OECD Public Governance Reviews

HAITI

STRENGTHENING PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION FOR RESILIENT AND SUSTAINABLE GOVERNANCE

OECD

OECD Public Governance Reviews: Haiti

STRENGTHENING PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION FOR RESILIENT AND SUSTAINABLE GOVERNANCE

Please cite this publication as:
OECD (2021), *OECD Public Governance Reviews: Haiti: Strengthening Public Administration for Resilient and Sustainable Governance*, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/dfd5f806-en*.

ISBN 978-92-64-76449-1 (print)
ISBN 978-92-64-36214-7 (pdf)

OECD Public Governance Reviews
ISSN 2219-0406 (print)
ISSN 2219-0414 (online)

Photo credits: Cover © ContentForAll/Shutterstock.com.

Corrigenda to publications may be found on line at: *www.oecd.org/about/publishing/corrigenda.htm*.

Foreword

The Republic of Haiti faces complex and multidimensional environmental, political, as well as social and economic developmental challenges, which hinder the proper functioning of public governance and the achievement of Haitian administration's objectives. In response to these challenges, and in the face of acute and persistent regional disparities, the Haitian administration is pursuing a broad and inclusive reform agenda that includes the Strategic Plan for the Development of Haiti (*Plan Stratégique de Développement d'Haïti* - PSDH), the State Modernisation Programme 2018-2023 (*Programme de Modernisation de l'État 2018-2023* - PME-2023), and the Public Finance Reform Strategy (*Stratégie de Réforme des Finances Publiques* - SRFP). These documents reflect the government's determination to pursue a strong public governance reform agenda and to achieve clear and ambitious social and economic development goals. The objectives of these reforms are to bring the country closer to emerging economy status, strengthen the rule of law, foster a more cohesive and inclusive society and renovate and modernise public governance.

It is in this context that the OECD is collaborating with the Haitian administration by producing a Public Governance Review (hereinafter "the Review"), which aims to present a holistic account of public governance in Haiti. The review is structured around public governance issues identified in collaboration with the government and is accompanied by recommendations to help the country achieve its priority reform objectives. Anchored in a desire for continuity and coherence with existing initiatives, it thus represents an exceptional opportunity to consolidate past reforms and propose new initiatives, enabling Haiti to achieve its long-term strategic vision of promoting inclusive and sustainable economic growth for all its citizens. The recommendations proposed by the OECD are also intended to provide the government with guidance and analytical tools for the selection, coordination and evaluation of projects proposed for international support.

In this regard, the Review recommends that Haiti pursue a comprehensive public governance reform programme, in line with the targets of the PME-2023 and Haiti's Strategic Development Plan, to make decision-making more strategic across government and to strengthen the capacity of the public administration and the centre of government in the following areas: centre of government-led coordination; evidence-based decision making; multi-level governance; strategic management of the public service; and open government and strategic management of public communication.

In addition, the Review proposes a series of recommendations, the implementation of which depends in part on the national political will and the stability of political and socio-economic conditions. The Review thus makes recommendations that need to be integrated into a regular and ongoing process of reform across Haitian government and administration. In addition, in view of the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as current security and political events, the Review recommends extending the implementation period of the State Modernisation Plan beyond 2023, in order to ensure the success of public governance reforms.

This report is part of a series of public governance reviews conducted by the OECD in member and non-member countries. It was conducted under the auspices of the OECD Public Governance Committee, with support from the Public Governance Reviews and Partnerships Division. The review was conducted in collaboration with the Office of Human Resources Management, a strategic body of the Office of the Prime

Minister of the Republic of Haiti. It is based on evidence provided by the Government of the Republic of Haiti, including documented responses to a project-specific OECD questionnaire; two background reports produced by local experts; two fact-finding missions and a finalisation mission conducted remotely due to health and safety conditions, which brought together government and non-government stakeholders; and peer reviewers from France, Morocco, Senegal, the European Evaluation Society and Tunisia.

This report is made possible by the support of the American People through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The contents of this report are the sole responsibility of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the United States Government.

The drafting of this report and the related fact-finding activities were carried out from February 2019 to June 2021. The report was approved and declassified by the Public Governance Committee by written procedure on 8 July 2021. It has been prepared for publication by the Secretariat.

