This implies that, in almost all countries, immigrants fully finance their share of expenditure on congestible public goods and contribute to the financing of pure public goods.

In 2017, this contribution of immigrants to the financing of pure public goods represented a total of USD 547 billion in the 25 countries included in the analysis.

Figure 4.1 plots the share of the government's expenditure on *pure* public goods that is financed by immigrants. This is calculated as the net fiscal contribution of immigrants in percentage of GDP from Column B in Table 4.1 divided by the host country's expenditure on *pure* public goods in percentage of GDP. The median share of *pure* public goods financed by immigrants is 10%, and in 80% of countries, it is over 2%.

Figure 4.1. The share of the total government expenditure on *pure* public goods financed by immigrants, 2006-18 average



Note: The share of total government expenditure on pure public goods financed by immigrants is the net fiscal contribution of immigrants in percentage of GDP from Specification B (Column B in Table 4.1) divided by the host country's expenditure in *pure* public goods in percentage of GDP.

Source: Secretariat calculations based on Annual National Accounts data set OECD, income and labour force surveys. See Annex 4.B for details.

When pure public goods are apportioned per capita to immigrants and natives alike (Columns C2), the total net fiscal contribution of immigrants is negative in 18 out of 25 countries, as is the total net fiscal contribution of the native-born in 20 out of 25 countries. This is because most countries were running budget deficits over the years 2006-18. In these estimations, the total net fiscal contribution of immigrants is between minus one and plus 1% of GDP for most countries, which is in line with the literature.

Box 4.1. Accounting for the fiscal impact of the native-born children of immigrants: An incomplete picture

The native-born children of immigrants represent an increasing share of the population in many OECD countries. Studying the fiscal impact of this group is of interest by itself. However, there is no information on the country of birth of the parents in the surveys used in the chapter. The native-born children of immigrants are impossible to identify in the data, with the exception of those who live in the household of their parents.

Table 4.2 reproduces Table 4.1 but allocates the net fiscal contribution of the native-born children of immigrants to the immigrant population, instead of the native-born population. The net fiscal contribution of children consists exclusively in the government's expenditure on their health and education. In both Table 4.1 and Table 4.2, the net fiscal contribution of the native-born children of immigrants aged 15 and over is attributed to the native-born population. In particular, the positive net contribution of the native-born children of immigrants during their working years is attributed to the native-born.

Shifting the expenditure on the native-born children of immigrants from the native-born to the foreign-born translates into a shift of -0.5% of GDP on average across countries in the individualised net fiscal contribution of the native-born to the foreign-born. The largest expenditure of the native-born children of immigrants are observed for Luxembourg, Sweden, Canada, the United States and Switzerland.

The relatively large magnitude of this shift in expenditure and the way it varies across countries is explained by two main factors. First, the native-born children of immigrants represent a large share of the population aged under 15 in most countries. Annex Table 4.A.5 shows the distribution of the population aged 15 and less by their country of birth and the country of birth of the parents. On average across countries, 20% of native-born children have at least one foreign-born parent. This share varies substantially across countries, e.g. 16% in Spain and 46% in Switzerland, which explains some of the differences in the expenditure shift across countries.

Second, education expenditure represents a large item in the government's expenditure. Across countries and years, education accounts on average for 11% of total expenditure and 5% of GDP, and a large share of this expenditure is on children aged under 15. Differences in the share of education expenditure in the government budget also explain why the shift of expenditure towards the foreign-born leads to different changes in the fiscal contribution across countries. For example, in Austria, the share of native-born children with at least one immigrant parent is larger than in Sweden (30% vs. 25% of the native-born children). However, the expenditure on their education is larger in Sweden because education expenditure represents a larger share of GDP than in Austria (6.3% vs. 4.6%).

Table 4.2. The net fiscal contribution of the foreign-born and their native-born children, 2006-18 average

	Foreign-born and native-born children of the foreign-born			Native-born			
	A	B/C1	C2	A	B	C1	C2
	Items at the individual level only	With congestible public goods		Items at the individual level only	With congestible public goods		
	No pure public goods	Pure public goods apportioned to the foreign and native-born		No pure public goods	Pure public goods apportioned per capita to the native-born only	Pure public goods apportioned to the foreign and native-born	
AUT	0.98	0.14	-1.20	9.45	5.46	-2.24	-0.90
BEL	0.73	-0.52	-1.93	14.20	7.32	-1.93	-0.52
CAN	1.32	-0.11	-2.03	10.45	6.23	-1.34	0.58
CHE	2.45	1.73	0.11	6.36	4.58	-1.06	0.56
CZE	0.30	0.06	-0.11	11.42	3.77	-1.70	-1.54
DEU	1.03	0.42	-0.79	9.75	6.63	-0.67	0.54
DNK	0.41	0.26	-0.54	9.97	8.55	-0.08	0.71
ESP	1.37	0.46	-0.48	6.88	1.02	-5.89	-4.96
EST	-0.14	-0.84	-1.71	10.04	6.34	0.85	1.72
FIN	-0.04	0.01	-0.35	7.33	8.64	-0.49	-0.13
FRA	0.46	-0.31	-1.41	9.87	4.73	-3.79	-2.69
GBR	1.60	0.78	-0.20	5.76	0.67	-6.26	-5.28
GRC	0.96	0.77	-0.25	7.53	5.16	-8.27	-7.26
IRL	1.14	0.18	-0.65	3.31	-1.56	-6.52	-5.69
ITA	1.50	1.11	0.20	10.27	6.21	-4.18	-3.26
LTU	0.17	-0.08	-0.36	8.21	3.28	-2.44	-2.16
LUX	6.20	3.78	1.46	5.90	2.81	-2.48	-0.16
LVA	0.10	-0.90	-1.76	9.72	4.12	-1.61	-0.75
NLD	0.35	-0.12	-0.85	8.37	4.74	-1.65	-0.92
NOR	0.84	1.41	0.72	11.30	16.17	9.80	10.49
PRT	1.43	1.20	0.52	5.72	2.75	-6.49	-5.81
SVN	0.37	-0.09	-0.74	8.00	3.35	-3.68	-3.03
SWE	0.13	-0.19	-1.69	10.86	9.37	0.57	2.07
USA	0.23	0.23	-1.45	2.64	2.59	-7.20	-5.52
Average	1.00	0.39	-0.64	8.47	5.12	-2.45	-1.41

Source: Secretariat calculations based on Annual National Accounts data set OECD, income and labour force surveys. See Annex 4.B for details.

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The fiscal position of immigrants relative to the native-born varies across countries

The cross-country differences in the magnitude of the net fiscal contribution of immigrants presented in Table 4.1 partly stem from differences in the size of the immigrant population across countries. Table 4.3 provides another measure of the fiscal impact of immigrants, which is the ratio of government revenue contributed by immigrants over government expenditure on immigrants. This ratio is referred to as the fiscal ratio in the literature.

The fiscal ratio allows for a simple and meaningful comparison of the fiscal position of population groups with different sizes. Furthermore, this measure has an intuitive interpretation as it is expressed in

percentage terms. A ratio greater than one indicates that immigrants contribute more than they receive. A ratio of 1.2 (0.8) means that immigrants contribute 20% more (less) than they receive.¹⁴

While the fiscal ratio has the advantage that it is easy to interpret and independent of immigrant population size, both measures (fiscal ratio and fiscal contribution in terms of GDP) depend on macroeconomic conditions and the structure of the government's budget. For example, during a downturn, the fiscal position of immigrants is likely to deteriorate, but so is that of the native-born. Immigrants in countries with high expenditure on defence, or on public debt charges, tend to have a more negative total net fiscal contribution. A way to net out these macroeconomic or structural factors is to divide the fiscal ratio of immigrants by that of the native-born, that is to calculate the relative fiscal ratio.

Three groups of countries emerge from the comparison of the total fiscal ratio of immigrants across countries. In over a third of countries, the fiscal ratio of the foreign-born is considerably larger than that of the native-born (Column C2). These are the Southern-European countries, Luxembourg and Switzerland, as well as the United Kingdom, Ireland, the United States and Australia. In a quarter of countries, the foreign-born contribute relatively less than the native-born do. These are Estonia, Latvia, Sweden, Belgium, Lithuania and Canada. In the remaining countries, including traditional European immigration countries, such as Germany or France, the total net fiscal contribution of immigrants and that of the native-born is more similar.

In most countries, governments spend less per capita on immigrants than on the native-born, but also receive lower revenue per capita from them

Both the expenditure and revenue per capita of the foreign-born are in most countries slightly lower than that of the native-born (Table 4.4). Immigrants contribute 11% per capita less than the native-born, on average across countries. The government's expenditure on immigrants is 12% lower on the foreign than on the native-born.

On average across countries, the expenditure per capita on the foreign-born is lower than on the native-born on old age and survival, sickness and disability, education and health. Conversely, the expenditure per capita on family and children, unemployment, social exclusion and housing is on average larger on the foreign-born.

Age differences between immigrants and natives drive part of the observed differences in government expenditure. In many OECD countries, immigrants are substantially younger than the native-born, particularly so in recent immigration countries (Annex Table 4.A.1.). Hence, it is not surprising that government's per capita expenditure on pensions is significantly larger for the native-born.

The per capita expenditure on education of the foreign-born is less than half than that on the native-born. Foreign-born children represent only a small share of the total number of children in all countries; they are younger on average and, in a number of countries, are less likely to be enrolled in tertiary education (Annex Table 4.A.5).¹⁵

On the contrary, expenditure per capita on social exclusion/housing is much larger for immigrants than for native-born in most countries. The overrepresentation goes up to nine times in Sweden and more than six times in Belgium and Norway, and five times in Finland. Recently arrived refugees are notably often beneficiaries of this kind of support. Similarly, immigrants are also more likely to get family/children benefits. This is due to the younger age structure of immigrants who are more likely to have children in their household and to their relatively weaker economic status compared to the native born.

Table 4.3. The fiscal ratio (government revenue/government expenditure) of immigrants and the native-born, 2006-18 average

	Foreign-born		Native-born		Foreign-born/Native-born	
	A	C2	A	C2	A	C2
	Items at the individual level only	With all public goods apportioned per capita to all	Items at the individual level only	With all public goods apportioned per capita to all	Items at the individual level only	With all public goods apportioned per capita to all
AUS	1.69	0.96	1.47	0.91	1.16	1.06
AUT	1.40	0.93	1.32	0.96	1.06	0.97
BEL	1.31	0.83	1.50	0.97	0.88	0.86
CAN	1.44	0.88	1.61	0.99	0.89	0.89
CHE	1.67	1.09	1.41	0.99	1.19	1.10
CZE	1.58	0.97	1.52	0.96	1.03	1.01
DEU	1.36	0.96	1.38	1.00	0.99	0.96
DNK	1.28	0.98	1.28	1.01	1.00	0.98
ESP	1.98	0.96	1.27	0.87	1.56	1.11
EST	1.01	0.75	1.53	1.05	0.66	0.72
FIN	1.11	0.91	1.21	0.99	0.91	0.91
FRA	1.24	0.88	1.29	0.93	0.96	0.94
GBR	1.70	1.04	1.22	0.85	1.39	1.23
GRC	2.36	1.01	1.27	0.85	1.86	1.20
IRL	1.52	0.96	1.14	0.81	1.33	1.18
ITA	2.52	1.20	1.34	0.92	1.88	1.30
LTU	1.22	0.83	1.42	0.94	0.86	0.89
LUX	1.86	1.18	1.25	0.94	1.48	1.26
LVA	1.09	0.74	1.58	0.97	0.69	0.76
NLD	1.29	0.93	1.31	0.96	0.98	0.96
NOR	1.47	1.26	1.42	1.24	1.03	1.01
PRT	2.42	1.33	1.20	0.86	2.02	1.54
SVN	1.30	0.89	1.28	0.92	1.01	0.97
SWE	1.19	0.90	1.36	1.03	0.88	0.87
USA	1.36	0.88	1.10	0.81	1.24	1.08
Average	1.53	0.97	1.35	0.95	1.16	1.03

Source: Secretariat calculations based on Annual National Accounts data set OECD, income and labour force surveys. See Annex 4.B for details.

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Figure 4.2 shows how the differences in per capita expenditure on the different items add up to the total difference¹⁶. For example, in Italy, the total per capita government expenditure on the foreign-born represents 64% of the expenditure on the native-born. Expenditure on old age and survival accounts for over three-quarters of this gap (28 out of 36 percentage points), expenditure on health and education account for 10 percentage points, expenditure on sickness and disability for 2 percentage points. Expenditure on family and children, unemployment, and social exclusion has an effect in the opposite direction. The higher expenditure per capita on the foreign-born accounts for +4 percentage points in the total expenditure per capita on the foreign-born relative to the native-born.

Lower expenditure on old age and survival on the foreign-born explains for most countries the lower total expenditure per capita on the foreign-born. There are large differences in expenditure per capita on pensions between immigrants and natives, and pensions weigh heavily in the public budget of many countries. For example, in Italy or Greece, expenditure on old age and survival represent approximately

one-third of total government expenditure on natives. Excluding expenditure on old age survival, the expenditure per capita on the foreign-born is similar to that on the native-born. The expenditure per capita on the foreign-born would be 95% the expenditure on the native-born.

Table 4.4. Relative expenditure per capita (foreign-born/native-born) in the different expenditure items of the government's budget, 2006-18 average


	Total	Health	Education	Sickness/Disability	Old age/ Survival	Family/Children	Unemployment	Social Exclusion/Housing
AUS	0.92	0.97	0.48	0.72	1.28	0.87	0.93	0.91
AUT	0.82	0.80	0.45	0.78	0.46	1.43	2.06	2.64
BEL	0.94	0.88	0.45	1.18	0.58	1.39	1.30	6.27
CAN	0.95	1.03	0.51	0.83	1.04	1.53	0.74	1.21
CHE	0.92	0.84	0.44	1.30	0.61	1.38	2.83	1.78
CZE	0.97	1.00	0.35	0.91	1.03	1.18	0.68	2.80
DEU	0.93	0.94	0.38	0.54	0.95	1.41	1.29	1.98
DNK	0.92	0.73	0.62	1.06	0.44	1.56	1.68	1.07
ESP	0.68	0.65	0.45	0.27	0.20	1.05	1.21	1.57
EST	1.01	1.30	0.08	0.94	2.18	0.39	0.92	0.60
FIN	0.90	0.67	0.79	0.45	0.18	2.05	2.68	5.22
FRA	0.94	0.94	0.29	1.00	0.88	1.35	1.29	1.81
GBR	0.82	0.76	0.69	0.53	0.46	1.33	0.99	1.34
GRC	0.69	0.67	0.43	0.43	0.17	1.37	2.23	2.40
IRL	0.83	0.71	0.63	0.62	0.34	1.28	1.38	1.63
ITA	0.64	0.61	0.50	0.48	0.16	1.93	1.66	2.74
LTU	1.01	1.25	0.15	0.94	1.70	0.43	1.07	0.89
LUX	0.77	0.77	0.31	1.08	0.37	1.59	1.35	2.44
LVA	1.06	1.27	0.07	1.08	2.17	0.39	0.78	1.14
NLD	0.94	0.78	0.41	1.31	0.50	1.53	1.30	2.94
NOR	0.93	0.71	0.71	0.92	0.33	1.49	2.78	6.41
PRT	0.76	0.69	0.53	0.75	0.40	1.55	1.28	1.11
SVN	0.90	0.93	0.26	1.44	0.86	1.06	1.35	1.47
SWE	0.94	0.79	0.38	1.22	0.56	1.44	2.10	9.05
USA	0.80	0.84	0.47	0.56	0.48	1.42	0.88	1.54
Average	0.88	0.86	0.43	0.85	0.73	1.3	1.47	2.52

Source: Secretariat calculations based on Annual National Accounts data set OECD, income and labour force surveys. See Annex 4.B for details.

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Table 4.5 and Figure 4.3 reproduce the same exercise on the revenue side. The contributions per capita are lower for the foreign-born than the native-born across all items. The contributions of the foreign-born are 11% lower than the natives' on average across countries. The differences are smaller in terms of employer social contributions, as the contributions of immigrants are 6% lower than that of the native-born on average across countries. This is driven by the fact that immigrants are over-represented among the working-age population. The differences are larger in terms of household taxes and social contributions. Capital taxes are exceptional taxes, such as inheritance taxes, and represent a very small share of governments' total revenue. They are apportioned per capita to individuals aged 70 and over. This explains why revenue per capita on capital taxes is much lower from the foreign than the native-born, given that the foreign-born are under-represented among the older population in most countries.

Figure 4.2. Decomposition of the gap in expenditure per capita (foreign-born/native-born) into the different expenditure items, 2006-18




Note: Countries are sorted by relative expenditure per capita (foreign-born/native-born), from the lowest to the highest. For each country, the sum of the seven items is equal to the difference between the total expenditure per capita on the foreign-born and the native-born.

Source: Secretariat calculations based on Annual National Accounts data set OECD, income and labour force surveys. See Annex 4.B for details.

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Figure 4.3. Decomposition of the gap in revenue per capita (foreign-born/native-born) into different revenue items, 2006-18



Note: Countries are sorted by relative revenue per capita (foreign-born/native-born), from the highest to the lowest. For each country, the sum of the four items is equal to the difference between the total revenue per capita on the foreign-born and the native-born.


Source: Secretariat calculations based on Annual National Accounts data set OECD, income and labour force surveys. See Annex 4.B for details.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/saukr>

Table 4.5. Relative revenue per capita (foreign-born/native-born) in the different revenue items of the government's budget, 2006-18

	Total	Indirect taxes	Capital taxes	Employer social contributions	Household social contributions and taxes
AUS	0.97	0.94	0.97
AUT	0.79	0.84	0.58	0.88	0.67
BEL	0.80	0.88	0.73	0.84	0.70
CAN	0.85	0.91		0.86	0.76
CHE	1.01	1.00	0.67	1.09	1.01
CZE	0.97	1.00	1.18	0.92	0.97
DEU	0.89	0.97	1.05	0.84	0.84
DNK	0.90	0.95	0.43	1.01	0.86
ESP	0.75	0.76	0.24	0.89	0.61
EST	0.73	0.74		0.64	0.61
FIN	0.82	0.91	0.29	0.79	0.70
FRA	0.88	0.90	0.99	0.93	0.79
GBR	1.01	1.04	0.55	0.99	1.00
GRC	0.82	0.78	0.20	1.06	0.67
IRL	0.99	0.99	0.31	1.11	0.96
ITA	0.83	0.81	0.18	1.12	0.69
LTU	0.90	0.91	1.75	0.87	0.87
LUX	0.97	0.97	0.44	1.14	0.91
LVA	0.80	0.80	2.41	0.69	0.75
NLD	0.91	0.93	0.46	0.90	0.87
NOR	0.94	0.95	0.28	1.02	0.88
PRT	1.17	1.08	0.29	1.41	1.21
SVN	0.87	0.85	0.78	0.92	0.81
SWE	0.82	0.87	0.57	0.78	0.71
USA	0.87	0.87	0.77	0.93	0.79
Average	0.89	0.91	0.69	0.94	0.82

Source: Secretariat calculations based on Annual National Accounts data set OECD, income and labour force surveys. See Annex 4.B for details.


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Demographics are key in explaining the cross-country differences in the fiscal position of immigrants relative to the native-born

The total net fiscal contribution of immigrants and the native-born is largely driven by demographic differences between groups, which in turn are driven by countries' immigration history. For example, in the Baltic countries, the foreign-born are concentrated among the older population. This explains the high government expenditure per capita on old-age and low contributions relative to the native-born. In Southern Europe, migration is a relatively recent phenomenon, and most of the foreign-born are working-age. Immigrants tend to have larger contributions relative to expenditure than their native-born counterparts do.

There is a strong correlation between the relative fiscal ratio (last column in Table 4.3) and the relative share of the population that is working age (that is the share of the foreign-born population aged 15-64 divided by the share of the native-born population aged 15-64) (Figure 4.4).

Figure 4.4. Correlation between the relative fiscal ratio (foreign-born/native-born) and the relative share of the population aged 15-64, 2006-18 average



Note: The correlation is 70%.

Source: Secretariat calculations based on Annual National Accounts data set OECD, income and labour force surveys. See Annex 4.B for details.

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How much of the cross-country differences in the fiscal position of the foreign relative to the native-born are explained by differences in their age distribution? To answer this question, this section presents the result of a counterfactual exercise.¹⁷ The idea is to keep unchanged the government expenditure and revenue per capita for the foreign and native-born of each age group,¹⁸ but change the age distribution of the foreign-born so that it is the same than that of the native-born. In this set up, the fiscal ratio of the native-born does not change. The counterfactual fiscal ratio of the foreign-born is their fiscal ratio had they had the same age distribution than the native-born in the same host country.


The results for each country are presented in Annex Figure 4.A.1. Overall, differences in the age distribution of immigrants, relative to the native-born, account for 60% of the variation in the fiscal position of immigrants, relative to the native-born across countries.¹⁹

The net fiscal contribution of immigrants by age, education and employment status, 2006-18

Immigrants are over-represented among prime-aged individuals, the age group with the largest net fiscal contributions

Age is a prime determinant of the net fiscal contribution of individuals. The net fiscal contribution is generally positive during the working years, whereas the net fiscal contribution of children and older individuals is negative due to government expenditure on their education, health and old age benefits.

Figure 4.5 presents the median fiscal ratio (government revenue/government expenditure) across countries over the lifecycle for immigrants.²⁰ Annex Figure 4.A.3 presents a similar figure for each country. The first line is the fiscal ratio taking into account all the individualised items of the public budget (expenditure on health, education, social protection and revenue from taxes and social contributions) (specification A). The second line adds expenditure and revenue items that are attributed per capita to all adults except pure public goods (specification B), and the third line adds pure public goods (specification C2).

Figure 4.5. Median fiscal ratio of immigrants by age group, 2006-18 average

Note: Specification A corresponds to individualised items only; Specification B adds congestible public goods; Specification C2 adds also pure public goods apportioned to the foreign and native-born.

Source: Secretariat calculations based on Annual National Accounts data set OECD, income and labour force surveys. See Annex 4.B for details.

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Prime-aged immigrants contribute three times more than the government spends on them; this is excluding revenue and expenditure items that are apportioned per capita. Furthermore, their fiscal ratio is always greater than one, which means that they finance their share of expenditure on congestible *and* pure public goods and have a positive net contribution to the public budget. This is the case in each country (Annex Figure 4.A.3).


Over their lifecycle, the fiscal ratio of immigrants is lower than that of the native-born among working-age individuals, but equal or larger among older individuals in most countries (Annex Figure 4.A.8 and Annex Figure 4.A.4).²¹

When comparing immigrants and natives over their lifecycle, it is important to keep in mind that their distribution across age groups differs significantly. Immigrants are over-represented among prime-age individuals, the age group with the largest net fiscal contribution and under-represented among children (Annex Figure 4.A.9). In fact, most immigrants arrive in the host country having completed their education, at an age where the net fiscal contribution is already positive (Annex Figure 4.A.10).

Prime-aged immigrants lag behind their native-born counterpart due to lower revenue per capita

Despite the large fiscal ratio of prime-aged immigrants, their contributions, relative to expenditure, are lower than that of the natives by about 20% on average²². The lower revenue to expenditure ratio of the foreign-born, relative to the native-born, is driven by differences in government revenue rather than in government expenditure per capita. On average across countries, the expenditure on the prime-aged foreign-born is similar to that on the native-born (4% larger). However, the contributions of the foreign-born are 17% lower than the contributions of the native-born (Figure 4.6).

Figure 4.6. Relative per capita government revenue and expenditure (foreign-born/native-born), prime-aged individuals, 2006-18 average



Note: The differences are in percentage terms. For example, in Portugal, expenditure per capita on immigrants and the native-born is the same; revenue per capita from immigrants is 2% larger than from the native-born.

Source: Secretariat calculations based on Annual National Accounts data set OECD, income and labour force surveys. See Annex 4.B for details.

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The revenue gap is larger for the highly educated


Differences in revenue per capita between the foreign and native-born are larger than differences in expenditure per capita, at both low and high education levels (Figure 4.7).

Immigrants contribute less in social contributions and taxes than the native-born at both high and low educational attainment. The difference increases with the educational level. Low-educated immigrants contribute 11% less per capita than the native-born, on average across countries. High-educated immigrants contribute 16% less.

The larger difference between the revenue of the highly educated foreign and native-born implies that the difference is also larger in absolute terms for the highly educated. This is because the revenue per capita of highly educated individuals is on average larger than the revenue per capita of the low educated (Annex Figure 4.A.5).

The differences in expenditure per capita between the foreign and the native-born are small for both education groups, on average across countries. The expenditure on immigrants with low education is 1% larger than on the native-born; the expenditure on immigrants with high education is 4% larger. However, there is significant variation across countries. The expenditure per capita is actually lower on immigrants than on the native-born with low educational attainment in approximately half of the countries. Among the highly educated, expenditure per capita on the foreign-born is more similar to that on the native-born.

Figure 4.7. Relative per capita government revenue and expenditure (foreign-born/native-born), by educational attainment, prime-aged individuals, 2006-18 average



Note: The differences are in percentage terms. For example, in Germany, among individuals with low education, the revenue per capita from immigrants is 6% larger than that from the native-born; expenditure per capita is 20% lower on immigrants than on the native-born.

Source: Secretariat calculations based on Annual National Accounts data set OECD, income and labour force surveys. See Annex 4.B for details.

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Immigrants lower employment rates represent significant losses in fiscal contributions in many OECD countries

Immigrants' lower revenue per capita is driven, at least partially, by lower employment rates and lower wages. To get a sense of the magnitude of the losses in immigrants' total net fiscal contribution due to immigrants' lower employment rates, Table 4.6 presents the results of a counterfactual exercise. The employment rates of prime aged immigrants are set equal to those of the native-born of the same gender and educational attainment, keeping all other factors equal. The underlying assumption is that non-employed immigrants would have the same net fiscal contribution as immigrants of the same gender and education who are in employment.

This simple exercise shows that the gains from increasing immigrants' employment rates may be quite large. The gain is estimated at over 0.5% of GDP in Belgium and Sweden, and over a third of a percentage point in Austria, Denmark, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The gains generally increase with the level of education. The gains are also larger for women than for men.

Table 4.6. Change in the total net fiscal contribution in percentage of GDP if prime-aged immigrants had the same employment rate than the native-born of the same gender and educational attainment, 2006-18 average

	Education level			Gender		Total
	Low	Medium	High	Men	Women	
AUT	0.05	0.15	0.14	0.10	0.24	0.34
BEL	0.19	0.21	0.28	0.33	0.36	0.69
CAN	0.00	0.04	0.22	0.07	0.19	0.26
CHE	-0.05	0.11	0.13	0.04	0.14	0.18
DEU	-0.01	0.08	0.09	0.03	0.12	0.15
DNK	0.09	0.13	0.15	0.14	0.23	0.37
ESP	0.01	0.03	0.05	0.06	0.03	0.09
FRA	0.04	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.13	0.22
GBR	0.03	0.06	0.11	0.05	0.16	0.21
GRC	-0.01	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.03
IRL	-0.02	0.06	0.22	0.13	0.14	0.27
ITA	-0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.01
LUX	-0.03	0.12	0.24	0.13	0.20	0.33
NLD	0.14	0.15	0.12	0.21	0.21	0.41
NOR	0.04	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.13	0.22
PRT	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.04
SVN	0.00	0.03	0.02	0.00	0.05	0.05
SWE	0.20	0.15	0.25	0.27	0.32	0.60
USA	-0.01	0.00	0.04	-0.01	0.04	0.03

Source: Secretariat calculations based on Annual National Accounts data set OECD, income and labour force surveys. See Annex 4.B for details.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/v56fn7>


In OECD European countries, prime-aged EU immigrants fare better than non-EU immigrants²³

In European OECD countries, prime-aged immigrants born in other EU countries have larger fiscal ratios than immigrants born outside the EU (Figure 4.8). In many countries, the differences are quite large. For example, in Sweden, contributions from non-EU migrants cover 109% of government expenditure on them. Contributions from EU migrants cover 179%. In a few countries, the fiscal ratio is similar for EU and non-EU migrants, such as in the Czech Republic, Ireland and Portugal.

Prime-aged EU migrants contribute less, relative to public expenditure, than the native-born in most EU countries (Annex Figure 4.A.6). In Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Portugal and France, the fiscal ratio is actually larger for EU-migrants than the native-born.


Prime-aged non-EU migrants contribute positively to the public budget in almost all EU countries, despite their lower fiscal ratios. Their fiscal ratio is above one even when all public goods are apportioned per capita to the foreign and native born. An exception are non-EU migrants in Belgium and Finland. Once pure public goods are apportioned per capita to both the foreign and native-born, their contributions fall short of public expenditure by 11% and 7%.

Figure 4.8. Total fiscal ratio of immigrants born in EU countries and non-EU countries, European OECD countries, 2006-18 average



Note: The line is a 45-degree line. For countries to the right of the 45-degree line, the total fiscal ratio of EU migrants is larger than that of non-EU migrants.

Source: Secretariat calculations based on Annual National Accounts data set OECD, income and labour force surveys. See Annex 4.B for details.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/aswf9q>

Changes in the fiscal contribution of immigrants since the mid-2000s


In the last 15 years, the immigrant populations in OECD countries changed significantly. Immigrants represent a larger share of the working-age population and are more likely to have tertiary education than in the mid-2000s. In the meantime, the native-born population has aged significantly in many countries. The demographic changes as well as changes in the overall economic environment in destination countries have a major effect on the total net fiscal contributions of immigrants and natives alike.

Figure 4.9 shows the evolution of the total fiscal ratio of both natives and the foreign-born. Interestingly, in most countries, the evolution is very similar for both groups. Perhaps surprisingly, there is no significant effect of the 2015/16 humanitarian migration crisis in European countries. Box 4.2 discusses the difficulties in fully capturing the short-term fiscal impact of asylum seekers and refugees who arrived since 2015/16.

One notable exception to the similarity in the evolution of the total fiscal ratio of immigrants and natives is the United Kingdom, and to a lesser extent, Ireland and Switzerland, where the fiscal contribution of immigrants has markedly improved since 2009. This finding is particularly remarkable because these countries already showed larger total fiscal ratios for immigrants than for natives at the beginning of the period. As a result, the positive contribution of immigration to the public purse is truly outstanding in 2017/18 in the United Kingdom, as well as in Switzerland and Ireland.

Two other countries stand out, namely France and the Netherlands, but for showing a relative fall of the total fiscal ratio of immigrants compared to natives in the latest years. Spain and Luxembourg also show a similar trend, although the fiscal ratio of immigrants remains above that of the natives in 2017/2018. Finally, in the Baltic countries, notably in Lithuania and Latvia, the total fiscal ratio of immigrants decreased over time relative to that of the native-born due to the ageing of the foreign-born population. Annex Table 4.A.7 presents the fiscal ratio of the foreign and native-born for selected years in more detail.

Figure 4.9. Total fiscal ratio of the foreign and native-born over time, 2006-18



Note: EU-SILC data is not available for Switzerland in 2006 and for Ireland, Italy and the United Kingdom in 2018. Detailed data on government expenditure in the OECD Annual National Accounts data is also missing for Luxembourg in 2018.

Source: Secretariat calculations based on Annual National Accounts data set OECD, income and labour force surveys. See Annex 4.B for details.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/vi0m4o>

Box 4.2. The fiscal impact of the 2015/16 humanitarian migration crisis in Europe

In 2015/16, European countries faced a large and sudden increase in asylum requests, following the humanitarian crisis in Syria and Iraq. An important policy question concerns the short-term effect on public finances of this sudden spike in migrant flows.

Unfortunately, the methodology in this chapter is not suited to answer this question, due to data limitations in both national accounts and survey data. First, it is difficult to identify clearly expenditure linked to the humanitarian crisis in the national accounts data. Second, many asylum seekers only stay in the host country for a short period and are therefore not captured in labour force surveys.

The large costs faced by several OECD countries during the 2015/16 humanitarian crisis were of different nature: border control, rescue of refugees at sea, treatment of asylum requests, expenses for temporary sustenance (food, shelter, training), health care, voluntary repatriation of asylum seekers, and return of rejected asylum seekers, among others. These different cost items are classified in different functions of government in the national accounts: police services; general economic, commercial and labour affairs; social protection; foreign economic aid, etc. They are for the most part impossible to identify in the national accounts data.


Only the immigrant resident population – who has lived (or intends to live) in the host country for at least one year – is taken into account in the estimation of the fiscal impact of immigrants in this chapter. This limitation of labour force surveys implies that the population of asylum seekers is only partially covered in the target immigrant population.

The methodology and data used in this chapter are therefore better suited to understand the medium to long-term impact of immigration on public finances. Focussing on the impact of the humanitarian migration crisis would require a specific data collection and methodology.

Changes in demographics and in the composition of immigrants drive the changes in the fiscal position of immigrants since the mid-2000s

The correlation between the 10-year changes in the fiscal ratio of the foreign-born relative to the native-born and the changes in the share of the immigrant population that is working-age (also relative to the native-born) is 56% across countries (Figure 4.10). For example, in Ireland the share of the immigrant population that is working-age increased by 2 percentage points (from 86% to 88%), whereas the share of the working-age among the native-born population decreased by 5 percentage points (from 66% to 61%). This relative increase in the share of the foreign-born population that is of working-age is associated with an improvement in the relative fiscal position of the foreign-born. In countries with a longer history of immigration, such as France, the share of the population that is working-age has decreased since the mid-2000s for both the native and the foreign-born.

Figure 4.10. Correlation of the change in the relative fiscal ratio (foreign-born/native-born) and the change in the relative share of the working-age population, 2007-17 change



Note: The y-axis shows the change in percentage points between the relative fiscal ratios (foreign-born/native-born) from 2007 to 2017. The x-axis shows the change between 2007 and 2017 in percentage points of the relative (foreign-born/native-born) share of the total population that is of working-age, which is aged 15-64.

Source: Secretariat calculations based on Annual National Accounts data set OECD, income and labour force surveys. See Annex 4.B for details.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/h49wcb>

Furthermore, changes in the composition of the immigrant population also play a role in explaining the changes in the fiscal position of immigrants over time. For example, in the United Kingdom, Germany or the Czech Republic, the improvement in the fiscal position of immigrants is larger than what demographics alone would predict. In these countries, the share of highly educated immigrants, relative to the share of highly educated natives, has increased substantially in the past 15 years (Annex Table 4.A.2).

The fiscal position of both the foreign and native-born deteriorated during the 2008/09 global financial crisis; how the two groups compare in the downturn varies across countries...

The analysis in this chapter starts just before the 2008/09 global financial crisis and ends two years before the COVID-19 crisis. The economic impact of the global financial crisis varied across OECD countries and the extent to which immigrants were affected varied as well. The question is how the changes in the labour market of the foreign and native-born translated into changes in their fiscal position.


From 2007 to 2009, the unemployment rate increased for both foreign and native-born in almost all countries (Annex Figure 4.A.7). The increase in the unemployment rate of the foreign-born was particularly large in Spain, Ireland and the United States. In Spain, the unemployment rate of the native-born increased by 8 percentage points and that of the foreign-born by 17 percentage points. In Ireland and the United States, the increase in the unemployment rate of the native-born and foreign-born was more similar.

The fiscal ratio of both immigrants and natives also decreased from 2007 to 2009 in every country. The changes were small in countries in which the global financial crisis had relatively little impact such as Germany, Switzerland, or Sweden. The changes in the fiscal ratio were particularly large in Ireland, Spain and the United States. Spain stands as a clear outlier, with the largest decreases in the fiscal ratio of both native and foreign-born.

The decrease in the fiscal ratio of the foreign-born relative to that of the native-born is mixed across countries. In half the countries, the fiscal ratio of the foreign-born decreased by more than that of the native-born from 2007 to 2009 (countries below the 45 degree line in Figure 4.11), such as in Spain, Greece, Italy and the Netherlands. In half the countries, the fiscal ratio of the foreign-born decreased by less, such as in Ireland, Germany, Sweden and Portugal.

Figure 4.11. Change in the fiscal ratio of the foreign and native-born during the global financial crisis, working-age individuals

Percentage change from 2007 to 2009



Note: The line is a 45-degree line. In countries to the right of the 45-degree line, the fiscal ratio of the foreign-born decreased more than that of the native-born from 2007 to 2009.

Source: Secretariat calculations based on Annual National Accounts data set OECD, income and labour force surveys. See Annex 4.B for details.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/ail93r>

... and reflects the changes in the labour market

In order to understand how the changes in the labour market situation of immigrants, and natives, affected their fiscal contribution, Figure 4.12 plots the correlation between the change in the fiscal ratio between 2007 and 2009 and the change in the unemployment rate during the same period for the native and the foreign-born.


The correlation between the changes in the unemployment rate and the fiscal ratio is large, -70% for the native-born and -77% for the foreign-born²⁴, and similar for both groups. An increase in the unemployment rate of one percentage point is associated with a decrease of 1.2% of the fiscal ratio for the working-age native-born and 1.7% for the foreign-born.

The sectoral concentration of immigrants, relative to the native-born and across countries, is an important factor in explaining the impact of the global financial crisis on their labour market situation. Immigrants, and in particular men, are over-represented in many OECD countries in manufacturing and construction, sectors hard hit by the great financial crisis. However, there are also other dynamic effects at play. In some countries, the employment rate of the foreign-born actually increased during this period, such as in Germany. This was due to an increase in immigrant employment in residential care activities, domestic


services and food and beverage services, sectors less affected by the crisis. (OECD, 2010_[27]) provides a detailed analysis of the changes in the labour market of immigrants during the global financial crisis.

Figure 4.12. Correlation of the change in the fiscal ratio (%) and the unemployment rate (ppt) during the global financial crisis, working-age population

2007 to 2009



Source: Secretariat calculations based on Annual National Accounts data set OECD, income and labour force surveys. See Annex 4.B for details.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/1vs4aj>

Since data for 2020 are not yet available, this chapter cannot unfortunately address the question of how the COVID-19 recession has affected the fiscal contribution of migrants. The analysis of the global financial crisis in this chapter suggests that, during a recession, changes in the fiscal contribution of migrants are linked to changes in their employment status. In most countries, migrants are on average younger and more likely to be on short-term contracts. These factors make them more at risk of losing their jobs during a recession. On top of these factors, there may be sectoral composition effects if migrants are overrepresented in sectors that experience a stronger collapse. The COVID-19 recession affected sectors to very different degrees. However, it is not immediately clear whether these composition effects have played to the benefit or disadvantage of migrants. Migrants are overrepresented in some sectors that were strongly hit by the recession, such as hotels and restaurants, but also in sectors such as construction, which were less affected.

Conclusion

In 2013, the OECD published its first cross-country estimation of the fiscal impact of immigration. This chapter revisits the topic using a new methodology and data for a longer period, from 2006 to 2018. Despite the changes in the migrant population and in the public finances, scarred by the global financial crisis, the fiscal impact of immigrants remains small, between -1% and +1% of GDP, for most countries, throughout the period.

The fact that the overall fiscal impact of immigrants is persistently small and follows similar trends to that of the overall population, calls into question the relevance of the fiscal lens to assess the effectiveness of migration policies. In fact, migration policies respond to many other determining factors, such as *inter alia*

international obligations, humanitarian concerns, international economic partnerships, or labour and skills needs, based on which a relevant evaluation framework can be formulated.

That being said, the fiscal impact of migration remains a major issue of concern in the public debate and it is important to provide sound, updated and comparative evidence to inform this debate. More in-depth knowledge of the key factors explaining cross-country differences is also important.

This chapter clearly shows that immigrants' age distribution is key in explaining cross-country differences in the current total net fiscal contribution of immigrants, as well as in the changes over the last 15 years. The largest gains in the net fiscal contribution of immigrants over the period were registered in countries that attracted large inflows of labour migrants, notably highly skilled migrants.

The category of migration is also a determining factor. For obvious reasons, the net fiscal contribution is more positive in the short term for labour immigrants than for individuals migrating for family or humanitarian reasons. The long-term effects are however difficult to assess due to the lack of relevant data by category of migration.

This chapter also shows that, in most countries, prime-aged immigrants tend to have lower net fiscal contributions than their native-born counterparts. This is due to immigrants' lower taxes and contributions rather than higher government spending. Differences in employment between the foreign and the native-born explain a large part of these differences. This means that effective integration programmes are very valuable investments, with high returns in fiscal terms.

In the current context, as the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic are still unfolding, this may be one of the most important lessons learnt from the analysis presented in this chapter.

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Annex 4.A. Additional tables and figures

Annex Table 4.A.1. Age distribution of the foreign and native-born, 2007 and 2017

	2007						2017					
	Foreign-born			Native-born			Foreign-born			Native-born		
	0-14	15-64	65+	0-14	15-64	65+	0-14	15-64	65+	0-14	15-64	65+
AUS	0.06	0.76	0.18	0.24	0.65	0.11	0.06	0.74	0.20	0.24	0.62	0.14
AUT	0.05	0.83	0.12	0.17	0.65	0.17	0.06	0.82	0.12	0.16	0.64	0.19
BEL	0.07	0.78	0.14	0.18	0.65	0.17	0.06	0.79	0.15	0.19	0.62	0.19
CAN	0.06	0.74	0.20	0.18	0.67	0.16
CHE	0.06	0.80	0.14	0.19	0.65	0.17	0.06	0.80	0.15	0.19	0.62	0.20
CZE	0.03	0.74	0.23	0.15	0.71	0.14	0.04	0.77	0.19	0.16	0.64	0.20
DEU	0.03	0.72	0.25	0.15	0.66	0.19	0.06	0.73	0.21	0.15	0.64	0.21
DNK	0.10	0.82	0.09	0.19	0.64	0.16	0.07	0.83	0.10	0.18	0.61	0.21
ESP	0.06	0.89	0.06	0.16	0.67	0.17	0.03	0.89	0.08	0.17	0.63	0.20
EST	0.01	0.60	0.39	0.18	0.69	0.13	0.01	0.55	0.45	0.18	0.66	0.16
FIN	0.10	0.84	0.06	0.17	0.66	0.17	0.07	0.86	0.07	0.17	0.62	0.22
FRA	0.04	0.77	0.20	0.20	0.64	0.16	0.04	0.73	0.23	0.20	0.61	0.18
GBR	0.07	0.81	0.12	0.19	0.65	0.16	0.07	0.82	0.11	0.20	0.61	0.19
GRC	0.07	0.88	0.05	0.15	0.65	0.20	0.03	0.90	0.07	0.15	0.63	0.22
IRL	0.13	0.83	0.04	0.22	0.66	0.12	0.08	0.86	0.06	0.24	0.61	0.15
ITA	0.07	0.87	0.05	0.15	0.65	0.21	0.04	0.90	0.06	0.15	0.62	0.24
LTU	0.01	0.65	0.34	0.17	0.67	0.16	0.04	0.57	0.39	0.16	0.66	0.18
LUX	0.06	0.84	0.10	0.25	0.60	0.15	0.08	0.79	0.12	0.25	0.59	0.16
LVA	0.00	0.62	0.38	0.17	0.69	0.14	0.01	0.50	0.49	0.18	0.66	0.16
NLD	0.05	0.86	0.09	0.20	0.66	0.14	0.05	0.84	0.11	0.18	0.63	0.19
NOR	0.13	0.80	0.07	0.20	0.65	0.15	0.11	0.83	0.07	0.19	0.63	0.18
PRT	0.07	0.87	0.07	0.16	0.65	0.18	0.03	0.88	0.08	0.15	0.63	0.22
SVN	0.01	0.81	0.18	0.15	0.69	0.16	0.05	0.77	0.18	0.16	0.65	0.19
SWE	0.08	0.77	0.15	0.18	0.64	0.18	0.07	0.79	0.14	0.21	0.58	0.21
USA	0.06	0.82	0.12	0.23	0.65	0.12	0.05	0.81	0.15	0.21	0.63	0.16

Source: Labour force surveys.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/1jsa8r>

Annex Table 4.A.2. Share of the foreign and native-born working-age population with tertiary education

2007 and 2017

	2007		2017	
	Foreign-born	Native-born	Foreign-born	Native-born
AUS	0.49	0.33	0.64	0.42
AUT	0.18	0.18	0.32	0.36
BEL	0.30	0.35	0.35	0.44
CAN	0.70	0.56
CHE	0.33	0.33	0.44	0.47

	2007		2017	
	Foreign-born	Native-born	Foreign-born	Native-born
CZE	0.22	0.15	0.37	0.25
DEU	0.18	0.27	0.26	0.31
DNK	0.30	0.33	0.45	0.41
ESP	0.25	0.35	0.28	0.44
EST	0.37	0.34	0.41	0.41
FIN	0.28	0.39	0.32	0.47
FRA	0.27	0.30	0.32	0.40
GBR	0.33	0.33	0.50	0.41
GRC	0.16	0.25	0.17	0.36
IRL	0.48	0.34	0.56	0.47
ITA	0.13	0.15	0.13	0.22
LTU	0.28	0.30	0.41	0.44
LUX	0.35	0.22	0.49	0.34
LVA	0.23	0.23	0.35	0.36
NLD	0.25	0.34	0.31	0.43
NOR	0.37	0.36	0.40	0.47
PRT	0.23	0.14	0.33	0.27
SVN	0.11	0.25	0.22	0.39
SWE	0.34	0.33	0.46	0.45
USA	0.36	0.43	0.43	0.51

Source: Labour force surveys.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/6hw95x>

Annex Table 4.A.3. Net fiscal contribution of the foreign-born, with and without defence and public debt charges

Percentage of GDP, 2006-18 average

	No pure public goods	Pure public goods except defence and debt charges	Pure public goods except debt charges	All pure public goods
AUS	1.52	0.22	-0.41	-0.41
AUT	0.83	0.08	-0.03	-0.50
BEL	0.12	-0.62	-0.76	-1.28
CAN	0.73	0.05	-0.39	-1.19
CHE	2.46	1.27	1.03	0.84
CZE	0.13	0.02	-0.01	-0.04
DEU	0.93	0.22	0.06	-0.28
DNK	0.71	0.19	0.07	-0.08
ESP	0.79	0.32	0.19	-0.15
EST	-0.66	-1.22	-1.50	-1.53
FIN	0.18	-0.07	-0.13	-0.18
FRA	0.25	-0.30	-0.53	-0.85
GBR	1.20	0.89	0.58	0.23
GRC	1.05	0.60	0.41	0.04
IRL	0.62	0.28	0.22	-0.21
ITA	1.48	1.09	0.98	0.57
LTU	-0.03	-0.17	-0.24	-0.31
LUX	5.21	3.26	3.11	2.89
LVA	-0.72	-1.20	-1.40	-1.58

	No pure public goods	Pure public goods except defence and debt charges	Pure public goods except debt charges	All pure public goods
NLD	0.38	-0.02	-0.15	-0.36
NOR	1.91	1.51	1.34	1.22
PRT	1.56	1.26	1.18	0.89
SVN	0.22	-0.12	-0.22	-0.43
SWE	0.68	-0.42	-0.66	-0.83
USA	1.00	0.22	-0.43	-0.68
Average	0.90	0.29	0.09	-0.17

Source: Secretariat calculations based on Annual National Accounts data set OECD, income and labour force surveys. See Annex 4.B for details.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/riagf>

Annex Table 4.A.4. Net fiscal contribution per capita, divided by GDP per capita, foreign-born and native-born, 2006-18 average

	Foreign-born		Native-born	
	A	C2	A	C2
	Items at the individual level only	Public goods apportioned per capita to all	Items at the individual level only	Public goods apportioned per capita to all
AUS	10.92	-1.30	8.81	-3.38
AUT	9.58	-2.87	10.61	-1.94
BEL	8.96	-8.37	16.02	-1.37
CAN	8.51	-4.67	12.91	-0.33
CHE	11.11	2.94	7.88	-0.24
CZE	12.04	-1.35	11.71	-1.65
DEU	9.33	-1.68	11.07	0.03
DNK	9.39	-0.88	10.48	0.28
ESP	12.63	-1.10	7.57	-6.11
EST	0.29	-9.51	11.74	1.82
FIN	3.20	-4.57	7.46	-0.32
FRA	7.88	-6.54	10.70	-3.74
GBR	14.32	1.61	6.21	-6.64
GRC	16.77	0.50	7.83	-8.14
IRL	9.45	-1.25	3.44	-7.35
ITA	20.99	6.39	10.87	-3.98
LTU	4.62	-6.29	8.58	-2.33
LUX	17.46	6.61	7.94	-2.83
LVA	1.88	-10.47	11.24	-1.09
NLD	7.39	-3.10	8.88	-1.60
NOR	12.07	10.98	12.15	11.23
PRT	24.66	12.21	5.78	-6.66
SVN	7.45	-4.66	8.47	-3.68
SWE	5.82	-4.84	12.06	1.46
USA	5.88	-3.96	2.31	-7.54
Average	10.10	-1.45	9.31	-2.24

Source: Secretariat calculations based on Annual National Accounts data set OECD, income and labour force surveys. See Annex 4.B for details.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/d7pb0g>

Annex Table 4.A.5. Distribution of the population aged under 15 years old by own and parents' country of birth


In percentage, 2006-18 average

	Foreign-born	Native-born			Share of the population that is under 15 years old
		One foreign-born parent	Two foreign-born parents	No foreign-born parent	
AUT	6	12	16	66	15
BEL	5	14	9	72	17
CAN	8	10	17	65	17
CHE	9	19	23	49	15
CZE	1	3	1	95	15
DEU	4	12	14	70	13
DNK	4	10	4	81	17
EST	1	8	1	90	16
ESP	4	8	7	82	15
FIN	2	6	3	89	17
FRA	2	12	8	77	19
GRC	2	5	8	85	15
IRL	8	13	8	72	21
ITA	3	8	9	80	14
LTU	1	4	0	95	15
LUX	17	20	32	32	17
LVA	1	9	1	89	15
NLD	2	13	8	76	17
NOR	7	10	9	75	18
PRT	2	13	4	81	15
SWE	5	15	9	71	17
SVI	2	7	4	86	14
GBR	5	11	8	75	18
USA	4	11	13	73	20
Average	4	11	9	77	16

Source: Secretariat calculations based on Annual National Accounts data set OECD, income and labour force surveys. See Annex 4.B for details.

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
Annex Figure 4.A.1. Relative fiscal ratio (foreign-born/native-born) if the foreign-born had the same age distribution as the native-born, 2006-18



Source: Secretariat calculations based on Annual National Accounts data set OECD, income and labour force surveys. See Annex 4.B for details.

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
Annex Figure 4.A.2. Decomposition of the relative expenditure per capita gap (foreign-born/native-born) into the different expenditure items, native-born children of immigrants classified as immigrants, 2006-18



Source: Secretariat calculations based on Annual National Accounts data set OECD, income and labour force surveys. See Annex 4.B for details.

StatLink <https://stat.link/7eka02>

Annex Figure 4.A.3. Total fiscal ratio of immigrants by age group, by country, 2006-18 average



Source: Secretariat calculations based on Annual National Accounts data set OECD, income and labour force surveys. See Annex 4.B for details.

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
Annex Table 4.A.6. Fiscal ratio of prime-aged foreign and native-born, 2006-18 average

	% of prime-aged individuals is the population		Fiscal ratio, no items apportioned per capita		Fiscal ratio, all public goods apportioned per capita	
	Foreign-born	Native-born	A	A	C2	C2
			Foreign-born	Native-born	Foreign-born	Native-born
AUS	50.3	38.7	3.59	3.20	1.47	1.45
AUT	59.7	40.8	2.54	4.24	1.32	1.91
BEL	56.3	38.7	2.18	4.18	1.16	1.86
CAN	50.5	40.9	2.73	3.98	1.26	1.65
CHE	59.9	37.9	2.83	3.63	1.46	1.66
CZE	54.3	43.3	4.28	4.78	1.68	1.79
DEU	51.8	40.1	2.93	3.66	1.55	1.88
DNK	57.2	37.5	1.61	2.45	1.16	1.59
ESP	68.6	42.7	3.03	3.76	1.19	1.63
EST	32.9	43.0	3.48	3.70	1.61	1.80
FIN	65.7	37.9	1.36	2.92	1.04	1.77
FRA	50.0	38.4	2.50	3.62	1.39	1.80
GBR	60.3	38.0	2.98	3.07	1.47	1.54
GRC	68.7	41.0	3.99	5.72	1.24	1.73
IRL	62.1	39.4	2.23	2.62	1.23	1.41
ITA	70.3	40.4	3.96	5.49	1.46	1.99
LTU	37.2	41.5	3.81	3.70	1.62	1.65
LUX	61.5	34.5	3.32	4.68	1.69	2.11
LVA	32.2	43.0	4.20	4.56	1.50	1.64
NLD	62.9	38.7	1.77	2.94	1.14	1.61
NOR	62.5	38.7	1.84	2.67	1.45	1.86
PRT	68.3	40.5	4.70	4.57	1.82	1.78
SVN	54.0	42.9	3.29	4.40	1.50	1.90
SWE	54.8	36.2	1.74	3.28	1.16	1.80
USA	58.7	37.4	2.50	3.19	1.17	1.43
Average	56.4	39.7	2.94	3.80	1.39	1.73


Source: Secretariat calculations based on Annual National Accounts data set OECD, income and labour force surveys. See Annex 4.B for details.

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
Annex Figure 4.A.4. Total fiscal ratio of the foreign and native-born by age group, by country, 2006-18 average



Source: Secretariat calculations based on Annual National Accounts data set OECD, income and labour force surveys. See Annex 4.B for details.

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
Annex Figure 4.A.5. Difference in the total net fiscal contribution per capita, divided by GDP per capita, between the foreign and native-born prime-aged, by education level, 2006-18 average



Source: Secretariat calculations based on Annual National Accounts data set OECD, income and labour force surveys. See Annex 4.B for details.

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Annex Figure 4.A.6. Total fiscal ratio of EU and non-EU immigrants, relative to the native-born, 2006-18 average



Source: Secretariat calculations based on Annual National Accounts data set OECD, income and labour force surveys. See Annex 4.B for details.

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
Annex Table 4.A.7. Total fiscal ratio, immigrants and native-born, 2007, 2009 and 2017

	Foreign-born			Native-born			Foreign-born/native-born		
	C2	C2	C2	C2	C2	C2	C2	C2	C2
	2007	2009	2017	2007	2009	2017	2007	2009	2017
AUS	1.05	0.91	0.99	1.01	0.83	0.95	1.03	1.09	1.04
AUT	0.92	0.84	1.00	0.98	0.91	0.98	0.94	0.93	1.02
BEL	0.87	0.76	0.88	1.02	0.92	1.01	0.85	0.83	0.87
CAN		0.85	0.91		0.93	1.03		0.91	0.89
CHE	1.11	1.08	1.12	1.03	0.99	1.00	1.08	1.08	1.12
CZE	0.87	0.81	1.26	0.99	0.88	1.03	0.88	0.92	1.22
DEU	0.87	0.86	1.04	1.03	0.95	1.03	0.85	0.91	1.01
DNK	1.05	0.88	1.08	1.11	0.96	1.02	0.95	0.92	1.06
ESP	1.39	0.79	1.13	1.01	0.75	0.91	1.37	1.04	1.24
EST	0.86	0.75	0.71	1.13	0.99	1.03	0.76	0.76	0.70
FIN	0.99	0.87	0.99	1.11	0.96	0.99	0.89	0.91	1.00
FRA	0.92	0.84	0.86	0.95	0.88	0.96	0.96	0.96	0.90
GBR	1.06	0.86	1.27	0.92	0.78	0.89	1.15	1.11	1.43
GRC	1.04	0.81	1.23	0.85	0.71	1.00	1.23	1.13	1.22
IRL	1.10	0.82	1.20	0.99	0.69	0.95	1.11	1.19	1.26
ITA	1.35	1.13	1.24	0.95	0.89	0.93	1.41	1.28	1.34
LTU	0.93	0.78	0.86	0.98	0.80	1.02	0.95	0.98	0.84
LUX	1.33	1.17	1.09	1.00	0.88	0.99	1.33	1.33	1.10
LVA	0.85	0.68	0.73	1.01	0.81	1.03	0.85	0.84	0.70
NLD	1.04	0.84	0.97	0.99	0.90	1.04	1.04	0.94	0.94
NOR	1.46	1.25	1.05	1.41	1.22	1.11	1.04	1.03	0.95
PRT	1.31	1.26	1.40	0.91	0.78	0.91	1.44	1.62	1.55
SVN	0.99	0.86	0.97	1.00	0.88	1.00	0.99	0.97	0.97
SWE	0.94	0.93	0.90	1.09	1.00	1.06	0.86	0.93	0.85
USA	0.92	0.73	0.95	0.89	0.69	0.88	1.04	1.06	1.09
Average	1.05	0.89	1.03	1.02	0.88	0.99	1.05	1.02	1.05


Source: Secretariat calculations based on Annual National Accounts data set OECD, income and labour force surveys. See Annex 4.B for details.

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
Annex Figure 4.A.7. Change in the unemployment and employment rate of the foreign-born and native-born between 2007 and 2009




Source: Secretariat calculations based on Annual National Accounts data set OECD, income and labour force surveys. See Annex 4.B for details.

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Annex Figure 4.A.8. Fiscal ratio of the foreign and native-born over the lifecycle, expenditure on public goods apportioned per capita to all adults, 2006-18 average




Source: Secretariat calculations based on Annual National Accounts data set OECD, income and labour force surveys. See Annex 4.B for details.


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Annex Figure 4.A.9. Age distribution of immigrants and the native-born


Average across countries, 2006-18



Source: Secretariat calculations based on Annual National Accounts data set OECD, income and labour force surveys. See Annex 4.B for details.

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Annex Figure 4.A.10. Total net fiscal contribution per capita, divided by GDP per capita, of the foreign and native-born by age, 2006-18



Source: Secretariat calculations based on Annual National Accounts data set OECD, income and labour force surveys. See Annex 4.B for details.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/y9it73>

Annex 4.B. Data and methodology

OECD Annual National Accounts Dataset: The budget of the general government

Data on the public budget of OECD countries over time comes from the OECD National Accounts Statistics data set. Data are internationally comparable by following the System of National Accounts 2008 (SNA 2008). The level of analysis used is that of the general government. This includes not only the central government but also consolidated accounts that include state and local government, as well as social security funds.

Government expenditure

The general government's expenditure is aggregated using the Classification of the Functions of Government (COFOG). The classification has ten main functions of government (general public services; defence; public order and safety; economic affairs; environment protection; housing and community amenities; health; recreation, culture, and religion; education; and social protection). Each of these functions is split into up to ten sub functions.

The different items of expenditure of the general government's accounts are enumerated in Annex Table 4.B.1

Canadian Classification of the Functions of Government (CCOFOG)

Data on government expenditure following the COFOG for Canada is not available at this stage. The analysis in this chapter uses instead the Canadian Classification of the Functions of Government (CCOFOG) available from 2008 onwards.²⁵ Some items are not available in the CCOFOG. To ensure comparability between the data on government expenditure between Canada and the other countries, some adjustments have been made.

Almost 20% of the expenditure of the general government for Canada is not classified under the CCOFOG. This expenditure corresponds to two items of the national accounts: "consumption of fixed capital" and "non-financial assets acquisition" (or "gross capital formation"). Each one of these corresponds to about half of the missing expenditure. Expenditure on "consumption of fixed capital" is attributed to the different levels of the CCOFOG based on available data on the distribution of consumption of fixed capital by function of government for the United Kingdom.²⁶ No similar adjustment is possible for the expenditure on "non-financial assets acquisition", as the distribution of this expenditure item across functions of government varies widely across countries.

Additional data used to complement the OECD Annual National Accounts for the United States

Data on government expenditure split by the COFOG in the OECD annual national accounts data set is missing at the sub-level for the United States.²⁷ Additional datasets were used to estimate the expenditure for the sub-levels necessary to the analysis.


Item COFOG 10, expenditure on social protection is split into the sub-items of social protection using the shares of expenditure for each category as calculated from the OECD Social Expenditure Database (OECD, 2021_[28]).²⁸

Data on expenditure on public debt transactions (COFOG 01.7) comes from historical tables of the United States Federal Government Finances.²⁹

Item COFOG 9, expenditure on education, is attributed to the different levels of education using the shares of expenditure for each level as calculated from the data on educational expenditure from OECD Education at a Glance.³⁰

Annex Figure 4.B.1. Main categories of public expenditure in OECD countries

2018 or most recent data available



Source: Based on Annual National Accounts data, OECD and other data sets. See details in text.

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Government revenue

The government's revenue items considered in the analysis follow (OECD, 2017^[29]). The different items of revenue of the general government's accounts are enumerated in Annex Table 4.B.1


Additional data used to complement the OECD Annual National Accounts for Canada and the United States

No data on households and employer social contributions is available in the OECD national accounts for Canada. The total amount of social contributions in the national accounts was split between households and employers using the shares from the OECD Global Revenue Statistics Database.

Similarly, for the United States, data from the National Income and Product Accounts (Bureau of Economic Analysis) is used to split the total amount of social contributions from the national accounts into household social contributions and employer social contributions.³¹

Annex Figure 4.B.2. Main categories of public revenue in OECD countries

2018 or most recent data available



Source: Based on Annual National Accounts data, OECD and other data sets. See details in text.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/t3qrg0>

Labour force surveys: The foreign and native-born populations

The analysis focuses on foreign-born individuals living in the host country in each year. It uses labour force surveys for the different countries as a representative base of the resident population: EU-LFS for European countries; Current Population Survey (CPS) for the United States; Labour Force Survey for Canada.

One problem that arises from using labour force surveys is that for some countries it does not cover the country's population of all ages. Individuals aged under 15 are not covered in the EU-LFS in Norway, Switzerland, as well as Luxembourg and Sweden for some of the years in the analysis. Furthermore, data for Norway and Sweden also does not include the population aged 75 and over, in at least some of the years.

Additional datasets were used to get information on the younger and older missing populations in the EU-LFS. For the older populations, information on the number of individuals by country of birth (foreign-born vs native-born) and age group is sufficient for the analysis. However, for the children, information is also needed on the country of birth of the parents to identify the native-born children of immigrants.

To fill the *population gaps* in the EU-LFS, data was collected from different sources, such as Eurostat data on the foreign and native-born population by age; data from special data requests to national statistical offices, as for example for Norway. When data was missing only for some years, the missing data was estimated by interpolation.

Similarly, the Canadian LFS does not cover individuals aged under 15. Data from the Canadian Censuses 2006, 2016 and the National Household Survey 2011 was used to estimate the number of children by five-year age group, country of birth (foreign or native-born) and country of birth of the parents (foreign or native-born).

Income surveys: Information on taxes and benefits

The apportionment of all categories of social protection, as well as that of direct taxes and social contributions, is based on survey data on income. The surveys used are the European Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) for OECD European countries, the Current Population Survey (CPS) for the United States, the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID) for 2006-11 and the Canadian Income Survey (CIS) for 2012-18 for Canada.

The variables used from the EU-SILC are:

- The benefits received by the individual: **sickness** py120g; **disability** py130g; **old age** py100g; **survivor** py110g; **unemployment** py090g
- The benefits and allowances received by the household (which are divided by the number of adults in the household for the analysis): **family and children** allowances hy050g; **social exclusion** benefits hy060g; **housing** allowances hy070g
- The taxes and social contributions paid by the household (which are divided by the number of adults in the household for the analysis) – **direct taxes and social contributions**: regular taxes on wealth (hy120g) and taxes on income and social insurance contributions (hy140g); and the **employer social contributions** paid by the individual's employer (py030g).
- Household **disposable income** (hy020) equalised using the square root scale, according to which the household income is divided by the square root of the household size. The sum of the equalised amounts is divided by the number of adults in the household and used in the analysis to apportion indirect taxes (see section below).

Symmetrically, the variables used from the Canadian SLID and CIS are:

- The benefits received by the individual: **sickness and disability**: workers' compensation benefits and disability benefits included in the Canada and Quebec pension plan benefits; **old age and survivor**: old age security; guaranteed income supplement; Canada and Quebec pension plan benefits (except disability benefits); **unemployment**: employment insurance benefits.
- The benefits and allowances received by the household (which are divided by the number of adults in the household for the analysis): **family and children**: universal childcare benefits; child tax benefits/credits; **social exclusion**: social assistance benefits; GST/HST credit; provincial tax credits; **housing**: there is no information on the amount of housing subsidy the household receives. Hence, the apportionment uses the share of households that receive a housing subsidy.
- **Taxes and social contributions**: employment insurance contribution; Canada and Québec pension plan contributions; individual income tax. The **employer social contributions** are estimated at 1.4 times the individual's employment insurance contributions.
- **Equalised individual disposable income**.

The variables used from the American CPS are:

- The benefits received by the individual: **sickness and disability**: disability benefits, such as worker's compensation, federal government disability, etc.; **old age and survivor**: supplemental security income, social security payments, pension/retirement payments, survivor payments, veteran payments; **unemployment**: unemployment compensation.
- The benefits and allowances received by the household (which are divided by the number of adults in the household for the analysis): **family and children**: market value of school lunches, child tax credit and some items of public assistance; **social exclusion**: public assistance, earned income tax credit, market value of food stamps; **housing**: there is no information on the amount of housing subsidy the household receives. Hence, the apportionment uses the share of households that receive a rent subsidy or live in public housing.

- **Taxes and social contributions:** federal income tax, state tax, federal retirement payroll deduction, social security retirement payroll deduction. The **employer social contributions** are social security retirement payroll deduction, unemployment insurance.
- **Estimated individual disposable income.**

The variables used from the Australian SIH are:

- The benefits received by the individual: **sickness and disability:** disability pension, sickness allowance, carer allowance; **old age and survivor:** age pension, service pension; **unemployment:** newstart allowance.
- The benefits and allowances received by the household (which are divided by the number of adults in the household for the analysis): **family and children:** paid parental leave payment, parenting payment, family tax benefits; **housing:** rent assistance.
- **Taxes:** imputed taxes at the individual level. There are no social contributions in Australia.
- **Equalised individual disposable income.**

Apportionment of all revenue and expenditure items to the foreign and native-born population

Each revenue and expenditure item is apportioned to the foreign-born and native-born population based on specific criteria for each item, presented in section Several strategies are used to apportion each expenditure and revenue item of the public budget to the foreign or native-born populations.

Annex Table 4.B.1 provides the detailed criteria to allocate all items of expenditure and revenue items to the different groups of the foreign and native-born populations.

Annex Table 4.B.1. Criteria to allocate government expenditure and revenue items

National Accounts Item – Expenditure	Apportioning criterion
Pure public goods Public debt transactions: COFOG 01.7. Defence: COFOG 02. ○ Other: COFOG 01 – General public services (except for 01.7 Public debt transactions)	Per capita to adults aged 15+: foreign-born and native-born, or native-born only depending on the scenario considered.
• Congestible public goods: COFOG 03 to COFOG 06 and COFOG 08	Per capita to all adults aged 15+.
• Health expenditure ○ Demographically modelled: COFOG 07.1 to COFOG 07.4 ○ Other: COFOG 07.5 to 07.6	Country specific age-cost curves estimated by the OECD (Lorenzoni et al., 2019 ^[25]). Per capita to all adults aged 15+.
Education expenditure Pre-primary and primary: COFOG 09.1 ○ Secondary: COFOG 09.2 ○ Post-secondary: COFOG 09.3 ○ Tertiary: COFOG 09.4 ○ Subsidiary services to education: COFOG 09.6 ○ Other: COFOG 09.5 and COFOG 09.7 to COFOG 09.8	Per capita to all children, foreign and native-born, aged 0 to 9. Per capita to children aged 10-14 and to individuals aged 15+ enrolled in secondary education (as estimated in LFS). ¹ Per capita to individuals aged 15+ enrolled in post-secondary education (as estimated in LFS). Per capita to individuals aged 15+ enrolled in tertiary education (as estimated in LFS). Per capita to all individuals in education. ² Per capita to all adults aged 15+.
• Social Protection ○ Sickness and disability: COFOG 10.1	Proportionally to each group's average self-declared sickness and disability benefits. ³

○ Old Age: COFOG 10.2	Proportionally to each group's average self-declared old age benefits (individuals aged 60 and over).
○ Survivors: COFOG 10.3	Proportionally to each group's average self-declared survivor benefits.
○ Family/Children: COFOG 10.4	Proportionally to each group's average self-declared family benefits.
○ Unemployment: COFOG 10.5	Proportionally to each group's average unemployment benefits.
○ Housing: COFOG 10.6	Proportionally to each group's average self-declared housing benefits; or proportionally to the number of households that receive benefits (CAN and USA).
○ Social exclusion: COFOG 10.7	Proportionally to each group's average self-declared social exclusion/social assistance benefits. ⁴
○ Other: COFOG 10.8 and COFOG 10.9	Per capita to all adults aged 15+.
National Accounts Item – Revenue	Apportioning criterion
● Indirect taxes – Taxes on products and production – GD2R	Proportionally to each group's average equalised disposable income.
● Direct taxes – Current taxes on wealth and income – GD5R PLUS	Proportionally to each group's average self-declared taxes on wealth & income and social contributions.
● Household social contributions – GD611HR ⁵	
● Capital taxes – GD9R	Per capita to all individuals aged 70 and over.
● Employer social contributions – GD6111R	Proportionally to each group's average self-declared employer social contributions. ⁶
● Other revenue – Sales, Grants and other revenue	Per capita to all adults aged 15+.

1. The Canadian COFOG compiles the expenditure on pre-primary, primary and secondary education as a single item. This total expenditure is attributed per capita to all foreign and native-born aged 0-14 and aged 15+ who attend secondary education as estimated from the Canadian LFS.

2. This item is not available separately in the Canadian COFOG.

3. There is no information on sickness benefits for Italy, so the apportionment of expenditure on sickness is based on the information on disability benefits.

4. No data is available on social exclusion benefits for Denmark, so housing benefits are used to apportion social exclusion expenditure from the national accounts.

5. Net social contributions GD61R equals GD6111R+GD611HR+GD612R. GD612R is imputed social contributions. These are attributed to the employer in the analysis.

6. No data is available on employer social contributions for Germany, so revenue from employer social contributions is apportioned based on household social contributions.

Notes

¹ The chapter benefited from contributions from Xavier Chojnicki, Lionel Ragot, and Bhargavi Sakthivel.

² All immigrants are included as long as they are *residents* of the host country. They have lived, or intend to live, in the host country for at least one year.

³ EU-LFS is used for European countries; Current Population Survey (CPS) for the United States; Labour Force survey for Canada.

⁴ In this case, native-born children with two immigrant parents are classified as immigrants; native-born children with one immigrant parent are classified 50% as immigrant and 50% as native.

⁵ All revenue items in the National Accounts are aggregated following the classification in the OECD publication *Government at a Glance* (OECD, 2017_[29]).

⁶ The cost-age curves determine the relative per capita health costs of individuals in each five-year age group. The cost-age curves used in the estimation are time-invariant.

⁷ There are five age groups: 0-14, 15-24, 25-54, 55-64, 65+. There are three education levels: low (secondary education not completed), medium (completed secondary education and post-secondary/non-tertiary education), and high (tertiary education). Ideally, the native-born and foreign-born populations would be divided into finer groups, such as five-year age groups, and the foreign-born would also be split into different regions of origin. Unfortunately, the sample sizes in EU-SILC are too small to consider finer groups.

⁸ The total expenditure on social protection in the national accounts does not refer to benefits only. It also includes expenditure on compensation of employees and intermediate consumption, among others. Nevertheless, benefits represent most of the expenditure (approximately 90%). The estimation uses total expenditure. Hence, social protection expenditure other than benefits is apportioned proportionately in the same way than benefits are.

⁹ The population counts for Australia come from the resident Population estimates from the Australian Bureau of Statistics.

¹⁰ The sample sizes are larger in the LFS and the panel rotation is more frequent which allow for a larger and more representative sample of immigrants.

¹¹ Another possibility would be to apportion indirect taxes based on the relative expenditure on indirect taxes as a percentage of disposable income for households at different quintiles of the disposable income distribution. This is the approach taken for the United Kingdom in Dustmann and Frattini (2014^[9]). Unfortunately, this information is not available for all countries in the analysis.

¹² Annex Table 4.A.3 presents the net fiscal contribution of the foreign-born with and without expenditure on defence and public debt transactions, the main items classified under *pure public goods*.

¹³ These differences across countries are partly driven by the size of the immigrant population. A cross-country comparison of the net fiscal contribution of immigrants considering these differences is provided later in this section.

¹⁴ An alternative measure that does not depend on the size of the immigrant population is the net fiscal contribution per capita, i.e. the difference between revenue and expenditure of immigrants divided by the immigrant population. This measure can then be divided by GDP per capita to arrive at a measure that is comparable across countries. In practice, this measure is very highly correlated with the fiscal ratio. Additional results using this measure are presented in Annex Table 4.A.4.

¹⁵ If the native-born children of immigrants are classified as part of the immigrant group (Box 4.1), the government's expenditure per capita on the education of the native-born and the foreign-born becomes similar. The expenditure per capita on health also changes from 0.85 to 0.93. The ratios of all other expenditure and revenue items remain the same. The expenditure per capita is 9% larger on the foreign than on the native-born on average across countries. Annex Figure 4.A.2 reproduces Figure 4.3 but attributing the expenditure on health and education on the native-born children of immigrants to immigrants instead of attributing it to the native-born population.

¹⁶ The contribution of each expenditure item j to the foreign-born/native-born ratio of total expenditure per capita is calculated as (the relative per capita expenditure on item j minus one) multiplied by the share of expenditure on item j on total expenditure for the native-born.

¹⁷ No causality implied.

¹⁸ The age groups considered throughout the analysis are 0-14, 15-24, 25-54, 55-64, 65+. The fiscal ratio of immigrants and natives by age group are presented in section *The net fiscal contribution of immigrants by age, education and employment status*.

¹⁹ The standard deviation of the counterfactual relative (foreign-born/native-born) fiscal ratio is 0.08, 40% of the variance of the actual relative fiscal ratio across countries (0.19).

²⁰ The fiscal ratio of children is 0 given that their contributions are 0 and hence cover 0% of the government's expenditure on them.

²¹ In some countries, such as The Czech Republic, Ireland, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States, the immigrant and native-born fiscal ratios are very similar at all age groups. In others, differences are more sizeable, for example in Sweden, the fiscal ratio of the foreign-born is lower than that of the native-born for all working-age groups (see Annex Figure 4.A.4)

²² This is true for all countries but to a different extent (see Annex Table 4.A.6). For example in Belgium, immigrants cover 117% of the government's expenditure with their contributions whereas the native-born cover 188%. In the United Kingdom, the fiscal ratios of immigrants and natives are more similar: immigrants cover 148% of the government's expenditure with their contributions compared with 155% for the native-born.

²³ In this analysis, the United Kingdom is included in EU28 countries given that the data refers to the 2006-18 period.

²⁴ Similarly, the correlations between the changes in the employment rate and the fiscal ratio are 80% for the foreign-born and 65% for the native-born.

²⁵ Statistics Canada, Table10-10-0005-01 Canadian Classification of Functions of Government (CCOFOG) by consolidated government component (x 1, 000, 000), <https://doi.org/10.25318/1010000501-eng>.

²⁶ Available from the UK Office for National Statistics, <https://www.ons.gov.uk/file/p51cbycofoggg.xls>.

²⁷ Also, there is no expenditure classified under COFOG 05 (environmental protection) for the United States.

²⁸ Data on Social expenditure, detailed data for the United States.

²⁹ Table 3.1 available at <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BUDGET-2020-TAB/pdf/BUDGET-2020-TAB.pdf>.

³⁰ Educational expenditure by source and destination – EAG 2020.

³¹ Table 3.6 Contributions for government social insurance.

5

Residential segregation of immigrants: Patterns, drivers, effects and policy responses

Thomas Liebig and Gilles Spielvogel

In all OECD countries, immigrants are concentrated in certain areas, especially in the poorer neighbourhoods and outskirts of the large metropolitan cities. However, not all immigrant groups tend to concentrate to the same extent, and concentration is shaped by both geography and historical settlement patterns. The effects of this concentration on integration are complex. On the one hand, arrival in an area with high concentration is often associated with better initial employment prospects for immigrants. On the other hand, in the longer run, immigrant concentration tends to hamper host-country language acquisition and, in many cases, educational advancement for children of immigrants. Policies should thus not primarily focus on preventing migrant residential segregation, but rather on enhancing mobility out of those areas. More attention should be given notably to the quality and accessibility of housing for immigrants.¹

In Brief

Key findings

- **The issue of residential concentration of immigrants is of high policy interest because of the impact that it can have on immigrants' integration and social cohesion at large.** Especially in European OECD countries, high concentration of immigrants is widely considered to be a bane for integration.
- **High concentration of immigrants is ubiquitous across the OECD.** In most OECD countries, the share of immigrants in the population is higher in urban areas than in rural areas, in areas with high population density and in large metropolitan areas as compared with smaller cities. Within cities, immigrants tend to be overrepresented in poorer neighbourhoods and at the outskirts. Housing in areas with residential segregation tends to be in poorer condition, and the local environment is much more frequently characterised by higher levels of violence, pollution and noise.
- While it is difficult to compare levels of residential concentration of immigrants across countries due to lack of comparable data and relevant spatial delimitations, **the available evidence does not point to an overall increase in levels of immigrant concentration at regional level.** If anything, evidence from a number of OECD countries suggests that new arrivals are now more dispersed at this level than previously. This holds for example for States in the United States and for capital city regions (as compared with the remainder of the country) in Europe.
- However, this trend of greater dispersal may not hold at the neighbourhood level. The concentration of immigrant children in schools since 2006 has increased twice as much in schools that were already at the highest quartile of immigrant concentration than at the average school.
- **Not all immigrant groups tend to concentrate to the same extent.** In European countries, non-EU immigrants are significantly more concentrated than EU immigrants. There is also some evidence of higher concentration of refugees compared with other migrant groups at the neighbourhood level, in spite of dispersal policies that are in place in many countries.
- In Canada, more than two-thirds of all immigrants from Asia living in cities in 2016 resided in the three largest cities, while this was the case for only 55% of immigrants from Europe. In the United States, in 2018, 35% of Latin American immigrants living in metro areas resided in New York, Los Angeles or Miami (the three cities with the largest shares of immigrants), which hosted a bit more than one-quarter of Asian or European immigrants.
- **Geography and historical settlement patterns matter in explaining the spatial distribution of immigrants.** Both population density and city size are generally associated with a larger immigrant presence. In a number of OECD countries, larger shares of immigrants are observed in border regions, notably due to the proximity to origin countries. When deciding on where to live in their destination country, immigrants tend to favour areas where there is already a significant presence of immigrants from their region or country of birth.
- **Recently arrived immigrants are more likely to change location than those who have lived longer in the host country.** Mobility is also more pronounced among better-off immigrant households. When they move, immigrants who used to live in areas with a high share of

immigrants from their region of origin tend to choose areas where it is lower, especially immigrants with more favourable socio-economic characteristics.

- **Outmigration of non-migrants also shapes immigrants' concentration patterns.** Immigrant concentration tends to be enhanced further by native-born leaving immigrant-dense areas. Outmigration thereby tends to lower the average socio-economic position of the population in areas with high immigrant concentration.
- **The effects of immigrant concentration on integration are complex.** On the one hand, arrival in an area with high concentration is often associated with better initial employment prospects. For example, in the United States, a 10% increase in own-group share locally is associated with a 1.4 percentage point increase in the employment probability for newly arrived immigrants. On the other hand, immigrant concentration also appears to hamper host-country language acquisition and, in many cases, educational advancement for children of immigrants.
- There is also some evidence, notably from Sweden, that **residential segregation is more likely to be associated with a negative effect on women than on men**, notably with respect to language acquisition.
- **In most European OECD countries, concentration of children of immigrants in schools is associated with a penalty in terms of educational outcomes.** This penalty extends to more than a year of schooling in countries such as Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, and Sweden. There also tends to be a penalty for children of native-born in such schools, but it is much lower.
- **This penalty is largely explained by the lower socio-economic status of parents in schools with high concentration of migrant children.** Accounting for the higher share of low-educated mothers of children in these schools explains a significant part of the disadvantage in most countries. What is more, in schools with high concentration of migrant children, a higher proportion than elsewhere do not speak the host-country language at home and with classmates. As the composition of schools tends to reflect the composition of the neighbourhood, these latter findings also suggests that immigrants in highly concentrated areas are less likely to speak the host-country language.
- **Native-born descendants of immigrants living in segregated neighbourhoods also tend to have lower educational attainment levels.** To which degree this disadvantage impacts labour market integration later on has not been the object of systematic study to date. However, evidence from Sweden indicates that, once this education disadvantage is accounted for, no further disadvantage is observed in the labour market.
- **Prevention of the concentration of immigrants or of its negative long-term consequences has been an area of particular attention by policy making in OECD countries.** Given the strong links between migrant concentration and lower educational outcomes, education policy has been subject to particular attention. About two-thirds of OECD countries have systematic support for schools with high concentration of disadvantaged children, and nine countries (Canada, the Czech Republic, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Portugal, Slovenia and Switzerland) factor in the share of migrants. Belgium Flanders and Italy have specific maximum thresholds, while Sweden allows under certain conditions for a prioritisation of migrant students in oversubscribed schools.
- **Both housing and urban regeneration policies can affect neighbourhood composition and therefore migrant concentration.** Many of these policies also aim at achieving a greater mix with respect to socio-economic background and parental origin. Such policies generally aim at achieving a greater socio-economic mix of neighbourhoods, and migrant background is rarely an explicit factor.

- A number of OECD countries have specific urban regeneration programmes that try to address the issue of high concentration of disadvantage in certain urban areas. **Urban regeneration policies are longstanding in the Nordic countries – where they are linked with specific anti-segregation action plans – and in the Netherlands**, but have also been pursued elsewhere. Only Denmark has a specific focus on reducing the population share of immigrants in areas of high concentration through a number of measures, including restrictions on inward mobility.
- **Migration policy parameters can also affect migrant concentration.** This is most common with respect to asylum seekers, who are dispersed in about half of all OECD countries, and refugees. Australia, Canada and New Zealand have specific provisions to favour economic migration outside of the metropolitan areas. Denmark is the only OECD country that restricts, under certain conditions, family migration to areas with high shares of immigrants.
- Overall, it appears that, in many cases, there is a trade-off for immigrants living in segregated areas. This provides short-term gains for new arrivals, while it can hamper integration in the long run. It therefore appears that **policies should not primarily focus on preventing migrant residential segregation, but rather on enhancing mobility out of those areas.**
- **More attention should be given notably to the quality and accessibility of housing for immigrants.** More targeted investment in these areas into language training and information about the functioning of the host-country labour market and education system, notably for new arrivals, also seem warranted. Greater policy attention is required especially with respect to immigrant women's integration in areas with high residential segregation. Both research and integration policy also need to pay more attention to the spatial aspects of intergenerational dynamics.

Introduction

It is a well-established fact that immigrants are not equally distributed within OECD countries and tend to be concentrated in certain areas, especially within large cities (OECD, 2016^[1]). Immigrants' neighbourhood shapes their opportunities to make contacts, to learn the host-country language, and to access resources such as housing, schools, potential employers, transportation nodes and the like. The local neighbourhood can provide new opportunities but it can also constrain integration outcomes. This concerns the situation of immigrants just after their arrival but also their future integration prospects and those of their descendants. As residential segregation tends to be associated with fewer contacts with the host-country society and norms, its impact on social integration and social cohesion at large has also become an issue of scrutiny.

Indeed, high concentration of immigrants is widely considered to be a bane for integration. A 2017 survey revealed that EU-wide, more than half of EU citizens consider limited interactions between immigrants and the native-born to be a "major obstacle" for integration; and more than 80% considered that a "better intermingling" between immigrants and native-born would improve integration (European Commission, 2018^[2]).

More recently, in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, many OECD countries have observed higher health vulnerability for migrants, witnessed both with respect to a higher likelihood of infection and higher probability of severe cases (OECD, 2020^[3]). Detailed analyses accounting for individual contextual factors have concluded that part of this disadvantage is associated with high spatial concentration of certain immigrant groups, even after accounting for housing conditions and other socio-economic factors.

What are the driving factors of immigrant spatial concentration? What is the impact of this concentration on integration outcomes? How can policy affect migrant concentration and its association with integration outcomes? To address these questions, this chapter reviews the patterns of immigrant concentration across regions, cities, and neighbourhoods in OECD countries, and analyses some of the key determinants of immigrants' location choices on the basis of both a comprehensive review of the literature and novel data analysis. It also analyses the consequences of immigrant concentration and residential segregation on integration outcomes and prospects, as well as public policies implemented in OECD countries to tackle this issue – building on a policy questionnaire that was sent to all OECD countries.

It is structured as follows. Section 2 describes past and current patterns of immigrant spatial concentration in OECD countries, at different geographical scales, including the question of residential segregation within cities. Section 3 looks at the determinants of immigrants' location choices and mobility patterns. Section 4 investigates the consequences of immigrant concentration on immigrant integration. Section 5 discusses the role of public policies in driving and responding to residential segregation. Section 6 concludes with some lessons for policy making.

Box 5.1. Definitions and concepts used in this chapter

In the literature, both the terms concentration and residential segregation are used. There is no clear-cut distinction between the two, although the latter term is more often used to describe the dynamics and the concentration at neighbourhood level, while the former tends to refer to larger areas. This chapter will use both terms synonymously.

A key issue that arises in the study of immigrants' residential segregation is its interlinkage with ethnic segregation, which is used in the literature when referring to immigrants from specific origin countries or regions and their descendants. As immigrant populations become longstanding, the number of native-born descendants of immigrants – both direct and multi-generation – increases. To the degree that they live in the same neighbourhoods, looking at the share of immigrants will thus tend to provide a distorted picture if the actual issue of interest is ethnic segregation. This is a particular issue when considering changes over time. Indeed, it is conceivable that immigrant segregation – as measured by the share of foreign-born – declines while it increases once their descendants are considered. However, apart from the Nordic countries with their longstanding population registers, there is little data on residential concentration at the local level that would include both immigrant and their native-born descendants. This chapter focuses on immigrants and their direct descendants. Where the latter are included, this is specifically mentioned. The word “ethnic” segregation is used in this chapter when not only direct descendants are considered but also subsequent generations.

In addition, there are links between the residential segregation of immigrants and broader patterns of socio-economic residential segregation: to the extent that immigrants are overrepresented among the population with socio-economic disadvantage, they will tend to live in neighbourhoods where housing is cheaper, or with a higher share of social housing.

Finally, much of the literature on residential segregation, especially from the Anglo-Saxon countries, does not focus on immigrants and their descendants, but on racial segregation. While some of the issues are similar, this issue is not considered in this chapter which focuses on foreign-born and their direct descendants.

Patterns of immigrant concentration

This section first focuses on the regional distribution and then zooms in at the city level to discuss concentration across neighbourhoods. Both historical and contemporary patterns are discussed, bearing in mind that differences in data availability across countries, as well as country-specific geo-administrative divisions, may limit international comparability.

Immigrant concentration at the regional level and across cities

Historical concentration patterns

Across most OECD countries, the share of immigrants in the population tends to be higher in urban areas than in rural areas, in denser regions and in large cities. This fact has already been highlighted half a century ago in the early empirical analyses of settlement patterns of late 19th century European immigrants in the United States. Incentivised by better employment opportunities and the presence of persons from the same origin country, new immigrants tended to settle in states with a higher share of urban population and a higher population density (Gallaway and Vedder, 1971^[4]; Gallaway, Vedder and Shukla, 1974^[5]). This phenomenon was also observed in several European countries. As noted by Noiriel (1988^[6]) for France, immigrants already tended to concentrate in the largest industrial cities at the end of the 19th century. In the United Kingdom, London has been the main pole of attraction of immigrants: in 1881, it hosted almost one-quarter of all immigrants living in England and Wales, while accounting for a population share of 15% (Minnesota Population Center, 2020^[7]). In the early 20th century, in Canada, England, Sweden and the United States, data show that immigrants were systematically more regionally concentrated than the native-born, and they lived more often in cities (Annex Table 5.A.1).

Location patterns of immigrants across regions and cities in the second half of the 20th century also exhibited significant concentration. This was for instance the case in the United States across metropolitan areas (Bartel, 1989^[8]) and across states (Chiswick and Miller, 2004^[9]). As documented in Box 5.2, this trend continues until now.

European countries have also exhibited a strong spatial concentration of immigrants for decades, with a prominent role of capital cities. In Great Britain, France, Spain and Sweden, the population share of capital regions has remained consistently higher for immigrants than for the native-born since the 1960s (Figure 5.2). In Great Britain, between 1971 and 2020, between 35% and 40% of the immigrant population lived in Greater London, while this was the case for about 10% of the native-born. For France, the pattern was quite similar, although the difference between the foreign-born and the native-born was smaller. The share of the foreign-born living in the Ile-de-France region (which includes Paris and its suburbs) increased from about 25% in 1962 to about 35% in 2017, while the share of all native-born living in this region remained close to 17%. In Spain, the Madrid region was home to close to 19% of immigrants in 1960, compared to 8% of the native-born. This gap almost disappeared in the 1990s before widening again: in 2001, 21% of immigrants lived in the Community of Madrid, down to 19% in 2020. In the case of Sweden, in 2020, about 30% of all immigrants lived in Stockholm County, while this was the case for about 20% of the native-born, this difference having been substantially larger in the past.


Box 5.2. The regional distribution of immigrants in the United States since 1940

The geographical distribution of immigrants in the United States has undergone a significant shift since the mid-20th century (Figure 5.1). In 1940, immigrants were most strongly overrepresented in the Northeast region. At that date, almost one-in-four immigrants in the United States lived in New York State, and 23% of the population of this state was foreign-born, compared to about 10% countrywide. In 1960, while the foreign-born share in the United States was only 6%, close to its lowest point in the 20th century, immigrants were even more concentrated in New York, with 26% of them living in the state.

A major change occurred after the 1970s, when immigration started to increase again, especially from East and Southeast Asia and from Mexico. By 1980, 16% of the population of California was foreign-born, almost the same share as in New York State. Taken together, these two states hosted 42% of the immigrant population of the country, compared with 18% of the total population. However, California was home to 57% of the Mexican immigrants and one-third of all Asian immigrants, while New York State hosted only 0.5% and 11% of the Mexican and Asian immigrants, respectively. In 2000, the share of foreign-born in California had reached 27% and there were more than twice as many immigrants in California as in New York State, while the opposite was true in 1960.

In the last two decades, there has been some regional deconcentration: the relative shares of California and New York State have decreased significantly, while the number of immigrants has increased more rapidly in states with traditionally low immigrant shares, such as Kentucky, Tennessee or Iowa.

Figure 5.1. Location quotients of immigrants across US states, 1940-2019



Note: Data for the contiguous the United States. The location quotient of immigrants for state i is computed as $LQ_i = (FB_i / P_i) / (FB_T / P_T)$, with immigrant and total populations noted FB and P respectively, and indices i and T referring to state i and the whole country respectively. The location quotient is lower than 1 when the local/state share of immigrants is lower than their share in the country as a whole, and higher than 1 when state i has a higher share of foreign-born than the country overall.


Source: United States census data for 1940, 1960, 1980 and 2000; American Community Survey for 2019; Ruggles et al. (2021^[10]), "IPUMS USA: Version 11.0 [dataset]", <http://dx.doi.org/10.18128/D010.V11.0>, and OECD Secretariat calculations.

Figure 5.2. Share of immigrants and native-born living in the capital region in the United Kingdom, France, Spain and Sweden, 1960-2020



Note: In 1971, about 36% of all the foreign-born in Great Britain lived in London, while this was the case for about 12% of the native-born. United Kingdom: data only cover Great Britain; Greater London is defined as the 32 London boroughs and the City of London. France: the Ile de France region is centred around Paris and encompasses 8 French departments. Spain: data for the Madrid province from 1960 to 1981 and for the Community of Madrid since 1991. Sweden: data relate to nationality for 1973-2019; dashed lines: data relate to place of birth (foreigners vs native-born) for 2000-20; Stockholm County corresponds to the City of Stockholm.

Source: United Kingdom: census data, Office for National Statistics (ONS); France: census data, National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) and Minnesota Population Center (2020^[7]), "Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, International: Version 7.3", <http://dx.doi.org/10.18128/D020.V7.3>; Spain: census data, National Statistics Institute (INE); Sweden: register data, Statistics Sweden (SCB); OECD Secretariat calculations.