Acknowledgements

The OECD's Public Governance Reviews are conducted by the Governance Reviews and Partnerships Division, headed by Martin Forst, Head of Division, in the Public Governance Directorate, under the responsibility of Elsa Pilichowski. The mission of the OECD's Governance Directorate is to help governments at all levels design and implement innovative, evidence-based strategies to strengthen public governance, respond effectively to diverse and disruptive economic, social and environmental challenges and achieve their stated targets, including public governance reforms.

This review of public governance in Haiti was led by Adam Ostry, Head of the Public Governance Reviews Unit and Senior Project Manager, and coordinated by Emma Phillips, Policy Analyst in the same unit. Meghan Hennessy, Events Coordinator, Public Governance Review Unit, and Patricia Marcelino, Research Officer, Public Governance Review Unit**,** provided valuable administrative assistance to the project coordination team. Editorial work and quality control was provided by Ciara Muller, Communication Coordinator, Public Governance Review Unit, who also prepared the manuscript for final publication.

Chapter 1, which presents the contextual factors influencing public governance reform in Haiti, was written by Marion Tolboom, with the assistance of Arnault Pretet, Analyst, Public Governance Reviews Unit, under the direction of Emma Phillips and Adam Ostry. Chapter 2, on coordination by the centre of government in Haiti, was written by Emma Phillips under the direction of Adam Ostry. Chapter 3, which discusses the link between strategic planning, the use of evidence and budgeting, was written by Claire Salama, Analyst, Performance and Results Unit, Public Management and Budgeting Division, and Alexandre Leroy, Analyst, Financial Management Reporting Unit, Public Management and Budgeting Division. Emma Phillips wrote Chapter 4 on multi-level governance with advice from Adam Ostry. Donal Mulligan, Analyst, Public Employment and Management Unit, Public Management and Budgeting Division, and François Villeneuve, Analyst, Public Employment and Management Unit, Public Management and Budgeting Division, wrote Chapter 5 on strategic human resource management. Carla Musi, Analyst, Open Government and Civic Space Unit, Open and Innovative Government Division, Emilie Cazenave, Analyst, Open Government and Civic Space Unit, Open and Innovative Government Division and Emma Cantera, Analyst, Open Government and Civic Space Unit, Open and Innovative Government Division, wrote Chapter 6 on Open Government and Government Communication.

This review also reflects the contributions and assistance of a number of participants from across the Haitian government, without whom this review would not have been possible and to whom the team is grateful. Special thanks to:

- Mr. Jean Roudy Aly, General Coordinator, Office of Management and Human Resources, Office of the Prime Minister, Republic of Haiti, and his predecessor Mr. Josué Pierre Louis;
- Mr. Élie Jean-Philippe, Coordinator of the Technical Secretariat, Office of Management and Human Resources, Office of the Prime Minister, Republic of Haiti;
- Mr. Henri Boucicaut, Coordinator, Office of Management and Human Resources, Office of the Prime Minister, Republic of Haiti;

- Mr. Pierre-Eugène Géraldy, Coordinator, Office of Management and Human Resources, Office of the Prime Minister, Republic of Haiti;
- Mr. Thomas Wisner, Coordinator, Office of Management and Human Resources, Office of the Prime Minister, Republic of Haiti;
- Mr. Georges Garnier, Coordinator, Unit for the Coordination of Delegations and Vice-Delegations, Ministry of the Interior and Territorial Collectivities, Republic of Haiti;
- Mr. Ricardo Germain, Head of Department, Minister of Planning and External Cooperation, Republic of Haiti;
- Mrs. Léonne Prophète, Director of Economic and Social Planning, Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation, Republic of Haiti.