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Current patterns

Historical patterns described above still characterise very well the current situation observed in different parts of the OECD. The median share of immigrants in the working-age population in rural areas across 25 European OECD countries in 2019 was about 7%, while it was 18% in cities. This higher urban share is observed in all European OECD countries, irrespective of the overall share of immigrants in their population. In Canada and the United States, the share of immigrants was also higher in metropolitan areas than in the rest of the country (Figure 5.3). The difference between urban and rural areas is much

smaller in those European countries where immigration is relatively recent and driven by labour needs prior to the global economic crisis of 2008, such as Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. It is also smaller in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, where immigration is more longstanding but which have relatively high shares of humanitarian migrants who are dispersed throughout the country. All three of these latter countries also have relatively strong policies to prevent migrant concentration (see below the discussion on policies).

Figure 5.3. Share of foreign-born in the working-age population (15-64) according to the degree of urbanisation in selected OECD countries, 2019



Note: Population aged 15-64. For European countries, the share of foreign-born is shown according to categories of degree of urbanisation: cities and other areas (towns and suburbs and rural areas). The degree of urbanisation is a joint European Commission / OECD classification. Local Administrative Units (LAU) are classified as cities, towns and suburbs or rural areas based on a combination of criteria of geographical contiguity and minimum population threshold applied to 1 km² population grid cells. Cities are LAUs where at least 50% of the population lives in urban centres. For Canada, the share of foreign-born is shown for Census Metropolitan Areas (CMAs) and for the rest of the country. Data for Canada refer to 2016. For the United States, the share of foreign-born is shown for Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) and for the rest of the country.

Source: European countries: Eurostat, Canada: Statcan, the United States: Census Bureau; OECD Secretariat calculations.

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In addition, there is generally a positive correlation between city population and the local share of immigrants, which is often driven by the higher share of immigrants in the capital or largest city. This is true in most European OECD countries, although with some heterogeneity (Table 5.1). For example, the share of foreign-born in the largest urban area in France, Paris, was close to 22% in 2014, while it was 11% in all other French urban areas combined. In Spain, the two largest cities, Madrid and Barcelona, had a share of immigrants of 19% each in 2019, while immigrants accounted for 12% of the population in the other cities combined. In Sweden, however, the difference was less stark between the largest city, Stockholm (25% of immigrants in 2018) and the other urban areas of the country (20% of immigrants). In countries where the overall share of immigrants is smaller, their spatial concentration in the largest city can also be significant. This is for example the case in Finland, where 12% of the population of Helsinki was foreign-born in 2019, compared with only 5% on average in the other cities. In the Belgian case, a recent government report highlighted that the share of foreign nationals varied drastically across the main cities: it was 40% in Brussels and 25% in Antwerp, the two largest cities, but only 7% in Bruges and 10% in Namur (SPF Emploi and Unia, 2020^[11]). Germany stands out as an exception to this pattern: for historical reasons, most large West-German cities have a higher share of immigrants than Berlin; in 2019, 35% of Frankfurt's population was foreign-born, while this share was 22% in Berlin.

Table 5.1. Share of foreign-born according to geographical classification in selected OECD countries

	Capital or largest city		Other cities		Other areas	Total
Australia, 2016	Sydney	35.2%	Other capital cities (7)	29.6%	13.3%	25.4%
Belgium, 2019	Brussels	28.6%	Other FUAs (10)	15.7%	11.9%	17.2%
Canada, 2016	Toronto metro area	49.0%	Other CMAs (34)	24.6%	7.6%	23.9%
Chile, 2017	Santiago Province	8.3%	Largest cities at Northern border	10.7%	2.3%	4.5%
Colombia, 2020	Bogota	5.4%	Largest cities at border with Venezuela	13.0%	4.5%	4.9%
Finland, 2019	Helsinki	12.4%	Other FUAs (6)	5.4%	4.4%	6.8%
France, 2014	Paris	21.5%	Other FUAs (83)	10.6%	7.6%	11.7%
Germany, 2019	Berlin	22.0%	Other large cities (14)	23.9%	15.3%	17.0%
Japan, 2018	Tokyo Metropolis	4.0%	Capitals of other prefectures	2.1%	1.8%	2.1%
Korea, 2015	Seoul Capital Area	3.6%	Other cities and province capitals	1.4%	2.3%	2.7%
Mexico, 2020	Mexico City	1.1%	Largest cities at Northern border	2.9%	0.8%	1.0%
Netherlands, 2019	Amsterdam	19.8%	Other FUAs (35)	13.4%	7.2%	13.3%
New Zealand, 2018	Auckland	42.4%	Other major urban areas (6)	26.4%	27.3%	27.1%
Spain, 2019	Madrid	19.3%	Other FUAs (72)	13.7%	11.7%	13.9%
Sweden, 2019	Stockholm	24.8%	Other FUAs (11)	19.8%	14.5%	18.5%
United States, 2018	NYC-Newark-Jersey City	28.8%	Other MSAs (389)	13.9%	4.0%	13.5%

Note: European countries data for the capital city relate to the functional urban area (FUA). Australia: Greater Capital City Statistical Areas (GCCSA) are geographical areas built from Statistical Areas Level 4 and are designed to represent the functional extent of each of the eight State and Territory capital cities. Canada: Census metropolitan areas (CMA) are formed by one or more adjacent municipalities centred on a population centre (core). A CMA must have a total population of at least 100 000 of which 50 000 or more must live in the core. New Zealand: Besides Auckland, the other major urban areas are Christchurch, Wellington, Hamilton, Tauranga, Lower Hutt and Dunedin. United States: Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) are defined as one or more adjacent counties or county equivalents that have at least one urban core area of at least 50 000 population, plus adjacent territory that has a high degree of social and economic integration with the core as measured by commuting ties. Japan: Data on nationals and foreigners from registers of the resident population; Tokyo Metropolis refers to the 62 municipalities of the whole metropolitan prefecture of Tokyo. Korea: Data on foreign and total residents by municipality; Seoul Capital Area refers to the whole metropolitan area, including the cities of Seoul and Incheon and Gyeonggi Province. Colombia: Cucuta, Riohacha and Valledupar are the capitals of the three densest departments bordering Venezuela (La Guajira, Norte de Santander, Cesar). Chile: Santiago Province is the province of the capital; Arica, Iquique and Antofagasta are the capitals of the three northernmost regions of the country (Arica and Parinacota, Tarapacá, Antofagasta). Mexico: Mexico City refers to the federal entity Ciudad de México; the largest cities of the Northern border states are Tijuana (Baja California), Hermosillo (Sonora), Juarez (Chihuahua), Saltillo (Coahuila), Monterrey (Nuevo León) and Reynosa (Tamaulipas). Source: European countries: Eurostat, Destatis (for Germany); Australia: Australian Bureau of Statistics (Census 2016); Canada: Statistics Canada (Census 2016); New Zealand: NZ Stat (Census 2018); United States: Census Bureau (American Community Survey 2018, 5-Year estimates); Japan: Portal of Official Statistics of Japan (System of Social and Demographic Statistics; Municipality data); Korea: Ministry of the Interior and Safety (Statistics on Foreign Residents by Local Government); Colombia: DANE; Chile: INE (Censo 2017); Mexico: INEGI (Censo 2020); OECD Secretariat calculations.

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A high concentration in the largest cities is also observed in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States (Table 5.1). In Australia, in 2016, the share of immigrants in Sydney and in the other state capitals was more than twice as large as in the rest of the country.² The same pattern was observed in New Zealand, with 42% of immigrants in Auckland in 2018 and 26% in the other major urban areas. In Canada, the share of immigrants in the population reached 30% on average in metropolitan areas (CMAs) in 2016, while it was below 8% outside the largest cities. It was particularly high in Toronto (49%), the largest city, and Vancouver (45%), the third largest city. In the United States, in 2018, almost 15% of the population of metropolitan areas was foreign-born, while this share was only 4% in the rest of the country. The share of immigrants was particularly high in some of the largest metropolitan areas, such as New York-Newark-Jersey City (29%), Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim (33%) – the two most populated metro


areas – and Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach (40%). Meanwhile, it was only 6.6% on average in metropolitan areas with a population of 75 000 to 500 000.

In OECD countries where the overall share of foreign-born or foreigners is much lower, there is also a significant concentration of immigrants in the largest cities (Table 5.1). This is for example the case in Japan: in Tokyo prefecture, the share of foreigners³ in the population was 4% in 2018, while the overall share in Japan was 2.1%.⁴ In Korea, in 2015, more than 65% of all foreigners lived in the Seoul Capital Area, which accounted for half of the country's total population, with foreigners accounting for 3.6% and 2.7% of the population, respectively. However, the share of foreigners in large cities outside the capital, such as Busan and Daegu, and in the other provincial capitals, was below average.

In Latin America, immigrants are often concentrated in the border cities (Table 5.1). In Chile, while the share of foreign-born in the population at the national level was 4.5% in 2017, it reached 8.3% in the Province of Santiago, the capital. It was even higher in the capitals of the three Northern regions of Arica and Parinacota, Tarapacá, Antofagasta, which have borders with Peru and Bolivia. These data, however, do not fully account for Venezuelan refugees who have arrived in Chile in the recent years. In 2019, the number of Venezuelan nationals living in Chile increased by more than 160 000, and more than half of the newly-arrived Venezuelans lived in the Santiago metropolitan area, significantly affecting the overall distribution of immigrants in the country. A similar pattern is observed in Colombia: while the share of immigrants in Bogota was about 5% in 2020, it was 13% in the largest cities close to the Venezuelan border. In Mexico, in 2020, one-quarter of all foreign-born lived in Mexico City or in the largest city of each of the six states along the border with the United States, while those seven cities together hosted 13% of the total population.⁵

There are notable differences in the relationship between immigrant share and city population according to the place of birth of immigrants. This is apparent for European countries from Figure 5.4 and the results in Annex Table 5.A.2: the correlation between city population and the share of immigrants is weaker for EU-born immigrants than for non-EU-born ones. An uneven concentration pattern across migrant groups is also observed for Canada (Figure 5.5) and the United States (Figure 5.6). For immigrants born in North America (i.e. mostly those born in the United States for Canada, and those born in Canada for the United States), there is basically no correlation between their share in the total population and the size of cities. In Canada, there is a strong positive correlation for immigrants born in Asia. In fact, more than two-thirds of all Asian immigrants living in Canadian cities in 2016 resided in the three largest cities: Toronto (42%), Vancouver (19%) and Montréal (7%). By contrast, these three cities hosted 55% of immigrants born in Europe and only 43% of those born in North America, which is close to the share of these cities in the overall urban population of Canada. In the United States, there is a particularly strong correlation between city size and the share of immigrants born in South and Central America and the Caribbean. Close to 35% of immigrants born in this region and living in metro areas lived in the three cities hosting the largest number of immigrants in 2018 (New York Metro Area, Los Angeles Metro Area and Miami Metro Area), while this share was 27% for European or Asian immigrants.

Figure 5.4. Share of immigrants and population in cities in selected EU countries, by place of birth




Note: Total population (aged 0+) of functional urban areas (FUAs) with more than 50 000 inhabitants. The dark and light blue lines show kernel-weighted local polynomial smoother for the relationship between city population and the share of immigrants – EU-born and non-EU-born, respectively. A FUA consists of a densely inhabited city and of a surrounding area whose labour market is highly integrated with the city.

Source: Eurostat; OECD Secretariat calculations.

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Figure 5.5. Share of immigrants and population in Canadian cities, by place of birth, 2016



Note: Total population (aged 0+) of census metropolitan areas and census agglomerations. The scale of the vertical axis varies across continents of birth. The blue line shows a kernel-weighted local polynomial smoother.

Source: Statistics Canada (Census 2016); OECD Secretariat calculations.




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Figure 5.6. Share of immigrants and city population in the United States, by place of birth, 2018



Note: Total population (aged 0+) of Metropolitan Statistical Areas. The scale of the vertical axis varies across continents of birth. The blue line shows a kernel-weighted local polynomial smoother.

Source: Census Bureau (American Community Survey 2018, 5-year estimates); OECD Secretariat calculations.

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Immigrant concentration within cities

Immigrants also tend to be concentrated within cities. This has long been recognised and has given rise to a large transdisciplinary literature on immigrants' residential segregation across neighbourhoods (see Annex for a discussion of measurement issues).

Key findings from the literature

Drawing on the existing literature, it is possible to describe some aspects of immigrants' residential segregation in several OECD countries. This description will remain only partly comparative because, across contexts, segregation is often measured along different dimensions and geographical units. In addition, some studies deal explicitly with immigrants, while others refer to broader ethnic residential segregation – including native-born descendants of immigrants.

In a recent comparative study, Andersson et al. (2018_[12]) analysed residential segregation patterns at the neighbourhood level in 2011 in Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden. Rogne et al. (2020_[13]) used the exact same methodology to add Norway to this comparison. Both studies used geo-coded, individual-level register data from all five countries to compute comparative measures of segregation of non-European immigrants, across neighbourhoods covering the whole territory of each country, at different spatial scales (from small neighbourhoods with about 200 people, to larger areas with about 51 000 people). At the smallest scale level, corresponding to neighbourhoods with 200 persons, they found strikingly similar patterns of concentration for the first four countries, while Norway stands out with a much lower level of segregation, as measured by the dissimilarity index (see Annex Box 5.A.1 for the definition). At larger-scale levels, Belgium had relatively strong concentration compared with other countries (Table 5.2).

Table 5.2. Dissimilarity index of non-European immigrants in Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden and Norway, 2011

Neighbourhood size	Belgium	Denmark	Netherlands	Sweden	Norway
200	51.2	47.5	48.7	48.9	42.9
1 600	47.3	40.4	43.6	44.1	35.9
12 800	43.7	31.3	37.5	35.7	29.2
51 200	40.6	25.3	32.6	29.7	26.2

Note: In this analysis, the dissimilarity index is computed as the sum across neighbourhoods of the absolute difference between non-European migrant representation (nei/NE : number of non-European-born living in neighbourhood i , divided by the total non-European-born population) and European-born person representation, including the native-born (ei/E), divided by two (see also Annex Box 5.A.1). In each row, the dissimilarity index is computed for individualised neighbourhoods of different size: 200 nearest neighbours, 1 600 nearest neighbours, etc.

Source: Rogne et al. (2020_[13]), "Neighbourhood Concentration and Representation of Non-European Migrants: New Results from Norway", <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10680-019-09522-3>.

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The Belgian case was further analysed by Costa and De Valk (2018_[14]). They identified a process of clustering of deprived migrants in Belgium's inner cities. Despite the central location of neighbourhoods with high concentration of migrants and poverty, they found concentration to be very high, both in extension and in population density. They identified macro/national factors such as housing policies as key determinants of the segregation patterns in Belgian cities. Across neighbourhoods in Brussels, in 2016, the share of people with foreign background was much higher in the lower income areas of the city: it was up to 81% in Saint-Josse-ten-Noode, Molenbeek, Anderlecht and Schaerbeek (SPF Emploi and Unia, 2020_[11]).

For Germany, Buch, Meister and Niebuhr (2021_[15]), using geocoded data for 2007-09, found that the level of segregation of foreign nationals was relatively low in German cities, although with considerable variation in both segregation and diversity across cities. East German cities were characterised by a low population share of foreign workers, a high diversity in terms of origin among foreign workers and an above-average degree of segregation. The largest West German cities, as well as the main college towns, tended to show a diverse population structure, accompanied by low segregation levels. In contrast, cities in the old industrialised Ruhr area were characterised by above-average segregation levels and relatively low diversity. Looking at differences across foreign nationality groups in Germany, Sager (2012_[16]) assessed the residential segregation of immigrants from Turkey, Italy, the Balkans and Eastern Europe, with a special focus on the link between social and nationality-based segregation. Substantial levels of residential concentration in the form of own-group overexposure were found for all four migrant groups. This study also measured the effect of socio-economic neighbourhood sorting on residential segregation by foreign nationals. It showed that differences in income, education, language skills and village/city size could account for 29-84% of the residential isolation of the four groups (see Annex Box 5.A.1 for the definition of the isolation index).

The case of Sweden was studied in detail by Malmberg et al. (2018_[17]). They analysed changes in the composition of Swedish neighbourhoods at different scales from the 1990s to the mid-2010s. The results confirmed that migrants, especially those from non-European countries, faced high levels of segregation in Sweden. Large increases in the non-European populations in combination with high levels of segregation have increased the proportion of non-European migrants living in neighbourhoods that already had high proportions of non-European migrants. However, for both European migrants from 1990 and non-European migrants from 1997, the authors identified a downward trend in segregation as measured by the dissimilarity index at all scale levels.

Immigrant segregation trends in France over the last 40 years were reviewed by Pan Ké Shon and Verdugo (2015_[18]). Similarly to other European countries, France experienced a rise in the proportion of immigrants

in its population that was characterised by a new predominance of non-European immigration. Despite this, average segregation levels remained moderate. There was a significant decrease in residential segregation of immigrants from the late 1960s to the late 1980s, due in part to the eradication of slums located at the periphery of a number of large French cities, and the spatial diffusion associated with more diversified housing options. Since the 1990s, residential segregation, as measured by the dissimilarity index, has remained relatively stable for most origin groups. However, the number of census tracts with more than 30% of immigrants in the population has increased, particularly during the 2000s. Comparing the distribution of immigrants and natives across census tracts in 2007, the study showed that about three-quarters of the native-born lived in census tracts with at most 15% of immigrants (from all origins). By contrast, only about one-third of immigrants from North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa or East Asia lived in these census tracts, and about 20% of them lived in census tracts with more than 30% of immigrants.

A recent study provides additional insights on trends in residential segregation of immigrants and their children in France since the 1990s (Botton et al., 2020^[19]). The authors found that immigrants of European origin exhibit low and stable segregation over time, as measured through the dissimilarity index. Those of non-European origin, and especially their children, are much more segregated, though less so in 2015 than in 1990. However, because their numbers have increased, children living with at least one non-European immigrant parent are more likely to live in neighbourhoods where they make up the majority of the under-18s (38% in 2015, compared with 17% in 1990).

For the United States, Iceland and Scopilliti (2008^[20]) examined the extent of residential segregation among immigrants of different racial and ethnic origins using data from the 1990 and 2000 censuses. The findings provided broad support for spatial assimilation theory, which posits that residential mobility follows from the acculturation and social mobility of individuals, resulting in the dispersion of immigrant and minority-group members and desegregation over time. Foreign-born Hispanics, Asians, and blacks appeared more segregated from native-born non-Hispanic whites than were the US-born of these groups. The patterns for Hispanics and Asians could be explained by the average characteristics of the foreign-born generally associated with higher levels of segregation, such as lower levels of income, English language ability, and homeownership. The authors also found that immigrants who had been in the United States for longer periods were generally less segregated than new arrivals. However, patterns also varied across groups. Levels of segregation were much higher for black immigrants than for Asian, Hispanic, and white immigrants. In addition, because black immigrants were, on average, of higher socio-economic status than native-born blacks, such characteristics could not help explain their very high levels of segregation.

A more recent analysis focused on how suburbanisation affected the residential segregation of foreign-born populations in the United States (Farrell, 2016^[21]). While city centres are generally more attractive than suburban neighbourhoods in most European countries, the opposite is true in the United States, where suburbanites in large metro areas usually have higher income levels than people living in urban core areas. In this context, moving from the city centre to a suburban neighbourhood is typically viewed as an ascending residential trajectory. Using 2000-12 data from the decennial census and American Community Survey, the study tracked the suburban settlement patterns of 17 country-of-origin groups. The findings indicated that most immigrant groups rapidly suburbanised during the 2000s, though with large differences in suburbanisation rates among country-of-origin groups. Immigrant suburbanites tended to be less segregated from US-born whites than were their counterparts from the same ethnic origin in large cities. At the metro level, suburbanisation was associated with lower levels of immigrant segregation even after controlling for relevant metropolitan characteristics. These findings are consistent with spatial assimilation, though trends over time suggest a more complicated picture. While immigrants are gaining access to the suburbs, most groups experienced increasing segregation at the same time they were rapidly suburbanising. This is due to increasing segregation within the suburbs, which often offsets segregation declines occurring within large cities.


A study on Canada also highlighted the rising suburbanisation of immigrant settlement in the main cities (Houle and Vézina, 2017^[22]). Using data from the 2001 and 2006 censuses and the 2011 National Household Survey, the authors showed that the settlement of the immigrant population in municipalities (census subdivisions) on the periphery of central municipalities grew steadily between 2001 and 2011 in the Montréal, Toronto and Vancouver metropolitan areas. During this period, the proportion of immigrants living in the periphery rose from 27% to 33% in Montréal, from 40% to 50% in Toronto, and from 66% to 72% in Vancouver. This trend of suburbanisation of immigrants is observed not only among established immigrants who have lived in Canada for several years and their second-generation descendants, but also among recent immigrants who have been settled for five years or less. This changing location pattern of immigrants does not mean, however, that they have become less spatially concentrated. In fact, the dissimilarity index is higher in the peripheral municipalities than in the centre of the three cities considered.

New evidence on residential segregation in cities of selected OECD countries

Using spatially disaggregated population data by origin, the concentration of immigrants across neighbourhoods is visible in a wide range of OECD cities. Examples for some European capitals are shown in Figure 5.7, which depicts the location quotient for non-EU immigrants at a very fine spatial level, based on the *Data for Integration* (D4I) dataset published by the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission (Alessandrini et al., 2017^[23]) (see Annex Box 5.A.2 for the methodology). From this selection of maps, it is apparent that location patterns of non-EU immigrants are quite diverse across European cities. For example, in Berlin, there is a visible difference between the former West and East parts of the city, with a much higher share of immigrants in the Western part compared to the Eastern part, and mostly in the centre of the city compared to the outskirts. This rather unique pattern is driven by the fact that Berlin was a separated city prior to the fall of the Iron curtain – the districts in the centre of the city were its outskirts prior to 1990. In Paris, non-EU immigrants are strongly concentrated in the Northern and North-eastern parts of the urban area, especially in the Seine-Saint-Denis department, as well as along the Seine river South-East of Paris. In these areas, the share of non-EU immigrants in the population is at least twice as high as the average share in the urban area. In London, the share of non-EU immigrants is higher than average in several extended areas of the city, in particular in the Northwest and West (Kenton, Harrow, Wembley, Southall, Hounslow) as well as in the Northeast (Ilford, Barking). By contrast, in Rome, non-EU immigrants are clustered in much smaller areas scattered around the city.

Across countries covered in the D4I data, cities exhibit very different segregation levels (Figure 5.8). In a number of cities, the dissimilarity index of non-EU immigrants, which represents the proportion of members of this group that would have to change their neighbourhood of residence to achieve an even distribution, is below 20%, while in others it is higher than 50%. There are also differences between countries: on average, French, German and Dutch cities exhibit lower levels of residential segregation of non-EU immigrants than British, Italian or Spanish cities. For Italy and Spain, and to some extent for Germany, there is a negative correlation between the share of non-EU immigrants at the city level and their dissimilarity index. In Spain and Italy in particular, the dissimilarity index reaches high levels in cities where the share of non-EU immigrants is quite low. On the contrary, in France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, there is no obvious correlation between the dissimilarity index and the share of non-EU immigrants.


Figure 5.7. Location quotients of non-EU-born immigrants in Berlin, London, Paris and Rome, 2011



Note: Maps at different scales. Functional urban areas: core only.
 Source: Joint Research Centre D4I dataset; OECD Secretariat calculations.

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Figure 5.8. Dissimilarity index and share of non-EU immigrants in cities in European countries, 2011




Source: Joint Research Centre D4I dataset; OECD Secretariat calculations.

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For Sweden, there is evidence of a moderate increase in the residential segregation of immigrants in the three main cities (Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö) between 2007 and 2017, as measured by the dissimilarity index of the foreign-born compared to the native-born (Fjellborg and Söderhäll, 2021^[24]). The residential segregation of native-born with immigrant parents, compared to the native-born with a Swedish background, has however increased much more strongly and regularly over this period (Figure 5.9). In Stockholm, non-EU born immigrants are mostly concentrated in suburbs dominated by large-scale rental housing units built during the period 1955-80 (e.g. Rinkeby in northern Stockholm, Vårberg in Huddinge, etc.). The most central area in Stockholm with a high concentration of non-EU born individuals is Östberga, an older suburb planned during the 1950s. In the inner city and the suburbs with single-family housing units, the share of non-EU immigrants is much lower, and a large majority of the population is native-born or EU-born. The same pattern can be observed in Gothenburg, with a high concentration of non-EU immigrants in large-scale modernist suburbs (e.g. Angered) (Figure 5.10).


Figure 5.9. Dissimilarity index of immigrants and native-born with immigrant parents in Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö, Sweden, 2007-17



Source: Fjellborg and Söderhäll (2021^[24]), “Spatial concentration and residential segregation of immigrants in Sweden”.

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Figure 5.10. Location quotients of non-EU immigrants in Stockholm and Gothenburg, Sweden, 2017



Source: Fjellborg and Söderhäll (2021^[24]), “Spatial concentration and residential segregation of immigrants in Sweden”.


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Box 5.3. Perceptions of residential segregation among immigrants in EU countries


The Second European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey (EU-MIDIS II), carried out by the EU Fundamental Rights Agency in 2016 provides interesting comparative insights on perceptions of residential segregation among immigrant groups in a dozen of EU countries. Respondents were asked to assess the share of residents of the same ethnic or immigrant background as themselves in their neighbourhood (Figure 5.11). Across all countries, 35% of respondents – immigrants or native-born with immigrant parents – said that they lived in a neighbourhood where all or most residents had the same background as themselves. Results show that this perception varies significantly across countries: the highest shares were observed in the Netherlands and Belgium, while the lowest shares were reported in Finland, Sweden and Greece.

A multivariate analysis shows that people with higher education levels reported much less frequently living in such neighbourhoods than those with lower levels of educational attainment. Respondents originating from Sub-Saharan Africa were less likely to say that they lived in segregated areas than those from Turkey, North Africa or South Asia. This was also the case for younger immigrants and native-born children of immigrants. People living in larger and poorer households were also more likely to report living in a segregated neighbourhood. There was however no difference across gender.

Figure 5.11. Share of respondents saying that they live in neighbourhoods where all or most people in their neighbourhood have the same ethnic or immigrant background as themselves, 2016




Note: Respondents aged 16+ who are immigrants or children of immigrants. The survey question is: "In the neighbourhood where you live, how many of the residents would you say are of the same ethnic or immigrant background as you: all of the residents, most of them, some or none of them?". The chart reports the share of respondents reporting that all or most residents are of the same background as themselves. Source: EU MIDIS II, OECD Secretariat calculations.

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In Canada, based on tract-level data from the 2016 census, there is also evidence of concentration of the foreign-born in specific neighbourhoods (Figure 5.12). For example, in Toronto, Scarborough and Markham are two areas where immigrants, especially Asians, are over-represented. In Montréal, many

Haitian immigrants live in specific areas of the city, such as Montréal-Nord, where they represent more than 15% of the total population in several census tracts.

Figure 5.12. Location quotients of the foreign-born in Toronto, Montréal and Vancouver, 2016




Note: Data for census tracts.

Source: Census Profile 2016, StatCan; OECD Secretariat calculations.

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A more systematic appraisal of living conditions in Canadian neighbourhoods with high share of immigrants can be obtained by looking at the correlation between tract-level shares of different groups of immigrants and local indicators of living standards, such as median income or the share of people living in non-suitable housing. As shown in Figure 5.13, there is a consistent negative correlation between the share of immigrants from African, Asian and American countries and the two living standards indicators at the tract level in the main Canadian metro areas. However, the relationship is absent or at least less significant for European immigrants, as well as in smaller cities. Among the largest cities, Vancouver stands out: in contrast to other metro areas, there is no negative correlation between tract level median income and the share of African or American immigrants, median income is significantly lower in tracts with a higher share of Asian immigrants. This is probably because there are relatively few non-Asian immigrants in Vancouver, compared to Toronto and Montréal. As a result, Asians are the only immigrant group for which there is significant tract level concentration in Vancouver, while this is much more prevalent for other groups in the other large cities.

Figure 5.13. Correlation between the share of immigrants from different regions of birth and living standards (median income and share of non-suitable housing) in Canadian cities, 2016



Note: Metro areas ranked by population size (largest cities at the bottom); Pearson correlation coefficients and 95% confidence intervals. Each dot shows, across census tracts within a given city, the correlation between the share of immigrants from a given region and one of the two indicators of living standards (median income and share of non-suitable housing).

Source: Census Profile 2016, Statistics Canada; OECD Secretariat calculations.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/xd0jrt>

In the case of Japan, based on data from the three most recent censuses, Korekawa (2021^[25]) has shown that the share of foreigners living in census tracts with at least 10% of foreigners has increased rapidly between 2010 and 2015: this proportion was 5.4% in 2010 and 9.9% in 2015. In addition, Brazilian immigrants were much more likely (19.5%, in 2015) than Chinese nationals (3.8%) to live in such areas, which points to very different patterns of spatial integration. In a number of prefectures, the share of foreigners living in migrant concentrated areas was higher than 15%.

A school level perspective on residential segregation: Evidence from PISA


The composition of students in schools reflects the degree of residential segregation in the respective area, especially in the case of strict residence-based school allocation. Concentration of children of immigrants

in schools is prevalent in all OECD countries. OECD-wide, three out of four 15-year-old students with immigrant parents go to schools where at least a quarter of their classmates also have migrant parents and almost one in five go to a school where over three-quarters do. Obviously, that share is larger in countries with larger immigrant presence than in that with smaller presence. A comparable measure is presented in Figure 5.14, which shows the percentage of children of immigrants that are in the quartile of schools with the highest concentration.

On average in the OECD, more than half of all children of immigrants find themselves in the top quartile of concentrated schools. This concentration is highest in countries with small immigrant populations, while children of immigrants are much more dispersed in countries with large shares of children of immigrants.

Figure 5.14. Concentration of children of immigrants in schools

Share of 15-year-old pupils with at least one immigrant parent who attend schools in the top quartile of schools in terms of share of children of immigrants, 2018



Note. Schools with the highest concentration refer to the top quartile of schools by the share of children of immigrants. Each quartile has the same number of students overall.


Source: PISA 2018.

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At the same time, the concentration of children of immigrants in schools has increased in most OECD countries between 2006 and 2018 (Figure 5.15). Among the 33 OECD countries that registered increasing shares of children of immigrants at age 15 since 2006, only Greece, Luxembourg, New Zealand and Switzerland have not seen an increase in concentration. In all other countries, the share of children of immigrants increased; on average it increase twice as much in the most concentrated schools as in the remainder.

Figure 5.15. Evolution of concentration of children of immigrants in schools

Change in the share of students at age 15 with at least one immigrant parent between 2006 and 2018



Note: Schools with the highest concentration refer to the top quartile of schools by the share of children of immigrants. Each quartile has the same number of students overall.

Source: PISA 2006 and 2018.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/uglyow>

Location choices and residential mobility of immigrants

The spatial concentration of immigrants at the regional level, as well as within cities, is driven by their location choices. Understanding changes in concentration or residential segregation therefore requires to characterise immigrants' initial location choices upon arrival in the destination country, as well as their subsequent residential mobility. Do immigrants tend to locate in areas where there is already a significant share of people from the same origin as themselves, or do they rather tend to move away from such neighbourhoods? In addition, residential segregation is affected by the location choices of the native-born: in a given area, even without any changes in the location pattern of immigrants. Do the native-born tend to leave neighbourhoods with a high share of immigrants? And, when moving, do they select destinations where there are fewer immigrants?

Initial location of immigrants

Key findings from the literature

A significant amount of literature has examined the initial location choices of immigrants in the United States, covering arrivals from the mid-1960s to the recent years. Using data from the 1980 census, Bartel (1989^[8]) showed that recently arrived immigrants tended to live in cities where immigrants from the same origin countries were already present, pointing to the role of immigrants' origin-related social networks to facilitate their installation and integration in the destination country. The role of this variable was similar for Asian and Hispanic immigrants and a bit less important for European immigrants. In addition, educational attainment moderated this association, suggesting that more educated immigrants were less reliant on their origin-related social networks to settle.

For immigrants arrived in the early 2000s, Huang and Newbold (2017^[26]) found that the dispersion of new immigrant groups varied by origin, although all groups were subject to the attraction of communities from

the same ethnic origin and better labour market conditions in the destination. However, ethnic concentration was much more important than labour market conditions in the destination choice decision, particularly for the poorly educated. In contrast, there was a strong negative effect of ethnic concentration on the location choice decision of highly educated new immigrants.

There are also important differences in settlement and mobility patterns by entry categories. For example, looking at the location choices of new recipients of legal permanent residence and new refugees between 1989 and 1994, Zavodny (1999^[27]) reported that legal permanent residents admitted under employment-based preferences in the United States were locating in states with favourable economic conditions and with lesser association with the location of other foreign-born people than most of the other admission categories. On the other hand, new refugees and refugees converting to long-term permanent resident status appeared to be more likely to settle in states with higher social benefits. However, this could also be associated with other factors such as a greater willingness of such states to accept refugees. Likewise, analysing the location choices of immigrants (1971-2000) per category, Jaeger (2007^[28]) found that immigrants had a higher probability of moving to states where individuals from their region of birth constituted a larger share of the state population. Labour market conditions were found to affect immigrant location choices across time and across admission categories, but were most important in determining employment-related immigrants' locations.

While most of the literature on the United States looks at location choices at the state level, Scott, Coomes and Izyumov (2005^[29]) analysed location choices at the MSA level for new employment-based immigrants arrived in 1995. They found that economic migrants were generally attracted to large cities with warmer weather, higher wages, and a higher-educated population. They also noted the tendency for immigrants to settle in localities where there is a higher share of immigrants of their own origin already living there, varied greatly according to individual characteristics of immigrants, such as age, education and marital status.

Looking at the location choice of Mexican immigrants across US cities or counties, using survey data from the Mexican Migration Project,⁶ Bauer, Epstein and Gang (2005^[30]) found that Mexican immigrants were attracted to communities where the Mexican share of the population was higher. This effect, however, was moderated by English language proficiency: the effect was strongest on the location choice of immigrants with the lowest language abilities and more modest for those who had the highest language proficiency.

Outside of the United States, the literature on location choices of immigrants has developed more recently and remains limited to the main OECD destination countries. In the case of Canada, Hou (2007^[31]), using data from five consecutive censuses of Canada over the period from 1981 to 2001, concluded that most of the rising concentration in the 1970s and 1980s was attributable to the increase in the concentration of initial destination among most immigrant groups. In the 1990s, the rise in the concentration level of immigrants at their initial destination primarily resulted from the continuing shift in immigrant source regions. During the 1980s and 1990s, changes in the concentration level of immigrants at their initial destination were clearly the major determinant of the geographic distribution of immigrants, while internal mobility after immigration had a much smaller effect.

For the United Kingdom, a study looked at the determinants of the location choice of recent immigrants in 2007-09, at the ward and district level using National Insurance Number (NINo) registrations (in England) (Lymeropoulou, 2013^[32]). Results showed that higher neighbourhood co-ethnic density and ethnic diversity levels were associated with increased immigrant settlement. Most immigrants were also more likely to settle in neighbourhoods with a higher availability of social housing. Apart from EU Accession nationals, immigrants were more likely to settle in large urban districts.

In the case of Germany, Tanis (2020^[33]) investigated initial and subsequent location choices of recent European Union immigrants at the county level (NUTS-3), using federal employment register data. Results suggested heterogeneous preferences among individuals regarding regional characteristics. For the first

location choice, good labour market conditions seemed to attract immigrants strongly, while the presence of co-nationals appeared to be less important.

In a study on location choices of immigrants who arrived in the Netherlands in 1999, Zorlu and Mulder (2008^[34]) analysed the settlement patterns of immigrants from various countries of origin who entered the country as labour, family or asylum migrants. They identified distinct settlement trajectories for asylum and other non-Western immigrants. The presence of immigrants from the same origin countries and their descendants and other persons with immigrant parents, but also socio-economic neighbourhood characteristics, appeared to play an important role in determining location choice. They also found differences in the settlement and spatial mobility patterns of immigrants with various degrees of distance from the native Dutch in terms of human and financial capital, proficiency in the relevant language(s), and religion.

An analysis of location choices of immigrants arrived in Belgium between 1994 and 2007 showed that local factors, including local employment opportunities, mattered more than network effects driven by the presence of immigrants from the same origin (Jayet et al., 2016^[35]).

For Japan, an analysis of the destination choices made by new immigrants who entered Japan in the 1995-2000 period indicated that destination-choice patterns differed markedly by ethnicity. In addition, the higher the educational attainment of the immigrants, the greater the attraction of the Tokyo prefecture and the less dispersed the destination-choice pattern (Liaw and Ishikawa, 2008^[36]). A more recent study analysing the destination choices of new immigrants within Japan in the period 2005-10 found three main factors explaining location choices: local labour market conditions, attraction to communities from the same ethnic origin, and, to a lesser extent, the spatial distribution of marital opportunities (Hanaoka, Ishikawa and Takeshita, 2017^[37]).

New empirical evidence on the initial location choice of immigrants

Using the American Community Survey and focusing on immigrants who have lived in the United States for less than two years, it is possible to analyse the correlates of their initial location choices at the PUMA (Public Use Microdata Area) level. In 2019, half of all newly arrived immigrants aged 20 to 69 located in less than 4% of all PUMAs, which host “only” 25% of the total population of the same age group.

A key variable of interest to understand settlement patterns of new immigrants is the share of immigrants from the same region of origin already living in the area, which captures network effects. Regression results show that these network effects are indeed significant in shaping the location decisions of newly arrived immigrants. As shown in Table 5.3, the number of new immigrants is positively correlated with the share of already settled immigrants from the same origin at the PUMA level. For example, in 2019, a 1 percentage point difference in the share of Central American immigrants living in a given PUMA, all else constant, was associated with about 15 additional new immigrants from this region deciding to settle in this area. This is a substantial effect, as the average number of newly arrived Central American immigrants at the PUMA level was close to 330. It should be noted that the overall number of newly arrived immigrants is also positively correlated with the total share of immigrants already present locally. This reflects the fact that, on average, new immigrants tend to settle in localities with larger immigrant communities, irrespective of their origin. The direct network association – i.e. from the same region of origin – is however at least three times larger than this overall association with immigrant presence.

In addition, new immigrants tend to settle more frequently in the densest neighbourhoods, which confirms that they are attracted by economic opportunities, and more generally by the amenities provided by large cities.

Table 5.3. Correlation between initial location choice of immigrants and pre-existing local migrant networks in the United States, 2018-19

Dependant variable: Number of new immigrants from:	Share of immigrants already living in destination:	
	From the same region	Total
– Central America	0.045***	0.014***
– South America	0.108***	0.037***
– Asia	0.049***	0.013***
– Europe	0.110***	0.011***
– Africa	0.315***	-0.008

Note: Each row includes results from a separate Poisson regression of the number of new immigrants (i.e. arrived in the last two years) aged 20-69 from a specific region at the PUMA level on the share of immigrants already living in the same PUMA. In addition to the share of each group of immigrants and the total share of immigrants in the PUMA, regressions include the following control variables, all at the PUMA level: total population, unemployment rate, share of workers in highly skilled occupations, share of people aged 65+, share of low educated individuals, quartiles of population density. ***: significant at the 1% level.

Source: ACS 2018-19; OECD Secretariat calculations.

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An analysis on Canada at the metropolitan area level, based on census data, shows that, in 2016, 32% of immigrants aged 20-69 who had arrived in Canada in the last two years lived in Toronto (Table 5.4). Vancouver also had a share of new immigrants that was slightly lower than its share of all immigrants (12.6% vs 13.8%), while Montréal, Calgary and Edmonton had higher shares of recent immigrants. This pattern was strikingly differentiated across regions of origin. Latin American immigrants were the most concentrated group of recent immigrants, as only 13% of them lived outside one of the five main destination cities. By contrast, one-third of recent immigrants from the United States lived outside the main cities. Recent Asian immigrants, which represented about two-thirds of all recent immigrants (and a bit less than half of all immigrants), were underrepresented in both Toronto and Vancouver compared to the shares of all Asian immigrants in those cities. However, they were overrepresented in Calgary and Edmonton. European immigrants, which were the second largest group among recent arrivals, were largely overrepresented in Montréal compared to the overall share of European-born in this city.

There were also significant differences in the geographical distribution of recent immigrants according to migration categories, although less marked than across regions of origin (Table 5.5). For example, only 5% of recent refugees settled in Vancouver, while 19% of them lived in Montréal. Among all refugees, the geographical distribution was however quite different, as only 9% of them lived in Montréal, and 14% in Vancouver.

Differences in the geographical distribution of recent versus all immigrants may be explained by different initial location choices or different composition across different cohorts of immigrants, or by mobility patterns of immigrants after their arrival in Canada (including leaving the country), which are discussed below. Policy parameters also increasingly influence settlement of new arrivals in Canada (see section on migration policy further below).

Table 5.4. Distribution of newly arrived immigrants across metropolitan areas in Canada, by region of origin, 2016 (%)

	Total		Latin America		United States		Asia		Europe		Other regions	
	New	All	New	All	New	All	New	All	New	All	New	All
Toronto	32.2	36.5	37.6	45.1	23.2	17.6	37.0	43.9	28.9	33.3	14.0	15.5
Montréal	15.7	12.8	30.6	23.4	10.8	7.9	7.7	7.7	27.8	14.2	31.8	20.4
Vancouver	12.6	13.8	6.6	5.2	20.7	12.1	14.9	20.0	13.4	9.2	4.7	6.9
Calgary	8.6	5.6	9.1	3.9	6.9	6.1	8.7	6.5	9.1	4.2	8.0	5.9
Edmonton	7.6	4.3	3.5	2.7	5.4	3.6	7.9	4.8	6.4	3.3	9.4	5.7
Other cities and areas	23.3	27.0	12.6	19.7	33.0	52.8	23.8	17.1	14.4	35.9	32.1	45.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Note: Immigrants aged 20-69. Recent: immigrants arrived between 2014 and 2016.

Source: Census of Canada, 2016; OECD Secretariat calculations.

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Table 5.5. Distribution of newly arrived immigrants across metropolitan areas in Canada, by category of immigration, 2016 (%)

	Economic		Family and other		Refugees	
	New	All	New	All	New	All
Toronto	29.4	37.0	37.5	40.4	35.8	40.3
Montréal	15.4	16.0	14.8	14.0	19.3	8.6
Vancouver	13.2	13.7	14.1	12.2	5.0	14.4
Calgary	9.1	6.3	9.1	5.7	5.0	5.9
Edmonton	8.5	4.3	5.9	4.4	7.3	5.0
Other cities and areas	24.4	22.8	18.5	23.3	27.6	25.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Note: Immigrants aged 20-69. Newly arrived immigrants: immigrants arrived between 2014 and 2016.

Source: Census of Canada, 2016; OECD Secretariat calculations.

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In the case of France, data from the 2017 census show that, overall, newly arrived immigrants were less concentrated among the top immigrant-hosting departments than those who had been living in France for several years (Table 5.6). However, about 11% of immigrants aged 20-69 arrived in the previous year lived in Paris, which is a much higher share than among all immigrants (7.4%). Newly arrived EU-born immigrants were particularly overrepresented (11.7% vs 6.7%) in the capital, while North African and Sub-Saharan African immigrants were underrepresented. Among all immigrants aged 20-69, the department hosting the largest share of North African and Sub-Saharan African immigrants was Seine-Saint-Denis, in Paris' suburbs, with respectively 7.5% and 11.1%. However, the share of newly arrived immigrants from these two regions living in this department was significantly lower (5.9% for North African immigrants and 6.3% for Sub-Saharan African immigrants).

As in the Canadian case, this raises the question of the source of the difference in location patterns of recent immigrants compared to immigrants arrived earlier. Figure 5.16 provides a comparison of the geographical distribution of three groups of newly arrived immigrants in 2012 and 2017. Although location patterns look broadly similar for both cohorts, there are actually non-negligible differences. For instance, the share of new immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa settling in Seine-Saint-Denis decreased by 3 percentage points between 2012 and 2017, while the share of North African immigrants increased by

2 percentage points. There was also a significant decline in the share of North African immigrants settling in the Bouches-du-Rhône department. Overall, the concentration of new immigrants' initial locations decreased for the different regions of origin. This shows that, at least in the French case, significant changes in initial location patterns of immigrants across regions can occur, even over a relatively short time.

Table 5.6. Distribution of newly arrived immigrants across departments in France, by region of origin, 2017 (%)

	Newly arrived immigrants				All immigrants				Population
	Total	EU	North Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa	Total	EU	North Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa	Total
Paris (75)	10.9	11.7	5.2	5.9	7.4	6.7	5.5	7.7	3.8
Seine-Saint-Denis (93)	3.5	1.4	5.9	6.3	7.7	4.1	7.5	11.1	2.5
Val-de-Marne (94)	3.0	1.7	4.1	5.0	4.8	3.6	4.3	6.8	2.3
Hauts-de-Seine (92)	4.4	2.5	5.5	5.6	4.8	3.5	4.9	5.9	2.6
Bouches-du-Rhône (13)	2.3	1.2	3.2	3.0	4.2	2.4	6.9	3.4	3.1
Val-d'Oise (95)	2.1	0.9	2.4	3.7	3.9	2.5	3.6	5.2	1.9
Rhône (69)	3.7	2.5	5.2	4.5	3.6	2.6	4.5	3.2	2.8
Other departments	70.2	78.2	68.7	66.1	63.7	74.7	62.9	56.8	81.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Note: Immigrants aged 20-69. Newly arrived immigrants are those who were living abroad on 1 January 2016.

Source: INSEE, Census 2017; OECD Secretariat calculations.



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Figure 5.16. Distribution of newly arrived immigrants across departments in France, by region of origin, 2012-17



Note: Immigrants aged 20-69. Newly arrived immigrants in 2017 are those who were living abroad on 1 January 2016. Newly arrived immigrants in 2012 are those who were living abroad on 1 January 2011. The category "Other departments" is not shown.

Source: INSEE, Census 2012 and 2017; OECD Secretariat calculations.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/rquib4>

Residential mobility of immigrants

Key findings from the literature

As is the case for the issue of immigrants' initial location, there is substantial evidence on immigrants' residential mobility in the United States. Bartel (1989^[38]) provided an analysis of subsequent internal migration of immigrants arrived in the mid-1960s to mid-1970s and showed that better educated and younger immigrants were more likely to relocate, probably because they not only had more opportunities in the first place, but were also better able to identify places with better opportunities and bear the cost of moving. Kritz and Nogle (1994^[39]), also using the 1980 census data, found that intrastate and interstate migration differed across immigrant groups. In addition, they noted that Mexican immigrants were less likely to migrate both within and across states than the native-born and almost all other foreign-born groups, even after controlling for individual socio-demographic characteristics. They argued that the higher share of irregular migrants in this group could help explain this result, as a change of residence increases the risk of detection by the authorities. Using census data for 1980 and 1990, Funkhouser (2000^[39]) highlighted immigrants' tendency to move away from areas with a high share of immigrants from their own country: over time, they were less likely to live in such areas. The study showed that this relocation process could occur quite late after arrival in the country.

Evidence on mobility patterns of immigrants within cities in the United States is sparser than across states or cities. An analysis of survey data showed that Latino residential mobility into neighbourhoods with a greater percentage of non-Hispanic whites (i.e. Anglos) increased with human and financial capital and English-language use. There were, however, variations in the residential mobility process among Latinos: for example, Puerto Ricans were less likely than Mexicans to move to neighbourhoods with relatively large Anglo populations, while among Puerto Ricans and Cubans, darker skin colour inhibited mobility into Anglo neighbourhoods (South, Crowder and Chavez, 2005^[40]).

For Canada, an analysis of interprovincial mobility of immigrants in the early 1980s showed that, just like the native-born, the foreign-born were attracted to destinations with high employment growth rates, high-income levels, and a similar cultural makeup and were dissuaded by distance, coldness, and high unemployment levels (Newbold, 1996^[41]).

For the case of Sweden, Boman (2011^[42]) compared migratory behaviour of native Swedes and immigrants following job displacement. The migratory propensity of the foreign-born was not significantly different from that of native Swedes when regional and individual characteristics were controlled for. In addition, a significant locking-in effect of areas with immigrant residential segregation on non-Nordic immigrants and a strong negative effect of living in a major city was found. The latter effect was also found to be greater for immigrants than for native Swedes. When controlling for these two additional effects, immigrants were in fact found to be more mobile than native Swedes. Another analysis focused on location choices of a sample of immigrants from Iran and Turkey living in Sweden between 1968 and 2001, investigating whether region of origin was a better predictor of internal migration decisions than was country of origin (Aradhya et al., 2017^[43]). The results indicated that individuals were less likely to leave municipalities with a large presence of other immigrants from the same region of origin, but were more likely to leave municipalities with a large number of individuals from their country of origin.

In the case of Spain, Bosch, Carnero and Farré (2015^[44]) conducted a field experiment to investigate the role of discrimination in the rental market as an obstacle to the residential mobility of immigrants and as a driver of residential segregation observed in large cities. They found that immigrants face a differential treatment when trying to rent an apartment. Results also indicate that this negative treatment varies considerably with the share of immigrants in the area. In neighbourhoods with a scarce presence of immigrants, the response rate is 30 percentage points lower for immigrants than for natives, while this differential decays towards zero as the immigration share increases.

Several papers have also looked at the location choices of immigrants in France. Rathelot and Safi (2014^[45]) used longitudinal data to measure mobility across municipalities over time and estimated the effect of the initial municipality's composition in terms of origin countries of immigrants and their direct descendants on the probability of moving out. Results indicated that the presence of persons from the same parental origin in their residential location hindered immigrants' outward mobility. A similar analysis using panel data for the period 1990-2013 at the neighbourhood level found a significant negative effect of the neighbourhood share of persons from the same parental origin on moving out among immigrants. In contrast, the French majority were more likely to exit areas with increasing shares of immigrants, except in models controlling for unobserved neighbourhood characteristics (McAvay, 2018^[46]). Another study investigated how the supply of public housing during the 1970s influenced the initial location choices of immigrant families across local labour markets. Cities with more public housing attracted a significantly larger number of immigrants with children; although housing conditions were on average better in these locations, employment prospects were less favourable (Verdugo, 2016^[47]).

In the case of Germany, Tanis (2020^[33]) showed that for EU immigrants arrived relatively recently, there was an extremely high positive correlation between ethnic concentration/immigrant density and regional attractiveness. As a corollary, a higher concentration of foreign nationals in the initial location limited the probability of relocation.


New empirical evidence on the residential mobility of immigrants

For the United States, data from the American Community Survey show that average mobility rates are relatively homogenous across immigrants from different origins, as well as compared with the native-born. In 2019, 12% of immigrants had changed house compared to the previous year, including within the same neighbourhood, and about 2% had moved to a different state. For the native-born, this was a little bit higher, with 13% changing house and 2.3% moving to another state. However, among immigrants, duration of stay in the United States was a key differentiating parameter: 27% of immigrants who had been in the country for two years or less had moved in the previous year, while this share was less than 9% for immigrants who had been in the country for at least 20 years. The same pattern was found for interstate mobility, with 6% for recently arrived immigrants and 1.4% for those in the country for 20 years or more. The region of origin also mattered; for instance, immigrants from Central America were less likely to move than African immigrants (10% vs 16%, respectively, for any mobility).

A first key question regarding mobility patterns of immigrants is whether they are more prone to leave areas with a high concentration of immigrants from the same region of origin. A multivariate analysis showed that, for immigrants from Central America, Asia and Europe, there was a significant negative correlation between the local own-group share and the probability of leaving one's neighbourhood, while there was no such correlation for South American or African immigrants. For the former groups, mobility is slowed down by the presence of a higher share of immigrants from the same region.


As expected, duration of stay in the United States is a strong predictor of internal mobility: recently arrived immigrants are significantly more mobile than those who have been in the country for several years, this being true across origin groups (Figure 5.17).

Figure 5.17. Correlation between duration of stay in the country and the probability of internal mobility, by region of birth, the United States, 2018-19



Note: Coefficients for duration of stay in the United States from a linear probability model of internal mobility for immigrants. The model includes the following covariates: age, gender, duration of stay, marital status, number of children, educational attainment, population density in area of origin, share of own-group and share of other immigrants in area of origin, unemployment rate.

Source: ACS 2018-19; OECD Secretariat calculations.

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Immigrants changing residence witness a decline in the share of migrants from their own region of origin. On average, the raw difference is 0.2 percentage point (the average own-group share being 9.4%). However, regression results show that there is substantial heterogeneity across immigrant groups. For Central American immigrants, for instance, changing residence is associated with a decrease of the local own-group share of about 4 percentage points if they lived in an area with an own-group share of 20%, while mobility may be associated with an increase in the own-group share for those living in areas with few immigrants from the same origin. Similarly, among Asian immigrants, mobility is associated with a decrease of the own-group share if the previous area of residence had a relatively high share of Asian immigrants.

Residential mobility of the native-born

Key findings from the literature

A prolific line of investigation has examined “native flight”, i.e. how the mobility behaviour of the native-born affect residential segregation patterns within cities. Although not addressing directly this issue, but rather the question of “white flight”, Card, Mas and Rothstein (2008_[48]) used regression discontinuity methods and census tract data from 1970 through 2000 to test for discontinuities in the dynamics of neighbourhood racial composition in the United States. They found strong evidence that white population flows exhibited tipping-like behaviour in most cities – i.e. an acceleration of outflows of whites when their share in the population dropped below a certain threshold – with a distribution of tipping points ranging from 5% to 20% minority share. Using longitudinal data, Hall and Crowder (2014_[49]) examined how the migration behaviours of native-born whites and blacks were related to local immigrant concentrations, and how this relationship varied across traditional and non-traditional metropolitan gateways. Results indicated that the likelihood of neighbourhood out-migration among natives increased as the local immigrant population grew, and that their neighbourhood of destination had substantially smaller immigrant concentrations than the ones they left. They found that this tendency to move away from immigrants was particularly pronounced for both black and white natives living in metropolitan areas developing into a major gateway

– that is, a community that has experienced rapid recent growth in foreign-born populations. Qualitatively similar results were also obtained by Saiz and Wachter (2011^[50]) and Logan and Zhang (2010^[51]).

At the neighbourhood level, Bråmås (2006^[52]) investigated whether mobility patterns of the native-born had played a role in the increased concentration of immigrants that has affected many residential areas in Swedish cities during the 1990s. The results indicated that ‘Swedish avoidance’, i.e. low in-migration rates among Swedes, rather than ‘Swedish flight’, i.e. high out-migration rates, had been the main driving-force behind the production and reproduction of immigrant concentration areas. A similar result was obtained by Müller, Grund and Koskinen (2018^[53]), using Swedish register data on residential moves within Stockholm municipality between 1990 and 2003, who identified ‘ethnic avoidance’ by Swedes as the main driver of segregation in the country. A similar result was obtained by Andersen (2017^[54]) in the case of Denmark for the period 1985-2008.

Similarly, for the Netherlands, Bolt and van Kempen (2010^[55]) also suggested that, compared with immigrants, the native Dutch were more likely to move out of neighbourhoods with high concentration of immigrants and less likely to move in such neighbourhoods. In the French context, Rathelot and Safi (2014^[45]) found no evidence of “native flight” but they showed that the native-born avoided moving into localities with a higher share of immigrants.

The phenomenon regarding “native flight” is not only observed with respect to residential segregation but also regarding school segregation. Especially better-off parents tend to have a preference to remain in their own group and select schools that are deemed to match their socio-economic background. As with respect to residential sorting patterns, most empirical literature with respect to sorting in schools has focused on racial rather than migrant sorting, especially in the United States (Lankford, Lee and Wyckoff, 1995^[56]; Fairlie and Resch, 2002^[57]). Rangvid (2010^[58]) and Andersson, Malmberg and Östh (2012^[59]) find evidence of “native flight” in schools in Denmark and Sweden once the share of immigrants in a school exceeds a certain threshold. For Spain, Farre, Ortega and Tanaka (2018^[60]) also find evidence of “native flight” to private schools as a response to higher immigrant densities in public schools. Cascio and Lewis (2012^[61]) also emphasised the role of school choice as a driver of “native flight”, examining whether low-skilled immigration to the United States had contributed to immigrants’ residential isolation by reducing native demand for public schools. According to their estimates, between 1970 and 2000, the average California school district lost more than 14 non-Hispanic households with children to other districts in its metropolitan area for every 10 additional households enrolling low-English Hispanics in its public schools.

A common conclusion of these studies is that school choice policy and parental preferences are important determinants of school segregation. There is also evidence that school district boundaries impact directly on residential segregation. For example, Kauppinen, van Ham and Bernelius (2021^[62]) show that migrant segregation is stronger among households with children than among childless households and the residential mobility of higher-income Finnish-origin households with children is particularly affected by the school catchment area boundaries.

New empirical evidence on the residential mobility of the native-born

In the United States, native-born who have changed residence, will on average live in areas where the share of immigrants is lower. On average, without controlling for covariates, the difference in the foreign-born share between their areas of origin and destination is 0.4 percentage point (the average share of foreign-born across areas being 13.5%). A multivariate analysis, controlling for individual characteristics and contextual factors, shows that the decrease in the local share of immigrants following a residential mobility can reach 15 to 20 percentage points for those who lived in areas where the immigrant share was above 30%.

How does residential segregation affect immigrant integration?

The relationship between immigrants' spatial concentration and their integration is disputed. Concentration can provide benefits, especially for newly arrived immigrants in search for a job or an accommodation, but it may also harm integration in the medium- and long-term because of fewer contacts with the native-born. Although many theoretical arguments have been advanced, the actual balance of effects can only be determined through empirical analyses, and is bound to be heterogeneous depending on the context and the characteristics of the immigrants themselves.

For some analysts, an excessive concentration of immigrants in specific areas or neighbourhoods is a manifestation of a lack of integration in the host country (Massey and Denton, 1985^[63]; Alba et al., 1999^[64]). Social interactions with the native-born, as well as with immigrants from other countries, will indeed be more limited if most immigrants live in homogenous communities of the same origin. High concentration may hamper full participation in society, reduce exposure to the host country language, and lower the integration prospects of immigrants and their children. It may also bring about negative externalities for the host society as a whole. These risks may be exacerbated when immigrants are concentrated in areas with poor infrastructure, insufficient access to public services and markets, substandard housing, and overall inferior amenities, which is relatively common across OECD countries.

This perspective on immigrants' residential segregation mostly considers that immigrants location choice is constrained, at least initially. This can happen for financial reasons if immigrants can only afford to live in such areas, because of discrimination on the housing market, or because of policies which regulate the spatial placement of certain categories of newly arrived immigrants.

A different view of residential segregation notes that immigrants themselves might choose to live in areas with immigrant residential segregation because this provides them with a number of advantages (Bolt, Sule Özüekren and Phillips, 2010^[65]). For example, immigrants can derive benefits from spatial proximity with persons from the same origin country to find housing or jobs more easily, especially upon arrival. A close-knit community of origin can also reduce the psychological cost of being far away from relatives in a foreign environment. For immigrant business owners, there may also be economic benefits to evolving in an environment with high demand for specific "ethnic goods", and consumers also benefit from higher quality and lower price in this context. Finally, a community having reached a critical mass can also get political advantages through political influence on local governments and other local actors.

From an empirical perspective, it may however be difficult to establish whether immigrants' residential segregation has a detrimental or positive impact on their integration. First, there is no reason to believe a priori that the different mechanisms exposed above are mutually exclusive: residential segregation may bring benefits to some immigrants in some contexts (e.g. city, period, cohort or age), and be detrimental to other immigrants – or the same – in other situations. Second, identifying a – positive or negative – causal impact of residential segregation on a given integration outcome in a given country does not imply that this finding can be generalised to other countries, or to other dimensions of integration. It is indeed likely that, for a given level of residential segregation, urban and integration policies, as well as the national context more broadly, are strong factors influencing immigrants' opportunities and outcomes. Third, whether an estimated correlation between residential segregation and integration can be given a causal interpretation depends on the nature of selection processes and whether they are properly accounted for. If immigrants are negatively selected (self-selected or not) in segregated areas, those with ex ante low integration prospects end up living in neighbourhoods with a high share of immigrants from the same origin – and potentially poor integration perspectives as well. In this case, a negative correlation between segregation and integration may actually hide a positive causal impact. On the other hand, if there is positive selection, immigrants with good integration prospects are attracted to segregated neighbourhoods, which may induce an unwarranted positive estimate of the impact of residential segregation on integration outcomes.

Just as there is no a priori reason to believe that the causal impact is always positive or always negative, different selection patterns may exist in different contexts and for different categories of immigrants. In this context, any appraisal of the influence of residential segregation on integration outcomes must be done very cautiously.

Employment outcomes

Key findings from the literature

Employment is recognised as one of the most important indicators of immigrants' socio-economic integration. A key question raised in relation with the spatial concentration of immigrants is whether it improves or hinders their employment prospects.

As noted above, origin-related social networks can help immigrants find employment (Giulietti, Schluter and Wahba, 2013^[66]). This mechanism is expected to be particularly important for recent humanitarian immigrants because they are more likely to lack country-specific knowledge of the functioning of the labour market (e.g. which firms or sectors are more likely to hire). They may also have difficulties getting their formal skills or work experience recognised in the host country, or they may not yet speak the language well enough to interact with all employers. Although these origin-related social networks no longer necessarily require spatial proximity to operate, it is likely that it still plays a role in their effectiveness.

Conversely, one can expect that a high spatial concentration of immigrants from the same origin, especially if they are not highly educated and if access to transportation is problematic, entail high job search costs and may lead to higher than average levels of unemployment (Dujardin, Selod and Thomas, 2008^[67]). In addition, in a local environment where unemployment is high, the quality of the jobs referral network for new labour market entrants will be lower.

Thanks in part to the availability of high quality register data, which allow to track individuals' location and employment outcomes over time, several studies have focused on Nordic countries. An early analysis focused on refugees and used the dispersal policy put in place by the Swedish Government between 1985 and 1991 as an exogenous source of variation in their initial location (Edin, Fredriksson and Aslund, 2003^[68]). When accounting for the endogeneity of residential choice, the authors found that earnings rose with local concentration of immigrants from the same origin countries and their descendants for less educated immigrants. They also found that the positive effects of high immigrant concentration clusters were magnified by their "quality": immigrants in origin-related groups with high earnings or high self-employment rates had higher returns to living in such a cluster. However, immigrants belonging to an origin group with less than average earnings may actually lose from residing in this area.

In the same spirit, Damm (2009^[69]) examined the effects of the concentration of immigrants from the same origin and their descendants on labour market outcomes of refugees in Denmark for the period 1984-2000. They accounted for ability sorting into areas with immigrant residential segregation by exploiting the Danish spatial dispersal policy under which refugees were randomly dispersed across locations. They found strong evidence of self-selection of refugees with unfavourable unobserved characteristics into neighbourhoods with high concentration of immigrants from the same origin and their descendants. In addition, they found that an increase in such concentration increased earnings, irrespective of skill level. Their results were consistent with the explanation that networks of immigrants from the same origin and their descendants disseminate job information, increasing the job-worker match quality and thereby the hourly wage rate.

Another study on Sweden analysed how annual income among several immigrant groups in Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö during the period 1991-2006 varied according to the share of immigrants from the same origin at the neighbourhood level (Andersson, Musterd and Galster, 2014^[70]). Overall, the authors found that immigrants gain if they reside in neighbourhoods with higher shares of immigrants from the same origin and their descendants. They found that immigrant men tended to gain more than women, and

that this impact depended on neighbourhoods' trajectory of the share of immigrants from the same origin and their descendants, with more positive results for immigrants living in neighbourhoods where the share of persons from the same origin (including descendants) stayed the same or increased.

By focusing on the level of affluence of neighbourhoods, Wimark, Haandrikman and Nielsen (2019^[71]) provided a complementary perspective on how location affects labour market outcomes of immigrants in Sweden. Using longitudinal data, the authors looked at the "port-of-entry" effect and showed that immigrants who lived in deprived areas upon arrival in the country had lower employment probability several years later. Interestingly, they also found that employment prospects were much better for immigrants who left their initial neighbourhood of residence. However, this study does not provide specific results regarding the impact of living in neighbourhoods with a high share of immigrants from the same origin. Andersson, Musterd and Galster (2019^[72]) also discussed the impact of "port-of-entry" neighbourhoods on later employment outcomes, focusing on refugees from Iran, Iraq and Somalia arrived between 1995 and 2004. They found a negative impact of the share of immigrants from the same origin and their descendants in the initial neighbourhood of residence for women on employment five years later, but no significant effect for men. The effect was concentrated on women who had lived in neighbourhoods with the lowest employment rates among immigrants from the same origin and their descendants.

Also looking at employment prospects of refugees, Vogiazides and Mondani (2020^[73]) analysed the impact of their residential context over a longer period, assessing contemporaneous neighbourhood effects. For refugee men and women who immigrated to Sweden between 2000 and 2009, they found a significant negative effect of the neighbourhood share of non-Western migrants on entry into employment, but did not examine specifically the role of immigrants from the same origin and their descendants. They also found stark differences between regions, with refugees living in Stockholm having much better employment prospects than elsewhere in the country.

Analysing employment outcomes of Iraqi, Iranian, Turkish, and Somalian immigrants for 2000-10 living in Stockholm, Göteborg, and Malmö, Kadarik et al. (2021^[74]) introduced an important distinction in neighbourhood effects by looking at the impact of the local share of employed persons from the same origin country, while also controlling for the local share of persons from the same origin country and the local employment rate. For all groups of immigrants, they found a significant positive effect of the share of employed persons from the same origin country on employment probability. This result highlights the key role of the quality of the local job information network for immigrants' integration prospects.

Several studies on the effect of local context on immigrants' employment in the United States have been carried out. Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor (2008^[75]) investigated the impact of local immigrant concentration on earnings and inactivity of young immigrants using data from the 1990 census. The authors attempted to deal with endogenous selection of immigrants into areas with immigrant residential segregation through various approaches, including instrumental variables, and found that selection into such neighbourhoods was generally negative. Correcting for this selection produced positive mean effects of segregation, and a positive correlation between group average human capital and the impact of segregation.

Zhu, Liu and Painter (2014^[76]) analysed the impact of segregation on labour market outcomes among Latino immigrants in the United States. They used data from the 2000 census and the 2008-10 American Community Survey (ACS) on four metro areas (Atlanta, Washington, D.C., Chicago, and Los Angeles) to examine three labour market outcomes: employment probability, wages, and commuting time. Their results demonstrated that residence in an ethnic community increased the probability of finding work after the recession, albeit with longer commutes. By contrast, in estimates drawn from 2000 Census data, residents of ethnic communities in central cities, inner ring suburbs, or outer ring suburbs fared worse in the labour market than did residents outside those communities. This pattern of results was stronger for new immigrants.

In the case of Australia, Kalfa and Piracha (2018^[77]) assessed how social contacts and ethnic concentration affected the education-occupation mismatch of natives and immigrants. Using data from the Household

Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) for the period 2001-11, they showed that social capital exacerbated the incidence of over-education, particularly for women. For the foreign-born, ethnic concentration significantly increased the incidence of over-education.

A recent study investigated how networks of immigrants from the same origin and their descendants affect the economic success of immigrants in Germany with a dynamic perspective (Battisti, Peri and Romiti, 2021^[78]). Using longitudinal data of immigrants and including a large set of fixed effects and pre-migration controls to address the possible endogeneity of initial location, they found that immigrants in districts with larger origin-related networks were more likely to be employed soon after arrival. They also found that this advantage faded after four years, as migrants located in places with smaller origin-related networks caught up due to greater human capital investments. These effects appeared stronger for lower-skilled immigrants, as well as for refugees and Ethnic Germans (Aussiedler and Spätaussiedler).

New evidence on the effect of concentration on employment in the United States

Using data from the 2019 American Community Survey, one can assess the correlation between the local share of an immigrant group and employment outcomes. Although the objective is to get as close as possible to a causal estimate, this is by definition challenging with cross-sectional observational data.

When considering the full sample of immigrants aged 25 to 64 living in metropolitan areas, beyond the expected positive impact of duration of stay on employment probability, and negative impact of the local unemployment rate, there is a significant positive correlation with the local share of immigrants from the same origin (Table 5.7). A 10% increase in own-group share in the PUMA is associated with a 1.4 percentage point increase in employment probability for newly arrived immigrants. This effect, however, declines with duration of stay in the United States and becomes null after about 20 years in the country.

Table 5.7. Coefficients from regressions of employment among immigrants on the local share of own group, by region of birth, the United States, 2019

	Full sample	Excluding household heads and spouses	Central America	South America	Asia	Europe	Africa
Duration of stay (years)	0.011	0.009	0.008	0.013	0.015	0.010	0.015
Share of own-group	0.140	0.107	0.105	-0.039 (ns)	0.072 (ns)	0.169	-0.374 (ns)
Share of own-group x duration of stay	-0.007	-0.004	-0.005	-0.004 (ns)	-0.005	-0.008 (ns)	0.011 (ns)
Share of other immigrants	0.034	0.025 (ns)	0.032 (ns)	0.151	0.047 (ns)	0.043 (ns)	-0.047 (ns)
Unemployment rate	-0.604	-0.945	-0.795	-0.446	-0.479	-0.364	-0.067 (ns)
Number of observations	255 019	49 270	101 519	19 668	88 958	33 359	11 515

Note: Each column shows coefficients from a linear probability model of employment among immigrants aged 25-64 on the following variables: duration of stay in the United States (and its square); share of own group in the PUMA of residence, interacted with duration of stay; share of other immigrant groups in the PUMA of residence; age; sex; educational attainment; unemployment rate in the PUMA of residence. The model is estimated for residents of metropolitan areas only and includes fixed effects for metropolitan areas.

Source: ACS 2019; OECD Secretariat calculations.

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In order to attenuate the bias due to sorting, a sub-sample excluding household heads and spouses is analysed. It can indeed be expected that individuals in this group – mostly children of the household head or other relatives – have less decision power regarding the location of the household, which is therefore more exogenous to their employment situation than it is for the main decision makers. The results are qualitatively similar. Although the coefficients of the own-group share and its interaction with duration of

stay are now smaller, they remain significant. This indicates that sorting partly explains the correlation between the own-group share and employment probability, but probably not all of it.

Language proficiency

Key findings from the literature

Upon arrival, learning the language of the destination country is a priority task for new immigrants if they are not already proficient. A good command of the host country language is indeed very often a necessary condition, although not sufficient, for a smooth social and economic integration (Chiswick and Miller, 2015^[79]). Beyond language courses, day-to-day interactions with native speakers and, more generally, exposure to written and oral communication, can certainly accelerate and improve learning. In immigrant neighbourhoods where a large share of the population is from the same origin country, it is likely that exposure to the host country language will be on average lower.

It is also possible that immigrants who are less willing or less able to learn the host country language sort into neighbourhoods where they will have more interactions in their own language. Since these two processes are not mutually exclusive and can be self-reinforcing, a correlation between residence in a neighbourhood with many immigrants from the same origin and host-country language proficiency among immigrants is not necessarily causal. Although many correlation studies have been carried out in a number of countries, only a couple have attempted to assess the extent of sorting or to estimate causal effects.

Studying the case of Mexican immigrants to the United States, Bauer, Epstein and Gang (2005^[30]) showed that location decisions were conditioned on linguistic ability. Immigrants with limited English proficiency directed themselves disproportionately to destinations with substantial numbers of Mexicans, thus providing an environment where they could get by in Spanish, whereas those with English ability were more likely to go to places with small immigrant populations. This means that language ability is endogenous to the location decision. Studies showing that residence in areas with immigrant concentration retards language assimilation are therefore likely to overestimate the effect of residential segregation.

To try to identify causal neighbourhood effects on language proficiency, one approach used in the literature is to analyse the correlation between neighbourhood concentration and language fluency by duration of stay. If the effect of minority concentration on language is created primarily through learning, then the interaction between minority concentration and years of residence should contribute to explaining language proficiency. If sorting is the only relevant mechanism, then this interaction should not be significant.

Using data from the 1990 census of the United States, Lazear (1999^[80]) showed that there was a significant negative effect of county-level share of immigrants on fluency in English, a positive effect of duration of stay in the country, but that the interaction was not significant. Sorting was therefore the predominant mechanism explaining lower fluency in areas with a higher share of immigrants. Analysing the case of the United Kingdom in 1993-94, Dustmann and Van Soest (2004^[81]) found similar results on the impact of ward-level concentration of Indian-background immigrants on fluency in English: shortly after entry, immigrants in low minority concentration areas spoke better English, a finding that can be explained only by self-selection.

To study neighbourhood effects on language learning among immigrants, Danzer and Yaman (2016^[82]) used a quasi-experimental approach on guest-workers in Germany during the 1960s and early 1970s that enable them to avoid the effect of sorting. The authors argued that, given the placement procedure, the initial job location of the guest workers was exogenous, which implies that the result can be attributed to differences in contact rates with natives, and not by differences in the willingness to integrate. They found a small negative effect from immigrants from the same origin concentration on language fluency which is persistent across various immigrant subgroups.

New evidence on the effect of concentration on language proficiency in selected EU countries and the United States


Analysing data from the EU-MIDIS II survey (which covers a dozen of EU countries in 2016) provides interesting insights on the potential influence of neighbourhood of residence on language fluency. Although the data do not permit to identify neighbourhoods where immigrants live, respondents were asked to assess the share of people from the same origin as themselves in their neighbourhood. In addition, respondents also assessed their level of proficiency in the host-country language.

An empirical model of language proficiency was estimated, which included the self-assessed level of immigrant concentration and duration of stay in the host country, as well as their interaction, to capture potential sorting and learning effects. As expected, fluency in the host country language is higher for all immigrants when they have lived in the country for a longer time. However, this progress is slower for immigrants living in neighbourhoods with a high concentration of people from the same background. Partial results showing this effect are presented in Figure 5.18. That notwithstanding, these results could also be due to a selective crowding out effect through which those who improve their language proficiency have a higher propensity to move to another part of the country, leaving behind those with more difficulties.

However, there is no evidence of sorting for recently arrived Turkish and North African immigrants: they have similar language proficiency whether they live in high or low concentration neighbourhoods. On the contrary, recent South Asian immigrants living in high concentration neighbourhoods are less proficient than those living in low concentration areas, which indicates some self-selection for this group. For those three groups of immigrants, there is a tendency towards an increasing fluency gap between the two types of neighbourhoods with duration of stay in the host country. This is not the case, however, for Sub-Saharan African immigrants, for whom there is no significant difference in proficiency across neighbourhood context at any stage. Overall, apart for Sub-Saharan African immigrants, those results suggest that there is a negative effect of neighbourhood level own group concentration on host-country language learning.

A similar analysis can be carried out for the United States, using the American Community Survey, which includes a question about proficiency in English. Among immigrants who arrived in the United States at most one year before the survey – and who have not changed location – the share who speak English well or very well varies drastically by region of birth: African and European immigrants are those who are more likely to be proficient in English (86% and 83% respectively), followed by Asian immigrants (76%). South American and Central American immigrants are those who exhibit the lowest levels of proficiency, with only 53% and 44% of them speaking English well upon arrival (Table 5.8).

Figure 5.18. Difference in predicted host-language fluency according to residence in high-concentration vs low-concentration neighbourhoods, by duration of stay, for immigrants born in Turkey, North Africa, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa (selected European countries, 2016)



Note: Differences in predicted host-language proficiency estimated from a model with the following covariates: high vs low concentration of immigrants at the neighbourhood level (self-assessed); duration of stay and its square; interaction between duration of stay and high-low concentration; region of origin dummies and interactions with the three preceding variables; educational attainment; age group; gender; country of residence. List of countries included: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom. Sample: Immigrants aged 16 and above (N=10 075). Standard errors clustered at the country level. Vertical bars show 95% confidence intervals.

Source: EU MIDIS II; OECD Secretariat calculations.

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For all groups, there is evidence that the least proficient in English choose to live in areas where the share of their own group in the local population is higher. For example, among Central American immigrants, 56% of those who live in areas with relatively low share of other Central Americans (first quartile) speak English well, while this share is only 29% in areas with the highest own group concentration (fourth quartile). While this gap is the highest for Central Americans, it is observed for all immigrant groups, which confirms the results obtained by Bauer, Epstein and Gang (2005_[30]).

Table 5.8. Share of newly arrived immigrants speaking English well or very well, by region of birth and quartile of own group concentration in PUMA, the United States, 2019 (%)

	Central America	South America	Asia	Europe	Africa
1 st quartile	56.1	59.0	83.7	91.1	90.4
2 nd quartile	41.1	63.0	79.8	85.9	92.5
3 rd quartile	44.2	46.4	70.5	81.7	88.8
4 th quartile	29.1	47.2	65.6	76.0	77.0
Total	43.5	53.2	75.9	83.1	85.6
Gap 4 th – 1 st	-27.0	-11.8	-18.1	-15.1	-13.4

Note: Recent immigrants: duration of stay of one year at most and no mobility in the last year.

Source: ACS 2019; OECD Secretariat calculations.

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To complement this finding, an empirical model is estimated to study the relationship between English proficiency and local own-group concentration, taking into account duration of stay in the United States. Results from this model are shown in Table 5.9.

Duration of stay in the United States positively affects English proficiency for all immigrant groups. As expected from the descriptive results discussed above, the coefficient of the own-group share is significantly negative for all immigrant groups, although, after controlling for covariates, it is much larger for European immigrants than for other groups. The model also includes the local share of other immigrant groups. This variable has a significantly negative coefficient for South American, Asian and European immigrants: those settling initially in an area with a high share of immigrants from other regions have on average a lower proficiency.

The interaction between duration of stay in the United States and the own-group share is insignificant for Central and South American immigrants, showing that spatial sorting is the predominant mechanism explaining proficiency among them. On the contrary, this interaction is significant for Asian, European and African immigrants, indicating that learning plays a stronger role for these groups. This coefficient is negative for Asian immigrants: those living in areas with a high share of Asian immigrants will tend to learn English more slowly than those living in areas with a lower own-group share. This is similar to the result obtained for Turkish, North African and South Asian immigrants in European countries. However, for European and African immigrants in the United States, the sign of the interaction indicates positive neighbourhood effects: those living in areas with a higher own-group share tend to learn English faster. Finally, the interaction between the local share of other immigrants and duration of stay is only significant for Central American immigrants, which also point to a form of positive externalities: Central American immigrants living in areas where other immigrant groups represent a higher share of the population tend to learn English faster. For other immigrant groups, it makes no difference.

Table 5.9. Coefficients from regressions of English proficiency among immigrants on the local share of own group, by region of birth, the United States, 2019

	Central America	South America	Asia	Europe	Africa
Duration of stay in years	0.017	0.021	0.009	0.004	0.008
Share of own-group	-0.407	-0.193	-0.224	-1.599	-0.575
Share of own-group x duration of stay	0.000 (ns)	-0.003 (ns)	-0.002	0.021	0.027
Share of other groups	0.640 (ns)	-4.070	-4.330	-2.130	0.680 (ns)
Share of other groups x duration of stay	3.180	-0.270 (ns)	0.300 (ns)	0.030 (ns)	-0.580 (ns)

Note: Each column shows coefficients from a linear probability model of English proficiency among immigrants aged 15-64 on the following variables: duration of stay in the United States (and its square); share of own group in the PUMA of residence, interacted with duration of stay; share of other immigrant groups in the PUMA of residence, interacted with duration of stay; age; sex; educational attainment. (ns) indicates that the coefficient is not significant at 5% level.

Source: ACS 2019; OECD Secretariat calculations.

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Housing conditions and access to homeownership

Housing conditions are a key component of households' well-being, and access to homeownership is often an important step in immigrants' integration process. It is a well-established fact that immigrants have on average much poorer housing conditions and disadvantages on the housing market than the native-born. Migrants' often weaker socio-economic position puts them on a more difficult financial situation on the housing market. This has been exacerbated by the overall rise in rent prices in the last two decades in almost all OECD countries (OECD, 2020^[83]). As a result, in 2019, almost one in five immigrants in EU countries paid over 40% of their disposal income on rents, which is twice the share among the

native-born. Likewise, OECD-wide, among immigrants, the overcrowding rate is more than twice as high as for native-born (17% against 8%) (OECD/European Union, 2018_[84]). In parallel in almost two-thirds of OECD countries, home ownership rates for native-born are more than twice as high as for foreign-born (OECD/European Union, 2018_[84]).

According to data from the EU-MIDIS II survey, in Europe, immigrant households in segregated areas live in accommodations with a similar level of basic facilities equipment, such as tap water, kitchen or bathroom, as immigrant households in non-segregated areas. There is also no significant difference between the two groups of immigrants with respect to housing overcrowding. However, compared to non-segregated areas, accommodations in areas with residential segregation are assessed by interviewers to be in poorer condition, and the local environment is much more frequently characterised by higher levels of noise, pollution and violence. This result holds when segregation is assessed by respondents themselves or by interviewers (Table 5.10).

Table 5.10. Relationship between indicators of segregation and housing conditions in selected European countries, 2016

	Respondent: high own-group share	Interviewer: segregated area
Overcrowded housing	-0.004 (ns)	0.01 (ns)
Accommodation in poor condition (itw)	-0.102	-0.189
Lack of tap water	0.004	-0.002 (ns)
Lack of kitchen	0.005 (ns)	0.000 (ns)
Lack of indoor toilet	0.002 (ns)	-0.005 (ns)
Lack of shower / bathroom	0.006	0.001 (ns)
Lack of heating	-0.003 (ns)	-0.002 (ns)
Too dark	-0.002 (ns)	0.009 (ns)
Too noisy	0.063	0.087
Leaking roof or damp walls	0.027 (ns)	0.044
Pollution, grime	0.051	0.069
Crime, violence, vandalism	0.109	0.134

Note: Each cell contains coefficient from separate regressions type of area (dense urban, etc.), immigrant group, foreign-born vs native-born children of immigrants, age, gender, household size. (ns) indicates that the coefficient is not significant at 5% level.

Source: EU-MIDIS II survey; OECD Secretariat calculations.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/l8tsg7>

In the case of Japan, Korekawa (2021_[25]) analysed homeownership patterns of Brazilian and Chinese immigrants. The study found that the gap in homeownership rates of high-rise condominiums is almost negligible between Japanese and Chinese citizens, which is attributable to the stronger preference for this type of housing, especially among highly-educated Chinese nationals. However, less-educated Chinese and Brazilians rarely access high-rise condominiums, implying that their chances for home acquisition are generally more constrained than those of Japanese people. The analysis also revealed that home ownership is associated with lower migrant concentration in certain areas and is not affected by duration of stay in Japan.

Box 5.4. Association between residential segregation and values: evidence on gender norms from European OECD countries

In the EU MIDIS survey, respondents were asked about their views on gender equality through four questions: whether having a job is the best way for a woman to be independent; whether both the husband and wife should contribute to household income; whether men should take as much responsibility as women for the home and children; and whether it is important that both girls and boys stay in education for the same length of time. For each question, respondents could give four possible answers: strongly disagree (1), disagree (2), agree (3), or strongly agree (4). Based on these survey questions, it is possible to build a simple gender equality index ranging from 0 to 1 after rescaling the sum to these four questions. Across respondents (only immigrants or native-born children of immigrants) the average was 0.78 for men and 0.83 for women, indicating that women have more progressive views on gender norms than men do.

There were also some differences based on where people lived: on average, respondents living in self-assessed segregated areas had an index of 0.79, while those living in non-segregated areas had an index of 0.82 (after controlling for basic demographic characteristics), but this gap was in fact only significant among women (0.81 vs 0.84). However, there was no significant correlation between views on gender equality and segregation as assessed by interviewers.

This result points to tentative evidence of a slight difference in views regarding gender equality among immigrant women, depending on whether they say they live in an area with a high share of people from the same immigrant background as themselves.

Source: EU MIDIS II Survey.

Association with educational outcomes

In most OECD countries, native-born pupils with immigrant parents perform less well in schools with the highest shares of children of immigrants (Figure 5.19). This penalty extends to more than a year of schooling for children in the highest quartile of concentration in countries such as Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, and Sweden. Only part of the penalty is explained by the fact that children of immigrants in such schools tend to have lower-educated parents, and a higher proportion than elsewhere does not speak the host-country language at school.


Indeed, in the vast majority of OECD countries, the likelihood of not speaking the host country language at home is closely associated with high concentration of migrant children in schools – even after accounting for parental education and other factors. As the composition of schools tend to reflect the composition of the neighbourhood, this finding also suggests that immigrants in highly concentrated areas are less likely to speak the host-country language at home; that is, to have contact with the host-country language. However, in most countries a significant disadvantage remains even after controlling for such factors.

The penalty is further reduced – by two-thirds on average – once accounting for the overall parental disadvantage of students (as measured by the share of low-educated mothers) in highly concentrated schools. In several countries with high overall penalties, such as Austria, Belgium, and France, the penalty disappears, and is no longer statistically significant. In fact, among the countries with large immigrant populations, the penalty remains large and statistically significant only in Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands.

In a number of countries, there is no penalty observed from the outset. Among the countries with large immigrant populations, this is the case for Australia, Luxembourg and Norway. Both Australia and Luxembourg have highly-educated immigrant populations, with much higher shares of highly-educated among the immigrants than among the native-born. In Norway, there are important urban-rural differences in the performance of the school system, with schools in the urban parts – where immigrants are concentrated – performing much better.

Figure 5.19. Performance of native-born students with immigrant parents in schools with a high concentration of such students compared with those with a lower concentration

Differences in PISA points



Note: All models with controls also include controls for age and gender. Schools with a high concentration refer to the top quartile of schools by the share of children of immigrants. Each quartile has the same number of students overall. Results that are not statically significant from zero at the 5% level are marked in white.

Source: PISA 2018.


StatLink  <https://stat.link/zmo0dt>

Not only children of immigrants, but also children of native-born tend to face a disadvantage in such schools, especially in the Netherlands but also in the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Greece, Belgium, Luxembourg and Germany (Figure 5.20). However, with the notable exception of the Netherlands, the penalty is smaller for children of native-born than for the children of immigrants.

In a number of countries, there is actually a premium for attending a school with high shares of immigrants.⁷ What is more, the penalty is in most countries again greatly reduced once accounting for the fact that schools with high shares of children of immigrants are also schools with high shares of students with low-educated mothers. Indeed, in a number of countries the penalty turns into an advantage and on average, no more penalty is observed for students with native-born parents.

Figure 5.20. Performance of native-born students with native-born parents in schools with a high concentration of children of immigrants compared with those with a lower concentration

Differences in PISA points



Note: All models with controls also include controls for age and gender. Schools with a high concentration refer to the top quartile of schools by the share of children of immigrants. Each quartile has the same number of students overall. Results that are not statically significant from zero at the 5% level are marked in white.

Source: PISA 2018.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/pm316d>

Intergenerational dimension of integration

The issue of residential concentration relates not only to immigrants themselves but also to their native-born children. Indeed, the location of immigrants across regions and within cities at different stages of their life cycle will condition where their children will grow up, where they will go to school, and whom they will make friends with. This may in turn influence a number of their economic and social outcomes. A significant literature has therefore investigated the intergenerational consequences of immigrants' location choices on their native-born descendants. This kind of analyses requires to link information, both individual and contextual, on two generations, which is very demanding in terms of data.

Many studies have analysed the Swedish case. For example, Grönqvist (2006^[85]) used register data on first- and second-generation immigrants who in 1982 were residing in Sweden and were aged 6 to 15. The paper considered education and employment outcomes, observed in 2001 when the sampled individuals were aged 25 to 34. Results indicated that the share of immigrants from the same origin and their descendants negatively affected the probability of graduating from high school among immigrants themselves, but not among their native-born descendants. The size of the immigrant cluster of the same origin and their descendants negatively affected the probability that both immigrants and their native-born descendants graduated from university. Neuman (2016^[86]) also analysed register data, focusing on native-born descendants of immigrants and natives born in Sweden between 1976 and 1980, and studying

both short-run economic outcomes, observed in 2000 when individuals were aged 20-24, and long-run economic outcomes, observed in 2007 when they were aged 27-31. The results indicated that native-born descendants of immigrants raised in immigrant-dense neighbourhoods had a lower probability to continue to higher education, whereas, their earnings, unemployment and use of social assistance were unaffected.

Working with register data for all individuals who were born in 1974 and lived in metropolitan Sweden in both 1990 and 2006, Gustafsson, Katz and Österberg (2017^[87]) investigated whether young adults lived in neighbourhoods that were similar, in terms of relative average household income, to the neighbourhoods in which they grew up. The authors found a high correlation between average neighbourhood incomes at these two points in the sample's life cycle. They also found that half of the children of 'visible minorities' grew up in the poorer quartile of neighbourhoods, and of these, almost two-thirds remained in the poorest quartile of neighbourhoods as adults.

In a study using longitudinal data from France (1990-2008), McAvay (2018^[88]) also investigated the extent to which second-generation immigrants and the French majority population continued to live in similar neighbourhood environments during childhood and adulthood. To explore the persistence of residential segregation and spatial disadvantage, the author drew on two measures of neighbourhood composition: the immigrant share and the unemployment rate. The results documented a strong stability of neighbourhood environments through the life cycle, especially with regard to the composition of the neighbourhood in terms of immigrants from the same origin and their descendants. Individual-level factors were shown to be quite weak in accounting for these patterns compared with the characteristics of the city of origin.

Zuccotti and Platt (2017^[89]) used a large-scale longitudinal dataset of England and Wales, covering a 40-year period, to assess the impact of neighbourhood co-ethnic concentration in childhood on subsequent adult labour market outcomes. They distinguished the five main minority groups in the United Kingdom and showed that greater concentration of co-ethnics in the neighbourhood resulted in substantially lower labour market participation and lower social class for Pakistani and Bangladeshi women but better social class outcomes for Indian men.

Abramitzky et al. (2019^[90]) focused on three cohorts of immigrants who entered the United States during the 19th or 20th centuries and studied intergenerational mobility of the children of these immigrants. They found that, both historically and today, children of immigrants at the bottom of the income distribution have higher rates of upward mobility than children of similarly ranked US-born fathers. They also found that immigrant parents were more likely than US-born parents to move to areas offering better prospects for their children, i.e. higher upward mobility.

Policy issues and migrant segregation

This section considers the association between public policies and migrant concentration, both with respect to the impact of policy on migrant concentration and with respect to its impact on integration outcomes. In addition to migration policy itself, three policy areas are of particular interest in this context: education, housing, and broader urban regeneration policies. Other policy areas, such as infrastructure development and public transportation, may also impact migrant concentration, but the policy levers are more indirect.

Migration policies

Migration policy has only a very limited direct influence over migrant concentration, and this influence varies by migrant category.

Family migration (family formation and reunification) is driven by family ties, which by definition tends to enhance concentration, at least in cases where the principal applicant is a migrant. However, while most countries have put in place requirements regarding appropriate housing (OECD, 2017^[91]) which may be

easier to meet in certain areas (see below), neighbourhood characteristics such as the share of migrants are generally not considered exclusionary. The one notable exception in this respect is Denmark. In that country, the applicant's spouse/partner will normally be required to reside outside of specific areas. This list of specific areas is based on a number of criteria including unemployment, crime rates and the share of immigrants from so-called "non-Western countries".

Economic migration is generally not confined to specific places. No OECD country has explicit criteria with respect to migrant concentration in the local community, although Australia, Canada and New Zealand have a number of incentives programmes to select migrants who will reside outside the large centres, given the high concentration of immigrants in the metropolitan areas. However, the main intention of such policies is not to prevent segregation per se, but rather to make sure that rural areas also have access to migrant labour. In its points system, New Zealand allocates additional points for settlement outside of the metropolitan area of its largest city, Auckland, but there is no further differentiation regarding rural and urban areas outside of Auckland. Australia has a number of measures in place to facilitate economic migration to rural areas (OECD, 2018^[92]). This includes priority processing, specific regional settlement programmes and providing a number of incentives for migrants on temporary or provisional visas living in regional areas to settle – including for example through additional points for skilled migration candidates who have studied at a regional university. Migrants under regional settlement programmes are also obliged to remain in their area for the first two years. In Canada, where economic migration has seen a significant shift towards regionalisation in recent years (OECD, 2019^[93]), provinces have their own economic migration programme – and these generally favour rural settlement. Recently, Canada also initiated a rural pilot programme, allowing local communities to sponsor economic migrants. Communities must have a population of maximum 50 000 people and be located at least 75 km from the core of a Census metropolitan area, or they must have a population of between 50 000 and 200 000 people and be remotely located from other larger cities.

Apart from the settlement countries, only Korea has policy parameters in place to favour economic migration outside the main cities in order to spread the benefits of immigration more widely (OECD, 2019^[94]). For example, regulations with respect to the maximum share of foreign workers in the country are eased for manufacturing companies located outside of metropolitan areas.

Humanitarian migration is the migrant category where most place-based policies are in place, often with the explicit objective to have a more equal distribution of such migrants throughout the country. About a third of all OECD countries have some sort of formal mechanism in place to distribute asylum seekers across the country (see Table 5.11; see also OECD (2016^[95])). In practice, the situation is often less clear-cut. On the one hand, a number of countries that do not have an explicit dispersal policy in place nevertheless try to avoid a concentration of asylum applicants in specific areas, or to avoid large number from the same country or region of origin as is the case for example in Luxembourg. On the other hand, in countries with systematic dispersal, local concentration is not always prevented as the distribution of asylum seekers across the country is often largely proportional to population size – as is the case in Germany for example. What is more, a key parameter of allocation within recipient regions is often the availability of integration support services – and these tend to be in areas with high migrant presence. In the United States, for example, resettlement occurs through partner agencies and initial settlement is where these agencies are active. The availability of housing is also a key parameter in the decision of local dispersal, for example in Sweden and the United Kingdom. As immigrants tend to live in areas with lower housing prices, such parameters can reinforce concentration. The net effect is often unclear. However, for Sweden, Dahlberg and Valeyatheepillay (2019^[96]) find that the initial neighbourhoods of refugees placed under the dispersal policy have been characterised by a higher share of native-born and a lower share of non-Western immigrants compared to refugees who arrived in a time period when they could themselves choose where to locate.⁸

The systematic dispersal of persons with humanitarian status – that is, asylum seekers who obtained a humanitarian residence visa, resettled refugees or other forms of international protection – is somewhat less common than that of asylum seekers (OECD, 2016^[95]). However, in practice, the initial dispersal of

asylum seekers determinates to a certain degree the location after obtaining refugee or other international protection status. Whether or not this is actually the case depends on the likelihood that humanitarian migrants stay in the area in which they were initially located as asylum seekers. A number of countries also make receipt of social assistance for refugees conditional on staying in the designated area. This is for example the case in Denmark, Germany, Norway and Sweden. A number of countries have explicit anti-segregation objectives in refugee settlement. In Sweden, the allocation of refugees between municipalities takes into account local labour market conditions, population size and the overall number of newly arrived immigrants, unaccompanied minors and asylum seekers already living in the municipality. In Norway, settling refugees in Norwegian municipalities is the joint responsibility of central and local governments. Municipalities that are requested to settle refugees are selected on the basis of a set of criteria, including the avoidance of settlement in areas with migrant shares above 30%.

There is a large and growing amount of literature on the economic effects of dispersal policies. Most studies have found that dispersal has been associated with lower employment rates (Brücker et al., 2019^[97]; Fasani, Frattini and Minale, 2021^[98]; Damm and Rosholm, 2009^[99]; Edin, Fredriksson and Aslund, 2004^[100]). Studies have also consistently found that subsequent onward moves tend to be associated with higher employment among refugees (Haberfeld et al., 2019^[101]; Azlor, Damm and Schultz-Nielsen, 2020^[102]; Robinson and Andersson, 2003^[103]; Stewart, 2012^[104]), indicating that dispersal should not prevent such onward-migration – especially when it is employment-driven. Indeed, most countries with dispersal policies allow for subsequent moves if this is for the purposes of taking up employment. However, these studies must be interpreted with some caution, as long term-effects and impacts on other policy areas – including social integration – were generally not considered.

Dispersal does not always intend to avoid segregation. In New Zealand, for example, while refugees are dispersed across the country, within the recipient areas, efforts are made to ensure that refugees are settled in areas with peers from similar backgrounds.

Table 5.11. Countries with parameters in their migration policies that aim at preventing migrant concentration

Dispersal Policies for Asylum Seekers	Dispersal Policies for Refugees	Incentives for labour migrants to settle outside of segregated areas or urban centres
Australia	Australia	Australia
Austria	Canada	Canada
Belgium	Denmark	Korea
France	Estonia	New Zealand (points higher if job offers outside of Auckland but no further differentiation)
Germany	Finland	
Hungary	Korea	
Ireland	Luxembourg	
Italy	Netherlands	
Netherlands	New Zealand	
Norway	Norway	
Poland	Portugal	
Portugal	Sweden	
Slovenia	United States	
Sweden		
Switzerland		
Turkey		
United Kingdom		

Source: OECD questionnaire on policies aiming at reducing segregation of immigrants and its negative consequences, 2020.

Education policies

More than half of all OECD countries have some policy in place to counteract school segregation. As Table 5.12 shows, most policies do not directly target migrant concentration but rather aim at broader socio-economic segregation or on a broader definition of disadvantage that considers both immigrant and socio-economic background. In practice, in many countries there is a significant overlap between concentration of immigrant parentage and socio-economic disadvantage. Data from the 2018 PISA show that in 29 OECD countries, schools with high concentration of children of migrants are overrepresented among the schools with high shares of students with socio-economic disadvantage. In Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, more than half of all schools that find themselves in the top quartile of concentration of children of immigrants are also in the top quartile of schools with socio-economic disadvantage.

Table 5.12. Most common anti-segregation policies in the school sector

		Migrant parentage	Socio-economic disadvantage	Both
Quota Regulations	Minimum quota	Sweden	Korea	Belgium Flanders (double quota system)
	Maximum threshold	Belgium Flanders Italy	Hungary	Belgium Flanders (double quota system)
Mobility-increasing support at student-level (e.g. mentoring, scholarships, provision of early childhood education)		Canada Costa Rica Ireland Italy Luxembourg Portugal (applicants/beneficiaries for/of international protection) Slovenia Sweden Switzerland Sweden	Chile Lithuania	Belgium Flanders Colombia Japan Slovenia United Kingdom
Support for disadvantaged schools		Canada Czech Republic Ireland Luxembourg Slovenia Switzerland	France New Zealand Portugal	Belgium Flanders Chile Finland Italy Korea Lithuania Mexico Netherlands Sweden United Kingdom

Source: OECD questionnaire on policies aiming at reducing segregation of immigrants and its negative consequences 2020.

Policies with respect to addressing segregation in the school system can be split into two strands. The first strand concerns policies that try to prevent or at least alleviate school segregation (*ex-ante* policies). The second strand includes measures aiming to alleviate detrimental effects of school segregation by targeted support for the concerned schools and students (*ex-post* policies). However, as will be seen below, a clear-cut separation is not always possible.

Policies to prevent migrant segregation in schools ex ante

The key question to prevent school segregation in the first place is the student allocation process. Some countries have a regulated school allocation mechanism, while others leave it to the parents of students to

choose a school. The most common method for regulated school assessment is according to the student's residence. Residence-based school allocation used to be predominant in OECD countries but its importance declined since the beginning of the millennium. At the same time, evidence suggests that schools became more selective (OECD, 2019^[105]). In parallel, however, over the past two decades, many OECD countries implemented reforms that aimed at loosening the link between home address and school, by providing more choice to families (Givord, 2019^[106]).

The ambiguous effect of school choice

The effect of increased school choice on segregation is ambiguous. On the one hand, it decouples school segregation from residential segregation; on the other hand, school choice may enhance more subtle sorting mechanisms as choosing the most appropriate school can be challenging for immigrant families. Native-born, especially higher-income, families tend to be better informed about school offers, admission criteria and the quality differences between schools. Immigrant families often not only lack such information but might also be hampered by language difficulties. What is more, they may prefer to choose the closest rather than the otherwise most appropriate school – also to minimise transport costs. In Sweden, for example, foreign-born students were found to travel shorter distances to schools except for those with highly educated parents (Andersson, Malmberg and Östh, 2012^[59]) (Cerna, 2019^[107]). Some might also prefer to send their children to a nearby school with a high share with other students from the same background in order to facilitate contacts.

The selection process by schools with limited admissions can also contribute to school segregation. As high learning outcomes are easier to achieve with better-off students, schools tend to have a preference to admit students that already know the teaching language and have intellectual support from home. Evidence for cream skimming was found in many OECD countries such as England (West, Ingram and Hind, 2006^[108]), the United States (Jabbar, 2015^[109]), Sweden (Böhlmark, Holmlund and Lindahl, 2016^[110]), Norway (Haugen, 2020^[111]) and Slovenia (Trnavcevic, 2002^[112]). Academic results or tests as admission criteria enable schools to “cream skim” the best students and therefore increase academic segregation.

The literature has provided ample evidence of links between school choice and different types of school segregation (socio-economic segregation: e.g. Burgess and Briggs (2010^[113]), Levin (1998^[114]); segregation by racial or ethnic origin: e.g. Urquiola (2005^[115]); segregation with respect to parental education levels: e.g. Söderström and Uusitalo (2010^[116])). However, most studies have focused on socio-economic segregation or racial/ethnic segregation rather than migrant segregation per se.

Levelling the playing field for choosing a school

Policies aimed at providing comprehensive information on the offer of schools and their quality differences to everyone can reduce the information gap faced by immigrant families. Luxembourg, for instance, provides school brochures in different languages to make information accessible for immigrant families.

School admission fees can be a further obstacle. In Ireland, the 2018 Education (Admission to Schools) Act reduced financial barriers by banning fees related to admission at non-fee charging schools. Furthermore, the Act abolishes waiting lists to create equal chances for newly arriving students and students residing there for a longer time. Several countries also provide transport subsidies to compensate for additional costs.

Sweden took a further step by banning the admission by ability or family background to avoid cream skimming by schools on high demand (Böhlmark, Holmlund and Lindahl, 2016^[110]).

School funding according to pupils' characteristics

The interaction between school choice policies and school funding schemes can be a powerful tool to set incentives for admitting disadvantaged students. Weighted funding systems that take into account pupils'

background seek to counteract the occurrence of school segregation in the first place. Where there is per capita funding without differentiation between the background of pupils or where funding depends on learning outcomes, admission officers will face incentives to skim the best students. Haugen (2020^[111]) conducted interviews with teachers from different schools in Oslo and found out that they decide admissions depending on the expected resources in relation to the expected costs they will have with the respective student. Funding schemes that take the student's background and the connected higher effort for the school into account could encounter such distortions. The United Kingdom, for example, incorporates student-specific additional needs in the school-funding scheme. The National Funding Formula takes into account pupils who are eligible for Free School Meals and also includes a factor for those who need to learn English.

Affirmative Action and upper thresholds to enhance social mix

A more rigorous way of getting public schools to meet certain diversity criteria are quota regulations or target ranges for the share of migrant students with which they have to comply. Target ranges can reduce cream skimming and prevent schools from exceeding a certain threshold of migrant students, thereby addressing both ends of the concentration scale. This is the case for example in Sweden, where oversubscribed independent schools may use a quota (max. 5%) to prioritise students that have moved to Sweden within the last two years, although it appears that many schools do not take advantage of this possibility (Cerna, 2019^[107]). In Korea, a minimum quota of students from a disadvantaged socio-economic background is in place for special-purpose high schools. Italy applies a 30% upper threshold for students with migrant background as share of total students enrolled to avoid high migrant concentrations. However, in countries in which the share of immigrants varies widely, such regulations with fixed limits can be difficult to implement. In Belgium Flanders, the quota varies by the density of disadvantaged pupils within a certain vicinity.

Some countries give oversubscribed schools the opportunity to prioritise disadvantaged students. In the United Kingdom, for instance, the School Admission Code enables admission authorities to give priority to disadvantaged pupils. The targeting towards children of immigrants is more direct in Sweden, where oversubscribed schools can give preference to migrant students who immigrated within the last two years.

Desegregation by dispersion

A controversial school-specific strategy is the dispersal of disadvantaged pupils from segregated schools to better-off schools. In the last century, the United States and the United Kingdom implemented busing programmes to desegregate schools by changing the composition of students. These busing measures aimed to comply with certain target ranges of ethnic and racial groups on schools despite residential segregation. Busing as desegregation strategy came along with many problems and protests, as many did not share the objective of racial and ethnic integration. As a consequence, students from a racial or ethnic minority had to deal with busing-related offenses (Bergman, 2018^[117]) and were often exposed to racism (Bebber, 2015^[118]). In the United States, positive effects on performance of minority students participating in voluntary busing programmes were found (Bergman, 2018^[117]).

In contrast to these programmes which focused on ethnic minorities and were voluntary, the Danish city of Aarhus has experimented with forced busing for students with migrant parents. A recent empirical study found negative effects on the performance and on the well-being of the students subjected to this forced busing (Damm et al., 2020^[119]). The test scores in maths of pupils assigned to busing in grades three and six were found to be poorer than those of their immigrant peers. Similar negative effects were found for the reading scores in grades six and eight.

These opposing results could be due to a selection bias in busing on a voluntary basis, i.e. ambitions concerning school performance of students participating in voluntary busing measures. It is also possible that some of the students concerned by busing would have preferred to stay in schools with students from similar backgrounds and did not feel like they belonged in their new schools. A related issue is the allocation of newly-arrived immigrant students (see Box 5.5).

Box 5.5. School allocation of newly-arrived immigrant students

The significant arrival of vulnerable migrants into many OECD countries since 2015 has put the school allocation of newly-arriving immigrant students into schools into the spotlight. The allocation across schools and schools' ability to provide language and integration classes are important factors in determining the education path of new arrivals and their integration in the education system and society at large. The allocation of schools can also influence the extent of contact between migrant students and host-country students.

One major challenge is that the integration of newly-arrived immigrant students requires specialised teachers who are able to deal with diverse backgrounds and limited host-country language knowledge as well as adapted curricula. As a consequence, there is often a trade-off between providing high quality integration classes for late-arriving students and distributing them to different public schools to ensure a better social mix. As a result, policy approaches differed. Turkey, for instance, reacted to the increase of Syrian refugees by building up specialised temporary education centres. In Finland, schools provide instructions in the respective mother tongues of the immigrant pupils if teachers for that are available. Furthermore, immigrant pupils in Finland are entitled to have classes in Finnish/ Swedish as a second language to catch up on the language requirements needed in school.

In several countries, including Austria, Denmark, Germany and Lithuania, students that do not master the host country's language can attend special classes within public schools where foreign language teachers provide language support. Schools in Lithuania also offer the opportunity to attend supplementary education activities with native-born students to improve their Lithuanian. In Austria, less language-intensive courses such as sports and music are taught within the mainstream classroom. These mixed forms allow the students to have both specialised classes to catch up on the national curriculum and contact to students from the host country – in addition to preventing school segregation.

Policies aimed at alleviating the effects of school segregation

The line between ex-ante and ex-post policies is often blurry and policies can be overlapping. For example, while specific support measures for students with immigrant parents at schools with high concentration might not attract students with native-born parents, general compensatory support to concentrated schools aiming to increase the quality can make schools attractive for a wider range of students.

Increasing the attractiveness of segregated schools

One policy option to attract students from more affluent, native-born families is to implement special high-demand curricula in segregated schools. In Turkey, some schools implemented special curricula to attract students from diverse backgrounds and, at the same time, create cultural awareness. In the scope of the elective course "Living Languages and Dialects", students can learn about different cultures. Transforming segregated schools to "Magnet Schools" (that is, schools offering specialised courses or curricula that aim at attracting a diverse set of students) is also part of the desegregation strategy implemented in the United States. Nonetheless, evidence on the effect of the implementation of magnet curricula on diversity is mixed. Riel et al. (2018^[120]) expect that an increase in magnet schools in the United States is likely to promote diversity in schools and districts while Saporito (2003^[121]), for instance, found that socio-economic and origin-related sorting takes place even when parents send their children to magnet schools.

Additional support for schools to counteract the negative effects of segregation for migrant youth

School funding can depend on the respective individual student characteristics or on the school itself with its composition of students and its location. However, these two methods are closely interlinked, as the student composition in school is a direct consequence of schools' admission policies. While weighted per-pupil funding sets incentives for admissions (see above), targeted financial support for schools rather aims to compensate the negative effects of already existing school segregation. Therefore, a number of OECD countries provide extra resources to improve the quality of schools with high shares of children of migrants or foreigners (e.g. Czech Republic) or socio-economically disadvantaged students (e.g. New Zealand). The Netherlands directs extra funding to schools that have a high share of low-performers. A threshold regulation ensures that money is only allocated to schools that exceed a certain share of youth at risk of underperforming and, thus, need extra support. The challenge with these policies is that while schools with high shares of students with immigrant students might receive extra funding, they may not always use it for these students, unless there is some regulation/condition attached to the funding.

In Canada, schools with high numbers of newcomer students can make use of the federally-funded programme Settlement Workers in Schools. The measures within this programme depend on the province but can range from school registration information and orientation activities to informal language learning and non-therapeutic counselling and peer support.

In other countries, the additional support depends not on the school itself, but on the area where the school is located. Finland allocates extra funding to schools in socio-economically deprived areas with high shares of foreign language residents and in the United Kingdom, so-called social mobility "cold spots" (that is, areas with low upward social mobility) receive additional funding to increase the quality of schools in these areas. In addition to extra funding to schools, the provision of higher salaries for the teaching staff can compensate them directly for their extra work and can incentivise experienced teachers to teach in segregated schools. Portugal targets schools in socio-economically deprived areas with the TEIP programme (Priority Intervention Educational Areas), which covers about 17% of the Portuguese school clusters (schools within the same geographical area) and defines improvement plans depending on the respective local context. These improvement plans can include additional teachers, psychologists or social workers as well as more diverse educational offers.

In France, schools in socio-economically disadvantaged areas – in which children of immigrants are strongly overrepresented – are subject to priority education. Priority education aims to reduce the performance gap between schools in disadvantaged areas and other schools to less than 10% by a certain age level. It includes different quality-improving measures and tries to address the needs of students with a disadvantaged background. Additional teaching staff is available which allows for more individual support. Furthermore, the strategy sets incentives for teachers to teach in these schools. They obtain extra remuneration and can increase their chances to get employed by their school of preference afterwards. The programme therefore tends to attract rather junior teachers who often move on after a few years. Within this framework of priority education for disadvantaged students, the "parcours d'excellence" (pathways to excellence) programme supports secondary school pupils that aspire to ambitious studies and professional integration. Such students can make use of special offers such as cultural visits and individual coaching, but the numbers involved are small.

Financial incentives for schools and teachers, special training for teaching staff or additional equipment can improve the learning situation in these disadvantaged schools. The Life Skills Programme in Chile, for instance, provides tools to teachers and management teams to work with vulnerable students in schools with particularly high concentrations of such students. Likewise, welfare workers and psychological support as provided in Korea's Education Welfare Priority Programme for schools exceeding a certain threshold of disadvantaged students can help overcome learning difficulties.

Sweden frames its extra support for disadvantaged students as “compensatory mission of schools” that should guarantee equal opportunities regardless of the background of the parents, and Norway aims to give all children the opportunity to attend a minimum of one after-school-activity and promotes a mentor system for at-risk youth (Staver, Brekke and Søholt, 2019^[122]).

In summary, while few policies target migrant segregation in schools specifically, a number target disadvantaged students, among which migrant students tend to be overrepresented. Table 5.13 summarises the anti-segregation policy measures discussed in this chapter, differentiating between interventions at the school-level and at the student-/family-level.

Table 5.13. Anti-segregation school policies

	Ex-Ante	Mixed	Ex-Post
School Level	Regulation of admission criteria	Special curricula at segregated schools (“Magnet Schools”)	Increased language teaching time
	Quota regulations or target ranges for migrant pupils	Special training and incentives for teachers and principals to teach in segregated schools	Multilingual teaching staff
		Extra funding and support for identified segregated schools	
Student/Family Level	Provision of equal information on school offers		Provision of special support for migrant students at segregated schools
	Reduction of barriers to exercise school choice (transport subsidies, school vouchers)		Reduction of barriers to change school (vouchers, etc.)
	Dispersal of new-arriving migrants		Desegregation of segregated schools by dispersal of students (busing)

Source: OECD questionnaire on policies aiming at reducing residential segregation of immigrants and its negative consequences 2020.

Housing policies

A core policy area in relation to migrant concentration is housing policy. Across the OECD, there are wide differences in the functioning of the housing market and the scale and scope for policy action – as well as the policy levers – therefore vary widely. The accessibility and availability of quality housing in areas with residential segregation is also closely linked with the broader issue of urban regeneration (see Box 5.6).

Box 5.6. Urban regeneration in areas with high concentration

A number of OECD countries have experimented with comprehensive urban regeneration programmes for areas with high concentration of disadvantage and poor housing and neighbourhood conditions, which often concerns areas of high immigrant concentration. In addition to the Scandinavian countries where such urban regeneration policies are embedded in anti-segregation strategies, programmes with a strong direct or indirect targeting of neighbourhoods with high shares of immigrants exist in Belgium Flanders, Estonia, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States (see Table 5.14). The interventions either focus directly on the spatial dimension of the areas concerned (notably with respect to improvements to housing, public spaces and infrastructure) or try to improve livelihoods and social integration through economic and social interventions, or both (e.g. in the Nordic countries, in France or in the Netherlands (Musterd and Ostendorf, 2008^[123])).

As part of urban regeneration, a few OECD countries explicitly relocate residents or try to restrict inward settlement. This concerns Denmark, where the most vulnerable areas (“severe ghettos”) are required to undergo a development plan to reduce the share of social housing to 40% by 2030. This can be achieved through sales, establishment of new private property, demolition, etc. Municipalities with targeted areas are required to introduce criteria giving priority to applicants based on employment and education. Municipalities cannot assign refugees temporary housing in areas that are designated as deprived areas, and family reunification to such areas is also restricted. Portugal’s strategy to counteract segregation in deprived areas includes rehousing measures where people from areas with poor living conditions are relocated to other parts of the city.

Several countries also try to physically change areas of high concentration of disadvantage. The most radical approach is demolition of poor-quality housing blocks, to improve the physical appearance of the areas to attract better-off households and improve quality of life for those who remain. In several metropolitan areas in France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, large-scale demolitions were carried out in deprived areas. Evaluations on the effectiveness of such demolition policies as the Dutch Big City Policy, where poor-quality housing stock was destroyed and replaced by new, higher-value housing to create more socio-economically mixed neighbourhoods, have shown ambiguous results (Tosics, 2009^[124]). The newly-created dwellings were often more expensive, and previous residents could no longer afford to live there. As a result, the demolition exacerbated the shortage of affordable housing and led to displacements, often leaving those displaced less well off. As a result, displaced households often tended to locate in different neighbourhoods with similarly high proportions of immigrants (Bolt and Van Kempen, 2010^[125]), thereby just displacing rather than resolving the challenge of migrant concentration.

Several OECD countries have targeted social interventions in areas with high concentration of disadvantage. Germany, for example, runs a programme “social cohesion” which provides 200 million Euros per year for disadvantaged neighbourhoods. Urban development investments in the residential area, in the infrastructure and in the quality of living aim at promoting neighbourhood attractiveness and at strengthening social cohesion. The integrated development concept as an important core element of the programme brings together all actors and resources in the district. Investments under this programme can include social infrastructure, housing, or schooling, as well as integration support for migrants.

Table 5.14. Overview of policies for area-specific interventions and their parameters

	Identification of the areas	Area-specific interventions
Belgium Flanders	Socio-economic indicators, foreign nationalities	Targeted funding for neighbourhood improvement programmes, regeneration programmes
Denmark	Socio-economic indicators, “ non-western ” immigrants and their descendants	Physical changes: tenure type changes, demolition, sales, establishment of new private properties Social changes: priority to applicants based on employment and education, no refugees assigned to specific areas, better policing, mandatory early childhood learning, penalties for schools with poor results
Estonia	High share of immigrants and their descendants , low-income earners	Provision of special social services, language and life-long learning emphasised, regeneration programmes Forthcoming: strategy with main aim to prevent any kind of segregation based on migrant background “Population and Coherent Society”
Finland	Socio-economic indicators (mostly concentrated in same areas as non-finish speakers)	Allocating different tenure types (private rental, owner occupied) to neighbourhoods with high concentrations of social housing, regeneration programmes, projects improving the quality and attractiveness of the neighbourhoods
Germany	Socio-economically disadvantaged areas (but also infrastructure, physical characteristics of area and share of immigrants and their descendants + language skills considered)	“Sozialer Zusammenhalt” (social cohesion) project: Targeted investments to improve infrastructure, neighbourhood quality, chances for participation and integration for inhabitants
Norway	Varying definitions: overcrowding, socio-economic indicators, accumulation of drug and health problems, high shares of immigrants and foreigners , insecurity	“Area initiatives”: improve attractiveness by changing the environment, long-term strategy with long-term goals that are defined accordingly
Portugal	Socio-economic indicators	Education interventions, rehousing, measures to promote social integration of residents
Sweden	Areas with socio-economic challenges	Prioritised interventions cover the following: housing, education, labour market, democracy, civil society and crime
United States	Targeted Employment Areas: unemployment rate at 150% of the national average rate	Facilitations for non-citizen investors (lower investment threshold (USD 900 000) for new commercial enterprises locating in Targeted Employment Areas)

Source: OECD questionnaire on policies aiming at reducing segregation of immigrants and its negative consequences, 2020.

Driving factors of migrant concentration in the housing market

In addition to the often lower overall socio-economic status of migrant households, there are a number of migrant-specific disadvantages in the housing market such as smaller networks, discrimination and a lack of knowledge about the functioning of the housing market that restrict their residential choice.

These factors are often interlinked. For example, with respect to mortgages, conditions for recent arrivals tend to be less favourable as they lack a credit history. A study from the Netherlands showed that, even after controlling for socio-economic background, the acceptance rate for a credit loan was lower for immigrants than for their native-born peers (Aalbers, 2007_[126]).

There is also ample evidence of discrimination in the rental market (see for an overview the recent meta-study by Auspurg, Schneck and Hinz (2019_[127]). Further research has shown that migrants are offered by real estate agents fewer and different dwellings than their native-born peers (Galster and Godfrey, 2005_[128]). In addition to outright discrimination by property owners, there is also a further effect due to a negative impact of high shares of immigrants and their descendants on housing appreciation (Flippen, 2004_[129]). As a result, evidence from the United States suggests that agents provide more information to native-born white clients and steer them towards more white and less poor neighbourhoods (Galster and Godfrey, 2005_[128]). In addition, immigrants often have to pay a premium in the private property market. For example, Bayer et al. (2017_[130]) examined four big cities in the United States and found that Hispanic homebuyers have to pay a price premium of around 2%.

Social housing

Given the obstacles faced by immigrants on the private housing market, the social housing sector is of particular relevance for tackling residential segregation. The access to social housing, its scale and scope, and the areas in which it is provided, are all key housing policy parameters that can directly influence migrant residential segregation and indeed, migrant integration at large.

The lever of social housing measures depends on the size of the social housing market in the overall housing market. According to the OECD *Affordable Housing Database* (OECD, 2021^[131]), the share of social housing is above 10% in eight OECD countries: the Netherlands (38%), Austria (24%), Denmark (22%), the United Kingdom (17%), France (14%), Ireland (13%) and Iceland and Finland (11%). There are also wide differences in the functioning of the social housing market, including with respect to the parameters which govern access and distribution (OECD, 2020^[132]).

Social housing can be both a driving and a preventative force for residential segregation, depending on the size, location and allocation process of social housing units. While large social housing projects can be a driver of segregation, small-size projects tend to decrease segregation as they are more likely to disperse social housing residents in different areas (Verdugo and Toma, 2018^[133]). One of the OECD's key recommendations in this respect is "Inclusionary Zoning" (Moreno Monroy et al., 2020^[134]). According to the (World Bank, n.d.^[135]), under inclusionary zoning private developers are either required or incentivised to incorporate affordable or social housing in their site development. This can be achieved either by incorporating affordable housing into the same development, by building it elsewhere, or by providing funding or land for social or affordable housing. The French Social Housing Act "Solidarité et Renouvellement Urbain" implemented a social housing minimum quota of 20% in every municipality in urban areas (Blanc, 2010^[136]), and localities that do not comply with the 20% minimum are fined. Likewise, some German cities have a social quota in place for land use allocation. However, implementation often needs a lot of time as new social housing dwellings need to be built or converted from the existing housing stock.

Of course, for social housing to play a role in reducing migrant concentration, it is not only important that social housing is de-concentrated; it also needs to be accessible to migrants. In the majority of OECD countries, permanent residents tend to have the same formal access to public housing as the native-born. However, there are obstacles for immigrants to get into social housing shortly after arrival. Some countries have long waiting lists (e.g. Belgium, Canada) or require applicants to have lived a minimum amount of time in the region (e.g. some municipalities in Norway) or in the country (e.g. New Zealand). In addition, immigrants face difficulties to meet other requirements such as in Belgium Flanders, where a certain level of Dutch language skills may be required.

Individual financial support

Rather than providing social housing per se, there is also the possibility to support households in need financially to access the private housing market. This can be done through housing allowance schemes, including voucher systems (e.g. voucher-based systems in the United States for low-income households) and other financial support systems for disadvantaged groups, which can target those in need more specifically. Most OECD countries have such kind of support for low-income households, and immigrant households generally tend to be eligible for this as well. About a dozen OECD countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Lithuania, New Zealand, Norway and Slovenia) have specific loan or financial support schemes for refugees.

Tackling migrant-specific disadvantages

While all OECD countries provide some legal protection against discrimination (OECD, 2020^[137]), only a few countries have specific policies or monitoring mechanisms to combat discrimination in the housing

market. Among these countries is the United States, where the Fair Housing Act guarantees legal protection to specific groups that are at risk of discrimination due to their skin colour, disability status, familial status, national origin, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation or gender. To enforce the act and to monitor discrimination, “Fair Housing Testers” are employed across the United States (United States Department of Justice, 2021^[138]). These testers act as home seekers to gather information about discriminatory housing market practices. In European OECD countries, in contrast, the issue of discrimination in the housing market has received little policy attention as witnessed by the fact that there have been very few discrimination suits over housing, when compared with those over employment issues (Silver and Danielowski, 2019^[139]). This gap is noteworthy, since data from the Second European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey show that self-reported discrimination in the housing market is just as common as in the labour market. While this does not necessarily reflect actual discrimination, it does suggest that it is an underappreciated issue.

Given migrants’ disadvantage with respect to knowledge about the functioning of the housing market, some countries provide targeted information and counselling – notably for refugees. In the Netherlands, for example, “facilitation days” for refugees provide support with these issues (Network of Integration Focal Points, 2007^[140]) and in Belgium, the accommodation structure of persons newly recognised as refugees provides assistance to find new housing. This includes especially linguistic assistance but also legal and financial consultation and the search for adequate housing. Some cities provide assistance and support services to help newcomers find affordable housing.

Conclusion

High residential concentration of immigrants is a universal phenomenon in OECD countries. It is observed at different geographical levels: across regions or cities and across neighbourhoods within cities. While there is some indication of growing immigrant residential segregation, this primarily concerns the school level, while the evidence at the neighbourhood level is more mixed. However, even when immigrants spread more broadly across space, this does not necessarily translate into diminished perceptions of the issue, for two reasons. First, in long-standing immigration countries, native-born descendants of immigrants often end up living in “historical” immigrant neighbourhoods, which leads to a perception of ethnicisation of neighbourhoods even though the local share of foreign-born has actually declined. Second, a more even spread of immigrants across cities and regions also make them more visible to a larger share of the native-born population, who may take this as a marker for an even larger immigrant presence in previously segregated neighbourhoods.

The drivers and impacts of migrants’ concentration are multiple and complex. New arrivals tend to move to areas with a high concentration of individuals from the same origin, and this is often associated with short-term benefits, because of the help provided by local social networks in searching for a job or an accommodation. However, this initial advantage tends to turn into a disadvantage over time, as high immigrant concentration is associated with slower familiarity with the host-country institutions and language.

It thus appears that living in an area with a high residential concentration of immigrants is associated with a trade-off: it entails both short-term benefits for new arrivals but also long-term integration costs. In any case, residential concentration is difficult to tackle. In particular, trying to prevent migrants from seeking such short-term gains is not only challenging, but could also be counterproductive. Countries have nevertheless tried it – notably regarding new humanitarian arrivals – but the evidence suggests that this strategy did often not bear the expected fruits: it was associated with lower employment while many migrants subjected to dispersal moved nevertheless to segregated areas later. Indeed, the short-term benefits of living in a segregated area tend to be quite robust, while the long-term costs are less certain,

particularly in contexts where immigrants are uncertain about their long-term residence and integration prospects.

While outmigration concerns both native-born and immigrants, it does not necessarily enhance segregation. However, as the movers out of areas with disadvantage tend to be in a better socio-economic position than those who remain, it does exacerbate the overall level of disadvantage in the neighbourhood. In any case, outmigration only plays a limited role as segregation patterns remains largely determined by initial residence. It is thus vital to break negative intergenerational dynamics for immigrants, especially for the low-educated, not only but particularly in areas with high residential concentration. More policy attention should be devoted to address the causes of the immobility of migrants and their children – especially of those who are in a very low socio-economic position – living in disadvantaged areas.

In this context, more attention needs to be given notably to the quality, distribution and accessibility of housing for immigrants – both for new arrivals and settled migrants. This is a much underappreciated policy area regarding integration, although it is also particularly difficult to tackle, especially in countries where the social housing stock is small. Apart from the levers associated with social housing, broader access to housing credits and addressing discrimination in the housing market are also promising and underappreciated areas for policy action.

Another area where greater policy attention is required is the integration of immigrant women in areas with high residential segregation, in particular as it has a spill over effect on the outcomes of their children. The tentative evidence in this chapter suggests that this is partly associated with different social norms in areas with high segregation, especially when immigrants from origin countries with high gender disparities are concerned. However, the evidence in this respect is not very strong, and both the gender impact of residential segregation and the links between segregation and social norms are under-researched areas.

Both research and integration policy also need to pay more attention to the spatial aspects of intergenerational dynamics. To overcome the lower interactions with the host-country institutions and language barriers, specific language training efforts and information outreach for immigrants in areas with high concentration seem a further promising avenue for policy efforts.

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Annex 5.A. Supplementary materials


Tables and figures

Annex Table 5.A.1. Regional concentration and urban share of native-born and foreign-born populations in Canada, England, Sweden and the United States, 1910-11

	Canada, 1911		England, 1911		Sweden, 1910		United States, 1910	
	Foreign-born	Native-born	Foreign-born	Native-born	Foreign-born	Native-born	Foreign-born	Native-born
Share of regions comprising 50% of the respective population	10.4% (23/222 districts)	31.5% (70/222 districts)	5.0% (2/40 counties)	12.5% (5/40 counties)	12.5% (3/24 counties)	37.5% (9/24 counties)	1.2% (36/2 952 counties)	13.7% (403/2 952 counties)
Urban share	54.4%	43.8%	23.2%	10.7%	47.0%	22.8%	68.6%	40.8%

Note: For each country, the share of administrative units (districts for Canada, counties for the three other countries) comprising 50% of the population is computed as follows: for each group (foreign-born and native-born), the distribution of the population across all regional units is obtained, and regional units are sorted in decreasing order of their respective share. A count is then done to determine the minimal number of regional units needed to reach 50% of the population. The urban share is the share of the population living in localities designated as urban. The definition of “urban” varies across countries. In some cases, the definition is based on a population threshold or other measurable criteria, in other cases the categorisation is based on an administrative classification.

Source: Census data of Canada, England, Sweden and the United States; Minnesota Population Center (2020^[7]), “Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, International: Version 7.3”, <http://dx.doi.org/10.18128/D020.V7.3> and OECD Secretariat calculations.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/ciebh6>

Annex Table 5.A.2. Coefficients from regressions of the share of foreign-born on city population in European countries, 2010-19

	Total immigrants	Non-EU immigrants	EU immigrants
Log city population	1.81***	1.43***	0.38***
Controls	Country and year fixed effects		
Number of observations	2 263	2 263	2 263

Note: Each cell shows the coefficient of a different linear regression of the share of immigrants in the population (total, only non-EU-born or only EU-born) on log city population. Observations are 435 functional urban areas (FUAs) in 20 European countries pooled over 10 years (2010-19; unbalanced panel). A FUA consists of a densely inhabited city and of a surrounding area (commuting zone) whose labour market is highly integrated with the city. All regressions include country and year fixed effects (coefficients not shown). ***: coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 1% level.

Source: Eurostat; OECD Secretariat calculations.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/jywx3>

Measurement of segregation

In order to measure the residential segregation of a region, several methodological and conceptual issues must be addressed. First, because residential segregation indicates the extent to which individuals of different groups live in different neighbourhoods, the meaning of “neighbourhood” must be clarified.

Second, a conceptual definition of residential segregation must be chosen. Massey and Denton (1988^[141]) describe five different dimensions of segregation: evenness, exposure, clustering, concentration, and centralisation. Strategies for measuring residential segregation will depend on which of these aspects are relevant for the question at hand. Third, the population dimension along which to measure segregation must be defined (e.g. country of origin).


Most traditional measures of residential segregation are described as *aspatial* because they implicitly define an individual's social environment as equivalent to some areal unit (e.g. a census tract), without considering the relative location of these units in space. All individuals in a given census tract, for example, are defined as occupying the same environment, whose composition is independent of the makeup of nearby tracts.

Aspatial segregation measures have often been criticised in the residential segregation context for their failure to account for the spatial patterning of census tracts (Reardon and O'Sullivan, 2004^[142]). In particular, those measures do not account for the “checkerboard problem” and the “modifiable areal unit problem”.

The “checkerboard problem” stems from the fact that aspatial measures ignore the spatial proximity of neighbourhoods and focus instead only on the composition of neighbourhoods. In a checkerboard where each square represents a black or white neighbourhood, if all the black squares were moved to one side of the board and all white squares to the other, a measure of segregation should register this change as an increase in segregation because most neighbourhoods would now be surrounded by neighbourhoods of the same colour (Annex Figure 5.A.1). Aspatial measures of segregation, however, do not distinguish between the first and second patterns, since in each case the compositions of individual neighbourhoods are the same.

The “modifiable areal unit problem” (MAUP) arises in residential segregation measurement because residential population data are typically collected and/or reported for spatial units (such as census tracts) that have no necessary correspondence with meaningful social/spatial divisions. This data collection scheme implicitly assumes that individuals living near one another but in separate spatial units are more distant from one another than are two individuals living relatively far from one another but within the same spatial unit. As a result, all measures of spatial and aspatial segregation that rely on population counts aggregated within subareas are sensitive to the definitions of the boundaries of these subareas. Two aspects of the MAUP are illustrated in Annex Figure 5.A.1: aggregation effects, which result in differences in measured segregation if different sized subareas are used to compute it; and zoning effects, which result in differences in measured segregation if the subarea boundaries are shifted, even if the number and size of the subareas remain fixed.

Annex Figure 5.A.1. The checkerboard problem and the modifiable areal unit problem



When measuring residential segregation, the checkerboard problem and MAUP pose conceptual difficulties. Reardon and O’Sullivan (2004^[142]) argue that these problems are caused by the reliance on subarea (e.g. tract) boundaries in the computation of segregation measurement. In principle, segregation measures that use information on the exact locations of individuals and their proximities to one another in residential space would eliminate the “checkerboard problem” and MAUP issues from the measurement of residential segregation.

As noted above, Massey and Denton (1988^[141]) describe five distinct “dimensions” of residential segregation, which they term evenness, exposure, clustering, centralisation, and concentration. In their formulation, evenness and exposure are aspatial dimensions, while clustering, concentration, and centralisation are explicitly spatial dimensions of segregation and require information on the locations and areas of census tracts to compute.

Reardon and O’Sullivan (2004^[142]) suggest an alternative to the Massey and Denton dimensions of residential segregation, arguing instead for two primary conceptual dimensions: spatial exposure (or spatial isolation) and spatial evenness (or spatial clustering). Spatial exposure refers to the extent that members of one group encounter members of another group (or their own group, in the case of spatial isolation) in their local spatial environments. Spatial evenness, or clustering, refers to the extent to which groups are similarly distributed in residential space. Spatial exposure, like aspatial exposure, is a measure of the typical environment experienced by individuals and depends in part on the overall racial composition of the population in the region under investigation. Spatial evenness, in contrast, is independent of the population composition.

Annex Box 5.A.1. Measuring and visualising residential segregation: The dissimilarity and isolation indexes and location quotients

Many indicators have been proposed in the literature to capture the different dimensions of residential segregation (see e.g. Massey and Denton (1988^[141]) and Reardon and O’Sullivan (2004^[142]) for extensive descriptions of existing a-spatial and spatial indicators and their properties).

The dissimilarity index, which captures evenness, is certainly one of the most widely used indicators of residential segregation. It compares the distribution of two populations – typically a minority group versus a majority group – across local units (e.g. census tracts within a region or city). More specifically, the dissimilarity index measures the share of the minority group that would need to move to different geographic areas to achieve a uniform distribution across local units in the region or city considered. It is computed as follows:

$$D = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^N \left| \frac{a_i}{A} - \frac{b_i}{B} \right|$$

where a_i and b_i are the populations of groups A and B in local unit i (e.g. census tract), A and B are the total populations of these groups in the whole region or city, and N is the number of local units in the region or city.

The isolation index provides a complementary perspective, measuring exposure of members of the minority group to other minority persons; it is the probability that an individual from the minority group shares a local unit with another individual from the same group. For group A, it is computed as follows:

$$I_A = \sum_{i=1}^N \left(\frac{a_i}{A} \right) \left(\frac{a_i}{a_i + b_i} \right)$$

with the same notations as above (and assuming A and B are the only two groups in the population). One obvious limitation of the isolation index is that it increases mathematically with the share of group A in the population, making comparisons over time or across groups uneasy. The adjusted isolation index corrects this bias and is computed as:

$$\tilde{I}_A = \frac{I_A - [A/(A+B)]}{1 - [A/(A+B)]}$$

Residential segregation is intrinsically a spatial phenomenon. It is therefore useful to map the spatial distribution of different groups in a city or region. The relative concentration of a group at the local level can be assessed through location quotients. The location quotient of group A for cell (or census tract) j in city k is:

$$LQ_{Aj}^k = \frac{a_j^k / t_j^k}{A^k / T^k}$$

where a_j^k is the population of group A in cell j in city k , t_j^k is the total population of this cell, A^k is the population of group A in city k , and T^k is the total population of city k . A location quotient above 1 indicates an area where the local share of this immigrant group is higher than the city average.

Annex Box 5.A.2. The Joint Research Centre *Data for Integration* (D4I) dataset

The *Data for Integration* (D4I) dataset, published by the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission, has been obtained through a spatial disaggregation of statistics of the 2011 Census, collected from national statistical institutes. The results of the spatial processing of the original data is a uniform grid showing the concentration of migrants in cells of 100 by 100 metres in all cities of eight European countries (France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom). Immigrants are grouped at three different levels of aggregation: by specific country, continent, and EU versus third country origin. A detailed description of the data is provided in Alessandrini et al. (2017^[23]).

The analyses based on this dataset in this chapter focus on non-EU immigrants and use a slightly coarser grid (300 by 300 metres). Maps in Figure 5.7 report location quotients for each cell in the core of some of the major functional urban areas in Europe.

Notes

¹ This work was produced with the financial support of the Swedish Ministry of Employment. It includes a contribution by Anke Windisch (Consultant to the OECD).

² As already noted by (Hugo, 2008^[143]), “immigrants have shown an increasing tendency to settle in large cities, especially Sydney and Melbourne, which in 2006 had 34.1% of the Australia-born population but 53.1% of the foreign-born.” In 2016, the foreign-born accounted for 35% of the population of Sydney, and 32% of Melbourne’s.

³ For Japan and Korea, data by place of birth are not available. For these two countries, data refer to foreign nationals.

⁴ It was also above average in the largest prefecture capitals, such as Osaka (5.1%), Nagoya (3.6%), Kyoto (3.3%) or Kobe (3.1%). In total, Tokyo and the 46 prefecture capitals hosted 47% of all foreigners living in Japan, compared to 37% of the total population.

⁵ The share of foreign-born was especially high in Tijuana (4.8%) and Juarez (4.5%), which accounted for 18% of all US-born residents of Mexico.

⁶ <https://mmp.opr.princeton.edu>.

⁷ This has also been confirmed in country-specific studies, for example for the United Kingdom (Geay and McNally, 2013^[145]).

⁸ Although not related to humanitarian but to ethnic migration, in Israel, the limited availability of housing as well as opposition by resident middle and upper class in certain areas led to spatial segregation of Ethiopians in certain, often deprived, areas (OECD, 2010^[144]).

6 Country notes: Recent changes in migration movements and policies

Australia

Foreign-born population – 2020	
Size: 7.7 million, 51% women	<i>Main countries of birth:</i> United Kingdom (15%), India (9%), China (9%)
30.0% of the population	
Evolution since 2010: +30%	

Between July 2019 and June 2020, Australia received 163 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status), -15% compared to 2018. This figure comprises 27% labour migrants, 59% family members (including accompanying family), 8% humanitarian migrants and 6% immigrants benefitting from free mobility. Around 123 000 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 202 000 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants.

India, China and the United Kingdom were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2019. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Nepal registered the strongest increase (900) and the Philippines the largest decrease (-1 700) in flows to Australia compared to the previous year.

In 2020, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -29.8%, to reach around 19 000. The majority of applicants came from Malaysia (4 000), China (2 300) and India (1 800). The largest increase since 2019 concerned nationals of Timor-Leste (300) and the largest decrease nationals of Malaysia (-3 100). Of the 26 000 decisions taken in 2020, 10.2% were positive.

Emigration of Australians to OECD countries increased by 13% to 36 000 in 2019. Approximately 30% of this group migrated to the United Kingdom, 21% to New Zealand and 13% to Japan.

Australia maintained the Migration Program planning level at 160 000 places for 2020-21, although there were changes to the allocations for specific categories. Family category places were increased significantly, from 47 732 places to 77 300 places. This brought the total proportion of Family places in the Migration Program to 48% – the highest it has been since 1995-96. Further, Skilled category places were reduced from 108 682 to 79 600 places. Both the Global Talent and the Business Innovation and Investment Programs have seen significant growth in both volume and proportion of places in the Skilled category. There are 100 places set aside for Special Eligibility and 3 000 places for children noting that places for children are an estimate only and not subject to the Migration Program ceiling).

In August 2020, Hong Kong, China passport holders who held temporary graduate or temporary skilled visas received a five-year extension. Hong Kong, China passport holders that apply for new temporary graduate or temporary skilled visas will be granted a visa with a validity of five years. Additionally, Australia is developing a permanent residency

pathway for Hong Kong, China passport that reside in Australia for five years on temporary skilled or temporary graduate visas, or three years for those who choose to reside in a regional area.

In September 2020, Australia established the Global Business and Talent Attraction Taskforce to support Australia's post-COVID-19 economic recovery. The Taskforce provides eligible enterprises with the facilitated relocation of executives and their critical staff to Australia. The Global Talent visa is the primary visa used by the Taskforce, and individuals who meet the visa criteria gain direct access to permanent residence and priority visa processing.

In April 2021, Australia introduced major reforms to improve access to its largest settlement programme, the Adult Migrant English Program (AMEP). AMEP assists migrants and humanitarian entrants to learn English, understand Australian systems and build confidence and skills to successfully settle in Australia. Legislative amendments to the *Immigration (Education) Act 1971* removed the previous 510 hour limit to provide unlimited hours of tuition; extended the eligibility threshold of the programme from functional to vocational English; and removed time limits on registration, commencement and completion of tuition for eligible migrants who first arrived in Australia on or before 1 October 2020. These changes mean more migrants and humanitarian entrants can now access government-funded English tuition for longer and until they reach a higher level of proficiency.


Throughout 2020 Australia introduced temporary visa arrangements in response to COVID-19 to support public health measures, support critical sectors and assist with economic recovery. From April 2020, a COVID-19 Pandemic event visa was created to assist with regularising the visa status of individuals in Australia working in critical sectors such as health, aged and disability care, childcare, agriculture and food processing during the pandemic. Further, COVID-19 Pandemic Event visa holders working in the medical sector and other critical sectors can count this work towards qualifying for a second or third Working Holiday Maker visa. In September 2020, the Priority Migration Skilled Occupation List (PMSOL) was created for people with critical skills to aid the recovery of the Australian economy post-COVID-19. PMSOL occupations receive a higher visa processing priority than other occupations. The PMSOL is based on labour market advice from the National Skills Commission and is subject to regular review.

For further information:

www.immi.homeaffairs.gov.au

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Australia

Long-term immigration flows by category
2019 (Source: OECD)



Temporary migration
(Source: OECD)

Temporary labour migration

	2019	2019/18
Working holidaymakers	209 040	- 1%
Seasonal workers	12 200	+ 44%
Intra-company transfers	2 840	- 39%
Other temporary workers


Education

	2019	2019/18
International students	173 370	+ 6%
Trainees


Humanitarian

	2020	2020/19
Asylum seekers	19 220	- 30%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(national definition)



Emigration of Australians to OECD countries
(national definition)




Components of population growth

	2020 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2020/19 difference
Total	13.3	-1.7
Natural increase	5.2	-0.3
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	0.1	-8.9

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2020)	1 192	-32.0	+0.1
Outflows (2020)	4 302	-42.2	+0.3

Labour market outcomes
2020



Austria

Foreign-born population – 2020	
Size: 1.8 million, 51% women	<i>Main countries of birth:</i> Germany (13%), Bosnia and Herzegovina (10%), Turkey (9%)
19.6% of the population	
Evolution since 2010: +38%	

In 2019, Austria received 82 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status and free mobility), -6% compared to 2018. This figure comprises 70.2% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 7.4% labour migrants, 12.8% family members (including accompanying family) and 9.1% humanitarian migrants. Around 3 600 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 11 000 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 320 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2019, an increase of 170% compared to 2018. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Romania, Germany and Hungary were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2019. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Germany registered the strongest increase (1 400) and Hungary the largest decrease (-500) in flows to Austria compared to the previous year.

In 2020, the number of first asylum applicants increased by 21.8%, to reach around 13 000. The majority of applicants came from Syria (5 100), Afghanistan (2 800) and Morocco (700). The largest increase since 2019 concerned nationals of Syria (2 400) and the largest decrease nationals of Iran (-400). Of the 10 000 decisions taken in 2020, 65.1% were positive.

Emigration of Austrians to OECD countries decreased by -5% in 2019 to 15 000. Approximately 41% of this group migrated to Germany, 19% to Switzerland and 9% to Turkey.

In 2019, the points system of the Red-White-Red (RWR) card was amended with occupational experience receiving more weight and less to age, while English proficiency was introduced. The highly skilled group was further differentiated by adding very highly skilled (a wide variety of graduate engineers; economic trustees, physicians) for whom a fast track immigration path was opened. The shortage list for RWR cards was extended in January 2020 by an additional 11 occupations bringing the total to 56. Other occupations, mostly in tourism, were added to local shortage lists in all provinces except Vienna and Burgenland, resulting in an annual cap of 300 additional permits in total. The requirement of proof of a legal title to accommodation was abolished in the RWR card scheme at the end of 2020.

In July 2020, the transition regulations relative to labour mobility of Croatians came to an end after seven years, opening free access to the Austrian labour market for migrants from Croatia, including unskilled workers.

In response to a shortage of seasonal staff, partly as a result of travel restrictions imposed by countries of origin, in 2020 farm workers were declared essential workers and Eastern Europeans were allowed in for harvesting jobs. In addition, care-workers were flown in from Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania with some employers offering bonus payments for care-workers who were prepared to stay longer.

In December 2019, the Aliens Police Act 2005 was amended, temporarily suspending the return of asylum seekers in apprenticeship training to their countries of origin in case of a negative decision. Asylum seekers with a negative asylum decision were allowed to finish their apprenticeship in Austria. Thereafter, the legal situation of the individual case will be assessed again and in case of no change in this regard, the asylum seeker has to fulfil his/her obligation to leave Austria.

Following legislation in 2019, in effect from the beginning of 2020 a Federal Agency for the support of asylum seekers was established by the government. The Agency, a private limited company, has the exclusive responsibility for the provision of accommodation, care and legal counselling for asylum seekers in the federal reception system. The Agency is expected to work at full capacity as of 2021.

In response to the integration challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, the expert council on the integration of migrants (to the Minister of Integration in the Federal Chancellery) drew up a policy brief, suggesting steps to improve the labour force participation of migrants and thereby stabilise their income. Measures proposed include accelerated digitalisation and the implementation of automation in work processes, up- and re-skilling of low-skilled migrants and facilitation and promotion of education and training of migrant women.

An amendment of the Citizenship law allows direct descendants of individuals persecuted under Austrofascism and National Socialism to acquire Austrian citizenship in a simplified procedure since September 2020, without having to abandon their current citizenship.

For further information:

www.migration.gv.at


www.bmeia.gv.at

www.bmi.gv.at

www.sozialministerium.at

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Austria

Long-term immigration flows by category
2019 (Source: OECD)



Temporary migration
(Source: OECD)

Temporary labour migration (non-EU citizens)

	2019	2019/18
Working holidaymakers
Seasonal workers	9 390	+ 23%
Intra-company transfers	140	- 4%
Other temporary workers	990	+ 1%


Education (non-EU citizens)

	2019	2019/18
International students	3 580	- 4%
Trainees


Humanitarian

	2020	2020/19
Asylum seekers	13 420	+ 22%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(national definition)



Emigration of Austrians to OECD countries
(national definition)




Components of population growth

	2020 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2020/19 difference
Total	3.5	-1.3
Natural increase	-0.9	-1.1
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	4.4	-0.2

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2020)	3 089	+1.5	+0.7
Outflows (2020)	5 878	+0.1	+1.4

Labour market outcomes
2020



Belgium

Foreign-born population – 2020	
Size: 2.1 million, 51% women	<i>Main countries of birth:</i> Morocco (11%), France (9%), the Netherlands (6%)
17.7% of the population	
Evolution since 2010: +37%	

In 2019, Belgium received 113 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status and free mobility), 3.7% more than in 2018. This figure comprises 60.9% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 4.5% labour migrants, 28.5% family members (including accompanying family) and 5.9% humanitarian migrants. Around 8 000 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 1 400 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 218 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2019, an increase of 39% compared to 2018. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Romania, France and the Netherlands were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2019. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Afghanistan registered the strongest increase (1 600) and Syria the largest decrease (-800) in flows to Belgium compared to the previous year.

In 2020, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -44.1%, to reach around 13 000. The majority of applicants came from Afghanistan (2 300), Syria (1 300) and Eritrea (800). The largest increase since 2019 concerned nationals of Brazil (400) and the largest decrease nationals of West Bank and Gaza Strip (-1 900). Of the 16 000 decisions taken in 2020, 34.9% were positive.

The government of the Brussels-Capital Region introduced some changes to ease the recruitment of highly skilled third-country immigrants that took effect in July 2020. The recruitment is no longer limited to workers from origin countries who signed an employment agreement with Belgium.

In April 2021, Flanders updated its 2019 shortage occupation list for medium skilled occupations. A similar shortage occupation list exists in Wallonia, which is reviewed every year.

In December 2020, the Council of Ministers approved the creation of an Interministerial Conference on Migration and Integration to help ensure coherent policies across levels of government.

In February 2021, in preparation for transposition of the Students and Researchers Directive 2016/801/EU, a draft law on the mobility of third-country students was submitted to the Council of Ministers. The main change concerns the possibility to extend their stay for up to 12 months to find work or create a business, after completing their studies. In 2020 the EU Seasonal Workers Directive was enacted into national law.

In May 2021, Belgium launched a Single Electronic Platform 'Working in Belgium'. It will allow employers to electronically

file and monitor the status of applications for Single Permits, EU Blue Cards and EU Intracompany Transfer permits. The scope of applications should be gradually extended by 2022 to all work permits, professional cards and single permits for indefinite duration. The purpose of this platform is to streamline immigration processes across regions, which can develop their own labour migration policies since the State Reform of 2014. The platform also aims to reduce administrative workload; facilitate information sharing and data exchange between the three regions, the Federal immigration office, municipalities, and the national social security office; and ultimately reduce processing time for applications. In March 2021, Flanders made some changes in its posted workers legislation. Among other provisions, temporary workers are now excluded from a labour card if they comply with certain conditions.

EUR 50 million were reallocated to asylum and migration policy in April 2021 and changes in recruitment policy are foreseen to limit turnover in asylum services.

The appointment system of asylum seekers prior to arrival introduced in April 2020 in order to respect health measures in the context of COVID-19 has been abandoned.

In October 2020, a set of measures entered into force to increase the effectiveness of the Dublin procedure and improve information sharing with reception centres. A new instruction includes the possibility of house arrest and to limit reception of applicants in a Dublin procedure in case of lack of co-operation.

In reaction to the mobilisation of civil society, the Council of State suspended the possibility to detain families with children in irregular stay in special return units close to Brussels Airport.

During the COVID-19 crisis, applications for visas and permits were still accepted and processed despite organisational challenges. Regional employment authorities do not require compliance with the immigration salary threshold in case of suspension of the employment contract during the pandemic.

In April 2021, following a request from the State Secretary for Asylum and Migration, a survey was organised in reception centres by Fedasil. Around 200 asylum seekers, graduated or with some experience in the field of health or care, have been identified and should be granted a work authorisation to support health professionals during the pandemic.

For further information:

www.dofi.ibz.be


www.emploi.belgique.be

www.myria.be

www.statbel.gov.be

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Belgium

Long-term immigration flows by category
2019 (Source: OECD)



Temporary migration (non-EU citizens)
(Source: Eurostat)


Temporary migration

	2019	2019/18
Remunerated activities reasons	1 410	+ 34%
Family reasons	9 490	+ 24%
Education reasons	1 090	+ 5%
Other	5 550	- 17%


Humanitarian

	2020	2020/19
Asylum seekers	12 930	- 44%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(national definition)



Emigration of Belgians to OECD countries
(national definition)




Components of population growth

	2020 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2020/19 difference
Total	3.8	-2.0
Natural increase	-1.1	-1.9
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	4.9	-0.1

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2020)	13 121	+7.9	+2.6
Outflows (2020)	6 404	+20.4	+1.2

Labour market outcomes
2020



Bulgaria

Foreign-born population – 2020	
Size: 0.2 million, 51% women	<i>Main countries of birth:</i> Russia (17%), Turkey (9%), Syria (8%)
2.8% of the population	
Evolution since 2010: +124%	

In 2019, 7 000 new immigrants obtained a residence permit longer than 12 months in Bulgaria (excluding EU citizens), 20.8% more than in 2018. This figure comprises 13% labour migrants, 22% family members (including accompanying family), 9.7% who came for education reasons and 55.3% other migrants. Around 900 short-term permits were issued to international students and 1 400 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 14 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2019, an increase of 300% compared to 2018. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Turkey, Russia and Ukraine were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2019. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Turkey registered the strongest increase (600) and Syria the largest decrease (-400) in flows to Bulgaria compared to the previous year.

In 2020, the number of first asylum applicants increased by 66.7%, to reach around 3 500. The majority of applicants came from Afghanistan (1 700), Syria (1 100) and Iraq (200). The largest increase since 2019 concerned nationals of Afghanistan (700) and the largest decrease nationals of Iraq (-55). Of the 2 200 decisions taken in 2020, 37.4% were positive.

Emigration of Bulgarians to OECD countries increased by 5% to 91 000 in 2019. Approximately 51% of this group migrated to Germany, 10% to the Netherlands and 6% to Austria.

The Law on Foreigner Citizens which regulates the residence of foreign persons in Bulgaria was changed several times in 2019-20. A main reason for the changes was the need to further harmonise the legislation with EU requirements, including a single application procedure, a common set of rights and conditions of entry for posted workers. The overall policy direction is towards more regulated immigration, by reducing the loopholes for irregular migrants and facilitating access to residence and

the labour market for seasonal and highly-skilled foreign labour.

Access to Bulgaria by migrants who set up a company representation office solely to receive a long-term residence permit on that ground was restricted. Unaccompanied children became eligible for long-term residence status until they reached the age of 18. To reduce the administrative burden on seasonal and highly qualified foreign workers, they no longer have to file a new application for residence permission. A further amendment introduced more preconditions for family reunion when granting residence to refugees' partners, including proof of a long-standing relationship before arrival.

Foreign students from third countries who reside and study in another EU member state were given the right to enter Bulgaria and continue their education in Bulgaria. Foreign students who complete their education in Bulgaria no longer need to return to their home countries before applying for a residence permit.

In order to encourage entrepreneurs to set up businesses in Bulgaria, a "start-up" visa was introduced which also provides for a long-term residence permit. In 2019, a bilateral employment agreement with Georgia was signed and came into force.

The Asylum and Refugees Law was amended in 2020 to streamline the procedures for granting status for unaccompanied minors.

Following Brexit, the reciprocity principle was adopted in order to protect the rights of UK citizens in Bulgaria as much as the Bulgarian citizens are protected in the United Kingdom. A special status is provided to the UK citizens who entered Bulgaria before 29 April 2019 and they and their family members receive unlimited leave to remain.

Foreign residents in Bulgaria whose residence permit expired during the COVID-19 lockdown received automatic extension of stay for six months.

For further information:


www.aref.government.bg

www.nsi.bg

www.mvr.bg

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Bulgaria

Grants of long-term residence permits (non-EU citizens)
2019 (Source: Eurostat)



Temporary migration (non-EU citizens)
(Source: Eurostat)


Temporary migration

	2019	2019/18
Remunerated activities reasons	1 370	+ 37%
Family reasons	2 340	- 0%
Education reasons	870	+ 3%
Other	930	- 12%


Humanitarian

	2020	2020/19
Asylum seekers	3 460	+ 66%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(national definition)



Emigration of Bulgarians to OECD countries
(national definition)




Components of population growth

	2020 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2020/19 difference
Total	-5.0	+2.0
Natural increase	-9.5	-2.8
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	4.4	+4.7

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2020)	955	-59.2	+1.4
Outflows (2020)	189	-7.6	+0.3

Labour market outcomes
2020



Canada

Foreign-born population – 2018	
Size: 7.9 million, 52% women	<i>Main countries of birth:</i> India (8%), China (8%), Philippines (7%)
21.3% of the population	
Evolution since 2008: +22%	

In 2020, Canada received 185 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status), 46% more than in 2019. This figure comprises 33% labour migrants, 52% family members (including accompanying family) and 14% humanitarian migrants. Around 51 000 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 153 000 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants.

India, China and the Philippines were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2019. Among the top 15 countries of origin, India registered the strongest increase (16 000) and the Philippines the largest decrease (-7 200) in flows to Canada compared to the previous year.

In 2020, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -67.4%, to reach around 19 000. The majority of applicants came from Mexico (1 800), India (1 600) and Nigeria (600). The largest increase since 2019 concerned nationals of Democratic People's Republic of Korea (6) and the largest decrease nationals of India (-3 600). Of the 31 000 decisions taken in 2020, 49.6% were positive.

Canada's 2021-23 Immigration Levels Plan envisions a further increase in new permanent migration: 401 000 admissions in 2021, 411 000 in 2022, and 421 000 in 2023. To meet these targets and to retain workers in essential occupations, new temporary pathways to permanent residence were opened. From May-November 2021, these new pathways to permanent residence were established for eligible foreign nationals currently employed in Canada – up to 50 000 applicants in health care and other essential occupations, as well as 40 000 international students who have recently graduated from a Canadian post-secondary institution. Non-capped streams with the same eligibility criteria are open to French-speakers with French language test results. In February 2021, Canada issued a historically large number of invitations to apply through its Express Entry system to eligible Canadian Experience Class candidates.

A number of new policies support Canada's Francophone Immigration Strategy, which seeks to achieve 4.4% French-speaking immigrants, outside of Quebec, by 2023. Since October 2020, French-speaking candidates and bilingual candidates applying to economic immigration programs via the Express Entry application management system receive additional points for their language skills and a new national partnership with francophone organisations was introduced to streamline access to settlement services in French.

Building on the experience of regional economic immigration programmes, such as the Provincial Nominee Program and the Rural and Northern Immigration Pilot, Canada is currently working to develop and implement a Municipal Nominee Program, which would allow local communities, chambers of commerce and local labour councils to select permanent immigrants. The Economic Mobility Pathways Pilot (EMPP) is Canada's new model for refugee labour mobility. Launched in 2018, the EMPP sought to pilot a way to support skilled refugees in immigrating to Canada through existing economic pathways. Canada is currently looking at increasing the number of EMPP applicants, based on lessons learned and is working towards the launch of a Global Task Force on Refugee Labour Mobility, a collaboration between states, NGOs, and the private sector to promote labour complementary pathways to resettlement worldwide.


In response to COVID-19, non-essential travel to Canada was halted in March 2020. Those exempted from these rules, including citizens and their family, essential workers, international students and limited cohorts of foreign nationals approved for permanent residence, needed to meet testing and quarantine requirements. Some measures for temporary residents included: developing policies that allow temporary foreign workers in the country to stay and work permanently, while alleviating barriers for those who applied from outside Canada; extending timelines to restore temporary resident status; allowing international students enrolled in a virtual format to count all online study towards their post-graduation work permit until the end of 2021; and, allowing graduates to apply for a work permit even if they completed their entire programme online from outside Canada. With the exception of urgent protection cases and refugees who were already in possession of a permanent resident visa for Canada at the time that travel restrictions were enacted in Canada, refugee resettlement was significantly impacted. In June 2020, resettlement resumed in areas where country conditions and operational capacity of the overseas network allowed. Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, the Government of Canada worked with Canada's network of over 500 settlement service providers, the refugee sponsorship community, and provincial/territorial partners to provide information and support to newcomers, including by adapting services that were predominantly in-person to remote settlement services.

For further information:

www.canada.ca/en/services/immigration-citizenship

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Canada

Long-term immigration flows by category
2019 (Source: OECD)



Temporary migration
(Source: OECD)

Temporary labour migration

	2019	2019/18
Working holidaymakers	47 460	- 2%
Seasonal workers	36 850	+ 3%
Intra-company transfers	14 630	+ 14%
Other temporary workers	169 000	+ 14%


Education

	2019	2019/18
International students	171 980	+ 13%
Trainees


Humanitarian

	2020	2020/19
Asylum seekers	19 050	- 67%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(national definition)



Emigration of Canadians to OECD countries
(national definition)




Components of population growth

	2018 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2018/17 difference
Total	14.1	+2.1
Natural increase	2.6	-0.2
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	11.5	+2.2

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2020)	911	-30.6	+0.1
Outflows (2020)	6 538	-22.1	+0.4

Labour market outcomes
2020



Chile

Foreign-born population – 2020	
Size: 1.5 million, 49% women	<i>Main countries of birth:</i> Venezuela (31%), Peru (16%), Haiti (12%)
7.8% of the population	
Evolution since 2010: +324%	

Venezuela, Haiti and Colombia were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2019. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Venezuela registered the strongest increase (13 000) and Haiti the largest decrease (-76 000) in flows to Chile compared to the previous year.

In 2020, the number of first asylum applicants increased by 100%, to reach around 1 700. The majority of applicants came from Colombia (700), Cuba (500) and Venezuela (400). The largest increase since 2019 concerned nationals of Colombia (400) and the largest decrease nationals of Dominican Republic (-10). Of the 1 900 decisions taken in 2020, 0.3% were positive.

Emigration of Chileans to OECD countries increased by 14% in 2019, to 12 000. Approximately 36% of this group migrated to Spain, 14% to the United States and 11% to Germany.

On 10 December 2020, the Chilean Congress approved a law that reforms the immigration system. From the publication of the Law in April 2021, the Ministry of Interior has 12 months to publish implementing immigration regularisations.

According to the new law, foreign nationals who entered Chile as tourists are no longer able to change to residence status in-country, with the exception of family reunification.

In order to perform short-term work, foreign nationals need to apply for a Special Work Authorisation through a digital process abroad or in-country. This authorisation replaces the current Special Work Permit for Tourists that tourists can apply for upon entry. This allows new entrants to start work immediately upon arrival in Chile; in the previous system, foreign nationals had to enter Chile and wait for their work permit to be issued.

The new law expands the Temporary Residence Visa category to, among others, self-employed workers, employees, seasonal workers, and foreign nationals seeking job opportunities. Before, it was restricted to specific populations such as intracompany transfers, professionals, Mercosur nationals or those with family ties to a Chilean national or permanent resident. The government will be able to create new subcategories in response to labour market needs such as multiple entry visa for business. Dependent family members of temporary residence holders automatically receive work authorisation.

Permanent residents are able to remain outside Chile for up to two years without losing their status.

The publication of the new law has triggered the start of an exceptional regularisation process. Those who entered Chile illegally and depart Chile before 17 October 2021 do not face any penalties and are allowed to enter Chile again under a legal route. Foreigners who entered Chile legally before 18 March 2020 and have no criminal records but who are in an irregular status have until 17 October 2021 to regularise their status and obtain work authorisation. The government expects at least 100 000 applications for this new regularisation process (the previous regularisation took place in 2018 and benefited around 210 000 foreigners). For the foreigners who entered Chile legally after 18 March 2020 and overstayed their visa the usual rules prevail: after paying a fine, they have a ten-day grace period to either depart the country or file a residence application if eligible under an existing residence category.


Starting in March 2020, Chile has put in place different restrictions to mobility of nationals and different categories of foreigners. Between April and October 2021, the processing of permanent residence applications at the Immigration Department is conducted exclusively online for all nationalities. If they need special assistance, they can go in person to a Chile Atiende office to upload the applications.

For further information:

www.extranjeria.gob.cl

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Chile


Long-term and temporary immigration flows
2018 (Source: OECD)




Asylum seekers
(Source: UNHCR)

	2020	2020/19
Asylum seekers	1 680	+ 118%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(national definition)



Emigration of Chileans to OECD countries
(national definition)




Components of population growth

	2019 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2019/18 difference
Total	27.4	-0.8
Natural increase	5.3	-0.9
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	22.1	+0.2

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2020)	71	+2.2	+0.0
Outflows (2020)	774	+7.1	+0.3

Labour market outcomes
(2017 compared to 2020 OECD average)



China

Foreign population – 2020	
Size: 0.5 million, 41% women	<i>Main countries of origin:</i> Korea (11%), Viet Nam (10%), United States (10%)
0.03% of the population	

In 2020, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -10%, to reach around 400. The majority of applicants came from Cameroon (200), Uganda (59) and Zimbabwe (33).

Emigration of Chinese to OECD countries increased by 8% in 2019, to 466 000. Approximately 28% of this group migrated to Japan, 16% to the United Kingdom and 13% to the United States.

At the end of 2020 there were a total of 463 405 foreign residents in the People's Republic of China (PRC). The top three countries of origin for foreign residents in the PRC were Korea (11%), Japan (10%) and the United States (10%).

The PRC has introduced a single service window to apply for work and residence permits. From October 2020, pilot programs for this service window began in Beijing, Shanghai, Chongqing, Xiamen and Shenzhen. China has also begun to improve visa and residence permit application procedures, including by allowing foreign residents to submit visa and residence permit applications via e-mail or mail.

In March 2021, the PRC introduced relaxed eligibility requirements and other beneficial rules for work permit applications in Shanghai, focusing on foreign nationals in scientific and technological occupations, foreign nationals in innovative entrepreneurial occupations, and special experts. The exact new requirements are at the discretion of the authorities. Previously, these applicants had to be below 60 years old, have at least two years' work experience and a bachelor's degree. The changes are in line with Chinese Government's goal to attract more highly-skilled foreign nationals, especially in scientific and innovative fields.

The PRC is the top Asian destination for international study and expands its lead in the region every year. In 2019, more than 260 000 students were enrolled in the PRC's tertiary

education institutions, 13% more than in 2018. The PRC has aimed to attract students with scholarships for international students, especially students from Africa and from countries in its Belt and Road Initiative. Currently, African students represent the second largest group of international students by region in the PRC, after Asian students.

While figures on outflows of overseas contract workers deployed by the PRC are not available, the stock of such workers overseas fell. According to the Ministry of Commerce, the number of workers overseas dropped from 1 013 000 to 644 000 between November 2019 and July 2020. No recovery was seen over the northern hemisphere summer of 2020.

At the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, entry of foreigners with valid visas and residence permits to China was suspended, as well as the visa-free transit and regional visa-free policies. In February 2020, China provided automatic extensions of two months for visas and residence permits of foreigners engaged in innovative and entrepreneurial work or scientific research in China that had expired during the period where pandemic control measures were in place. From May 2020, the PRC successively established 'Fast Track' programs with Korea, Germany, Singapore, Cambodia, Indonesia and several other countries to facilitate entry to China for essential business and official travel. China has gradually expanded the 'Fast Track' Program to almost all countries.


From September 2020, foreign nationals holding valid Chinese residence permits for work, personal matters and family reunion were allowed to enter China without applying for new visas. From March 2021, the PRC began offering visa facilitation to foreign nationals that have been inoculated with COVID-19 vaccines produced in China and that were planning to travel to China to conduct essential business activities or to visit family members.

For further information:

<https://en.nia.gov.cn>

Key figures on immigration and emigration – China


Grants of residence permits
(Source: National Immigration Administration)




Temporary migration
(Source: UIS, UNHCR)

	2019	2019/18
Education		
International students	201 177	+ 13%
Humanitarian		
Asylum seekers	354	- 10%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(Source: National Immigration Administration)



Emigration of Chinese to OECD countries
(national definition)



Components of population growth

	2020 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2020/19 difference
Total	3.9	-0.4
Natural increase
Net migration plus statistical adjustments

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2020)	59 507	-13.0	+0.4
Outflows (2020)	18 121	+19.7	+0.1

Colombia

Foreign-born population –.	
Size: 1.9 million, 49.9% women	<i>Main countries of birth:</i> Venezuela (93%), United States (1%), Ecuador (1%)
3.7% of the population	

Around 4 100 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 21 000 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants.

Venezuela, the United States and China were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2019.

In 2020, the number of first asylum applicants increased by 12.2%, to reach around 12 000. The majority of applicants came from Venezuela (12 000), Cuba (57) and Ecuador (5). The largest increase since 2019 concerned nationals of Venezuela (1 400). Of the 1 100 decisions taken in 2020, 32.4% were positive.

Emigration of Colombians to OECD countries increased by 19% in 2019, to 135 000. Approximately 57% of this group migrated to Spain, 16% to Chile and 14% to the United States.

The pandemic has put a brake on migration to Colombia, which registered a decline of its immigrant population in 2020 for the first time since the crisis in neighbouring Venezuela initiated large-scale migration. That notwithstanding, throughout 2020 and in early 2021, policy with respect to migration and integration in Colombia continued to be largely in reaction to the large inflows of Venezuelans. A key and recurring challenge has been to provide for appropriate regularisation procedures for those in an irregular situation. In recent years, Colombia initiated several rounds of renewal of the Special Stay Permit (Permiso Especial de Permanencia, PEP), which had an initial validity of two years. In addition, the government has also supported the prevention of statelessness by granting Colombian nationality to children born in Colombia to Venezuelan parents.

The Ministry of Labour, in co-ordination with Migration Colombia, issued an additional phase of the PEP, called the Special Permit to Stay for the Promotion of Formalisation – PEPFF, which allowed the regularisation of migration through the formalisation of labour for Venezuelans in

irregular migration status, guaranteeing their social security and decent work. The period of issuance of this was from February 2020 to 30 May 2021, achieving the regularisation of approximately 20 000 migrants.

Notwithstanding the above efforts by the Colombian Government, by the end of 2020, the majority of Venezuelans in Colombia were estimated to be in an irregular situation. To provide a lasting solution, the Colombian president announced in early February the creation of a new 10-year temporary protection permit (TPS).

Venezuelan migrants resident in Colombia on 31 January 2021 will be available for the measure. In spite of the 31 January residency requirement, in an attempt to discourage illegal entry, migrants who arrive via legal channels over the next two years may also apply for the temporary protection permit. In total, more than 2 million Venezuelans are expected to benefit from the measure, making it one of the largest regularisations ever undertaken in the OECD.

Migración Colombia is in charge of implementing the measure, which is carried out in two stages. The first, which has been carried out virtually, consists of the registration of foreigners in the Single Registry of Venezuelan Migrants, a mechanism that will allow the National Government to characterise and identify the Venezuelan population living in Colombia, in order to be able to better target its policies. The second phase – in person – is the issuance of a Personal Protection Permit, a regularisation and identification document for Venezuelan citizens who benefit from the measure.


Colombia has also taken a number of measures to digitalise its migration services and foreigners visas. In terms of integration, the regular Joint Needs Assessment conducted by the Inter-Agency Group on Mixed Migratory Flows showed that the living conditions of refugees and migrants with the intention to stay in Colombia have deteriorated significantly following the introduction of the COVID-19 preventive isolation measures.

For further information:

www.migracioncolombia.gov.co

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Colombia

Long-term immigration flows by category
2019 (Source: OECD)



Temporary migration
2019 (Source: OECD)

Temporary labour migration

	2019	2019/18
Working holidaymakers	230	+ 14%
Seasonal workers
Intra-company transfers	130	- 4%
Other temporary workers	21 000	- 3%


Education

	2019	2019/18
International students	4 060	- 13%
Trainees


Humanitarian

	2020	2020/19
Asylum seekers	11 920	+ 12%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(national definition)



Emigration of Colombians to OECD countries
(national definition)




Components of population growth

	2019 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2019/18 difference
Total	23.6	+13.1
Natural increase	8.4	-0.2
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	15.1	+13.4

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2020)	6 874	+1.7	+2.5
Outflows (2020)	259	-25.5	+0.1

Labour market outcomes
2020



Czech Republic

Foreign-born population – 2020	
Size: 0.9 million, 48% women	<i>Main countries of birth:</i> Slovak Republic (32%), Ukraine (15%), Viet Nam (6%)
8.5% of the population	
Evolution since 2010: +34%	

In 2019, 96 000 new immigrants obtained a residence permit longer than 12 months in the Czech Republic (excluding EU citizens), 56.6% more than in 2018. This figure comprises 64.1% labour migrants, 22.8% family members (including accompanying family), 7.3% who came for education reasons and 5.8% other migrants. Around 7 500 short-term permits were issued to international students and 4 900 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 102 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2019, an increase of 230% compared to 2018. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Ukraine, the Slovak Republic and Russia were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2019. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Ukraine registered the strongest increase (6 100) and the Slovak Republic the largest decrease (-900) in flows to the Czech Republic compared to the previous year.

In 2020, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -49.5%, to reach around 800. The majority of applicants came from Ukraine (200), Georgia (85) and Belarus (60). The largest increase since 2019 concerned nationals of Belarus (50) and the largest decrease nationals of Armenia (-300). Of the 1 000 decisions taken in 2020, 10.9% were positive.

Emigration of the Czechs to OECD countries were stable at 18 000. Approximately 49% of this group migrated to Germany, 10% to Austria and 6% to Switzerland.

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Czech Republic restricted the entry of foreign nationals between March and May 2020. The issuance of new visas has been restricted at the Czech Embassies and Consulates abroad since March 2020 as well. Despite these restrictions, the number of foreigners residing, both permanently and temporarily, in the Czech Republic was 634 800 in December 2020, a 6.5% increase compared to December 2019. The Czech Republic has continued to implement policy reforms that aim to increase the social integration and participation of migrants.

In January 2021, the Czech Republic introduced an integration course for non-EU migrants that reside in the

Czech Republic on a long-term or permanent basis. The course provides instructions on the migrant's rights and obligations during their stay in the Czech Republic, the values of the Czech Republic, as well as everyday life, culture and customs. The four-hour integration course is administered by the Centres for Support of Integration of Foreign Nationals. The course is taught in Czech, although course content is also translated into English, French, Mongolian, Russian, Serbian, Spanish, Ukrainian or Vietnamese. The migrant must pay the course fee of CZK 1 500 (about EUR 60) and is subject to a fine of CZK 10 000 (EUR 390) if they do not complete the course within one year of receiving their residence permit.

From 1 September 2021, the Czech language requirement for permanent residence permit will increase from A1 to A2 in the Common European Framework. The current language requirement for obtaining permanent residence in the Czech Republic, one of the lowest in the EU, is not considered sufficient for a migrant to operate independently in the Czech society. The increased threshold was recommended by an expert advisory group including the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of the Interior, the National Pedagogical Institute of the Czech Republic, the Institute of Language and Vocational Training of Charles University and the Association of the Czech as a Foreign Language Teachers.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Czech Republic instituted measures to extend visas and valid travel periods for visa-holders. This covered third-country nationals with short-term visas for employment or seasonal employment, visas for a stay of over 90 days for seasonal employment and holders of special work visas. Extensions and extended travel periods were granted when the visa was to expire after 12 March 2020 and the employer arranged extension of the employment relationship, or a new employment relationship immediately related to the previous employment relationship.

For further information:

www.mvcr.cz/mvcren

www.czso.cz


www.mpsv.cz

www.uradprace.cz

www.cizinci.cz

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Czech Republic

Grants of long-term residence permits
2019 (Source: Eurostat)



Temporary migration
(Source: Eurostat)


Temporary migration (non-EU citizens)

	2019	2019/18
Remunerated activities reasons	4 850	+ 88%
Family reasons	4 890	+ 107%
Education reasons	7 480	+ 128%
Other	3 790	+ 135%


Humanitarian

	2020	2020/19
Asylum seekers	800	- 49%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(national definition)



Emigration of Czechs to OECD countries
(national definition)




Components of population growth

	2020 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2020/19 difference
Total	0.7	-3.4
Natural increase	-1.8	-1.8
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	2.5	-1.6

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2020)	4 184	+8.4	+1.7
Outflows (2020)	3 265	-5.3	+1.4

Labour market outcomes
2020



Denmark

Foreign-born population – 2020	
Size: 0.6 million, 50% women	<i>Main countries of birth:</i>
10.6% of the population	Poland (7%), Syria (6%),
Evolution since 2010: +48%	Turkey (5%)

In 2019, Denmark received 53 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status and free mobility), -4.4% compared to 2018. This figure comprises 54.6% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 16.6% labour migrants, 15.3% family members (including accompanying family) and 3.3% humanitarian migrants. Around 8 500 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 7 500 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 46 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2019, an increase of 130% compared to 2018. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Romania, Poland and Germany were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2019. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Italy registered the strongest increase (200) and Lithuania the largest decrease (-400) in flows to Denmark compared to the previous year.

In 2020, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -45.7%, to reach around 1 400. The majority of applicants came from Syria (300), Eritrea (200) and Morocco (100). The largest increase since 2019 concerned nationals of Turkey (10) and the largest decrease nationals of Eritrea (-300). Of the 1 200 decisions taken in 2020, 35.1% were positive.

Emigration of Danes to OECD countries increased by 1% in 2019, to 8 300. Approximately 22% of this group migrated to Sweden, 13% to Norway and 11% to Spain.

Two new labour migration schemes were introduced in Denmark in mid-2020. The Labour Market Attachment Scheme allows foreigners who have been working in Denmark for at least two years, but who have lost a Danish residence permit for family or humanitarian grounds, to apply for a new residence permit of up to 2 years. The Positive List for Skilled Work is a list of skilled professions experiencing a shortage of qualified professionals in Denmark. Foreigners who have been offered a job included in this list can apply for a Danish residence permit in this scheme, provided the employer has fulfilled certain educational obligations on a societal level regarding training of apprentices. In addition to these two new schemes, the Establishment Card, which grants a change of immigration status for work purposes to foreign students who have completed some tertiary educated degrees, was extended to include bachelor and professional bachelor graduates.

In August 2020, new legislation on the housing of refugees was adopted, making it possible for municipalities to apply for and to voluntarily receive a higher number of refugees than originally allocated to them, if the total amount of refugees to be allocated is expected to rise beyond certain thresholds. A Danish Return Agency has been established and has been operational since August 2020. The new agency is responsible for the return of persons with illegal stay in Denmark and for providing counselling and co-ordinating both voluntary and forced returns.

In June 2020, Denmark has amended The Law on Danish Language Courses for all adult immigrants and others, rendering the participation payment to Danish language courses free for foreign workers and students and regulating the deposit for the same migrant group. The government currently supports several integration initiatives, in particular those with the aim to increase the integration of women with a migration background into the Danish society and labour market.

To address the problems of vulnerable residential areas, where a high average share of the population are without employment or education, have a conviction for crime, low income, and a non-Western background, Denmark in 2018 launched a wide range of initiatives aiming at turning those areas into regular neighbourhoods before 2030. From 2019-26 DKK 10 billion are prioritised in the National Building Fund for conversion of these residential areas via i.e. renovation, demolition, new infrastructure, social housing initiatives and rehousing of residents. Since 2019, schools where more than 30% of the pupils live in those vulnerable neighbourhoods are also required to perform a special language test in 0 grade (kindergarten).

During the lockdown and border closures following the peak of the COVID-19 pandemic, third-country nationals who were not able to renew their permits were temporarily tolerated in Denmark. Departure deadlines were as a rule extended two months from the decision date. The government also implemented temporary suspensions of a number of integration efforts requiring personal attendance, such as employment efforts and language education. These suspensions and exceptions have been gradually lifted.

For further information:

www.uim.dk (in Danish).

www.nyidanmark.dk


www.integrationsbarometer.dk (in Danish).

www.dst.dk

www.workindenmark.dk

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Denmark

Long-term immigration flows by category
2019 (Source: OECD)



Temporary migration
(Source: OECD)

Temporary labour migration (non-EU citizens)

	2019	2019/18
Working holidaymakers	3 690	+ 105%
Seasonal workers
Intra-company transfers
Other temporary workers	1 430	- 17%


Education (non-EU citizens)

	2019	2019/18
International students	8 460	- 5%
Trainees	2 360	+ 5%


Humanitarian

	2020	2020/19
Asylum seekers	1 440	- 46%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(national definition)



Emigration of Danish citizens to OECD countries
(national definition)




Components of population growth

	2020 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2020/19 difference
Total	3.0	+0.1
Natural increase	1.1	-0.1
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	1.9	+0.3

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2020)	1 495	+11.9	+0.4
Outflows (2020)	3 327	+0.4	+0.9

Labour market outcomes
2020



Estonia

Foreign-born population – 2020	
Size: 0.2 million, 56% women	<i>Main countries of birth:</i>
14.9% of the population	Russia (58%), Ukraine (13%),
Evolution since 2010: -9%	Belarus (5%)

In 2019, 5 900 new immigrants obtained a residence permit longer than 12 months in Estonia (excluding EU citizens), 22.3% more than in 2018. This figure comprises 33.6% labour migrants, 39.5% family members (including accompanying family), 22.6% who came for education reasons and 4.3% other migrants. Around 35 short-term permits were issued to international students and 100 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 5 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2019, an increase of 58% compared to 2018. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Ukraine, Russia and Finland were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2019. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Ukraine registered the strongest increase (300) and Finland the largest decrease (-100) in flows to Estonia compared to the previous year.

In 2020, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -55%, to reach around 45. The majority of applicants came from Russia (15), Syria (5) and Eritrea (5). The largest increase since 2019 concerned nationals of Eritrea (5) and the largest decrease nationals of Turkey (-15). Of the 70 decisions taken in 2020, 35.7% were positive.

Emigration of Estonians to OECD countries decreased by -8% in 2019, to 4 300. Approximately 38% of this group migrated to Finland, 11% to Germany and 8% to the Netherlands.

Starting from 1 August 2020, an amendment to the Aliens Act enables applications for a digital nomad visa. Under this scheme, visa holders will be able to work remotely from Estonia for an employer in another country, or as freelancers. Digital nomads can only come to work in Estonia through a mediator who assumes responsibility for their stay. Granting a visa to a digital nomad is subject to the general terms, including having sufficient funds for staying in Estonia. The implementation of the digital nomad visa programme will be phased. In the first stage, foreigners who can prove they are digital nomads will be allowed to apply for the visa. A convergence between the digital nomad visa and other Estonia's e-solutions – especially e-residency, is also planned.

The preparation of a new national integration plan for 2021-30 is underway, which will formulate the objectives of the integration policy of Estonia and the activities needed to achieve them. The state wishes to recognise the value of everyone in society, support cultural diversity, and promote the Estonian language and culture. The new integration plan will include activities designed for native Estonians as well as the long-term foreign residents of Estonia. Also, more attention will be paid to new immigrants and refugees, as well as compatriots living outside Estonia.

The Tallinn City Centre Government and the Ministry of the Interior entered into a partnership agreement to develop an action plan to support the integration of new immigrants, compile a comprehensive overview on the needs of new immigrants and accessibility of services in the district, and co-ordinate a support network on a local level. The action plan will guarantee that all relevant information about the district reaches local English-speaking residents in a timely manner.

The Ministry of the Interior has submitted legislative amendments to the Aliens Act regarding international students and labour migration. These amendments aim notably at reinforcing requirements for short-term labour migration, including seasonal employment, for family reunification, as well as for the obtention of student visas.


Estonia reacted to the COVID-19 crisis by providing multilingual information and medical care to immigrants, and by covering all costs of their diagnosis and treatment of COVID-19, even for those who are not insured in the public health system. In addition, all migration proceedings were temporarily suspended as of mid-March 2020. Immigrants with temporary visas who were unable to return had their visas automatically extended. In mid-March 2020, Estonia temporarily reintroduced border controls. Migration services only processed applications for short-term employment for foreigners already living in the country. Streamlined procedures were introduced for foreign-born physicians and agriculture workers. Personal interviews for asylum seekers were suspended and the Dublin transfers postponed.

For further information:

www.politsei.ee
www.stat.ee
www.siseministeerium.ee
www.workinestonia.com
www.tootukassa.ee

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Estonia

Grants of long-term residence permits (non-EU citizens)
2019 (Source: Eurostat)



Temporary migration (non-EU citizens)
(Source: Eurostat)


Temporary migration

	2019	2019/18
Remunerated activities reasons	110	+ 26%
Family reasons	70	- 19%
Education reasons	40	- 31%
Other	50	- 15%


Humanitarian

	2020	2020/19
Asylum seekers	50	- 50%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(national definition)



Emigration of Estonians to OECD countries
(national definition)




Components of population growth

	2020 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2020/19 difference
Total	0.9	-2.2
Natural increase	-2.0	-1.0
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	2.8	-1.2

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2020)	507	-6.7	+1.6
Outflows (2020)	204	-18.2	+0.7

Labour market outcomes
2020



Finland

Foreign-born population – 2020	
Size: 0.4 million, 48% women	<i>Main countries of birth:</i> Former USSR (14%), Estonia (11%), Sweden (8%)
7.3% of the population	
Evolution since 2010: +73%	

In 2019, Finland received 24 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status and free mobility), 4.5% more than in 2018. This figure comprises 27.3% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 9.2% labour migrants, 46.7% family members (including accompanying family) and 16.5% humanitarian migrants. Around 5 200 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 12 000 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 36 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2019, an increase of 81% compared to 2018. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Russia, Estonia and India were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2019. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Russia registered the strongest increase (600) and Iraq the largest decrease (-600) in flows to Finland compared to the previous year.

In 2020, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -40.7%, to reach around 1 500. The majority of applicants came from Afghanistan (200), Turkey (80) and Iraq (500). The largest increase since 2019 concerned nationals of Iraq (200) and the largest decrease nationals of Turkey (-300). Of the 3 100 decisions taken in 2020, 37.8% were positive.

Emigration of Finns to OECD countries decreased by -8% in 2019, to 10 000. Approximately 21% of this group migrated to Sweden, 12% to the Netherlands and 9% to Spain.

In March 2020, to overcome labour shortages, nine sectors of activity were identified as essential, and able to benefit from new entries of labour migrants under exceptional circumstances: 1) agriculture, horticulture and fisheries, 2) the food sector, 3) energy supply, 4) maritime and manufacturing industries, 5) construction, 6) transport and communications, 7) chemical industry, 8) pharmaceutical and health technology industries and 9) the forest sector.

In December 2020, due to the persisting spread of COVID-19, Finland extended restrictions on entry with some exceptions. The processing of asylum applications continued otherwise and some seasonal workers were still allowed to enter.

In June 2021, an amendment to the Seasonal Workers Act was implemented to make it easier for seasonal workers from third countries to change employers. Meanwhile, employers are able to notify the Finnish Immigration Service of more than one employee at once, and the return of seasonal workers to the same employer is facilitated by suppressing the obligation to report on the employment conditions.

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, until the end of 2021, residence permits can be extended without meeting the minimum income level.

As of 1 February 2021, the Finnish Immigration Service set up a project aimed at speeding up and streamlining the processing of work-based permits and residence permits for international students. The goal is to reduce the processing time to one month for work permits by 2023; and to two weeks for specialists, startup entrepreneurs and their family members in 2021.

In July 2020, the age limit for unaccompanied minors with a residence permit to be eligible for an extended child care allocation has been prolonged from 21 to 25 years old. It is estimated that around 2 000 young foreigners will be entitled to this allocation.

A comprehensive and external audit has been requested by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment of Finland to confirm the promising first outcomes of the 2016-19 integration Social Impact Bond (SIB) experiment in sectors that suffer from labour shortages. This was the occasion to test an innovative funding method through private investors who bear the economic risk.