The OECD team would like to thank the seven peer reviewers who contributed to this review through their extensive knowledge and experience of public governance:

- Mr. Jean-Marc Chneider, Head of the Office of European and International Foresight and Expertise, Directorate-General for Administration and the Civil Service, France;
- Mr. Ahmed Khalid Benomar, Coordinator of the unit in charge of economic policy and investment, Head of Government Office, Kingdom of Morocco;
- Ms. Sarah Lamrani, Director of Studies, Communication and Cooperation, Department of Administration Reform, Kingdom of Morocco;
- Mr. Djiby Diagne, Deputy Director General, Operational Monitoring Office,Republic of Senegal; and
- Mr. Baye Gueye, Operational Monitoring Office, Republic of Senegal.
- Mr. Mondher Bousnina, President of the Body for Foresight and Support of the Decentralisation Process, Republic of Tunisia;
- Ms. Danièle Lamarque, President of the European Evaluation Society.

The review team would also like to thank the local OECD coordinator, Mr. David Alexandre, as well as Mr. Kesner Pharel, CEO of Group Croissance and his team, for their support during the fact-finding missions and the sounding board mission. The OECD also thanks Mr. Tony Cantave for sharing his knowledge with the project team through a background report.

The review has received ongoing support from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), led in Haiti by Mr. Chris Cushing, USAID's head of mission in Haiti. In this regard, the review team would like to extend special thanks to Mrs. Régine Dupuy, Senior Governance Advisor, USAID Haiti, and her team for their active contribution to the Public Governance Review process in Haiti. Finally, the OECD would like to thank her predecessor, Mr. Alphonse Nkunzimana, former Senior Governance Advisor, USAID Haiti, for his support in the definition and implementation of the project.

Table of contents

Tables

Figures

Boxes

Abbreviations and acronyms

AFD	French Development Agency (Agence Française de Développement)
AfDB	African Development Bank
ANMF	National Association of Border Mayors (Association nationale des maires frontaliers)
ASEC	Municipal Section Assembly (Assemblée des sections communales)
CAB	Budget Affairs Unit (Cellule des affaires budgétaires)
CAED	Coordination Framework for External Development Assistance (Cadre de coordination de l'aide externe au développement)
AFD	Water committees (Comités d'approvisionnement en eau potable)
AfDB	Administrative Council of the Municipal Section (Conseil d'administration de la section communale)
ANMF	Rural Administration Councils (Conseil d'administration des sections rurales)
ASEC	Interim Cooperation Framework (Cadre de coopération intérimaire)
CAB	Public Policy Coordination and Monitoring Unit (Cellule de coordination et de suivi des politiques publiques)
CAED	Economic and Social Development Council (Conseil de développement économique et social)
CAEP	French Development Agency (Agence Française de Développement)
CASEC	African Development Bank
CASER	National Association of Border Mayors (Association nationale des maires frontaliers)
CCI	Municipal Section Assembly (Assemblée des sections communales)
CCSPP	Budget Affairs Unit (Cellule des affaires budgétaires)
CDES	Coordination Framework for External Development Assistance (Cadre de coordination de l'aide externe au développement)
CEA	Aid Effectiveness Committee (Comité d'efficacité de l'aide)
CEP	Provisional Electoral Council (Conseil Électoral Provisoire)
CFPB	Property tax on built-up areas (Contribution foncière des propriétés bâties)
CFT	Territorial financial controllers (Contrôleurs financiers territoriaux)
CGR/FPT	Regional Management Centres of the Territorial Public service (Centres de gestion régionaux de la fonction publique territoriale)
CIAT	Inter-ministerial Committee on Land Use Planning (Comité interministériel d'aménagement du territoire)
CIRH	Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (Commission intérimaire pour la reconstruction d'Haïti)
CMRA	Ministerial Committees for Administrative Reform (Comités ministériels de la réforme administrative)
CMRP	Communauté des municipalités de la région de Palmes
CNFPT	National Centre for the Regional public service (Centre national de la fonction publique territoriale)
CNMP	National Public Procurement Commission (Commission Nationale des Marchés Publics)
CoG	Centre of government
CRPP-GE	Commission for the Reform of Public Finance and Economic Governance (Commission de réforme des finances publiques et de la gouvernance économique)