In March 2021, the government proposed a new law to improve the legal status and earning opportunities of foreign berry pickers. These workers currently work as entrepreneurs and their status hardly ensures equal treatment with other companies providing the same services.

Accommodation capacity for asylum seekers will decrease by 700 reception places by the end of September 2021. Due to COVID-19, the Finnish Immigration service preferred reducing the number of places available per centre instead of closing more centres, to allow some flexibility in case of upcoming trends in asylum seeker flows.

The course on Finnish society for asylum seekers has been renewed to include more self-study materials, notably guidance on the national legislation, the Finnish society, equality, sexual health and the functioning of the Finnish labour market.

A government report on integration was published in June 2021 and it proposes an extensive programme to better support immigrants in their integration. The government report on the need for a reform in integration promotion services is related to a report the parliamentary Audit Committee prepared during the previous parliamentary term, urging a reform of integration promotion.

For further information:

www.tem.fi/en/labour-migration-and-integration


www.migri.fi

www.stat.fi

www.intermin.fi

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Finland

Long-term immigration flows by category
2019 (Source: OECD)



Temporary migration
(Source: OECD)

Temporary labour migration (non-EU citizens)

	2019	2019/18
Working holidaymakers
Seasonal workers	11 500	+ 49%
Intra-company transfers
Other temporary workers


Education (non-EU citizens)

	2019	2019/18
International students	5 250	+ 1%
Trainees	160	- 35%


Humanitarian

	2020	2020/19
Asylum seekers	1 460	- 41%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(national definition)



Emigration of Finns to OECD countries
(national definition)




Components of population growth

	2020 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2020/19 difference
Total	1.5	+0.2
Natural increase	-1.6	-0.1
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	3.2	+0.4

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2020)	801	+0.4	+0.3
Outflows (2020)

Labour market outcomes
2020



France

Foreign-born population – 2020	
Size: 8.4 million, 52% women	<i>Main countries of birth:</i> Algeria (17%), Morocco (12%), Portugal (7%)
12.9% of the population	
Evolution since 2010: +16%	

In 2019, France received 291 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status and free mobility), 3.5% more than in 2018. This figure comprises 27% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 17.7% labour migrants, 35% family members (including accompanying family) and 11.5% humanitarian migrants. Around 87 000 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 29 000 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 450 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2019, an increase of 72% compared to 2018. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2019. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Morocco registered the strongest increase (1 700) and Spain the largest decrease (-2 300) in flows to France compared to the previous year.

In 2020, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -40.9%, to reach around 82 000. The majority of applicants came from Afghanistan (10 000), Guinea (4 700) and Bangladesh (4 600). The largest increase since 2019 concerned nationals of Ukraine (900) and the largest decrease nationals of Albania (-6 500). Of the 86 000 decisions taken in 2020, 22.2% were positive.

Emigration of French to OECD countries increased by 4% in 2019, to 109 000. Approximately 14% of this group migrated to the United Kingdom, 13% to Switzerland and 11% to Spain.

A new visa and residence permit processing system, based on digitalised documents, is going to be progressively implemented from 2021 onwards.

As of 6 April 2021, work authorisations are submitted through a new Online Application Platform. Processing criteria have been lowered, focusing on the enforceability of the employment situation, the employer's compliance with its legal obligations and the verification of the level of remuneration offered. Along that line, the Shortage Occupation List, which was last published in 2008, has been updated in 2021 with some regional specificities. The lists, which exempt an extended number of occupations from the labour market test, are planned to be updated regularly. The Labour Authorities "DREETS" (ex-"DIRECCTE") are no longer involved in application processing and are replaced by interregional platforms.

French authorities have also implemented the Revised Posted Worker Directive, which reduces to 12 months the period during which a posted worker can remain under some

home country labour laws. After this period, the full French labour law applies.

In the field of refugee integration, France defined in 2019 its priorities regarding integration measures, focusing on the labour market integration of new arrivals through the Republican Integration Contract (CIR) and on how to strengthen local initiatives and their evaluation. New arrivals who are looking for a job can benefit from a labour integration and orientation pathway, involving the Public Employment Service (PES) that best fits their needs. The Ministry of Interior plans to double the number of "Open school to parents for children success" schemes, which give language and civic training to parents. The ministry has also supported NGO-based schemes such as HOPE and ACCELAIR, which support immigrants in their access to housing and to the labour market at the local level and which have been widespread in 2020 throughout all the territory.

In 2020, French authorities also launched a pilot project "1 000 validations of acquired experience for foreign first-arrivals". Through that scheme, migrants who do not have any documents proving their past experience, can be sponsored by the French Agency for adults' vocational training (AFPA), after an in-depth evaluation of the candidate's skills.

The Interministerial Delegation for Reception and Integration of Refugees (DIAIR) provides ongoing support for several integration initiatives, such as the "Investment plan for skills" and the "civic service programme". The DIAIR launched the web platform *Réfugiés.info*, which provides simple and translated information and made a call for proposals in 2020 to tackle the digital divide.


Following the first lockdown that started on 16 March, France took measures with regard to the expiration date of certain visas and permits. The validity of several visas (long stay visas; stay permits with the exception of diplomats; provisional stay authorisations; applications for a residence permit or for asylum seekers) which were to expire between 16 March and 15 May were extended by six months. All public services fully opened in October 2020 with a strict health protocol. Language training continued through distance learning.

For further information:

www.immigration.interieur.gouv.fr/Immigration
www.accueil-integration-refugies.fr

Key figures on immigration and emigration – France

Long-term immigration flows by category
2019 (Source: OECD)



Temporary migration
(Source: OECD)

Temporary labour migration (non-EU citizens)

	2019	2019/18
Working holidaymakers	5 200	+ 4%
Seasonal workers	10 290	+ 26%
Intra-company transfers	3 600	- 3%
Other temporary workers	5 660	+ 29%


Education (non-EU citizens)

	2019	2019/18
International students	86 460	+ 7%
Trainees	4 210	+ 37%


Humanitarian

	2020	2020/19
Asylum seekers	81 740	- 41%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(national definition)



Emigration of French to OECD countries
(national definition)




Components of population growth

	2020 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2020/19 difference
Total	1.8	-0.3
Natural increase	1.0	-1.1
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	0.8	+0.8

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2020)	24 482	-8.8	+0.9
Outflows (2020)	15 038	-0.3	+0.6

Labour market outcomes
2020



Germany

Foreign-born population – 2020	
Size: 13.7 million, 49% women	<i>Main countries of birth:</i> Poland (12%), Turkey (10%), Russia (8%)
16.3% of the population	
Evolution since 2010: +30%	

In 2019, Germany received 609 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status and free mobility), -3.9% compared to 2018. This figure comprises 59% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 11.8% labour migrants, 15.9% family members (including accompanying family) and 12.2% humanitarian migrants. Around 49 000 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 12 000 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 506 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2019, an increase of 18% compared to 2018. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Romania, Poland and Bulgaria were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2019. Among the top 15 countries of origin, India registered the strongest increase (5 400) and Poland the largest decrease (-15 000) in flows to Germany compared to the previous year.

In 2020, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -28%, to reach around 103 000. The majority of applicants came from Syria (36 000), Afghanistan (9 900) and Iraq (9 800). The largest increase since 2019 concerned nationals of Afghanistan (400) and the largest decrease nationals of Nigeria (-5 800). Of the 129 000 decisions taken in 2020, 48.6% were positive.

Germany created new facilities and changed regulations to ease labour migration processes through the Skilled Immigration Act implemented in 2020. The previous limitation to occupations experiencing skills shortage is suspended and measures have been implemented to accelerate the recognition process of foreign professional qualifications. Skilled workers with a concrete job offer and employers hiring foreign skilled workers can use the “accelerated procedure for skilled workers” to speed up administrative procedures.

Furthermore, “Regional Co-ordination Centres for Skilled Worker Immigration” were set up to support employer services and advise enterprises in the respective regions on recruitment procedures for foreign workers under the Skilled Immigration Act.

In addition to the existing counselling structures, a Service Centre for Professional Recognition (ZSBA) was established as the central point of contact in the recognition process for skilled workers living and applying for professional recognition from abroad. The new centre is also intended to increase the transparency of the recognition process for applicants.

In recent years, Germany has launched several initiatives to enhance integration in addition to the existing wide range of measures. In March 2021, Germany finalised the Federal Government’s National Action Plan on Integration (NAP-I) co-ordinated by the Federal Government Commissioner for Migration, Refugees and Integration which covers five phases: (I) Prior to Migration, (II) Upon Arrival, (III) Incorporation, (IV) Growing together, (V) Cohesion. More than 300 actors at all state levels and civil society, including migrant organisations, succeeded to launch more than 110 key projects to support migrants and strengthen social cohesion. In this context, the federal government also set up a cabinet committee to combat right-wing extremism and racism, which met for the first time in May 2020. Accordingly Germany plans to provide more than 1 billion euros to combat right-wing extremism, racism, anti-semitism and other forms of intolerance between 2021 and 2024.

Furthermore, the federal governments’ Expert Commission on the framework conditions for integration capability handed over its final report to Parliament in January 2021. The report analyses, inter alia, the economic, labour market, social and demographic conditions for integration in Germany and provides impulses and recommendations both for the state and civic sector on how to improve integration of newly arrived immigrants, of people with migration background living in Germany and the society as a whole.

COVID-related changes and investments were necessary to ensure continuation of integration courses and other integration measures. The “pandemic allowance”, an additional lump-sum transfer granted to course providers since July 2020, supports conversion of language courses to hygiene-compliant course formats, such as virtual lessons. Additionally, the Integration Qualification Program transferred its support services (counselling, training, qualification courses for people with a migration background and for multipliers) to virtual formats and used available personnel capacities for crisis-related counselling needs.

In March 2020 the German Ministry of Interior, Building and Community decided to reduce the burden on immigration authorities caused by the COVID-19 Crisis by allowing immigrants with an expiring Schengen Visa to stay in Germany temporarily without a renewed residence permit in Germany. The regulation expired after an extension at the end of September 2020.

For further information:

www.bmas.de


www.bmi.bund.de

www.bamf.de


www.destatis.de

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Germany

Long-term immigration flows by category
2019 (Source: OECD)



Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(national definition)



Temporary migration
(Source: OECD)

Temporary labour migration (non-EU citizens)

	2019	2019/18
Working holidaymakers
Seasonal workers
Intra-company transfers	6 710	-16%
Other temporary workers


Education (non-EU citizens)

	2019	2019/18
International students	49 180	+2%
Trainees	5 140	+12%

Humanitarian

	2020	2020/19
Asylum seekers	102 580	-28%

Emigration of Germans to OECD countries
(national definition)



Components of population growth


	2020 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2020/19 difference
Total	-0.1	-1.9
Natural increase	-2.6	-0.7
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	2.4	-1.3

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2020)	17 899	-2.0	+0.5
Outflows (2020)	22 024	-8.0	+0.6

Labour market outcomes

(2019 compared to 2020 OECD average)



Greece

Foreign-born population – 2019	
Size: 1.3 million, 54% women	<i>Main countries of birth (2016):</i> Albania (48%), Georgia (7%), Russia (5%)
12.5% of the population	
Evolution since 2010: +2%	

In 2019, 42 000 new immigrants obtained a residence permit longer than 12 months in Greece (excluding EU citizens), 19.1% more than in 2018. This figure comprises 7.4% labour migrants, 46.5% family members (including accompanying family), 2.3% who came for education reasons and 43.8% other migrants. In addition, 17 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2019, an increase of 55% compared to 2018. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

In 2020, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -49.5%, to reach around 38 000. The majority of applicants came from Afghanistan (11 000), Syria (7 400) and Pakistan (3 500). The largest increase since 2019 concerned nationals of Indonesia (30) and the largest decrease nationals of Afghanistan (-12 000). Of the 62 000 decisions taken in 2020, 55.2% were positive.

Emigration of Greeks to OECD countries decreased by -11% in 2019, to 36 000. Approximately 39% of this group migrated to Germany, 16% to Turkey and 13% to the Netherlands.

Among the most notable developments in 2020 was the amendment of the law on asylum “*On International Protection and other provisions*” which was introduced in May 2020. The amendments aimed at addressing the concerns that the law raised at the time about its impact on the Greek asylum system, and the safeguards of refugee protection.

In February 2020, the Special Secretariat for the Protection of Unaccompanied Minors was established. Its mission is to plan, implement and supervise the National Strategy in Greece for the protection of unaccompanied minors. The Special Secretariat also initiates and implements all necessary policies and required actions to ensure the protection and well-being of third-country nationals and stateless individuals who are unaccompanied minors or separated from their families. It reports directly to the Minister of Migration and Asylum.

Greece has a “Greek and Foreign NGO Members Registry”, established in 2018, for Greek and foreign NGOs active in the area of asylum, migration and social inclusion. On 27 March 2020, a Joint Ministerial Decision brought changes to the registration and certification rules for this registry. It lays down additional conditions for registration of NGOs and their members, staff and volunteers.

Since May 2020, the dependent residence permit allows spouses of holders of *Work/Residence Permit for Senior-Level Employees*, to work immediately after the grant. Previously, spouses had to wait for the first renewal of the permit or request a separate authorisation to work. Since

31 December 2020, UK citizens living in Greece must apply for a residence permit, which will last five years, or ten years for those who apply for permanent residence. Greece raised the 2021-22 EU Blue Card quota for the Attica region to 380, up from 280 previously.

As of 19 April 2021, the measures in place to respond to the COVID-19 situation were the following.

For all visitors, entry in Greece is subject to the presentation of a vaccination certificate or a negative PCR test conducted up to 72 hours before traveling. Passengers also have to fill in the Passenger Locator Form (PLF). Self-isolation of visitors from abroad is no longer required. Countries from which entry is allowed, under the aforementioned conditions, are EU and Schengen countries, the United States, the United Kingdom, Israel, Serbia, the United Arab Emirates, Australia, New Zealand, Korea, Thailand, Rwanda, Singapore and Russia.


Residence permits are automatically extended until 31 December 2021. For EU Blue Cards holders a salary reduction may impact the outcome of their renewal application. This does not concern other foreign workers who saw their hours reduced or were put in unemployment.

Further information:

www.migration.gov.gr
www.astynomia.gov.gr
www.statistics.gr

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Greece


Grants of long-term residence permits (non-EU citizens)
2019 (Source: Eurostat)




Asylum seekers
(Source: Eurostat)

	2020	2020/19
Asylum seekers	37 860	- 49%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(national definition)



Emigration of Greeks to OECD countries
(national definition)




Components of population growth

	2020 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2020/19 difference
Total	-3.4	-2.8
Natural increase	-4.3	-0.5
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	0.9	-2.4

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2020)	611	-9.6	+0.3
Outflows (2020)	2 725	+2.2	+1.4

Labour market outcomes
2020



Hungary

Foreign-born population – 2020	
Size: 0.6 million, 48% women	<i>Main countries of birth:</i> Romania (35%), Ukraine (12%), Serbia (7%)
6.2% of the population	
Evolution since 2010: +46%	

In 2019, 44 000 new immigrants obtained a residence permit longer than 12 months in Hungary (excluding EU citizens), 10.6% more than in 2018. This figure comprises 72.6% labour migrants, 12.9% who came for education reasons and 14.5% other migrants. Around 4 500 short-term permits were issued to international students and 6 800 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 21 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2019, an increase of 22% compared to 2018. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Ukraine, Romania and Germany were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2019. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Ukraine registered the strongest increase (4 500) and Serbia the largest decrease (-400) in flows to Hungary compared to the previous year.

In 2020, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -80.9%, to reach around 90. The majority of applicants came from Pakistan (25), Afghanistan (15) and Syria (10). The largest increase since 2019 concerned nationals of Bangladesh (5) and the largest decrease nationals of Afghanistan (-200). Of the 500 decisions taken in 2020, 27.4% were positive.

Emigration of Hungarians to OECD countries decreased by -21% in 2019, to 46 000. Approximately 40% of this group migrated to Germany, 26% to Austria and 8% to the Netherlands.

In 2019 or 2020 there were no legislative or administrative changes relating to the status, conditions of access to the labour market and entitlement for jobseeker's benefit of foreign workers and no bilateral agreements were signed.

As a result of the judgment on 14 May 2020 of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the transit zones of Hungary were closed and the applicants placed there were accommodated in other reception facilities.

In accordance with the provisions of the EU directives on posting of workers, the rules on the employment and the relevant inspection of posted workers were changed from 30 July 2020.

Without modifying its internal procedures, organisation and structure, from July 2019 the Immigration and Asylum Office was changed into a law enforcement agency under the name of National Directorate-General for Aliens Policing.

Third-country nationals who were unable to leave Hungary and the Member States of the European Union whose visas expired during the COVID-19 epidemic were granted a temporary residence certificate for humanitarian reasons.

The validity period of those residence documents, permanent residence and immigration permits issued – except for the short-term visa and entry visa for receiving a residence permit – were automatically extended until the 45th day after the end of the state of danger during the first wave of the pandemic in the spring and summer of 2020. This measure was repeated at the second wave of the pandemic from November, with the exception that extension applies only until the 30th day after the end of the state of danger.


With the adoption of Act LVIII of 2020 on the transitional rules and epidemiological preparedness related to the cessation of the state of danger as well as Government Decree No. 292/2020 (VI.17.), at present, foreigners – as a basic rule – must first declare their intent to seek asylum at a diplomatic representation in order to enter Hungary and make an application there.

For further information:

www.bmbah.hu

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Hungary

Grants of long-term residence permits (non-EU citizens)
2019 (Source: Eurostat)



Temporary migration (non-EU citizens)
(Source: Eurostat)


Temporary migration

	2019	2019/18
Remunerated activities reasons	6 830	- 7%
Family reasons
Education reasons	4 500	- 13%
Other	2 300	- 0%


Humanitarian

	2020	2020/19
Asylum seekers	90	- 81%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(national definition)



Emigration of Hungarians to OECD countries
(national definition)




Components of population growth

	2020 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2020/19 difference
Total	-4.0	-3.7
Natural increase	-4.9	-1.1
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	0.9	-2.5

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2020)	3 650	-22.5	+2.4
Outflows (2020)	1 250	-11.1	+0.8

Labour market outcomes
2020



Ireland

Foreign-born population – 2020	
Size: 0.9 million, 51% women	<i>Main countries of birth:</i> United Kingdom (32%), Poland (13%), Lithuania (4%)
17.8% of the population	
Evolution since 2010: +27%	

In 2019, Ireland received 49 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status and free mobility), 7.8% more than in 2018. This figure comprises 64% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 26.1% labour migrants, 7.9% family members (including accompanying family) and 1.9% humanitarian migrants. Around 35 000 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 1 300 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 17 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2019, an increase of 120% compared to 2018. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

In 2020, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -67.6%, to reach around 1 500. The majority of applicants came from Nigeria (200), Somalia (200) and Pakistan (85). The largest increase since 2019 concerned nationals of Somalia (30) and the largest decrease nationals of Albania (-900). Of the 1 300 decisions taken in 2020, 74.1% were positive.

Emigration of Irish to OECD countries decreased by -31% in 2019, to 17 000. Approximately 14% of this group migrated to Australia, 13% to Spain and 12% to the Netherlands.

The Department of Justice was restructured in 2019, as part of which policy and legislation on immigration matters were amalgamated with other similar functions within a new Civil Justice & Equality pillar, along with Immigration Service Delivery, including: visas; border management; determination of immigration permissions for non-EEA nationals in the State; registration of residence permissions; EU Treaty Rights; and citizenship applications and repatriation.

During 2020 to 2021 changes were introduced for occupations in the health sector including eligibility for permits for health care assistant and other roles and widening access to the Critical Skills employment permit to registered nurses, midwives and radiographers who are diploma qualified. Also in 2020, minimum remuneration levels for the Critical Skill employment permit were increased and the duration of the labour market test was extended to four weeks. From March 2019, spouses/partners of Critical Skills employment permit holders and researchers with a hosting agreement will have full access to the labour market without the need to obtain an Employment Permit.

A public consultation on the Employment Permits (Consolidation and Amendment) Bill was launched in December 2019. The bill includes proposals for a seasonal employment permit that would provide for a non-EEA national to work in the Irish State temporarily while retaining

a legal domicile in a third country, for the purposes of employment in a sector of seasonal activity. The bill also provides for the introduction of a special circumstances employment permit to cover occasional needs in the labour market that would not meet all the criteria for a standard General Employment Permit.

The Report of the Advisory Group on the Provision of Support including Accommodation to Persons in the International Protection Process was published in September 2020. The Advisory Group was established in 2019 to advise on the development of a long-term approach to support for persons in the international protection process. It recommended: a holistic approach to the international protection process; shorter processing times for international protection applications; ending the congregated and segregated accommodation of applicants for protection and providing own-door accommodation; and early transition to a new system to be implemented by 2023.

The immigration preclearance scheme was extended to non-EEA national de facto partners of Irish citizens in 2019. This allows partners of Irish citizens to apply for permission to reside prior to arrival in the state, can register with immigration authorities and have immediate access to the labour market.

Administrative data on the recipients of the Pandemic Unemployment Payment from May to November 2020 show that around 28% of PUP claimants were non-Irish nationals: This is significantly higher than the proportion of non-Irish nationals in the labour force in Q1 2020 before the pandemic hit (17.5%). East European nationals were also more likely to receive payments under the Temporary Wage Subsidy Scheme (TWSS) relative to their share of employment, though not other non-Irish groups.

For further information:


www.inis.gov.ie

www.ria.gov.ie

www.enterprise.gov.ie

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Ireland

Long-term immigration flows by category
2019 (Source: OECD)



Temporary migration
(Source: OECD)

Temporary labour migration (non-EU citizens)

	2019	2019/18
Working holidaymakers
Seasonal workers
Intra-company transfers	1 070	+ 39%
Other temporary workers	150	+ 2%

Education (non-EU citizens)

	2019	2019/18
International students	34 740	+ 15%
Trainees	30	+ 50%


Humanitarian

	2020	2020/19
Asylum seekers	1 540	- 68%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(national definition)



Emigration of Irish to OECD countries
(national definition)




Components of population growth

	2020 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2020/19 difference
Total	8.5	-3.7
Natural increase	4.9	-0.8
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	3.7	-2.8

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2020)	368	-37.3	+0.1
Outflows (2020)

Labour market outcomes
2020



Israel

Foreign-born population – 2020	
Size: 1.8 million, 55% women	<i>Main countries of birth:</i>
20.9% of the population	Former USSR (49%), Morocco (7%), United States (6%)
Evolution since 2010: -3%	

In 2019, Israel received 33 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status), 18.3% more than in 2018. This figure comprises 19.2% family members (including accompanying family). Around 68 000 permits were issued to temporary and seasonal labour migrants.

Citizens of ex-USSR countries form the main group of newcomers in 2019 followed by US and French citizens. Among the top 15 origins, the ex-USSR countries registered the strongest increase (5 400) and France the largest decrease (-200) in flows to Israel compared to the previous year.

In 2020, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -38.8%, to reach around 5 800. The majority of applicants came from Russia (300), Ukraine (200) and India (200). The largest increase since 2019 concerned nationals of Serbia (38) and the largest decrease nationals of Russia (-4 200). Of the 8 800 decisions taken in 2020, 0.7% were positive.

Emigration of Israelis to OECD countries increased by 2% in 2019, to 10 000. Approximately 45% of this group migrated to the United States, 13% to Canada and 11% to Germany.

No major changes in immigration policies were made during 2019-21, a period which saw multiple elections and delayed formation of new governments. Israel maintained longstanding policies to encourage the immigration of Jews around the world to Israel, and to promote their integration in the labour market and society. 2019 was the year with the highest number of new permanent migrants in a decade.

Temporary foreign workers stood at 98 200 at the end of 2020, down from 102 000 a year earlier. The main sectors of employment were care (55 700), agriculture (22 300) and construction (14 900). Due to COVID-19 restrictions, 80% fewer foreign workers arrived from abroad in 2020 than in 2019.

In 2020, the Israeli Government issued additional quotas: 2 500 auxiliary workers to be employed in Long Term Care Facilities (to be recruited through bilateral labour agreements), 700 Jordanian daily workers to work in the hotel industry in Eilat, and a temporary 2020 quota of 1 100 in the construction sector, above the 16 500 previously allocated. The seasonal agricultural quota was cancelled in 2019.

Palestinian cross-border workers numbered 82 800 at the end of 2019. A reform in December 2020 allowed Palestinian construction workers to receive their work permits directly, rather than granting it through a specific Israeli employer, and to change employers more easily. This reform aims to put an end to illegal trade in work permits and

to allow competition between employers for the workers' services.

Israel continues to sign bilateral labour agreements (BLAs) with: Thailand in agriculture (2020), Ukraine in construction (2020), Sri Lanka in home-based caregiving (2019), and the Philippines in the hotel sector (2019). In September 2020, agreements were signed with both Georgia and Nepal for auxiliary workers for work in nursing homes and institutions.

Since 2017, no illegal border-crossers have been registered (they are considered "infiltrators" and remain on a tolerated status). The "Special Track for Voluntary Departure from Israel" supported the departure of 2 700 African border-crossers in 2019 and 840 in 2020, to their origin countries or, more often, resettled in countries that participate in resettlement programs sponsored by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

Since 2017, Darfurian asylum seekers meeting certain criteria whose applications have not been adjudicated have been obtaining temporary humanitarian protection status from courts or from the Ministry of Interior if certain criteria are met. In 2021, the High Court of Justice ruled that the State must adopt a policy concerning the status of Darfurian asylum-seekers by the end of December 2021.


Following COVID-19 related border closures, Israel adopted measures for resident foreign workers, granting several temporary extensions of work visas beyond the maximum 63-month stay, allowing continued employment. Suspension of deportation and permits for asylum seekers were also extended.

For more Information:

www.gov.il
www.knesset.gov.il
www.mfa.gov.il
www.cbs.gov.il

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Israel

Long-term immigration flows by category
2019 (Source: OECD)



Temporary migration
(Source: OECD)

Temporary labour migration

	2019	2019/18
Working holidaymakers	100	- 18%
Seasonal workers
Intra-company transfers
Other temporary workers	68 400	+ 4%


Education

	2019	2019/18
International students
Trainees


Humanitarian

	2020	2020/19
Asylum seekers	5 780	- 39%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(national definition)



Emigration of Israelis to OECD countries
(national definition)




Components of population growth

	2020 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2020/19 difference
Total	16.7	-2.5
Natural increase	14.0	-1.1
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	2.7	-1.5

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2020)	6 106	-1.3	+1.5
Outflows (2020)	5 843	-6.4	+1.4

Labour market outcomes
2020



Italy

Foreign-born population – 2020	
Size: 6.2 million, 54% women	<i>Main countries of birth:</i> Romania (16%), Albania (8%), Morocco (7%)
10.2% of the population	
Evolution since 2010: +6%	

In 2019, Italy received 191 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status and free mobility), -14.8% compared to 2018. This figure comprises 30.9% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 3.6% labour migrants, 53.2% family members (including accompanying family) and 9.6% humanitarian migrants. Around 2 900 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 4 800 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 174 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2019, an increase of 130% compared to 2018. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Romania, Albania and Brazil were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2019. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Albania registered the strongest increase (4 200) and Nigeria the largest decrease (-12 000) in flows to Italy compared to the previous year.

In 2020, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -39.4%, to reach around 21 000. The majority of applicants came from Pakistan (4 900), Bangladesh (2 300) and El Salvador (1 100). The largest increase since 2019 concerned nationals of Bangladesh (900) and the largest decrease nationals of Pakistan (-2 400). Of the 41 000 decisions taken in 2020, 28.4% were positive.

The major developments in migration policies in 2019-20 were related to the change of government in the summer of 2019 and to COVID-19. They were: reform of security decrees approved in 2018 and in the first part of 2019; the regularisation of irregular migrant workers present in Italy before 8 March 2020; and changes to the yearly quota decree for seasonal and non-seasonal workers. In addition, the first National Plan to Address Labour Exploitation and Illegal Recruitment in agriculture was adopted in 2020. This plan works on prevention, protection, enforcement and remedies through specific actions. While covering all agricultural workers, migrants – especially irregular and those in need of protection – are a priority category.

Reform of the two “Security Decrees” passed in 2018 and 2019 restored a single system for the reception of applicants and holders of protection. The single system entrusts reception and integration to local authorities and restores a third protection status in addition to the right to asylum and subsidiary protection. The reform also prevents expulsion or rejection of a person to a State if there are well-founded reasons to believe that such action violates the right to respect for one’s private and family life.

The number of residence permits which allow conversion into a permit for subordinate work was increased, to include not only study reasons but also permits on grounds of special protection, calamities, elective residence, sports, artistic activities, religious reasons, awaiting citizenship, and assistance for minors.

The 2020 quota decree set a maximum admissions quota of 30 850 workers, 18 000 of which are reserved for seasonal work. As a pilot, aimed at reducing the risk of illegal intermediation, 6 000 applications for seasonal permits may be filed by employers’ associations. Among the remaining non-seasonal workers, 6 000 were allotted to certain sectors (transport of goods, hospitality and tourism and construction). Nationalities eligible include those from countries with which Italy has an agreement for co-operation on migration issues. The remaining quota is largely reserved for various status change and special categories.

The maximum duration of the procedure for granting Italian citizenship to a foreigner has been reduced to 24 months.

Although the Minister of the Interior may still restrict or prohibit the transit and stopping of rescue ships in Italian waters, this may not apply in the case of rescue operations immediately communicated to the competent Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centre and carried out in accordance with the instructions of the competent authority for search and rescue at sea.

In response to COVID-19, new measures allowed the possible regularisation of foreign workers, present in Italy before 8 March 2020. Employers may issue new contracts with irregularly resident citizens of non-EU countries in the sectors of agriculture, fisheries and related activities or in domestic work or caregiving services. They receive a renewable one- or two-year residence permit, depending the duration of the job contract. A six-month temporary residence permit could be requested by those currently employed in those sectors, or unemployed whose residence permit expired after October 2019 and who were employed in the same sectors before November 2019. The temporary permit may be converted into a residence permit for work reasons. 207 000 applications were received from employers (85% for domestic work and 15% for agriculture) and 13 000 from unemployed irregular migrants by the deadline in August 2020. Processing of applications was slow to start; by 1 June 2021, 11 000 permits had been issued, with 86% still pending.

For further information:


www.interno.gov.it

www.integrazionemigranti.gov.it

www.istat.it

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Italy

Long-term immigration flows by category
2019 (Source: OECD)



Temporary migration
(Source: OECD)

Temporary labour migration (non-EU citizens)

	2019	2019/18
Working holidaymakers	650	- 7%
Seasonal workers	4 180	- 26%
Intra-company transfers
Other temporary workers


Education (non-EU citizens)

	2019	2019/18
International students	2 860	- 12%
Trainees


Humanitarian

	2020	2020/19
Asylum seekers	21 220	- 39%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(national definition)



Emigration of Italians to OECD countries
(national definition)




Components of population growth

	2020 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2020/19 difference
Total	-6.5	-3.6
Natural increase	-5.8	-2.2
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	-0.7	-1.4

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2020)	9 711	-7.1	+0.5
Outflows (2020)	10 187	+6.4	+0.5

Labour market outcomes
2020



Japan

Foreign-born population – 2019	
Size: 2.7 million, 51% women	<i>Main countries of nationality:</i> China (28%), Korea (26%), Viet Nam (12%)
2.2% of the population	
Evolution since 2010: +23%	

In 2019, Japan received 138 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status), 18.4% more than in 2018. This figure comprises 60% labour migrants, 26.2% family members (including accompanying family) and 0.1% humanitarian migrants. Around 122 000 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 304 000 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants.

Viet Nam, China and the Philippines were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2019. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Viet Nam registered the strongest increase (25 000) and France the largest decrease (27) in flows to Japan compared to the previous year.

In 2020, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -62.1%, to reach around 3 900.

Emigration of Japanese to OECD countries increased by 4% in 2019, to 23 000. Approximately 21% of this group migrated to Germany, 19% to the United States and 8% to New Zealand.

In 2019, two new statuses of residence, “Specified Skilled Worker (i)” and “Specified Skilled Worker (ii)”, were created to accept foreigners who have a certain level of expertise and skill in 14 industry fields. In 2020, these statuses of residence were amended and expanded. In February 2020, Japan and Thailand signed a Memorandum of Co-operation establishing a framework for information partnerships related to the deployment and human rights protection of Thai workers under the Specified Skilled Workers (SSW) visa. As of 31 August 2020, Japan has entered similar information-sharing agreements related to the SSW visa with 12 countries – the Philippines, Cambodia, Nepal, Myanmar, Mongolia, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Viet Nam, Bangladesh, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, and Thailand. In April 2020, an amendment allowing any person with residency in Japan to take the examination for the SSW visa was implemented.

In June 2020, the “Basic Policy for the Comprehensive and Effective Implementation of Measures to Promote Japanese Language Education,” based on Article 10 of “the Act on Promotion of Japanese Language Education,” was approved. The policy aims to promote Japanese language education for foreign nationals residing in Japan by working with local governments to develop Japanese language education as well as improving ICT language learning materials for self-study.

On 28 June 2019, a partial amendment to “Specific Measures for the Admission of Refugees through Resettlement” increased the quota of yearly refugees

accepted for resettlement to 60 people, beginning in fiscal year 2020.

On 1 April 2020, a revision of the landing criteria passed in 2017 for foreign residents under the status of “Nursing Care” came into effect. Foreign workers with more than three years of training as a technical intern in the long-term care field and who pass the State Examination for Certified Care Workers may gain the status of residence of “Nursing Care,” a visa which can be renewed without limit.

In March 2020, guidelines were announced for the Project for Facilitation of Acceptance of Foreign Entrepreneurs in National Strategic Special Zones. Under these guidelines, foreign nationals residing in Japan with the status of residence of “Student” will be able to change their status of residence to “Business Manager” in cases where the foreign nationals plan to engage in the activities to start up a business utilising the project and where certain requirements are met.

One of the first countries outside of China to detect a case of the COVID-19 virus, Japan instituted an entry ban on foreign nationals – except for Special permanent residents and those who have special exceptional circumstances – from January 2020. During this time, foreign nationals staying with the status of residence of “Technical Intern Training” or “Student” who have difficulty in returning to their home country due to COVID-19 were allowed to change their status of residence to “Designated Activities”. For technical intern trainees who had been dismissed due to COVID-19, they can remain in Japan for up to one year, with the possibility of extending an additional six months.

For more information:

www.isa.go.jp


www.moj.go.jp

www.mhlw.go.jp

www.e-stat.go.jp

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Japan

Long-term immigration flows by category
2019 (Source: OECD)



Temporary migration
(Source: OECD)

Temporary labour migration

	2019	2019/18
Working holidaymakers	18 020	+ 13%
Seasonal workers
Intra-company transfers	9 960	+ 5%
Other temporary workers	89 500	+ 9%


Education

	2019	2019/18
International students	121 640	- 2%
Trainees	186 880	+ 18%


Humanitarian

	2020	2020/19
Asylum seekers	3 940	- 62%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(national definition)



Emigration of Japanese to OECD countries
(national definition)




Components of population growth

	2019 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2019/18 difference
Total	-2.2	-0.1
Natural increase	-3.9	-0.5
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	1.7	+0.4

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2020)	4 875	+11.5	+0.1
Outflows (2020)	8 243	+20.7	+0.2

Labour market outcomes
(2015 compared to 2020 OECD average)



Korea

Foreign-born population – 2019	
Size: 1.2 million, 45% women	<i>Main countries of nationality:</i> China (44%), Viet Nam (14%), Uzbekistan (4%)
3.8% of the population	
Evolution since 2010: +39%	

In 2019, Korea received 69 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status), -2% compared to 2018. This figure comprises 0.9% labour migrants and 21.5% family members (including accompanying family). Around 35 000 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 114 000 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants.

China, Viet Nam and Thailand were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2019. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Uzbekistan registered the strongest increase (7 100) and China the largest decrease (-30 000) in flows to Korea compared to the previous year.

In 2020, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -56.8%, to reach around 6 700. The majority of applicants came from Russia (1 100), Egypt (700) and Kazakhstan (600). The largest increase since 2019 concerned nationals of Egypt (600) and the largest decrease nationals of Russia (-1 800). Of the 12 000 decisions taken in 2020, 1.2% were positive.

Emigration of Koreans to OECD countries increased by 6% in 2019, to 77 000. Approximately 44% of this group migrated to Japan, 24% to the United States and 8% to Canada.

COVID-19 measures covered many aspects of migration management. Foreign residents who leave the country must apply for a re-entry permit to retain their residence status. From August 2020, non-professional temporary foreign workers holding H-2 or E-9 visas who were unable to depart at the end of their maximum work period (36 or 58 months) were allowed to work in farming and fishing for up to five months and to receive a loan against their Departure Guarantee Insurance. E-9 workers who were unable to return to their home country at the end of the maximum stay in Korea were allowed to extend their employment period by an additional year. This possibility was included in a Revision in April 2021 of the relevant Act on Employment of Foreign workers.

Borders remain open, although as of April 2021 subject to a PCR test prior to arrival and a 14-day quarantine subject to inspection. Persons without a permanent address in Korea must stay in – and pay for – government-run quarantine facilities. Admission of E-9 workers was restricted in 2021 to 50 persons/day, subject to the same quarantine requirement; the government was operating 420 quarantine rooms for these workers as of April 2021. Until early April the only country from which E-9 workers were admitted was Cambodia. From 6 April 2021, the list of countries from which E-9 workers are admitted was expanded, and the cap

on E-9 workers admitted per day was raised to 100 persons a day.

In March 2021, COVID-19 testing was made mandatory for all resident foreigners in many jurisdictions, although this requirement was later restricted to only at-risk foreign residents, primarily labour migrants in crowded conditions.

The annual entry quotas for non-professional temporary workers were reduced slightly from 2020 to 2021. The total number of new workers with the E-9 visa to be admitted in 2021 was set at 52 000, down from 56 000 for the previous years. The decline was primarily in the quota for the manufacturing sector, which was set at 37 700, down 3 000 from the previous year, and in construction, at 1 800, down from 2 300. Due to closure of borders, the number of entering and re-entering E-9 workers fell from 51 400 in 2019 to 6 700 in 2020.

2020 saw the roll-out of the new selection method for E-9 workers to all participating origin countries. The selection method involves an initial round of a Korean language test, now followed by a skills test and an additional optional competency test. Points awarded in the latter can help make up for lower scores in the language and skills test.

In 2021, the Ministry of Employment and Labor introduced new measures to improve the housing conditions of E-9 workers in agriculture and fisheries, almost all of whom live in employer-provided accommodation. Some changes were driven by concern over the risk of transmission of COVID-19. Permits will not be granted to employers who offer unsuitable housing. Workers will be allowed to change employer if offered substandard housing. From July 2021, these measures will be extended to all EPS employers, including those in manufacturing, construction and service. The government intends to reduce the maximum occupancy of shared housing rooms from 15 to eight.

For further information:


www.eps.go.kr

www.immigration.go.kr

www.kostat.go.kr

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Korea

Long-term immigration flows by category
2019 (Source: OECD)



Temporary migration
(Source: OECD)

Temporary labour migration

	2019	2019/18
Working holidaymakers	2 680	+ 11%
Seasonal workers
Intra-company transfers	400	+ 3%
Other temporary workers	110 040	- 9%


Education

	2019	2019/18
International students	35 350	- 0%
Trainees	810	- 25%


Humanitarian

	2020	2020/19
Asylum seekers	6 670	- 57%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(national definition)



Emigration of Koreans to OECD countries
(national definition)




Components of population growth

	2019 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2019/18 difference
Total	0.5	-0.5
Natural increase	0.1	-0.5
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	0.4	+0.0

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2020)	7 413	+3.4	+0.5
Outflows (2020)	9 219	-17.9	+0.6

Labour market outcomes
2020



Latvia

Foreign-born population – 2020	
Size: 0.2 million, 61% women	<i>Main countries of birth:</i> Russia (48%), Belarus (17%), Ukraine (14%)
12.6% of the population	
Evolution since 2010: -24%	

In 2019, 7 400 new immigrants obtained a residence permit longer than 12 months in Latvia (excluding EU citizens), 19.8% more than in 2018. This figure comprises 45.9% labour migrants, 18.3% family members (including accompanying family), 30% who came for education reasons and 5.7% other migrants. Around 300 short-term permits were issued to international students and 1 000 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 5 200 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2019, an increase of 140% compared to 2018. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Ukraine, Russia and India were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2019. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Ukraine registered the strongest increase (100) and India the largest decrease (-100) in flows to Latvia compared to the previous year.

In 2020, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -19.4%, to reach around 150. The majority of applicants came from Belarus (45), Russia (10) and Syria (10). The largest increase since 2019 concerned nationals of Belarus (40) and the largest decrease nationals of Azerbaijan (-25). Of the 120 decisions taken in 2020, 20.8% were positive.

Emigration of Latvians to OECD countries decreased by -2% in 2019, to 11 000. Approximately 34% of this group migrated to Germany, 16% to the Netherlands and 7% to Norway.

In 2019, activities related to the introduction of the Common European Asylum System were mainly carried out using AMIF (Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund) resources. The main measures related to the provision of information and guidelines about life in Latvia for persons with international protection status. As part of a programme to improve and develop information systems supporting migration and asylum and related processes, the government is moving towards a more electronic-based system.

In June 2019, the *Saeima* adopted amendments to the Immigration Law, allowing employers to recruit third-country nationals on the basis of a long-term visa. The process of receiving a visa is simpler, cheaper and faster than receiving a residence permit, thus allowing employers to attract the necessary workforce more flexibly.

At the end of 2019, the Cabinet of Ministers adopted amendments to three migration-related regulations, introducing further simplification of procedure for hiring foreigners (e.g. the term of registration of the vacancy with the Public Employment Services has been reduced from a

month to 10 working days, but in certain cases, this requirement was abolished).

On 1 December 2020, the State Border Guard Law entered into force. The law integrates legal regulation of the State Border Guard with other regulatory enactments.

In 2020, the mandatory requirement to prove the existence of sufficient financial resources (according to the set salary threshold – EUR 1 076) was abolished if the third-country national had entered and applied for a temporary residence permit before 10 June 2020. For persons applying for a first-time temporary residence permit after 10 June 2020, the requirements for meeting the national salary threshold for third-country nationals continued to apply in full.

In December 2020, amendments to the Labour Law as a result of the incorporation of the EU Directive governing the posting of workers were adopted.

Those residence permit holders who in current circumstances experience a delay in applying for a repeated residence permit or registering a residence permit (ID card), may in most cases be allowed to legalise their status in Latvia by paying a state fee for examining documents in accelerated time (five working days).

Cases of foreigners staying irregularly in Latvia during the COVID-19 emergency are examined individually; usually the immigration authority issues a D-long stay visa (national visa) or prolongs a Schengen visa on humanitarian grounds.

From 7 December 2020, the State Border Guard, in co-operation with the National Armed Forces and the State Police, intensified monitoring of whether persons who entered Latvia met their obligation to submit a confirmation questionnaire on the personal information system website.

Under legislation related to limiting the spread of COVID-19 infection, regulatory enactments have been introduced designed to reduce the number of on-site services and minimise direct contact between clients and service providers. The regulations will remain in force as long as necessary to limit COVID-19 infection, but their impact will be permanent. In connection with these regulatory enactments, the range of electronic services has been significantly expanded and procedures changed to allow remote provision. It is planned to adopt these principles also in those permanent regulatory enactments relating to the entry of third-country nationals.

For further information:


www.pmlp.gov.lv

www.csp.gov.lv

www.emn.lv

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Latvia

Grants of long-term residence permits (non-EU citizens)
2019 (Source: Eurostat)



Temporary migration (non-EU citizens)
(Source: Eurostat)


Temporary migration

	2019	2019/18
Remunerated activities reasons	1 030	+ 25%
Family reasons	1 050	+ 8%
Education reasons	350	- 39%
Other	280	+ 1%


Humanitarian

	2020	2020/19
Asylum seekers	150	- 17%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(national definition)



Emigration of Latvians to OECD countries
(national definition)




Components of population growth

	2020 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2020/19 difference
Total	-7.6	-1.2
Natural increase	-5.9	-1.2
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	-1.7	+0.1

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2020)	1 088	-4.7	+3.3
Outflows (2020)	174	-27.9	+0.5

Labour market outcomes
2020



Lithuania

Foreign-born population – 2020	
Size: 0.2 million, 47% women	<i>Main countries of birth:</i> Russia (32%), Belarus (24%), Ukraine (17%)
5.6% of the population	
Evolution since 2010: -29%	

In 2019, 21 000 new immigrants obtained a residence permit longer than 12 months in Lithuania (excluding EU citizens), 79.6% more than in 2018. This figure comprises 87.1% labour migrants, 5.1% family members (including accompanying family), 5.3% who came for education reasons and 2.5% other migrants. Around 200 short-term permits were issued to international students and 200 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 10 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2019, an increase of 230% compared to 2018. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Ukraine, Belarus and Russia were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2019. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Ukraine registered the strongest increase (3 100) and India the largest decrease (-61) in flows to Lithuania compared to the previous year.

In 2020, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -59%, to reach around 260. The majority of applicants came from Russia (65), Belarus (80) and Tajikistan (40). The largest increase since 2019 concerned nationals of Belarus (65) and the largest decrease nationals of Russia (-200). Of the 400 decisions taken in 2020, 22.9% were positive.

Emigration of Lithuanians to OECD countries decreased by -35% in 2019, to 18 000. Approximately 30% of this group migrated to Germany, 14% to Norway and 11% to the Netherlands.

In October 2019, the Lithuanian Migration Information System (MIGRIS) was launched. Clients use the system to submit electronic applications for the issue or renewal of residence permits and to register for an appointment to meet a Migration Department specialist.

In January 2019, the Constitutional Court established the right of the same-sex spouse or partner who is a foreign national to family reunification in Lithuania with their spouse who is a citizen of the Republic of Lithuania.

Since September 2019, issue or renewal of a temporary residence permit may be refused if a foreign student enrolled in a higher education and research institution fails to progress in their studies and no justified reasons have been presented.

On 1 January 2020, a readmission agreement with Ukraine entered into force.

Since January 2020, asylum applicants have the right to take up employment if the Migration Department does not take a decision on granting asylum within six months from the lodging of a claim.

As a response to COVID-19, between March and June 2020 the government approved a quarantine regime and banned

foreigners from entering Lithuania; in November 2020, the quarantine regime was reintroduced. During the first quarantine, the procedure of issuing temporary residence permits was simplified for foreigners working in Lithuanian companies engaged in international commercial/freight transport. The Migration Department granted a tolerance period during the quarantine, and for two months from the end of the quarantine, for foreigners whose period of legal stay in Lithuania ended when quarantine was announced but who could not leave Lithuania due to no fault of their own.

Since September 2020, applications for the issuance of temporary residence permits such as EU Blue Cards or for lecturers or researchers and their family members may be examined once they are lodged on MIGRIS.

Due to the political situation in Belarus, since September 2020 Belarus citizens may obtain a multiple-entry national visa valid for six months under facilitated conditions. Family members of Belarusian nationals who are in possession of a national visa or a temporary residence permit may also obtain a national visa under the same facilitated conditions.

In 2020 the Ministry of the Interior launched a procedure according to which a foreigner may acquire the status of an electronic resident (e-resident). This digital ID will give access to the administrative, public or commercial services provided in Lithuania by electronic (remote) means.

A new provision was introduced in 2020 stipulating that a child of stateless persons lawfully residing in the country is a citizen of Lithuania who has acquired citizenship by birth, regardless of their place of birth.

For the first time, an annual quota (32 200 for 2021) was approved for foreigners entering Lithuania for the purpose of taking up employment in an occupation included in the list of Shortage Occupations. Once the quota is exhausted, foreigners whose occupation is included in the list will be required to obtain a work permit.

Since March 2021, Blue Card holders may start employment immediately after they have lodged their application if the position is labour-market tested or labour-market-test exempt. Foreign students at Master level may work without any restrictions.

For further information:


www.migracija.lt

www.stat.gov.lt

www.emn.lt

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Lithuania

Grants of long-term residence permits (non-EU citizens)
2019 (Source: Eurostat)



Temporary migration (non-EU citizens)
(Source: Eurostat)


Temporary migration

	2019	2019/18
Remunerated activities reasons	160	+ 8%
Family reasons	80	+ 38%
Education reasons	220	- 43%
Other	20	+ 11%


Humanitarian

	2020	2020/19
Asylum seekers (2018)	260	- 59%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(national definition)



Emigration of Lithuanians to OECD countries
(national definition)




Components of population growth

	2020 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2020/19 difference
Total	0.6	+0.6
Natural increase	-6.6	-2.7
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	7.2	+3.3

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2020)	791	-39.4	+1.4
Outflows (2020)	366	-39.2	+0.7

Labour market outcomes
2020



Luxembourg

Foreign-born population – 2020	
Size: 0.3 million, 49% women	<i>Main countries of birth:</i> Portugal (24%), France (14%), Belgium (7%)
48.2% of the population	
Evolution since 2010: +53%	

In 2019, Luxembourg received 23 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status and free mobility), 4.6% more than in 2018. This figure comprises 75.7% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 10.1% labour migrants, 10.1% family members (including accompanying family) and 3.5% humanitarian migrants. Around 400 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 300 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 53 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2019, an increase of 45% compared to 2018. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

France, Portugal and Italy were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2019. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Portugal registered the strongest increase (300) and Poland the largest decrease (-64) in flows to Luxembourg compared to the previous year.

In 2020, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -41.1%, to reach around 1 300. The majority of applicants came from Syria (400), Eritrea (300) and Afghanistan (100). The largest increase since 2019 concerned nationals of Sri Lanka (5) and the largest decrease nationals of Eritrea (-300). Of the 1 200 decisions taken in 2020, 64.4% were positive.

In 2019, Luxembourg introduced long-term visas simplifying the entry and stay of third country nationals without the need to apply for a residence permit. Four laws clarifying the status of British nationals residing in Luxembourg were passed to ensure the legal status for UK citizens, largely present in the banking and service sectors. The Immigration Law was amended to combat irregular migration more effectively and to ensure a more efficient retention and return of irregularly staying TCNs.

As of 1 January 2020, Luxembourg created the National Reception Office (ONA) by splitting the competences of the Luxembourg Reception and Integration Agency (OLAI). The ONA, attached to the General Secretariat of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, is responsible for organising the reception of applicants for international protection and creating and managing accommodation facilities reserved for the temporary accommodation of applicants for international protection and people eligible for subsidiary protection.

A new Integration Department was created under the auspices of the Ministry of Family Affairs, Integration and the Greater Region handling all matters relating to the integration of foreigners, as the Welcome and Integration Contract (CAI) and the Guided integration trail (PIA). The Integration Department is also co-ordinating the multiannual

National Integration Plan (PAN) and the implementation of the Local Integration Plans (PCI). In 2020, 13 projects supporting social, cultural, and economic initiatives empowering communities and societal groups were implemented under the PAN. The projects had a focus on young people, as well as the development of efficient integration strategies. A new call for proposals for 2021 was launched at the end of 2020.

Through intra-municipal and regional co-operation, local integration plans have been developed increasingly, thus adapting to the reality of integration in suburban and rural areas. Good practices are exchanged in the Local Integration Exchange and Support Group (GRESIL) which emphasised the co-operation between communities during their 2019 sessions.

Given the tight housing situation, the ONA increased their efforts to incentivise cities and municipalities to provide adequate and affordable housing for beneficiaries of international protection even after they exceed the maximum duration of stay in any reception facility.

On January 2019, the REVIS (Social Inclusion Revenue) substituted the RMG (guaranteed minimum revenue). The new legislation clarifies that all beneficiaries of international protection older than 25 years and their dependants are entitled to the REVIS. Asylum seekers do not benefit from the REVIS.

Luxembourg reached bilateral agreements with its neighbours ensuring the free circulation of cross-border commuters when the borders with Luxembourg were closed. Many cross-border workers work in the health industry and uphold the full operation of the health care system.

Luxembourg renewed all residence permits as well as short-term visas for TCNs which would have expired at the end of the state of crisis, in addition to asylum seekers' certificates. ONA also opened eight new reception facilities for asylum seekers in 2019-20. Luxembourg provided TCNs in situations of irregular stay with access to social grocery stores and COVID-19 medical resources. Repatriation and Dublin transfers were suspended during the crisis.

For further information:


www.guichet.public.lu

www.ona.gouvernement.lu

www.mae.gouvernement.lu

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Luxembourg

Long-term immigration flows by category
2019 (Source: OECD)



Temporary migration
(Source: OECD)

Temporary labour migration (non-EU citizens)

	2019	2019/18
Working holidaymakers
Seasonal workers
Intra-company transfers	220	- 10%
Other temporary workers


Education (non-EU citizens)

	2019	2019/18
International students	420	+ 20%
Trainees	50	+ 45%


Humanitarian

	2020	2020/19
Asylum seekers	1 300	- 41%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(national definition)



Emigration of Luxembourgers to OECD countries
(national definition)




Components of population growth

	2020 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2020/19 difference
Total	13.7	-6.0
Natural increase	2.9	-0.2
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	10.7	-5.9

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2020)	2 138	+6.6	+2.9
Outflows (2020)	14 203	+3.4	+19.4

Labour market outcomes
2020



Mexico

Foreign-born population – 2020	
Size: 1.2 million, 50% women	<i>Main countries of birth:</i> United States (74%), Guatemala (3%), Colombia (3%)
0.9% of the population	
Evolution since 2010: +26%	

In 2019, Mexico received 39 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status), 0.1% more than in 2018. This figure comprises 15.5% labour migrants, 43.8% family members (including accompanying family) and 20.4% humanitarian migrants. Around 5 700 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 24 000 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants.

Venezuela, the United States and Honduras were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2019. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Venezuela registered the strongest increase (1 100) and Guatemala the largest decrease (-400) in flows to Mexico compared to the previous year.

In 2020, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -41.4%, to reach around 41 000. The majority of applicants came from Honduras (15 000), Haiti (5 000) and Cuba (5 800). The largest increase since 2019 concerned nationals of Haiti (400) and the largest decrease nationals of Honduras (-14 000). Of the 27 000 decisions taken in 2020, 63.6% were positive.

Emigration of Mexicans to OECD countries decreased by -2% in 2019, to 176 000. Approximately 88% of this group migrated to the United States, 3% to Spain and 2% to Canada.

The López-Obrador government came into office in December 2018. In early 2019, a document titled “The new migration policy of the Government of Mexico, 2018-24” was published. It promoted a shared responsibility approach; safe, orderly and regular migration; addressing irregular migration; strengthening migration institutions; protecting Mexicans abroad; integration and reintegration; and encouraging sustainable development in the communities of origin. In September 2019, as a Presidential Decree, the Inter-Agency Commission for Comprehensive Attention of Migration Affairs was established, charged with co-ordinating the policies, programming and actions on migration issues with the different offices, administrative bodies and other entities of the federal public administration. Finally, in the first half 2020, the 2020-24 Governance Sector Program was published in the Official Gazette of the Federation. This programme established notably the objective to “guarantee the full exercise and enjoyment of Human Rights of all people who settle, enter, reside, transit or return to Mexico based on the design, co-ordination and implementation of a comprehensive population and human mobility policy”.

There was an important increase of the irregular flows of migrants from Central America that began in 2018, better known as “caravans”, and it was a major concern for the US Administration due to the arrival of this population at the

border between Mexico and the United States. In this regard, Mexico agreed to offer protection to migrants who were affected by the unilaterally determined US Migrant Protection Protocol, while they awaited the adjudication of their asylum claims.

The government took unprecedented steps to increase enforcement to curb irregular migration, including the deployment of its National Guard throughout Mexico, giving priority to its southern border. The National Guard was created in 2018-19 originally to fight drug cartels but was deployed on the northern and southern Mexican borders to aid the National Institute for Migration in migratory control tasks and to tackle human trafficking and smuggling.

After the Biden Administration announced it would stop new enrolments in the Migrant Protection Protocols policy on 23 January 2021, the Government of Mexico ceased accepting returning migrant families arriving at the U.S.-Mexico border. Both the Biden and the López-Obrador administrations have agreed in the long term to continue addressing ‘the root causes’ that expel Central Americans out of their home communities rather than emphasise border controls.

In addition, legislative advances were made in the area of migrant children, which consisted of reforming the Migration Law, and the Law of Refugees, Political Asylum, and Complementary Protection (11 November 2020), focused on strengthening the child protection system in contexts of human mobility, and considering their best interests.


Furthermore, non-detention is established for this population in migration stations, regardless of their accompaniment situation and their provisional regularisation.

For further information:

www.gob.mx
www.inegi.org.mx
www.politicamigratoria.gob.mx

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Mexico

Long-term immigration flows by category
2019 (Source: OECD)



Temporary migration
(Source: OECD)

Temporary labour migration

	2019	2019/18
Working holidaymakers
Seasonal workers	10 000	- 7%
Intra-company transfers
Other temporary workers	14 330	- 34%


Education

	2019	2019/18
International students	5 650	- 8%
Trainees


Humanitarian

	2020	2020/19
Asylum seekers	41 200	- 41%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(national definition)



Emigration of Mexicans to OECD countries
(national definition)




Components of population growth

	2019 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2019/18 difference
Total	11.3	-0.4
Natural increase	11.5	-0.9
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	-0.2	+0.5

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2020)	42 880	+9.9	+4.0
Outflows (2020)	899	-8.4	+0.1

Labour market outcomes
2020



Netherlands

Foreign-born population – 2020	
Size: 2.4 million, 52% women	<i>Main countries of birth:</i> Turkey (8%), Suriname (7%), Morocco (7%)
14.0% of the population	
Evolution since 2010: +31%	

In 2019, the Netherlands received 153 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status and free mobility), 12.5% more than in 2018. This figure comprises 58.7% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 15.4% labour migrants, 22.4% family members (including accompanying family) and 3.2% humanitarian migrants. Around 20 000 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 3 700 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 219 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2019, an increase of 74% compared to 2018. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Poland, India and Romania were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2019. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Romania registered the strongest increase (2 400) and the United States the largest decrease (200) in flows to the Netherlands compared to the previous year.

In 2020, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -39.1%, to reach around 14 000. The majority of applicants came from Syria (4 100), Algeria (1 000) and Turkey (1 000). The largest increase since 2019 concerned nationals of Syria (400) and the largest decrease nationals of Nigeria (-1 500). Of the 14 000 decisions taken in 2020, 63.3% were positive.

Emigration of Dutch to OECD countries decreased by -12% in 2019, to 35 000. Approximately 22% of this group migrated to Belgium, 18% to Germany and 13% to Spain.

In 2019 and 2020, only a few minor changes occurred in the regulatory framework for labour migration to the Netherlands. In October 2019, a structural scheme was implemented to bring cooks working in the Asian hospitality sector to the Netherlands. The permit is valid for two years, is issued on the condition that no Dutch or European cook is available and the employer must make efforts to train staff in order to fill vacancies.

A new residence scheme for essential staff of start-ups founded in the Netherlands was announced in July 2019. It is expected to come into force in early 2021, initially in the form of a four-year-long pilot.

An assistance scheme for third-country nationals without a right of residence in the Netherlands and with no right to other forms of shelter/support was piloted in five municipalities in 2019. By providing counselling for assisted voluntary return, migration to another country or, if applicable, legalisation of stay, the facilities aim to prevent irregular stay and to limit the consequences of irregular stay for the local environment. The pilots will run for two years. If

the pilot is successful, the National Immigration Facilities will be implemented as a permanent provision.

In 2019, a joint Task Force (Ministry of Education, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Justice and Security) was formed for the screening of students in sensitive study programmes.

On 1 May 2020, a Task Force was set up for the protection of labour migrants. This team issued two advisory reports in 2020: on the risk of infection by COVID-19 at work and on their poor living and working conditions. At the end of 2020 the government promised to start working immediately on improvements in the field of medical care and registration of migrant workers. Preparations are also being made for more drastic measures in the field of living and working conditions.

Following proposals for a new civic integration system in July 2018, the House of Representatives passed the Civic Integration Act in 2020 and will enter into force on 1 January 2022. Measures include language training, help in entering employment and funding provision for municipalities.


Measures in response to the COVID-19 pandemic include: temporary suspension of asylum procedures; civic integration courses offered via e-learning; and easing of salary criteria where necessary. International students were allowed to extend their residence permits if study was delayed, the virus deemed an 'excusable reason' for insufficient study progress. Specific measures were introduced to register for a study programme with an online language test or to use this test for the application of visa documents.

For further information:

www.ind.nl
www.cbs.nl

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Netherlands

Long-term immigration flows by category
2019 (Source: OECD)



Temporary migration (non-EU citizens)
(Source: Eurostat)


Temporary migration

	2019	2019/18
Remunerated activities reasons	3 720	+ 2%
Family reasons	4 490	+ 32%
Education reasons	7 100	+ 9%
Other	40	- 38%


Humanitarian

	2020	2020/19
Asylum seekers	13 720	- 39%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(national definition)



Emigration of Dutch to OECD countries
(national definition)




Components of population growth

	2020 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2020/19 difference
Total	3.9	-3.3
Natural increase	0.0	-1.0
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	3.9	-2.3

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2020)	2 521	+5.2	+0.3
Outflows (2020)	13 923	-4.3	+1.5

Labour market outcomes
2020



New Zealand

Foreign-born population – 2018	
Size: 1.3 million, 51% women	<i>Main countries of birth:</i>
26.8% of the population	United Kingdom (21%),
Evolution since 2010: +39%	China (10%), India (9%)

In 2019, New Zealand received 38 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status), -14.9% compared to 2018. This figure comprises 10.5% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 22.9% labour migrants, 57.2% family members (including accompanying family) and 9.4% humanitarian migrants. Around 16 000 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 112 000 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants.

China, India and South Africa were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2019. Among the top 15 countries of origin, South Africa registered the strongest increase (5 300) and India the largest decrease (-200) in flows to New Zealand compared to the previous year.

In 2020, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -19.1%, to reach around 400. The majority of applicants came from Indonesia (100), China (60) and India (43). The largest increase since 2019 concerned nationals of Indonesia (100) and the largest decrease nationals of China (-31).

Emigration of New Zealanders to OECD countries decreased by -83% in 2019, to 5 200. Approximately 21% of this group migrated to Japan, 20% to the United States and 14% to Australia.

In 2019, New Zealand announced that it would implement major changes to the way employers recruit some migrants for temporary work. The new framework will replace six types of temporary work visas and have three consecutive steps: an employer check, a job check and a migrant check. The reforms are being implemented incrementally and will be complete by November 2021.

As part of these reforms, in July 2020 skill levels were replaced with a median wage threshold (the 2019 rate still in force: NZD 25.5 per hour) in the Essential Skills visa (a temporary work visa for migrants with a job offer). This new threshold determines how long a migrant can stay on an Essential Skills visa and their options to support family. Migrants that earn less than the median wage but over an income threshold are eligible for 12-month visas. Migrants earning more than the median wage are eligible for a

three-year visa, and may support their partner for a work visa, and their children for visitor or student visas. There is no longer a five-year visa option for higher-skilled occupations.

COVID-19 had a large impact on New Zealand, which closed its borders progressively from February and almost completely in March 2020. The Immigration (COVID-19 Response) Act 2020 introduced new powers under which the Minister of Immigration can change conditions on classes of visas and grant new visas to classes of people. These powers, alongside short-term changes to policy settings, were used (among other things) to extend visas and add work rights for groups of visitors, students, and workers onshore following the border closure. Offshore applications for temporary visas were suspended, unless the applicant had been invited to apply following an Expression of Interest (EOI).

New Zealand also suspended a number of visa programmes, including selections for EOIs in the Skilled Migrant Category (SMC). As of mid-2021 New Zealand is prioritising the processing of SMC and Residence from Work applications from persons that are currently in New Zealand, if the applicant is highly remunerated (at least NZD 51 per hour) or is authorised to work in an occupation that requires official registration. New Zealand will review the decision to delay the EOI selection process later in 2021.

New Zealand continues to select and assess EOIs for the Investor residence category, noting that successful offshore applicants may not be able to enter at present. In 2020-21, 400 Investor places were made available.

Refugee resettlement under the Refugee Quota Programme resumed on a limited basis. Refugees under the Refugee Quota Programme started to arrive in New Zealand from early February 2021 in small family groups. The refugee quota of 1 500 places is unlikely to be met in 2020-21.

In July 2020, New Zealand announced a set of policy and operational changes and NZD 50M in new funding to address migrant exploitation. The changes, being implemented in 2021, include a new dedicated reporting line for migrant workers and a new visa to ensure they can leave exploitative workplaces.


For further information:

www.immigration.govt.nz/about-us/what-we-do/welcoming-communities

www.immigration.govt.nz

Key figures on immigration and emigration – New Zealand

Long-term immigration flows by category
2019 (Source: OECD)



Temporary migration
(Source: OECD)

Temporary labour migration

	2019	2019/18
Working holidaymakers	44 430	- 30%
Seasonal workers	12 790	- 2%
Intra-company transfers
Other temporary workers	53 630	- 6%


Education

	2019	2019/18
International students	16 430	- 28%
Trainees	770	- 36%


Humanitarian

	2020	2020/19
Asylum seekers	440	- 19%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(national definition)



Emigration of New Zealanders to OECD countries
(national definition)




Components of population growth

	2019 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2019/18 difference
Total	16.3	+0.5
Natural increase	5.2	+0.0
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	11.1	+0.5

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2020)	397	-20.2	+0.2
Outflows (2020)	929	+1.9	+0.4

Labour market outcomes
2020



Norway

Foreign-born population – 2020	
Size: 0.9 million, 48% women	<i>Main countries of birth:</i> Poland (12%), Sweden (6%), Lithuania (5%)
16.0% of the population	
Evolution since 2010: +65%	

In 2019, Norway received 41 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status), 1.8% more than in 2018. This figure comprises 48.4% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 10.6% labour migrants, 28.5% family members (including accompanying family) and 12.4% humanitarian migrants. Around 3 800 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 7 900 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants.

Poland, Lithuania and India were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2019. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Congo registered the strongest increase (600) and Syria the largest decrease (-2 400) in flows to Norway compared to the previous year.

In 2020, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -39.2%, to reach around 1 300. The majority of applicants came from Syria (500), Eritrea (200) and Turkey (85). The largest increase since 2019 concerned nationals of Tanzania (5) and the largest decrease nationals of Turkey (-300). Of the 1 600 decisions taken in 2020, 72.5% were positive.

Emigration of Norwegians to OECD countries increased by 3% in 2019, to 8 600. Approximately 21% of this group migrated to Sweden, 17% to Denmark and 16% to Spain.

Norway is implementing a new Integration Act since January 2021. It allows for more differentiation of the length of the Introduction Programme for refugees and their families – to last between six months to four years -and provides better access to acquire formal education, notably to complete upper secondary education during participation. As a part of a regional reform in Norway, and regulated in the Integration Act, the counties will co-ordinate regional integration work, provide plans for the qualification of immigrants, give career guidance and recommend how many refugees should settle in their municipalities. The Integration Act also replaces the previous need-based offer of hours in Norwegian language training by a Norwegian language goal, between A2 and B2 depending on prior education and skills. For Norwegian language learning more generally, Norway is piloting a grant scheme offering participants a pass to access a certain number of teacher-led Norwegian language lessons.

In 2020, temporary regulatory changes allowed non-EU/EFTA seasonal workers in agriculture staying in Norway to renew their residence permit and work for more than six months. The temporary changes ceased on 31 December 2020, but were reintroduced on 19 April 2021 to apply through September 2021. Skilled workers from outside the EU/EFTA with temporary residence permits, laid off work between March and October 2020, had been

allowed to stay in Norway until their permits expired, apply for unemployment benefits and renew their permits between June to end-October 2020. This is no longer possible and skilled workers with temporary residence permit who lose their job, do not qualify for unemployment benefits and have to leave Norway when their permit expires.

Since March 2020, a new regulation on assisted return defines who may be granted return assistance. It regulates the amount of assistance, standardised for each country of origin, but leaves room for flexibility, based on individual needs.

In December 2019, Norway launched a new Action Plan against Racism and Discrimination on the Grounds of Ethnicity and Religion and in September 2020 the first Action Plan against Discrimination and Hatred of Muslims. The Action Plan against Radicalisation and Violent Extremism was revised in 2020, including new measures addressing right-wing extremism.

As a follow-up of the strategy against work-related crime, the government proposed and the parliament passed, that the Norwegian Labour Inspection Authority supervises hiring processes, and issues orders and reactions in the event of illegal hiring. The new regulation entered into force from July 2020.

To fight the spread of COVID-19, Norway introduced entry restrictions for foreign nationals from March 2020. Borders were re-opened on several occasions for EEA/Schengen residents, requiring a mandatory quarantine period. Restrictions remained throughout for third country nationals, but exemptions applied for certain groups. Norway suspended refugee resettlement between March and August 2020, and as a result did not fill all quota places of 2020. Support measures for vulnerable groups included financial compensation for temporary layoffs of additional groups, for example international students. To encourage competence building, the possibility to combine training and education with unemployment benefits was eased until July 2021 and will be replaced by a new permanent set of rules.

For further information:


www.udi.no

www.imdi.no

www.ssb.no

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Norway

Long-term immigration flows by category
2019 (Source: OECD)



Temporary migration
(Source: OECD)

Temporary labour migration

	2019	2019/18
Working holidaymakers	240	+ 8%
Seasonal workers	3 410	+ 18%
Intra-company transfers	1 600	- 4%
Other temporary workers	2 410	- 1%


Education

	2019	2019/18
International students	3 830	+ 6%
Trainees	220	- 18%


Humanitarian

	2020	2020/19
Asylum seekers	1 340	- 39%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(national definition)



Emigration of Norwegians to OECD countries
(national definition)




Components of population growth

	2020 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2020/19 difference
Total	4.4	-3.0
Natural increase	2.3	-0.3
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	2.1	-2.7

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2020)	578	-6.3	+0.2
Outflows (2020)

Labour market outcomes
2020



Poland

Foreign-born population – 2020	
Size: 0.8 million, 59% women	<i>Main countries of birth:</i>
2.2% of the population	Ukraine (34%), Germany (12%),
Evolution since 2010: +26%	Belarus (12%)

In 2019, 93 000 new immigrants obtained a residence permit longer than 12 months in Poland (excluding EU citizens), 8.3% more than in 2018. This figure comprises 61.5% labour migrants, 15.5% family members (including accompanying family), 2.1% who came for education reasons and 20.9% other migrants. Around 19 000 short-term permits were issued to international students and 568 000 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 94 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2019, an increase of 250% compared to 2018. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Ukraine, Belarus and India were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2019. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Ukraine registered the strongest increase (22 000) and Germany the largest decrease (-800) in flows to Poland compared to the previous year.

In 2020, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -45.4%, to reach around 1 500. The majority of applicants came from Russia (500), Belarus (400) and Afghanistan (100). The largest increase since 2019 concerned nationals of Belarus (400) and the largest decrease nationals of Russia (-1 300). Of the 2 000 decisions taken in 2020, 18.5% were positive.

Emigration of Poles to OECD countries decreased by -8% in 2019, to 150 000. Approximately 42% of this group migrated to Germany, 18% to the Netherlands and 9% to the United Kingdom.

From January 2019, holders of a temporary residence and work permit who are in Poland to pursue a profession desirable for the Polish economy were given easier access to a permanent residence permit. They may apply for one after only four years of legal residence in Poland and, if successful, are exempted from a labour market test.

An amendment to the Act on foreigners which entered into force in April 2019 made possible the issue a national visa or a temporary residence permit for purposes of research, internships or voluntary work as part of the European Voluntary Service. The requirement is that the host entity is approved by the Minister of the Interior. These changes are related to the implementation of the 2016/801/EU Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of research, studies, training, voluntary service, pupil exchange schemes or educational projects and au pairing.

In September 2020, the government launched a new programme 'Poland. Business Harbour' aimed at supporting ICT entrepreneurs from Belarus who are interested in

relocating to Poland. It is targeted at freelancers but also start-ups, SMEs and large companies.

From September 2020, new rules on posting of workers have been in force, introduced in order to implement the provisions of Directive 2018/957/EU into Polish law.

A legal amendment in April 2019 gave foreign graduates of Polish universities the right to stay in Poland for a period of nine months on the basis of a temporary residence permit in order to seek employment or set up a business.

In October 2020, a draft amendment to the Social Assistance Act was submitted. Among other things, it grants the right to an individual integration programme for foreigners with refugee status or subsidiary protection.

From the beginning of 2021 all UK nationals and their family members retain their right to stay in Poland under previous conditions provided that they came to and lived in Poland before the end of the transition period. Though not obligatory, it is recommended that they apply for new residence documents confirming their rights since this can be helpful in exercising these rights.


In response to COVID-19, from 14 March 2020, the validity of various types of residence permits, including work permits and seasonal work permits as well as Schengen and national visas, were automatically extended until the 30th day following the day on which the epidemic state is cancelled. During this time, the stay of foreigners in Poland on the basis of these documents is considered legal, but does not translate into the right to stay or travel to other Schengen countries.

For further information:

- www.emn.gov.pl
- www.udsc.gov.pl
- www.stat.gov.pl
- www.cudzoziemcy.gov.pl
- www.fundusze.mswia.gov.pl

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Poland

Grants of long-term residence permits (non-EU citizens)
2019 (Source: Eurostat)



Temporary migration (non-EU citizens)
(Source: Eurostat)


Temporary migration

	2019	2019/18
Remunerated activities reasons	568 040	+ 18%
Family reasons	2 390	+ 15%
Education reasons	18 770	- 49%
Other	42 340	+ 2%


Humanitarian

	2020	2020/19
Asylum seekers (2018)	1 510	- 45%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(national definition)



Emigration of Poles to OECD countries
(national definition)




Components of population growth

	2020 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2020/19 difference
Total	-3.1	-2.7
Natural increase	-3.2	-2.3
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	0.1	-0.4

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2020)	5 930	-8.8	+1.0
Outflows (2020)	6 550	-8.2	+1.1

Labour market outcomes
2020



Portugal

Foreign-born population – 2019	
Size: 1.1 million, 53% women	<i>Main countries of birth:</i> Angola (15%), Brazil (13%), France (9%)
10.81% of the population	
Evolution since 2010: +40%	

In 2019, Portugal received 88 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status and free mobility), 37% more than in 2018. This figure comprises 31.1% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 39.5% labour migrants, 34.3% family members (including accompanying family) and 0.2% humanitarian migrants. Around 13 000 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 400 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 50 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2019, an increase of 74% compared to 2018. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Brazil, the United Kingdom and Italy were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2019. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Brazil registered the strongest increase (21 000) and France the largest decrease (-900) in flows to Portugal compared to the previous year.

In 2020, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -48.1%, to reach around 900. The majority of applicants came from the Gambia (200), Angola (100) and Guinea-Bissau (90). The largest increase since 2019 concerned nationals of Morocco (50) and the largest decrease nationals of Angola (-200). Of the 400 decisions taken in 2020, 22.6% were positive.

Emigration of Portuguese to OECD countries increased by 9% in 2019, to 64 000. Approximately 27% of this group migrated to the United Kingdom, 14% to Spain and 13% to Switzerland.

The Portuguese nationality law was amended in November 2020 to broaden the access to citizenship to children born in Portugal to immigrant parents. Children born in Portugal to foreign parents now automatically receive Portuguese citizenship if at least one of the parents is a legal resident in the country, irrespective of duration of stay, or has been living in Portugal for at least one year, irrespective of legal status in the country. The law had already been previously amended in 2018. The 2018 amendment decreased the time that one of the parents was required to have been living legally in Portugal before the birth of the child from five to two years.

During 2020, Portugal continued its participation in the Voluntary Resettlement Programme co-ordinated by the UNHCR and the EC, under which it committed to hosting 1 010 persons from Turkey and Egypt in the pledge 2018-19. In August 2020, 41 resettled refugees arrived from Turkey and 25 unaccompanied asylum-seeking children were relocated from Greece to Portugal in July 2020. In September 2020, the IOM and the Immigration and Borders Service (SEF) signed a new Framework Agreement towards

Resettlement of Refugees to Portugal for the period 2020-22.

In 2015, Portugal established a decentralised integration programme to host relocated asylum seekers from Italy and Greece in which both municipalities and the civil society play a key role. The integration programme put in place has co-existed with a pre-existing system to host and integrate spontaneous asylum seekers and refugees. A new unified framework for welcoming and integrating all applicants and beneficiaries of international protection has been recently established by resolution of the Council of Ministers in November 2020.

To deliver an adequate response to the growing number of migrant women seeking the support of the Domestic Violence Victims National Network during the pandemic, the High Commission for Migration and the Commission for Citizenship and Gender Equality launched a new service in the One-Stop-Shop National Support Centres for the Integration of Migrants, in Lisbon (November 2020) and Oporto (February 2021) to assist victims of domestic violence and/or harmful traditional practices.

In 2020, the Portuguese Government renewed exceptional measures in order to ensure that all migrants with pending immigration or asylum processes with the Portuguese Border Service (SEF) could fully access the national health system during the COVID-19 crisis. All migrants with processes filed between 18 March 2020 and 30 April 2021 are temporarily regular in the national territory, which means they are granted full access to the national health system, but also access to social support services, the rental and the labour market, financial and essential public services. Simplified procedures were also put in place for the allocation of residence permits without previous demand of visas and the renewal of residence permits. Visas and residence permits that expired after 24 February 2020 were extended until 31 December 2021 and shall continue to be accepted under the same terms after that date, as long as the holder proves they have already scheduled the renewal. All migrants regardless of migratory status have access to health care, including vaccination and testing, in relation to COVID-19.

For further information:


www.acm.gov.pt

www.om.acm.gov.pt

www.sef.pt

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Portugal

Long-term immigration flows by category
2019 (Source: OECD)



Temporary migration (non-EU citizens)
(Source: Eurostat)


Temporary migration

	2019	2019/18
Remunerated activities reasons	390	+ 39%
Family reasons	1 860	- 30%
Education reasons
Other	730	+ 3%


Humanitarian

	2020	2020/19
Asylum seekers	900	- 48%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(national definition)



Emigration of Portuguese to OECD countries
(national definition)




Components of population growth

	2020 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2020/19 difference
Total	0.2	-1.7
Natural increase	-3.8	-1.3
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	4.0	-0.3

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2020)	4 327	+0.0	+1.9
Outflows (2020)	240	-7.4	+0.1

Labour market outcomes
2020



Romania

Foreign-born population – 2019	
Size: 0.6 million, 46% women	<i>Main countries of birth:</i>
7.8% of the population	Moldova (40%), Italy (11%),
Evolution since 2010: +278%	Spain (9%)

In 2019, 22 000 new immigrants obtained a residence permit longer than 12 months in Romania (excluding EU citizens), 79.5% more than in 2018. This figure comprises 64.8% labour migrants, 16.2% family members (including accompanying family), 14.1% who came for education reasons and 4.8% other migrants. Around 1 800 short-term permits were issued to international students and 2 100 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 16 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2019, an increase of 32% compared to 2018. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

In 2020, the number of first asylum applicants increased by 100%, to reach around 6 000. The majority of applicants came from Afghanistan (2 400), Syria (1 400) and Iraq (400). The largest increase since 2019 concerned nationals of Afghanistan (2 200) and the largest decrease nationals of Iraq (-200). Of the 2 500 decisions taken in 2020, 25.3% were positive.

Emigration of Romanians to OECD countries increased by 2% in 2019, to 288 000. Approximately 38% of this group migrated to Germany, 14% to Italy and 11% to the United Kingdom.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs has proposed a new National Strategy on Immigration for 2020-23, which focuses on border control and illegal migration. It is also aimed at meeting the demand for labour in the country by attracting foreign labour, using a quota system. In 2019, the quota of authorisations of employment for foreign citizens in 2020 was increased to 30 000; for 2021, the number was reduced to 25 000.

Admission and legal residence procedures for third-country nationals were changed in 2020 to exempt citizens of the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, and the Republic of Serbia from the need to obtain work authorisation. They must be employed in Romania with an individual full-time contract of employment for a maximum period of nine months in a calendar year. They may apply for a long-stay visa for employment without the need to present a copy of the authorisation of employment.

Significant changes to Romania's integration law were made in 2019. The main aim was to improve the integration process of beneficiaries of international protection by increasing the resources available and strengthening the co-operation between the central government, local governments, communities, and civil society organisations. Specific measures related to education, housing, community involvement and stakeholder co-operation.

Legislation in 2020 relating to the posting of workers provided for additional rights, in terms of remuneration and working conditions, and additional obligations for their employers, such as new administrative requirements and higher costs.

In response to COVID-19, an Emergency Ordinance in 2020 revised the provisions concerning foreign nationals. The validity of the documents issued by the Romanian Immigration Authorities was maintained throughout the state of emergency and for 90 days after the end of the state of emergency; for subsequent travels to Romania, the additional days granted by this ordinance will not be taken into account when calculating the maximum stay period allowed.

Between 1 June 2020 and 31 December 2020, the Emergency Ordinance provided financial support to employers who hired dismissed Romanians previously working abroad on full time permanent contracts.

For further information:


www.alba.INSSE.ro

www.MAI.gov.ro

www.IGI.MAI.gov.ro

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Romania

Grants of long-term residence permits (non-EU citizens)
2019 (Source: Eurostat)



Temporary migration (non-EU citizens)
(Source: Eurostat)


Temporary migration

	2019	2019/18
Remunerated activities reasons	2 080	+ 26%
Family reasons	630	+ 9%
Education reasons	1 830	+ 19%
Other	490	+ 18%


Humanitarian

	2020	2020/19
Asylum seekers (2018)	6 030	+ 145%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(national definition)



Emigration of Romanians to OECD countries
(national definition)




Components of population growth

	2020 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2020/19 difference
Total	-7.4	-3.0
Natural increase	-6.2	-3.1
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	-1.2	+0.1

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2020)	7 447	-8.5	+3.0
Outflows (2020)	546	+12.4	+0.2

Labour market outcomes
2020



Russian Federation

Foreign-born population – 2020	
11.6 million, 51% women	<i>Main countries of birth:</i>
8% of the population	Ukraine (28%), Kazakhstan (22%), Uzbekistan (10%)

Ukraine, Tajikistan and Armenia were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2019. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Armenia registered the strongest increase (28 000) and Belarus the largest decrease (-100) in flows to Russia compared to the previous year.

In 2020, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -13.8%, to reach around 6 000. The majority of applicants came from Ukraine (4 700), China (900) and Afghanistan (600). The largest increase since 2019 concerned nationals of China (900) and the largest decrease nationals of Ukraine (-1 300). Of the 6 900 decisions taken in 2020, 77.6% were positive.

Emigration of Russians to OECD countries was stable in 2019, at 98 000. Approximately 18% of this group migrated to Turkey, 14% to Germany and 11% to the United States.

The main changes in migration legislation in Russia, not related to the pandemic, dealt with the simplification of the procedures for acquiring citizenship for selected categories of foreigners, simplified access to a residence permit, and registration of migrants at the place of temporary residence.

The changes relate to reform of the migration regime and migration legislation and the preparation of a new legal act that will combine (in a modified form) many of the provisions currently contained in different laws. They imply the cancellation of the temporary residence permit, overall digitalisation of services related to foreigners' stay and work in Russia, a unification of the terms of a foreigner's long-term stay in Russia (exceeding 90 days), and reclassification of naturalisation channels.

From 1 November 2019, many foreigners can obtain a permanent residence permit, bypassing a temporary residence permit. Among them are almost all persons who apply for a permit based on family reunification (except spouses), graduates of Russian professional training institutions (tertiary and secondary) in case of having a diploma with honours, skilled specialists with selected occupations (from the abovementioned list of the Ministry of Labour) after half a year work in Russia.

There will be a single procedure for a long-term stay (more than 90 days a year) for any legal purposes, including work and education, without obtaining a residence permit and acquiring Russian citizenship. These rules will apply to foreigners who enter the Russian Federation in a manner that does not require a visa, including citizens of the member states of the Eurasian Economic Union, with the exception of citizens of Belarus.

An e-visa was introduced to facilitate international trips to Russia for the citizens of 52 countries.

A Federal Law in April 2020 introduced several important changes to the procedures of citizenship acquisition. Foreigners who were recognised as Russian language native speakers, and reside in Russia, regardless of the country of their previous citizenship, are allowed to apply for Russian citizenship without renouncing their current citizenship. Previously (since 2016), this applied only to citizens of Ukraine.


The policy responses to the COVID-19 pandemic included closing borders (and then gradually restoring transport links with some countries), suspending the validity of various documents that allowed foreigners to stay in Russia, and permission to apply for work permits regardless of the purpose of entry. Employers were allowed to hire workers of this category. Measures apply until June 2021. Since 16 March 2021 foreign students from countries deemed epidemiologically safe are allowed to return to Russia.

For further information:


www.mvd.pf
www.mvd.pf/mvd/structure1/Glavnie_upravlenija/guvm
www.mvd.pf/Deljatelnost/statistics/migracionnaya
www.mid.ru
www.gks.ru

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Russian Federation

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(national definition)



Emigration of Russians to OECD countries
(national definition)



Components of population growth

	2019 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2019/18 difference
Total	0.9	-0.5
Natural increase	0.1	+0.0
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	0.8	-0.5

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2020)	9 836	-5.7	+0.7
Outflows (2020)	16 895	-24.0	+1.1

StatLink  <https://stat.link/7qscgm>

Slovak Republic

Foreign-born population – 2020	
Size: 0.2 million, 49% women	<i>Main countries of birth:</i> Czech Republic (44%), Hungary (8%), Ukraine (6%)
3.8% of the population	
Evolution since 2010: +36%	

In 2019, 22 000 new immigrants obtained a residence permit longer than 12 months in the Slovak Republic (excluding EU citizens), 30.8% more than in 2018. This figure comprises 70% labour migrants, 12.8% family members (including accompanying family), 10.8% who came for education reasons and 6.4% other migrants. Around 500 short-term permits were issued to international students and 5 400 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 33 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2019, an increase of 140% compared to 2018. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

The Czech Republic, Hungary and Ukraine were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2019. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Ukraine registered the strongest increase (46) and Romania the largest decrease (-200) in flows to the Slovak Republic compared to the previous year.

In 2020, the number of first asylum applicants increased by 23.3%, to reach around 300. The majority of applicants came from Afghanistan (50), Morocco (40) and Syria (35). The largest increase since 2019 concerned nationals of Morocco (35) and the largest decrease nationals of Afghanistan (-35). Of the 80 decisions taken in 2020, 50% were positive.

Emigration of the Slovaks to OECD countries decreased by -5% in 2019, to 25 000. Approximately 23% of this group migrated to the Czech Republic, 22% to Germany and 18% to Austria.

In July 2018, the Act on the Residence of Foreigners reintroduced the law that a stateless person may obtain permanent residence for five years, instead of for an indefinite period as before. In addition, a stateless person may be granted permanent residence for five years as previously without fulfilling the conditions defined in the Act if they can prove that they do not have a citizenship of the state a) where they were born, b) where their previous domicile or residence was and c) have the citizenship of their parents and other family members.

In 2018 the Slovak Republic prepared a new national border control and management plan entitled “National Integrated Border Management Strategy for 2019 to 2022”. The document specifies new responsibilities for the Slovak Republic to undertake during the period as part of European Integrated Border Management.

In November 2018, the government approved the fifth National Programme to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings 2019 – 2023. Its main aim is to introduce a co-ordinated system to limit the practice.

Changes to the Act on Employment in January 2019 updated the frequency of review of the shortage occupations list and imposed a general obligation on employers to report vacancies to the Office of Labour.

In 2019 the government started to update its integration policy with projects focusing on improving the integration of third-country nationals at the municipal level.

Also in 2019, changes were made in the Act on the Residence of Foreigners in connection with the exit of the United Kingdom from the EU. These changes came into force on 1 January 2020.

The Act on the Residence of Foreigners was amended from April 2020, to introduce transitional provisions related to the pandemic crisis. The validity of temporary residence, permanent residence or tolerated residence, expiring during the crisis or within one month from the revocation of the crisis regulations, was extended until two months have elapsed from the revocation. A third-country national (TCN) who legally entered the country and had not been granted residence under the Act was entitled to stay until one month after the end of the crisis. TCNs staying outside Slovak Republic during the crisis were allowed to apply for renewal of a temporary residence or for permanent residence for an indefinite period at the embassy.

With effect from 21 May 2020, The Act on Employment Services was amended to maintain the validity of granted temporary stays of TCNs. Validity of a vacancy certificate corresponding to a highly qualified job, a vacancy certificate and a work permit that would otherwise have expired during an emergency (or exceptional state declared in connection with COVID-19) or within one month from the end of the emergency shall be extended until two months from the end of the emergency.

The Slovak Republic temporarily reintroduced border control of its internal borders with the Czech Republic, Austria, Hungary, Poland and at international airports from 8 April to 27 May 2020.


The temporary reintroduction of border control was subsequently prolonged to 11 June 2020 and after 11 June 2021 border control remained in effect at the internal border with Poland and at international airports until 26 June 2020.

For further information:

www.minv.sk

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Slovak Republic

Grants of long-term residence permits (non-EU citizens)
2019 (Source: Eurostat)



Temporary migration (non-EU citizens)
(Source: Eurostat)


Temporary migration

	2019	2019/18
Remunerated activities reasons	5 400	+ 72%
Family reasons	710	+ 47%
Education reasons	520	+ 18%
Other	100	+ 69%


Humanitarian

	2020	2020/19
Asylum seekers (2018)	270	+ 23%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(national definition)



Emigration of Slovaks to OECD countries
(national definition)




Components of population growth

	2020 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2020/19 difference
Total	0.3	-1.1
Natural increase	-0.4	-1.1
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	0.8	+0.1

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2020)	1 879	-10.0	+1.8
Outflows (2020)	296	-15.6	+0.3

Labour market outcomes
2020



Slovenia

Foreign-born population – 2020	
Size: 0.3 million, 42% women	<i>Main countries of birth:</i> Bosnia and Herzegovina (45%), Croatia (16%), Serbia (10%)
13.5% of the population	
Evolution since 2010: +21%	

In 2019, 20 000 new immigrants obtained a residence permit longer than 12 months in Slovenia (excluding EU citizens), 10.7% more than in 2018. This figure comprises 66.3% labour migrants, 32% family members (including accompanying family), 0.9% who came for education reasons and 0.8% other migrants. Around 2 500 short-term permits were issued to international students and 7 400 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 17 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2019, an increase of 88% compared to 2018. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and North Macedonia were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2019. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Bosnia and Herzegovina registered the strongest increase (2 100) and Russia the largest decrease (-94) in flows to Slovenia compared to the previous year.

In 2020, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -4.1%, to reach around 3 500. The majority of applicants came from Morocco (1 200), Afghanistan (700) and Pakistan (500). The largest increase since 2019 concerned nationals of Morocco (500) and the largest decrease nationals of Algeria (-700). Of the 300 decisions taken in 2020, 28.3% were positive.

Slovenia is an important transit country; most migrants trying to reach western European countries from Turkey use either the central route via Serbia or the route stemming from the Greek-Albanian border, along the Bosnian and Herzegovinian – Croatian – Slovenian corridor. As such, Slovenia took several measures to reinforce border surveillance. New surveillance capabilities have been installed and enhanced IT support provided for border checks.

Regarding asylum, the AMIF project, which entitled all asylum seekers to free legal advice and representation through the asylum procedure, terminated in late April 2020. However, with the support of UNHCR, the service was continued and especially vulnerable groups benefitted from it. Moreover, due to the travel restrictions associated to the COVID-19 pandemic, Dublin transfers were *de facto* suspended. At the end of March 2021, the Slovenian National Assembly approved legislative amendments to the International Protection Act (IPA) that limit procedure abuse. Proposed by the Slovenian Ministry of Interior Affairs, the law includes measures to speed up asylum procedures and sanctions for applicants who violate rules and laws. In accordance with the Reception Conditions Directive, applicants may move freely on the Slovenian territory in order to exercise specific rights. Otherwise, their movement

is restricted to the municipality of temporary residence. In December 2020, the government adopted the Act that provides more efficient and faster international protection procedures and to improve integration of people with international protection. However, 80% of asylum procedures ended primarily because applicants left Slovenia, which, *inter alia*, has an impact on recognition rate.

Apart from measures for asylum seekers, the new Foreigners Act also includes *inter alia* measures regarding family reunification, which requires third-country nationals to legally reside in Slovenia for two years before their family can apply for a residence permit for family reunification (with the exception of EU Blue Card holders, intra-company transferred migrant workers and those whose residence permits are issued for work in research and higher education). Another major change sets Slovenian language knowledge as a condition for the prolongation of temporary or permanent residence permits and introduces a system of periodic checks on sufficient means of subsistence. The Act also includes provisions to transpose the European Union's Directive on students and researchers (EU 2016/801) into national law. In addition, the Act includes the implementation of the Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community regarding residence permits (e.g. continuous right of residence in Slovenia for UK nationals with residence permits expiring after December 2020). The new Act addresses also the emergence of a complex crisis in the field of migration (e.g. major migration influx of persons asking for international protection).

In the context of the COVID-19 crisis, Slovenia introduced special measures to address the shortage of seasonal workers in the agricultural sector and relief was provided for registered migrants to stay temporarily at the end of their permit. Until the end of May 2020 and the containment measures, third-country nationals were allowed to stay in the country. After the reopening of the borders, entry could still be refused to non-Slovenian citizens with no Slovenian residence permit and with COVID-19 symptoms. After suspending for a month all oral hearings for international protection applicants, they resumed in May 2020 (in person). Finally, a proposal to extend the existing accommodation for unaccompanied minors in 2021 is under preparation.

For further information:


www.stat.si

www.gov.si/podrocja/drzava-in-druzba

www.infotujci.si

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Slovenia

Grants of long-term residence permits (non-EU citizens)
2019 (Source: Eurostat)



Temporary migration (non-EU citizens)
(Source: Eurostat)


Temporary migration

	2019	2019/18
Remunerated activities reasons	7 390	- 11%
Family reasons	2 090	+ 34%
Education reasons	2 460	+ 16%
Other	10	+ 150%


Humanitarian

	2020	2020/19
Asylum seekers (2018)	3 470	- 4%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(national definition)



Emigration of Slovenes to OECD countries
(national definition)




Components of population growth

	2020 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2020/19 difference
Total	6.2	-1.0
Natural increase	-2.5	-1.9
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	8.7	+0.9

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2020)	558	-8.7	+1.1
Outflows (2020)	299	-6.5	+0.6

Labour market outcomes
2020



Spain

Foreign-born population – 2020	
Size: 7 million, 52% women	<i>Main countries of birth:</i> Morocco (11%), Romania (8%), Colombia (6%)
15.0% of the population	
Evolution since 2010: +11%	

In 2019, Spain received 337 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status and free mobility), 5.6% more than in 2018. This figure comprises 41.3% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 10.2% labour migrants, 39.3% family members (including accompanying family) and 0.9% humanitarian migrants. Around 45 000 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 17 000 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 177 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2019, an increase of 180% compared to 2018. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Colombia, Morocco and Venezuela were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2019. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Colombia registered the strongest increase (24 000) and Romania the largest decrease (-2 100) in flows to Spain compared to the previous year.

In 2020, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -25%, to reach around 86 000. The majority of applicants came from Venezuela (28 000), Colombia (27 000) and Honduras (5 500). The largest increase since 2019 concerned nationals of Peru (1 200) and the largest decrease nationals of Venezuela (-12 000). Of the 125 000 decisions taken in 2020, 40.9% were positive.

Emigration of Spanish citizens to OECD countries increased by 5% in 2019, to 82 000. Approximately 22% of this group migrated to the United Kingdom, 14% to Germany and 13% to France.

Several measures have been taken in 2020 to promote orderly, regular and safe migration to Spain. Instructions were adopted to relax the application of the sufficient means condition for family reunification authorisations and the family reunification of minors procedure. In addition, and to adapt migration legislation to Brexit, Spanish authorities included in Royal Decree-Law in December 2020 measures to consider the United Kingdom as a third country after the transitional period. British posted workers in Spain can then remain in the country and continue to work. The Agreement on Withdrawal, which provides the legal framework to the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union, recognises a United Kingdom national as a frontier worker in Spain.

A new Ministry of Inclusion, Social Security and Migration was created in 2020, with the first Minister appointed in January 2020. The Ministry's action plan involves improvements and simplifications in migration management and regulations, notably regarding migrants' legal access to the labour market. Progress was also made in the digitalisation of migration procedures. In December 2020,

Spain improved the recruitment procedure of migrant seasonal workers with new regulations for their contracts in the country of origin and the provision of health protection measures.

Spain continues to deal with irregular migration. The increase of arrivals on the coast of the Canary Islands between 2019 and 2020 (23 322 in 2020) led authorities to increase the assistance capability by creating 7 000 semi-permanent places in up to five camps. The voluntary return programmes operated with difficulties due to flight restrictions (only 436 people have returned during 2020).

Regarding integration and inclusion, SEM Instruction 1/2020 allowed foreign minors from the age of 16 to work. This initiative targeted unaccompanied minors, whose authorisation to reside (provided under the Service of Protection for Minors) did not automatically allow them to work.

From the state of alarm until 30 June young people between the ages of 18 and 21 in a regular situation but without authorisation to work (students, asylum seekers, tutored minors) were authorised to work in the agricultural sector without any migration procedure. Under Instructions 9/2020 of DGM, they were granted two-year residence and work permits (renewable for two further years).

Moreover, the campaign 'My school, my shelter' launched in November 2020, in the context of the European project IMMERSE, sheds light on schools' crucial role in ensuring migrant and refugee children's integration, and the impact of school closure during the pandemic.

Spain adopted several measures to protect migrants from the COVID-19 pandemic. Residence permit procedures for essential workers (health care professionals and agriculture workers) were sped up; all residence permits have been extended for six months after the lifting of the emergency state in June 2020 and long-term visas for three months. Other relief measures include the possibility for third-country nationals to re-enter the country even with an expired residence permit; the non-withdrawal of residence permits during renewal proceedings for unemployment or business difficulties related to the COVID-19 pandemic; and more flexible renewals for all residence permits, including for family reunification, temporary residence permits for self-employed, highly qualified professionals and minor students.

For further information:


www.extranjeros.inclusion.gob.es

www.mites.gob.es

www.ine.es

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Spain

Long-term immigration flows by category
2019 (Source: OECD)



Temporary migration
(Source: OECD)

Temporary labour migration (non-EU citizens)

	2019	2019/18
Working holidaymakers	990	..
Seasonal workers	11 640	- 16%
Intra-company transfers	980	- 48%
Other temporary workers	3 530	+ 10%


Education (non-EU citizens)

	2019	2019/18
International students	45 030	+ 7%
Trainees


Humanitarian

	2020	2020/19
Asylum seekers	86 390	- 25%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(national definition)



Emigration of Spanish to OECD countries
(national definition)




Components of population growth

	2020 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2020/19 difference
Total	1.3	-7.1
Natural increase	-3.2	-2.0
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	4.5	-5.1

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2020)	8 509	-14.7	+0.7
Outflows (2020)	349	-23.9	+0.0

Labour market outcomes
2020



Sweden

Foreign-born population – 2020	
Size: 2 million, 50% women	<i>Main countries of birth:</i> Syria (9%), Iraq (7%), Finland (7%)
20.0% of the population	
Evolution since 2010: +51%	

In 2019, Sweden received 102 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status and free mobility), -17.5% compared to 2018. This figure comprises 26.5% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 16.4% labour migrants, 38.3% family members (including accompanying family) and 18.8% humanitarian migrants. Around 15 000 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 8 300 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 85 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2019, an increase of 59% compared to 2018. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Afghanistan, India and Syria were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2019. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Pakistan registered the strongest increase (700) and Syria the largest decrease (-7 900) in flows to Sweden compared to the previous year.

In 2020, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -41.1%, to reach around 14 000. The majority of applicants came from Syria (1 800), Uzbekistan (700) and Ukraine (500). The largest increase since 2019 concerned nationals of Afghanistan (100) and the largest decrease nationals of Syria (-3 300). Of the 17 000 decisions taken in 2020, 25.7% were positive.

Emigration of Swedes to OECD countries increased by 5% in 2019, to 18 000. Approximately 17% of this group migrated to Spain, 11% to Norway and 9% to Germany.

In 2016, the Swedish Parliament passed an act to temporarily restrict the possibility to obtain resident permits in Sweden, which has been prolonged until 19 July 2021. Under the Aliens Act entering into force on 20 July 2021, residence permits will, as a rule, be time-limited. Permanent residence permits will be granted only after having had a temporary residence permit for at least three years and if certain special requirements are met.

In February 2020, the Swedish Government established an inquiry to propose a new residence permit for highly-skilled third-country nationals who seek to find employment or create a business in Sweden. The inquiry will also present legislation to avoid labour migrants being expelled due to minor deviations from requirements and measures to prevent exploitation of foreign workers.

In April 2020, the government appointed an inquiry to make a review of the regulatory system concerning expulsion on account of criminal offences. The purpose has been to draft a tighter regime making it possible to expel aliens who commit criminal offences in more cases than present. The committee will present its report in June 2021.

The government increased funding to the Migration Agency to provide more information about Swedish society to asylum seekers, in addition to the information already provided by the Agency. This includes education on issues related to democracy, rights and obligations. The government also provides permanent funding for the national website “Information Sverige” to meet information needs of newly arrived immigrants.

In 2019, the need for a clear gender perspective in all measures within the integration programme was included as an assignment in the appropriation warrant of the Swedish Public Employment Service for 2019 and was extended to 2020.

Preparations for Entry Agreements have been ongoing over the past year and Entry Agreements are planned to be introduced during 2021. These agreements constitute a new strategy for getting long-term unemployed and newly arrived immigrants into the labour market and facilitate skills supply for Swedish employers.

Due to the pandemic, the government decided to restrict non-essential travel to Sweden from countries outside the EU/EEA until 31 August 2021. The government also adopted a separate entry-ban on travel to Sweden from EU/EEA and some other countries until 31 August 2021. This entails an entry-ban on travel to Sweden without a vaccination certificate, a negative COVID-19 test result, a certificate confirming recovery from COVID-19 or a corresponding certificate can be presented. There are exemptions from the entry bans for various categories of travellers. Entry from Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Norway is not subject to entry restrictions. In May 2021 the Government once again decided to reintroduce border control at the Schengen-internal border. Such border checks have been in place since 2015 and the current decision is in force until 11 November 2021.

The Swedish Government adopted a high number of labour market policy changes during 2020 to mitigate the economic impacts of the pandemic, including measures for newly arrived immigrants. The measures contain temporary reinforcement of the unemployment insurance, increased funds for the Public Employment Service and active labour market policy measures as well as funds for summer jobs for youth.

For further information:


www.migrationsverket.se

www.scb.se

www.regeringen.se

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Sweden

Long-term immigration flows by category
2019 (Source: OECD)



Temporary migration
(Source: OECD)

Temporary labour migration (non-EU citizens)

	2019	2019/18
Working holidaymakers	1 990	+ 64%
Seasonal workers	6 300	+ 26%
Intra-company transfers
Other temporary workers


Education (non-EU citizens)

	2019	2019/18
International students	15 460	+ 11%
Trainees


Humanitarian

	2020	2020/19
Asylum seekers	13 630	- 41%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(national definition)



Emigration of Swedes to OECD countries
(national definition)




Components of population growth

	2020 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2020/19 difference
Total	5.0	-4.5
Natural increase	1.4	-1.1
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	3.5	-3.5

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2020)	3 091	-2.9	+0.6
Outflows (2020)	1 766	-7.9	+0.3

Labour market outcomes
2020



Switzerland

Foreign-born population – 2020	
Size: 2.6 million, 51% women	<i>Main countries of birth:</i> Germany (14%), Italy (10%), Portugal (8%)
29.9% of the population	
Evolution since 2010: +27%	

In 2019, Switzerland received 122 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status), 0.2% more than in 2018. This figure comprises 74.3% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 1.9% labour migrants, 15.5% family members (including accompanying family) and 5.3% humanitarian migrants. Around 11 000 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 100 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants.

Germany, Italy and France were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2019. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Romania registered the strongest increase (2 100) and Italy the largest decrease (-600) in flows to Switzerland compared to the previous year.

In 2020, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -22.5%, to reach around 9 800. The majority of applicants came from Eritrea (1 600), Afghanistan (1 600) and Turkey (1 100). The largest increase since 2019 concerned nationals of Afghanistan (300) and the largest decrease nationals of Eritrea (-900). Of the 11 000 decisions taken in 2020, 90.3% were positive.

Emigration of Swiss to OECD countries increased by 3% in 2019, to 9 100. Approximately 26% of this group migrated to Germany, 16% to Spain and 8% to the Netherlands.

To ensure temporarily admitted persons' integration in the labour market and in society, the Confederation launched in 2019 the Swiss Integration Agenda. In order to reach its objectives, refugees receive, shortly after arrival, language trainings, skills training for those able to enter the labour market, and benefit from targeted information and support on their rights, customs and rules. In 2020, the State Secretariat for Migration (SEM) has notably focused on digitalisation and on the development of visual material to inform refugees on resettlement programmes. The Confederation supports the Cantonal Integration Programmes (PIC), whose next phase will last exceptionally two years, with one-off integration lump sums, which were increased in 2019 to CHF 18 000 per refugee. During the COVID-19 pandemic, integration measures in Switzerland continued as much as possible, especially thanks to the possibilities offered by digitalisation.

In the context of the 2019 revision of the Asylum Act, Switzerland has been divided in six asylum regional structures in which the SEM processes asylum applications and accommodates asylum seekers in Federal Centres, where they receive free legal protection for the duration of the procedure. This new configuration has accelerated the asylum process.

To address labour shortages and respond to demand for high-skilled workers, the government decided in 2019 to increase the quotas on work permits delivered to non-EU/EFTA nationals, and left them unchanged in 2020 and 2021. Following the end of the Swiss-UK Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons, separate quotas for UK nationals were introduced for 2021 (1 -400 L and 2 100 B permits). Furthermore, the United Kingdom and Switzerland have come to an agreement on services. The agreement secures facilitated market access for service providers from Switzerland and the United Kingdom from 1 January 2021 and is initially limited to two years.

Since January 2020, employers have been required to advertise jobs for occupations where unemployment reaches 5% to people seeking work through Switzerland's Public Employment Service for five days before others can access the job notification. This measure was initially implemented in July 2018 in sectors with national unemployment rates above 8%. Following the increase in unemployment due to COVID-19, the job notification requirements have been extended to additional positions, mostly in sales, marketing, services and construction, beginning 1 January 2021.


COVID-19-related measures required temporary visa holders to submit an application to obtain a special concession to stay after visa expiry. For third-country nationals who could not leave the Schengen area, the number of days spent in Switzerland after visa expiry will be taken into account for a subsequent stay. In April 2020, the Federal Council took measures to strengthen the protection of persons implicated in asylum procedures, including the extension of the time limits for appealing against an asylum decision and for voluntary departure of rejected asylum seekers, as well as the provision of additional spots in accommodation centres. COVID-19-related measures in general concerned mainly entry restrictions.

For further information:

www.sem.admin.ch

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Switzerland

Long-term immigration flows by category
2019 (Source: OECD)



Temporary migration
(Source: OECD)

Temporary labour migration

	2019	2019/18
Working holidaymakers
Seasonal workers
Intra-company transfers
Other temporary workers


Education

	2019	2019/18
International students	11 370	+ 2%
Trainees	140	+ 8%


Humanitarian

	2020	2020/19
Asylum seekers	9 770	- 22%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(national definition)



Emigration of Swiss to OECD countries
(national definition)




Components of population growth

	2020 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2020/19 difference
Total	7.1	-0.1
Natural increase	1.1	-1.0
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	5.9	+0.9

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2020)	2 557	+5.9	+0.3
Outflows (2020)	27 965	-0.8	+3.7

Labour market outcomes
2020



Turkey

Foreign-born population – 2018	
Size: 2.3 million, 52% women	<i>Main countries of birth:</i> Bulgaria (16%), Iraq (12%), Germany (12%)
2.8% of the population	
Evolution since 2014: +56%	

In 2019, Turkey received 578 000 new immigrants, 24% more than in 2018. Iraq, Turkmenistan and Afghanistan were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2019. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Turkmenistan registered the strongest increase (45 000) and Iraq the largest decrease (-26 000) in flows to Turkey compared to the previous year.

In 2020, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -44.5%, to reach around 31 000. The majority of applicants came from Afghanistan (23 000), Iraq (5 900) and Iran (1 400). The largest decrease since 2019 concerned nationals of Afghanistan (-12 000). Of the 43 000 decisions taken in 2020, 19.4% were positive.

Emigration of Turks to OECD countries increased by 2% in 2019, to 70 000. Approximately 43% of this group migrated to Germany, 9% to the Netherlands and 8% to the United States.

In Turkey, the main concerns are related to the integration of people under international protection, as well as their prospect for voluntary and safe return.

As a part of combatting irregular migration, a major dimension of migration management, Turkey's Strategy Document and National Action Plan on Irregular Migration (2021-21) was adopted to take national and international actions against migrant smuggling and human trafficking. Actions include increased border security, identification of irregular migrants staying in the country and their removal based on human rights-based policies in co-operation with national and international stakeholders and measures to meet the needs of vulnerable individuals.

In early March 2020, as the COVID-19 crisis hit Turkey, Syrian refugees together with many asylum seekers, refugees and irregular migrants from many other countries

trying to cross the borders to Europe had to leave the border zone and go back to their place of residence or were quarantined in the designated facilities by governmental authorities.

In response to COVID-19 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided not to pursue overstay penalties against foreign nationals unable to depart due to the virus if they left Turkey within one month of the international border opening date. The proviso was that they showed evidence of their inability to depart, such as a cancelled flight reservation. Appointment dates for foreigners who have applied for residence permits in Istanbul were postponed and residence cards automatically renewed. The government also decided that all regular migrants with temporary residence or/and work permits, together with refugees/asylum seekers who needed renewal of their documents could do so online, with no deportation if procedures were delayed.

The measures in the National Strategy on Harmonization and the National Action Plan, adopted by the Turkish Government in February 2018, became important integration policy tools to encourage dialogue and interaction between refugees, host communities and service providers while supporting local communities in receiving refugees. Similarly, the Eleventh Development Plan (2019-23), which was approved by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey on 18 July 2019, included direct reference to the implementation of policies targeting the integration of Syrian refugees.

For further information:

www.ailevecalisma.gov.tr

www.goc.gov.tr

www.iskur.gov.tr

www.nvi.gov.tr

www.mfa.gov.tr


www.tuik.gov.tr

www.yok.gov.tr


www.denklik.yok.gov.tr

Key figures on immigration and emigration – Turkey

Inflows of top 10 nationalities (national definition)



Emigration of Turks to OECD countries (national definition)




Components of population growth

	2019 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2019/18 difference
Total	13.9	-5.4
Natural increase	9.1	-9.9
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	4.9	+6.5

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2020)	795	-1.9	+0.1
Outflows (2020)	1 344	-19.0	+0.2

Labour market outcomes 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/ks0o18>

United Kingdom

Foreign-born population – 2020	
Size: 9.2 million, 52% women	<i>Main countries of birth:</i> India (9%), Poland (8%), Pakistan (6%)
14.0% of the population	
Evolution since 2010: +30%	

In 2019, the United Kingdom received 346 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status and free mobility), 0.8% more than in 2018. This figure comprises 41.6% immigrants benefitting from free mobility, 14.9% labour migrants, 31.7% family members (including accompanying family) and 5.1% humanitarian migrants. Around 375 000 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 89 000 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 133 000 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2019, an increase of 120% compared to 2018. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

India, China and Romania were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2019. Among the top 15 countries of origin, India registered the strongest increase (30 000) and Italy the largest decrease (-12 000) in flows to the United Kingdom compared to the previous year.

In 2020, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -19%, to reach around 36 000. The majority of applicants came from Iran (4 200), Iraq (3 300) and Albania (3 100). The largest increase since 2019 concerned nationals of Eritrea (700) and the largest decrease nationals of Iran (-1 300).

Emigration of British nationals to OECD countries increased by 8% in 2019, to 139 000. Approximately 21% of this group migrated to Spain, 10% to Australia and 9% to the United States.

As of 1 January 2021, EU citizens who wish to move to the United Kingdom are subject to the same rules as citizens from the rest of the world, with the exception of Irish citizens who can continue to come without restrictions under separate arrangements.

From 2021 the new Points Based Immigration System caters to all foreign workers, including EU nationals. It is aimed at the most highly skilled workers, skilled workers, students and a range of other specialist work routes including those for global leaders in their field and innovators. Points are awarded for a job offer at the appropriate skill level, knowledge of English and being paid a minimum salary. People will normally need to be paid at least GBP 25 600 per year, have enough money to pay the application fee, the health care surcharge and be able to support themselves. The visa lasts for up to five years before it needs to be extended.

Alongside the skilled worker visa, several other routes have opened, including Global Talent, Innovator, Start-up and Intra-company Transfer. A Student route and Child Student

route opened in October 2020 to eligible international students from across the globe.

A new Graduate route for international students will open in July 2021. In order to apply they must have completed an eligible course at a UK higher education provider, with a track record of compliance with the government's immigration requirements. Students on this route will be able to work or look for work after their studies for a maximum period of two years, or three years for Doctoral students.

In March 2021 the Home Secretary announced a new plan for immigration, focusing on reform of the asylum system. It is designed to increase the fairness and efficacy of our system to better support those in genuine need of protection, deter illegal entry into the United Kingdom, and remove more easily those with no right to be in the United Kingdom.

Changes to the Immigration Rules in March 2021 made it easier for key foreign workers in health and care roles to enter the country. Additions to the shortage occupation list included pharmacists, laboratory technicians, senior care workers and nursing assistants, public health and domiciliary managers, as well as modern foreign language teachers.

After its closure in 2013, the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme (SAWS) has been partially reinstated, in 2020 as an initial pilot and in 2021 as an extended pilot. The scheme allows agricultural workers to come to the United Kingdom for up to six months. Eligible workers need to be sponsored by a government selected 'operator' and there is no route to settlement.

In response to China's imposition of the National Security Law on Hong Kong, a new visa for Hong Kong British National (Overseas) status holders and their immediate family members was launched on 31 January 2021.


The deadline for the EU Settlement Scheme was 30 June 2021 for EU, EEA and Swiss citizens and their family members resident in the United Kingdom by 31 December 2020; as of 30 June 2021 there had been over 6 million applications to the Scheme. The Scheme will remain open after 30 June for certain groups including late applicants, joining family members and pre-settled status holders applying for settled status.

For further information:

www.gov.uk/government/organisations/home-office
www.ons.gov.uk

Key figures on immigration and emigration – United Kingdom

Long-term immigration flows by category
2019 (Source: OECD)



Temporary migration
(Source: OECD)

Temporary labour migration (non-EU citizens)

	2019	2019/18
Working holidaymakers	20 110	- 4%
Seasonal workers	2 490	..
Intra-company transfers	27 140	- 14%
Other temporary workers	39 450	+ 3%


Education (non-EU citizens)

	2019	2019/18
International students	374 500	+ 13%
Trainees


Humanitarian

	2020	2020/19
Asylum seekers	36 030	- 19%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(national definition)



Emigration of British to OECD countries
(national definition)




Components of population growth

	2019 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2019/18 difference
Total	5.7	+1.8
Natural increase	1.6	-11.1
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	4.0	+2.6

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2020)	3 307	-21.5	+0.1
Outflows (2020)	9 336	-9.9	+0.3

Labour market outcomes
(Q1-Q3) 2020



United States

Foreign-born population – 2019	
Size: 44.9 million, 51% women	<i>Main countries of birth:</i> Mexico (25%), India (6%), China (5%)
13.7% of the population	
Evolution since 2010: +17%	

In 2019, the United States received 1 031 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status), -6% compared to 2018. This figure comprises 7% labour migrants, 75.3% family members (including accompanying family) and 10.4% humanitarian migrants. Around 364 000 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 766 000 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants.

Mexico, China and India were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2019. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Viet Nam registered the strongest increase (5 800) and Cuba the largest decrease (-36 000) in flows to the United States compared to the previous year.

In 2020, the number of first asylum applicants decreased by -16.6%, to reach around 251 000. The majority of applicants came from Guatemala (36 000), Honduras (31 000) and Venezuela (24 000). The largest increase since 2019 concerned nationals of Haiti (3 200) and the largest decrease nationals of Guatemala (-15 000). Of the 94 000 decisions taken in 2020, 17.3% were positive.

Emigration of Americans to OECD countries decreased by -5% in 2019, to 113 000. Approximately 21% of this group migrated to Japan, 15% to the United Kingdom and 9% to Germany.

Following an administration change, US government agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), were tasked with reviewing their policies and processes to ensure a safe, orderly and humane immigration system. Executive Orders and Proclamations signed by President Biden outlined efforts to restore US commitment to welcoming refugees, respond to the situation at the US Southern border, reduce barriers to legal immigration and promote citizenship and integration.

The Migrant Protection Protocols were suspended, and DHS has resumed processing of individuals who had been returned to Mexico for the duration of their immigration proceeding. Efficient intake of unaccompanied children at the US-Mexican border is a policy priority.

The United States returned to previous guidance on the public charge inadmissibility provision following a court order vacating the 2019 final rule on Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds. US government agencies are now focused on engagement with the public, stakeholders, and benefits-granting agencies to advance education and awareness regarding the public charge rules, particularly with respect to public health in light of COVID-19 and ongoing vaccination efforts.

In December 2020, DHS announced it would review new applications for Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) according to the original eligibility conditions of 2017. One-year approvals and associated work authorisation issued between July and December 2020 will be extended an additional year.

COVID-19 impacted nearly every aspect of the immigration system and DHS responded to the pandemic by finding alternatives to traditional in-person processes to maintain operations while abiding by public health guidance, including with the use of video technology where possible.

Removals continued throughout 2020, but the United States introduced exceptional measures for individuals impacted by COVID-19. In August 2020, DHS published a temporary rule to reduce uncertainty in agricultural production, permitting petitioners with a valid temporary certification to employ temporary workers (H-2A) pending final approval. The rule also allowed temporary workers to change employers.

DHS announced filing flexibilities in response to COVID-19, including extended response times to requests for evidence and deadlines for appeal of an adverse decision. Additionally, delays due to COVID-19 may excuse failure to make a timely request for extension or change of status. Visa Waiver Program (VWP) entrants facing a COVID-related emergency may seek a 30-day extension to depart.

DHS introduced measures to offset delays in processing employment authorisation applications, including allowing F-1 student applicants for optional practical training (OPT) to complete OPT within the 14-month period after approval of work authorisation rather than from date of the end of their programme (for applications through 1 May 2021).

For further information:

www.whitehouse.gov/priorities


www.dhs.gov

www.uscis.gov

www.state.gov

Key figures on immigration and emigration – United States

Long-term immigration flows by category
2019 (Source: OECD)



Temporary migration
(Source: OECD)

Temporary labour migration

	2019	2019/18
Working holidaymakers	108 300	+ 4%
Seasonal workers	204 800	+ 4%
Intra-company transfers	76 990	+ 3%
Other temporary workers	375 300	+ 8%


Education

	2019	2019/18
International students	364 200	+ 0%
Trainees	1 040	- 0%


Humanitarian

	2020	2020/19
Asylum seekers	250 940	- 17%

Inflows of top 10 nationalities
(national definition)



Emigration of Americans to OECD countries
(national definition)




Components of population growth

	2019 Per 1 000 inhabitants	2019/18 difference
Total	4.8	-0.5
Natural increase	4.2	-0.0
Net migration plus statistical adjustments	0.6	-0.4

Annual remittances

	Million current USD	Annual change %	Share in GDP %
Inflows (2020)	6 166	-8.3	+0.0
Outflows (2020)	68 000	-5.0	+0.3

Labour market outcomes
2020



Notes and data sources

Foreign-born population

National sources and Secretariat estimates. Sources and notes are available in the statistical annex (see metadata for Tables A.4 and B.4).

Long-term immigration flows

The statistics are generally based on residence and work permit data and have been standardised, to the extent possible, except for Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia, for which the source is Eurostat's database on first permits by reason, length of validity and citizenship (Table migr_resfirst).

Temporary migration

Residence or work permit data. Data on temporary workers do not generally cover workers who benefit from a free circulation agreement. Students exclude secondary education and vocational training. For Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia, the source is Eurostat's database on first permits by reason, length of validity and citizenship (migr_resfirst).

Inflows of asylum seekers. United Nations High Commission for Refugees (www.unhcr.org/statistics); Eurostat.

Inflows of top 10 nationalities

OECD countries and Russia: sources and notes are available in the statistical annex (metadata related to Tables A.1 and B.1).

Bulgaria: Number of new permanent and long-term residence permits granted (Source: Ministry of the Interior); Romania: Changes in permanent residence (Source: Romanian Statistical Yearbook).

Emigration of nationals to OECD countries

Sum of the inflows of the country's citizens to OECD countries.

Components of population growth

European countries: Population change – Demographic balance and crude rates at national level (Eurostat); other countries: national sources.

Annual remittances

World Bank calculation based on data from IMF Balance of Payments Statistics database and data releases from central banks, national statistical agencies, and World Bank country desks.

Labour market outcomes

European countries and Turkey: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat).

Australia, Canada, Israel, New Zealand: Labour Force Surveys.

Chile: *Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional (CASEN)*.

Japan: Population census 2015.

Korea: Survey on Immigrants' Living Conditions and Labour Force and Economically Active Population Survey of Korean nationals (the rates refer to the long term resident foreign born population aged 15-59 who is foreign or was naturalised within the last five years).

Mexico: *Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo (ENOE)*.

United States: Current Population Surveys.

The OECD average excludes Chile, Japan and Korea.

Annex A. Statistical annex

Inflows and outflows of foreign population

A.1. Inflows of foreign population into selected OECD countries and Russia

B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality

A.2. Outflows of foreign population from selected OECD countries

Metadata relative to Tables A.1, B.1. and A.2. Inflows and outflows of foreign population

Inflows of asylum seekers

A.3. Inflows of asylum seekers into OECD countries and Russia

B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality

Metadata relative to Tables A.3. and B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers

Stocks of foreign and foreign-born populations

A.4. Stocks of foreign-born population in OECD countries and in Russia

B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth

Metadata relative to Tables A.4. and B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population

A.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality in OECD countries and in Russia

B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality

Metadata relative to Tables A.5. and B.5. Stocks of foreign population

Acquisitions of nationality

A.6. Acquisitions of nationality in OECD countries and in Russia

B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality

Metadata relative to Tables A.6. and B.6. Acquisitions of nationality

Introduction

Most of the data published in this annex have been provided by national correspondents of the OECD Expert Group on Migration appointed by the OECD Secretariat with the approval of the authorities of member countries. Consequently, these data are not necessarily based on common definitions. Countries under review in this annex are OECD countries for which data are available, as well as the Russian Federation. The OECD Expert Group on Migration has no authority to impose changes in data collection procedures. It is an observatory which, by its very nature, has to use existing statistics. However, it does play an active role in suggesting what it considers to be essential improvements in data collection and makes every effort to present consistent and well-documented statistics.

The purpose of this annex is to describe the “immigrant” population (generally the foreign-born population). The information gathered concerns the flows and stocks of the total immigrant population as well as the acquisition of nationality. These data have not been standardised and are therefore not fully comparable across countries. In particular, the criteria for registering persons in population registers and the conditions for granting residence permits, for example, vary across countries, which means that measurements may differ greatly even if the same type of source is being used.

In addition to the problem of the comparability of statistics, there is the difficulty of the very partial coverage of unauthorised migrants. Part of this population may be counted in censuses. Regularisation programmes, when they exist, make it possible to identify and enumerate a far from negligible fraction of unauthorised immigrants after the fact. In terms of measurement, this makes it possible to better measure the volume of the foreign-born population at a given time, even if it is not always possible to determine the year these immigrants entered the country.

Each series in the annex is preceded by an explanatory note concerning the data presented. A summary table then follows (series A, giving the total for each destination country), and finally the tables by nationality or country of birth, as the case may be (series B). At the end of each series, a table provides the sources and notes for the data presented in the tables for each country.

General comments

The tables provide annual series covering the period 2009-19 or 2010-20.

- The series A tables are presented in alphabetical order by the name of the country. In the other tables, nationalities or countries of birth are ranked by decreasing order of frequency for the last year available.
- In the tables by country of origin (series B) only the 15 main countries are shown. “Other countries” is a residual calculated as the difference between the total foreign or foreign-born population and the sum for all countries indicated in the table. For some countries, data are not available for all years and this is reflected in the residual entry of “Other countries”. This must be borne in mind when interpreting changes in this category.
- There is no table by nationality for the series on outflows of the foreign population (series A.2). These statistics, as well as data by gender are available online (<http://www.oecd.org/els/mig/keystat.htm>).
- The rounding of data cells may cause totals to differ slightly from the sum of the component cells.
- The symbol “..” used in the tables means that the data are not available.
- Figures in italic are estimated by the Secretariat.

Inflows and outflows of foreign population

OECD countries seldom have tools specifically designed to measure the inflows and outflows of the foreign population, and national estimates are generally based either on population registers or residence permit data. This note describes more systematically what is measured by each of the sources used.

Flows derived from population registers

Population registers can usually produce inflow and outflow data for both nationals and foreigners. To register, foreigners may have to indicate possession of an appropriate residence and/or work permit valid for at least as long as the minimum registration period. Emigrants are usually identified by a stated intention to leave the country, although the period of (intended) absence is not always specified.

In population registers, departures tend to be less well recorded than arrivals. Indeed, the emigrant who plans to return to the host country in the future may be reluctant to inform about his departure to avoid losing rights related to the presence on the register. Registration criteria vary considerably across countries; in particular the minimum duration of stay for individuals to be registered ranges from three months to one year, which poses major problems of international comparisons. For example, in some countries, register data cover many temporary migrants, in some cases including asylum seekers when they live in private households (as opposed to reception centres or hostels for immigrants) and international students.

Flows derived from residence and/or work permits

Statistics on permits are generally based on the number of permits issued during a given period and depend on the types of permits used. The so-called “settlement countries” (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States) consider as immigrants persons who have been granted the right of permanent residence, and this right is often granted upon arrival. Statistics on temporary immigrants are also published in this annex for these countries. In the case of France, the permits covered are those valid for at least one year (excluding students).

Another characteristic of permit data is that flows of nationals are not recorded. Some flows of foreigners may also not be recorded, either because the type of permit they hold is not included in the statistics or because they are not required to have a permit (freedom of movement agreements). In addition, permit data do not necessarily reflect physical flows or actual lengths of stay since: i) permits may be issued overseas but individuals may decide not to use them, or delay their arrival; ii) permits may be issued to persons who have in fact been resident in the country for some time, the permit indicating a change of status.

Flows estimated from specific surveys

Ireland provides estimates based on the results of Quarterly National Household Surveys and other sources such as permit data and asylum applications. These estimates are revised periodically on the basis of census data. Data for the United Kingdom are based on a survey of passengers entering or exiting the country by plane, train or boat (International Passenger Survey). One of the aims of this survey is to estimate the number and characteristics of migrants. The survey is based on a random sample of approximately one out of every 500 passengers. The figures were revised significantly following the latest census in each of these two countries, which seems to indicate that these estimates do not constitute an “ideal” source either. Australia and New Zealand also conduct passenger surveys which enable them to establish the length of stay on the basis of migrants’ stated intentions when they enter or exit the country.

Table A.1. Inflows of foreign population into selected OECD countries and Russia

Thousands

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Australia	219.4	202.2	206.4	236.0	244.8	233.9	223.7	218.5	224.2	186.6	155.8
Austria	91.7	96.9	109.9	125.6	135.2	154.3	198.7	158.7	139.3	131.7	135.0
Belgium	102.7	113.6	117.9	128.9	117.6	106.3	128.8	103.2	109.5	116.8	129.5
Canada	252.2	280.7	248.7	257.8	259.0	260.3	271.8	296.4	286.5	321.0	341.2
Chile	35.9	41.4	50.7	65.2	84.4	83.5	101.9	135.5	207.2	339.4	254.1
Colombia	5.7	8.3	11.3	10.6	7.8
Costa Rica	15.7	6.6	8.6	9.2	7.8
Czech Republic	38.2	28.0	20.7	28.6	27.8	38.5	31.6	34.8	43.5	55.9	63.3
Denmark	32.0	33.4	34.6	35.5	41.3	49.0	58.7	54.6	49.0	45.3	42.3
Estonia	2.2	1.2	1.7	1.1	1.6	1.3	7.4	7.7	9.1	9.7	11.0
Finland	18.1	18.2	20.4	23.3	23.9	23.6	21.4	27.3	23.7	23.1	24.2
France	149.6	145.8	142.1	151.6	251.3	251.8	242.7	245.7	245.9	248.9	266.3
Germany	606.3	683.5	841.7	965.9	1 108.1	1 342.5	2 016.2	1 719.1	1 384.0	1 383.6	1 345.9
Greece	35.8	35.4	33.0	32.0	31.3	29.5	34.0	86.1	80.5	87.3	95.4
Hungary	25.6	23.9	22.5	20.3	21.3	26.0	25.8	23.8	36.5	49.3	55.3
Iceland	3.4	3.0	2.8	2.8	3.9	4.3	5.0	7.9	11.8	11.5	9.5
Ireland	50.7	23.9	33.7	37.2	41.0	43.7	49.3	53.9	57.2	61.9	61.7
Israel	14.6	16.6	16.9	16.6	16.9	24.1	27.9	26.0	26.4	28.1	33.2
Italy	406.7	424.5	354.3	321.3	279.0	248.4	250.5	262.9	301.1	285.5	264.6
Japan	297.1	287.1	266.9	303.9	306.7	336.5	391.2	427.6	475.0	519.7	592.0
Korea	232.8	293.1	307.2	300.2	360.5	407.1	372.9	402.2	452.7	495.1	438.2
Latvia	2.7	2.8	2.9	3.7	3.5	4.5	4.5	3.4	5.1	6.6	6.6
Lithuania	1.7	1.1	1.7	2.5	3.0	4.8	3.7	6.0	10.2	12.3	19.7
Luxembourg	14.6	15.8	19.1	19.4	19.8	21.0	22.6	21.6	23.1	23.3	25.1
Mexico	23.9	26.2	22.0	18.2	63.0	43.5	34.4	35.9	32.8	38.7	40.5
Netherlands	104.4	110.2	118.5	115.7	122.3	139.3	159.5	182.2	183.9	191.0	215.2
New Zealand	75.7	69.7	71.4	71.6	77.2	91.7	102.9	105.6	105.3	111.8	121.8
Norway	56.7	65.1	70.8	70.0	66.9	61.4	59.1	58.5	49.8	44.4	44.6
Poland	41.3	41.1	41.3	47.1	46.6	32.0	86.1	107.0	128.0	137.6	163.5
Portugal	61.4	50.7	45.4	38.5	33.2	35.3	37.9	46.9	61.4	93.2	129.2
Russia	279.9	187.8	214.9	290.6	350.7	443.1	425.0	388.6	393.1	365.0	500.1
Slovak Republic	5.1	4.2	3.8	2.9	2.5	2.4	3.8	3.6	2.9	2.9	2.5
Slovenia	27.3	12.7	10.7	12.2	11.6	11.3	12.6	13.8	15.6	24.1	27.6
Spain	365.4	330.3	335.9	272.5	248.4	264.5	290.0	352.2	454.4	560.0	666.0
Sweden	83.8	79.0	75.9	82.6	95.4	106.1	113.9	143.0	125.0	114.4	98.2
Switzerland	132.4	134.2	142.5	143.8	155.4	152.1	150.4	143.1	137.8	140.1	140.6
Turkey	..	29.9	273.9	364.6	466.9	578.5
United Kingdom	430.0	459.0	453.0	383.0	406.0	504.0	481.0	455.0	520.0	486.5	507.0
United States	1 130.8	1 042.6	1 062.0	1 031.6	990.6	1 016.5	1 051.0	1 183.5	1 127.2	1 096.6	1 031.8

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of Table A.2.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/9k7g0j>

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Australia (permanent)

Thousands

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
India	25.3	23.5	21.9	27.8	38.1	39.6	34.7	38.6	40.0	33.1	32.6	49
China	22.3	24.5	28.7	25.3	27.9	27.1	27.9	29.1	29.3	25.7	25.5	55
New Zealand	33.0	24.4	34.6	44.3	41.2	27.3	22.4	19.7	12.6	15.2	15.0	50
United Kingdom	33.3	26.7	21.5	27.0	23.1	23.8	22.2	19.0	17.6	14.1	13.3	47
Philippines	8.9	10.2	10.7	12.8	11.0	10.3	11.9	12.0	12.1	10.9	9.2	59
Viet Nam	3.3	3.8	4.8	4.8	5.7	5.2	5.1	5.4	5.5	5.2	5.5	63
Pakistan	2.0	1.8	1.8	3.9	3.6	5.7	8.0	7.0	6.8	6.3	4.7	49
South Africa	11.3	11.1	8.1	8.0	5.8	4.9	4.7	4.0	4.8	4.3	4.0	49
Nepal	1.0	1.3	2.1	2.5	4.0	4.4	4.2	5.1	4.4	3.0	3.8	50
United States	3.1	3.2	3.0	3.3	3.8	3.8	3.5	3.5	3.6	2.7	3.6	55
Sri Lanka	4.8	5.2	4.5	5.7	5.3	4.5	3.9	3.8	3.2	2.7	2.7	53
Malaysia	5.4	4.9	4.9	5.4	5.6	4.5	4.0	4.1	4.2	3.4	2.5	56
Korea	5.2	4.3	4.3	5.0	5.4	3.8	3.6	3.3	3.2	2.2	2.5	59
Thailand	2.7	2.6	2.5	2.7	3.1	2.7	2.5	2.8	2.7	2.5	2.3	78
Ireland	2.7	3.0	3.4	5.0	5.3	6.3	6.3	4.9	3.9	2.4	2.3	47
Other countries	55.3	51.6	49.7	52.4	55.6	60.1	58.8	56.4	70.3	52.7	26.4	
Total	219.4	202.2	206.4	236.0	244.8	233.9	223.7	218.5	224.2	186.6	155.8	54

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/x78him>**Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Austria**

Thousands

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Romania	9.3	11.3	12.9	13.4	13.5	20.7	17.5	16.7	17.9	19.2	20.3	43
Germany	17.6	18.0	17.4	17.8	17.7	16.8	17.0	16.1	16.2	17.0	18.3	47
Hungary	5.8	6.4	9.3	13.1	14.9	14.5	14.4	13.3	13.1	12.6	12.1	46
Serbia	4.6	7.1	6.1	6.7	7.1	7.4	7.6	7.3	7.2	6.8	6.5	42
Bulgaria	2.6	3.1	3.2	3.6	3.9	5.8	5.2	4.9	5.0	5.3	5.7	43
Croatia	1.9	1.9	1.9	2.0	4.2	6.0	5.8	5.1	5.1	5.4	5.5	42
Poland	3.8	4.0	6.4	7.1	7.3	6.9	6.1	5.4	5.2	4.8	4.7	35
Slovak Republic	4.0	4.0	5.3	6.0	6.2	6.5	6.1	5.6	5.1	4.8	4.6	48
Italy	2.0	2.2	2.3	3.1	4.0	4.1	4.6	4.2	4.4	4.4	4.5	41
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2.4	2.5	3.9	4.1	5.0	5.2	5.2	4.3	4.2	4.1	3.9	44
Turkey	4.7	4.3	3.8	4.1	4.5	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.3	3.0	3.3	43
Slovenia	0.8	0.8	1.3	1.9	2.5	3.1	2.8	2.7	2.5	2.2	2.2	41
Russia	2.4	2.2	2.6	3.4	3.5	3.1	2.9	2.7	2.4	2.1	2.2	59
China	1.4	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.8	2.1	1.9	1.9	2.0	2.1	55
United States	1.6	1.6	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.9	2.0	1.9	1.9	2.0	1.9	52
Other countries	26.8	26.1	30.2	36.0	37.5	46.7	95.6	62.9	43.9	36.4	37.1	
Total	91.7	96.9	109.9	125.6	135.2	154.3	198.7	158.7	139.3	131.7	135.0	45

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <https://stat.link/x78him>

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Belgium

Thousands

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Romania	6.1	6.4	9.9	10.0	8.7	11.3	10.6	10.9	11.9	13.4	14.3	37
France	12.3	12.2	12.8	12.4	12.6	12.0	12.0	11.3	11.3	11.7	12.0	50
Netherlands	8.8	8.4	8.5	8.1	7.9	8.1	8.1	7.9	7.8	7.8	7.8	47
Morocco	9.1	9.4	8.6	5.8	4.5	4.7	4.8	4.7	4.5	5.0	5.8	56
Italy	3.6	3.6	4.3	4.8	5.1	5.3	5.1	4.8	4.9	5.4	5.5	46
Spain	3.6	3.5	4.9	5.5	5.5	5.0	4.1	3.6	4.0	4.2	4.7	49
Bulgaria	3.3	3.7	4.0	4.0	3.5	4.2	3.8	3.5	3.7	3.9	4.7	42
Poland	9.9	9.6	8.2	7.7	6.6	5.8	5.3	4.6	4.3	4.2	4.3	46
Afghanistan	0.2	1.2	3.1	2.1	1.1	1.1	7.5	2.6	1.6	2.2	3.8	35
India	1.8	1.4	2.1	1.9	2.1	1.9	2.2	2.4	3.0	3.3	3.3	45
Portugal	2.9	2.7	2.8	3.9	3.8	3.0	2.9	3.0	2.7	2.9	3.2	38
Turkey	3.1	3.3	3.2	2.2	1.8	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.9	2.4	2.8	40
Syria	0.2	0.5	0.6	0.5	1.0	2.8	10.4	4.7	5.5	3.6	2.8	40
West Bank and Gaza Strip	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.6	0.9	2.8	2.6	28
Germany	3.4	3.1	2.8	2.6	2.6	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.5	2.6	52
Other countries	34.6	47.5	57.8	44.4	38.8	36.9	47.7	37.3	38.9	44.4	49.2	
Total	102.7	116.7	133.6	116.1	105.5	106.3	128.8	106.1	109.2	119.7	129.5	46

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/x78him>**Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Canada (permanent)**

Thousands

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
India	29.4	34.2	27.5	30.9	33.1	38.3	39.5	39.8	51.7	70.0	85.6	48
China	29.6	30.4	28.5	33.0	34.1	24.6	19.5	26.9	30.3	29.7	30.2	56
Philippines	28.6	38.6	36.8	34.3	29.5	40.0	50.8	41.8	40.9	35.1	27.8	55
Nigeria	3.2	3.9	3.1	3.4	4.2	4.2	4.1	4.4	5.5	10.9	12.6	49
Pakistan	7.2	6.8	7.5	11.2	12.6	9.1	11.3	11.3	7.7	9.5	10.8	49
Syria	0.9	1.0	1.0	0.6	1.0	2.1	9.9	34.9	12.0	12.0	10.1	48
Eritrea	0.9	0.9	1.2	1.3	1.7	2.0	2.2	4.6	4.7	5.7	7.0	45
Korea	5.9	5.5	4.6	5.3	4.5	4.5	4.1	4.0	4.0	4.8	6.1	56
Iran	6.6	7.5	7.5	7.5	11.3	16.8	11.7	6.5	4.7	5.5	6.1	52
Brazil	2.5	2.6	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.9	1.8	1.7	2.8	4.0	5.3	52
France	5.1	4.6	4.1	6.3	5.6	4.7	5.8	6.4	6.6	6.2	5.0	47
Iraq	5.5	5.9	6.2	4.0	4.9	3.9	4.0	2.4	4.7	5.3	4.4	49
Viet Nam	2.2	1.9	1.7	1.7	2.1	2.5	2.6	2.4	2.5	3.1	4.2	62
Jamaica	2.5	2.3	2.1	2.2	2.5	3.1	3.4	3.6	3.8	3.9	4.0	46
Afghanistan	1.7	1.8	2.2	2.6	2.0	1.5	2.6	2.6	3.4	3.6	3.9	51
Other countries	120.5	132.6	113.4	111.6	108.2	101.2	98.5	103.0	101.3	111.9	118.0	
Total	252.2	280.7	248.7	257.8	259.0	260.3	271.8	296.4	286.5	321.0	341.2	51

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/x78him>

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Chile

Thousands

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Venezuela	0.5	0.5	0.8	0.8	1.0	2.3	7.4	21.9	65.9	122.8	135.8	..
Haiti	0.3	0.5	0.7	1.1	1.2	2.2	6.4	23.0	42.1	108.7	32.2	..
Colombia	4.1	5.5	9.4	12.1	16.7	15.4	19.5	26.9	28.5	28.1	21.7	..
Bolivia	2.1	4.6	6.2	10.8	23.6	21.6	19.8	14.8	20.1	27.1	19.6	..
Peru	14.9	14.7	16.4	18.9	18.9	19.8	24.7	25.5	24.7	26.5	17.8	..
Argentina	2.8	2.8	2.8	3.3	4.3	4.5	4.9	4.1	4.2	3.5	5.8	..
Ecuador	1.8	1.6	1.9	2.0	2.3	2.2	2.8	4.3	5.8	6.1	4.6	..
Cuba	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.8	0.7	2.0	2.7	2.6	..
Dominican Republic	0.4	0.8	1.2	2.9	0.7	0.4	0.6	0.8	0.8	2.2	2.4	..
Brazil	0.8	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.7	2.0	2.2	2.0	2.3	..
China	0.9	0.8	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.4	1.7	1.7	2.1	1.9	1.6	..
United States	1.7	2.2	2.1	2.3	2.3	2.1	1.7	1.4	1.2	0.9	0.9	..
Spain	0.6	0.7	1.0	2.1	4.1	3.4	2.5	1.9	1.4	0.9	0.9	..
Paraguay	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.7	..
Mexico	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.5	..
Other countries	4.0	4.5	4.6	4.9	5.2	5.3	5.9	5.0	4.7	4.5	4.5	..
Total	35.9	41.4	50.7	65.2	84.4	83.5	101.9	135.5	207.2	339.4	254.1	..

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/x78him>**Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Colombia**

Thousands

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Venezuela					113.7	209.1	162.9	41.7	..
United States					4.7	5.1	6.5	12.1	..
Ecuador					5.8	5.2	5.2	3.0	..
Mexico					2.6	3.0	3.0	3.6	..
Peru					2.0	2.0	2.6	2.7	..
Brasil					2.1	2.1	2.3	2.7	..
Spain					1.8	1.8	2.2	3.2	..
Argentina					2.0	2.1	2.4	1.8	..
Chile					1.4	1.6	1.8	2.8	..
France					1.2	1.6	2.2	2.3	..
Germany					1.0	1.1	1.7	1.1	..
China					0.8	0.7	1.4	0.7	..
Dominican Republic					0.8	0.7	1.0	1.0	..
Italy					0.6	0.6	1.0	1.2	..
Canada					0.5	0.5	0.8	1.1	..
Other countries					0.6	0.5	0.8	0.8	..
Total					148.6	245.2	206.7	91.1	..

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <https://stat.link/x78him>

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Czech Republic

Thousands

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Ukraine	5.6	5.1	4.4	4.8	6.5	6.9	6.7	6.7	6.3	6.7	5.8	48
Slovak Republic	4.1	3.7	2.1	3.2	3.1	4.9	2.9	2.4	2.9	3.4	4.3	51
Russia	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.7	0.9	1.2	1.3	1.6	1.8	2.2	2.1	32
Romania	2.3	1.4	0.7	1.6	1.2	1.7	1.3	1.8	2.2	2.3	1.9	58
Viet Nam	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.4	1.0	1.8	27
Serbia	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.7	1.0	1.1	1.0	1.3	1.6	2.0	1.7	34
Bulgaria	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.3	0.4	0.7	1.1	1.6	32
Belarus	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.8	1.0	1.2	1.5	30
India	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5	1.3	32
United Kingdom	0.5	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.6	0.7	1.2	1.5	1.3	47
Mongolia	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.2	1.3	1.1	39
Hungary	0.6	0.5	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.8	1.1	1.0	45
China	0.8	0.7	0.5	0.6	0.6	1.0	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.8	1.0	52
Kazakhstan	2.5	1.7	1.3	1.1	0.8	0.9	0.8	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.0	50
United States	11.3	9.1	7.3	8.0	8.0	9.3	8.2	9.6	10.9	12.9	13.0	48
Other countries	5.6	5.1	4.4	4.8	6.5	6.9	6.7	6.7	6.3	6.7	5.8	
Total	38.2	28.0	20.7	28.6	27.8	38.5	31.6	34.8	43.5	55.9	63.3	39

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/x78him>**Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Denmark**

Thousands

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Romania	1.5	2.0	2.7	3.2	3.6	4.2	4.3	4.2	4.1	4.1	3.9	36
Poland	3.4	2.9	3.2	3.3	3.6	4.0	4.1	3.8	3.7	3.4	3.0	37
Germany	2.2	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.8	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.3	2.4	2.4	52
India	0.8	0.9	1.1	0.9	1.1	1.4	1.6	1.9	1.9	2.1	2.1	44
Ukraine	1.4	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.5	1.1	1.3	1.6	1.9	2.0	40
Italy	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.9	1.1	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.7	44
United Kingdom	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.4	1.6	1.7	1.6	1.5	37
China	1.0	0.8	0.8	0.8	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.2	1.3	1.4	54
Norway	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.7	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.4	61
Lithuania	1.3	1.5	1.6	1.5	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.7	1.9	1.9	1.4	41
Sweden	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.3	1.4	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.4	52
Bulgaria	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.2	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.3	36
Spain	0.5	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	46
Philippines	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.4	1.7	1.5	1.3	1.1	1.3	1.2	1.0	91
United States	0.7	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.2	0.9	52
Other countries	12.8	13.7	13.5	13.9	17.4	22.7	32.1	27.6	21.2	17.5	15.6	
Total	32.0	33.4	34.6	35.5	41.3	49.0	58.7	54.6	49.0	45.3	42.3	47

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <https://stat.link/x78him>

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Estonia

Thousands

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Ukraine	0.2	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.4	1.2	1.1	1.0	1.5	1.8	35
Russia	0.5	0.4	0.9	0.5	0.5	0.4	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.5	1.7	52
Finland	0.3	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.7	39
Latvia	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.4	0.9	0.8	0.7	33
Germany	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	50
India	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3	39
France	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	37
Italy	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	39
Belarus	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3	33
Nigeria	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	40
United Kingdom	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	22
Spain	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	46
Iran	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	35
Turkey	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	29
Pakistan	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	30
Other countries	0.7	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.3	2.2	2.4	2.9	3.0	3.5	
Total	2.2	1.2	1.7	1.1	1.6	1.3	7.4	7.7	9.1	9.7	11.0	39

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/x78him>**Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Finland**

Thousands

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Russia	2.3	2.3	2.8	3.1	2.9	2.4	2.1	2.5	1.5	1.7	2.2	54
Estonia	3.2	3.9	4.7	6.0	5.9	4.7	3.4	2.6	2.2	2.0	1.6	41
India	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.7	1.0	1.4	43
Iraq	0.9	1.1	0.7	0.6	0.9	0.8	0.8	3.2	2.6	1.9	1.3	35
China	0.8	0.6	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.8	1.0	54
Philippines	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.8	62
Ukraine	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.7	0.8	48
Syria	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.6	0.6	1.7	2.0	0.7	0.7	49
Turkey	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.7	46
Afghanistan	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.4	1.9	0.9	0.7	0.7	42
Viet Nam	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.7	0.9	0.6	0.6	0.7	54
Sweden	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.7	35
Romania	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.6	36
United Kingdom	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.5	0.5	25
Thailand	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.5	80
Other countries	7.0	6.9	7.4	8.3	8.6	9.4	9.0	9.8	9.6	10.2	9.9	
Total	18.1	18.2	20.4	23.3	23.9	23.6	21.4	27.3	23.7	23.1	24.2	46

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/x78him>

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – France

Thousands

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Morocco	21.5	20.1	18.8	19.8	20.0	18.1	18.4	18.8	19.1	20.8	22.5	..
Algeria	23.1	21.4	21.2	23.7	23.6	22.0	22.4	21.8	21.8	22.6	21.7	..
Tunisia	10.3	10.7	10.3	11.3	11.6	10.8	10.5	11.3	11.9	14.2	15.0	..
Italy	12.2	12.7	13.2	13.9	13.6	14.4	14.6	45
Spain	13.7	12.9	12.4	10.7	10.9	12.7	10.5	49
United Kingdom	10.4	9.3	9.8	11.6	10.0	9.3	8.7	48
Romania	6.1	8.1	10.1	8.5	8.1	8.4	8.6	48
Portugal	18.8	14.7	11.6	12.4	8.3	8.0	7.6	48
Côte d'Ivoire	3.5	3.3	3.2	3.4	3.6	4.0	3.7	3.9	4.2	5.3	6.8	..
Belgium	6.6	6.5	6.4	6.7	6.6	7.4	6.8	52
Comoros	3.3	2.9	2.5	3.1	4.8	5.5	7.3	3.9	4.2	5.0	6.6	..
Germany	7.7	6.4	7.1	6.2	5.7	6.1	5.7	53
United States	3.5	3.0	3.1	3.1	3.1	4.4	4.4	4.5	4.4	4.8	5.5	..
China	5.5	5.7	5.5	6.3	7.6	5.3	5.0	5.3	4.7	4.6	5.4	..
Afghanistan	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.9	0.8	0.6	1.7	5.0	5.3	5.3	..
Other countries	78.7	78.4	77.0	80.4	100.4	110.4	99.8	104.5	107.8	111.3	115.2	..
Total	149.6	145.8	142.1	151.6	251.3	251.8	242.7	245.7	246.2	260.2	266.3	..

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/x78him>**Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Germany**

Thousands

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Romania	57.3	75.5	97.5	120.5	139.5	198.7	221.4	222.3	230.6	252.0	245.0	33
Poland	112.0	115.6	164.7	177.8	190.4	192.2	190.8	160.7	149.7	143.6	128.6	33
Bulgaria	29.2	39.8	52.4	60.2	60.9	80.1	86.3	83.0	81.6	85.7	87.4	37
Italy	22.2	23.9	28.1	36.9	47.5	56.7	57.2	52.6	51.5	53.3	50.4	39
Croatia	9.1	10.2	11.5	12.9	25.8	46.1	61.0	62.1	58.6	57.7	48.4	35
Syria	2.3	3.0	4.6	8.5	19.0	69.1	309.7	179.4	76.4	49.0	44.1	49
Turkey	27.2	27.6	28.6	26.2	23.2	22.1	23.7	28.6	33.7	40.6	43.8	34
India	12.0	13.2	15.4	18.1	19.5	22.4	26.1	27.7	29.5	33.7	39.1	36
Hungary	25.3	29.3	41.1	54.5	60.0	58.8	58.1	51.6	48.1	43.9	36.7	33
Serbia	7.0	16.7	16.5	22.1	27.3	38.4	39.7	22.9	24.5	25.6	26.2	35
China	15.4	16.2	18.3	19.7	22.4	23.2	25.5	26.6	26.6	25.9	25.6	51
Bosnia and Herzegovina	6.1	6.9	9.5	12.2	15.1	20.7	21.7	22.4	24.0	22.7	24.9	35
Greece	8.6	12.3	23.0	32.7	32.1	28.8	28.3	27.1	26.1	25.6	23.5	38
North Macedonia	2.4	7.6	5.7	11.3	14.4	15.6	24.8	14.3	18.2	18.5	20.4	39
United States	17.7	18.3	20.1	19.6	20.5	20.5	21.1	20.7	21.1	20.3	19.2	48
Other countries	252.4	267.5	304.6	332.8	390.6	449.4	820.8	717.0	483.8	485.4	482.8	..
Total	606.3	683.5	841.7	965.9	1 108.1	1 342.5	2 016.2	1 719.1	1 384.0	1 383.6	1 345.9	39

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/x78him>

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Hungary

Thousands

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Ukraine	1.9	1.6	1.3	0.9	0.6	0.7	1.1	1.2	6.3	16.7	21.2	31
Romania	7.1	6.6	5.8	4.2	4.0	3.7	3.5	3.1	2.9	2.9	2.7	32
Germany	2.7	2.4	2.4	2.1	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.3	2.5	2.5	2.6	46
Serbia	1.2	1.0	0.9	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6	1.7	2.9	2.5	24
China	1.3	1.1	0.9	1.1	2.2	4.7	3.5	1.5	2.3	2.0	2.4	50
Viet Nam	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.7	1.3	2.0	45
Slovak Republic	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.5	1.5	1.5	58
United States	1.3	1.1	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.1	1.4	1.3	1.4	52
Korea	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.6	0.8	1.2	31
India	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.8	1.4	1.2	27
Turkey	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.7	1.0	1.0	1.2	30
Russia	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.6	1.0	0.9	0.7	0.8	0.9	0.9	58
Mongolia	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.7	0.8	45
United Kingdom	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.6	39
Italy	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	31
Other countries	6.6	6.3	6.4	6.6	7.1	8.6	8.9	9.0	12.6	12.6	12.5	
Total	25.6	23.9	22.5	20.3	21.3	26.0	25.8	23.8	36.5	49.3	55.3	38

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/x78him>**Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Iceland**

Thousands

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Poland	1.2	0.8	0.8	0.9	1.3	1.4	1.6	2.9	4.5	3.9	2.8	39
Lithuania	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.7	1.3	1.2	0.9	31
Romania	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.6	25
Latvia	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.6	0.6	0.4	26
Czech Republic	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.4	49
Spain	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	38
Croatia	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.3	25
United States	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	47
Portugal	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	24
Germany	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	71
United Kingdom	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	36
Philippines	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.2	78
France	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	48
Italy	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	51
Slovak Republic	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	39
Other countries	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.3	1.4	1.9	2.1	2.3	2.3	
Total	3.4	3.0	2.8	2.8	3.9	4.3	5.0	7.9	11.8	11.5	9.5	41

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <https://stat.link/x78him>

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Israel

Thousands

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Former USSR	6.8	7.0	7.2	7.2	7.3	11.6	14.7	14.5	16.2	18.8	24.2	51
United States	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.3	2.2	2.4	2.5	2.7	2.6	2.5	2.5	51
France	1.6	1.8	1.6	1.7	2.9	6.5	6.6	4.2	3.2	2.4	2.2	51
Brazil	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	54
United Kingdom	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5	52
Argentina	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.4	51
South Africa	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	49
Canada	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	50
Germany	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	59
Turkey	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.2	51
Mexico	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	53
Australia	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	51
Venezuela	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	52
Belgium	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	49
Spain	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	52
Other countries	1.3	2.8	3.8	3.5	2.6	1.5	1.5	1.7	1.5	1.7	1.4	
Total	14.6	16.6	16.9	16.6	16.9	24.1	27.9	26.0	26.4	28.1	33.2	51

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/x78him>**Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Italy**

Thousands

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Romania	105.6	92.1	90.1	81.7	58.2	50.7	46.4	45.2	43.5	40.1	39.2	58
Albania	27.5	22.6	16.6	14.1	12.2	11.4	11.5	13.0	15.4	18.0	22.2	50
Brazil	9.7	8.6	7.1	5.7	5.0	5.0	7.0	10.5	15.7	18.0	20.6	51
Morocco	33.1	30.0	23.9	19.6	19.6	17.6	15.0	14.7	15.7	16.9	20.3	52
India	12.8	15.2	13.3	11.2	10.8	11.1	11.2	10.0	7.7	11.1	12.0	48
Bangladesh	8.9	9.7	10.3	10.1	10.5	12.7	12.4	10.7	14.6	13.4	11.8	45
China	16.8	22.9	20.1	20.5	17.6	15.8	14.9	12.4	11.3	10.0	10.8	53
Pakistan	7.9	10.8	7.5	8.8	7.8	9.6	11.4	14.7	15.0	13.2	9.9	33
Egypt	8.0	9.3	9.6	8.6	9.8	8.7	7.4	6.6	7.7	7.4	9.0	39
Ukraine	22.6	30.4	17.9	11.5	12.8	9.7	9.3	8.7	7.9	7.7	6.6	73
Senegal	4.9	8.9	6.6	5.5	6.5	6.3	7.5	8.5	10.9	8.8	5.8	33
Nigeria	4.0	4.8	4.5	6.7	6.3	5.3	8.9	14.7	23.3	17.9	5.7	46
Tunisia	5.7	6.0	5.9	5.4	4.3	3.7	3.9	3.7	3.6	3.7	4.9	43
Argentina	1.4	1.2	0.9	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.9	1.0	1.4	2.2	4.3	50
Sri Lanka	6.3	7.1	6.8	7.1	6.3	5.3	4.8	4.0	3.7	3.4	4.1	55
Other countries	131.6	144.9	113.3	104.0	90.8	74.9	77.9	84.5	103.8	93.7	77.6	
Total	406.7	424.5	354.3	321.3	279.0	248.4	250.5	262.9	301.1	285.5	264.6	51

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/x78him>

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Japan

Thousands

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Viet Nam	10.9	11.9	13.9	19.5	31.7	43.0	65.9	77.5	98.6	123.3	148.2	..
China	121.2	107.9	100.4	107.0	93.0	98.6	100.6	103.3	109.8	114.9	131.6	..
Philippines	15.8	13.3	13.6	15.4	16.4	19.9	24.0	26.2	29.6	31.3	34.7	..
Korea	27.0	27.9	23.4	25.7	24.2	21.1	22.6	25.6	28.0	32.4	33.9	..
Indonesia	7.5	8.3	8.4	9.3	9.6	11.8	14.3	16.8	19.6	23.2	28.8	..
United States	23.5	22.7	19.3	21.0	21.1	22.0	21.5	22.2	22.0	22.9	24.1	..
Thailand	9.9	10.9	13.6	15.4	15.4	14.3	14.5	15.4	16.4	17.1	17.9	..
Brazil	3.0	4.7	4.5	5.8	4.8	6.1	9.1	12.8	14.2	15.8	16.6	..
Chinese Taipei	5.4	6.6	5.6	6.6	6.6	7.7	10.8	12.2	13.7	14.9	16.3	..
Nepal	3.6	2.9	3.5	4.8	8.3	11.5	13.4	14.1	14.5	13.0	13.1	..
Myanmar	1.4	1.1	1.1	1.5	2.1	3.3	5.2	6.1	7.6	8.1	11.6	..
India	4.6	4.9	4.7	5.6	5.6	6.9	6.9	7.0	7.9	9.6	11.0	..
United Kingdom	5.3	5.8	5.2	5.5	6.1	5.9	6.7	6.6	6.7	7.1	7.7	..
Cambodia	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.3	2.3	3.7	4.2	4.8	5.0	6.3	..
France	3.9	4.0	2.9	4.0	4.5	4.5	5.0	5.6	5.5	6.2	6.2	..
Other countries	53.0	53.2	45.8	55.7	56.0	57.5	67.2	71.7	76.0	74.9	84.0	..
Total	297.1	287.1	266.9	303.9	306.7	336.5	391.2	427.6	475.0	519.7	592.0	..

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/x78him>**Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Korea**

Thousands

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
China	117.6	155.3	149.2	127.3	178.6	192.9	177.0	165.5	156.8	169.3	138.7	52
Viet Nam	16.4	22.9	27.9	24.7	22.2	28.0	30.2	40.1	48.0	56.0	61.3	47
Thailand	5.8	6.9	10.3	13.8	18.3	48.3	20.1	28.5	71.5	80.3	53.3	62
Uzbekistan	4.7	8.6	8.2	11.4	12.3	12.9	14.2	16.2	18.5	18.8	26.0	37
United States	27.1	28.3	28.1	28.9	26.6	24.5	22.7	21.8	19.8	21.2	20.8	55
Russia	2.9	2.6	2.6	2.7	2.8	3.2	6.8	15.0	18.6	18.7	18.0	44
Kazakhstan	0.5	0.8	0.8	1.1	1.1	1.4	3.5	7.7	13.4	15.7	12.5	45
Cambodia	2.6	3.7	6.4	9.5	10.5	9.5	9.6	10.2	9.5	8.7	9.9	29
Indonesia	3.3	5.3	8.1	8.3	11.8	10.5	8.5	9.0	6.9	10.7	9.8	14
Philippines	8.9	9.1	9.6	9.9	12.0	10.7	9.9	9.5	9.0	10.1	9.1	40
Nepal	2.6	2.7	4.3	6.9	6.0	6.8	6.5	8.7	8.6	9.8	8.8	14
Mongolia	5.3	5.4	4.3	5.7	4.3	4.0	8.3	8.2	11.8	10.2	8.7	50
Myanmar	1.7	0.6	2.6	4.1	4.6	5.1	5.2	6.7	6.3	7.4	5.9	7
Japan	4.4	4.7	5.5	5.8	5.9	4.7	4.6	4.7	4.5	5.2	5.1	79
Canada	6.5	6.5	6.0	6.0	5.6	5.5	5.3	5.3	4.6	4.6	4.4	58
Other countries	22.5	29.7	33.5	34.1	37.7	39.1	40.4	45.3	44.8	48.2	45.9	..
Total	232.8	293.1	307.2	300.2	360.5	407.1	372.9	402.2	452.7	495.1	438.2	48

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <https://stat.link/x78him>

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Latvia

Thousands

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Ukraine	0.1	0.1	0.5	0.9	1.4	1.6	19
Russia	0.7	0.9	1.3	0.9	0.9	0.9	43
India	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.6	0.9	0.8	14
Uzbekistan	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.5	0.6	9
Belarus	0.1	0.0	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	23
Viet Nam	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	54
Lithuania	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	37
Azerbaijan	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	20
Pakistan	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.1	5
Germany	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	29
Kazakhstan	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	35
Sri Lanka	..	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	33
Tajikistan	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	1
Turkey	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	20
China	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	42
Other countries	1.4	1.4	1.6	1.4	1.5	1.4	
Total	2.7	2.8	2.9	3.7	3.5	4.5	4.5	3.4	5.1	6.6	6.6	24

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/x78him>**Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Lithuania**

Thousands

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Ukraine	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.4	1.1	1.1	1.6	4.3	5.7	8.9	5
Belarus	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.4	1.2	2.7	3.3	6.4	5
Russia	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.5	0.8	1.5	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.8	1.0	30
India	0.0	0.0	0.0	..	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.3	21
Moldova	0.0	0.0	0.0	..	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3	6
Georgia	0.0	0.0	0.0	..	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	19
Latvia	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	44
Turkey	0.1	0.0	0.0	..	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	24
Kazakhstan	0.0	0.0	0.0	..	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	37
China	0.0	0.0	0.0	..	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	48
United Kingdom	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	28
United States	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	44
Germany	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	28
Israel	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	45
Uzbekistan	0.0	0.0	0.0	..	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	3
Other countries	0.3	0.2	0.5	1.0	0.9	1.1	0.9	1.2	1.3	1.2	1.6	
Total	1.7	1.1	1.7	2.5	3.0	4.8	3.7	6.0	10.2	12.3	19.7	10

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/x78him>

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Luxembourg

Thousands

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
France	2.7	2.9	3.2	3.5	3.5	3.9	4.1	4.0	4.2	4.0	4.1	43
Portugal	3.8	3.8	5.0	5.2	4.6	3.8	3.5	3.4	3.3	3.5	3.8	43
Italy	0.7	0.8	1.0	1.1	1.3	1.6	1.6	1.8	1.8	1.9	2.0	39
Belgium	1.0	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.5	1.6	1.5	1.3	1.4	1.2	1.2	42
Germany	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.0	49
Spain	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.8	42
Romania	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.8	49
India	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.7	0.8	45
United Kingdom	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.6	41
United States	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.7	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.6	51
China	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	58
Greece	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.5	47
Eritrea	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	53
Poland	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.4	56
Brazil	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.4	65
Other countries	3.3	3.8	4.9	4.3	4.6	5.0	6.5	5.9	6.3	6.4	7.2	
Total	14.6	15.8	19.1	19.4	19.8	21.0	22.6	21.6	23.2	23.3	25.1	46

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/x78him>**Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Mexico**

Thousands

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Venezuela	1.3	1.7	1.3	1.2	2.8	2.6	2.2	2.5	3.4	6.3	7.4	55
United States	2.9	4.0	4.3	4.0	14.4	9.4	7.1	6.8	5.4	5.2	5.0	44
Honduras	1.4	1.5	1.0	0.4	2.4	2.3	1.8	2.6	2.5	3.4	3.6	50
Cuba	1.7	1.8	1.7	1.8	3.2	2.7	2.6	2.4	2.1	2.3	2.7	47
Colombia	1.9	2.3	1.8	1.4	3.2	2.5	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.8	2.7	53
El Salvador	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.4	1.6	1.2	1.1	1.8	2.3	2.8	2.5	46
China	2.0	1.7	1.1	0.8	5.2	2.6	2.2	2.1	1.5	1.8	1.9	40
Guatemala	2.1	1.8	1.3	0.5	3.1	2.6	1.6	1.7	1.8	2.3	1.9	50
Canada	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.8	3.5	2.0	1.8	1.7	1.3	1.4	1.3	46
Spain	0.9	1.0	0.8	1.0	2.6	1.8	1.6	1.7	1.5	1.5	1.3	38
Argentina	1.4	1.4	1.0	0.9	3.2	2.1	1.4	1.4	1.0	1.1	1.1	45
Brazil	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.3	1.1	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.6	49
Korea	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.4	1.3	0.8	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.6	42
Nicaragua	0.3	0.4	0.2	0.1	0.6	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.5	44
Japan	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.6	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.5	0.5	32
Other countries	5.6	5.9	4.9	4.1	14.0	9.3	7.0	7.2	6.2	5.9	6.8	
Total	23.9	26.2	22.0	18.2	63.0	43.5	34.4	35.9	32.8	38.7	40.5	47

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <https://stat.link/x78him>

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Netherlands

Thousands

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Poland	12.7	14.5	18.6	18.3	20.4	23.8	23.0	23.1	23.8	25.5	27.3	43
India	3.1	3.2	3.8	4.0	4.5	5.1	6.1	7.2	8.6	10.6	12.3	44
Romania	2.2	2.6	2.7	2.5	2.5	4.6	4.3	5.2	7.5	9.4	11.8	40
Germany	8.7	9.8	9.6	8.7	8.1	8.2	8.6	9.4	10.5	10.9	11.7	57
Italy	2.6	2.8	3.1	3.6	4.2	5.1	5.7	6.5	7.6	8.5	9.4	45
Bulgaria	4.3	4.3	5.4	5.0	4.5	5.2	4.8	5.0	6.0	6.9	9.2	43
United Kingdom	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.7	5.1	5.3	5.8	6.5	7.2	7.7	8.7	41
Spain	2.6	3.1	3.7	4.6	5.3	5.0	5.0	5.2	5.9	6.5	7.6	49
China	4.3	4.5	5.5	5.2	4.7	4.8	5.4	5.7	6.5	6.8	7.5	52
Turkey	3.5	3.7	3.4	3.2	3.0	2.8	2.8	3.2	4.4	5.5	6.6	46
United States	3.1	3.3	3.7	3.7	3.6	3.8	4.7	4.7	5.6	5.8	6.0	55
France	2.9	2.9	2.9	3.0	3.2	3.6	4.0	4.5	5.0	5.5	5.9	51
Syria	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.6	6.9	17.3	25.1	15.3	5.3	5.7	43
Greece	1.4	1.8	2.7	3.3	2.9	2.6	2.8	3.1	3.6	4.0	4.7	42
Portugal	2.4	2.0	2.1	2.5	2.4	2.3	2.2	2.4	2.7	3.1	3.7	44
Other countries	46.2	47.2	46.8	43.1	47.3	50.3	56.9	65.2	63.7	69.0	77.2	
Total	104.4	110.2	118.5	115.7	122.3	139.3	159.5	182.2	183.9	191.0	215.2	48

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/x78him>**Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – New Zealand**

Thousands

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
China	7.7	7.7	9.6	10.0	10.6	13.0	15.1	16.5	15.5	15.0	15.9	52
India	8.5	9.6	8.4	8.5	9.1	16.2	19.6	14.8	14.1	14.3	14.1	43
South Africa	3.3	2.2	2.1	1.9	2.3	2.6	3.4	5.8	5.8	7.0	12.2	49
Philippines	3.9	3.3	3.7	4.2	4.7	6.5	8.4	8.2	9.1	9.1	10.2	38
United Kingdom	10.1	8.8	9.2	8.8	9.0	8.8	8.7	8.9	9.0	8.2	8.8	46
Australia	5.1	5.1	4.9	4.8	5.8	6.2	6.8	7.1	7.1	6.7	7.6	50
United States	3.0	2.7	2.9	2.9	3.1	2.9	3.3	3.1	3.5	3.5	4.2	51
Samoa	2.3	1.6	2.0	2.0	1.9	2.1	2.3	2.4	2.7	2.8	3.4	38
Korea	3.9	3.2	2.6	2.2	2.1	2.5	2.6	3.1	2.9	2.7	3.0	60
Fiji	4.6	2.3	2.1	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.5	3.0	2.5	2.4	2.8	47
France	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.0	1.4	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.8	2.6	46
Tonga	1.6	1.2	1.1	0.9	1.1	1.1	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.4	2.0	31
Japan	1.3	1.3	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.9	62
Germany	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.5	1.8	54
Brazil	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.6	0.9	1.3	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.8	50
Other countries	17.4	17.8	18.3	18.6	20.2	21.8	22.6	24.6	24.9	25.7	29.6	
Total	75.6	69.7	71.3	71.6	77.2	91.7	102.8	105.6	105.3	105.3	121.8	47

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <https://stat.link/x78him>

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Norway

Thousands

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Poland	10.5	11.3	12.9	11.5	10.5	9.9	8.2	6.0	5.2	5.0	5.0	36
Lithuania	3.2	6.6	7.7	6.6	5.6	4.4	3.3	2.5	2.7	2.8	2.5	40
India	0.8	0.8	1.2	1.5	1.5	1.8	1.7	1.4	1.6	2.0	2.4	42
Sweden	6.0	7.6	8.2	5.7	5.3	4.6	3.6	2.5	2.2	2.1	2.0	46
Philippines	1.7	2.1	2.6	2.5	2.8	2.2	2.2	2.1	1.9	1.8	1.8	79
Syria	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.8	2.1	4.0	11.2	7.0	3.8	1.5	51
Congo	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.7	1.3	52
Germany	2.8	2.7	2.3	1.8	1.6	1.5	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.3	1.3	53
Romania	1.1	1.3	1.4	2.0	2.5	2.1	1.9	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.3	37
United Kingdom	1.3	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.0	0.9	0.9	1.1	1.2	35
United States	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.1	52
Denmark	1.3	1.4	1.6	1.8	2.0	1.7	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.1	46
Spain	0.5	0.8	1.0	1.4	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.1	1.0	0.9	1.0	43
Turkey	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.4	1.0	44
Thailand	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.1	0.8	1.0	1.4	1.1	1.0	0.9	81
Other countries	24.8	26.5	27.8	30.7	28.8	26.1	26.7	24.4	21.4	18.2	19.4	
Total	56.7	65.1	70.8	70.0	66.9	61.4	59.1	58.5	49.8	44.4	44.6	48

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/x78him>**Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Poland**

Thousands

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Ukraine	10.1	10.3	10.1	11.8	11.9	7.8	45.2	63.8	79.0	88.7	111.0	46
Belarus	3.2	2.9	2.5	2.6	2.3	1.4	3.2	3.5	6.2	7.9	8.1	44
India	1.1	1.2	1.1	1.2	1.2	0.8	1.9	2.8	4.1	4.5	4.9	26
Georgia	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.5	0.6	0.7	1.9	4.3	17
Russia	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.9	1.9	1.1	2.5	2.6	2.7	3.0	3.4	54
Viet Nam	3.0	2.4	2.1	4.0	2.8	2.0	3.3	3.2	4.0	3.0	2.7	44
China	2.0	2.3	2.8	2.9	3.0	1.6	3.8	3.9	4.2	2.9	2.3	45
Moldova	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.5	0.7	0.9	1.1	2.0	35
Turkey	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.4	0.9	1.7	1.7	2.0	1.9	1.7	25
Korea	1.0	1.1	1.0	1.0	1.1	0.6	1.0	0.8	0.7	0.7	1.2	35
Uzbekistan	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.5	0.9	0.8	0.5	1.1	10
United Kingdom	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.5	1.1	19
Germany	1.7	1.8	1.9	2.3	2.0	2.0	2.3	2.3	2.2	1.8	1.0	19
Azerbaijan	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.3	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.9	22
Bangladesh	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.6	0.6	0.8	11
Other countries	15.2	15.1	15.5	16.5	17.3	12.4	18.6	18.6	18.9	17.9	17.1	
Total	41.3	41.1	41.3	47.1	46.6	32.0	86.1	107.0	128.0	137.6	163.5	42

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/x78him>

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Portugal

Thousands

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Brazil	23.1	16.2	12.9	11.7	6.7	5.6	5.7	7.1	11.6	28.2	48.8	52
United Kingdom	2.2	1.8	1.7	1.2	1.4	1.5	1.9	3.1	3.8	5.1	8.4	44
Italy	1.0	1.0	0.8	0.7	0.8	1.1	1.6	3.1	5.3	7.0	7.9	43
India	1.0	0.9	1.1	0.9	1.0	0.9	1.1	1.0	1.8	4.1	6.3	20
Nepal	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.5	0.8	0.9	1.4	1.3	1.7	4.2	5.0	37
Angola	1.5	1.3	1.4	1.3	1.5	1.5	1.3	1.5	1.8	2.9	4.5	56
France	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.5	0.7	1.9	2.5	3.5	4.7	5.3	4.4	54
Cape Verde	4.6	4.2	4.6	3.4	2.7	2.2	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.6	4.4	54
Guinea-Bissau	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.6	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.0	1.1	1.9	3.5	44
Spain	1.5	1.7	1.5	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.7	2.2	2.7	2.9	3.2	48
Germany	1.1	1.0	0.8	0.6	0.8	1.0	1.0	1.6	1.9	2.5	2.8	44
Bangladesh	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.4	0.7	0.4	0.7	2.0	2.4	24
China	1.9	1.7	1.5	1.4	1.9	3.7	2.6	2.8	2.6	2.3	2.2	52
Venezuela	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.5	0.9	1.7	1.9	58
Romania	8.1	6.0	4.6	3.0	2.7	2.5	2.6	2.5	2.4	2.1	1.9	41
Other countries	12.7	12.2	11.2	9.7	9.0	9.3	10.5	13.4	16.2	18.4	21.8	
Total	61.4	50.7	45.4	38.5	33.2	35.3	37.9	46.9	61.4	93.2	129.2	47

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/x78him>**Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Russia**

Thousands

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Ukraine	45.9	27.5	30.1	35.4	40.1	89.5	139.7	115.0	90.3	78.9	82.9	54
Tajikistan	27.0	18.2	25.7	31.7	40.2	44.6	35.6	38.1	45.3	45.5	66.5	31
Armenia	35.8	19.9	24.5	27.6	31.0	35.1	34.1	32.2	33.4	31.8	59.8	38
Kazakhstan	38.8	27.9	7.2	22.8	28.5	34.8	38.3	41.0	40.7	40.7	56.3	51
Uzbekistan	42.5	24.1	53.7	75.3	103.3	115.1	57.1	44.5	47.5	39.8	48.3	33
Kyrgyzstan	23.3	20.9	5.0	11.7	14.2	17.0	15.1	17.7	30.5	34.2	45.4	35
Azerbaijan	22.9	14.5	16.6	17.1	18.0	21.5	19.4	18.3	18.9	19.5	28.3	38
China	0.8	1.4	6.9	8.4	8.0	10.5	8.9	7.9	8.0	6.9	15.2	27
Belarus	5.5	4.9	4.9	12.4	12.0	14.5	14.1	10.9	17.1	15.0	14.9	36
Turkmenistan	3.3	2.3	2.2	2.8	3.8	4.3	4.5	5.4	6.9	8.5	12.8	40
Moldova	16.4	11.8	9.2	11.9	15.4	18.8	18.3	15.1	12.9	11.7	12.3	48
India	0.1	0.1	1.4	1.0	1.4	1.8	2.8	4.7	5.6	5.0	9.6	34
Viet Nam	1.0	0.9	3.2	3.5	3.7	3.7	3.9	3.6	3.8	3.8	6.6	38
Georgia	7.5	5.2	3.9	4.3	4.2	4.3	3.8	3.3	3.6	3.3	4.6	46
Egypt	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.8	1.0	2.9	14
Other countries	9.1	8.1	20.3	24.4	26.6	27.4	29.0	30.4	27.7	19.4	33.8	
Total	279.9	187.8	214.9	290.6	350.7	443.1	425.0	388.6	393.1	365.0	500.1	40

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/x78him>

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Slovak Republic

Thousands

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Czech Republic	1.0	0.8	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.4	54
Hungary	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.4	0.5	0.4	36
Ukraine	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	48
Romania	0.6	0.4	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.2	0.4	0.2	26
United Kingdom	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	31
Poland	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	40
Italy	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	27
Germany	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	37
Spain	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	23
Russia	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	49
Austria	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	24
France	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	35
Bulgaria	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	36
Croatia	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	36
Greece	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	34
Other countries	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.4	0.4	0.4	
Total	5.1	4.2	3.8	2.9	2.5	2.4	3.8	3.6	2.9	2.9	2.5	38

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/x78him>**Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Slovenia**

Thousands

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Bosnia and Herzegovina	12.9	4.4	3.4	4.0	3.8	3.4	4.7	4.8	6.2	11.7	13.8	24
Serbia	2.9	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.6	2.0	3.2	3.8	19
North Macedonia	3.0	1.1	1.0	1.1	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.9	1.0	1.5	1.6	37
Croatia	1.4	0.9	0.9	1.1	1.2	1.1	0.8	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.3	32
Bulgaria	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.6	24
Russia	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.5	55
Italy	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.4	31
Ukraine	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	50
China	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	37
Hungary	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	35
Montenegro	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	41
United Kingdom	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	39
Romania	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	29
Turkey	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	48
Germany	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	35
Other countries	4.9	3.1	2.3	2.4	2.1	2.2	2.5	2.5	2.5	3.7	4.6	
Total	27.4	12.7	10.8	12.3	11.6	11.3	12.7	13.8	15.5	24.1	27.6	26

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/x78him>

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Spain

Thousands

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Colombia	20.4	13.7	13.2	10.0	8.7	8.5	9.4	22.6	34.2	53.3	76.8	55
Morocco	43.2	30.2	28.0	22.4	20.5	20.0	23.8	29.7	39.8	60.9	72.9	40
Venezuela	5.7	6.5	6.8	4.6	4.7	7.2	10.5	18.5	31.5	47.1	58.1	56
Italy	11.8	11.2	11.6	12.0	12.2	14.9	18.6	21.7	28.7	31.3	33.4	47
United Kingdom	17.9	16.2	15.7	16.4	14.1	14.2	15.0	18.5	21.2	24.0	29.4	47
Honduras	3.7	4.7	6.3	5.3	4.3	5.7	7.6	10.9	18.2	23.4	29.1	66
Peru	13.7	8.0	7.7	5.6	4.8	4.7	5.3	8.0	13.9	19.3	28.6	57
Romania	44.1	51.9	50.8	27.3	22.8	29.7	28.8	28.6	31.2	29.1	27.0	47
Argentina	6.7	5.4	4.9	3.6	3.8	4.2	5.0	6.4	8.8	11.1	17.9	52
Nicaragua	2.4	3.0	3.6	2.8	2.1	2.7	3.1	4.1	6.2	11.4	17.1	65
Brazil	10.5	8.7	7.9	6.4	5.1	5.6	7.1	9.7	12.5	15.5	16.5	57
Cuba	5.6	6.1	7.4	5.7	5.1	4.6	4.9	5.9	8.0	11.3	14.2	51
France	7.7	7.8	7.8	7.4	7.3	8.1	9.0	9.3	11.4	11.7	12.1	49
China	11.9	10.5	10.7	9.2	9.1	9.4	10.1	10.2	11.5	11.9	12.1	56
Paraguay	10.8	9.4	8.2	4.8	3.8	4.2	4.7	7.2	8.4	9.3	12.0	61
Other countries	149.4	137.2	145.3	129.0	119.9	120.8	127.1	140.9	168.9	189.2	208.9	
Total	365.4	330.3	335.9	272.5	248.4	264.5	290.0	352.2	454.4	560.0	666.0	50

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/x78him>**Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Sweden**

Thousands

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Afghanistan	1.6	1.9	3.4	4.7	4.2	3.8	3.4	4.1	11.3	9.6	7.9	27
India	1.8	2.2	1.7	2.0	2.4	3.0	3.5	4.2	5.7	7.3	7.4	43
Syria	0.7	1.0	1.5	4.7	11.7	21.7	28.0	49.0	20.9	13.9	6.0	53
Eritrea	1.4	1.6	2.1	2.2	3.3	5.9	7.6	7.6	4.8	3.8	3.9	52
Poland	5.2	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.6	5.1	5.6	5.0	4.4	3.8	3.2	38
Pakistan	1.8	1.6	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.8	1.1	1.2	1.7	2.5	3.1	44
China	3.1	3.2	2.6	2.5	2.1	2.4	2.3	2.2	2.7	2.9	2.8	51
Iraq	8.5	4.5	4.5	3.6	2.3	2.4	2.8	3.4	6.0	3.9	2.8	47
Germany	2.8	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.3	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.5	54
Iran	2.4	2.8	2.2	2.1	2.0	1.7	1.3	1.7	2.3	2.5	2.3	51
Finland	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.6	2.8	3.0	2.9	2.6	2.2	58
Turkey	2.0	2.2	2.0	1.8	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.5	2.2	2.2	39
Somalia	6.9	6.8	3.1	4.5	11.0	4.2	3.5	3.8	2.8	2.8	2.0	48
Romania	1.8	1.7	1.9	1.7	1.9	2.0	2.3	2.3	2.2	2.3	2.0	41
Serbia	1.0	0.9	1.0	1.3	1.0	1.7	1.7	1.6	2.0	2.1	2.0	49
Other countries	40.4	39.6	40.0	41.6	42.3	45.4	44.5	50.3	51.3	49.9	46.3	
Total	83.8	79.0	75.9	82.6	95.4	106.1	113.9	143.0	125.0	114.4	98.2	47

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/x78him>

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Switzerland

Thousands

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Germany	33.9	30.7	30.5	27.1	26.6	23.8	22.1	20.9	19.7	20.2	19.9	43
Italy	8.5	10.1	10.8	13.6	17.5	17.8	18.2	18.1	15.5	16.5	15.9	39
France	10.9	11.5	11.5	11.4	13.5	13.8	14.8	13.8	14.1	13.8	14.0	44
Portugal	13.7	12.8	15.4	18.6	19.9	14.9	12.6	10.1	9.2	8.7	8.3	41
Spain	2.5	3.3	4.6	6.5	8.8	7.6	7.0	5.8	5.2	5.6	5.2	48
Poland	2.1	2.0	3.4	3.3	2.9	4.8	4.8	4.1	4.1	4.7	4.7	41
Romania	1.0	1.4	1.7	2.3	2.7	2.4	2.0	2.9	2.9	2.4	4.5	48
United Kingdom	4.8	5.5	5.4	4.4	4.6	4.2	3.9	3.6	3.8	3.8	4.0	42
China	..	1.9	2.1	2.4	2.9	2.9	3.3	3.2	3.1	3.1	3.3	56
Hungary	1.1	1.2	2.1	2.5	2.5	4.2	3.9	3.6	3.3	3.2	3.1	44
India	..	2.4	2.4	2.6	2.5	2.6	2.9	2.9	3.1	3.1	3.0	45
Austria	2.8	2.6	2.9	3.1	2.9	3.0	3.2	2.9	2.8	2.8	2.9	43
United States	..	4.0	4.2	3.5	3.4	3.1	2.9	2.9	3.0	3.0	2.7	51
Bulgaria	0.5	0.6	0.9	1.0	1.1	0.9	1.0	1.8	1.7	1.3	2.3	36
Eritrea	..	2.1	2.4	1.1	1.5	1.8	2.2	2.6	2.9	2.4	2.3	51
Other countries	50.7	42.0	42.2	40.4	42.1	44.2	45.6	44.0	43.5	45.5	44.6	
Total	132.4	134.2	142.5	143.8	155.4	152.1	150.4	143.1	137.8	140.1	140.6	46

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/x78him>**Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – Turkey**

Thousands

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Iraq	..	1.2	70.9	97.1	110.3	83.8	46
Turkmenistan	..	1.2	8.4	20.3	34.9	80.0	35
Afghanistan	..	2.2	27.9	37.7	45.0	47.2	40
Syria	..	0.9	25.7	28.2	39.0	43.2	45
Iran	..	1.5	15.5	17.8	31.9	42.4	44
Azerbaijan	..	2.5	15.3	20.9	23.2	26.6	49
Uzbekistan	..	0.6	9.0	17.9	15.2	25.1	67
Russia	..	1.8	6.4	7.3	13.8	17.3	61
Egypt	..	0.1	4.1	8.6	13.5	12.5	39
Libya	..	0.0	4.3	6.0	7.4	12.1	37
Jordan	..	0.1	1.7	2.9	8.0	11.3	38
Somalia	..	0.2	0.7	1.5	4.5	10.3	47
West Bank and Gaza Strip	..	0.2	2.0	4.8	8.6	10.0	37
Kyrgyzstan	..	1.0	6.0	9.0	9.1	10.0	73
Kazakhstan	..	1.4	3.6	4.3	7.4	10.0	57
Other countries	..	15.1	72.3	80.3	95.1	136.9	
Total	..	29.9	273.9	364.6	466.9	578.5	46

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <https://stat.link/x78him>

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – United Kingdom

Thousands

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
India	64	68	61	36	30	46	36	35	50	62	92	..
China	22	28	45	41	46	39	43	35	58	56	74	..
Romania	10	7	8	6	19	37	56	55	51	29	31	..
Italy	8	9	10	10	17	17	26	26	19	31	18	..
Spain	11	5	8	17	21	21	20	18	18	14	18	..
Portugal	..	4	5	7	12	15	10	12	15	12	17	..
United States	17	16	16	17	12	20	18	17	19	16	17	..
Pakistan	17	30	43	19	10	11	8	11	15	10	16	..
France	14	11	17	14	15	24	15	25	14	11	15	..
Poland	32	34	33	30	28	32	40	29	25	21	14	..
Philippines	12	9	4	2	2	4	3	3	5	5	12	..
Australia	12	18	13	16	11	15	16	13	18	9	11	..
Other countries	211	220	190	168	183	223	190	176	213	210	172	..
Total	430	459	453	383	406	504	481	455	520	486	507	52

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/x78him>**Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality – United States (permanent)**

Thousands

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Mexico	163.2	138.3	143.0	146.0	135.1	133.2	158.3	173.5	170.1	161.6	155.7	55
China	64.8	71.4	87.9	82.4	72.1	75.9	74.4	81.9	71.8	65.6	62.3	58
India	55.6	67.5	67.4	64.7	67.3	76.3	62.8	63.0	59.1	58.9	53.8	50
Dominican Republic	48.8	53.3	45.7	41.2	41.2	43.7	50.0	59.9	58.1	57.0	49.4	53
Philippines	59.4	57.6	56.6	56.9	54.3	49.2	56.0	52.2	48.7	46.9	45.6	63
Cuba	38.8	33.4	36.1	32.4	31.8	45.9	53.6	65.6	64.5	75.5	39.4	50
Viet Nam	28.5	30.0	33.5	27.6	26.5	29.4	30.4	40.1	37.9	33.4	39.2	59
El Salvador	19.7	18.6	18.5	16.1	18.2	19.2	19.4	23.1	24.9	28.1	27.5	55
Jamaica	21.2	19.3	19.3	20.4	19.1	18.7	17.4	22.9	21.7	20.2	21.5	55
Brazil	14.3	12.0	11.5	11.2	10.8	10.2	11.2	13.5	14.7	15.1	19.4	58
Colombia	27.2	21.9	22.2	20.4	20.7	17.7	16.8	18.0	17.4	17.1	19.3	63
Korea	25.7	22.1	22.6	20.7	23.0	20.2	17.0	21.7	19.0	17.5	18.3	57
Canada	24.0	20.4	20.2	20.6	21.0	18.5	20.1	20.3	18.8	16.1	17.8	54
Haiti	24.0	22.4	22.0	22.7	20.2	15.2	16.9	23.3	21.7	21.3	17.2	51
Honduras	6.3	6.4	6.1	6.9	8.9	8.1	9.2	13.1	11.3	13.7	15.8	55
Other countries	509.2	447.9	449.6	441.5	420.4	435.4	437.5	491.4	467.4	448.7	429.7	..
Total	1 130.8	1 042.6	1 062.0	1 031.6	990.6	1 016.5	1 051.0	1 183.5	1 127.2	1 096.6	1 031.8	54

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/x78him>

Table A.2. Outflows of foreign population from selected OECD countries

Thousands

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Australia	27.6	29.3	31.2	29.9	31.7	32.6	33.9	33.2
Austria	67.2	68.4	72.8	74.4	74.5	76.5	80.1	89.0	89.6	91.7	90.0
Belgium	49.1	43.4	52.7	60.4	69.7	64.9	59.8	61.8	58.6	56.8	46.5
Czech Republic	9.4	12.5	2.5	16.7	27.2	16.1	15.0	13.4	14.4	16.2	17.5
Denmark	26.6	27.1	26.6	29.1	29.7	30.4	30.6	37.4	41.5	45.4	52.4
Estonia	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.4	0.3	0.3	3.3	3.4	4.3	3.9	6.2
Finland	4.0	3.1	3.3	4.2	4.2	5.5	6.7	7.5	6.8	7.6	7.2
France	23.8	8.1	37.9	40.9	38.4	49.3	51.9	50.2	21.5	30.1	29.9
Germany	578.8	529.6	538.8	578.8	657.6	765.6	859.3	1 083.8	885.5	923.6	961.3
Greece	23.9	33.7	39.2	59.4	55.0	51.2	53.4	51.8	49.7	53.1	49.5
Hungary	5.6	6.0	2.7	9.9	13.1	10.8	10.4	10.5	12.9	24.4	27.9
Iceland	5.8	3.4	2.8	2.2	2.3	2.5	2.2	3.6	3.9	4.9	4.4
Ireland	52.8	40.3	38.6	33.3	33.0	30.0	27.5	29.1	34.0	28.0	25.9
Italy	32.3	32.8	32.4	38.2	43.6	47.5	44.7	42.6	40.6	40.2	57.5
Japan	262.0	242.6	230.9	219.4	213.4	212.9	223.5	233.5	259.2	292.1	333.6
Korea	233.5	196.1	217.7	290.0	268.1	270.5	301.0	325.0	348.7	365.1	425.6
Latvia	6.7	4.7	3.4	1.4	2.6	3.0	2.3	2.9	4.1
Lithuania	5.5	3.8	2.4	2.6	3.3	3.5	7.6	4.3	2.6	3.2	4.8
Luxembourg	7.3	7.7	7.5	8.6	8.9	9.5	10.4	11.3	11.6	11.6	13.0
Netherlands	57.5	64.0	70.2	80.8	83.1	83.4	85.2	89.9	96.4	102.8	109.9
New Zealand	41.2	43.4	44.6	41.0	39.4	37.8	39.2	41.4	48.2	48.1	54.1
Norway	18.4	22.5	22.9	21.3	25.0	23.3	27.4	30.7	26.6	24.5	17.6
Poland	50.4	48.6	51.0	68.9	49.5	68.6	89.5	40.1	45.8	43.0	43.9
Portugal	2.8	2.0	2.6	2.5	3.0	1.9	0.5	1.1	0.6	2.3	0.8
Slovak Republic	0.5	0.4	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
Slovenia	15.0	11.7	7.3	6.2	5.6	6.2	6.3	6.8	7.7	6.9	8.5
Spain	344.1	363.2	353.6	389.3	459.0	320.0	249.2	237.5	280.2	230.3	220.2
Sweden	18.4	22.1	23.7	26.6	24.6	26.4	31.3	23.5	23.4	24.1	25.3
Switzerland	55.2	65.5	64.0	65.9	70.0	69.2	73.4	77.6	79.1	80.7	80.0
Turkey	178.0	253.6	323.9	245.4
United Kingdom	211.0	185.0	190.0	165.0	170.0	171.0	164.0	195.0	222.0	203.0	202.0

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata in the following table.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/ftdhjs>

Metadata related to Tables A.1., B.1. and A.2. Inflows and outflows of foreign population

Country	Types of migrant recorded in the data	Other comments	Source
Australia	Includes persons who are entitled to stay permanently in Australia at arrival (Settler Arrivals) as well as those who changed status from temporary to permanent residence. Settler arrivals include holders of a permanent visa, holders of a temporary (provisional) visa where there is a clear intention to settle, citizens of New Zealand indicating an intention to settle and persons otherwise eligible to settle. <i>Outflows:</i> People leaving Australia for 12 months or more in a 16-month period. Net Overseas Migration (NOM).	Data refer to the fiscal year (July to June of the year indicated). From 2014, figures inferior to 5 individuals are not shown.	Department of Immigration and Border Protection.
Austria	<i>Inflows and outflows:</i> Foreigners holding a residence permit and who have actually stayed for at least 3 months.	Outflows include administrative corrections.	Population Registers, Statistics Austria.
Belgium	<i>Inflows:</i> Foreigners holding a residence permit and intending to stay in the country for at least 3 months. <i>Outflows:</i> Include administrative corrections.	From 2012, asylum seekers are included in inflow and outflow data.	Population Register, Directorate for Statistics and Economic Information (DGSIE).
Canada	Total number of people who have been granted permanent resident status in Canada.	Country of origin refers to country of last permanent residence. Due to privacy considerations, the figures have been subjected to random rounding. Under this method, all figures in the table are randomly rounded either up or down to multiples of 5.	Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada.
Chile	Total number of people who obtained a temporary visa for the first time.	Estimations for the years 2017 and 2018.	Register of residence permits, Department of Foreigners and Migration, Ministry of the Interior.
Colombia	Inflows of all foreign nationals who entered Colombia in the given year and subsequently stayed for at least 90 days.		Migration Colombia.
Czech Republic	<i>Inflows:</i> Foreigners holding a permanent or a long-term residence permit (visa over 90 days) or who were granted asylum in the given year. Excludes nationals of EU countries if they intend to stay for less than 30 days in the country. <i>Outflows:</i> Departures of foreigners who were staying in the country on a permanent or temporary basis.	Country of origin refers to country of last permanent or temporary residence. Inflows and outflows of nationals of EU countries are likely to be underestimated.	Register of Foreigners, Czech Statistical Office.
Denmark	<i>Inflows:</i> Foreigners who live legally in Denmark, are registered in the Central population register, and have been living in the country for at least one year. <i>Outflows:</i> Include administrative corrections.	Excludes asylum seekers and all those with temporary residence permits.	Central Population Register, Statistics Denmark.
Estonia	<i>Inflows and outflows:</i> Foreigners expecting to stay in the country (out of the country in the case outflows) for at least 12 months.	The number of nationals from other EU countries who are staying temporarily in the country for at least 12 months may be underestimated.	Statistics Estonia.
Finland	<i>Inflows and outflows:</i> Foreign nationals with a residence permit valid for more than one year and nationals of EU countries who intend to stay in the country for more than 12 months. Nordic citizens who are moving for less than 6 months are not included.	Includes foreign persons of Finnish origin. Excludes asylum seekers and persons with temporary residence permits. Inflows and outflows of nationals of EU countries can be underestimated.	Central Population Register, Statistics Finland.