CSAFP	Higher Council for the Administration of the Public Service (Conseil supérieur de l'administration de la fonction publique)
CSCCA	Higher Court of Accounts and Administrative Disputes (Cour supérieure des comptes et du contentieux administratif)
CSFPT	Higher Council of the Territorial Public service (Conseil supérieur de la fonction publique territoriale)
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DCT	Directorate of Territorial Collectivities (Direction des collectivités territoriales)
DGI	General Taxation Directorate (Direction générale des impôts)
DINEPA	National Directorate of Drinking Water and Sanitation (Direction nationale de l'eau potable et de l'assainissement)
DSNCRP	Document de stratégie nationale pour la croissance et la réduction de la pauvreté
EG	General Asssembly (États Généraux)
FAES	Economic and Social Assistance Fund (Fonds d'assistance économique et sociale)
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FENACA	National Federation of CASECs (Fédération nationale des CASEC)
FENAFEMH	National Federation of Women Mayors of Haiti (Fédération nationale des femmes maires d'Haïti)
FENAMH	National Federation of Mayors of Haiti (Fédération nationale des maires d'Haïti)
FENASEC	National Federation of ASECs (Fédération nationale des ASEC)
FGDCT	Local Government Management and Development Fund (Fonds de gestion et de développement des collectivités territoriales)
GAC	General Administration of Customs
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNI	Gross National Income
HR	Human Resources
HRD	Human Resource Director
HRM	Human resources management
IGF	Inspectorate General of Finance (Inspection générale des finances)
IHSI	Haitian Institute of Statistics and Informatics (Institut haïtien de statistique et d'informatique)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INAT	National Institute of Territorial Administration (Institut national de l'administration territoriale)
INET	National Institute for Regional Studies (Institut national des études territoriales)
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
MARNDR	Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development (Ministère de l'Agriculture, des Ressources naturelles et du développement rural)
MCI	Ministry of Trade and Industry (Ministère du Commerce et de l'Industrie)
MDE	Ministry of Environment (Ministère de l'Environnement)
MEF	Ministry of Economy and Finance (Ministère de l'Économie et des Finances)
MGAE	External Assistance Management Module (Module de gestion de l'aide externe)
MICT	Ministry of the Interior and Local government (Ministère de l'Intérieur et des Collectivités territoriales)
MPCE	The Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation (Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération Externe)
MSPP	Ministry of Public Health and Population (Ministère de la Santé publique et de la Population)
MTEF	Medium-term expenditure framework
MTPTC	Ministry of Public Works, Transports and Communications (Ministère des Travaux publics, Transports et communications)
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
ODA	Official Development assistance
OGP	Open Government Partnership

OMRH	Office of Management and Human Resources (Office de management et des ressources humaines)
OPC	Office for the Protection of the Citizen (Office pour la protections du citoyen)
OREPA	Regional drinking water and sanitation boards (Offices régionaux d'eau potable et d'assainissement)
PARDH	Action Plan for the Reconstruction and Development of Haiti (Plan d'action pour le relèvement et le développement d'Haïti)
PCD	Municipal development plans (Plans communaux de développement)
PCRE I / II	State Reform Framework Programme I / II (Programme cadre de réforme de l'État I / II)
PEFA	Public expenditures and financial accountability
PIP	Programmes d'investissements publics
PME - 2023	State Modernisation Programme 2018-2023 (Programme de modernisation de l'État 2018-2023)
MPCE	National Deconcentration Policy (Politique Nationale de Déconcentration)
MSPP	Procedural Manual for the Implementation of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Monitoring and Evaluation (Procédure de mise en œuvre de la chaîne de planification, de programmation, de budgétisation et de suivi-évaluation)
MTEF	Strategic Development Plan for Haiti (Plan stratégique de développement d'Haïti)
MTPTC	Three-year investment programmes (Programmes triennaux d'investissement)
NGO	Growth and Poverty Reduction Service (Service pour la croissance et la lutte contre la pauvreté)
ODA	Small Island Developing States
OGP	National land use plan (Schéma national d'aménagement du territoire)
OMRH	National Water Resources Service (Service national des ressources en eau)
OPC	CIAT technical secretariat (Secrétariat technique du CIAT)
OREPA	Technical Implementation Unit
PARDH	Technical and Financial Partners
PCD	Programming and Study Units (Unités d'études et de programmation)
PCRE I / II	United Nations Development Programme
PEFA	National Deconcentration Policy (Politique Nationale de Déconcentration)
PIP	Procedural Manual for the Implementation of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Monitoring and Evaluation (Procédure de mise en œuvre de la chaîne de planification, de programmation, de budgétisation et de suivi-évaluation)
PME - 2023	Strategic Development Plan for Haiti (Plan stratégique de développement d'Haïti)
PND	Three-year investment programmes (Programmes triennaux d'investissement)
PPBSE	Growth and Poverty Reduction Service (Service pour la croissance et la lutte contre la pauvreté)
PSDH	Small Island Developing States
PTI	National land use plan (Schéma national d'aménagement du territoire)
SCLP	National Water Resources Service (Service national des ressources en eau)
SIDS	CIAT technical secretariat (Secrétariat technique du CIAT)
SNAT	Technical Implementation Unit
SNRE	Technical and Financial Partners
ST-CIAT	Programming and Study Units (Unités d'études et de programmation)
TEU	United Nations Development Programme
TFP	National Deconcentration Policy (Politique Nationale de Déconcentration)
UEP	Procedural Manual for the Implementation of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Monitoring and Evaluation (Procédure de mise en œuvre de la chaîne de planification, de programmation, de budgétisation et de suivi-évaluation)
UNDP	Strategic Development Plan for Haiti (Plan stratégique de développement d'Haïti)

Note: The acronyms of Haitian national institutions (ministries, units, committees, councils…) and of official national documents and programmes have been kept in French.

Executive Summary

In response to the political, socio-economic and environmental challenges facing Haiti today, the government has embarked on a path of public governance reform, notably with the 2018-2023 Modernisation Programme (*Programme de Modernisation de l'État 2018 -2023* - PME-2023) and the 2012-2030 Strategic Development Plan for Haiti (*Plan Stratégique de Développement d'Haïti* - PSDH). It is in this spirit that the OECD is presenting this Public Governance Review of Haiti conducted on behalf of the Office of Human Resources Management (*Office de management et des ressources humaines* - OMRH). Building on the government's framework documents, it includes five areas of public governance reform that can promote sustainable and inclusive socio-economic development for all Haitians: government coordination, evidence-based decision making, multi-level governance, public service management and open government.

Government-wide coordination of public policy is carried out by a number of institutions at the centre of government, whose functions are divided between the Presidency, the Office of the Prime Minister, the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers and various ministries. However, there are gaps and overlaps between the mandates and in the actual activities of these institutions. Given the important role of development aid in Haiti, Technical Financial Partners (TFPs) also play a crucial part in supporting and implementing reforms. In order to strengthen coordination and harmonise the strategic vision and implementation of reforms, the government could:

- Clarify the definition and mandates of the centre of government for policy development and implementation, strategic planning, decision making, monitoring and evaluation;
- Strengthen and better define mechanisms for institutional coordination and collaboration to improve decision-making and coherence of government action;
- Strengthen coordination with TFPs to ensure that projects advance national strategic priorities, that funding is aligned with national plans and that monitoring and evaluation frameworks link international support to government targets.

The production and use of evidence is essential for strategic planning and budgeting. In this regard, Haiti's strategic plans have clear targets that can be measured by indicators, but they could be made more consistent with other planning instruments. In the area of public finance management, significant progress has been made in establishing a sound fiscal base, but important challenges remain. Finally, Haiti lacks a framework for monitoring and evaluation practices. The recommendation is therefore made to:

- Revise the PME-2023 to improve its internal structure and consistency with other planning instruments such as the budget and the PSDH;
- Better align the budget cycle with Haiti's strategic targets;
- Strengthen some of the fundamentals of public finance, such as the consolidation of a single treasury account or greater transparency in the budgetary process;
- Establish a strong institutional context for monitoring and evaluating public policies.

Since the 1987 Constitution, the government has been striving to give effect to decentralisation and deconcentration and to improve governance at several levels. Given the difficulties of the legislative context and its implementation and the lack of capacity of the local authorities, it remains essential for the government to create a strong and operational strategic governance framework, to strengthen territorial coordination mechanisms and to translate national strategic decisions into concrete policies at the territorial level. For this purpose, this review makes recommendations to:

- Clarify the current legal context for decentralisation and deconcentration and develop coordination mechanisms at multiple levels;
- Strengthen territorial coordination structures and implement the national deconcentration policy;
- Clarify and make more coherent the current territorial and administrative division.