Country	Types of migrant recorded in the data	Other comments	Source
France	Inflows of non-EU nationals are first issuances of permanent-type permits. They include status changes from a temporary-type permit to a permanent-type permit. Inflows of EU nationals included from 2013 onwards are extracted from the permanent census.		Ministry of the Interior and INSEE.
Germany	<i>Inflows:</i> Foreigners who had previously no registered address in Germany and intending to stay at least one week in the country. <i>Outflows:</i> Deregistrations from population registers of persons who move out of their address without taking a new address in the country and administrative deregistrations.	Includes asylum seekers living in private households. Excludes inflows of ethnic Germans (<i>Aussiedler</i>). In 2008, local authorities started to purge registers of inactive records. As a result, higher emigration figures were reported from this year.	Central Population Register, Federal Statistical Office.
Greece	Permits valid for more than 12 months delivered to third country nationals.		Eurostat.
Hungary	<i>Inflows:</i> Foreigners expecting to stay in the country for at least 90 days. <i>Outflows:</i> Foreign citizens having a residence or a settlement document and who left Hungary in the given year with no intention to return, or whose permission's validity has expired and did not apply for a new one or whose permission was invalidated by authority due to withdrawal. From 2012, it contains estimations.		Population Register, Office of Immigration and Nationality, Central Statistical Office.
Iceland	<i>Inflows and outflows:</i> Foreigners expecting to stay in the country (out of the country in the case outflows) for at least 12 months.		Register of Migration Data, Statistics Iceland.
Ireland	<i>Inflows:</i> The estimates derive from the quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS) and relate to those persons resident in the country at the time of the survey and who were living abroad one year earlier. <i>Outflows:</i> The estimates derive from the quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS) and relate to the persons who were resident in the country at a point in the previous twelve-month period who are now living abroad.	Figures for Tables A.1. and A.2. are based on May to April of the year indicated.	Central Statistics Office.
Israel	Data refer to permanent immigrants by last country of residence.	The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.	Population register, Central Bureau of Statistics.
Italy	<i>Inflows and outflows:</i> Changes of residence.	Excludes seasonal workers. Administrative corrections are made following censuses (the last census took place in 2011).	Administrative Population Register (Anagrafe) analysed by ISTAT.
Japan	<i>Inflows:</i> Foreigners who entered the country, excluding temporary visitors and re-entries. <i>Outflows:</i> Foreigners who left Japan without re-entry permission. Excludes temporary visitors.		Ministry of Justice, Immigration Bureau.
Korea	<i>Inflows and outflows:</i> Data refer to long-term inflows/outflows (more than 90 days).		Ministry of Justice.

Country	Types of migrant recorded in the data	Other comments	Source
Latvia	<i>Inflows and outflows:</i> Long-term migration (permanent change of residence or for a period of at least one year).		Population Register, Central Statistical Office.
Lithuania	<i>Inflows and outflows:</i> Foreign citizens who have been residing in the country for at least 6 months.		Lithuanian Department of Migration.
Luxembourg	<i>Inflows:</i> Foreigners holding a residence permit and intending to stay in the country for at least 12 months. <i>Outflows:</i> Foreigners who left the country with the intention to live abroad for at least 12 months.		Central Population Register, Central Office of Statistics and Economic Studies (Statec).
Mexico	Until 2012, number of foreigners who are issued an immigrant permit for the first time (" <i>inmigrante</i> " FM2). 2011 and 2012 also include new and former refugees who obtained immigrant status (" <i>inmigrado</i> "). From 2013 on, number of foreigners who are issued a permanent residence card, as the 2011 Migration Act came into effect.	The sharp increase in the numbers of 2013 is explained by administrative changes with the implementation of the 2011 Migration Act. Most of these "new residents" are foreigners already in the country on a temporary status.	National Migration Institute, Unit for Migration Policy, Ministry of Interior.
Netherlands	<i>Inflows:</i> Foreigners holding a residence permit and intending to stay in the country for at least four of the next six months. <i>Outflows:</i> Outflows include the "net administrative corrections", i.e. unreported emigration of foreigners.	Inflows exclude asylum seekers who are staying in reception centres.	Population Register, Central Bureau of Statistics.
New Zealand	<i>Inflows:</i> Permanent and long-term arrivals to live in the country for 12 months or more. <i>Outflows:</i> Permanent and long-term departures: Foreign-born returning to live overseas after a stay of 12 months or more in New Zealand.	Revised series due to a change in methodology.	Statistics New Zealand.
Norway	<i>Inflows:</i> Foreigners holding a residence or work permit and intending to stay in the country for at least 6 months. Include EU/EFTA foreigners. <i>Outflows:</i> Foreigners holding a residence or work permit and who stayed in the country for at least 6 months.	Asylum seekers are registered as immigrants only after having settled in a Norwegian municipality following a positive outcome of their application. An asylum seeker whose application has been rejected will not be registered as an 'immigrant', even if the application process has taken a long time and return to the home country is delayed for a significant period.	Central Population Register, Statistics Norway.
Poland	Number of permanent and "fixed-term" residence permits issued. Since 26 August 2006, nationals of European Union Member States and their family members are no longer issued residence permits. However, they still need to register their stay in Poland, provided that they are planning to stay in Poland for more than 3 months.		Office for Foreigners.
Portugal	Data based on residence permits. Following the new legislation, the data include the new residence permits delivered to every foreigner with a citizenship from an EU or non-EU country. Includes continuous regularisation.		Immigration and Border Control Office (SEF); National Statistical Institute (INE); Ministry of Foreign Affairs (before 2008).
Russia	Registered changes of residence. Until 2010, data refer to the country of previous residence. Data from 2011 on refer to citizenship.		Federal Migration Service.
Slovak Republic	<i>Inflows and outflows:</i> Includes permanent, temporary, and tolerated residents.		Register of Foreigners, Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic.
Slovenia			Eurostat.

Country	Types of migrant recorded in the data	Other comments	Source
Spain	<i>Inflows and outflows:</i> Changes in regular residence for at least 12 months declared by foreigners.	From 2008 on, data correspond to Migration Statistics estimates that are based on the number of registrations and cancellations in the Municipal Registers by all foreigners, irrespective of their legal status.	Municipal Population Registers (<i>Padron municipal de habitantes</i>), National Statistical Institute (INE).
Sweden	<i>Inflows:</i> Foreigners holding a residence permit and intending to stay in the country for at least one year (including nationals of EU countries). <i>Outflows:</i> Departures of foreigners who have the intention to live abroad for at least one year.	Excludes asylum seekers and temporary workers.	Population Register, Statistics Sweden.
Switzerland	<i>Inflows:</i> Foreigners holding a permanent or an annual residence permit. Holders of an L-permit (short duration) are also included if their stay in the country is longer than 12 months. <i>Outflows:</i> Departures of foreigners holding a permanent or an annual residence permit and of holders of an L-permit who stayed in the country for at least one year. The data include administrative corrections, so that, for example, foreigners whose permit expired are considered to have left the country.		Register of Foreigners, Federal Office of Migration.
Turkey	<i>Inflows:</i> Residence permits issued for the first time to foreigners intending to stay 12 months or more in the country (long-term residents). <i>Outflows:</i> Departures of long-term residents.		General Directorate of Security, Ministry of the Interior.
United Kingdom	<i>Inflows:</i> Non-British citizens admitted to the United Kingdom. <i>Outflows:</i> Non-British citizens leaving the United Kingdom.	Statistics whose coefficient of variation exceeds 30% are not shown separately but grouped under "Other countries". Annual variations should be interpreted with cautious. Last year data is estimated.	International Passenger Survey, Office for National Statistics.
United States	<i>Permanent migrants:</i> Lawful Permanent Residents (LPRs) ("green card" recipients).	Includes persons already present in the United States who changed status. Certain LPRs are admitted conditionally and are required to remove their conditional status after two years; they are counted as LPRs when they first enter. Data cover the fiscal year (October to September of the year indicated).	Office of Immigration Statistics, Department of Homeland Security; Citizenship and Immigration Services, Department of Homeland Security.

Note: Data for Serbia include persons from Serbia, Montenegro and Serbia and Montenegro. Some statements may refer to nationalities/countries of birth not shown in this annex but available on line at: <http://stats.oecd.org/>.

Inflows of asylum seekers

Statistics on asylum seekers published in this annex are based on data provided by Eurostat and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees. Since 1950, the UNHCR, which has a mission of conducting and co-ordinating international initiatives on behalf of refugees, has regularly produced complete statistics on refugees and asylum seekers in OECD countries and other countries of the world (<https://www.unhcr.org/data.html>).

These statistics are most often derived from administrative sources, but there are differences depending on the nature of the data provided. In some countries, asylum seekers are enumerated when the application is accepted. Consequently, they are shown in the statistics at that time rather than at the date when they arrived in the country. Acceptance of the application means that the administrative authorities will review the applicants' claims and grant them certain rights during this review procedure. In other countries, the data do not include the applicants' family members, who are admitted under different provisions (e.g. France), while other countries count the entire family (e.g. Switzerland).

The figures presented in the summary table (Table A.3) generally concern initial applications (primary processing stage) and sometimes differ significantly from the totals presented in Tables B.3, which give data by country of origin. This is because the data received by the UNHCR by country of origin combine both initial applications and appeals, and it is sometimes difficult to separate these two categories retrospectively. The reference for total asylum applications remains the figures shown in summary Table A.3.

Table A.3. New asylum requests in OECD countries and Russia

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Australia	8 250	11 510	15 790	11 740	8 960	12 360	27 630	36 250	28 840	27 400	19 220
Austria	11 010	14 420	17 410	17 500	28 060	85 620	39 950	22 470	11 610	11 010	13 420
Belgium	21 760	26 000	18 530	12 500	13 870	38 700	14 670	14 060	18 160	23 140	12 930
Canada	22 540	24 990	20 220	10 360	13 450	16 070	23 830	49 430	55 390	58 340	19 050
Chile	260	310	170	250	280	630	2 300	5 660	5 780	770	1 680
Colombia	160	80	100	230	630	2 710	10 620	11 920
Costa Rica	990	960	1 170	950	1 370	2 180	4 490	6 320	27 980	59 180	21 130
Czech Republic	980	760	750	500	920	1 250	1 210	1 140	1 360	1 580	800
Denmark	4 970	3 810	6 190	7 560	14 820	21 230	6 240	3 140	3 500	2 650	1 440
Estonia	30	70	80	100	150	230	70	180	90	100	50
Finland	4 020	3 090	2 920	3 020	3 520	32 270	5 320	4 350	2 960	2 460	1 460
France	48 070	52 150	55 070	60 230	59 030	74 300	70 750	91 970	111 420	138 290	81 740
Germany	41 330	45 740	64 540	109 580	173 070	441 900	722 360	198 310	161 930	142 510	102 580
Greece	10 270	9 310	9 580	8 220	9 450	11 370	49 850	56 950	64 990	74 920	37 860
Hungary	2 100	1 690	2 160	18 570	41 370	174 430	28 070	3 120	640	470	90
Iceland	50	80	110	170	160	360	1 130	1 070	730	810	630
Ireland	1 940	1 420	1 100	950	1 440	3 280	2 240	2 910	3 660	4 740	1 540
Israel	5 580	6 460	5 700	4 760	5 560	5 010	8 150	15 370	16 260	9 440	5 780
Italy	10 050	34 120	17 350	25 720	63 660	83 240	122 120	126 560	53 440	35 010	21 220
Japan	1 200	1 870	2 550	3 260	5 000	7 580	10 900	19 250	10 490	10 380	3 940
Korea	430	1 010	1 140	1 570	2 900	5 710	7 540	9 940	16 150	15 430	6 670
Latvia	..	340	190	190	360	330	340	360	180	180	150
Lithuania	370	410	530	280	390	290	320	520	390	630	260
Luxembourg	740	2 080	2 000	990	970	2 300	1 940	2 330	2 230	2 200	1 300
Mexico	1 040	750	810	1 300	1 520	3 420	8 780	14 600	29 620	70 370	41 200
Netherlands	13 330	11 590	9 660	14 400	23 850	43 100	18 410	16 090	20 470	22 540	13 720
New Zealand	340	310	320	290	290	350	390	560	460	540	440
Norway	10 060	9 050	9 790	11 470	12 640	30 520	3 200	3 390	2 550	2 210	1 340
Poland	6 530	5 090	9 170	13 760	6 810	10 250	9 840	3 010	2 410	2 770	1 510
Portugal	160	280	300	510	440	900	1 460	1 020	1 240	1 740	900
Russia	2 180	1 270	1 240	1 960	6 670	1 270	26 410	14 090	7 880	8 090	6 980
Slovak Republic	540	490	730	280	230	270	100	160	160	220	270
Slovenia	250	370	310	240	360	260	1 260	1 440	2 800	3 620	3 470
Spain	2 740	3 410	2 580	4 510	5 900	13 370	16 270	30 450	52 750	115 190	86 390
Sweden	31 820	29 650	43 880	54 260	75 090	156 460	22 410	22 230	18 110	23 150	13 630
Switzerland	13 520	19 440	25 950	19 440	22 110	38 120	25 870	16 670	13 540	12 600	9 770
Turkey	9 230	16 020	26 470	44 810	87 820	133 590	77 850	123 600	83 820	56 420	31 330
United Kingdom	22 640	25 900	27 980	29 400	31 260	39 970	38 380	33 380	37 370	44 470	36 030
United States	49 310	70 030	78 410	84 400	121 160	172 740	261 970	331 700	254 300	301 070	250 940
OECD	358 610	435 060	481 710	578 270	838 240	1 663 960	1 637 610	1 270 590	1 120 490	1 289 170	857 800

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the Tables B.3.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/qkm6fp>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Australia

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Malaysia	249	182	173	209	704	2 767	7 258	7 983	9 791	7 065	4 010
China	1 187	1 189	1 155	1 537	1 541	1 456	1 914	6 638	6 586	5 058	2 296
India	409	769	949	1 163	964	652	1 117	1 299	1 813	2 495	1 762
Iran	458	2 152	1 851	967	262	844	2 971	5 075	744	1 069	1 289
Viet Nam	78	130	81	128	264	223	772	1 263	812	959	1 165
Fiji	375	277	236	413	287	250	390	260	638	1 093	649
Thailand	27	17	24	22	16	98	204	301	1 481	919	636
Indonesia	179	174	126	190	152	208	318	510	618	752	605
Sri Lanka	589	370	2 468	806	176	806	2 662	2 184	451	836	534
Pakistan	428	817	1 538	1 104	828	642	1 334	1 404	657	801	495
Tonga	28	35	70	88	64	26	55	222	400
Philippines	74	71	57	63	45	62	93	190	318	671	363
Afghanistan	1 265	1 720	3 064	370	123	567	2 563	1 478	453	697	346
Bangladesh	97	127	162	382	250	217	433	462	252	308	336
Timor-Leste	3	0	2	4	0	0	0	0	318
Other countries	2 800	3 475	3 830	4 295	3 312	3 542	5 548	7 198	4 225	4 454	4 017
Total	8 246	11 505	15 786	11 741	8 988	12 360	27 632	36 245	28 839	27 399	19 221

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/d8pb2x>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Austria

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Syria	194	422	922	1 991	7 661	24 314	8 723	7 255	3 300	2 675	5 080
Afghanistan	1 582	3 609	4 003	2 589	4 916	25 143	11 506	3 525	1 765	2 585	2 825
Morocco	137	313	353	516	220	666	953	205	90	110	705
Iraq	336	484	491	468	1 051	13 285	2 737	1 345	650	605	625
Somalia	190	610	483	433	1 152	2 040	1 500	655	475	600	615
Russia	2 322	2 314	3 098	2 841	1 484	1 340	1 235	1 035	690	550	360
Algeria	304	447	573	949	442	821	867	220	80	120	325
Iran	387	457	761	595	726	3 381	2 415	950	1 050	660	310
Turkey	369	414	273	302	165	190	310	260	175	245	280
Bangladesh	116	87	212	278	88	709	0	125	95	205	215
Egypt	76	124	124	184	83	0	0	130	85	45	165
Pakistan	276	949	1 827	1 037	330	2 892	2 414	1 445	160	255	145
Tunisia	55	182	198	225	128	0	0	70	35	55	145
India	433	476	401	339	266	371	407	310	195	295	140
Nigeria	573	414	400	691	544	1 245	1 659	1 135	395	170	100
Other countries	3 662	3 114	3 294	4 065	8 804	9 223	5 226	3 805	2 370	1 835	1 380
Total	11 012	14 416	17 413	17 503	28 060	85 620	39 952	22 470	11 610	11 010	13 415

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/d8pb2x>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Belgium

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Afghanistan	1 124	2 774	2 349	892	744	7 562	2 227	995	1 045	2 245	2 310
Syria	374	494	798	944	2 524	10 185	2 612	2 625	2 770	2 730	1 320
Eritrea	106	62	65	57	745	333	331	665	725	1 155	805
Somalia	262	454	293	156	260	1 994	727	295	380	765	600
Turkey	275	430	340	204	144	182	652	465	785	1 000	585
El Salvador	0	29	18	22	6	30	76	115	220	1 365	510
Guinea	1 455	2 046	1 370	1 023	657	619	721	750	1 000	830	455
West Bank and Gaza Strip	39	55	26	27	0	51	139	815	2 420	2 320	455
Brazil	3	2	0	3	0	0	6	15	30	30	430
Iraq	1 637	2 005	636	295	965	9 180	759	600	895	845	405
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	813	1 080	1 392	1 166	632	620	503	550	405	520	385
Burundi	149	149	133	133	51	251	271	235	400	620	320
Albania	208	1 152	607	472	487	599	649	670	505	540	270
Cameroon	289	451	457	360	345	278	257	350	355	390	270
Russia	1 886	1 747	1 190	791	536	535	410	390	355	405	220
Other countries	13 135	13 073	8 851	5 955	5 780	6 281	4 330	4 520	5 870	7 380	3 590
Total	21 755	26 003	18 525	12 500	13 876	38 700	14 670	14 055	18 160	23 140	12 930

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/d8pb2x>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Canada

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Mexico	1 299	763	324	84	73	110	259	1 511	3 156	5 061	1 776
India	532	632	765	228	294	374	557	1 484	4 524	5 150	1 564
Haiti	1 062	523	419	329	364	295	616	7 921	1 403	1 374	1 056
Colombia	1 384	904	724	597	579	701	848	1 413	2 571	3 040	974
Iran	327	318	264	201	161	149	286	684	2 483	3 663	689
Pakistan	526	882	808	630	776	897	1 137	1 746	2 031	2 059	684
Nigeria	846	696	700	468	578	793	1 493	5 840	9 599	3 976	646
United States	344	308	386	127	166	184	375	2 553	1 311	1 076	345
Turkey	299	332	369	178	174	263	1 096	2 194	1 820	1 548	312
Venezuela	149	111	106	27	161	257	565	1 245	1 254	1 199	289
China	1 650	1 922	1 741	762	1 189	1 500	1 180	1 078	1 865	1 394	279
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	288	347	357	308	346	281	411	621	1 167	1 312	276
Sri Lanka	1 200	635	414	190	198	237	192	379	524	664	267
Bahamas	15	25	16	10	8	45	97	193	210	283	266
Angola	9	7	45	48	10	13	53	267	511	712	201
Other countries	12 613	16 580	12 785	6 169	8 584	9 971	14 668	20 296	20 956	25 827	9 422
Total	22 543	24 985	20 223	10 356	13 661	16 070	23 833	49 425	55 385	58 338	19 046

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/d8pb2x>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Chile

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Cuba	220	267	1 804	2 516	1 157	252	670
Colombia	14	9	56	1 603	2 764	272	531
Venezuela	0	2	245	1 345	1 666	226	394
Other countries	16	14	67	192	108	10	80
Total	260	305	168	249	282	630	2 299	5 656	5 784	770	1 675

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/d8pb2x>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Colombia

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Venezuela	2 592	10 479	11 832
Cuba	24	57
Ecuador	0	5
Pakistan	0	5
Turkey	0	5
Other countries	118	113	16
Total	161	84	99	229	630	2 710	10 621	11 920

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/d8pb2x>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Costa Rica

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Nicaragua	31 624	9 416
Cuba	1 856	1 644
Venezuela	2 626	742
Colombia	1 137	377
El Salvador	1 149	152
Honduras	436	129
Haiti	92	73
China	153	60
Dominican Republic	67	21
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	34	9
Guatemala	37	8
Chile	11	7
Peru	0	7
Burundi	0	6
Jamaica	5	6
Other countries	19 952	8 470
Total	991	964	1 170	954	1 373	2 181	4 487	6 323	27 975	59 179	21 127

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/d8pb2x>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Czech Republic

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Ukraine	141	152	101	68	416	574	356	295	280	215	240
Georgia	9	17	6	12	0	5	46	110	140	190	85
Belarus	67	71	33	13	0	0	8	15	10	10	60
Moldova	13	8	6	10	7	0	5	15	10	40	45
Viet Nam	49	46	35	37	42	37	53	60	75	120	40
Uzbekistan	16	26	9	6	0	0	17	10	90	65	35
Azerbaijan	5	1	8	2	0	0	49	120	35	35	30
Russia	62	47	29	40	5	12	53	40	70	80	30
Turkey	68	32	10	11	0	0	23	25	35	20	25
Kazakhstan	57	18	18	17	0	5	19	35	30	95	20
Syria	17	23	57	69	102	121	73	70	30	35	20
Armenia	19	11	19	29	0	11	51	115	100	330	10
Cuba	18	20	14	36	15	107	80	55	145	25	10
Iran	8	7	2	6	0	0	1	..	20	35	10
Kyrgyzstan	36	32	13	9	0	0	8	10	15	20	10
Other countries	394	245	393	138	327	378	372	165	275	260	125
Total	979	756	753	503	914	1 250	1 214	1 140	1 360	1 575	795

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/d8pb2x>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Denmark

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Syria	821	428	907	1 702	7 185	8 604	1 251	765	600	490	340
Eritrea	26	20	57	98	2 293	1 738	267	295	675	480	165
Morocco	29	45	108	162	226	183	347	300	175	155	100
Iran	597	461	548	374	285	2 771	299	145	195	135	80
Afghanistan	1 476	903	576	425	321	2 288	1 122	170	115	90	70
Iraq	237	115	133	115	148	1 531	449	130	120	115	55
Algeria	46	103	134	111	120	92	164	80	70	40	45
Somalia	110	107	914	964	688	259	262	85	105	160	40
Georgia	15	19	75	69	104	94	73	70	405	65	35
Turkey	51	25	54	18	5	24	18	35	25	25	35
Russia	340	304	521	983	526	175	81	45	80	60	30
India	48	32	39	30	10	21	27	25	20	40	20
Pakistan	26	57	67	75	59	84	75	20	25	40	20
Ukraine	6	19	15	38	118	92	96	40	45	35	20
Albania	6	4	39	66	47	65	88	70	80	55	15
Other countries	1 131	1 169	1 999	2 327	2 639	3 209	1 616	865	760	660	365
Total	4 965	3 811	6 186	7 557	14 774	21 230	6 235	3 140	3 495	2 645	1 435

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/d8pb2x>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Estonia

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Russia	7	4	8	15	0	6	8	15	10	30	15
Eritrea	0	0	0	0	0	..	0	0	5
Syria	0	0	4	17	0	8	0	80	5	5	5
Tajikistan	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	..	0	0	5
Turkey	1	1	3	1	0	0	5	..	0	20	5
Other countries	13	47	53	59	143	198	41	75	75	40	10
Total	30	67	77	97	143	230	69	180	90	100	45

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/d8pb2x>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Finland

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Iraq	575	588	784	764	807	20 427	1 083	1 000	565	270	475
Afghanistan	265	292	188	172	198	5 198	697	305	135	125	190
Somalia	571	365	173	196	407	1 974	426	100	155	140	180
Russia	436	294	199	219	167	160	174	395	455	285	95
Turkey	117	74	56	55	13	40	98	110	285	360	80
Syria	41	109	180	148	146	876	600	740	105	95	55
Nigeria	84	105	93	202	157	153	162	95	90	105	35
Cameroon	21	21	22	37	29	28	86	45	55	60	25
Iran	142	125	121	147	84	601	141	90	230	95	25
Ukraine	10	9	16	5	298	58	56	40	40	20	20
Eritrea	14	7	5	2	0	104	279	435	15	5	15
Gambia	33	21	29	64	39	21	64	35	30	25	15
Pakistan	5	23	20	32	26	42	93	30	25	15	15
Yemen	3	1	0	4	0	51	64	60	50	70	15
Colombia	0	3	1	10	0	0	2	5	0	25	10
Other countries	1 701	1 049	1 035	966	1 146	2 537	1 294	865	720	760	205
Total	4 018	3 086	2 922	3 023	3 517	32 270	5 319	4 350	2 955	2 455	1 455

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/d8pb2x>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – France

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Afghanistan	772	653	522	526	605	2 453	5 466	6 600	10 255	11 685	10 000
Guinea	2 034	2 033	1 884	2 445	2 166	2 131	2 387	4 130	6 685	7 045	4 690
Côte d'Ivoire	536	1 671	986	968	949	1 278	1 504	3 620	5 295	6 725	4 635
Bangladesh	3 145	3 572	1 093	3 069	2 646	3 358	2 198	2 620	3 920	6 705	4 615
Pakistan	893	1 433	1 941	1 735	2 130	1 810	1 691	1 500	2 100	4 610	3 555
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	3 426	3 845	5 321	5 263	5 170	3 984	3 063	3 805	3 965	4 545	3 120
Nigeria	744	802	967	1 306	1 375	1 586	1 612	2 030	2 985	5 720	3 100
Turkey	1 415	1 737	2 054	1 682	1 391	1 030	907	1 290	2 050	4 110	3 095
Haiti	2 008	2 016	1 602	1 473	1 854	3 198	4 936	5 600	2 305	4 720	2 830
Somalia	420	762	511	479	787	1 350	829	905	2 270	3 160	2 390
Algeria	1 171	1 132	1 162	1 479	1 601	2 323	2 290	2 995	3 100	3 075	2 180
Ukraine	84	91	129	122	1 386	1 623	486	530	735	1 175	2 110
Moldova	181	237	122	54	8	33	26	15	310	2 040	2 105
Albania	479	477	2 647	5 016	2 843	3 228	5 769	11 425	8 300	8 510	2 010
Comoros	753	1 381	662	528	642	383	229	355	380	1 585	1 830
Other countries	30 013	30 305	33 465	34 089	33 488	44 532	37 355	44 545	56 760	62 880	29 470
Total	48 074	52 147	55 068	60 234	59 041	74 300	70 748	91 965	111 415	138 290	81 735

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/d8pb2x>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Germany

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Syria	1 490	2 634	6 201	11 851	39 332	158 657	266 248	48 970	44 165	39 270	36 435
Afghanistan	5 905	7 767	7 498	7 735	9 115	31 382	127 011	16 425	9 945	9 520	9 900
Iraq	5 555	5 831	5 352	3 958	5 345	29 784	96 115	21 930	16 330	13 740	9 845
Turkey	1 340	1 578	1 457	1 521	1 565	1 500	5 383	8 025	10 160	10 785	5 780
Nigeria	716	759	892	1 923	3 924	5 207	12 709	7 810	10 170	9 070	3 305
Iran	2 475	3 352	4 348	4 424	3 194	5 394	26 426	8 610	10 855	8 405	3 120
Somalia	2 235	984	1 243	3 786	5 528	5 126	9 851	6 835	5 075	3 570	2 605
Eritrea	642	632	650	3 616	13 198	10 876	18 854	10 225	5 570	3 520	2 560
Georgia	664	471	1 298	2 336	2 873	2 782	3 448	3 080	3 765	3 330	2 050
Russia	1 199	1 689	3 202	14 887	4 411	5 257	10 985	4 885	3 940	3 145	1 700
Moldova	41	21	30	68	255	1 561	3 346	890	1 780	1 770	1 285
Guinea	229	281	428	1 260	1 148	662	3 458	3 955	2 870	2 420	1 270
Algeria	439	487	489	1 056	2 176	2 041	3 563	1 950	1 200	1 060	1 205
Viet Nam	1 009	758	660	613	545	659	528	530	615	825	1 110
Pakistan	840	2 539	3 412	4 101	3 968	8 199	14 484	3 670	2 210	2 175	1 015
Other countries	16 553	15 958	27 379	46 445	76 495	172 813	119 955	50 520	33 280	29 905	19 395
Total	41 332	45 741	64 539	109 580	173 072	441 900	722 364	198 310	161 930	142 510	102 580

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/d8pb2x>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Greece

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Afghanistan	524	637	584	1 223	1 711	1 544	4 293	7 480	11 820	23 665	11 100
Syria	167	352	275	485	791	3 319	26 614	16 305	13 145	10 750	7 415
Pakistan	2 748	2 309	2 339	1 358	1 623	1 503	4 417	8 345	7 185	6 420	3 515
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	16	12	20	153	75	112	224	1 085	1 450	3 570	1 850
Bangladesh	987	615	1 007	727	635	536	1 053	1 255	1 435	2 375	1 625
Turkey	71	34	32	30	26	20	182	1 820	4 820	3 795	1 590
Somalia	141	68	60	122	109	90	123	230	715	2 270	1 530
Iraq	342	257	315	145	175	579	4 773	7 870	9 640	5 590	1 465
West Bank and Gaza Strip	150	27	28	41	61	48	848	1 305	1 515	2 140	1 260
Albania	693	276	384	579	570	913	1 295	2 345	3 125	2 795	1 025
Iran	125	247	211	188	358	187	1 084	1 295	1 730	2 325	835
Georgia	1 162	1 121	893	532	350	297	583	985	1 340	1 460	750
Egypt	104	306	249	308	280	233	259	810	915	1 695	710
Cameroon	20	39	24	84	281	155	211	455	1 035	855	395
India	381	179	165	81	30	24	64	170	210	370	255
Other countries	2 642	2 832	2 991	2 168	2 357	1 810	3 824	5 195	4 905	4 840	2 540
Total	10 273	9 311	9 577	8 224	9 432	11 370	49 847	56 950	64 985	74 915	37 860

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

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Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Hungary

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Pakistan	41	121	327	3 052	296	15 011	3 652	100	20	25	25
Afghanistan	702	649	880	2 279	8 539	45 560	10 774	1 365	270	185	15
Syria	23	91	145	960	6 749	64 081	4 735	565	50	20	10
Bangladesh	4	3	15	678	222	4 000	256	10	0	0	5
Iran	62	33	45	59	247	1 780	1 248	95	30	20	5
Iraq	48	54	28	56	468	9 173	3 357	795	215	155	5
Russia	23	12	4	11	0	8	5	..	0	0	5
Other countries	1 151	660	649	10 325	24 517	34 037	3 381	165	50	65	20
Total	2 104	1 693	2 157	18 565	41 111	174 430	28 070	3 120	635	470	90

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/d8pb2x>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Iceland

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
West Bank and Gaza Strip	0	2	2	0	0	0	15	15	25	20	120
Iraq	5	5	3	6	5	19	73	110	110	135	110
Venezuela	0	0	0	0	0	..	15	180	105
Syria	2	1	3	5	5	13	37	30	40	20	60
Somalia	5	2	1	1	0	0	21	30	50	35	40
Nigeria	2	7	17	2	0	0	21	10	35	50	35
Afghanistan	7	3	9	4	0	14	23	15	45	45	30
Iran	6	3	12	1	0	0	20	25	30	35	15
Albania	0	2	11	22	10	103	231	255	90	45	10
Libya	0	0	2	2	0	0	1	5	5	0	10
Azerbaijan	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	5	0	5	5
Bangladesh	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	5	5	0	5
Colombia	0	2	1	0	5	0	2	..	5	10	5
Georgia	1	4	8	3	5	0	42	290	30	20	5
Honduras	0	3	0	0	1	..	0	5	5
Other countries	23	44	44	123	140	211	641	270	245	200	65
Total	51	76	113	172	170	360	1 132	1 065	730	805	625

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/d8pb2x>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Ireland

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Nigeria	387	205	181	129	139	186	176	185	250	385	210
Somalia	38	24	8	10	5	0	29	20	55	135	165
Pakistan	200	197	123	91	291	1 353	233	195	240	205	85
South Africa	53	47	35	28	33	39	94	105	200	315	80
Zimbabwe	48	69	50	70	74	88	192	260	280	445	80
Afghanistan	69	74	50	32	7	119	121	75	95	105	70
Algeria	32	53	39	51	73	77	63	80	95	95	70
Brazil	3	8	12	5	0	0	32	35	110	115	70
Malawi	15	26	24	55	36	93	50	50	80	80	45
Syria	2	11	16	38	5	68	244	545	330	85	45
Albania	13	35	46	48	91	214	221	280	460	970	40
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	71	76	62	72	61	44	66	95	100	75	35
Georgia	53	18	20	15	0	9	75	300	450	635	35
Bangladesh	51	22	32	31	93	285	55	60	55	60	30
Morocco	10	3	4	3	0	0	12	15	15	25	30
Other countries	894	551	402	268	540	705	574	610	840	1 010	445
Total	1 939	1 419	1 104	946	1 448	3 280	2 237	2 910	3 655	4 740	1 535

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/d8pb2x>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Italy

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Pakistan	929	2 058	2 601	3 175	7 095	10 287	13 516	9 470	7 445	7 305	4 930
Bangladesh	222	1 595	566	460	4 524	6 017	6 611	12 125	4 165	1 340	2 275
El Salvador	44	9	35	44	101	209	1 060	1 365	2 270	2 520	1 050
Tunisia	139	4 558	893	502	465	295	332	445	1 005	705	1 000
Nigeria	1 385	6 208	1 613	3 170	9 689	17 779	26 698	24 950	5 510	1 255	855
Venezuela	0	4	10	13	0	19	142	520	1 260	1 545	830
Somalia	84	1 205	807	2 761	807	719	2 405	2 010	605	405	750
Peru	4	2	19	13	5	16	41	120	750	2 445	735
Afghanistan	873	1 289	1 495	2 049	3 104	3 986	2 843	1 010	495	590	640
Colombia	66	30	44	52	60	26	89	210	580	875	540
Côte d'Ivoire	235	1 938	629	237	1 481	3 084	7 464	8 380	1 685	405	500
Georgia	80	29	65	107	79	135	194	540	1 155	970	490
Morocco	81	265	282	307	312	576	1 554	1 860	1 875	1 510	475
Iraq	380	309	403	552	781	505	1 530	1 650	1 170	940	450
Albania	35	39	66	114	175	420	364	465	1 290	1 545	445
Other countries	5 495	14 579	7 824	12 164	34 979	39 167	57 281	61 440	22 180	10 650	5 255
Total	10 052	34 117	17 352	25 720	63 657	83 240	122 124	126 560	53 440	35 005	21 220

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/d8pb2x>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Japan

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Sri Lanka	171	224	255	346	485	468	939	2 226	1 551	1 530	..
Turquie	126	234	422	655	845	925	1 143	1 198	563	1 331	..
Cambodge	0	0	0	61	318	772	961	1 321	..
Népal	109	251	320	544	1 293	1 768	1 451	1 451	1 713	1 256	..
Pakistan	83	169	298	241	212	296	289	469	720	971	..
Myanmar	342	491	368	380	434	808	651	962	656	788	..
Inde	91	51	125	163	225	228	470	603	549	730	..
Bangladesh	33	98	169	190	284	244	241	438	542	662	..
Cameroun	20	48	58	99	56	51	66	98	203	234	..
Sénégal	2	4	2	7	7	0	45	223	..
Ouganda	21	30	24	31	11	20	39	193	..
Chine	17	20	32	35	43	159	156	315	308	134	..
Nigéria	33	51	112	68	79	148	108	120	..
Philippines	9	15	18	57	73	295	1 412	4 897	860	108	..
Tunisie	1	5	15	21	5	11	63	86	..
Autres pays	145	176	327	423	948	2 098	3 510	5 821	1 867	688	..
Total	1 203	1 867	2 545	3 260	5 000	7 580	10 901	19 250	10 493	10 375	3 936

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/d8pb2x>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Korea

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Russia	0	4	1	2	0	16	324	692	1 916	2 829	1 064
Egypt	0	4	6	97	568	812	1 002	741	870	114	718
Kazakhstan	2	0	0	0	0	39	539	1 223	2 496	2 236	603
Malaysia	0	0	0	0	6	448	1 236	1 438	452
Bangladesh	41	38	32	45	52	388	335	383	608	491	435
India	6	15	7	2	34	292	218	691	1 120	959	420
China	7	8	3	46	359	401	1 062	1 413	1 199	2 000	311
Pakistan	129	434	244	275	396	1 143	809	667	1 120	790	303
Nepal	5	14	43	90	79	230	217	149	175	291	260
Morocco	1	0	1	4	37	86	127	152	305	365	173
Turkey	0	3	0	0	11	..	158	320	171
Uzbekistan	6	2	3	1	0	71	145	..	146	235	168
Philippines	3	1	4	2	0	128	260	246	507	229	154
Nigeria	19	39	102	206	203	265	324	486	390	270	147
Thailand	0	1	0	0	0	96	139	296	341	284	117
Other countries	206	451	697	801	1 168	1 743	2 024	2 355	3 560	2 582	1 170
Total	425	1 011	1 143	1 574	2 896	5 710	7 542	9 942	16 147	15 433	6 666

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/d8pb2x>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Latvia

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Belarus	0	2	0	0	4	5	0	5	45
Afghanistan	4	0	5	33	35	15	5	5	10
Azerbaijan	2	0	0	5	4	5	15	35	10
Russia	8	5	0	0	27	25	50	25	10
Syria	18	15	24	5	149	140	5	5	10
Bangladesh	0	0	0	0	3	5	5	5	5
China	0	0	0	0	1	..	0	5	5
Colombia	0	0	0	0	0	..	0	0	5
Georgia	106	144	163	25	4	10	10	10	5
India	0	0	0	0	20	5	5	15	5
Iran	6	1	0	0	1	..	0	5	5
Iraq	0	2	15	85	6	5	20	5	5
Pakistan	2	0	0	5	17	..	5	5	5
Turkey	2	1	0	0	4	10	10	5	5
Uzbekistan	0	3	0	0	2	5	0	5	5
Other countries	41	12	157	172	67	125	45	45	10
Total	..	335	189	185	364	330	344	355	175	180	145

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/d8pb2x>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Lithuania

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Belarus	9	12	12	35	15	15	80
Russia	41	58	59	80	50	275	65
Tajikistan	5	4	18	50	120	205	40
Iraq	2	1	18	..	35	10	15
Turkey	0	2	6	20	20	15	15
Afghanistan	26	45	32	15	20	10	10
Armenia	22	28	13	25	10	5	5
China	0	1	0	..	0	0	5
Sri Lanka	0	0	1	20	15	0	5
Syria	0	1	82	170	15	15	5
United States	0	..	0	0	5
Uzbekistan	2	7	1	..	0	5	5
Albania	1	0	0	..	0	0	0
Algeria	0	0	0	..	0	0	0
Andorra	0	..	0	0	0
Other countries	265	247	75	105	85	70	5
Total	373	406	526	275	406	290	317	520	385	625	260

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/d8pb2x>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Luxembourg

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Syria	19	10	14	24	78	635	289	405	280	375	360
Eritrea	11	14	7	5	15	23	105	230	410	565	255
Afghanistan	15	22	11	17	0	211	56	40	180	170	100
Iraq	95	41	31	27	0	527	161	140	185	130	65
Iran	23	22	30	22	0	55	50	20	50	55	55
Turkey	18	21	10	3	0	8	15	10	45	60	45
Venezuela	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	..	10	65	45
Algeria	43	30	33	38	26	6	75	160	75	75	35
Guinea	3	3	10	5	0	0	18	35	50	40	25
Morocco	4	4	8	25	0	6	74	205	90	45	25
Albania	18	24	302	70	80	122	212	130	40	55	20
Cameroon	5	5	6	4	0	0	18	15	15	25	20
Somalia	29	12	13	7	0	0	21	20	30	45	20
Tunisia	3	42	46	52	18	0	38	100	90	30	20
Georgia	7	16	6	16	0	12	63	135	135	35	15
Other countries	450	1 810	1 476	674	756	695	742	680	540	430	190
Total	744	2 076	2 003	989	973	2 300	1 938	2 325	2 225	2 200	1 295

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/d8pb2x>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Mexico

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Honduras	135	168	4 119	4 272	13 631	30 093	15 469
Haiti	39	38	47	436	..	5 536	5 964
Cuba	42	48	43	796	212	8 683	5 758
El Salvador	159	181	3 488	3 708	6 186	8 999	4 053
Venezuela	6	2	361	4 042	6 344	7 665	3 292
Guatemala	59	69	437	676	1 383	3 778	3 005
Chile	1	1	0	418	808
Nicaragua	15	6	70	62	1 246	2 232	802
Colombia	82	43	44	96	204	558	501
Brazil	5	1	3	552	372
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	6	9	5	221	128
Ghana	9	14	16	86	105
Ecuador	4	6	20	78	85
Panama	1	0	1	12	66
Angola	..	0	0	184	58
Other countries	476	167	127	508	417	1 271	738
Total	1 039	753	811	1 296	1 524	3 420	8 781	14 596	29 623	70 366	41 204

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/d8pb2x>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Netherlands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Syria	125	168	454	2 673	8 748	18 675	2 226	2 965	2 960	3 675	4 070
Algeria	21	13	28	29	0	29	992	890	1 270	1 210	995
Turkey	92	96	89	59	35	33	298	480	1 300	1 250	990
Morocco	26	22	24	69	42	76	1 274	980	1 065	1 060	775
Nigeria	168	129	106	136	223	216	201	245	560	2 105	635
Yemen	11	12	26	39	18	33	45	170	530	645	410
Afghanistan	1 364	1 885	1 022	673	452	2 550	1 045	320	325	435	390
Eritrea	392	458	424	978	3 833	7 344	1 523	1 590	1 410	500	370
Iran	785	929	834	728	505	1 890	890	720	1 870	1 535	370
Iraq	1 383	1 435	1 391	1 094	616	3 009	952	845	745	620	335
Pakistan	60	94	150	150	181	157	162	180	310	395	265
Tunisia	8	22	16	20	0	5	205	170	385	295	240
Gambia	16	24	25	27	5	37	131	215	350	540	205
Somalia	3 372	1 415	877	3 078	349	257	157	125	135	220	200
Libya	165	136	96	147	94	58	341	355	460	305	190
Other countries	5 345	4 752	4 102	4 499	8 749	8 731	7 972	5 840	6 790	7 750	3 280
Total	13 333	11 590	9 664	14 399	23 850	43 100	18 414	16 090	20 465	22 540	13 720

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/d8pb2x>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – New Zealand

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Indonesia	3	1	2	8	0	0	5	0	0	5	111
China	22	20	33	21	6	7	64	76	103	91	60
India	1	1	9	2	0	0	31	43	49	66	43
Malaysia	2	1	4	1	0	0	12	10	18	36	38
Sri Lanka	28	19	25	41	6	7	11	30	42	50	25
Fiji	66	29	21	37	10	22	12	10	0	12	18
Iran	43	29	39	22	0	0	15	19	20	32	14
Afghanistan	5	11	9	7	0	0	6	27	5	32	13
Colombia	2	4	1	1	0	0	8	5	10	14	12
Philippines	1	1	2	2	0	0	3	10	5	11	11
Russia	2	1	1	0	0	0	5	22	5	11	11
South Africa	20	14	0	9	0	11	15	5	5	14	8
Turkey	4	4	9	12	0	0	20	34	10	13	8
Bangladesh	6	8	8	6	0	0	11	27	12	21	7
Brazil	3	0	0	1	0	0	6	0	5	5	6
Other countries	132	162	161	121	266	303	163	242	166	125	50
Total	340	305	324	291	288	350	387	560	455	538	435

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/d8pb2x>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Norway

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Syria	119	198	312	868	1 978	10 520	510	1 000	415	535	540
Eritrea	1 711	1 256	1 600	3 766	2 805	2 785	353	840	220	180	150
Turkey	74	42	38	62	34	78	89	160	770	360	85
Afghanistan	979	979	987	720	549	6 916	373	135	90	95	55
Iran	429	355	435	274	84	1 308	132	85	110	70	45
Iraq	460	357	229	179	165	2 939	214	140	95	50	35
Colombia	5	5	0	6	0	0	8	15	10	35	25
Russia	628	365	294	339	172	105	76	45	50	80	25
Ethiopia	505	293	221	356	365	662	157	85	40	40	20
Somalia	1 397	2 216	2 803	2 530	756	501	154	45	45	30	20
Albania	24	43	167	179	202	431	130	85	65	60	15
China	192	101	85	98	12	53	23	25	15	15	15
Morocco	95	87	136	110	132	137	87	45	20	20	15
Pakistan	99	92	147	142	96	429	34	20	40	20	15
Venezuela	1	0	0	0	0	0	8	10	20	20	15
Other countries	3 346	2 664	2 331	1 838	5 290	3 656	854	650	545	595	265
Total	10 064	9 053	9 785	11 467	12 640	30 520	3 202	3 385	2 550	2 205	1 340

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/d8pb2x>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Poland

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Russia	4 795	3 034	4 940	11 933	2 079	6 985	7 488	2 120	1 600	1 770	495
Belarus	46	64	61	23	0	0	35	30	25	30	385
Afghanistan	25	35	88	43	14	5	19	25	40	55	120
Ukraine	45	43	58	32	2 147	1 573	589	300	225	215	95
Turkey	19	11	8	12	0	10	65	45	55	115	70
Tajikistan	0	0	9	5	107	526	835	85	35	80	45
Iraq	27	25	25	24	19	33	41	40	65	30	40
Syria	8	11	107	255	98	278	42	40	25	25	35
Georgia	1 082	1 427	2 960	1 057	561	232	56	20	20	50	20
Venezuela	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	..	0	0	15
Egypt	11	5	102	33	0	0	11	15	20	15	10
Iran	7	10	15	9	0	0	15	10	30	35	10
Pakistan	27	8	34	24	22	0	20	20	25	15	10
Sri Lanka	6	3	2	1	0	0	1	..	5	0	10
Yemen	0	0	0	0	0	6	2	..	10	5	10
Other countries	436	410	758	307	1 763	602	621	255	225	325	140
Total	6 534	5 086	9 167	13 758	6 810	10 250	9 840	3 005	2 405	2 765	1 510

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/d8pb2x>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Portugal

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Gambia	2	2	1	6	0	0	22	20	20	175	150
Angola	12	5	4	2	5	7	30	120	225	305	115
Guinea-Bissau	10	11	19	17	0	0	5	10	50	155	90
Morocco	0	5	4	15	6	6	4	10	30	35	85
Guinea	43	46	64	81	0	25	52	45	70	120	80
Senegal	2	5	7	36	0	0	26	25	20	70	80
Nigeria	7	22	27	37	0	0	4	10	20	60	35
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	9	13	18	13	0	5	42	160	130	85	25
Cameroon	1	5	4	2	0	0	10	30	25	45	15
Ghana	2	1	2	0	0	0	3	10	10	20	15
Mali	0	0	2	26	7	73	24	15	10	25	15
Sierra Leone	7	7	4	5	0	0	24	35	15	45	15
Venezuela	0	0	0	0	0	0	16	35	40	95	15
Afghanistan	2	4	5	2	0	0	18	30	5	20	10
Bangladesh	0	2	2	5	0	0	7	..	5	5	10
Other countries	63	147	136	260	424	784	1 176	460	565	475	145
Total	160	275	299	507	442	900	1 463	1 015	1 240	1 735	900

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/d8pb2x>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Russia

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Ukraine	17	11	11	13	23 534	11 914	5 822	6 056	4 726
China	4	5	8	2	0	5	901
Afghanistan	884	540	493	382	788	147	149	1 008	572
Syria	3	31	197	1 073	1 265	191	306	334	218
Yemen	0	9	0	0	58	88	62
Uzbekistan	96	70	69	54	103	71	54
Belgium	0	45	39
Tajikistan	20	19	17	14	38	73	39
Georgia	641	314	238	137	101	29	36
Kazakhstan	12	10	13	6	11	31	26
Turkmenistan	6	2	13	2	20	24	24
Armenia	2	6	3	5	5	15	22
Azerbaijan	16	8	2	6	26	34	22
Kyrgyzstan	246	39	29	16	21	39	19
Sudan	3	2	6	20	15	10	16
Other countries	231	199	144	232	424	1 834	1 598	232	205
Total	2 181	1 265	1 243	1 962	6 980	1 267	26 409	14 086	7 875	8 094	6 981

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/d8pb2x>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Slovak Republic

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Afghanistan	76	75	63	84	67	23	8	25	30	85	50
Morocco	1	0	6	0	0	0	1	5	0	5	40
Syria	4	10	4	13	27	0	10	10	10	5	35
Algeria	9	8	13	1	0	0	6	5	0	5	20
Turkey	9	12	11	3	0	0	0	5	5	5	20
Bangladesh	6	8	3	1	5	0	1	5	0	15	15
Iran	12	13	0	3	0	0	4	5	15	45	15
Libya	0	1	1	3	0	0	7	5	0	0	15
India	44	24	1	0	0	0	5	..	0	5	10
Sri Lanka	6	1	0	0	0	0	1	5	0	0	10
Tunisia	1	1	3	0	0	0	0	..	0	0	10
China	31	13	3	5	0	0	0	5	5	0	5
Egypt	2	2	2	1	0	0	1	..	0	0	5
Pakistan	34	15	5	8	0	0	13	10	10	5	5
Viet Nam	32	22	2	0	15	0	0	20	10	0	5
Other countries	274	286	615	159	114	247	43	50	70	40	5
Total	541	491	732	281	228	270	100	155	155	215	265

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/d8pb2x>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Slovenia

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Morocco	4	9	7	9	0	0	38	40	170	720	1 215
Afghanistan	31	69	50	14	58	31	409	575	455	415	740
Pakistan	0	29	6	19	20	17	104	140	775	520	490
Algeria	6	11	23	14	0	0	41	190	470	1 010	275
Bangladesh	0	0	0	3	0	0	2	5	60	175	150
Egypt	0	6	1	1	5	0	1	10	15	40	145
Iraq	10	8	1	0	0	32	108	20	95	85	85
Syria	4	11	32	56	77	8	273	90	155	60	55
Turkey	32	51	26	11	5	0	60	100	65	65	55
Iran	11	11	2	6	6	5	73	50	160	120	50
Tunisia	3	25	8	3	0	0	11	15	40	130	30
Eritrea	4	1	4	2	0	0	26	40	60	5	20
India	0	3	0	0	0	0	7	5	35	25	20
Libya	0	6	3	1	0	0	17	30	25	55	15
Sri Lanka	0	0	0	2	0	0	3	5	5	15	15
Other countries	141	133	142	102	190	167	90	125	215	175	105
Total	246	373	305	243	361	260	1 263	1 440	2 800	3 615	3 465

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/d8pb2x>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Spain

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Venezuela	19	52	28	35	122	515	4 099	10 325	19 070	40 305	28 065
Colombia	123	104	60	62	91	87	641	2 410	8 465	28 880	27 180
Honduras	42	45	41	38	39	111	397	960	2 400	6 730	5 465
Peru	4	1	5	7	0	0	32	200	525	3 965	5 145
Nicaragua	6	11	6	13	0	0	20	30	1 360	5 840	3 680
El Salvador	35	21	36	23	48	90	439	1 100	2 240	4 715	2 475
Cuba	406	440	64	58	0	21	64	125	355	1 295	1 485
Mali	14	41	101	1 478	619	176	229	265	650	1 190	1 440
Ukraine	4	12	21	14	937	2 570	2 422	2 185	1 880	2 240	1 010
Morocco	114	37	47	46	91	397	343	510	1 280	2 470	945
Brazil	5	9	4	3	0	0	24	55	145	985	790
Pakistan	63	78	88	102	137	62	181	185	360	495	700
Senegal	22	21	26	45	14	10	47	190	435	720	665
Algeria	176	122	202	351	302	650	752	1 140	1 215	1 275	650
Georgia	48	12	9	9	5	16	76	195	910	1 625	500
Other countries	1 663	2 408	1 841	2 229	3 542	8 665	6 508	10 570	11 455	12 460	6 190
Total	2 744	3 414	2 579	4 513	5 947	13 370	16 274	30 445	52 745	115 190	86 385

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/d8pb2x>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Sweden

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Syria	421	640	7 814	16 317	30 313	50 909	4 731	5 250	2 615	5 015	1 760
Eritrea	1 443	1 647	2 356	4 844	11 057	6 513	744	1 540	750	1 155	1 205
Afghanistan	2 393	4 122	4 755	3 011	2 882	41 281	2 144	1 245	615	745	850
Iraq	1 977	1 633	1 322	1 476	1 743	20 259	2 046	1 475	1 065	940	765
Uzbekistan	272	377	366	349	279	282	221	280	665	965	720
Somalia	5 553	3 981	5 644	3 901	3 783	4 695	1 279	550	430	730	615
Iran	1 182	1 120	1 529	1 172	799	4 281	935	905	1 095	985	580
Ukraine	118	194	133	173	1 278	1 327	543	460	500	835	515
Turkey	240	139	149	187	152	222	690	825	440	635	395
Mongolia	727	773	463	487	546	972	348	335	310	310	380
Georgia	291	280	748	625	735	782	638	1 005	1 040	905	355
Ethiopia	194	269	339	383	467	1 602	376	295	280	265	345
West Bank and Gaza Strip	0	0	0	0	22	407	165	270	340	595	290
Yemen	188	173	295	214	187	413	143	125	295	320	220
Nigeria	321	340	501	601	438	409	303	320	320	300	205
Other countries	16 503	13 960	17 462	20 519	20 415	22 106	7 105	7 345	7 350	8 450	4 430
Total	31 823	29 648	43 876	54 259	75 096	156 460	22 411	22 225	18 110	23 150	13 630

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/d8pb2x>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Switzerland

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Eritrea	1 708	3 225	4 295	2 490	6 820	9 859	5 040	3 155	2 495	2 500	1 635
Afghanistan	632	1 006	1 349	863	727	7 800	3 183	1 180	1 125	1 350	1 630
Turkey	462	508	515	373	264	387	475	770	925	1 225	1 130
Algeria	313	464	681	714	337	284	521	515	710	780	935
Syria	387	688	1 146	1 852	3 768	4 649	2 040	1 810	1 195	945	755
Morocco	113	429	860	974	666	372	793	420	440	320	370
Sri Lanka	892	433	443	455	906	1 777	1 317	730	500	475	340
Iraq	501	378	382	351	279	2 286	1 251	545	520	490	270
Somalia	302	558	762	552	769	1 214	1 530	795	510	360	260
Iran	276	326	315	178	117	570	529	280	455	490	255
Georgia	531	281	614	565	402	365	396	615	805	530	205
Nigeria	1 597	1 303	2 353	1 574	848	906	1 065	665	485	325	145
Tunisia	291	2 324	1 993	1 565	664	283	213	180	245	125	135
Libya	31	243	183	140	161	122	199	140	155	115	130
China	333	688	801	671	376	578	333	255	260	225	125
Other countries	5 152	6 585	9 256	6 123	5 009	6 668	6 987	4 615	2 710	2 345	1 445
Total	13 521	19 439	25 948	19 440	22 113	38 120	25 872	16 670	13 535	12 600	9 765

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/d8pb2x>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – Turkey

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Afghanistan	1 248	2 486	14 146	8 726	15 652	63 292	34 669	66 459	53 029	35 042	22 606
Iraq	3 656	7 912	6 942	25 280	50 510	56 332	28 479	43 711	19 959	15 532	5 875
Iran	2 881	3 411	3 589	5 897	8 202	11 023	11 856	8 828	6 387	3 558	1 425
Other countries	1 305	1 968	1 632	4 334	12 864	2 884	2 665	3 903	4 201	2 285	1 428
Total	9 226	16 021	26 470	44 807	87 820	133 590	77 851	123 597	83 818	56 417	31 334

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/d8pb2x>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – United Kingdom

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Iran	2 225	3 047	3 155	2 967	2 499	3 716	4 780	3 050	3 955	5 464	4 199
Iraq	495	367	411	450	911	2 648	3 644	3 260	3 595	3 901	3 281
Albania	220	427	987	1 641	1 972	1 998	1 756	1 690	2 370	3 970	3 071
Eritrea	770	836	764	1 431	3 291	3 756	1 278	1 125	2 195	1 927	2 604
Sudan	645	791	732	834	1 615	3 018	1 462	1 830	1 770	1 784	2 153
Syria	160	499	1 289	2 020	2 353	2 794	1 587	795	915	1 374	1 746
Afghanistan	1 845	1 528	1 234	1 456	1 753	2 852	3 099	1 915	2 095	2 135	1 546
Pakistan	2 150	3 947	4 783	4 576	3 976	3 365	3 701	3 125	2 575	2 566	1 525
India	610	611	1 180	1 111	922	1 324	2 008	1 770	1 615	1 910	1 046
El Salvador	0	1	8	20	12	11	89	75	205	1 186	1 043
Nigeria	1 150	1 058	1 428	1 450	1 519	1 590	1 827	1 580	1 350	1 430	1 015
Viet Nam	465	329	412	466	400	620	774	1 085	1 230	1 584	982
Bangladesh	500	666	1 155	1 246	919	1 320	2 226	1 980	1 440	1 364	876
China	1 375	921	859	1 086	1 117	770	906	1 000	1 175	1 483	829
Turkey	175	178	196	267	296	254	424	505	780	1 266	794
Other countries	9 859	10 692	9 385	8 374	8 789	9 934	8 819	8 595	10 100	11 123	9 317
Total	22 644	25 898	27 978	29 395	32 344	39 970	38 380	33 380	37 365	44 467	36 027

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/d8pb2x>

Table B.3. New asylum requests by nationality – United States

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Guatemala	2 171	3 671	4 152	4 865	9 098	16 419	25 723	35 318	33 073	51 502	36 490
Honduras	1 030	1 559	2 115	3 165	6 798	14 255	19 470	28 806	24 435	39 466	30 815
Venezuela	584	764	716	882	3 113	7 354	18 312	29 926	27 483	25 664	23 530
El Salvador	2 685	4 324	4 587	5 692	10 093	18 883	33 620	49 459	33 391	33 619	23 352
Mexico	3 879	8 304	11 067	10 077	13 987	19 294	27 879	26 065	20 026	22 525	15 402
China	12 510	15 649	15 884	12 295	13 716	15 083	19 868	17 374	9 426	10 267	10 144
Cuba	287	242	195	185	155	112	147	730	1 512	9 155	9 497
Haiti	1 223	1 377	1 612	1 879	2 196	2 220	3 969	8 643	4 112	3 945	7 116
India	755	2 477	1 998	1 633	3 395	3 650	6 162	7 435	9 440	10 607	5 599
Brazil	223	340	444	311	492	983	1 454	2 625	2 282	2 798	4 593
Colombia	623	642	574	631	817	1 058	1 767	3 204	2 678	3 334	3 852
Nicaragua	241	312	280	259	349	387	518	857	1 527	5 474	3 736
Ecuador	404	807	1 394	1 848	3 545	3 732	4 423	3 884	2 386	2 748	3 378
Russia	828	888	881	950	1 103	1 699	2 158	2 936	1 900	2 595	2 775
Nigeria	204	260	337	289	548	770	1 308	3 052	3 464	2 764	2 437
Other countries	15 324	18 971	19 865	23 282	51 755	66 841	95 192	111 386	77 165	74 602	68 224
Total	42 971	60 587	66 101	68 243	121 160	172 740	261 970	331 700	254 300	301 065	250 940

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/d8pb2x>

Metadata related to Tables A.3. and B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers

Totals in Table A.3 might differ from the tables by nationality (Tables B.3) because the former totals get revised retroactively while the origin breakdown does not. Data for Table A.3 generally refer to first instance/new applications only and exclude repeat/review/appeal applications while data by origin (Tables B.3) may include some repeat/review/appeal applications. Data by country of origin since 2014 may be slightly underestimated as they are the sum of monthly data where only cells with 5 people and above were filled.

Comments on countries of asylum:

- France: Data include unaccompanied minors.
- Germany: Germany has a pre-registration system (EASY system). Asylum requests officially registered and presented in this section are lower than the pre-registrations in the EASY system (1.1 million in 2015).
- EU countries and United Kingdom: Figures are rounded to the nearest multiple of 5.
- United States: In Table B.3, data are a combination of the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS – number of cases) affirmative asylum applications, and of the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR – number of persons) defensive asylum applications, if the person is under threat of removal. Factors have been applied to totals since 2010 in both Table A.3. and Table B.3 to reflect the estimated number of cases.

Comments on countries of origin:

Serbia (and Kosovo): Data may include asylum seekers from Serbia, Montenegro, Serbia and Montenegro, and/or Former Yugoslavia.

Source for all countries: European countries: Eurostat; other countries: governments, compiled by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Population Data Unit (<http://popstas.unhcr.org/en/overview>).

Stocks of foreign and foreign-born populations

Who is an immigrant?

There are major differences in how immigrants are defined across OECD countries. Some countries have traditionally focused on producing data on foreign residents (European countries, Japan and Korea) whilst others refer to the foreign-born (settlement countries, i.e. Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States). This difference in focus relates in part to the nature and history of immigration systems and legislation on citizenship and naturalisation.

The foreign-born population can be viewed as representing first-generation migrants, and may consist of both foreign and national citizens. The size and composition of the foreign-born population is influenced by the history of migration flows and mortality amongst the foreign-born. For example, where inflows have been declining over time, the stock of the foreign-born will tend to age and represent an increasingly established community.

The concept of foreign population may include persons born abroad who retained the nationality of their country of origin but also second and third generations born in the host country. The characteristics of the population of foreign nationals depend on a number of factors: the history of migration flows, natural increase in the foreign population and naturalisations. Both the nature of legislation on citizenship and the incentives to naturalise play a role in determining the extent to which native-born persons may or may not be foreign nationals.

Sources for and problems in measuring the immigrant population

Four types of sources are used: population registers, residence permits, labour force surveys and censuses. In countries which have a population register and in those which use residence permit data, stocks and flows of immigrants are most often calculated using the same source. There are exceptions, however, with some countries using census or labour force survey data to estimate the stock of the immigrant population. In studying stocks and flows, the same problems are encountered whether population register or permit data are used (in particular, the risk of underestimation when minors are registered on the permit of one of the parents or if the migrants are not required to have permits because of a free movement agreement). To this must be added the difficulty of purging the files regularly to remove the records of persons who have left the country.

Census data enable comprehensive, albeit infrequent analysis of the stock of immigrants (censuses are generally conducted every five to ten years). In addition, many labour force surveys now include questions about nationality and place of birth, thus providing a source of annual stock data. The OECD produces estimates of stocks for some countries

Some care has to be taken with detailed breakdowns of the immigrant population from survey data since sample sizes can be small. Both census and survey data may underestimate the number of immigrants, because they can be missed in the census or because they do not live in private households (labour force surveys may not cover those living in collective dwelling such as reception centres and hostels for immigrants). Both these sources may cover a portion of the unauthorised population, which is by definition excluded from population registers and residence permit systems.

Table A.4. Stocks of foreign-born population in OECD countries and in Russia

Thousands and percentages

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Australia	5 881	6 018	6 214	6 409	6 570	6 730	6 912	7 139	7 333	7 533	7 653
% of total population	26.5	26.7	27.1	27.6	27.8	28.1	28.5	29.0	29.5	29.9	30.0
Austria	1 275	1 295	1 323	1 365	1 415	1 485	1 595	1 656	1 697	1 729	1 765
% of total population	15.2	15.3	15.6	16.0	16.4	17.1	18.2	18.8	19.1	19.3	19.6
Belgium	1 504	1 629	1 644	1 748	1 776	1 786	1 849	1 893	1 933	1 981	2 056
% of total population	13.7	14.8	14.8	15.7	15.8	15.8	16.3	16.6	16.8	17.2	17.7
Canada	6 778	6 776	6 914	7 029	7 156	7 287	7 541	7 714	7 896
% of total population	19.8	19.6	19.8	19.9	20.1	20.2	20.7	21.0	21.3
Chile	352	369	388	416	442	465	..	746	..	1 252	1 493
% of total population	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.4	2.5	2.6	..	4.0	..	6.6	7.8
Czech Republic	661	745	744	745	755	770	798	829	833	903	..
% of total population	6.3	7.1	7.0	7.0	7.1	7.3	7.5	7.8	7.8	8.5	..
Denmark	414	429	442	456	476	501	541	571	592	608	614
% of total population	7.5	7.7	7.9	8.1	8.4	8.8	9.5	10.0	10.3	10.5	10.6
Estonia	218	213	211	198	197	195	194	193	196	198	198
% of total population	16.4	16.0	15.9	15.0	14.9	14.8	14.7	14.6	14.8	14.9	14.9
Finland	233	248	266	285	304	322	337	358	373	387	404
% of total population	4.3	4.6	4.9	5.2	5.6	5.9	6.1	6.5	6.8	7.0	7.3
France	7 288	7 373	7 475	7 591	7 715	7 847	8 028	8 099	8 200	8 429	8 522
% of total population	11.6	11.7	11.8	11.9	12.0	12.2	12.4	12.5	12.6	12.9	13.1
Germany	10 510	10 503	9 752	10 047	10 401	10 792	11 392	12 609	13 043	13 457	13 682
% of total population	13.0	13.0	12.0	12.4	12.8	13.2	13.9	15.3	15.7	16.1	16.3
Greece	1 321	1 325	1 313	1 280	1 265	1 243	1 220	1 251	1 278	1 307	1 348
% of total population	12.1	12.2	12.2	11.9	11.8	11.7	11.5	11.8	12.1	12.5	12.9
Hungary	434	441	403	424	448	476	504	514	537	565	594
% of total population	4.4	4.5	4.1	4.3	4.6	4.9	5.2	5.3	5.5	5.8	6.2
Iceland	35	35	35	35	37	39	42	47	55	61	67
% of total population	11.0	10.7	10.6	10.8	11.3	11.9	12.6	13.9	16.2	18.1	19.6
Ireland	..	767	771	779	790	805	810	818	834	868	..
% of total population	..	16.7	16.7	16.9	17.1	17.3	17.3	17.2	17.3	17.8	..
Israel	1 878	1 869	1 850	1 835	1 821	1 817	1 818	1 812	1 811	1 809	1 812
% of total population	25.6	25.0	24.3	23.7	23.2	22.8	22.4	22.0	21.6	21.2	20.9
Italy	5 788	5 759	5 715	5 696	5 737	5 805	5 907	6 054	6 175	6 069	6 161
% of total population	9.8	9.7	9.5	9.5	9.5	9.6	9.7	10.0	10.2	10.0	10.2
Latvia	314	303	289	279	271	265	259	251	246	242	237
% of total population	14.8	14.5	14.0	13.7	13.4	13.3	13.1	12.9	12.8	12.7	12.6
Lithuania	215	208	207	..	137	136	130	127	131	138	153
% of total population	6.9	6.7	6.8	..	4.6	4.6	4.5	4.5	4.7	5.0	5.6
Luxembourg	197	205	215	226	238	249	261	271	281	291	302
% of total population	38.8	39.5	40.6	41.7	42.9	43.9	45.0	45.7	46.5	47.3	48.2
Mexico	961	967	974	991	940	1 007	1 075	..	1 212
% of total population	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.9	..	0.9
Netherlands	1 833	1 869	1 906	1 928	1 953	1 996	2 057	2 137	2 216	2 299	2 400
% of total population	11.0	11.2	11.4	11.4	11.6	11.8	12.1	12.6	13.0	13.4	14.0
New Zealand	946	956	965	1 002	1 050	1 108	1 169	1 231	1 272
% of total population	21.6	21.6	21.6	22.2	23.0	24.0	25.1	26.2	26.8
Norway	527	569	616	664	705	742	772	800	822	842	868
% of total population	10.8	11.5	12.3	13.1	13.7	14.3	14.7	15.1	15.4	15.6	16.0

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Poland	..	675	631	625	620	612	626	652	696	761	849
% of total population	..	1.8	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.8	2.0	2.2
Portugal	835	872	983	1 017	991	998	1 007	1 011	1 050	1 107	1 263
% of total population	7.9	8.2	9.3	9.7	9.5	9.6	9.8	9.8	10.2	10.8	12.4
Russia	11 195	11 636
% of total population	7.8	8.0
Slovak Republic	141	146	170	173	175	178	182	186	190	194	198
% of total population	2.6	2.7	3.1	3.2	3.2	3.3	3.3	3.4	3.5	3.6	3.6
Slovenia	254	229	230	233	235	238	241	245	250	265	282
% of total population	12.4	11.1	11.2	11.3	11.4	11.5	11.6	11.8	12.0	12.8	13.5
Spain	6 280	6 282	6 295	6 175	5 958	5 891	5 918	6 025	6 201	6 539	6 997
% of total population	13.4	13.3	13.4	13.2	12.7	12.6	12.7	12.9	13.3	14.0	15.0
Sweden	1 338	1 385	1 427	1 473	1 533	1 604	1 676	1 784	1 877	1 956	2 020
% of total population	14.2	14.6	15.0	15.3	15.8	16.4	17.0	18.0	18.8	19.5	20.0
Switzerland	2 038	2 075	2 158	2 218	2 290	2 355	2 416	2 480	2 519	2 553	2 590
% of total population	26.1	26.2	27.0	27.4	27.9	28.4	28.8	29.3	29.5	29.7	29.9
Turkey	1 460	1 592	1 777	1 924	2 278
% of total population	1.9	2.0	2.2	2.4	2.8
United Kingdom	7 056	7 430	7 588	7 860	8 064	8 482	8 988	9 369	9 183	9 482	..
% of total population	11.1	11.6	11.8	12.1	12.3	12.9	13.6	14.0	13.7	14.0	..
United States	39 917	40 382	40 738	41 344	42 391	43 290	43 739	44 525	44 729	44 933	..
% of total population	12.9	13.0	13.0	13.1	13.3	13.5	13.5	13.7	13.7	13.7	..

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the Tables B.4. The percentage of total population is based on the UN estimates of the total population and may differ from national estimates.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/qns1c3>

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Australia

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2020 (%)
United Kingdom	1 187.9	1 196.0	1 211.5	1 220.2	1 216.3	1 209.1	1 202.1	1 196.0	1 188.1	1 180.6	1 172.7	49
India	329.5	337.1	355.4	378.5	411.2	449.0	489.4	538.1	592.8	660.4	721.1	46
China	371.6	387.4	406.4	432.4	466.5	508.9	557.7	606.3	649.4	677.2	650.6	56
New Zealand	517.8	544.0	569.6	585.4	583.7	575.4	568.2	567.3	567.7	569.5	564.8	49
Philippines	183.8	193.0	206.1	218.9	230.2	241.1	252.7	265.8	277.6	293.8	310.1	61
Viet Nam	203.8	207.6	212.1	219.9	228.5	235.6	243.2	250.6	257.0	262.9	270.3	56
South Africa	156.0	161.6	167.6	172.2	174.9	177.4	180.5	185.5	189.3	193.9	200.2	50
Italy	204.7	201.7	200.4	200.7	200.4	198.5	195.8	191.5	187.0	182.5	177.8	49
Malaysia	129.9	134.1	136.6	138.4	139.4	143.4	152.9	164.7	173.6	175.9	177.5	53
Sri Lanka	96.5	99.7	105.0	110.7	115.1	119.7	124.5	129.5	134.4	140.3	147.0	48
Nepal	27.2	27.8	30.7	34.8	42.9	50.2	59.0	73.8	94.8	117.9	131.8	46
Korea	84.2	85.9	91.6	97.9	101.9	106.6	111.6	114.8	116.4	116.0	111.5	54
Germany	126.3	125.8	124.7	123.1	120.8	119.1	116.7	115.9	114.3	112.4	111.0	53
United States	85.3	90.1	96.7	100.8	102.7	104.7	105.8	108.1	108.4	108.6	110.2	54
Hong Kong, China	85.5	86.0	87.3	89.8	92.6	95.1	97.6	99.4	100.2	101.3	104.8	52
Other countries	2 091.7	2 140.3	2 212.4	2 285.3	2 343.3	2 396.0	2 454.6	2 531.5	2 581.7	2 639.9	2 691.8	
Total	5 881.4	6 018.2	6 214.0	6 408.7	6 570.2	6 729.7	6 912.1	7 138.6	7 332.6	7 533.0	7 653.2	51

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/v70bhq>**Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Austria**

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2020 (%)
Germany	191.2	196.9	201.4	205.9	210.7	215.0	219.9	224.0	227.8	232.2	237.8	52
Bosnia and Herzegovina	149.6	149.7	150.5	151.7	155.1	158.9	162.0	164.3	166.8	168.5	170.5	50
Turkey	157.8	158.5	158.7	159.2	160.0	160.0	160.2	160.4	160.3	159.7	159.6	48
Serbia	130.4	130.9	130.2	130.9	132.6	134.7	137.1	139.1	141.9	143.2	144.4	52
Romania	60.0	64.5	69.1	73.9	79.3	91.3	98.7	105.6	113.3	121.1	128.8	52
Hungary	37.6	39.3	42.6	48.1	55.0	61.5	67.7	72.4	75.8	79.0	81.9	54
Poland	57.0	57.8	60.5	63.2	66.8	69.9	72.2	73.8	75.1	75.6	76.1	51
Syria	2.9	3.0	3.4	4.2	5.2	12.3	33.6	41.6	47.0	48.5	49.7	41
Croatia	39.7	39.3	39.1	39.0	39.8	41.7	43.3	44.5	45.2	46.7	48.1	52
Slovak Republic	25.3	26.0	27.7	30.0	32.6	35.5	38.0	40.0	41.5	42.7	43.8	62
Afghanistan	7.5	8.4	11.0	13.6	18.2	20.3	36.6	44.7	44.4	43.1	42.2	34
Czech Republic	45.0	43.6	42.5	41.6	40.8	40.3	39.6	38.7	37.8	37.0	36.3	63
Russia	25.9	26.4	27.5	29.4	30.2	31.7	33.0	33.9	34.4	34.7	35.2	60
Italy	25.0	25.2	25.3	26.2	27.7	29.3	31.2	32.3	33.3	34.1	35.1	46
Bulgaria	13.5	14.6	15.7	17.0	18.5	21.6	23.8	25.7	27.4	29.2	31.1	54
Other countries	307.1	310.5	317.8	330.8	342.1	360.6	397.7	415.4	425.3	433.2	444.5	
Total	1 275.5	1 294.7	1 323.1	1 364.8	1 414.6	1 484.6	1 594.7	1 656.3	1 697.1	1 728.6	1 765.3	51

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/v70bhq>

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Belgium

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2020 (%)
Morocco	178.9	189.1	197.1	201.9	204.8	208.1	211.2	214.1	217.4	221.0	226.5	49
France	171.3	175.0	176.9	179.2	180.8	182.2	183.7	184.5	184.9	186.1	189.2	54
Netherlands	124.8	126.4	126.9	127.4	127.9	128.5	129.4	129.8	130.0	130.7	131.6	50
Italy	120.5	120.2	119.7	119.5	119.7	120.0	120.1	119.7	119.1	119.1	119.5	49
Turkey	93.6	97.0	98.0	98.5	98.4	98.3	98.3	98.5	99.1	100.1	102.0	48
Romania	30.6	37.7	45.0	52.7	57.9	65.2	71.7	77.3	83.5	90.9	99.9	45
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	76.2	81.3	82.0	83.1	83.5	83.6	84.1	84.4	84.9	85.4	86.4	54
Germany	84.1	84.2	83.9	83.2	82.4	81.5	81.1	80.6	80.2	80.2	80.2	54
Poland	51.7	57.7	63.0	67.8	70.9	73.4	75.5	76.3	76.9	77.4	78.2	57
Former USSR	39.0	51.1	51.0	51.5	51.1	51.8	51.2	51.7	53.1	54.6	58.5	59
Spain	37.0	38.8	40.5	42.8	44.7	46.0	47.0	47.2	47.9	48.9	50.5	53
Former Yugoslavia	36.6	47.3	45.7	44.2	43.1	43.1	42.9	42.9	43.1	43.8	46.9	49
Bulgaria	14.4	18.7	21.1	23.9	26.1	28.7	31.3	32.9	34.8	36.9	40.4	50
Portugal	27.5	28.3	29.4	31.5	33.3	34.3	35.2	36.1	36.4	36.8	37.7	48
Syria	4.4	5.8	6.2	7.2	8.1	10.9	21.3	25.1	30.0	33.1	35.7	43
Other countries	413.7	470.7	493.6	509.9	518.1	530.4	565.2	579.7	599.2	628.2	673.3	
Total	1 504.3	1 629.4	1 679.8	1 724.4	1 750.8	1 786.1	1 849.3	1 880.8	1 920.5	1 973.0	2 056.4	51

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/v70bhq>**Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Canada**

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2016 (%)
India	..	547.9	668.6
China	..	545.5	649.3
Philippines	..	454.3	588.3
United Kingdom	..	537.0	499.1
United States	..	263.5	253.7
Italy	..	256.8	236.6
Hong Kong, China	..	205.4	208.9
Pakistan	..	156.9	202.3
Viet Nam	..	165.1	169.3
Iran	..	120.7	154.4
Poland	..	152.3	146.5
Germany	..	152.3	145.8
Portugal	..	138.5	139.4
Jamaica	..	126.0	138.3
Sri Lanka	..	132.1	132.0
Other countries	..	2 821.2	3 208.3
Total	..	6 775.8	7 540.8

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/v70bhq>

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Chile

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2017 (%)
Peru	130.9	138.5	146.6	157.7	187.8	..	287.9	455.5	50
Colombia	12.9	14.4	16.1	19.1	105.4	..	223.9	235.2	52
Venezuela	83.0	..	178.8	185.9	36
Bolivia	24.1	25.1	26.7	30.5	73.8	..	147.4	161.2	53
Argentina	60.6	61.9	63.2	64.9	66.5	..	107.5	120.1	54
Haiti	62.7	..	74.4	79.5	49
Ecuador	19.1	20.0	20.9	21.9	27.7	..	36.8	41.4	51
Spain	11.0	11.3	11.6	12.1	16.7	..	20.6	22.5	45
Brazil	9.6	10.1	10.5	11.2	14.2	..	20.5	20.1	59
United States	9.7	10.0	10.4	10.9	12.3	..	18.1	20.0	54
Dominican Republic	11.9	..	16.2	18.5	50
China	4.6	5.2	5.9	6.6	10.1	..	15.8	16.3	42
Cuba	6.7	..	13.6	15.7	42
Mexico	5.8	..	8.7	10.5	48
Germany	6.5	6.7	6.9	7.1	5.7	..	8.8	10.4	53
Other countries	63.2	66.2	69.4	73.5	56.1	..	72.6	80.0	
Total	352.3	369.4	388.2	415.5	441.5	465.3	..	746.4	..	1 251.6	1 492.5	49

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/v70bhq>**Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Czech Republic**

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Slovak Republic	..	289.6	53
Ukraine	..	138.0	45
Viet Nam	..	52.4	40
Russia	..	35.7	57
Poland	..	26.0	62
Germany	..	16.7	32
Romania	..	12.8	51
Moldova	..	9.4	38
Bulgaria	..	9.2	39
United States	..	7.0	45
Kazakhstan	..	6.7	51
Mongolia	..	5.6	59
China	..	4.9	45
Hungary	..	4.8	57
United Kingdom	..	4.8	24
Other countries	..	121.7	
Total	..	745.2	48

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/v70bhq>

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Denmark

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2020 (%)
Poland	25.4	26.6	28.0	29.9	32.0	34.5	37.1	39.1	40.6	41.5	41.5	47
Syria	2.0	2.4	3.1	4.0	5.8	11.6	24.1	33.6	35.4	35.9	35.5	44
Turkey	32.3	32.5	32.4	32.2	32.4	32.4	32.5	32.6	32.9	33.1	33.1	48
Germany	28.2	28.5	28.6	28.7	28.7	28.7	29.1	29.6	29.8	30.3	30.6	52
Romania	5.9	7.7	10.1	12.9	15.7	18.7	21.9	24.3	26.3	28.5	29.4	43
Iraq	21.3	21.3	21.2	21.2	21.1	21.2	21.2	21.4	21.6	21.9	21.8	45
Iran	12.1	12.5	12.9	13.3	14.1	14.9	15.6	16.0	16.8	17.1	17.2	43
Bosnia and Herzegovina	17.9	17.8	17.6	17.4	17.3	17.3	17.2	17.1	17.1	17.0	16.8	50
Norway	14.7	14.7	14.9	14.9	14.9	15.1	15.6	15.8	15.8	15.7	15.7	65
United Kingdom	11.8	12.1	12.2	12.5	12.8	13.0	13.4	14.1	14.8	15.3	15.5	35
Pakistan	11.2	11.7	12.1	12.3	12.9	13.5	13.8	14.0	14.2	14.4	14.5	48
Sweden	13.2	13.2	13.1	13.1	13.2	13.4	13.6	13.8	14.2	14.3	14.4	61
Afghanistan	10.0	10.6	11.1	11.6	12.1	12.6	12.8	13.0	13.5	13.8	13.9	45
Lithuania	5.1	6.3	7.3	8.3	9.0	9.7	10.6	11.3	12.4	13.2	13.2	48
Lebanon	12.0	12.1	12.0	12.1	12.2	12.3	12.6	12.7	12.8	12.9	13.0	46
Other countries	191.2	199.1	204.9	212.0	221.8	232.3	249.5	262.2	273.5	282.9	288.2	
Total	414.4	428.9	441.5	456.4	476.1	501.1	540.5	570.6	591.7	607.6	614.4	50

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/v70bhq>**Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Estonia**

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2020 (%)
Russia	83.8	138.5	136.4	129.2	126.2	122.9	120.6	118.1	115.9	63
Ukraine	15.7	21.7	21.5	21.8	22.4	22.7	23.2	24.0	25.0	48
Belarus	9.1	11.6	11.5	11.1	10.9	10.7	10.6	10.4	10.4	61
Latvia	2.7	4.1	4.2	4.7	4.8	4.9	5.5	6.0	6.1	49
Finland	4.1	2.4	2.3	3.9	4.3	4.7	5.4	5.9	6.0	39
Kazakhstan	2.6	3.8	4.0	3.8	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.8	57
Germany	1.5	1.3	1.3	1.8	1.9	2.0	2.4	2.5	2.4	48
Lithuania	1.5	1.9	1.8	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.1	55
Georgia	0.8	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.8	49
Azerbaijan	1.2	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.7	41
United Kingdom	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.8	1.2	1.3	1.4	31
United States	0.3	0.7	0.8	0.6	0.7	0.7	1.1	1.2	1.2	38
Italy	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.6	0.7	0.8	1.1	1.2	1.2	34
Moldova	0.6	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.1	41
Uzbekistan	0.7	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	56
Other countries	85.1	7.0	7.2	9.4	10.4	11.4	14.1	16.0	18.0	
Total	217.9	212.7	210.8	199.0	196.9	194.7	193.9	192.6	196.3	198.1	199.0	56

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/v70bhq>

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Finland

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2020 (%)
Former USSR	47.3	48.7	50.5	52.3	53.7	54.7	55.6	56.5	56.7	57.1	58.1	62
Estonia	21.8	25.0	29.5	35.0	39.5	42.7	44.5	45.7	46.0	46.2	46.0	50
Sweden	31.0	31.2	31.4	31.6	31.8	31.9	32.0	32.1	32.4	32.7	32.9	48
Iraq	6.2	7.2	7.9	8.4	9.3	10.0	10.7	13.8	16.3	17.9	19.0	36
Russia	7.3	8.0	9.0	10.0	11.1	12.0	12.8	13.7	14.2	14.9	15.7	55
Somalia	7.1	8.1	8.8	9.1	9.6	10.1	10.6	11.1	11.4	11.8	12.1	48
China	6.6	7.0	7.7	8.3	8.9	9.4	10.0	10.4	10.9	11.4	11.9	58
Thailand	6.1	6.7	7.4	8.1	8.7	9.2	9.7	10.2	10.5	10.9	11.3	79
Viet Nam	4.3	4.5	4.8	5.2	5.5	6.0	6.6	7.5	8.0	8.5	9.0	55
Turkey	4.9	5.1	5.4	5.7	6.1	6.3	6.5	6.8	7.1	7.5	8.2	33
Former Yugoslavia	6.1	6.3	6.4	6.5	6.7	6.9	7.1	7.3	7.5	7.6	8.0	43
Iran	3.9	4.1	4.4	4.9	5.3	5.8	6.1	6.8	7.2	7.4	7.9	44
India	3.6	4.0	4.3	4.6	4.9	5.4	5.7	5.8	6.2	6.8	7.9	41
Afghanistan	2.3	2.6	2.9	3.3	3.7	4.0	4.3	5.7	6.4	6.9	7.3	38
Germany	5.8	5.9	6.1	6.2	6.4	6.5	6.6	6.6	6.6	6.7	6.9	44
Other countries	68.9	73.7	79.7	86.4	93.1	101.0	108.5	117.5	125.4	133.1	142.0	
Total	233.2	248.1	266.1	285.5	304.3	322.0	337.2	357.5	372.8	387.2	404.2	48

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/v70bhq>**Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – France**

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2015 (%)
Algeria	1 359.3	1 366.5	1 361.0	1 364.5	1 357.5	1 359.8	1 363.9	1 368.4	50
Morocco	859.0	870.9	881.3	888.0	895.6	907.8	924.0	935.4	49
Portugal	598.0	604.7	608.6	614.2	618.3	625.2	633.2	642.1	49
Tunisia	368.5	370.6	370.7	374.7	377.3	381.2	387.6	393.9	45
Italy	364.4	357.0	350.2	343.3	337.5	331.7	327.6	325.0	52
Spain	300.0	295.9	290.3	286.2	282.5	282.5	283.4	284.6	56
Turkey	243.4	246.8	251.1	255.8	257.6	259.5	260.2	261.2	47
Germany	224.6	223.5	221.7	219.0	217.6	213.8	211.6	209.9	57
United Kingdom	158.0	164.0	166.8	169.1	169.9	170.1	168.0	167.0	51
Belgium	140.5	143.6	145.8	146.9	148.2	148.5	149.7	151.2	55
Viet Nam	119.8	120.1	119.7	118.9	119.4	120.2	119.0	118.4	55
Madagascar	110.7	112.5	114.5	115.8	118.1	120.1	122.3	124.7	59
Senegal	106.1	108.3	112.1	114.0	116.4	119.6	124.1	127.7	47
Poland	101.7	102.6	102.9	102.4	102.8	102.5	102.3	101.6	62
China	80.3	85.3	90.2	95.4	98.5	102.2	105.3	106.9	59
Total	7 288	7 373	7 475	7 591	7 715	7 847	8 028	8 099	8 200	8 429	8 522	52

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/v70bhq>

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Germany

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2020 (%)
Poland	1 115	1 113	1 076	1 147	1 203	1 253	1 328	1 460	1 553	1 668	1 638	53
Turkey	1 458	1 471	1 298	1 292	1 313	1 343	1 362	1 321	1 194	1 319	1 339	49
Russia	1 005	980	961	950	959	936	954	955	1 057	1 076	1 076	56
Kazakhstan	635	697	735	728	728	725	735	735	909	946	926	53
Romania	387	371	377	422	460	484	545	653	670	779	813	51
Syria	..	41	35	42	53	70	141	453	620	711	721	39
Italy	428	414	372	371	417	425	439	506	467	508	522	40
Bosnia and Herzegovina	175	154	134	148	148	157	164	171	263	289	304	51
Croatia	249	225	199	205	208	219	254	305	242	278	297	50
Greece	224	229	198	211	221	233	256	281	264	298	294	45
Bulgaria	61	64	66	91	96	119	146	214	226	264	269	51
Ukraine	227	227	205	205	210	214	211	222	255	269	264	59
Iraq	87	87	74	75	88	97	104	151	193	233	245	42
Afghanistan	84	93	88	83	90	101	111	176	179	209	233	40
Serbia	188	183	158	174	180	185	183	187	205	207	223	53
Other countries	4 187	4 154	3 776	3 903	4 027	4 231	4 459	4 819	4 746	4 403	4 518	
Total	10 510	10 503	9 752	10 047	10 401	10 792	11 392	12 609	13 043	13 457	13 682	49

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/v70bhq>**Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Greece**

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2016 (%)
Albania	384.6	346.2	357.1	..	337.7	..	312.7	49
Georgia	62.6	53.0	54.2	..	45.1	..	43.3	62
Russia	55.7	44.4	37.8	..	43.0	..	35.3	67
Bulgaria	45.7	43.9	35.0	..	40.9	..	31.0	71
Germany	29.3	25.1	21.2	..	25.7	..	26.7	61
Romania	32.4	34.9	32.7	..	27.2	..	22.1	58
Ukraine	13.3	13.5	11.5	..	10.7	..	16.6	78
Pakistan	20.1	22.5	24.0	..	18.0	..	16.5	5
Armenia	9.1	10.6	9.6	..	7.7	..	11.4	63
Poland	10.8	7.3	9.4	..	16.6	..	10.8	61
Cyprus	10.2	12.8	10.3	..	10.9	..	9.8	50
Turkey	9.5	6.1	9.4	..	12.5	..	9.4	50
United States	7.5	6.2	7.4	..	5.3	..	8.7	58
Egypt	10.2	13.6	11.4	..	9.8	..	7.7	49
Moldova	4.9	3.4	1.8	..	4.9	..	6.3	72
Other countries	122.3	107.3	97.3	..	111.5	..	80.2	
Total	828.4	750.7	729.9	..	727.5	..	648.5	54

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/v70bhq>

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Hungary

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2020 (%)
Romania	198.7	201.9	183.1	190.9	198.4	203.4	208.4	206.3	207.4	207.1	210.4	51
Ukraine	14.6	13.4	25.5	28.8	33.3	42.0	50.2	55.8	61.6	68.5	72.2	48
Serbia	8.0	8.2	24.1	27.1	30.0	32.4	34.0	34.7	39.4	42.2	43.0	43
Germany	28.4	29.4	25.7	27.3	29.2	30.2	31.7	32.4	33.6	34.4	37.9	48
Former USSR	29.8	30.7	13.1	14.1	13.5	13.2	13.3	12.7	14.6	23.4	27.6	46
Slovak Republic	5.2	5.7	21.1	21.3	21.3	21.1	21.1	21.1	20.9	20.3	20.5	61
China	10.4	10.9	9.0	9.9	11.1	14.8	18.2	17.5	18.2	17.0	17.8	50
United Kingdom	4.4	4.7	4.9	5.6	6.8	7.9	9.4	11.2	12.9	14.6	16.7	46
Austria	7.6	7.8	7.6	8.1	8.8	9.3	9.9	10.3	10.6	10.8	11.5	46
United States	6.7	6.9	7.0	7.2	7.4	7.8	8.2	8.4	8.7	9.0	9.4	47
Italy	3.4	3.5	3.4	3.9	4.3	4.7	5.3	5.6	5.9	6.0	6.4	37
Viet Nam	3.2	3.3	2.8	3.2	3.2	3.3	3.5	3.6	4.1	5.1	6.3	48
Former Czechoslovakia	24.8	24.1	5.6	5.8	6.0	6.2	6.2	5.8	5.5	5.5	5.8	63
France	3.5	3.6	3.5	3.7	3.9	4.2	4.4	4.4	4.6	4.7	4.9	46
Netherlands	2.3	2.5	2.4	2.7	3.1	3.3	3.5	3.8	4.0	4.1	4.6	43
Other countries	83.3	84.2	64.0	64.6	67.3	72.3	77.0	80.5	84.5	92.5	99.4	
Total	434.4	441.0	402.7	424.2	447.7	476.1	504.3	514.1	536.6	565.1	594.3	48

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/v70bhq>**Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Iceland**

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2020 (%)
Poland	10.1	9.5	9.3	9.4	10.2	11.0	12.0	13.8	17.0	19.2	20.5	41
Denmark	2.9	2.9	3.0	3.1	3.2	3.3	3.3	3.4	3.5	3.6	3.6	50
Lithuania	1.4	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.9	2.4	2.9	3.3	37
United States	1.9	1.8	1.8	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.5	48
Philippines	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.9	2.1	2.2	67
Sweden	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.2	2.2	51
Germany	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.9	2.0	2.1	62
Romania	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.7	1.1	1.5	2.0	31
Latvia	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.4	1.8	2.0	33
United Kingdom	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.8	39
Thailand	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.4	74
Norway	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.3	52
Portugal	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.8	1.0	1.1	32
Spain	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.1	41
France	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.9	47
Other countries	8.5	8.6	8.8	9.2	9.5	10.0	10.7	12.2	14.6	16.7	18.7	
Total	35.1	34.7	34.7	35.4	37.2	39.2	42.0	46.5	54.6	61.4	66.8	45

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/v70bhq>

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Ireland

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2016 (%)
United Kingdom	..	288.6	277.2		51
Poland	..	115.2	115.2		50
Lithuania	..	34.8	33.3		54
Romania	..	18.0	28.7		49
United States	..	27.7	28.7		55
India	..	17.9	21.0		45
Latvia	..	20.0	19.0		57
Nigeria	..	19.8	16.6		53
Brazil	..	9.3	15.8		53
Philippines	..	13.8	14.7		59
Germany	..	13.0	13.0		56
Pakistan	..	8.3	12.9		35
France	..	10.1	11.9		50
Spain	..	7.0	11.8		60
China	..	11.5	11.3		56
Other countries	..	151.8	179.5		
Total	..	766.8	810.4		51

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/v70bhq>**Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Israel**

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2020 (%)
Former USSR	877.5	875.5	867.0	862.4	858.7	859.4	863.1	867.1	873.3	882.2	895.6	56
Morocco	154.7	152.0	149.6	147.2	145.4	143.1	140.9	138.8	136.1	133.2	130.3	53
United States	..	82.7	84.8	86.2	88.0	90.5	92.6	94.6	96.9	98.8	101.4	52
Ethiopia	77.4	78.9	81.9	84.6	85.9	85.6	85.7	85.5	87.0	86.9	87.5	50
Romania	96.4	93.1	90.0	87.0	84.0	80.8	77.8	74.8	71.8	68.8	66.0	56
France	41.4	42.9	43.5	44.2	46.3	51.1	57.0	60.1	62.6	64.0	65.3	54
Iraq	63.7	61.8	60.0	58.5	56.8	54.9	53.0	51.1	49.3	47.4	45.4	54
Iran	49.8	48.9	48.1	47.4	46.7	46.0	45.2	44.4	43.5	42.7	41.8	52
Argentina	37.6	37.5	37.6	36.8	36.3	36.0	35.6	35.4	35.1	34.8	34.9	53
Poland	54.0	50.7	48.0	45.0	42.2	39.7	37.2	34.8	32.6	30.5	28.6	58
Tunisia	..	29.9	29.2	28.8	28.4	28.6	28.3	27.7	27.1	26.4	25.6	55
United Kingdom	21.8	22.5	23.0	23.0	23.2	23.5	24.0	24.4	24.6	24.8	25.2	52
Turkey	26.1	25.6	24.9	24.1	23.4	22.8	22.1	21.6	21.2	20.6	20.0	53
Yemen	28.9	27.9	26.9	24.1	25.4	22.5	21.6	22.7	21.7	20.9	19.9	57
India	18.1	17.6	17.5	17.4	17.5	18.0	18.0	17.8	17.9	18.1	17.9	53
Other countries	330.4	221.5	218.0	218.3	213.0	214.6	215.5	211.7	210.6	208.9	207.0	
Total	1 877.7	1 869.0	1 850.0	1 835.0	1 821.0	1 817.0	1 817.5	1 812.4	1 811.2	1 808.9	1 812.2	55

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <https://stat.link/v70bhq>

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Italy

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2020 (%)
Romania	1 016.9	1 011.7	1 003.7	1 000.1	1 004.6	1 016.0	1 024.1	1 036.0	1 033.0	984.5	979.1	60
Albania	440.6	438.0	434.3	432.7	440.1	446.6	449.7	458.2	467.9	463.0	478.3	49
Morocco	416.8	414.5	411.1	409.6	418.1	424.1	428.9	434.5	437.8	432.4	442.4	46
China	194.7	193.5	192.0	191.3	197.1	200.4	212.2	220.1	223.7	218.3	222.4	51
Germany	222.7	221.5	219.9	220.0	216.3	214.3	211.6	210.4	209.0	205.5	204.7	57
Switzerland	194.5	193.5	192.1	191.5	194.9	194.0	192.8	192.1	191.7	190.4	190.1	54
India	129.0	128.3	127.3	126.8	134.1	139.1	149.5	155.6	157.8	154.4	160.6	41
Philippines	137.8	137.0	135.9	135.4	141.1	143.2	145.5	147.8	148.5	140.8	141.6	60
Brazil	110.5	110.0	109.2	108.9	102.5	100.0	104.8	111.8	121.8	129.4	140.7	61
Bangladesh	89.1	88.6	87.9	87.5	95.4	105.5	111.3	119.5	128.5	125.9	129.5	27
Egypt	107.1	106.6	105.8	105.5	106.7	108.9	112.8	117.7	121.8	120.9	127.5	32
France	137.7	137.3	136.5	136.7	132.2	127.9	128.4	128.1	127.4	124.8	124.3	60
Pakistan	78.2	77.9	77.3	77.1	83.4	89.5	97.8	108.9	116.7	117.9	121.5	29
Peru	115.0	114.4	113.4	113.0	114.1	113.2	112.9	113.0	113.7	110.4	112.0	62
Senegal	80.6	80.1	79.5	79.2	83.4	88.0	93.6	100.0	106.8	107.6	109.7	24
Other countries	2 316.5	2 306.0	2 289.1	2 280.6	2 273.3	2 294.6	2 331.6	2 400.1	2 469.3	2 442.8	2 477.0	
Total	5 787.9	5 759.0	5 715.1	5 695.9	5 737.2	5 805.3	5 907.5	6 054.0	6 175.3	6 069.0	6 161.4	54

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/v70bhq>**Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Latvia**

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2020 (%)
Russia	..	159.9	152.3	146.3	140.7	136.4	131.8	126.9	122.4	117.8	113.8	..
Belarus	..	55.1	53.2	51.5	50.0	48.6	47.2	45.5	43.9	42.6	41.3	..
Ukraine	..	38.4	36.8	35.7	34.7	34.1	34.0	33.0	32.5	32.6	32.4	..
Lithuania	..	19.7	18.6	17.9	17.2	16.7	16.1	15.4	14.9	14.3	13.9	..
Kazakhstan	..	6.7	6.4	6.2	6.0	5.9	5.9	5.8	5.7	5.7	5.6	..
United Kingdom	..	1.0	1.0	1.2	1.7	2.2	2.6	3.2	3.5	3.7	4.1	..
Uzbekistan	..	2.2	2.1	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.3	2.6	2.9	..
Estonia	..	3.2	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.0	3.0	2.9	2.9	2.8	..
Germany	..	2.5	2.2	2.1	2.3	2.4	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.2	..
Azerbaijan	..	2.2	2.1	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	2.0	2.0	..
Moldova	..	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.8	..
India	..	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.8	1.3	1.5	..
Georgia	..	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	..
Ireland	..	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.0	..
Poland	..	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.7	..
Other countries	..	7.1	6.6	6.5	6.9	7.4	7.4	7.7	8.3	9.3	9.8	
Total	313.8	302.8	289.0	279.2	271.1	265.4	258.9	251.5	246.0	241.8	237.0	

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/v70bhq>

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Lithuania

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2020 (%)
Russia	92.5	88.9	86.3	..	60.1	58.5	54.9	52.3	50.5	49.1	48.3	59
Belarus	52.2	49.6	47.8	..	35.4	33.6	31.1	30.0	30.8	32.2	36.0	50
Ukraine	19.1	18.0	17.4	..	12.4	12.3	11.3	12.4	15.4	19.6	25.7	24
United Kingdom	10.3	..	3.3	4.3	5.2	5.0	5.4	6.3	8.0	49
Latvia	9.8	9.4	9.2	..	5.7	5.6	5.6	5.5	5.4	5.4	5.5	57
Kazakhstan	7.7	..	4.6	4.5	4.2	4.1	4.0	4.0	4.2	54
Norway	1.0	1.4	2.0	2.2	2.3	2.6	3.1	47
Germany	3.2	3.2	3.3	..	1.5	1.6	1.8	1.7	1.8	2.0	2.3	45
Ireland	3.9	..	1.3	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.9	50
Poland	3.5	3.3	3.2	..	2.3	2.2	2.1	2.0	1.9	1.8	1.8	57
Moldova	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.1	20
Spain	1.2	..	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.9	44
Uzbekistan	1.6	..	1.0	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.9	48
Estonia	1.3	..	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	56
Italy	0.5	..	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.7	28
Other countries	35.0	35.5	12.9	..	6.7	7.2	6.7	7.2	8.2	9.6	11.4	
Total	215.3	207.9	206.6	..	137.4	136.0	129.7	127.4	131.0	138.2	152.6	47

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/v70bhq>**Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Luxembourg**

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2020 (%)
Portugal	..	60.9	72.5	72.8	73.2	73.3	48
France	..	28.1	39.0	40.6	41.9	43.2	47
Belgium	..	16.8	20.5	20.8	21.0	21.3	46
Italy	..	13.2	17.0	17.7	18.4	19.0	42
Germany	..	14.8	16.5	16.5	16.7	16.7	53
Cape Verde	..	4.6	6.4	6.6	6.9	7.4	53
Spain	..	2.9	4.9	5.2	5.5	5.8	49
United Kingdom	..	4.2	5.1	5.3	5.5	5.5	43
Romania	..	1.9	4.2	4.6	5.1	5.5	59
Poland	..	2.9	4.5	4.6	4.9	5.1	58
China	..	1.9	3.3	3.7	4.0	4.5	55
Brazil	..	1.8	2.9	3.2	3.6	4.2	61
Netherlands	..	3.5	3.9	3.9	3.9	3.9	46
Greece	..	1.2	2.5	2.8	3.1	3.3	50
India	..	0.9	1.8	2.2	2.7	3.3	46
Other countries	..	45.5	65.8	70.0	74.7	79.9	
Total	197.2	205.2	215.3	226.1	237.7	248.9	260.6	270.7	280.8	291.2	301.7	49

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/v70bhq>

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Mexico

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2018 (%)
United States	738.1	739.2	799.1	50
Guatemala	35.3	42.9	32.4	51
Colombia	13.9	18.7	27.9	61
Venezuela	10.1	15.7	24.4	60
Spain	18.9	22.6	19.7	58
Hong Kong, China	18.4	51
Cuba	12.1	12.8	18.2	39
Canada	7.9	9.8	14.8	11
Gabon	0.0	14.2	56
El Salvador	8.1	10.6	13.6	52
Argentina	13.7	14.7	10.5	69
Other countries	103.0	120.1	81.5	
Total	961.1	966.8	973.7	991.2	939.9	1 007.1	1 074.8	50

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/v70bhq>**Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Netherlands**

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2020 (%)
Turkey	196.7	197.4	197.4	196.5	195.1	192.7	191.0	190.8	192.0	194.3	198.0	49
Suriname	186.8	186.2	185.5	184.1	182.6	181.0	179.5	178.6	178.2	178.3	178.8	56
Morocco	167.4	167.7	168.3	168.2	168.5	168.6	168.5	168.7	169.2	170.5	172.2	49
Poland	58.1	66.6	78.2	86.5	96.2	108.5	117.9	126.6	135.6	145.2	155.2	52
Germany	120.5	122.3	122.8	121.8	120.5	119.1	118.6	118.8	119.5	120.6	122.0	58
Indonesia	140.7	137.8	135.1	132.0	129.2	126.4	123.5	120.8	117.9	115.1	112.5	57
Syria	6.9	7.1	7.3	7.7	9.5	17.9	38.5	65.9	81.8	86.7	91.9	44
Former USSR	41.9	45.6	49.2	51.8	53.7	56.4	59.1	62.2	66.6	72.1	78.9	62
China	42.5	44.7	47.5	49.7	51.3	52.5	54.4	56.1	58.3	61.1	64.2	57
Belgium	49.2	50.0	50.9	51.9	52.8	54.0	55.3	56.9	58.6	60.2	61.8	54
United Kingdom	47.1	47.2	47.5	47.8	48.4	49.1	50.2	51.7	53.4	55.8	59.0	44
Former Yugoslavia	52.8	52.7	52.7	52.5	52.5	52.6	52.7	53.1	53.5	54.3	55.6	53
India	17.3	18.2	19.5	20.7	22.2	24.3	27.0	30.6	35.3	41.2	48.2	44
Iraq	40.9	41.0	40.8	40.6	40.5	40.7	40.9	43.1	43.9	44.8	45.4	44
Italy	20.1	20.8	21.6	22.5	23.9	25.7	27.6	29.9	32.4	35.0	38.0	41
Other countries	643.5	663.3	681.9	693.3	706.5	726.8	751.8	783.5	819.6	863.5	918.2	
Total	1 832.5	1 868.7	1 906.3	1 927.7	1 953.4	1 996.3	2 056.5	2 137.2	2 215.9	2 298.7	2 399.8	52

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/v70bhq>

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – New Zealand

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2018 (%)
United Kingdom	255.0	265.5	49
China	89.1	132.9	55
India	67.2	117.3	42
Australia	62.7	75.8	53
South Africa	54.3	71.4	51
Philippines	37.3	67.6	52
Fiji	52.8	62.3	51
Samoa	50.7	55.5	51
Korea	26.6	31.0	54
United States	22.1	27.7	54
Tonga	22.4	26.9	48
Malaysia	16.4	19.9	54
Netherlands	19.9	19.3	50
Germany	12.9	16.6	57
Sri Lanka	9.6	14.3	47
Other countries	202.8	267.7	
Total	1 001.8	1 271.8	51

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/v70bhq>**Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Norway**

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2020 (%)
Poland	49.5	57.1	67.6	76.9	84.2	91.2	96.1	97.6	98.6	99.1	101.5	37
Sweden	41.8	44.6	47.0	47.8	48.6	49.2	49.1	48.3	47.9	47.7	47.7	49
Lithuania	9.9	15.6	22.7	28.6	33.0	35.9	37.4	37.7	38.4	39.4	40.7	42
Syria	1.4	1.5	1.6	2.0	3.1	5.5	9.7	20.8	27.4	30.8	32.0	41
Somalia	18.0	19.4	20.7	23.7	25.9	27.0	28.3	28.7	28.8	28.7	28.6	48
Germany	24.9	26.2	27.3	27.8	27.9	28.2	28.2	28.0	27.8	28.0	28.4	48
Philippines	13.5	14.7	16.3	17.8	19.5	20.6	21.4	22.2	23.1	24.1	25.1	76
Denmark	22.7	22.9	23.3	23.8	24.4	25.3	25.1	24.8	24.6	24.5	24.4	48
Iraq	20.6	21.4	22.0	22.1	22.1	22.2	22.2	22.5	23.1	23.3	23.3	44
Eritrea	4.8	6.6	8.2	10.1	12.4	14.8	17.7	20.1	21.9	22.7	23.2	42
Thailand	13.1	14.1	15.2	16.4	17.3	18.0	18.9	20.1	21.1	22.0	22.8	81
Pakistan	17.2	17.6	18.0	18.6	19.0	19.4	19.7	20.1	20.6	20.9	21.3	48
United Kingdom	16.9	17.5	18.1	18.6	19.0	19.3	19.5	19.4	19.4	19.7	20.3	39
United States	16.0	16.3	16.6	17.0	17.3	17.5	17.6	17.7	17.9	18.4	18.9	51
Russia	13.8	14.6	15.3	16.2	16.8	17.2	17.5	17.7	17.9	18.3	18.7	67
Other countries	242.8	259.0	276.6	296.4	313.9	330.4	344.0	354.1	363.8	374.3	390.8	
Total	526.8	569.1	616.3	663.9	704.5	741.8	772.5	799.8	822.4	841.6	867.8	48

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <https://stat.link/v70bhq>

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Poland

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Ukraine	..	227.5
Germany	..	84.0
Belarus	..	83.6
Lithuania	..	55.6
United Kingdom	..	38.0
Ireland	..	8.4
Other countries	..	177.8
Total	..	675.0	631	625	620	612	626	652	696	761	849	59

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/v70bhq>**Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Portugal**

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Angola	..	162.6	54
Brazil	..	139.7	58
France	..	94.5	54
Mozambique	..	73.1	54
Cape Verde	..	62.0	53
Guinea-Bissau	..	29.6	44
Germany	..	28.0	52
Venezuela	..	25.2	54
Romania	..	23.7	49
United Kingdom	..	19.1	50
Sao Tome and Principe	..	18.6	56
Spain	..	16.5	57
Switzerland	..	16.5	49
South Africa	..	11.5	53
China	..	10.9	48
Other countries	..	140.5
Total	..	871.8	53

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/v70bhq>

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Russia

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2010 (%)
Ukraine	2 942.0	54
Kazakhstan	2 481.9	54
Uzbekistan	1 111.7	47
Azerbaijan	743.9	44
Belarus	740.9	57
Kyrgyzstan	573.3	51
Armenia	511.2	44
Tajikistan	452.2	41
Georgia	436.4	46
Moldova	285.3	47
Turkmenistan	180.0	52
Germany	137.7	50
Latvia	86.7	53
Lithuania	68.9	53
Estonia	57.0	53
Other countries	385.8	
Total	11 194.7	51

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/v70bhq>**Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Slovak Republic**

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2020 (%)
Czech Republic	88.7	88.6	88.2	88.0	87.8	88.0	88.0	88.1	88.2	55
Hungary	17.6	17.7	17.3	17.1	16.8	16.6	16.3	16.1	15.8	48
Ukraine	9.8	9.8	9.9	10.1	10.5	10.7	11.1	11.4	11.8	58
United Kingdom	3.7	4.2	4.8	5.5	6.3	7.2	8.1	9.1	10.2	44
Romania	7.6	7.8	8.1	8.3	8.7	9.1	9.3	9.6	9.7	35
Poland	6.5	6.5	6.7	6.7	6.9	7.0	7.1	7.3	7.4	51
Germany	4.2	4.4	4.6	4.8	5.1	5.4	5.8	6.1	6.5	35
Austria	2.8	3.0	3.1	3.4	3.7	4.0	4.3	4.7	5.0	42
Italy	2.2	2.4	2.7	2.8	3.1	3.4	3.7	3.9	4.0	27
Russia	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.8	2.9	2.9	3.0	3.1	3.1	63
France	3.0	2.9	2.9	2.9	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	43
United States	1.9	2.0	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.6	2.7	46
Bulgaria	2.0	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.3	2.5	2.5	2.6	2.6	31
Serbia	1.7	1.8	1.9	1.9	2.0	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.5	36
Viet Nam	1.9	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.3	2.3	2.4	40
Other countries	13.6	14.6	15.7	16.8	18.2	19.7	21.0	22.2	23.4	
Total	140.7	145.7	169.8	172.6	174.9	177.6	181.6	186.2	190.3	194.4	198.4	48

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/v70bhq>

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Slovenia

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2020 (%)
Bosnia and Herzegovina	102.9	96.9	97.2	98.5	100.0	100.9	102.8	104.7	107.7	116.4	126.4	37
Croatia	56.0	49.2	48.8	48.3	47.7	47.0	46.1	45.6	45.0	44.4	43.9	51
Serbia	20.9	26.4	26.4	26.7	26.9	27.1	24.3	24.6	25.4	27.4	29.5	38
North Macedonia	14.3	13.7	14.2	14.7	15.1	15.6	15.9	16.5	17.1	18.2	19.3	41
Germany	12.3	8.5	8.4	8.0	7.7	7.6	7.4	7.4	7.3	7.3	7.3	48
Italy	4.3	3.1	3.2	3.4	3.5	3.6	3.8	4.0	4.1	4.3	4.3	40
Russia	0.9	1.1	1.2	1.4	1.7	2.1	2.6	2.8	3.0	3.4	3.7	58
Montenegro	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.9	3.4	3.3	3.4	3.4	46
Ukraine	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.8	2.0	2.3	2.5	2.7	2.8	65
Austria	5.5	3.2	3.1	3.0	2.9	2.8	2.7	2.7	2.6	2.7	2.7	50
Bulgaria	0.5	0.8	0.9	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.5	40
China	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	46
France	1.6	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	50
Switzerland	1.4	1.1	1.1	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.9	1.0	47
United States	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.9	46
Other countries	27.6	17.8	18.4	19.3	20.3	21.4	25.7	26.4	27.1	29.5	32.7	
Total	253.8	228.6	230.1	232.7	235.3	237.6	241.2	245.4	250.2	265.1	281.6	41

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/v70bhq>**Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Spain**

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2020 (%)
Morocco	763.7	767.0	762.4	740.1	712.5	699.9	696.8	699.5	713.3	752.2	752.2	45
Romania	727.5	736.3	750.4	715.0	670.1	646.2	627.8	611.9	596.6	587.1	587.1	51
Colombia	376.2	375.9	373.6	366.0	353.2	347.5	347.2	361.5	386.3	431.1	431.1	59
Ecuador	496.7	484.8	471.3	452.4	429.4	416.4	409.4	408.2	408.8	411.9	411.9	53
Venezuela	148.1	151.9	155.8	156.3	154.3	160.5	174.0	199.4	244.7	311.8	311.8	54
Argentina	282.6	276.4	270.9	264.0	255.3	251.8	252.1	255.5	261.1	272.8	296.0	50
United Kingdom	319.1	317.5	318.7	321.1	314.4	306.0	300.3	296.8	288.9	290.2	290.2	50
Peru	197.8	198.6	198.0	193.6	186.9	184.8	185.8	190.5	200.6	216.8	216.8	56
France	210.0	208.3	209.2	208.4	205.4	203.7	204.4	205.7	208.0	211.9	211.9	51
Germany	212.9	210.8	210.2	209.6	204.5	200.6	197.2	195.7	193.2	192.1	192.1	51
Dominican Republic	137.0	141.2	148.0	152.9	154.1	156.9	159.7	164.3	170.4	176.9	176.9	60
China	154.9	161.0	163.7	160.5	155.7	155.7	158.7	161.9	165.8	171.5	171.5	55
Cuba	103.2	109.5	118.6	124.0	127.5	131.1	134.8	139.0	145.0	155.4	155.4	55
Bolivia	216.0	201.6	188.7	174.3	157.5	150.7	148.3	148.6	150.2	153.1	153.1	61
Italy	87.3	89.9	94.8	99.3	102.1	106.3	114.2	123.7	135.4	147.0	147.0	41
Other countries	1 847.0	1 851.6	1 860.5	1 837.1	1 775.3	1 773.1	1 807.6	1 862.4	1 932.6	2 057.0	2 491.6	
Total	6 280.1	6 282.2	6 295.0	6 174.7	5 958.3	5 891.2	5 918.3	6 024.5	6 200.9	6 539.0	6 996.8	52

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/v70bhq>

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Sweden

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Syria	19.6	20.8	22.4	27.5	41.7	67.7	98.2	149.4	172.3	186.0	191.5	44
Iraq	117.9	121.8	125.5	127.9	128.9	130.2	131.9	135.1	140.8	144.0	146.0	46
Finland	172.2	169.5	166.7	163.9	161.1	158.5	156.0	153.6	150.9	147.9	144.6	61
Poland	67.5	70.3	72.9	75.3	78.2	81.7	85.5	88.7	91.2	92.8	93.7	53
Iran	59.9	62.1	63.8	65.6	67.2	68.4	69.1	70.6	74.1	77.4	80.1	47
Somalia	31.7	37.8	40.2	44.0	54.2	57.9	60.6	63.9	66.4	68.7	70.2	51
Former Yugoslavia	71.6	70.8	70.1	69.3	68.6	67.9	67.2	66.5	65.9	65.1	64.3	50
Bosnia and Herzegovina	56.1	56.2	56.3	56.6	56.8	57.3	57.7	58.2	58.9	59.4	60.0	50
Afghanistan	12.7	14.4	17.5	21.5	25.1	28.4	31.3	34.8	44.0	52.0	58.8	34
Turkey	40.8	42.5	43.9	45.1	45.7	46.1	46.4	47.1	48.3	49.9	51.7	45
Germany	47.8	48.2	48.4	48.7	49.0	49.4	49.6	50.2	50.9	51.1	51.4	53
Eritrea	9.0	10.3	12.0	13.7	16.6	21.8	28.6	35.1	39.1	42.3	45.7	45
Thailand	28.7	31.4	33.6	35.6	37.0	38.1	38.8	39.9	41.2	42.4	43.6	78
Norway	43.8	43.4	43.1	42.9	42.5	42.3	42.1	42.1	42.0	41.7	41.6	55
India	16.5	17.9	18.6	19.4	20.6	21.9	23.2	25.7	29.7	35.2	40.6	46
Other countries	542.0	567.6	592.4	616.3	640.2	665.9	690.1	723.6	761.5	799.6	835.8	
Total	1 338.0	1 384.9	1 427.3	1 473.3	1 533.5	1 603.6	1 676.3	1 784.5	1 877.1	1 955.6	2 019.7	50

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/v70bhq>**Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Switzerland**

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2020 (%)
Germany	..	318.9	330.0	337.4	343.6	348.1	350.5	352.2	353.4	355.3	357.4	50
Italy	..	233.1	241.0	244.7	251.3	258.3	263.3	267.3	267.9	268.8	268.9	44
Portugal	..	172.3	187.4	199.2	211.5	218.7	222.3	223.1	220.9	217.7	214.1	46
France	..	132.3	138.4	141.4	146.8	153.1	158.6	162.5	166.3	169.4	172.8	50
Turkey	..	76.0	76.9	77.4	77.9	78.2	78.7	79.2	79.8	80.4	81.6	47
North Macedonia	..	51.7	53.5	55.1	57.0	59.2	61.4	64.3	66.9	69.3	72.3	48
Spain	..	53.5	57.2	59.8	64.1	67.1	68.9	69.4	68.9	68.6	68.3	49
Serbia	..	56.5	59.2	60.1	62.9	63.4	64.6	65.3	65.7	65.9	66.8	51
Austria	..	58.8	59.2	59.7	59.9	60.0	60.1	59.8	59.6	59.2	58.8	59
Bosnia and Herzegovina	..	51.1	52.4	53.2	54.1	55.4	56.4	56.9	57.1	57.4	57.7	53
United Kingdom	..	41.1	43.7	44.2	44.8	45.2	45.2	45.0	45.3	45.7	46.3	46
Brazil	..	32.3	33.4	34.4	35.5	36.6	37.8	39.1	40.9	42.5	44.0	69
Poland	..	21.5	24.0	26.2	28.1	31.6	34.7	36.7	38.7	40.8	42.9	54
United States	..	33.7	34.9	35.4	35.9	36.3	36.6	37.0	37.6	38.6	39.0	52
Sri Lanka	..	28.6	29.6	30.0	30.6	31.3	32.6	34.2	35.1	35.6	35.8	47
Other countries	..	713.9	737.4	760.3	785.6	812.5	844.6	888.0	914.9	938.2	963.2	
Total	..	2 075.2	2 158.4	2 218.4	2 289.6	2 354.8	2 416.4	2 480.0	2 519.1	2 553.4	2 590.0	51

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/v70bhq>

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – Turkey

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2018 (%)
Bulgaria	382.1	378.7	374.0	366.2	362.7	54
Iraq	52.2	97.5	146.1	199.7	283.8	47
Germany	259.1	263.3	272.7	277.9	281.9	53
Syria	66.1	76.4	98.1	109.4	163.8	44
Afghanistan	33.8	38.7	59.3	78.7	115.2	41
Azerbaijan	46.1	52.8	64.2	71.2	85.3	57
Iran	30.2	36.2	47.5	53.8	80.2	48
Turkmenistan	19.9	24.9	30.3	45.2	71.2	58
Uzbekistan	29.6	36.1	43.7	52.1	63.2	64
Russia	30.3	34.5	37.8	37.4	47.2	68
Saudi Arabia	12.6	14.6	17.3	25.6	41.3	45
North Macedonia	44.3	43.4	42.3	41.0	40.0	54
Netherlands	32.0	32.3	34.1	34.1	34.6	54
France	28.1	28.5	33.3	35.3	33.9	51
United Kingdom	32.3	32.1	32.4	29.2	30.6	55
Other countries	361.2	402.3	444.4	467.2	543.7	
Total	1 459.8	1 592.4	1 777.3	1 923.9	2 278.5	52

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/v70bhq>**Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – United Kingdom**

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2020 (%)
India	687	686	750	746	733	784	807	809	862	837	847	51
Poland	534	617	658	650	764	783	883	907	889	827	746	55
Pakistan	382	441	432	476	419	510	525	523	529	533	519	49
Romania	77	82	118	151	162	220	264	340	410	434	370	45
Ireland	401	429	429	400	346	372	391	398	380	358	364	54
Germany	301	292	303	343	279	252	299	299	309	305	310	56
Bangladesh	193	219	191	184	187	198	220	247	259	259	251	49
Italy	130	150	135	142	159	168	188	220	237	246	240	47
South Africa	227	208	208	224	201	178	200	245	235	255	229	52
Nigeria	167	203	162	202	170	206	212	190	205	207	219	51
China	118	148	99	116	118	114	209	226	210	198	211	55
Portugal	91	104	84	114	111	141	141	142	132	149	175	50
France	122	132	146	128	127	174	146	164	178	183	169	56
United States	193	159	203	216	186	158	179	163	159	174	168	55
Philippines	110	140	134	129	124	150	148	143	144	144	167	64
Total	7 056	7 430	7 588	7 860	8 064	8 482	8 988	9 369	9 183	9 482	9 539	..

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/v70bhq>

Table B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth – United States

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Mexico	11 746.5	11 691.6	11 489.4	11 556.5	11 714.5	11 643.3	11 573.7	11 269.9	11 171.9	10 931.9
India	1 796.5	1 855.7	1 974.3	2 036.3	2 205.9	2 389.6	2 434.5	2 610.5	2 652.9	2 688.1
China	1 604.4	1 651.5	1 719.8	1 786.1	1 929.5	2 065.4	2 130.4	2 216.8	2 221.9	2 250.2
Philippines	1 766.5	1 814.9	1 862.0	1 863.5	1 926.3	1 982.4	1 941.7	2 008.1	2 013.8	2 045.2
El Salvador	1 207.1	1 245.5	1 254.5	1 247.5	1 315.5	1 352.4	1 387.0	1 401.8	1 419.3	1 412.1
Viet Nam	1 243.8	1 253.9	1 264.2	1 308.2	1 291.8	1 300.5	1 352.8	1 342.6	1 345.8	1 383.8
Cuba	1 112.1	1 090.6	1 114.9	1 138.2	1 172.9	1 210.7	1 271.6	1 311.8	1 344.0	1 360.0
Dominican Republic	879.9	878.9	960.2	1 010.7	997.7	1 063.2	1 085.3	1 162.6	1 177.9	1 169.4
Guatemala	797.3	844.3	880.9	900.5	915.6	927.6	935.7	958.8	1 007.0	1 111.5
Korea	1 086.9	1 095.1	1 105.7	1 081.2	1 079.8	1 060.0	1 041.7	1 063.1	1 039.1	1 038.9
Colombia	648.3	655.1	705.0	679.6	706.8	699.4	704.6	783.0	789.6	808.1
Canada	785.6	787.5	799.1	841.1	806.4	830.6	783.2	809.3	813.7	797.2
Jamaica	650.8	694.6	668.8	705.3	705.8	711.1	736.3	744.7	733.4	772.2
Honduras	518.4	500.0	535.7	539.2	588.3	599.0	651.1	655.4	646.3	745.8
Haiti	596.4	602.7	616.0	599.6	628.0	675.5	668.2	679.8	687.2	701.7
Other countries	13 476.3	13 719.7	13 787.8	14 050.7	14 405.9	14 778.8	15 041.1	15 507.4	15 665.0	15 716.6
Total	39 916.9	40 381.6	40 738.2	41 344.4	42 390.7	43 289.6	43 738.9	44 525.5	44 728.5	44 932.8

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/v70bhq>

Metadata related to Tables A.4. and B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population

Country	Comments	Source
Australia	Ⓒ Estimated residential population. <i>Reference date:</i> 30 June.	Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS).
Austria	Ⓒ Stock of foreign-born residents recorded in the population register. <i>Reference date:</i> 1 January.	Population Register, Statistics Austria.
Belgium	Ⓒ Stock of foreign-born recorded in the population register. Includes asylum seekers from 2008 on.	Population Register, Directorate for Statistics and Economic Information (DGSIE).
Canada	Ⓒ 2011: National Household Survey. The foreign-born population covers all persons who are or have ever been a landed immigrant/permanent resident in Canada. The foreign-born population does not include non-permanent residents, on employment or student authorizations, or who are refugee claimants. Ⓒ 2016: 2016 Census, 25% sample data. ε PM for other years.	Statistics Canada.
Chile	Ⓒ Register of residence permits.	Department of Foreigners and Migration, Ministry of the Interior.
Czech Republic	Ⓒ 2011 Census. ε CM for other years.	Czech Statistical Office.
Denmark	Ⓒ Immigrants according to the national definition, e.g. persons born abroad to parents both foreigner or born abroad. When no information is available on the parents' nationality/country of birth, foreign-born persons are classified as immigrants.	Statistics Denmark.
Estonia	Ⓒ National population register.	Ministry of the Interior.
Finland	Ⓒ Population register. Includes foreign-born persons of Finnish origin.	Central Population Register, Statistics Finland.
France	From 2006 on, annual censuses. From 2016 on estimated totals are based on Eurostat data. Includes the département of Mayotte from 2014. Includes persons who were born French abroad.	National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE).
Germany	Ⓒ Microcensus. Includes ethnic Germans (<i>Aussiedler</i>). Excludes people in shared/community accommodation, notably some refugees/asylum seekers.	Federal Statistical Office.
Greece	Totals in Table A.4 (Eurostat dataset) are not comparable to data presented in Table B.4 by country of birth (Labour Force Survey data, foreign-born population aged 15 and above; 4th quarter prior to 2014; 2nd quarter from 2014 on).	Eurostat and Hellenic Statistical authority.
Hungary	Ⓒ From 2010 on, includes third-country nationals holding a temporary residence permit (for a year or more). From 2011 on, includes persons under subsidiary protection. Data for 2011 were adjusted to match the October census results. <i>Reference date:</i> 1 January.	Office of Immigration and Nationality; Central Office Administrative and Electronic Public Services (Central Population Register); Central Statistical Office.
Iceland	Ⓒ National population register. Numbers from the register are likely to be overestimated. <i>Reference date:</i> 1 January.	Statistics Iceland.
Ireland	Ⓒ 2011 and 2016 Censuses. Persons usually resident and present in their usual residence on census night. ε PM for other years.	Central Statistics Office.
Israel	Estimates are based on the results of the Population Censuses and on the changes that occurred in the population after the Censuses, as recorded in the Population Register. They include Jews and foreign-born members of other religions (usually family members of Jewish immigrants). The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.	Central Bureau of Statistics.
Italy	Ⓒ Population register.	National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT).

Country	Comments	Source
Latvia	® Population register. <i>Reference date: 1 January.</i>	Central Statistical Office.
Lithuania	<i>Reference date: 1 January.</i>	Eurostat
Luxembourg	® 2011: Census. ε CM for other years.	Central Office of Statistics and Economic Studies (Statec).
Mexico	® 2010 census; 2015 Intercensal Survey. ε Other years, estimation from the National Survey on Occupation and Employment (ENOE).	National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI).
Netherlands	® <i>Reference date: 1 January.</i>	Population register, Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS).
New Zealand	® 2013 and 2018 Censuses. ε PM for other years.	Statistics New Zealand.
Norway	® <i>Reference date: 1 January.</i>	Central Population Register, Statistics Norway.
Poland	® 2011 Census. Excluding foreign temporary residents who, at the time of the census, had been staying at a given address in Poland for less than 12 months. Country of birth in accordance with administrative boundaries at the time of the census. From 2012 on, estimates based on Eurostat data.	Central Statistical Office and Eurostat.
Portugal	® 2011 census. From 2012 on, estimates based on Eurostat data.	National Statistical Institute (INE).
Russia	® 2010 Census.	Federal state statistics service (Rosstat).
Slovak Republic	® Population Register.	Ministry of the Interior.
Slovenia		Eurostat.
Spain	® Population register. Foreign-born recorded in the Municipal Registers irrespective of their legal status. <i>Reference date: 1 January.</i>	Municipal Registers, National Statistics Institute (INE).
Sweden	® <i>Reference date: 1 January.</i>	Population Register, Statistics Sweden.
Switzerland	® From 2011 on, Population Register of the Confederation. ε CM for other years.	Federal Statistical Office.
Turkey		Ministry of Labour and Social Security.
United Kingdom	® From 2006 on: Foreign-born residents in the Labour Force Survey. Figures are rounded to the closest thousand.	Office for National Statistics.
United States	® Includes persons who are naturalised and persons who are in an unauthorised status. Excludes children born abroad to US citizen parents.	American Community Survey, Census Bureau.

Notes: ® Observed figures. ε Estimates (in italic) made by means of the complement method (CM) or the parametric method (PM). No estimate is made by country of birth (Tables B.4). Data for Serbia include persons from Serbia, Montenegro and Serbia and Montenegro. Some statements may refer to nationalities/countries of birth not shown in this annex but available on line at: <http://stats.oecd.org/>.

Table A.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality in OECD countries and in Russia

Thousands and percentages

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Austria	883.6	913.2	951.4	1 004.3	1 066.1	1 146.1	1 267.7	1 341.9	1 395.9	1 438.9	1 486.2
% of total population	10.5	10.8	11.2	11.7	12.4	13.2	14.5	15.2	15.7	16.1	16.5
Belgium	1 057.7	1 168.6	1 206.5	1 231.3	1 241.2	1 276.9	1 333.2	1 353.8	1 376.4	1 413.8	1 478.8
% of total population	9.7	10.6	10.9	11.0	11.1	11.3	11.7	11.9	12.0	12.3	12.8
Canada	..	1 957.0	2 404.8
% of total population	..	5.8	6.7
Chile	952.7	..	1 251.2	1 492.5
% of total population	5.3	..	6.8	8.0
Czech Republic	432.5	424.3	434.2	435.9	439.2	449.4	464.7	493.4	524.1	564.3	593.4
% of total population	4.1	4.0	4.1	4.1	4.1	4.2	4.4	4.6	4.9	2 5.3	5.5
Denmark	329.9	346.0	358.9	374.7	397.3	422.6	463.1	485.0	506.0	525.8	537.1
% of total population	5.9	6.2	6.4	6.6	7.0	7.4	8.1	8.5	8.8	9.1	9.3
Estonia	211.1	210.9	211.7	211.4	211.5	212.2	213.7	216.4	215.6
% of total population	16.0	16.0	16.1	16.1	16.1	16.1	16.2	16.3	16.3
Finland	155.7	168.0	183.1	195.5	207.5	219.7	229.8	243.6	249.5	257.6	267.6
% of total population	2.9	3.1	3.4	3.6	3.8	4.0	4.2	4.4	4.5	4.7	4.8
France	3 818.0	3 889.0	3 980.0	4 084.0	4 289.0	4 428.0	4 542.0	4 704.0	4 769.4	4 986.9	..
% of total population	6.1	6.2	6.3	6.5	6.7	6.9	7.1	7.3	7.4	7.7	..
Germany	6 694.8	6 753.6	6 930.9	7 213.7	7 633.6	8 153.0	9 107.9	10 039.1	10 623.9	10 915.5	11 228.3
% of total population	8.3	8.4	8.6	8.9	9.4	10.0	11.1	12.1	12.8	13.1	13.4
Greece	931.4	934.4	921.4	886.5	855.0	822.0	798.4	810.0	816.1	831.7	906.3
% of total population	8.4	8.5	8.5	8.2	7.9	7.7	7.5	7.6	7.7	7.9	8.6
Hungary	197.8	206.9	143.4	141.4	140.5	146.0	156.6	151.1	161.8	180.8	200.0
% of total population	2.0	2.1	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.9	2.1
Iceland	21.7	21.1	21.0	21.4	22.7	24.3	26.5	30.3	37.8	44.3	49.4
% of total population	6.8	6.5	6.4	6.6	6.9	7.4	8.0	9.1	11.2	13.1	14.5
Ireland	575.4	598.1	599.9	601.8	603.7	605.5	607.4	566.6	593.5	622.7	644.4
% of total population	13.0	13.3	13.2	13.1	13.1	13.1	13.1	12.2	12.6	13.1	13.4
Italy	3 648.1	3 879.2	4 052.1	4 387.7	4 921.3	5 014.4	5 026.9	5 047.0	5 144.4	4 996.2	5 039.6
% of total population	6.1	6.5	6.8	7.3	8.1	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.5	8.3	8.3
Japan	2 184.7	2 132.9	2 078.5	2 033.7	2 066.4	2 121.8	2 232.2	2 382.8	2 561.8	2 731.1	2 933.1
% of total population	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.9	2.0	2.2	2.3
Korea	1 088.6	1 200.1	1 202.3	1 303.8	1 488.9	1 594.8	1 662.8	1 749.6	1 951.1	2 024.6	..
% of total population	2.2	2.4	2.4	2.6	2.9	3.1	3.3	3.4	3.8	4.0	..
Latvia	362.4	342.8	324.3	315.4	304.8	298.4	288.9	279.4	272.5	266.6	260.4
% of total population	17.1	16.4	15.7	15.4	15.1	14.9	14.6	14.3	14.1	14.0	13.8
Lithuania	27.3	24.0	22.9	22.2	21.6	22.5	18.7	20.1	27.3	47.2	65.8
% of total population	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.6	0.7	1.0	1.7	2.4
Luxembourg	216.3	220.5	229.9	238.8	248.9	258.7	269.2	281.5	288.2	291.5	296.5
% of total population	42.6	42.5	43.3	44.0	44.9	45.6	46.5	47.6	47.7	47.3	47.4
Mexico	281.1	303.9	296.4	..	326.0	355.2	381.8	423.9	462.0	480.3	..
% of total population	0.2	0.3	0.3	..	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	..
Netherlands	735.2	760.4	786.1	796.2	816.0	847.3	900.5	972.3	1 040.8	1 110.9	1 192.3
% of total population	4.4	4.5	4.7	4.7	4.8	5.0	5.3	5.7	6.1	6.5	7.0
Norway	333.9	369.2	407.3	448.8	483.2	512.2	538.2	559.2	567.8	584.2	604.5
% of total population	6.8	7.5	8.1	8.8	9.4	9.8	10.3	10.6	10.6	10.9	11.2
Poland	75.2	79.3	85.8	93.3	101.2	108.3	149.6	210.3	239.2	289.8	358.2
of total population	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.9

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Portugal	454.2	445.3	436.8	417.0	401.3	395.2	388.7	397.7	421.7	480.3	590.3
% of total population	4.3	4.2	4.1	4.0	3.9	3.8	3.8	3.9	4.1	4.7	5.8
Russia	687.0	490.3	621.0	715.8	872.6	1 039.0	1 104.7	1 130.8	1 134.5	1 038.2	..
% of total population	0.5	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.7	..
Slovak Republic	62.9	68.0	53.4	56.5	59.2	61.8	65.8	69.7	72.9	76.1	78.9
% of total population	1.2	1.3	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.4
Slovenia	82.2	82.7	85.6	91.4	96.6	101.5	107.8	114.4	121.9	138.2	156.4
% of total population	4.0	4.0	4.2	4.4	4.7	4.9	5.2	5.5	5.9	6.6	7.5
Spain	5 402.6	5 312.4	5 236.0	5 072.7	4 677.1	4 454.4	4 417.5	4 419.5	4 563.0	4 840.2	5 226.9
% of total population	11.5	11.3	11.1	10.8	10.0	9.5	9.5	9.5	9.8	10.4	11.2
Sweden	602.9	633.3	655.1	667.2	694.7	739.4	782.8	851.9	897.3	932.3	940.6
% of total population	6.4	6.7	6.9	6.9	7.2	7.6	8.0	8.6	9.0	9.3	9.3
Switzerland	1 680.2	1 720.4	1 772.3	1 825.1	1 886.6	1 947.0	1 993.9	2 029.5	2 053.6	2 081.2	2 111.4
% of total population	21.5	21.8	22.1	22.5	23.0	23.5	23.8	24.0	24.1	24.2	24.4
Turkey	167.3	190.5	242.1	278.7	456.5	518.3	650.3	816.4	919.1	1 211.0	1 531.2
% of total population	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.7	0.8	1.0	1.1	1.5	1.8
United Kingdom	4 524.0	4 785.0	4 788.0	4 941.0	5 154.0	5 592.0	5 951.0	6 137.0	5 991.0	6 227.0	..
% of total population	7.1	7.5	7.4	7.6	7.9	8.5	9.0	9.2	8.9	9.2	..
United States	21 641.0	22 460.6	22 225.5	22 115.0	22 016.4	22 263.4	22 426.2	22 415.3	22 595.7	22 518.8	..
% of total population	7.0	7.2	7.1	7.0	6.9	6.9	6.9	6.9	6.9	6.8	..

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the Tables B.5.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/z7h25u>

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Austria

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2020 (%)
Germany	136.0	144.1	150.9	157.8	164.8	170.5	176.5	181.6	186.8	192.4	200.0	50
Romania	36.0	41.6	47.3	53.3	59.7	73.4	82.9	92.1	102.3	112.7	123.5	51
Serbia	109.4	110.5	110.4	111.3	112.5	114.3	116.6	118.5	120.2	121.3	122.1	49
Turkey	111.3	112.5	112.9	113.7	114.7	115.4	116.0	116.8	117.3	117.2	117.6	49
Bosnia and Herzegovina	90.5	89.6	89.6	89.9	91.0	92.5	94.0	94.6	95.2	95.8	96.6	46
Hungary	23.3	25.6	29.8	37.0	46.3	54.9	63.6	70.6	77.1	82.7	87.5	52
Croatia	58.5	58.3	58.3	58.6	62.0	66.5	70.2	73.3	76.7	80.0	83.6	47
Poland	37.2	38.6	42.1	46.0	50.3	54.3	57.6	60.1	62.2	63.4	64.4	47
Syria	1.5	1.6	1.9	2.7	4.3	11.3	33.3	41.7	48.1	49.8	51.5	42
Afghanistan	5.7	6.7	9.4	12.4	14.0	16.8	35.6	45.3	45.7	44.4	43.7	34
Slovak Republic	19.2	20.4	22.5	25.3	28.6	32.1	35.3	38.1	40.2	42.0	43.6	60
Russia	23.4	24.2	25.5	27.3	28.8	30.0	31.2	32.0	32.4	32.6	32.9	58
Bulgaria	9.8	11.2	12.5	14.1	15.9	19.6	22.4	24.9	27.4	29.9	32.5	51
Italy	14.5	15.4	16.2	17.8	20.2	22.5	25.3	27.3	29.2	30.9	32.5	42
North Macedonia	18.1	18.6	18.9	19.4	20.1	20.9	21.7	22.4	23.1	23.4	24.1	49
Other countries	189.0	194.5	203.3	217.7	233.0	251.3	285.3	302.7	312.0	320.3	330.2	
Total	883.6	913.2	951.4	1 004.3	1 066.1	1 146.1	1 267.7	1 341.9	1 395.9	1 438.9	1 486.2	49

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/xw13a6>**Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Belgium**

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2020 (%)
France	140.2	145.3	149.8	153.3	155.9	158.8	161.8	163.7	164.9	166.9	170.9	52
Netherlands	133.5	137.8	141.1	143.8	146.0	148.9	151.7	153.2	154.7	157.1	159.5	48
Italy	165.1	162.8	159.6	157.4	156.4	156.6	156.8	156.3	155.6	155.5	155.7	46
Romania	26.4	34.2	42.4	50.9	56.7	65.3	73.2	79.8	86.6	94.9	105.5	44
Morocco	81.9	84.8	86.2	83.4	80.9	82.3	83.0	82.6	81.3	80.3	80.9	53
Poland	43.1	49.7	55.9	61.4	64.9	68.1	70.4	71.1	71.2	71.0	71.0	52
Spain	45.2	48.0	50.8	54.3	57.3	59.9	61.7	62.6	63.6	65.1	67.9	49
Portugal	33.1	34.5	36.0	38.7	41.1	42.6	44.2	45.6	46.4	47.5	49.1	47
Bulgaria	13.2	17.8	20.4	23.4	25.6	28.6	31.3	32.9	34.8	37.0	40.6	48
Germany	39.4	39.8	39.9	39.7	39.4	39.1	39.3	39.3	39.2	39.5	39.7	51
Turkey	39.6	40.8	40.1	38.7	37.4	37.2	37.1	37.0	37.0	37.5	38.8	48
Syria	1.8	2.9	3.1	3.8	4.6	7.4	18.0	22.1	27.5	30.8	33.1	44
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	18.1	22.5	22.6	22.5	22.0	22.1	22.3	22.3	22.5	22.5	22.8	51
Afghanistan	2.1	4.8	7.2	8.8	8.5	9.6	17.5	19.0	19.2	19.7	22.7	30
United Kingdom	25.0	25.0	24.8	24.5	24.1	23.9	23.5	22.8	21.2	20.2	19.1	43
Other countries	250.0	317.9	326.7	326.6	320.3	326.6	341.7	343.5	350.8	368.3	401.7	
Total	1 057.7	1 168.6	1 206.5	1 231.3	1 241.2	1 276.9	1 333.2	1 353.8	1 376.4	1 413.8	1 478.8	49

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/xw13a6>

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Canada

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2016 (%)
China	340.6	53
India	274.2	47
Philippines	259.2	58
United States	149.7	55
United Kingdom	113.9	48
France	65.2	46
Korea	60.5	56
Pakistan	59.2	49
Iran	52.2	50
Germany	46.6	52
Syria	35.9	49
Mexico	35.6	49
Haiti	27.7	54
Nigeria	27.2	47
Italy	27.2	51
Other countries	829.9	
Total	..	1 957.0	2 404.8	52

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/xw13a6>**Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Chile**

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2017 (%)
Argentina	501.3
Venezuela	117.1
Haiti	108.9
Bolivia	81.1
Peru	52.4
Colombia	33.7
Brazil	20.9
Ecuador	7.2
Australia	2.9
China	2.6
Uruguay	2.5
France	2.3
Spain	2.3
Germany	1.8
Israel	1.3
Other countries	14.4
Total	952.7	..	1 251.2	1 492.5	..

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/xw13a6>

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Czech Republic

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2020 (%)
Ukraine	131.9	124.3	118.9	112.5	105.1	104.2	105.6	109.9	117.1	131.3	145.2	45
Slovak Republic	73.4	71.8	81.3	85.8	90.9	96.2	101.6	107.3	111.8	116.8	121.3	46
Viet Nam	61.1	60.3	58.2	57.3	57.3	56.6	56.9	58.0	59.8	61.1	61.9	46
Russia	30.3	31.8	32.4	33.0	33.1	34.4	34.7	35.8	36.6	38.0	38.0	56
Poland	19.3	18.2	19.1	19.2	19.5	19.6	19.8	20.3	20.7	21.3	21.8	48
Germany	13.8	13.9	15.8	17.1	18.5	19.7	20.5	21.2	21.3	21.3	21.5	19
Bulgaria	6.4	6.9	7.4	8.2	9.1	10.1	11.0	12.3	13.8	15.6	17.2	37
Romania	4.1	4.4	4.8	5.7	6.8	7.7	9.1	10.8	12.6	14.7	16.8	33
Mongolia	5.7	5.6	5.4	5.3	5.3	5.5	6.0	6.8	7.9	9.1	9.8	53
United Kingdom	4.4	4.4	4.9	5.2	5.4	5.6	6.0	6.3	6.7	7.1	8.3	24
Hungary	0.7	0.7	0.8	1.0	1.5	2.3	3.1	4.1	5.4	6.6	7.7	37
China	5.4	5.5	5.6	5.6	5.5	5.6	5.7	6.1	6.9	7.5	7.7	47
United States	5.6	6.1	7.3	7.0	7.1	6.5	6.5	8.8	9.6	9.5	7.2	41
Belarus	4.0	4.2	4.2	4.3	4.3	4.4	4.5	4.7	5.2	6.2	6.9	47
Kazakhstan	3.9	4.2	4.5	4.8	4.8	5.0	5.1	5.5	5.7	6.0	5.9	56
Other countries	62.5	62.0	63.5	63.9	64.8	66.0	68.5	75.7	83.3	92.3	96.1	
Total	432.5	424.3	434.2	435.9	439.2	449.4	464.7	493.4	524.1	564.3	593.4	43

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/xw13a6>**Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Denmark**

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2020 (%)
Poland	21.1	22.6	24.5	26.8	29.3	32.3	35.3	37.6	39.3	40.5	40.8	45
Syria	0.9	1.3	1.9	2.7	4.4	9.8	21.6	31.0	33.6	34.7	34.9	45
Romania	5.1	6.9	9.5	12.4	15.4	18.8	22.4	25.3	27.8	30.7	32.4	42
Turkey	29.0	29.2	29.0	28.8	28.9	28.8	28.8	28.1	28.2	28.3	28.4	49
Germany	21.1	21.6	22.1	22.4	22.7	23.0	23.7	24.4	24.8	25.5	26.1	50
United Kingdom	14.3	14.7	15.0	15.4	15.8	16.1	16.7	17.6	18.3	18.8	19.0	36
Norway	15.0	15.1	15.3	15.3	15.5	15.8	16.4	16.7	16.8	16.8	17.0	61
Sweden	12.8	12.9	13.1	13.4	13.9	14.4	14.9	15.1	15.7	16.1	16.5	57
Lithuania	5.2	6.5	7.7	8.7	9.7	10.4	11.5	12.4	13.5	14.5	14.7	48
Ukraine	6.1	6.1	6.3	6.6	7.0	7.9	8.6	9.2	10.2	11.7	12.7	49
India	4.0	4.5	4.9	5.1	5.6	6.3	7.5	8.7	9.6	10.9	12.0	44
China	7.4	7.6	7.5	7.8	8.4	8.9	9.6	10.1	10.5	10.9	11.3	58
Italy	4.4	4.8	5.1	5.7	6.4	7.2	8.1	9.0	9.6	10.2	10.9	39
Bulgaria	2.3	3.2	4.0	5.0	6.1	7.2	8.2	9.0	9.7	10.4	10.8	42
Pakistan	7.1	7.8	8.2	8.6	9.2	9.8	10.1	9.9	10.1	10.4	10.7	51
Other countries	174.2	181.4	185.0	190.1	199.1	205.6	219.7	220.8	228.3	235.3	238.9	
Total	329.9	346.0	358.9	374.7	397.3	422.6	463.1	485.0	506.0	525.8	537.1	49

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/xw13a6>

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Estonia

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2020 (%)
Russia	96.5	95.1	93.6	92.6	91.4	90.3	89.0	88.1	86.0	53
Ukraine	5.4	5.5	5.7	6.3	7.2	7.8	8.3	9.3	10.4	41
Finland	4.3	5.0	5.7	6.3	6.9	7.6	8.2	8.8	9.2	35
Latvia	2.6	2.9	3.3	3.6	3.9	4.2	5.0	5.6	6.3	41
Germany	1.4	1.7	1.9	2.2	2.6	3.0	3.3	3.6	3.9	45
Lithuania	1.8	1.8	2.0	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.6	43
Italy	0.6	0.8	0.9	1.1	1.3	1.5	1.7	2.0	2.2	36
Belarus	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.9	2.0	52
France	0.5	0.6	0.8	0.9	1.1	1.3	1.5	1.7	2.0	40
United Kingdom	0.7	0.8	0.9	0.9	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.6	23
Sweden	0.8	0.9	1.0	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.3	1.4	1.5	22
Spain	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.7	0.8	1.0	1.1	1.3	1.4	42
Poland	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.1	42
Romania	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	1.0	21
India	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.9	29
Other countries	93.9	93.0	92.5	90.7	88.8	87.4	86.7	86.1	83.6	
Total	211.1	210.9	211.7	211.4	211.5	212.2	213.7	216.4	215.6	47

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/xw13a6>**Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Finland**

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2020 (%)
Estonia	25.5	29.1	34.0	39.8	44.8	48.4	50.4	51.5	51.5	51.5	50.9	49
Russia	28.2	28.4	29.6	30.2	30.8	30.6	30.8	31.0	29.2	28.7	28.5	55
Iraq	4.0	5.0	5.7	5.9	6.4	6.8	7.1	9.8	11.7	13.1	13.9	35
China	5.2	5.6	6.2	6.6	7.1	7.6	8.0	8.5	8.7	9.2	9.8	54
Sweden	8.5	8.5	8.5	8.4	8.4	8.3	8.2	8.0	8.0	8.0	8.0	40
Thailand	4.5	5.0	5.5	6.0	6.5	6.9	7.2	7.5	7.5	7.6	7.8	86
India	3.2	3.5	3.8	4.0	4.4	4.7	5.0	5.0	5.2	5.7	6.8	40
Afghanistan	2.3	2.5	2.8	3.0	3.2	3.5	3.7	5.3	5.8	6.2	6.7	38
Syria	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.5	1.0	1.6	3.4	5.3	6.0	6.6	46
Somalia	5.6	6.6	7.4	7.5	7.5	7.4	7.3	7.0	6.7	6.4	6.4	48
Viet Nam	2.5	2.8	3.1	3.3	3.6	4.0	4.6	5.3	5.6	5.9	6.4	53
Turkey	3.8	4.0	4.2	4.3	4.4	4.5	4.6	4.7	4.7	4.8	5.2	37
Ukraine	2.0	2.1	2.3	2.5	2.7	3.0	3.4	3.8	4.0	4.6	5.1	48
United Kingdom	3.3	3.5	3.7	3.9	4.0	4.3	4.4	4.6	4.5	4.6	4.7	19
Poland	2.1	2.2	2.5	2.9	3.3	3.7	4.0	4.2	4.3	4.4	4.5	41
Other countries	54.9	59.0	63.7	66.9	70.1	75.0	79.5	84.2	86.7	90.7	96.4	
Total	155.7	168.0	183.1	195.5	207.5	219.7	229.8	243.6	249.5	257.6	267.6	45

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/xw13a6>

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – France

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2015 (%)
Portugal	497.6	501.8	509.3	519.5	530.6	541.6	546.1	548.7	47
Algeria	466.4	466.6	469.6	476.5	483.8	495.7	505.6	518.1	48
Morocco	435.2	433.4	436.4	443.4	448.5	458.2	464.9	472.6	49
Turkey	221.2	219.8	217.8	216.4	215.7	215.5	212.5	211.8	47
Italy	172.7	172.6	174.9	177.2	181.3	187.9	194.6	202.6	45
Tunisia	147.1	150.4	155.0	161.5	168.0	173.0	178.9	187.1	41
Spain	128.0	129.1	133.4	138.7	144.4	152.2	157.4	163.6	50
United Kingdom	156.3	157.0	156.4	153.6	151.8	150.4	148.2	146.1	49
China	86.2	90.1	93.8	96.2	97.6	100.6	100.4	102.1	57
Belgium	92.9	94.7	95.1	96.1	97.4	99.2	100.4	101.7	52
Romania	49.3	57.6	64.8	74.3	86.9	96.9	106.2	116.8	50
Germany	93.3	93.7	93.4	91.7	90.8	89.8	88.2	86.6	55
Mali	63.3	64.9	66.8	69.7	71.0	73.4	75.5	78.1	40
Haiti	58.0	62.7	64.2	65.8	68.6	72.5	74.6	77.5	55
Senegal	51.7	52.6	54.8	57.4	59.8	62.8	65.2	69.2	44
Other countries	1 102.2	1 145.8	1 194.9	1 245.9	1 303.9	1 365.7	1 523.3	1 621.4	
Total	3 821.5	3 892.8	3 980.6	4 083.9	4 199.9	4 335.4	4 542.0	4 704.0	4 616.8	4 763.3	..	50

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/xw13a6>**Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Germany**

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2020 (%)
Turkey	1 658.1	1 629.5	1 607.2	1 575.7	1 549.8	1 527.1	1 506.1	1 492.6	1 483.5	1 476.4	1 472.4	48
Poland	398.5	419.4	468.5	532.4	609.9	674.2	741.0	783.1	866.9	860.1	862.5	46
Syria	28.9	30.1	32.9	40.4	56.9	118.2	366.6	637.8	699.0	745.6	789.5	41
Romania	105.0	126.5	159.2	205.0	267.4	355.3	452.7	533.7	622.8	696.3	748.2	43
Italy	517.5	517.5	520.2	529.4	552.9	574.5	596.1	611.5	643.1	643.5	646.5	42
Croatia	221.2	220.2	223.0	225.0	240.5	263.3	297.9	332.6	367.9	395.7	414.9	46
Greece	278.1	276.7	283.7	298.3	316.3	328.6	339.9	348.5	362.2	363.2	363.7	46
Bulgaria	61.9	74.9	93.9	118.8	146.8	183.3	226.9	263.3	310.4	337.0	360.2	46
Afghanistan	48.8	51.3	56.6	61.8	67.0	75.4	131.5	253.5	251.6	257.1	263.4	36
Russia	189.3	191.3	195.3	202.1	216.3	221.4	231.0	245.4	249.2	254.3	260.4	63
Iraq	79.4	81.3	82.4	84.1	85.5	88.7	136.4	227.2	237.4	247.8	255.1	42
Serbia	164.9	179.0	198.0	202.5	205.0	220.9	230.4	223.1	225.5	231.2	237.8	49
Hungary	61.4	68.9	82.8	107.4	135.6	156.8	178.2	192.3	207.0	212.4	211.7	43
Bosnia and Herzegovina	154.6	152.4	153.5	155.3	157.5	163.5	168.0	172.6	181.0	190.5	203.3	47
Austria	174.5	175.2	175.9	176.3	178.8	179.8	181.8	183.6	191.3	187.4	186.7	49
Other countries	2 552.7	2 559.3	2 598.0	2 699.3	2 847.4	3 021.9	3 323.4	3 538.4	3 725.2	3 816.9	3 952.2	
Total	6 694.8	6 753.6	6 930.9	7 213.7	7 633.6	8 153.0	9 107.9	10 039.1	10 623.9	10 915.5	11 228.3	46

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/xw13a6>

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Greece

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2016 (%)
Albania	501.7	485.0	449.7	471.5	410.4	436.9	369.1	49
Bulgaria	54.5	48.4	47.3	38.4	46.2	43.3	31.1	70
Romania	33.8	33.3	40.6	38.5	30.9	28.8	23.8	52
Georgia	33.9	32.8	28.0	23.5	19.8	19.4	16.2	73
Pakistan	23.0	21.2	24.1	24.5	17.0	19.0	12.0	9
Russia	19.5	14.1	12.0	15.1	12.4	10.9	11.8	80
Ukraine	13.7	12.2	10.8	10.7	8.3	8.1	11.0	81
Turkey	2.8	5.6	2.5	0.2	1.6	2.9	10.5	56
Poland	11.2	10.2	7.5	11.3	15.0	20.3	9.3	71
Cyprus	11.8	9.9	12.1	11.2	12.0	10.4	9.0	56
Bangladesh	12.5	14.6	10.5	7.5	6.7	8.4	7.3	12
Germany	7.3	9.6	6.2	5.2	6.8	4.6	7.0	55
India	7.7	8.0	2.8	5.4	4.5	4.5	6.4	39
United Kingdom	7.5	7.3	7.6	9.5	8.7	12.0	5.9	74
Egypt	10.3	9.5	10.9	10.4	3.3	4.7	4.7	26
Other countries	88.6	88.4	84.7	85.1	83.5	72.5	151.1	
Total	839.7	810.0	757.4	768.1	687.1	706.7	686.4	538.4

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/xw13a6>**Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Hungary**

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2020 (%)
Ukraine	17.2	16.5	11.9	10.8	8.3	6.9	6.7	5.8	10.5	24.2	30.3	35
Romania	72.7	76.9	41.6	34.8	30.9	28.6	29.7	24.0	22.7	21.0	22.2	33
China	11.2	11.8	10.1	11.5	12.7	16.5	19.8	19.1	19.9	18.9	19.7	50
Germany	18.7	20.2	15.8	17.4	18.7	18.8	19.4	18.6	17.9	16.5	18.3	44
Slovak Republic	6.4	7.3	6.7	7.6	8.3	8.7	9.4	9.5	9.7	9.6	10.6	57
Viet Nam	3.1	3.1	2.6	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.2	3.3	3.7	4.7	5.7	47
Russia	3.3	3.5	2.9	3.4	3.7	4.3	4.9	4.9	4.8	5.1	5.3	61
Serbia	17.2	16.3	8.3	4.9	3.1	2.4	2.4	2.3	3.4	5.3	5.0	28
Italy	1.6	1.8	1.6	2.0	2.3	2.7	3.1	3.4	3.6	3.6	4.0	29
United Kingdom	2.4	2.5	2.1	2.4	2.6	2.8	3.0	3.1	3.2	3.1	3.5	35
United States	3.1	3.3	3.1	3.1	3.0	3.1	3.3	3.2	3.4	3.4	3.5	46
Austria	3.7	3.9	3.3	3.7	3.9	4.0	4.0	4.0	3.7	3.1	3.3	36
India	0.7	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.3	1.5	2.0	2.9	3.2	31
Turkey	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.9	2.1	2.3	2.8	3.2	29
Netherlands	1.7	1.9	1.9	2.2	2.4	2.5	2.7	2.8	2.9	2.8	3.2	41
Other countries	33.2	35.3	29.0	32.0	35.0	38.7	41.7	43.5	48.2	53.7	58.9	
Total	197.8	206.9	143.4	141.4	140.5	146.0	156.6	151.1	161.8	180.8	200.0	41

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/xw13a6>

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Iceland

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2020 (%)
Poland	9.6	9.1	9.0	9.4	10.2	11.1	12.1	13.8	17.0	19.3	20.6	40
Lithuania	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.8	2.3	3.4	4.1	4.6	34
Latvia	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.4	1.9	2.1	31
Romania	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.6	1.0	1.5	2.1	29
Portugal	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	1.0	1.2	1.4	31
Germany	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.4	66
United Kingdom	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.2	33
Spain	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.9	1.1	42
Philippines	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.9	1.0	63
Denmark	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	54
Croatia	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.7	0.9	24
United States	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.8	49
Czech Republic	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.7	0.8	47
France	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.7	46
Italy	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6	40
Other countries	4.8	4.7	4.7	4.8	4.8	5.0	5.3	6.0	7.1	8.0	9.2	
Total	21.7	21.1	21.0	21.4	22.7	24.3	26.5	30.3	37.8	44.3	49.4	41

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/xw13a6>**Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Ireland**

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2016 (%)
Poland	..	122.6	122.5	50
United Kingdom	117.1	112.3	113.0	113.4	114.9	115.5	103.1	107.7	110.8	114.5	..	49
Lithuania	..	36.7	36.6	54
Romania	..	17.3	29.2	48
Latvia	..	20.6	19.9	57
Brazil	..	8.7	13.6	53
Spain	..	6.8	12.1	60
Italy	..	7.7	11.7	45
France	..	9.7	11.7	50
Germany	..	11.3	11.5	57
India	..	17.0	11.5	37
United States	..	11.0	10.5	58
Slovak Republic	..	10.8	9.7	50
Hungary	..	8.0	9.3	49
Pakistan	..	6.8	7.4	31
Other countries	..	190.8	187.1	
Total	575.4	598.1	600.0	601.8	603.7	605.6	607.4	566.6	593.5	622.7	644.4	50

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/xw13a6>

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Italy

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2020 (%)
Romania	726.2	782.0	834.5	933.4	1 081.4	1 131.8	1 151.4	1 168.6	1 190.1	1 143.9	1 145.7	57
Albania	441.2	450.2	450.9	465.0	495.7	490.5	467.7	448.4	440.5	423.2	421.6	49
Morocco	388.4	400.7	408.7	426.8	454.8	449.1	437.5	420.7	416.5	406.1	414.2	47
China	168.0	184.2	197.1	223.4	256.8	265.8	271.3	282.0	290.7	283.4	288.9	50
Ukraine	150.5	171.6	180.1	191.7	219.1	226.1	230.7	234.4	237.0	227.9	228.6	77
Philippines	112.6	120.0	129.2	139.8	162.7	168.2	165.9	166.5	167.9	158.0	157.7	57
India	97.2	109.2	118.4	128.9	142.5	147.8	150.5	151.4	151.8	147.2	153.2	42
Bangladesh	67.3	73.8	81.7	92.7	111.2	115.3	118.8	122.4	132.0	131.0	138.9	30
Egypt	58.6	62.4	66.9	76.7	96.0	103.7	109.9	112.8	119.5	119.9	128.1	34
Pakistan	57.8	66.3	71.0	80.7	90.6	96.2	101.8	108.2	114.2	116.6	121.6	32
Moldova	99.9	122.4	132.2	139.7	149.4	147.4	142.3	135.7	131.8	122.8	118.5	66
Nigeria	41.5	44.7	48.2	56.5	66.8	71.2	77.3	88.5	106.1	114.1	113.0	41
Sri Lanka	62.0	65.3	71.6	79.5	95.0	100.6	102.3	104.9	108.0	104.8	107.6	47
Senegal	63.9	69.5	73.7	80.3	90.9	94.0	98.2	101.2	105.9	105.3	106.2	27
Tunisia	80.5	81.1	83.0	88.3	97.3	96.0	95.6	94.1	93.8	90.6	93.4	38
Other countries	1 032.5	1 076.0	1 104.9	1 184.4	1 311.1	1 310.8	1 305.8	1 307.4	1 338.7	1 301.4	1 302.4	
Total	3 648.1	3 879.2	4 052.1	4 387.7	4 921.3	5 014.4	5 026.9	5 047.0	5 144.4	4 996.2	5 039.6	52

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/xw13a6>**Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Japan**

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2020 (%)
China	680.5	687.2	674.9	652.6	649.1	654.8	665.8	695.5	730.9	764.7	813.7	55
Korea	578.5	566.0	545.4	530.0	519.7	501.2	457.8	453.1	450.7	449.6	446.4	54
Viet Nam	41.0	41.8	44.7	52.4	72.3	99.9	147.0	200.0	262.4	330.8	412.0	43
Philippines	211.7	210.2	209.4	203.0	209.2	217.6	229.6	243.7	260.6	271.3	282.8	70
Brazil	267.5	230.6	210.0	190.6	181.3	175.4	173.4	180.9	191.4	201.9	211.7	46
Nepal	15.3	17.5	20.4	24.1	31.5	42.3	54.8	67.5	80.0	89.0	96.8	42
Indonesia	25.5	24.9	24.7	25.5	27.2	30.2	35.9	42.9	50.0	56.3	66.9	32
Chinese Taipei	22.8	33.3	40.2	48.7	52.8	56.7	60.7	64.8	66
United States	52.1	50.7	49.8	48.4	50.0	51.3	52.3	53.7	55.7	57.5	59.2	34
Thailand	42.7	41.3	42.8	40.1	41.2	43.1	45.4	47.6	50.2	52.3	54.8	71
Peru	57.5	54.6	52.8	49.2	48.6	48.0	47.7	47.7	48.0	48.4	48.7	48
India	22.9	22.5	21.5	21.7	22.5	24.5	26.2	28.7	31.7	35.4	40.2	32
Myanmar	8.4	8.6	8.7	8.0	8.6	10.3	13.7	17.8	22.5	26.5	32.0	53
Democratic People's Rep. of Korea	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	33.9	32.5	30.9	29.6	28.1	45
Sri Lanka	9.0	9.1	9.3	8.4	9.2	10.7	13.2	17.3	23.3	25.4	27.4	27
Other countries	172.2	168.1	164.2	156.9	162.7	172.4	186.7	201.2	217.0	231.7	247.8	
Total	2 184.7	2 132.9	2 078.5	2 033.7	2 066.4	2 121.8	2 232.2	2 382.8	2 561.8	2 731.1	2 933.1	51

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/xw13a6>

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Korea

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
China	537.6	610.7	591.8	650.3	755.1	809.1	824.5	837.1	886.1	887.1	..	51
Viet Nam	98.2	110.6	114.2	113.8	122.6	128.0	137.8	151.4	170.7	187.3	..	52
United States	64.3	67.0	67.8	69.0	71.1	70.6	69.7	69.1	69.3	71.3	..	52
Uzbekistan	21.2	25.8	30.9	34.5	39.3	42.5	49.3	56.7	63.1	68.1	..	35
Philippines	39.5	38.4	33.2	38.8	43.2	45.3	46.1	45.2	45.3	45.4	..	44
Cambodia	11.7	16.8	23.4	30.7	37.3	42.0	44.5	45.7	45.3	45.0	..	32
Nepal	9.2	12.6	17.8	20.7	25.5	29.2	33.1	35.4	38.9	40.9	..	11
Russia	6.6	7.2	8.0	9.0	9.8	13.2	21.5	28.7	35.3	40.5	..	50
Indonesia	27.5	29.7	29.9	33.3	38.9	40.2	39.3	37.1	37.6	37.3	..	9
Thailand	27.6	26.0	21.4	26.2	26.8	27.9	29.3	30.2	31.4	32.6	..	32
Myanmar	3.8	5.6	8.3	11.5	14.7	18.1	21.3	23.5	26.7	27.5	..	4
Japan	19.9	21.8	23.4	23.9	24.0	23.8	24.1	24.1	24.7	25.1	..	77
Mongolia	21.8	21.3	19.8	18.4	17.3	18.5	20.1	22.6	24.2	24.8	..	51
Sri Lanka	17.4	20.5	21.0	21.9	24.6	25.2	26.0	25.3	24.3	23.5	..	3
Kazakhstan	1.4	1.7	2.1	2.5	3.0	3.9	7.6	12.7	18.5	22.7	..	46
Other countries	180.8	184.5	189.3	199.4	235.9	257.3	268.6	304.7	409.7	445.3	..	
Total	1 088.6	1 200.1	1 202.3	1 303.8	1 488.9	1 594.8	1 662.8	1 749.6	1 951.1	2 024.6	..	45

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/xw13a6>**Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Latvia**

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2020 (%)
Russia	..	33.8	37.0	36.1	38.8	51.6	56.0	55.4	54.7	53.9	53.1	..
Ukraine	..	2.5	2.4	2.3	2.4	4.1	5.9	6.4	7.0	8.2	9.2	..
Lithuania	..	3.0	3.0	2.9	2.9	4.3	4.6	4.8	5.0	5.1	5.1	..
Belarus	..	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.7	2.6	2.9	3.0	3.2	3.5	3.9	..
India	0.6	0.9	1.3	2.2	2.7	..
Germany	..	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.6	1.8	2.2	2.4	2.6	2.5	2.6	..
Uzbekistan	1.0	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.7	2.3	..
Estonia	..	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.3	..
United Kingdom	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	..
China	0.9	1.3	1.2	1.1	1.0	0.9	..
Sweden	0.7	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	..
Bulgaria	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	..
Italy	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.8	..
Kazakhstan	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.8	..
Poland	..	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	..
Other countries	..	300.4	279.0	271.1	257.5	227.9	208.3	197.7	189.9	182.1	173.9	
Total	362.4	342.8	324.3	315.4	304.8	298.4	288.9	279.4	272.5	266.6	260.4	..

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/xw13a6>

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Lithuania

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2020 (%)
Ukraine	1.7	1.3	2.1	1.9	1.7	2.1	1.5	2.5	6.2	13.9	21.4	12
Belarus	3.3	2.3	3.4	3.0	2.3	1.9	0.8	0.9	3.2	8.9	15.6	14
Russia	11.7	11.2	10.8	10.5	10.3	10.7	8.9	8.3	8.1	10.9	12.3	48
Poland	0.5	0.4	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.5	50
Latvia	0.4	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.7	0.7	0.9	0.9	1.1	1.2	1.3	51
India	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.4	0.5	0.8	29
United Kingdom	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.6	0.8	47
Germany	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.8	30
Ireland	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.6	0.7	49
Moldova	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.6	15
United States	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	..	0.6	48
Romania	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6	15
Kazakhstan	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.5	51
Italy	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5	17
Turkey	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.4	0.5	23
Other countries	9.0	8.0	4.3	4.6	4.1	4.2	3.7	4.0	4.6	6.3	7.4	
Total	27.3	24.0	22.9	22.2	21.6	22.5	18.7	20.1	27.3	47.2	65.8	25

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/xw13a6>**Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Luxembourg**

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Portugal	79.8	82.4	85.3	88.2	90.8	92.1	93.1	96.8	96.5	95.5	95.1	47
France	29.7	31.5	33.1	35.2	37.2	39.4	41.7	44.3	45.8	46.9	47.8	47
Italy	18.2	18.1	18.1	18.3	18.8	19.5	20.3	21.3	22.0	22.5	23.0	44
Belgium	16.8	16.9	17.2	17.6	18.2	18.8	19.4	20.0	20.2	20.0	19.8	45
Germany	12.1	12.0	12.3	12.4	12.7	12.8	12.8	13.1	13.1	13.0	12.8	50
Spain	3.3	3.7	4.0	4.3	4.7	5.1	5.5	6.1	6.5	6.8	7.2	48
Romania	1.3	1.6	1.9	2.2	2.5	3.2	3.8	4.1	4.7	5.2	5.7	58
United Kingdom	5.5	5.5	5.6	5.7	5.9	6.0	6.1	6.1	5.9	5.8	5.3	43
Poland	2.5	2.7	3.0	3.2	3.4	3.8	4.1	4.3	4.5	4.7	4.8	56
Netherlands	3.9	3.9	3.9	3.9	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.3	4.3	4.2	4.2	46
China	..	1.6	1.7	1.8	2.2	2.5	2.8	3.2	3.5	3.7	3.9	54
Greece	1.5	1.5	1.7	1.9	2.1	2.3	2.6	2.9	3.3	3.4	3.7	50
Montenegro	..	3.8	3.8	3.9	3.9	3.9	3.8	4.4	4.2	3.6	3.2	48
India	..	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.8	1.0	1.2	1.4	1.9	2.3	2.8	45
Cape Verde	..	2.5	2.5	2.6	2.7	2.9	3.0	2.9	2.8	2.6	2.6	52
Other countries	42.0	32.3	35.1	36.8	39.1	41.5	45.0	46.2	49.0	51.2	54.5	
Total	216.3	220.5	229.9	238.8	248.9	258.7	269.2	281.5	288.2	291.5	296.5	48

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/xw13a6>

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Mexico

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2020 (%)
United States	60.0	64.9	68.5	63.4	..	65.3	67.5	68.9	74.6	79.6	..	44
Venezuela	10.1	11.8	12.8	12.9	..	15.3	18.6	22.3	28.2	35.1	..	55
Colombia	14.6	15.5	16.9	16.7	..	18.3	20.6	23.0	26.3	30.0	..	55
Spain	18.6	18.8	19.6	20.7	..	24.7	26.7	27.7	28.5	28.9	..	40
Cuba	10.3	11.8	14.0	14.5	..	17.0	18.4	20.5	24.3	26.5	..	50
China	10.2	12.5	15.2	15.6	..	18.3	20.5	21.5	22.7	23.5	..	42
Argentina	15.2	15.6	15.8	15.3	..	16.8	18.0	19.0	19.8	20.7	..	47
Honduras	4.9	6.3	7.6	6.9	..	7.8	9.3	12.0	15.6	19.5	..	55
Guatemala	8.4	9.8	10.9	9.7	..	10.3	11.6	13.2	15.8	18.5	..	55
Canada	10.9	12.7	13.6	12.9	..	13.2	14.1	14.6	16.0	17.2	..	46
El Salvador	4.8	5.0	6.0	5.7	..	6.2	7.2	9.0	12.2	15.3	..	51
France	9.4	9.1	9.1	9.0	..	9.8	10.5	10.9	11.7	12.1	..	45
Germany	8.9	8.8	9.0	8.8	..	9.5	10.5	10.9	11.2	11.4	..	42
Brazil	6.3	6.3	7.1	6.5	..	7.2	8.2	9.3	10.5	11.4	..	52
Japan	4.9	5.1	5.2	5.6	..	8.0	9.0	9.9	10.8	11.2	..	40
Other countries	65.2	67.2	72.7	72.1	..	78.3	84.5	89.2	95.8	101.1	..	
Total	262.7	281.1	303.9	296.4	..	326.0	355.2	381.8	423.9	462.0	..	47

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/xw13a6>**Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Netherlands**

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2020 (%)
Poland	43.1	52.5	65.1	74.6	85.8	99.6	110.9	121.4	132.4	144.0	155.9	50
Germany	68.4	71.4	72.8	72.6	72.2	71.8	72.3	73.3	75.0	77.1	79.5	56
Syria	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.8	1.4	8.2	25.4	51.4	67.5	74.1	79.5	44
Turkey	90.8	88.0	84.8	81.9	80.1	77.5	75.4	74.1	73.8	74.8	77.0	49
United Kingdom	41.4	41.4	41.4	41.7	42.3	43.0	44.2	45.3	46.0	47.3	47.9	41
Italy	21.1	21.9	22.6	23.6	25.0	27.1	29.5	32.3	35.5	39.1	43.3	42
China	19.8	21.4	23.9	25.9	27.2	28.2	29.7	31.4	33.9	36.5	39.4	53
India	8.7	9.6	10.8	11.7	13.1	14.7	17.1	20.4	24.9	30.6	37.4	42
Bulgaria	12.3	14.1	16.8	17.6	17.8	19.8	21.9	24.1	27.3	31.2	36.8	48
Belgium	26.9	27.2	27.6	28.2	28.8	29.6	30.6	31.9	33.2	34.4	35.9	53
Morocco	66.6	61.9	56.6	51.0	48.1	44.9	42.3	39.9	38.0	36.5	35.8	49
Spain	18.1	19.2	20.3	21.9	23.9	25.3	26.8	28.3	30.3	32.7	35.6	51
Romania	7.1	8.3	9.1	9.5	10.0	11.9	13.7	16.1	20.0	24.9	30.7	48
Eritrea	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	3.2	9.1	15.7	21.0	26.0	30.4	44
France	17.2	17.8	18.1	18.3	18.7	19.7	20.9	22.6	24.2	25.8	27.8	52
Other countries	292.8	305.0	315.2	316.5	321.2	322.6	330.7	344.1	357.8	375.8	399.6	
Total	735.2	760.4	786.1	796.2	816.0	847.3	900.5	972.3	1 040.8	1 110.9	1 192.3	50

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/xw13a6>

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Norway

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Poland	46.7	55.2	66.6	77.1	85.6	93.6	99.6	102.0	103.8	105.2	108.6	36
Lithuania	10.4	16.4	24.1	30.7	35.8	39.5	41.7	42.5	43.7	45.1	46.9	42
Sweden	35.8	39.2	42.0	43.1	44.2	45.1	45.1	44.4	44.0	44.0	44.2	48
Syria	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.7	1.5	3.6	7.6	18.9	26.0	30.2	32.0	42
Germany	20.8	22.4	23.7	24.4	24.6	25.0	25.2	24.9	24.7	24.8	25.3	47
Denmark	20.7	20.9	21.4	21.9	22.6	23.5	23.3	23.0	22.8	22.8	22.9	45
Eritrea	3.8	5.7	7.6	10.0	12.7	15.2	17.7	19.0	18.6	19.1	18.9	41
United Kingdom	13.3	14.0	14.7	15.5	15.8	16.3	16.3	16.3	16.2	16.5	17.2	35
Romania	3.4	4.5	5.7	7.5	10.0	12.0	13.8	14.5	15.0	15.6	16.6	43
Somalia	6.8	7.8	8.9	10.1	11.4	11.7	11.8	12.1	11.7	12.3	12.8	77
Philippines	2.8	4.9	6.9	8.5	9.4	10.3	10.8	11.0	11.1	11.5	12.1	42
Thailand	8.6	9.3	10.0	10.8	11.4	11.5	11.6	12.1	11.3	11.9	12.0	85
Latvia	10.8	11.1	10.8	13.0	14.4	15.1	16.8	16.8	15.9	14.5	12.0	48
Russia	10.6	10.8	10.9	11.2	11.4	11.5	11.5	11.4	11.3	11.4	11.8	66
United States	8.5	8.6	8.8	9.2	9.3	9.3	9.3	9.2	9.2	9.5	9.9	51
Other countries	130.5	138.0	144.8	155.2	163.1	169.0	176.1	181.2	182.6	189.9	201.5	
Total	333.9	369.2	407.3	448.8	483.2	512.2	538.2	559.2	567.8	584.2	604.5	46

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/xw13a6>**Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Poland**

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2010 (%)
Ukraine	10.2	..	13.4
Germany	4.4	..	5.2
Russia	4.2	..	4.2
Belarus	3.2	..	3.8
Viet Nam	2.9	..	2.6
Armenia	1.4	..	1.8
Sweden	1.3
Bulgaria	1.1
United States	1.1
Former USSR	1.0
Austria	1.0
Greece	0.9
United Kingdom	0.8
France	0.7
Czech Republic	0.7
Other countries	40.4	..	54.8
Total	75.2	79.3	85.8	93.3	101.2	108.3	149.6	210.3	239.2	47

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/xw13a6>

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Portugal

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2020 (%)
Brazil	116.2	119.4	111.4	105.6	92.1	87.5	82.6	81.3	85.4	105.4	151.3	57
Cape Verde	48.8	44.0	43.9	42.9	42.4	40.9	38.7	36.6	35.0	34.7	37.4	53
United Kingdom	16.4	17.2	17.7	16.7	16.5	16.6	17.2	19.4	22.4	26.4	34.4	46
Romania	32.5	36.8	39.3	35.2	34.2	31.5	30.5	30.4	30.8	30.9	31.1	46
Ukraine	52.3	49.5	48.0	44.1	41.1	37.9	35.8	34.5	32.5	29.2	29.7	54
China	14.4	15.7	16.8	17.5	18.7	21.5	21.4	22.6	23.2	25.4	27.9	50
Italy	4.5	5.1	5.3	5.2	5.1	5.3	6.1	8.5	12.9	18.9	25.4	41
France	4.9	5.1	5.3	5.2	5.3	6.5	8.4	11.3	15.3	19.8	23.1	47
Angola	26.6	23.5	21.6	20.4	20.2	19.7	18.2	17.0	16.9	18.4	22.7	56
Guinea-Bissau	22.9	19.8	18.5	17.8	17.8	18.0	17.1	15.7	15.2	16.2	18.9	47
India	5.8	5.3	5.4	5.7	6.0	6.4	6.9	7.2	8.0	11.4	17.6	25
Nepal	0.7	0.8	1.1	1.7	2.6	3.5	4.8	5.8	7.4	11.5	16.8	36
Spain	8.1	8.9	9.3	9.4	9.5	9.7	10.0	11.1	12.5	14.1	15.8	49
Germany	8.6	9.0	9.1	8.6	8.6	8.8	9.0	10.0	11.2	12.8	14.7	47
Sao Tome and Principe	11.5	10.5	10.5	10.4	10.3	10.2	9.6	9.0	8.6	9.2	10.2	55
Other countries	80.1	74.7	73.6	70.9	70.9	71.3	72.3	77.4	84.4	96.1	113.2	
Total	454.2	445.3	436.8	417.0	401.3	395.2	388.7	397.7	421.7	480.3	590.3	50

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/xw13a6>**Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Russia**

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Ukraine	93.4	92.0	110.2	122.3	192.7	306.0	345.8	346.2	331.3	270.4
Tajikistan	87.1	64.4	75.7	82.9	91.8	100.3	110.2	126.3	137.3	144.2
Uzbekistan	131.1	86.4	103.1	115.3	127.5	138.4	141.1	149.1	148.9	135.4
Azerbaijan	67.9	53.0	62.8	67.2	77.3	85.5	90.0	93.7	96.8	96.5
Armenia	59.4	73.0	90.0	102.3	115.0	116.1	114.8	107.3	98.9	90.7
Kazakhstan	28.1	16.3	42.2	65.5	79.4	85.7	93.2	92.4	92.2	86.4
Moldova	33.9	28.2	36.3	41.2	51.6	60.1	62.4	63.7	63.6	54.8
Belarus	27.7	6.1	9.8	14.0	17.7	20.2	24.9	28.7	32.9	34.7
Kyrgyzstan	44.6	4.4	14.0	22.4	30.8	34.2	30.7	27.8	27.4	24.6
Georgia	12.1	12.1	15.6	17.1	18.7	19.3	18.8	20.0	21.4	20.3
Viet Nam	11.1	8.8	10.2	10.7	11.5	12.1	12.1	12.9	13.3	13.1
China	28.4	7.6	8.5	8.0	8.9	8.5	8.6	8.9	9.5	8.6
Turkmenistan	5.6	3.8	4.1	4.4	5.0	4.6	4.6	5.0	5.9	7.2
Turkey	5.4	3.4	3.8	4.2	4.4	4.4	4.3	4.4	6.4	4.6
Afghanistan	2.0	2.5	3.1	3.5	3.7	3.9	3.6	3.7	4.0	4.3
Other countries	49.3	28.5	31.6	34.8	36.5	39.7	39.7	40.6	44.8	42.3
Total	687.0	490.3	621.0	715.8	872.6	1 039.0	1 104.7	1 130.8	1 134.5	1 038.2

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/xw13a6>

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Slovak Republic

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2020 (%)
Czech Republic	8.3	9.0	10.6	11.0	11.4	11.9	12.5	13.0	13.5	14.0	14.4	48
Hungary	4.6	5.3	7.1	7.8	8.1	8.6	9.2	9.8	10.2	10.7	11.1	34
Romania	5.4	5.8	4.4	4.7	4.9	5.3	5.8	6.3	6.5	6.9	7.1	29
Poland	5.4	5.6	4.8	4.9	5.1	5.2	5.4	5.6	5.8	5.9	6.1	47
Germany	4.0	4.1	3.4	3.5	3.6	3.7	3.8	3.9	4.1	4.2	4.3	26
Ukraine	5.9	6.3	2.6	2.7	2.7	2.8	3.1	3.2	3.5	3.7	4.1	61
Italy	1.5	1.7	1.7	1.9	2.0	2.1	2.4	2.6	2.8	2.9	3.0	19
United Kingdom	1.4	1.5	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.9	2.0	2.2	2.4	30
Austria	2.1	2.2	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.9	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.1	25
Bulgaria	1.5	1.7	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.8	1.9	2.0	2.1	2.1	25
France	1.6	1.7	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.7	29
Russia	2.0	2.2	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.7	62
Viet Nam	2.3	2.3	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.7	45
China	1.7	1.9	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.1	49
Croatia	0.4	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.1	24
Other countries	14.7	16.2	9.7	10.3	10.9	11.4	12.2	13.0	13.6	14.3	14.8	
Total	62.9	68.0	53.4	56.5	59.2	61.8	65.8	69.7	72.9	76.1	78.9	38

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/xw13a6>**Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Slovenia**

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2020 (%)
Bosnia and Herzegovina	39.0	38.8	39.3	41.3	43.3	44.9	47.7	50.4	54.0	62.9	73.2	28
Serbia	7.1	7.6	7.3	7.8	9.8	9.7	9.8	10.6	11.8	14.0	16.2	25
North Macedonia	9.1	8.8	9.1	9.6	9.8	10.1	10.4	10.8	11.3	12.3	13.3	44
Croatia	7.8	7.7	8.0	8.3	8.7	8.8	8.9	9.2	9.5	9.8	10.1	37
Bulgaria	0.8	1.1	1.5	1.8	2.1	2.5	2.6	2.9	3.2	3.4	3.6	28
Russia	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	1.1	1.5	2.0	2.3	2.6	3.0	3.3	55
Italy	0.7	0.9	1.0	1.2	1.4	1.6	1.8	2.1	2.2	2.4	2.5	33
Ukraine	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.7	1.9	2.0	2.2	2.3	62
China	0.8	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.3	46
Germany	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	48
Montenegro	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.9	44
Hungary	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.7	42
United Kingdom	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6	38
Slovak Republic	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	67
United States	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	45
Other countries	12.8	12.5	13.9	15.4	15.0	16.7	18.3	19.6	20.5	23.1	26.5	
Total	82.2	82.7	85.6	91.4	96.6	101.5	107.8	114.4	121.9	138.2	156.4	33

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/xw13a6>

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Spain

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2020 (%)
Morocco	761.2	774.2	771.6	759.3	718.0	688.7	680.5	665.6	682.5	713.8	760.7	46
Romania	770.4	783.2	799.0	769.6	728.3	708.4	695.0	683.8	675.1	670.2	665.9	51
United Kingdom	314.2	312.2	313.0	316.4	310.1	301.8	296.4	293.5	285.7	286.8	300.6	49
Italy	168.8	172.1	178.2	181.0	180.8	182.7	191.6	203.8	221.8	243.7	267.7	44
Colombia	288.8	265.8	245.8	223.1	173.2	145.5	135.9	138.4	160.1	199.2	261.2	56
China	160.4	167.6	170.8	169.6	166.0	167.5	172.2	177.5	183.4	190.6	197.2	51
Venezuela	57.2	55.1	53.8	52.0	44.4	44.2	50.0	63.3	91.2	134.0	187.2	57
Germany	157.0	154.2	153.6	153.4	148.5	145.0	142.1	141.1	139.1	138.3	139.0	51
Ecuador	399.4	350.3	309.8	269.4	214.0	174.4	159.0	145.2	140.0	134.9	132.6	47
Bulgaria	150.8	149.3	151.5	147.3	139.9	134.4	130.5	127.4	125.2	123.3	122.8	50
France	103.2	100.4	101.1	101.5	99.5	98.7	100.7	103.2	106.5	111.5	117.1	50
Honduras	25.5	28.1	32.2	35.0	34.3	35.9	40.8	48.1	64.2	84.8	109.5	71
Ukraine	82.3	83.3	84.4	84.1	81.8	84.1	90.8	94.5	99.1	103.6	107.6	57
Portugal	128.8	123.8	121.3	116.4	109.0	103.8	101.8	100.9	100.4	102.8	106.1	42
Peru	138.1	130.9	122.0	109.6	84.2	66.4	61.3	59.5	66.9	79.9	101.0	57
Other countries	1 696.5	1 662.0	1 628.0	1 584.8	1 445.1	1 372.6	1 369.0	1 373.7	1 421.6	1 522.9	1 650.7	
Total	5 402.6	5 312.4	5 236.0	5 072.7	4 677.1	4 454.4	4 417.5	4 419.5	4 563.0	4 840.2	5 226.9	51

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/xw13a6>**Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Sweden**

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2020 (%)
Syria	3.4	4.1	5.0	9.1	20.5	42.2	70.0	116.4	132.1	137.1	116.4	44
Poland	38.6	40.9	42.7	44.6	46.1	48.2	50.8	52.5	54.0	54.9	55.5	44
Afghanistan	8.6	9.8	12.7	16.7	20.3	23.6	26.0	28.0	37.4	45.4	49.6	32
Finland	74.1	70.6	67.9	65.3	62.8	59.7	57.6	55.8	53.8	51.0	48.7	58
Eritrea	5.0	6.4	8.4	10.0	12.8	18.0	25.1	32.1	36.4	39.7	43.0	44
Norway	35.2	34.9	34.8	34.8	34.6	34.5	34.4	34.6	34.7	34.5	34.5	52
Somalia	24.7	30.8	33.0	36.1	45.0	47.1	46.2	41.3	36.4	32.4	30.9	50
Denmark	40.3	40.5	40.5	40.2	39.3	38.4	37.1	35.2	33.4	31.5	30.2	42
Germany	27.5	27.6	27.8	28.0	28.1	28.2	28.2	28.7	29.0	29.2	29.5	50
India	5.7	7.1	7.7	8.4	9.2	10.4	11.4	13.5	17.1	22.2	27.0	41
Iraq	55.1	56.6	55.8	43.2	31.2	25.9	23.2	22.7	25.3	26.4	25.9	43
China	11.8	14.1	15.5	16.3	17.1	17.5	16.6	17.3	18.6	20.2	21.9	53
Romania	7.7	8.8	10.2	11.2	12.0	13.0	14.4	15.5	16.9	18.2	19.3	44
United Kingdom	17.3	17.4	18.1	18.4	18.8	19.4	19.8	19.9	20.0	20.0	16.4	32
Iran	11.8	13.5	14.3	14.5	14.8	14.9	14.1	14.2	14.6	15.2	15.9	46
Other countries	236.0	250.2	260.7	270.5	282.2	298.6	307.9	324.2	337.6	354.6	375.8	
Total	602.9	633.3	655.1	667.2	694.7	739.4	782.8	851.9	897.3	932.3	940.6	46

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/xw13a6>

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Switzerland

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which Women 2020 (%)
Italy	289.1	289.1	290.5	294.4	301.3	308.6	313.7	318.7	319.4	322.1	323.7	45
Germany	250.5	264.2	276.8	285.4	293.2	298.6	301.5	304.7	305.8	307.9	309.4	45
Portugal	205.3	213.2	224.2	238.4	253.8	263.0	268.1	269.5	268.0	265.5	262.9	45
France	90.6	95.1	99.5	103.9	110.2	116.8	123.1	127.3	131.5	135.3	139.6	45
Spain	64.1	64.2	66.0	69.8	75.4	79.5	82.4	83.5	83.7	84.3	85.2	46
North Macedonia	59.8	60.2	60.8	61.6	62.5	63.3	64.2	65.2	65.8	66.5	67.0	50
Turkey	71.0	70.6	70.2	69.6	69.2	69.1	68.6	68.0	67.3	66.7	66.3	47
Serbia	148.9	113.3	103.0	94.9	79.3	69.7	65.3	64.3	63.2	61.9	60.7	50
Austria	36.5	37.2	38.2	39.0	39.6	40.4	41.3	42.1	42.7	43.2	43.9	47
United Kingdom	34.1	36.4	38.6	39.4	40.4	41.1	41.3	41.0	41.0	41.0	41.4	43
Poland	10.2	11.5	13.9	16.2	17.9	21.4	24.7	26.9	29.2	31.6	33.9	49
Eritrea	..	8.4	8.4	9.8	11.7	14.0	16.6	19.8	23.2	26.2	29.0	44
Bosnia and Herzegovina	35.8	34.6	33.5	32.9	32.2	31.8	31.3	30.8	30.2	29.6	29.0	49
Croatia	34.9	33.8	32.8	31.8	30.7	30.2	29.6	29.0	28.5	28.5	28.3	50
Sri Lanka	..	24.6	24.6	23.9	23.7	24.5	25.4	25.8	25.9	26.0	26.2	48
Other countries	349.4	364.2	391.4	414.2	445.5	474.9	497.0	513.0	528.3	544.9	564.9	
Total	1 680.2	1 720.4	1 772.3	1 825.1	1 886.6	1 947.0	1 993.9	2 029.5	2 053.6	2 081.2	2 111.4	47

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/xw13a6>**Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – Turkey**

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2015 (%)
Germany	..	32.6	43.6	25.6	59.0	63.2	69.9		53
Syria	..	2.9	5.1	10.1	57.9	50.9	56.6		43
Iraq	..	8.1	11.8	19.1	31.1	47.2	93.7		43
Afghanistan	..	7.4	10.7	19.5	27.9	33.6	38.5		42
Azerbaijan	..	9.9	14.8	18.9	26.2	30.2	36.5		50
Iran	..	5.2	7.9	12.2	16.8	21.9	27.8		44
Russia	..	10.7	14.4	15.6	20.7	21.6	25.3		71
Georgia	..	1.7	2.4	15.7	13.5	19.1	19.8		88
Turkmenistan	..	3.9	5.8	11.7	13.4	18.4	23.4		60
United Kingdom	..	6.4	10.1	9.3	16.0	14.9	14.6		53
Ukraine	..	3.3	4.7	7.0	9.7	12.9	17.1		82
Kazakhstan	..	5.8	6.9	8.4	11.1	11.9	13.7		58
Uzbekistan	..	2.7	3.4	6.5	7.9	11.0	16.1		73
Kyrgyzstan	..	3.3	4.8	6.1	8.4	10.6	14.0		63
Austria	..	5.5	7.5	3.9	9.5	10.5	12.0		45
Other countries	..	81.1	88.2	89.1	127.4	140.5	171.2		
Total	167.3	190.5	242.1	278.7	456.5	518.3	650.3	816.4	919.1	..		53

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/xw13a6>

Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – United Kingdom

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2018 (%)
Poland	550	658	713	679	826	855	1 006	994	829	52
Romania	72	79	117	148	165	219	324	382	478	45
India	354	332	360	336	354	379	347	317	370	54
Ireland	344	386	356	345	309	329	330	343	350	56
Italy	117	153	125	138	182	212	262	296	311	42
Portugal	104	123	106	138	140	235	247	269	195	46
Pakistan	137	166	163	194	197	184	175	167	186	48
Lithuania	99	129	126	153	158	192	204	196	181	57
France	116	114	132	132	135	189	181	186	179	54
Spain	61	55	82	75	130	167	162	191	156	46
United States	133	109	146	149	145	132	127	130	149	58
China	107	106	87	93	106	122	113	132	148	65
Netherlands	58	56	59	83	85	81	102	97	125	55
Germany	129	132	137	153	110	119	166	131	120	61
Bulgaria	34	47	33	62	45	68	81	109	105	50
Other countries	2 109	2 140	2 047	2 063	2 067	2 109	2 124	2 197	2 109
Total	4 524	4 785	4 788	4 941	5 154	5 592	5 951	6 137	5 991	6 227	..	52

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/xw13a6>**Table B.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality – United States**

Thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Of which: Women 2017 (%)
Mexico	8 885.1	9 043.0	8 861.2	8 613.0	8 598.6	8 579.5	8 327.0	8 256.8	47
India	912.3	975.7	992.6	1 045.4	1 068.9	1 159.0	1 296.9	1 325.7	46
China	662.6	791.9	797.1	861.4	868.2	963.6	1 079.0	1 118.9	53
El Salvador	833.9	873.5	877.6	872.5	860.5	913.6	927.4	912.3	46
Guatemala	600.5	602.5	640.3	650.5	677.4	670.0	679.6	674.0	38
Philippines	598.0	611.5	638.4	635.9	595.7	596.1	615.2	563.8	60
Cuba	409.6	498.4	489.0	474.2	470.5	502.1	491.4	536.8	46
Honduras	361.5	405.9	386.8	412.8	421.9	441.3	462.8	518.7	47
Dominican Republic	415.0	462.9	457.4	487.0	502.9	474.4	493.6	513.3	52
Canada	444.2	430.2	428.8	444.9	452.8	422.0	445.9	405.1	52
Korea	446.6	472.3	476.7	475.3	435.7	418.0	409.5	389.9	56
United Kingdom	361.0	344.8	343.3	346.4	336.9	339.1	335.6	330.2	45
Viet Nam	282.9	313.5	296.5	299.6	316.9	318.0	320.0	307.4	58
Haiti	266.5	297.7	292.9	312.3	268.3	272.2	284.0	284.3	54
Colombia	323.6	335.3	327.2	322.8	294.5	294.3	304.1	280.3	57
Other countries	5 837.8	6 001.4	5 919.6	5 860.9	5 846.6	5 900.3	5 954.3	5 997.8
Total	21 641.0	22 460.6	22 225.5	22 115.0	22 016.4	22 263.4	22 426.2	22 415.3	22 595.7	22 518.8	..	49

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/xw13a6>

Metadata related to Tables A.5. and B.5. **Stocks of foreign population**

Country	Comments	Source
Austria	Stock of foreign citizens recorded in the population register. <i>Reference date:</i> 1 January.	Population Register, Statistics Austria.
Belgium	Stock of foreign citizens recorded in the population register. Includes asylum seekers from 2012 on. <i>Reference date:</i> 1 January.	Population Register, Directorate for Statistics and Economic Information.
Canada	2011 and 2016 Censuses.	Statistics Canada.
Chile	Estimation of the resident foreign population in the 2017 Census.	
Czech Republic	Numbers of foreigners residing in the country on the basis of permanent or temporary residence permits (i.e. long-term visa, long-term residence permit or temporary residence permit of EU nationals). <i>Reference date:</i> 1 January.	Ministry of the Interior, Directorate of Alien Police.
Denmark	Stock of foreign citizens recorded in the population register. Excludes asylum seekers and all persons with temporary residence permits. <i>Reference date:</i> 1 January.	Central Population Register, Statistics Denmark.
Estonia	Population register. <i>Reference date:</i> 1 January.	Ministry of the Interior.
Finland	Stock of foreign citizens recorded in the population register. Includes foreign persons of Finnish origin. <i>Reference date:</i> 1 January.	Central Population Register, Statistics Finland.
France	Foreigners with permanent residence in France. Including trainees, students and illegal migrants who accept to be interviewed. Excluding seasonal and cross-border workers. 2016 to 2019 totals are estimated based on Eurostat data. Includes the département of Mayotte from 2014.	Censuses, National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE).
Germany	Stock of foreign citizens recorded in the population register. Includes all foreigners regardless of their housing situation (private or non-private dwelling). Excludes ethnic Germans (<i>Aussiedler</i>). <i>Reference date:</i> 1 January.	Central Population Register, Federal Office of Statistics.
Greece	Totals in Table A.5 (Eurostat dataset) are not comparable to data presented in Table B.5 by nationality (Labour Force Survey data, foreign population aged 15 and above; 4th quarter prior to 2014; 2nd quarter from 2014 on).	Labour Force Survey, Hellenic Statistical authority.
Hungary	Foreigners having a residence or a settlement document. From 2010 on, includes third-country nationals holding a temporary residence permit (for a year or more). From 2011 on, includes persons under subsidiary protection. Data for 2011 were adjusted to match the October census results. <i>Reference date:</i> 1 January.	Office of Immigration and Nationality, Central Statistical Office.
Iceland	Data are from the National Register of Persons. It is to be expected that figures are overestimates. <i>Reference date:</i> 1 January.	Statistics Iceland.
Ireland	Census data for 2011 and 2016.	Central Statistics Office (CSO).
Italy	Data refer to resident foreigners (registered in municipal registry offices). Excludes children under 18 who are registered on their parents' permit. Includes foreigners who were regularised following the 2009 programme. <i>Reference date:</i> 1 January.	National Statistical Institute (ISTAT).
Japan	Foreigners staying in Japan for the mid- to long-term with a resident status under the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act. <i>Reference date:</i> 1 January.	Ministry of Justice, Immigration Bureau.
Korea	Foreigners staying in Korea more than 90 days and registered in the population registers.	Ministry of Justice.
Latvia	Population register. <i>Reference date:</i> 1 January.	Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs.
Lithuania	<i>Reference date:</i> 1 January.	Eurostat.
Luxembourg	Stock of foreign citizens recorded in population register. Excludes visitors (staying for less than 3 months) and cross-border workers. <i>Reference date:</i> 1 January. 2010 figures are extracted from the February 2011 census.	Population Register, Central Office of Statistics and Economic Studies (Statec).

Country	Comments	Source
Mexico	Number of foreigners who hold a valid permit for permanent or temporary residence. Data until 2013 are estimates under the terms of the 1974 Act; they include immigrants FM2 "inmigrante" and "inmigrado" (both categories refer to permanent residence) and non-immigrants FM3 with specific categories (temporary residence). Data from 2015 are estimates under the terms of the 2011 Migration Act.	National Migration Institute, Unit for Migration Policy, Ministry of Interior.
Netherlands	Stock of foreign citizens recorded in the population register. Figures include administrative corrections and asylum seekers (except those staying in reception centres). <i>Reference date:</i> 1 January.	Population Register, Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS).
Norway	Stock of foreign citizens recorded in the population register. It excludes visitors (staying for less than six months) and cross-border workers. <i>Reference date:</i> 1 January.	Central Population Register, Statistics Norway.
Poland		Central Population Register, Central Statistical Office.
Portugal	Figures include holders of a valid residence permit and holders of a renewed long-term visa.	Immigration and Border Control Office (SEF); National Statistical Institute (INE).
Russia	2010 Census: foreigners and stateless persons permanently residing in the Russian Federation. From 2011 on: stocks of temporary and permanent residence permit holders on 31 December.	Federal state statistics service (Rosstat); Federal Migration Service.
Slovak Republic	Holders of a permanent or long-term residence permit.	Register of Foreigners, Ministry of the Interior.
Slovenia	Number of valid residence permits, regardless of the administrative status of the foreign national. <i>Reference date:</i> 1 January.	Central Population Register, Ministry of the Interior.
Spain	All foreign citizens in the Municipal Registers irrespective of their legal status. <i>Reference date:</i> 1 January.	Municipal Registers, National Statistics Institute (INE).
Sweden	Stock of foreign citizens recorded in the population register. <i>Reference date:</i> 1 January.	Population Register, Statistics Sweden.
Switzerland	Stock of all those with residence or settlement permits (permits B and C, respectively). Holders of an L-permit (short duration) are also included if their stay in the country is longer than 12 months. Does not include seasonal or cross-border workers. <i>Reference date:</i> 1 January.	Register of Foreigners, Federal Office of Migration.
Turkey	<i>Reference date:</i> 1 January.	Eurostat.
United Kingdom	Foreign residents. Those with unknown nationality from the New Commonwealth are not included (around 10 000 to 15 000 persons). <i>Reference date:</i> 1 January.	Labour Force Survey, Home Office.
United States	Foreigners born abroad.	Current Population Survey, Census Bureau.

Note: Data for Serbia include persons from Serbia, Montenegro and Serbia and Montenegro. Some statements may refer to nationalities/countries of birth not shown in this annex but available on line at: <http://stats.oecd.org/>.

Acquisitions of nationality

Nationality law can have a significant impact on the measurement of the national and foreign populations. In France and Belgium, for example, where foreigners can fairly easily acquire the nationality of the country, increases in the foreign population through immigration and births can eventually contribute to a significant rise in the population of nationals. On the other hand, in countries where naturalisation is more difficult, increases in immigration and births among foreigners manifest themselves almost exclusively as growth in the foreign population. In addition, changes in rules regarding naturalisation can have significant impact. For example, during the 1980s, a number of OECD countries made naturalisation easier and this resulted in noticeable falls in the foreign population (and rises in the population of nationals).

However, host-country legislation is not the only factor affecting naturalisation. For example, where naturalisation involves forfeiting citizenship of the country of origin, there may be incentives to remain a foreign citizen. Where the difference between remaining a foreign citizen and becoming a national is marginal, naturalisation may largely be influenced by the time and effort required to make the application, and the symbolic and political value individuals attach to being citizens of one country or another.

Data on naturalisations are usually readily available from administrative sources. The statistics generally cover all means of acquiring the nationality of a country. These include standard naturalisation procedures subject to criteria such as age or residency, etc., as well as situations where nationality is acquired through a declaration or by option (following marriage, adoption or other situations related to residency or descent), recovery of former nationality and other special means of acquiring the nationality of the country.

Table A.6. Acquisitions of nationality in OECD countries and Russia

Numbers and percentages

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Australia	86 654	119 383	95 235	83 698	123 438	162 002	135 596	133 126	137 750	80 562	127 674
% of foreign population
Austria	7 978	6 135	6 690	7 043	7 354	7 570	8 144	8 530	9 271	9 450	10 606
% of foreign population	1.0	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8
Belgium	32 767	34 636	29 786	38 612	34 801	18 726	27 071	31 935	37 399	36 200	40 594
% of foreign population	3.4	3.4	2.8	3.3	2.9	1.5	2.2	2.5	2.8	2.7	2.9
Canada	156 363	143 579	179 451	111 923	127 470	259 274	251 144	147 267	105 813	176 487	250 151
% of foreign population	5.7	4.4
Chile	811	741	1 030	1 226	678	1 048	691	792	2 991	1 801	354
% of foreign population	0.2	..
Czech Republic	1 621	1 495	1 936	2 036	2 514	5 114	4 925	5 536	6 440	5 260	4 456
% of foreign population	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6	1.2	1.1	1.2	1.4	1.1	0.9
Denmark	6 537	3 006	3 911	3 489	1 750	4 747	11 745	15 028	7 272	2 836	1 781
% of foreign population	2.2	0.9	1.2	1.0	0.5	1.3	3.0	3.6	1.6	0.6	0.4
Estonia	1 670	1 189	1 518	1 340	1 330	1 614	897	1 775	882	766	779
% of foreign population	0.6	0.8	0.4	0.8	0.4	0.4	0.4
Finland	3 413	4 334	4 558	9 087	8 930	8 260	7 921	9 375	12 219	9 211	9 649
% of foreign population	2.6	3.0	2.9	5.4	4.9	4.2	3.8	4.3	5.3	3.8	3.9
France	135 852	143 261	114 569	96 050	97 276	105 613	113 608	119 152	114 274	110 014	109 821
% of foreign population	3.6	3.8	3.0	2.5	2.4	2.6	2.6	2.7	2.5	2.3	2.3
Germany	96 122	101 570	106 897	112 348	112 353	108 422	107 317	110 383	112 211	112 340	128 905
% of foreign population	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.6	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.2	1.1	1.2
Greece	17 019	9 387	17 533	20 302	29 462	21 829	12 837	32 819	34 305	27 857	16 328
% of foreign population	..	1.0	1.9	2.2	3.2	2.5	1.5	4.0	4.3	3.4	2.0
Hungary	5 802	6 086	20 554	18 379	9 178	8 745	4 048	4 315	2 787	3 508	3 255
% of foreign population	3.3	3.3	10.4	8.9	6.4	6.2	2.9	3.0	1.8	2.3	2.0
Iceland	728	450	370	413	597	595	801	703	637	569	437
% of foreign population	3.1	1.8	1.7	2.0	2.8	2.8	3.5	2.9	2.4	1.9	1.2
Ireland	4 594	6 387	10 749	25 039	24 263	21 090	13 565	10 044	8 195	8 223	5 791
% of foreign population	0.9	1.1	1.9	4.2	4.0	3.5	2.2	1.7	1.3	1.5	1.0
Italy	59 369	65 938	56 153	65 383	100 712	129 887	178 035	201 591	146 605	112 523	127 001
% of foreign population	1.7	1.9	1.5	1.7	2.5	3.0	3.6	4.0	2.9	2.2	2.5
Japan	14 785	13 072	10 359	10 622	8 646	9 277	9 469	9 554	10 315	9 074	8 453
% of foreign population	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.3
Korea	26 756	17 323	18 400	12 527	13 956	14 200	13 934	12 854	13 293	14 758	12 875
% of foreign population	2.7	1.7	1.7	1.0	1.2	1.1	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.7
Latvia	3 235	3 660	2 467	3 784	3 083	2 141	1 897	1 957	962	930	808
% of foreign population	0.8	1.0	0.7	1.1	1.0	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.3	0.3	0.3
Lithuania	214	162	311	183	173	179	177	173	166	196	123
% of foreign population	0.7	0.5	1.1	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.9	1.0	0.4
Luxembourg	4 022	4 311	3 405	4 680	4 411	4 991	5 306	7 140	9 030	11 864	11 451
% of foreign population	2.0	2.0	1.6	2.1	1.9	2.1	2.1	2.8	3.4	4.2	4.0
Mexico	3 489	2 150	2 633	3 590	3 581	2 341	2 736	2 940	3 067	3 872	3 070
% of foreign population	..	0.8	0.9	1.2	1.2	..	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.7
Netherlands	29 754	26 275	28 598	30 955	25 882	32 578	27 877	28 534	27 663	27 851	34 191
% of foreign population	4.3	3.7	3.9	4.1	3.3	4.1	3.4	3.4	3.1	2.9	3.3
New Zealand	18 140	15 331	19 513	27 607	28 468	28 759	28 468	32 862	37 464	36 840	31 977
% of foreign population
Norway	11 442	11 903	14 286	12 384	13 223	15 336	12 432	13 712	21 648	10 361	13 201
% of foreign population	4.3	3.9	4.3	3.4	3.2	3.4	2.6	2.7	4.0	1.9	2.3
Poland	2 503	2 926	2 325	3 792	3 462	4 518	4 048	4 086	4 259	4 593	12 917
% of foreign population	4.3	4.8	3.1	4.8	4.0	4.8	4.0	3.8	2.8	2.2	5.4
Portugal	24 182	21 750	23 238	21 819	24 476	21 124	20 396	25 104	18 022	21 333	21 099
% of foreign population	5.5	4.9	5.1	4.9	5.6	5.1	5.1	6.4	4.6	5.4	5.0

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Russia	382 694	102 131	129 802	91 915	114 927	138 578	197 379	254 283	249 199	262 893	490 347
% of foreign population	18.9	18.7	18.5	19.4	22.6	24.5	22.6	23.2	43.2
Slovak Republic	262	239	272	255	207	234	309	484	645	721	586
% of foreign population	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.8	1.0	1.0	0.8
Slovenia	1 792	1 840	1 775	1 490	1 470	1 057	1 255	1 297	1 563	1 978	1 911
% of foreign population	..	2.6	2.2	1.8	1.7	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.5	1.7	1.6
Spain	79 597	123 721	114 599	115 557	225 793	205 880	114 351	150 944	66 498	90 774	98 954
% of foreign population	1.6	2.3	2.1	2.2	4.3	4.1	2.4	3.4	1.5	2.1	2.2
Sweden	29 318	32 197	36 328	49 746	49 632	42 918	48 249	60 343	68 898	63 818	64 206
% of foreign population	5.6	5.7	6.0	7.9	7.6	6.4	6.9	8.2	8.8	7.5	7.2
Switzerland	43 440	39 314	36 757	34 121	34 332	33 325	40 888	41 587	44 515	42 630	40 277
% of foreign population	2.8	2.4	2.2	2.0	1.9	1.8	2.2	2.1	2.2	2.1	2.0
Turkey	8 141	9 488	9 216
% of foreign population	8.3	9.1	5.5
United Kingdom	203 789	195 094	177 934	194 370	208 095	125 754	118 109	149 421	123 106	157 004	159 348
% of foreign population	4.9	4.5	3.9	4.1	4.3	2.5	2.3	2.7	2.1	2.6	2.7
United States	743 715	619 913	694 193	757 434	779 929	653 416	730 259	753 060	707 265	761 901	843 593
% of foreign population	3.4	2.9	3.2	3.4	3.5	3.0	3.3	3.4	3.2	3.4	3.7

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the Tables B.6.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/ontj2k>

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Australia

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
India	9 124	17 788	12 948	10 076	19 217	27 827	24 236	21 989	24 181	17 716	28 470	49
United Kingdom	18 206	22 284	19 101	16 401	20 478	25 884	20 583	20 949	21 069	13 875	13 366	48
Philippines	3 453	4 505	4 051	5 592	9 090	11 628	8 996	8 333	9 112	4 921	9 267	57
China	6 700	11 109	8 898	6 876	8 979	9 203	7 549	6 931	6 578	1 720	7 974	59
Sri Lanka	2 203	3 412	2 520	1 671	2 746	3 957	3 179	3 752	4 487	3 262	4 861	48
Viet Nam	1 522	2 000	1 688	1 929	2 568	3 514	3 835	4 173	3 859	1 216	3 501	67
Pakistan	1 194	1 728	1 057	990	2 100	2 739	2 341	3 077	4 480	919	3 360	42
Nepal	298	550	520	589	1 384	1 810	2 401	2 959	2 402	1 665	3 294	49
Iraq	2 150	1 538	875	1 103	2 739	3 150	2 054	1 417	1 930	788	3 087	49
Korea	1 211	2 409	2 321	1 570	2 109	2 746	2 307	2 258	1 915	2 015	3 062	56
New Zealand	3 761	4 165	4 304	3 458	3 794	5 361	4 091	4 390	3 593	1 840	3 027	51
Ireland	881	1 280	1 302	1 145	1 796	2 843	3 092	3 943	4 286	2 670	2 991	47
Iran	823	918	779	1 024	1 657	2 155	2 198	2 416	3 182	1 108	2 770	44
South Africa	4 162	5 218	4 389	4 206	7 900	9 286	6 211	5 629	4 906	3 370	2 680	51
Malaysia	1 778	2 216	2 207	1 487	1 841	2 788	2 213	2 827	2 734	1 979	2 480	55
Other countries	29 188	38 263	28 275	25 581	35 040	47 111	40 310	38 083	39 036	21 498	33 484	
Total	86 654	119 383	95 235	83 698	123 438	162 002	135 596	133 126	137 750	80 562	127 674	52

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <https://stat.link/a3z0kq>

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Austria

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1 457	1 278	1 174	1 131	1 039	1 120	1 216	1 261	1 288	1 032	1 183	58
Turkey	1 242	937	1 178	1 198	1 108	885	997	818	778	828	911	48
Russia	135	137	296	316	427	431	298	337	323	373	463	59
Romania	246	114	223	275	224	244	221	257	291	456	376	61
Afghanistan	108	113	157	179	28	232	187	332	424	328	372	38
Ukraine	80	75	106	99	134	136	298	225	181	220	360	67
Iran	103	111	138	168	18	159	182	226	217	306	325	48
North Macedonia	281	150	182	163	182	210	224	297	296	453	313	56
India	90	84	82	171	165	207	233	277	342	238	250	49
Germany	174	132	117	110	127	187	148	182	234	265	239	52
Hungary	72	68	66	71	83	111	119	154	227	258	236	68
Egypt	124	94	97	152	174	189	214	169	196	247	236	44
Croatia	440	456	363	401	224	184	143	160	168	251	236	64
Nigeria	36	57	50	57	15	158	156	238	263	214	223	43
Bulgaria	66	46	46	65	82	87	90	104	140	147	184	65
Other countries	3 324	2 283	2 415	2 487	3 324	3 030	3 418	3 493	3 757	3 739	4 593	
Total	7 978	6 135	6 690	7 043	7 354	7 570	8 144	8 530	9 125	9 355	10 500	54

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/a3z0kq>

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Belgium

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Morocco	6 919	7 380	7 035	7 879	5 926	2 408	3 170	3 996	5 084	4 856	4 975	49
Romania	362	395	356	777	1 155	824	1 192	1 535	2 031	2 219	2 409	51
Poland	640	523	394	729	888	742	1 136	1 243	1 498	1 528	1 710	62
United Kingdom	143	111	114	99	141	110	127	506	1 381	1 045	1 630	44
Italy	1 700	2 833	3 697	3 203	1 856	1 199	1 067	1 048	1 174	1 352	1 589	45
Afghanistan	356	370	174	260	283	194	326	534	875	1 067	1 418	31
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	1 555	1 603	1 158	1 936	1 526	713	1 061	1 016	1 201	1 191	1 359	57
Netherlands	608	641	495	961	1 272	705	993	1 390	1 368	1 064	1 296	44
Turkey	2 763	2 760	2 359	2 517	1 857	691	843	989	1 061	985	1 073	44
Russia	1 647	1 641	1 032	1 439	1 525	641	950	1 029	973	896	1 059	60
Cameroon	401	490	600	924	915	546	738	845	872	955	1 046	54
Syria	238	259	186	246	205	92	185	253	243	474	979	36
France	792	717	638	903	973	586	647	673	795	869	952	53
Guinea	233	291	228	757	941	416	635	681	972	855	832	48
Bulgaria	213	208	185	338	514	326	526	579	655	554	773	53
Other countries	14 197	14 414	11 135	15 644	14 824	8 533	13 475	15 618	17 216	16 290	17 494	
Total	32 767	34 636	29 786	38 612	34 801	18 726	27 071	31 935	37 399	36 200	40 594	50

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <https://stat.link/a3z0kq>

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Canada

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Philippines	11 069	11 586	15 902	10 392	14 583	27 416	31 729	23 875	14 050	19 647	33 915	60
India	17 399	18 958	22 043	13 319	15 246	26 320	28 048	16 601	9 978	19 486	31 329	47
Iran	3 827	3 585	4 923	3 506	3 337	9 357	8 959	3 927	3 523	10 037	14 039	52
China	16 058	13 464	15 503	10 382	10 053	21 620	20 081	10 786	5 949	9 716	13 437	57
Pakistan	7 839	8 060	9 812	5 526	5 197	8 988	8 628	5 779	5 089	9 406	11 179	50
Syria	825	674	763	481	412	1 084	1 252	657	587	1 597	6 311	50
United States	3 737	3 713	5 010	3 797	4 424	7 249	6 627	4 405	3 283	4 229	5 572	53
France	2 688	1 971	2 702	1 441	2 089	5 755	4 590	2 252	2 112	3 836	5 500	46
Iraq	1 187	1 056	1 581	1 298	2 359	4 556	5 175	2 983	2 238	3 951	5 054	52
Nigeria	1 081	1 405	2 184	1 238	1 318	2 978	4 210	2 158	1 883	4 398	5 015	50
United Kingdom	4 372	4 506	5 971	4 298	4 721	7 293	6 255	4 158	3 005	3 515	4 842	44
Algeria	3 160	2 456	3 296	1 585	1 837	7 173	5 679	2 468	2 004	3 340	4 244	51
Haiti	2 057	1 249	1 427	751	1 411	3 918	4 020	2 561	2 374	3 147	4 154	55
Egypt	1 196	1 047	1 458	990	1 135	3 471	4 729	2 392	2 284	4 115	4 110	49
Mexico	1 846	1 798	2 392	1 423	1 599	3 558	3 477	2 079	1 505	2 433	3 768	52
Other countries	78 022	68 051	84 484	51 496	57 749	118 538	107 685	60 186	45 949	73 634	97 682	
Total	156 363	143 579	179 451	111 923	127 470	259 274	251 144	147 267	105 813	176 487	250 151	52

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/a3z0kq>

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Chile

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2016 (%)
Peru	171	156	241	307	153	237	142	167	940	57
Colombia	61	54	98	149	105	168	120	121	592	56
Ecuador	72	89	116	174	95	127	83	93	270	57
Bolivia	119	95	136	118	59	92	54	64	224	58
Cuba	107	119	158	159	88	115	83	69	183	43
Dominican Republic	7	6	4	17	2	13	10	15	103	73
Venezuela	14	17	26	21	8	24	23	42	92	60
Argentina	20	16	26	33	21	31	27	27	67	41
India	11	9	23	15	8	23	11	18	48	33
China	46	29	28	29	18	19	17	9	47	56
Haiti	0	1	2	1	1	6	4	14	43	21
Pakistan	17	15	20	17	12	4	3	13	33	0
Spain	10	9	5	14	8	17	8	6	32	33
Russia	13	3	8	13	4	6	6	4	28	75
Brazil	7	6	7	9	5	6	6	8	25	50
Other countries	136	117	132	150	91	160	89	118	249	
Total	811	741	1 030	1 226	678	1 048	686	788	2 976	52

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <https://stat.link/a3z0kq>

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Czech Republic

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women* 2019 (%)
Ukraine	520	396	501	518	948	2 075	1 044	1 429	1 891	1 319	1 002	..
Russia	58	50	68	173	162	463	305	563	752	633	574	..
Slovak Republic	431	377	378	331	270	574	111	372	630	501	421	..
Viet Nam	44	52	86	80	166	298	271	405	223	231	129	..
Belarus	20	15	38	49	53	137	94	135	215	139	107	..
Moldova	23	15	32	25	41	175	55	93	138	118	92	..
Romania	35	36	76	70	30	311	111	115	108	82	69	..
Poland	58	63	198	180	176	105	34	96	110	60	58	..
Kazakhstan	21	17	48	30	65	122	48	50	64	53	41	..
Bulgaria	12	21	28	19	27	52	51	65	87	53	30	..
Armenia	16	11	47	74	46	144	49	35	41	19	30	..
Bosnia and Herzegovina	9	9	16	27	11	59	47	49	51	38	28	..
Croatia	6	7	8	12	5	20	38	20	30	22	25	..
North Macedonia	11	2	9	6	14	20	23	28	47	31	22	..
Georgia	4	3	11	12	12	12	9	10	16	6	10	..
Other countries	353	421	392	430	488	547	2 635	2 071	2 037	1 955	1 818	
Total	1 621	1 495	1 936	2 036	2 514	5 114	4 925	5 536	6 440	5 260	4 456	..

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <https://stat.link/a3z0kq>

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Denmark

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Germany	84	81	55	80	41	27	38	110	248	168	129	59
United Kingdom	47	34	26	21	17	21	20	85	164	143	118	36
Sweden	52	58	64	57	33	47	105	277	164	185	117	58
Iraq	1 201	368	838	730	356	1 588	1 131	2 917	357	96	82	59
Ukraine	30	16	35	44	32	10	72	228	329	73	79	62
Poland	44	36	33	41	39	29	45	174	372	122	78	64
Turkey	511	239	227	300	166	150	193	977	353	113	71	61
Russia	123	74	55	85	62	31	76	232	330	110	62	89
Afghanistan	790	354	576	463	151	917	408	1 621	297	67	62	45
United States	18	13	12	11	15	6	23	110	248	114	54	56
Bosnia and Herzegovina	265	131	110	82	39	59	96	493	374	94	53	43
Iceland	26	17	24	12	16	17	39	238	160	144	52	56
India	64	25	27	27	9	34	31	211	85	48	45	40
Pakistan	214	21	73	89	77	38	191	641	199	82	43	40
China	199	103	103	97	19	105	23	348	175	52	41	68
Other countries	2 869	1 436	1 653	1 350	678	1 668	9 254	6 366	3 417	1 225	695	
Total	6 537	3 006	3 911	3 489	1 750	4 747	11 745	15 028	7 272	2 836	1 781	57

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <https://stat.link/a3z0kq>

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Estonia

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Russia	87	77	156	174	169	204	132	244	225	199	230	59
Ukraine	20	18	10	24	18	30	19	29	30	26	33	79
Other countries	1 563	1 094	1 352	1 142	1 143	1 380	746	1 502	627	541	516	
Total	1 670	1 189	1 518	1 340	1 330	1 614	897	1 775	882	766	779	56

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/a3z0kq>

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Finland

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Russia	1 026	1 925	1 652	2 477	2 103	2 317	1 728	2 028	2 758	1 766	1 946	62
Estonia	166	243	302	521	436	382	420	459	705	541	658	58
Iraq	207	78	106	457	521	405	560	534	742	621	589	41
Somalia	290	131	96	609	814	834	955	1 066	957	856	583	49
Afghanistan	186	108	100	510	479	251	242	376	469	339	309	50
Syria	7	6	23	20	22	16	28	47	118	118	299	45
Thailand	24	41	50	75	104	125	150	193	261	249	281	86
Turkey	94	132	166	278	271	257	229	264	313	210	260	34
Ukraine	53	92	95	148	157	141	145	163	281	202	255	63
Sweden	126	104	196	190	146	186	165	206	212	210	248	47
Philippines	15	33	35	48	77	67	79	106	141	182	225	70
Viet Nam	42	54	82	150	150	114	146	225	249	197	221	65
United Kingdom	8	20	16	20	20	13	26	31	147	134	211	27
Iran	180	137	145	451	341	219	140	222	309	244	205	53
India	27	73	76	117	99	152	137	193	245	154	174	61
Other countries	962	1 157	1 418	3 016	3 190	2 781	2 771	3 262	4 312	3 188	3 185	
Total	3 413	4 334	4 558	9 087	8 930	8 260	7 921	9 375	12 219	9 211	9 649	55

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/a3z0kq>

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – France

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Morocco	26 353	28 919	22 612	18 325	16 662	18 051	19 110	17 769	16 687	15 390	16 173	50
Algeria	20 757	21 299	15 527	12 991	13 408	15 142	17 377	17 662	16 283	14 867	15 079	50
Tunisia	9 476	9 008	6 828	5 546	5 569	6 274	7 018	7 663	7 045	6 687	6 808	47
Turkey	9 259	9 667	8 277	6 920	5 873	5 835	5 595	5 757	5 332	5 101	5 543	47
United Kingdom	231	205	261	335	354	279	374	517	1 733	3 268	4 104	51
Mali	2 786	3 214	2 616	2 201	2 645	3 345	3 621	4 111	4 057	3 662	3 829	47
Congo	3 309	3 417	2 018	1 326	1 808	1 797	2 089	2 181	2 967	2 935	3 095	52
Senegal	3 443	3 839	3 168	2 755	2 823	3 048	3 382	3 369	3 249	2 949	3 004	48
Côte d'Ivoire	2 582	3 096	2 257	1 766	2 513	3 055	3 188	3 652	3 363	3 012	2 931	55
Haiti	3 070	3 166	2 204	1 799	2 121	2 181	2 228	2 922	2 574	2 496	2 717	52
Comoros	1 373	1 546	1 828	1 778	2 307	2 175	1 881	2 869	2 917	3 903	2 694	48
Cameroon	2 425	2 890	2 425	1 926	2 579	3 010	3 125	3 377	3 137	2 502	2 502	60
Russia	4 157	4 507	3 390	2 203	2 517	3 040	2 654	4 094	3 550	2 011	2 440	71
Guinea	1 325	1 465	1 270	974	1 208	1 457	1 678	1 820	1 995	1 828	1 944	46
Romania	823	1 024	1 233	1 268	1 409	1 486	1 557	1 695	1 882	1 956	1 931	59
Other countries	44 483	45 999	38 655	33 937	33 480	35 438	38 731	39 694	37 503	37 447	37 832	
Total	135 852	143 261	114 569	96 050	97 276	105 613	113 608	119 152	114 274	110 014	112 626	52

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/a3z0kq>

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Germany

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Turkey	24 647	26 192	28 103	33 246	27 970	22 463	19 695	16 290	14 984	16 700	16 235	50
United Kingdom	260	256	284	325	460	515	622	2 865	7 493	6 640	14 600	39
Poland	3 841	3 789	4 281	4 496	5 462	5 932	5 957	6 632	6 613	6 220	6 020	71
Romania	2 357	2 523	2 399	2 343	2 504	2 566	3 001	3 828	4 238	4 325	5 830	63
Iraq	5 136	5 228	4 790	3 510	3 150	3 172	3 450	3 553	3 480	4 080	4 645	44
Italy	1 273	1 305	1 707	2 202	2 754	3 245	3 406	3 597	4 256	4 050	4 475	48
Ukraine	2 345	3 118	4 264	3 691	4 539	3 142	4 168	4 048	2 718	2 455	4 260	67
Syria	1 342	1 401	1 454	1 321	1 508	1 820	2 027	2 263	2 479	2 880	3 860	42
Iran	3 184	3 046	2 728	2 463	2 560	2 546	2 533	2 661	2 689	3 080	3 805	49
Greece	1 362	1 450	2 290	4 167	3 498	2 800	3 058	3 444	3 424	3 235	3 130	48
Afghanistan	3 549	3 520	2 711	2 717	3 054	3 000	2 572	2 482	2 400	2 545	2 675	41
Morocco	3 042	2 806	3 011	2 852	2 710	2 689	2 551	2 450	2 390	2 365	2 390	46
Viet Nam	1 513	1 738	2 428	3 299	2 459	2 196	1 929	2 190	2 018	2 230	2 270	56
Croatia	542	689	665	544	1 721	3 899	3 328	2 985	2 896	2 360	2 270	57
India	897	928	865	946	1 190	1 295	1 343	1 549	1 619	1 760	2 130	45
Other countries	40 832	43 581	44 917	44 226	46 814	47 142	47 677	49 546	48 514	47 415	50 310	
Total	96 122	101 570	106 897	112 348	112 353	108 422	107 317	110 383	112 211	112 340	128 905	52

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/a3z0kq>

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Greece

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Albania	14 271	6 059	15 452	17 396	25 830	18 409	10 665	28 251	29 769	24 203	14 050	48
Georgia	550	763	252	152	359	226	189	331	323	300	207	54
Romania	63	57	56	76	129	156	136	234	306	291	205	59
India	1	6	35	122	16	18	18	255	278	245	190	42
Russia	410	611	..	1	2	309	289	386	345	353	184	68
Ukraine	129	178	130	235	246	231	188	504	449	388	171	73
Armenia	137	199	150	210	189	150	109	296	287	240	154	57
Moldova	32	44	91	131	159	124	114	365	378	241	137	64
Bulgaria	62	70	101	75	192	200	142	287	329	220	136	73
Egypt	45	36	65	332	58	57	45	358	283	144	114	32
Syria	26	34	42	223	3	87	46	123	133	78	68	35
Turkey	175	71	49	70	167	151	139	141	107	106	63	41
Poland	33	38	25	27	52	33	46	66	89	78	51	75
Pakistan	2	8	21	26	88	75	59	46	30
Cyprus	87	61	46	41	118	93	73	95	76	38	46	72
Other countries	996	1 152	1 039	1 211	1 942	1 564	612	1 039	1 078	873	506	
Total	17 019	9 387	17 533	20 302	29 462	21 829	12 837	32 819	34 305	27 857	16 328	50

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/a3z0kq>

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Hungary

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Romania	3 805	3 939	15 658	14 392	6 999	6 200	2 605	2 874	1 757	2 123	1 822	46
Slovak Republic	97	97	414	307	202	310	208	282	136	223	260	60
Ukraine	558	646	2 189	1 765	894	858	386	365	186	192	142	64
Venezuela	0	0	1	1	2	3	1	0	2	46	129	53
Egypt	5	3	2	6	9	81	93	101	119	191	103	39
Viet Nam	39	75	38	29	15	67	39	36	46	87	100	53
Russia	119	111	168	151	97	170	131	119	75	89	93	67
Germany	35	25	55	67	35	59	29	15	38	50	59	49
United Kingdom	2	4	6	8	7	4	3	11	14	22	52	23
Turkey	10	9	12	8	20	58	19	20	23	20	26	15
United States	9	2	17	13	9	25	13	17	10	17	25	52
Poland	13	9	27	18	11	45	15	18	22	19	21	76
Iran	18	14	7	14	11	16	10	21	10	11	21	38
Israel	5	4	9	10	6	10	15	13	7	9	16	37
Greece	0	0	1	2	2	0	2	2	1	7	15	13
Other countries	1 087	1 148	1 950	1 588	859	839	479	421	341	402	371	
Total	5 802	6 086	20 554	18 379	9 178	8 745	4 048	4 315	2 787	3 508	3 255	48

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/a3z0kq>

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Iceland

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Poland	153	50	35	30	89	149	265	224	223	149	131	65
Viet Nam	51	39	14	8	39	33	33	26	22	27	30	53
Philippines	106	67	35	49	89	52	74	55	41	20	27	44
Thailand	40	28	27	26	26	43	42	48	34	37	19	95
Latvia	1	2	1	4	18	4	21	22	24	19	16	56
United States	15	19	11	12	13	14	18	11	17	28	12	50
Ukraine	18	15	10	21	18	12	17	12	11	7	11	64
Russia	17	21	12	21	18	13	25	14	20	10	11	55
Romania	12	4	2	12	7	10	24	5	4	3	11	55
France	1	3	1	3	1	8	0	4	8	2	9	44
Denmark	6	2	6	1	0	5	11	35	22	9	9	44
United Kingdom	4	5	7	3	2	1	3	2	5	6	8	62
India	7	11	3	3	2	0	9	3	1	4	8	37
Hungary	0	0	1	4	3	0	7	1	2	3	8	62
Czech Republic	0	0	2	1	1	1	4	3	7	10	8	75
Other countries	297	184	203	215	271	250	248	238	196	235	119	
Total	728	450	370	413	597	595	801	703	637	569	437	59

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/a3z0kq>

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Ireland

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Poland	13	29	25	359	508	939	1 161	1 326	1 357	1 464	925	50
United Kingdom	32	59	68	84	55	51	54	98	529	687	665	47
Romania	117	143	135	457	564	1 029	901	756	763	819	552	54
India	339	443	944	2 617	3 009	2 939	1 611	1 028	665	629	515	34
Nigeria	454	1 012	1 204	5 689	5 792	3 293	1 360	776	509	478	305	51
Latvia	16	22	19	98	150	226	327	379	392	308	221	62
Philippines	410	630	1 755	3 830	2 486	2 184	1 167	729	362	320	191	57
Brazil	21	31	86	203	245	459	393	304	264	220	188	55
China	131	258	403	798	656	576	494	304	225	234	162	64
United States	156	112	148	263	217	304	246	233	177	195	154	58
Pakistan	201	306	428	1 288	1 807	1 244	732	419	341	364	125	39
Hungary	4	2	1	38	77	137	172	216	163	142	102	54
South Africa	318	343	418	708	489	563	0	213	140	143	97	64
Lithuania	8	15	13	45	79	103	126	168	166	133	88	50
Ukraine	153	202	432	815	695	536	323	200	130	99	87	62
Other countries	2 221	2 780	4 670	7 747	7 434	6 507	4 498	2 895	2 012	1 988	1 414	
Total	4 594	6 387	10 749	25 039	24 263	21 090	13 565	10 044	8 195	8 223	5 791	51

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/a3z0kq>

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Italy

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2018 (%)
Albania	9 523	9 129	8 101	9 493	13 671	21 148	35 134	36 920	27 112	21 841	26 033	50
Morocco	9 096	11 350	10 732	14 728	25 421	29 025	32 448	35 212	22 645	15 496	15 812	53
Brazil	1 579	2 099	1 960	1 442	1 786	1 579	1 458	5 799	9 936	10 660	10 762	50
Romania	2 735	4 707	3 921	3 272	4 386	6 442	14 403	12 967	8 042	6 542	10 201	58
North Macedonia	954	923	1 141	1 219	2 089	2 847	5 455	6 771	3 845	3 487	4 966	47
India	894	1 261	1 051	2 366	4 863	5 015	6 176	9 527	8 200	5 425	4 683	45
Moldova	580	1 060	846	1 222	1 430	1 475	2 464	5 605	3 827	3 068	3 788	63
Ecuador	746	951	599	677	854	1 182	2 660	4 604	3 426	2 306	3 041	62
Senegal	592	689	797	1 070	2 263	4 037	4 144	5 091	4 489	2 918	2 869	38
Pakistan	349	535	601	1 522	3 532	4 216	5 617	7 678	6 170	1 974	2 722	40
Peru	1 947	2 235	1 726	1 589	2 055	3 136	5 503	5 783	3 689	2 421	2 685	62
Tunisia	2 066	2 003	2 067	2 555	3 521	4 411	5 585	4 882	3 187	2 484	2 471	48
Ukraine	1 131	1 820	1 199	1 580	1 806	1 443	1 822	2 890	2 698	2 423	2 400	73
Philippines	584	842	1 039	894	1 048	1 937	3 050	2 737	1 964	1 856	2 338	54
Argentina	1 613	1 007	569	332	362	331	404	753	956	1 348	2 304	50
Other countries	24 980	25 327	19 804	21 422	31 625	41 663	51 712	54 372	36 419	28 274	29 926	
Total	59 369	65 938	56 153	65 383	100 712	129 887	178 035	201 591	146 605	112 523	127 001	53

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/a3z0kq>

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Japan

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2015 (%)
Korea	7 637	6 668	5 656	5 581	4 331	4 744	5 247	5 434	5 631	4 357	4 360	..
China	5 392	4 816	3 259	3 598	2 845	3 060	2 813	2 626	3 088	3 025	2 374	..
Other countries	1 756	1 588	1 444	1 443	1 470	1 473	1 409	1 494	1 596	1 692	1 719	..
Total	14 785	13 072	10 359	10 622	8 646	9 277	9 469	9 554	10 315	9 074	8 453	..

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/a3z0kq>

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Korea

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
China	6 282	5 801	7 052	6 753	5 328	5 095	5 089	4 617	..
Viet Nam	3 011	4 034	3 044	2 834	3 429	3 894	4 988	4 008	..
United States	1 414	1 587	1 764	1 681	1 498	1 667	1 694	1 490	..
Philippines	339	532	400	412	476	496	750	612	..
Chinese Taipei	224	274	286	479	303	249	279	388	..
Cambodia	362	509	404	427	503	418	464	365	..
Canada	158	226	250	305	289	359	339	280	..
Australia	53	87	95	96	102	112	116	122	..
Russia	99	125	93	134	138	100	77	119	..
Mongolia	110	123	133	119	125	121	125	117	..
Thailand	72	91	84	81	75	94	99	115	..
Uzbekistan	75	110	96	120	87	82	86	93	..
Japan	57	84	82	95	68	68	71	59	..
Nepal	34	60	66	71	65	68	85	57	..
Pakistan	17	33	40	25	34	51	44	48	..
Other countries	220	280	311	302	334	419	452	385	..
Total	26 756	17 323	18 400	12 527	13 956	14 200	13 934	12 854	13 293	14 758	12 875	..

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/a3z0kq>

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Latvia

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Russia	54	67	49	82	71	109	70	127	53	50	59	..
Ukraine	41	34	13	8	51	54	32	39	9	8	22	..
Belarus	10	10	12	14	12	15	12	14	5	13	12	..
Other countries	3 130	3 549	2 393	3 680	2 949	1 963	1 783	1 777	895	859	715	..
Total	3 235	3 660	2 467	3 784	3 083	2 141	1 897	1 957	962	930	808	

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <https://stat.link/a3z0kq>

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Lithuania

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Russia	49	43	97	39	53	49	38	49	43	39	34	..
Ukraine	27	19	44	19	19	26	28	36	29	26	16	..
Belarus	12	11	17	14	14	12	14	16	22	29	9	..
Azerbaijan	1	1	..	1	1	1	2	5	..
Armenia	4	2	6	7	8	6	9	5	8	7	5	..
Egypt	1	1	1	2	3	1	7	3	..
Moldova	..	1	3	1	2	3	2	1	3	2	2	..
Lebanon	1	..	4	2	3	1	2	2	3	1	2	..
Kazakhstan	3	2	5	4	2	7	5	7	2	1	2	..
Bulgaria	1	..	2	..
Uzbekistan	1	3	1	..	2	1	..
Nigeria	1	2	1	..
Jordan	1	1	1	1	..
Ecuador	1	..
China	1	2	5	4	2	7	4	2	1	..
Other countries	114	81	130	91	69	66	69	47	53	80	38	..
Total	214	162	311	183	173	179	177	173	166	196	123	

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <https://stat.link/a3z0kq>

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Luxembourg

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2018 (%)
France	277	342	314	462	639	860	1 205	2 262	2 468	2 784	..	50
Belgium	224	258	450	1 581	1 577	1 346	1 264	1 836	1 624	1 598	..	48
Portugal	1 242	1 351	1 085	1 155	982	1 211	1 168	1 089	1 328	1 594	..	52
Brazil	7	3	7	12	18	15	30	100	280	931	..	52
United States	47	44	32	42	48	80	100	233	412	665	..	52
Italy	362	665	425	411	314	418	313	304	379	461	..	50
United Kingdom	62	53	44	56	37	66	75	128	384	440	..	46
Bosnia and Herzegovina	270	202	114	74	60	56	70	71	161	394	..	50
Germany	322	333	208	201	195	209	279	246	288	364	..	53
Cape Verde	77	40	60	41	44	27	47	33	142	220	..	54
Spain	48	58	35	38	30	48	42	44	85	124	..	53
Poland	30	27	27	25	23	17	30	30	47	102	..	62
Greece	6	14	11	14	15	21	23	33	59	99	..	54
Russia	40	50	30	17	22	30	40	31	60	77	..	75
China	33	11	15	10	12	16	27	21	41	74	..	59
Other countries	975	860	548	541	395	571	593	679	1 272	1 937	..	
Total	4 022	4 311	3 405	4 680	4 411	4 991	5 306	7 140	9 030	11 864	..	51

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <https://stat.link/a3z0kq>

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Mexico

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Venezuela	159	126	162	279	334	259	484	580	725	1 245	1 096	57
Cuba	307	240	408	579	531	287	305	341	403	467	376	48
Colombia	390	305	486	634	601	397	378	358	346	364	265	53
United States	266	117	79	108	119	120	136	119	127	189	139	46
Spain	227	121	152	180	163	119	169	166	165	173	116	34
Argentina	265	170	178	271	304	130	126	172	141	147	93	49
El Salvador	163	81	82	99	109	66	66	75	73	100	79	53
Honduras	131	55	92	143	129	60	74	89	66	94	78	56
Guatemala	209	95	117	196	141	62	57	98	84	75	62	52
Peru	166	107	138	182	159	100	93	79	79	72	58	50
Nigeria	0	0	7	8	3	5	39	63	56	59	56	27
Dominican Republic	50	29	22	75	59	53	63	81	72	69	52	37
Ecuador	41	41	46	63	59	40	62	56	63	78	49	55
Russia	55	24	36	42	36	44	29	28	38	41	45	73
Italy	76	39	45	53	66	31	38	59	60	61	43	28
Other countries	984	600	583	678	768	568	617	576	569	638	463	
Total	3 489	2 150	2 633	3 590	3 581	2 341	2 736	2 940	3 067	3 872	3 070	50

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/a3z0kq>

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Netherlands

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Turkey	4 167	4 984	5 029	4 292	2 872	3 119	2 824	2 764	2 947	2 675	2 828	53
United Kingdom	211	208	207	198	165	162	166	636	1 241	1 250	2 588	45
Morocco	5 508	5 797	6 824	6 238	3 886	4 251	3 272	3 364	2 944	3 005	2 582	55
Syria	73	80	82	126	236	235	210	86	94	214	1 587	44
Iraq	674	288	289	525	929	1 331	909	922	738	761	849	51
India	263	193	292	406	415	794	638	574	616	661	756	42
China	559	490	..	437	494	628	745	499	289	455	694	63
Suriname	1 142	967	934	875	659	828	594	601	536	560	593	61
Iran	279	217	281	361	848	690	464	449	492	443	463	54
Somalia	73	69	108	105	64	86	249	440	468	517	427	58
Ghana	411	367	519	540	435	575	503	507	393	374	426	64
Russia	400	275	295	427	291	446	355	403	376	399	409	73
Afghanistan	596	402	371	567	1 341	1 027	510	477	453	392	390	58
Poland	271	202	296	360	237	421	313	329	401	357	378	68
Thailand	383	413	571	602	371	534	443	414	357	364	344	87
Other countries	14 744	11 323	12 500	14 896	12 639	17 451	15 682	16 069	15 318	15 424	18 877	
Total	29 754	26 275	28 598	30 955	25 882	32 578	27 877	28 534	27 663	27 851	34 191	52

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


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Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – New Zealand

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
United Kingdom	3 254	2 814	4 808	6 039	5 299	4 883	4 382	5 405	6 552	6 074	4 896	50
India	2 283	1 573	1 664	2 249	2 225	2 235	2 429	3 412	4 745	4 948	4 798	43
Samoa	1 583	1 946	2 074	3 018	2 988	2 647	2 776	3 086	3 008	3 291	2 873	49
Philippines	697	852	676	2 240	2 822	2 757	3 048	3 060	3 633	3 164	2 625	57
South Africa	1 829	1 375	2 156	2 910	3 389	3 871	3 713	3 819	3 051	2 830	2 534	52
Fiji	1 553	1 309	1 219	2 097	2 124	2 270	2 422	2 752	3 307	2 583	2 059	54
China	1 137	693	852	1 158	1 190	1 239	922	1 138	1 209	1 092	1 046	55
Tonga	314	384	328	466	531	500	516	783	705	865	723	51
United States	340	324	448	587	605	602	558	659	830	889	722	55
Australia	111	118	116	179	232	287	317	564	764	881	667	57
Pakistan	83	42	47	112	135	149	161	190	195	361	571	49
Sri Lanka	300	242	164	204	271	350	445	537	704	654	555	48
Korea	588	459	445	564	406	374	349	437	592	623	481	49
New Zealand	103	147	105	168	235	408	489	389	369	352	368	48
Malaysia	445	464	398	467	398	392	386	477	495	472	358	57
Other countries	3 520	2 589	4 013	5 149	5 618	5 795	5 555	6 154	7 305	7 761	6 701	
Total	18 140	15 331	19 513	27 607	28 468	28 759	28 468	32 862	37 464	36 840	31 977	51

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/a3z0kq>

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Norway

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Somalia	1 737	1 528	2 131	1 571	1 667	1 138	451	1 250	1 746	1 879	2 986	48
Eritrea	63	248	254	199	323	563	1 114	1 911	2 971	1 089	1 406	49
Philippines	445	322	421	341	479	851	704	603	1 389	410	682	78
Afghanistan	857	1 054	1 281	1 013	1 005	1 371	1 088	1 004	1 264	448	655	49
Thailand	483	267	380	265	346	547	683	707	1 666	300	583	81
Iraq	1 267	1 338	947	1 642	1 663	1 418	817	833	1 175	602	471	32
Ethiopia	216	225	341	236	195	362	336	440	709	191	436	53
Sudan	43	90	122	72	58	80	57	180	293	125	404	39
India	185	152	209	130	132	313	382	391	636	167	373	48
Iran	785	554	539	297	307	336	353	420	626	365	333	52
Ukraine	75	68	119	112	107	243	171	233	339	145	254	74
Syria	39	49	61	54	57	65	84	112	289	141	253	38
Pakistan	469	430	526	478	424	503	714	482	592	437	222	49
Myanmar	33	103	260	325	533	838	378	440	466	112	221	58
China	157	182	221	175	174	238	146	200	354	82	216	55
Other countries	4 588	5 293	6 825	5 474	5 753	6 470	4 954	5 470	7 133	3 775	3 706	
Total	11 442	11 903	14 637	12 384	13 223	15 336	12 432	14 676	21 648	10 268	13 201	53

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/a3z0kq>

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Poland

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Ukraine	877	992	800	1 196	908	1 911	2 010	1 432	900	2 608	7 072	..
Belarus	357	418	320	456	390	741	527	512	229	833	2 145	..
Russia	162	215	200	244	171	370	251	112	63	219	367	..
Viet Nam	64	97	104	150	105	289	222	68	120	136	246	..
Armenia	79	101	103	163	111	367	285	160	113	119	120	..
Turkey	35	33	12	72	17	33	36	34	22	33	57	..
Tunisia	19	35	3	61	8	16	19	7	6	27	50	..
United Kingdom	6	9	7	9	16	7	8	6	7	29	47	..
Egypt	37	38	4	76	11	5	15	9	2	30	36	..
India	35	24	12	55	12	14	36	6	10	23	33	..
United States	47	50	53	75	86	26	22	23	11	19	32	..
Nigeria	35	45	4	68	8	8	26	18	12	20	32	..
Kazakhstan	41	38	42	44	41	36	36	17	13	40	32	..
Syria	22	18	22	43	20	33	16	12	7	23	31	..
Germany	47	92	106	171	389	38	17	31	34	39	31	..
Other countries	640	721	533	909	1 169	624	522	1 639	2 710	395	2 586	
Total	2 503	2 926	2 325	3 792	3 462	4 518	4 048	4 086	4 259	4 593	12 917	..

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/a3z0kq>

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Portugal

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Brazil	3 993	4 007	5 352	4 596	5 102	4 656	6 394	7 804	6 084	6 928	6 468	61
Cape Verde	5 368	3 982	3 502	3 230	3 821	3 200	2 854	3 607	2 591	3 640	3 462	60
Ukraine	978	1 358	2 336	3 322	4 007	3 310	2 895	3 240	1 909	1 752	1 620	53
Guinea-Bissau	2 442	1 847	1 815	1 753	2 082	1 915	1 676	1 884	1 226	1 542	1 451	46
Angola	2 113	1 953	1 870	1 857	2 131	1 630	1 316	1 507	1 225	1 438	1 387	57
Nepal	51	36	33	53	102	293	319	426	1 103	32
Sao Tome and Principe	1 289	1 097	1 156	869	1 027	938	809	1 061	753	1 006	951	61
India	1 055	919	860	628	539	490	454	1 002	693	855	747	27
Bangladesh	404	340	193	110	93	71	98	230	189	284	629	13
Romania	258	303	469	492	796	687	515	621	412	434	484	53
Moldova	2 896	2 675	2 324	2 043	1 816	1 363	964	815	453	400	356	51
Pakistan	200	388	476	443	346	333	189	407	239	285	291	29
Venezuela	91	76	87	68	45	80	51	127	90	188	283	60
Russia	535	580	590	506	515	395	327	359	194	272	196	67
Mozambique	253	208	204	193	199	148	148	206	158	175	161	60
Other countries	2 307	2 017	1 953	1 673	1 924	1 855	1 604	1 941	1 487	1 708	1 510	
Total	24 182	21 750	23 238	21 819	24 476	21 124	20 396	25 104	18 022	21 333	21 099	53

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/a3z0kq>

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Russia

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Ukraine	62 025	5 715	7 783	12 803	15 646	22 167	67 400	100 696	85 119	83 081	299 422	..
Kazakhstan	50 628	27 130	29 986	14 585	20 582	28 350	32 070	37 837	40 718	45 362	50 492	..
Tajikistan	39 214	4 393	6 152	9 773	12 476	13 743	16 758	23 012	29 039	35 732	44 707	..
Armenia	54 828	6 261	7 847	13 176	16 550	17 894	18 653	22 264	25 144	27 134	24 024	..
Uzbekistan	49 784	4 788	7 906	13 409	17 937	20 385	22 557	23 216	23 334	21 067	19 388	..
Moldova	20 429	1 992	2 802	5 252	8 878	9 953	14 086	17 397	15 473	17 071	15 791	..
Azerbaijan	34 627	5 265	5 635	6 440	6 856	7 513	7 177	9 885	10 394	12 152	13 521	..
Kyrgyzstan	48 720	37 348	52 362	8 415	7 177	9 037	9 041	9 316	8 777	8 793	9 371	..
Belarus	6 062	3 888	3 993	1 547	2 559	3 346	3 257	3 582	4 092	4 708	5 043	..
Georgia	9 876	2 513	2 405	3 082	2 849	2 347	2 239	2 623	2 535	2 502	2 625	..
Turkmenistan	4 026	482	544	753	825	817	950	774	729	1 044	1 361	..
Turkey	129	144	146	201	218	252	292	500	475	485	532	..
Syria	53	79	90	130	170	145	271	334	386	395	527	..
Afghanistan	124	188	153	135	204	173	272	300	441	461	501	..
Viet Nam	75	90	112	105	170	240	265	287	331	401	474	..
Other countries	2 094	1 855	1 886	2 109	1 830	2 216	2 091	2 260	2 212	2 505	2 568	..
Total	382 694	102 131	129 802	91 915	114 927	138 578	197 379	254 283	249 199	262 893	490 347	..

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/a3z0kq>

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Slovak Republic

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Czech Republic	48	45	45	36	24	37	70	105	91	119	88	48
Ukraine	77	44	61	60	63	62	73	77	129	127	76	63
United Kingdom	1	2	15	33	60	70	54
Viet Nam	11	15	5	11	15	49	20	26	53	54	46	48
United States	5	7	6	6	2	5	31	19	16	39	35	54
Germany	5	3	3	2	1	1	11	38	35	41	33	42
Switzerland	2	4	3	9	9	24	67
Russia	11	8	8	3	20	5	5	7	6	27	21	52
Australia	4	12	10	20	50
Romania	14	10	18	25	9	7	5	26	24	25	17	47
Canada	3	..	2	..	1	..	5	19	11	55
Syria	2	2	5	2	2	3	9	22
Hungary	17	12	9	8	5	1	4	6	13	15	8	37
Poland	3	5	4	4	4	2	4	4	6	9	7	86
Croatia	4	2	7	..	7	1	1	7	71
Other countries	62	88	103	100	55	62	74	152	211	163	114	
Total	262	239	272	255	207	234	309	484	645	721	586	49

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <https://stat.link/a3z0kq>

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Slovenia

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Bosnia and Herzegovina	488	565	635	587	545	570	741	724	918	1 321	1 215	35
North Macedonia	154	197	165	155	122	117	145	166	208	222	192	46
Croatia	198	154	164	134	93	34	30	30	22	40	48	50
Ukraine	23	25	31	30	35	17	21	29	23	24	33	82
Russia	20	6	19	13	12	26	8	11	17	7	13	92
Bulgaria	0	3	2	5	1	1	4	1	5	3	12	50
Italy	188	206	204	156	186	11	23	18	27	13	7	29
Moldova	5	4	10	9	7	10	6	6	7	3	6	50
United Kingdom	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	1	5	20
Slovak Republic	1	3	1	1	1	2	3	4	0	2	5	80
Dominican Republic	3	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	3	67
Albania	1	1	1	3	1	1	1	0	1	1	3	67
Uzbekistan	0	0	0	1	2	1	1	0	0	0	2	50
United States	18	23	19	27	29	0	1	3	0	1	2	0
Tunisia	2	2	0	2	0	1	0	0	2	4	2	0
Other countries	691	650	521	366	436	266	271	305	330	333	363	
Total	1 792	1 840	1 775	1 490	1 470	1 057	1 255	1 297	1 563	1 978	1 911	40

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <https://stat.link/a3z0kq>

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Spain

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Morocco	6 683	10 703	14 427	16 163	31 674	34 806	24 286	37 010	17 082	25 315	24 527	43
Ecuador	25 769	43 091	32 026	23 763	39 226	32 756	13 950	15 255	7 301	7 988	8 157	54
Colombia	16 527	23 995	19 803	19 396	39 332	25 114	11 881	14 299	5 647	6 826	7 515	60
Bolivia	1 813	4 778	5 333	7 424	19 278	20 895	11 164	15 802	6 124	8 157	7 417	62
Dominican Rep.	2 766	3 801	4 985	6 028	14 611	14 110	8 171	9 176	4 107	4 940	5 366	58
Peru	6 368	8 291	9 255	12 008	19 225	16 601	6 954	6 933	3 224	3 273	3 798	56
Cuba	2 696	3 546	3 088	2 921	7 026	5 618	3 072	4 353	1 429	2 688	3 105	56
Pakistan	262	375	491	596	1 949	3 326	2 798	3 148	1 708	2 054	3 057	31
Honduras	241	473	440	578	1 702	2 142	1 632	2 525	1 267	1 783	2 739	72
Brazil	943	1 738	1 854	2 540	4 698	4 017	2 273	3 427	1 294	2 153	2 737	68
Paraguay	298	766	864	1 297	2 958	3 003	1 935	3 358	1 265	2 500	2 726	77
Venezuela	1 744	2 730	2 596	2 823	6 217	4 302	2 332	3 127	1 068	2 034	2 554	57
Argentina	4 629	6 395	5 482	5 217	8 843	7 059	3 054	3 716	1 445	2 043	2 493	53
Romania	189	319	416	528	1 174	1 608	966	1 469	696	991	1 696	60
Ukraine	146	221	262	318	746	1 032	662	1 164	378	981	1 558	58
Other countries	8 523	12 499	13 277	13 957	27 134	29 491	19 221	26 182	12 463	17 048	19 509	
Total	79 597	123 721	114 599	115 557	225 793	205 880	114 351	150 944	66 498	90 774	98 954	53

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <https://stat.link/a3z0kq>

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Sweden

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Syria	498	418	675	666	540	495	1 370	4 479	8 635	10 626	20 066	39
United Kingdom	212	392	277	296	288	424	444	960	1 228	1 340	4 495	30
Somalia	882	1 075	1 087	1 547	2 482	2 925	4 776	9 069	8 140	6 746	2 952	52
Afghanistan	1 180	848	636	851	776	785	1 198	2 330	2 316	1 912	2 793	34
Iraq	3 170	4 354	6 164	16 582	14 317	7 271	4 955	3 694	3 272	2 579	2 260	48
Eritrea	350	326	396	743	836	997	1 113	1 451	1 677	1 836	1 865	49
Finland	2 429	2 966	2 227	2 245	2 255	3 023	2 133	2 182	1 974	2 522	1 730	64
Iran	1 097	958	1 021	1 392	1 305	1 128	1 331	1 420	1 788	1 736	1 399	52
Thailand	1 307	1 426	1 537	1 903	2 038	2 070	2 928	2 675	2 517	1 620	1 391	86
Denmark	409	483	391	475	564	603	1 510	1 942	1 720	2 052	1 356	46
Poland	819	1 477	1 787	1 645	2 473	2 417	2 333	2 702	2 083	1 783	1 209	55
Turkey	1 179	1 036	1 322	1 303	1 124	1 005	1 182	1 320	1 488	796	915	47
India	207	192	174	234	325	306	457	470	724	816	909	45
Pakistan	173	174	220	328	412	330	552	748	1 108	1 145	722	47
Russia	859	766	941	943	932	719	789	808	982	691	713	63
Other countries	14 547	15 306	17 473	18 593	18 965	18 420	21 178	24 093	22 174	19 989	16 234	
Total	29 318	32 197	36 328	49 746	49 632	42 918	48 249	60 343	61 826	58 189	61 009	46

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <https://stat.link/a3z0kq>

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – Switzerland

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Germany	4 035	3 617	3 544	3 401	3 835	4 120	5 255	4 658	6 021	6 212	6 640	51
Italy	4 804	4 111	4 109	4 045	4 401	4 495	5 496	5 134	5 863	5 233	4 839	46
Portugal	2 336	2 217	2 298	2 110	2 201	2 458	3 626	3 941	3 920	3 352	2 801	53
France	1 314	1 084	1 325	1 229	1 580	1 750	2 598	3 134	2 964	2 699	2 747	50
Turkey	2 593	2 091	1 886	1 662	1 628	1 399	1 808	1 729	1 796	1 678	1 802	51
North Macedonia	1 831	1 586	1 337	1 223	1 272	1 288	1 306	1 554	1 721	1 626	1 706	49
Spain	1 245	1 120	1 091	1 055	1 054	1 071	1 501	1 564	1 585	1 491	1 280	50
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2 408	1 924	1 628	1 163	1 173	966	1 103	965	972	995	847	53
United Kingdom	365	298	351	396	328	449	617	665	883	1 006	844	43
Sri Lanka	781	768	761	825	793	657	49
Croatia	1 599	1 483	1 273	1 201	1 126	838	904	737	730	649	560	56
Russia	397	397	562	614	589	514	536	68
Brazil	455	596	538	618	595	480	72
United States	364	390	436	383	456	380	58
Iraq	325	394	393	272	338	323	45
Other countries	20 910	19 783	17 915	16 636	15 337	12 169	13 964	14 764	15 373	14 993	13 835	
Total	43 440	39 314	36 757	34 121	34 332	33 325	40 888	41 587	44 515	42 630	40 277	52

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.


StatLink  <https://stat.link/a3z0kq>

Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – United Kingdom

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
India	26 541	29 405	26 290	28 352	36 353	22 425	18 398	24 616	16 687	15 104	14 680	50
Pakistan	20 945	22 054	17 641	18 445	21 655	13 000	13 088	16 740	10 379	11 802	12 914	45
Nigeria	6 953	7 873	7 933	8 882	9 276	8 077	8 054	9 811	6 941	8 696	8 839	48
Poland	458	1 419	1 863	3 043	6 066	3 166	3 777	4 437	7 113	9 626	8 802	60
Italy	310	356	297	556	810	479	846	1 282	3 515	5 255	5 774	49
Romania	993	1 009	566	679	2 488	1 501	1 674	1 980	3 022	5 527	5 604	53
South Africa	8 367	7 449	6 355	6 925	6 448	5 294	4 772	5 064	3 103	3 582	4 797	51
France	496	511	491	631	744	411	728	1 163	2 824	4 106	4 472	54
Germany	400	339	400	479	570	311	584	994	2 635	4 759	4 331	59
Bangladesh	12 041	7 966	5 149	5 702	8 902	3 892	3 612	4 648	3 080	3 572	3 780	48
United States	3 116	2 926	2 591	3 350	3 120	3 765	2 963	4 029	3 182	3 271	3 496	62
Zimbabwe	7 703	6 301	4 879	5 649	4 413	3 103	3 385	4 412	2 850	3 127	3 078	59
Sri Lanka	4 762	4 945	5 886	6 163	3 855	2 335	2 289	3 432	2 465	2 907	2 986	49
Iran	2 876	2 587	5 540	4 135	2 391	1 542	1 519	2 097	1 797	2 854	2 960	45
Bulgaria	1 916	1 930	969	746	1 941	1 314	995	1 247	1 818	2 640	2 914	55
Other countries	105 912	98 024	91 084	100 633	99 063	55 139	51 425	63 469	51 802	70 176	69 921	
Total	203 789	195 094	177 934	194 370	208 095	125 754	118 109	149 421	123 213	157 004	159 348	53


Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

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Table B.6. Acquisitions of nationality by country of former nationality – United States

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Of which: Women 2019 (%)
Mexico	111 398	66 941	94 721	102 121	99 330	94 843	105 910	103 487	118 469	131 950	121 973	55
India	51 851	60 049	45 087	41 916	48 945	36 931	41 178	45 183	49 815	51 325	63 578	50
Philippines	38 505	35 121	42 122	44 508	43 076	34 277	40 438	40 973	36 573	38 519	43 260	67
China	38 680	34 532	33 666	32 608	36 011	30 840	31 819	36 300	37 836	39 800	39 716	59
Cuba	24 655	13 910	20 903	31 071	30 299	23 975	25 674	31 939	25 836	31 940	35 969	54
Viet Nam	30 537	18 832	20 416	23 106	23 798	18 451	21 624	24 405	18 989	20 658	25 192	62
Dominican Rep.	20 648	15 405	20 402	33 225	39 448	23 694	26 582	31 216	29 598	22 891	22 976	58
Canada	15 075	14 131	14 723	14 443	14 931	13 878	14 969	15 170	13 649	15 796	18 495	52
Iraq	3 977	3 327	3 194	3 351	7 636	12 310	14 897	11 996	7 701	12 340	18 314	47
El Salvador	18 872	10 314	13 830	16 679	18 363	15 568	16 886	17 189	16 893	17 260	18 206	57
Jamaica	14 839	11 892	14 385	15 314	16 278	13 387	16 370	16 541	14 889	16 998	17 719	59
Colombia	16 417	18 234	22 478	23 733	21 942	16 283	17 024	18 374	16 012	17 402	16 914	62
Korea	17 499	11 065	12 623	13 732	15 697	13 513	14 119	14 251	14 470	15 922	16 149	56
Haiti	13 259	12 253	14 170	19 097	23 444	13 635	14 037	15 223	12 723	14 343	14 227	54
United Kingdom	12 183	10 023	10 945	10 814	11 066	10 333	11 638	11 052	10 485	12 165	13 907	45
Other countries	315 320	283 884	310 528	331 716	329 665	281 498	317 094	319 761	283 327	302 592	356 998	
Total	743 715	619 913	694 193	757 434	779 929	653 416	730 259	753 060	707 265	761 901	843 593	55

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/a3z0kq>

Metadata related to Tables A.6. and B.6. Acquisitions of nationality

Country	Comments	Source
Australia	Data from 2007 to 2010 are based on the former Reporting Assurance Section. Data from 2011 are sourced from Citizenship Programme Management. From 2014, figures inferior to 5 individuals are not shown.	Department of Immigration and Border Protection.
Austria	Data refer to persons living in Austria at the time of acquisition.	Statistics Austria and BMI (Ministry of the Interior).
Belgium	Data refer to all acquisitions of Belgian nationality, irrespective of the type of procedure. Data only take into account those residing in Belgium at the time of the acquisition.	Directorate for Statistics and Economic Information (DGSEI) and Ministry of Justice.
Canada	Data refer to country of birth, not to country of previous nationality. Persons who acquire Canadian citizenship may also hold other citizenships at the same time if allowed by the country of previous nationality.	Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada.
Chile	Register of residence permits.	Department of Foreigners and Migration, Ministry of the Interior.
Czech Republic	Acquisitions of nationality by declaration or by naturalisation.	Ministry of the Interior.
Denmark	The decrease in 2013 can be explained by the change in the naturalisation conditions that year.	Statistics Denmark.
Estonia	Acquisitions of citizenship by naturalisation.	Police and Border Guard Board.
Finland	Includes naturalisations of persons of Finnish origin.	Central Population Register, Statistics Finland.
France		Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of Justice.
Germany	Figures do not include ethnic Germans (<i>Aussiedler</i>).	Federal Office of Statistics.
Greece	Data refer to all possible types of citizenship acquisition: naturalisation, declaration (for Greek descents), adoption by a Greek, etc.	Ministry of Interior and Administrative Reconstruction.
Hungary	Person naturalised in Hungary: naturalisation (the person was born foreign) or renaturalisation (his/her former Hungarian citizenship was abolished). The rules of naturalisation in Hungary were modified by the Act XLIV of 2010. The act introduced the simplified naturalisation procedure from 1 January 2011, and made it possible to obtain citizenship without residence in Hungary for the foreign citizens who have Hungarian ancestors. This data refer only to those new Hungarian citizens who have an address in Hungary.	Central Office Administrative and Electronic Public Services (Central Population Register), Central Statistical Office.
Iceland	Includes children who receive Icelandic citizenship with their parents.	Statistics Iceland.
Ireland	Figures include naturalisations and post nuptial citizenship figures.	Department of Justice and Equality.
Italy		Ministry of the Interior.
Japan		Ministry of Justice, Civil Affairs Bureau.
Korea		Ministry of Justice.
Latvia	Acquisition of citizenship by naturalisation including children who receive Latvian citizenship with their parents.	Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs.
Lithuania		Eurostat.
Luxembourg	Excludes children acquiring nationality as a consequence of the naturalisation of their parents.	Ministry of Justice.
Mexico		Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SRE).
Netherlands		Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS).
New Zealand	Before 2016, the country of origin refers to the country of birth if birth documentation is available (if not, the country of origin is the country of citizenship as shown on the person's passport).	Department of Internal Affairs.
Norway	The statistics are based on population register data.	Statistics Norway.
Poland	Data include naturalisations by marriage and acknowledgment of persons of Polish descent, in addition to naturalisation by ordinary procedure.	Office for Repatriation and Aliens.

Country	Comments	Source
Portugal	Acquisition of nationality by foreigners living in Portugal. Until 2007, data exclude acquisitions of nationality due to marriage or adoption.	Institute of registers and notarial regulations, Directorate General for Justice Policy (DGPJ).
Russia	Naturalisations obtained through various simplified procedures benefiting mainly to participants to the Repatriation Programme of Compatriots; to persons who married a Russian citizen; to citizens from Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, countries which signed a bilateral agreement on naturalisations with Russia); plus a few persons who got their Russian citizenship restored (less than a thousand per year). Excludes citizenship acquired through consulates.	Federal Migration Service.
Slovak Republic	Data refer to persons living in Slovak Republic at the time of acquisition.	Ministry of the Interior.
Slovenia	Include all grounds on which the citizenship was obtained.	Internal Administrative Affairs, Migration and Naturalisation Directorate, Ministry of the Interior.
Spain	Includes only naturalisations on the ground of residence in Spain. Excludes individuals recovering their former (Spanish) nationality. The large increase in the number of naturalisations in 2013 is due to the Intensive File Processing Nationality Plan (<i>Plan Intensivo de tramitación de expedientes de Nacionalidad</i>) carried out by the Ministry of Justice.	Ministry of Employment and Social Security, based on naturalisations registered by the Ministry of Justice.
Sweden		Statistics Sweden.
Switzerland		Federal Office of Migration.
Turkey		General Directorate for population and citizenship, Ministry of the Interior.
United Kingdom	The increase in 2009 is partly due to the processing of a backlog of applications filled prior to 2009.	Home Office.
United States	Data by country of birth refer to fiscal years (October to September of the year indicated).	Department of Homeland Security.

Note: Data for Serbia include persons from Serbia, Montenegro and Serbia and Montenegro. Some statements may refer to nationalities/countries of birth not shown in this annex but available on line at: <http://stats.oecd.org/>.

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International Migration Outlook 2021

The 2021 edition of *International Migration Outlook* analyses recent developments in migration movements and the labour market inclusion of immigrants in OECD countries. It also monitors recent policy changes in migration governance and integration in OECD countries. This edition includes two special chapters, one providing an in-depth analysis of the fiscal impact of migration in OECD countries since the mid 2000s and another on the causes and consequences of the residential segregation of immigrants. The Outlook also includes country notes and a detailed statistical annex.



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