The PME-2023 has identified a number of critical issues in public sector development. Senior managers, in particular, have a key role to play and must be supported by specialist training and management practices. The principle of merit-based recruitment and career development must be continued. Haiti also needs to ensure effective cooperation between all players involved in human resources management, including by empowering and supporting Human Resources Managers (HRMs). This review thus stresses the need to:

- Support leaders by placing competencies at the heart of the appointment process for senior public servants and strengthen their accountability in public management;
- Strengthen the merit principle in recruitment and career management, in particular by publishing all public job offers and developing targeted measures for young candidates;
- Clarify responsibilities and facilitate cooperation between the OMRH and HRMs.

The Haitian government recognises the importance of establishing a culture of governance that promotes the principles of open government and is implementing initiatives to achieve it. However, significant efforts are still needed to ensure access to public information, protect civic space and institutionalise stakeholder participation. In this sense, strategic management of public communication is essential to support open government reforms and contribute to increased citizen participation. As such, this review makes recommendations to:

- Create an enabling environment for open government reforms, e.g. by conducting awareness campaigns;
- Establish a governance framework for open government reforms that facilitates coordination and collaboration with stakeholders;
- Strengthen mechanisms for stakeholder participation by adopting a law on access to information in line with international best practice and by promoting citizen consultation initiatives;
- Ensure strategic governance of public communication and define a strategic approach to public communication;
- Consolidate functions and competencies for strategic and effective public communication;
- Institutionalise the strategic use of public communication to foster citizen participation in public life through physical channels and online interactions.

Diagnostics & recommendations

The socio-economic challenges confronting the Republic of Haiti are to some extent the result of structural weaknesses in the Haitian governance system, largely inherited from a history punctuated by environmental, economic and political crises, including: administrative and economic centralisation and concentration, the policy capture and political fragmentation. These problems have hindered the implementation of effective and efficient public governance for the benefit of all Haitians and undermined the country's ability to achieve its ambitious development goals.

Thus, to help Haiti effectively address these challenges, this Review is structured around five key themes of public governance and offers recommendations to help the country achieve its priority reform objectives. Motivated by a strong desire for continuity and consistency with existing initiatives, the OECD is proposing a series of recommendations to the Haitian government in the fields of:

- Whole-of-government coordination,
- Fact and data-driven decision-making,
- Multi-level governance,
- The strategic management of the civil service, and
- Open government.

These themes are in line with Haiti's framework documents, including the 2018-2023 State Modernisation Programme *(Programme de Modernisation de l'État 2018-2023* - PME-2023) and Haiti's Strategic Development Plan (*Plan Stratégique de Développement d'Haïti* - PSDH), and are intended to support their implementation and contribute to the achievement of the government's economic and social development ambitions. Considering and implementing the OECD's recommendations represents a crucial opportunity to consolidate the reforms of the past and launch new initiatives that could help make Haiti an emerging economy by 2030. This report has been produced with the support and financial assistance of the United States Agency for International Development, USAID.

Towards better whole-of-government coordination by strengthening the centre of government

Centres of government are the backbone of public governance systems, particularly in the coordination, decision-making and priority-setting functions. In a governance context punctuated by socio-economic, political, environmental and humanitarian crises, the development of strategic policies and political leadership alongside better coordination of government policies and actions in Haiti is critical to achieving its objectives.

The Haitian government has legally mandated institutions to perform the key functions of the centre of government, notably coordination. The framework established by the decree of 17 May 2005 on the organisation of the central administration of the State, and the establishment in 2006 of certain institutions such as the Office of Management and Human Resources (*Office de Management et des ressources humaines* - OMRH) demonstrate the desire to modernise public administration and strengthen the coordination capacities of the State. Nevertheless, the legal construct of the centre of government is

shaped by an anachronistic legal framework, with gaps and overlapping mandates that in practice impede the design, coordination and implementation of cross-cutting policies. These weaknesses are visible among the institutions of the centre of government and within such specific institutions as the Prime Minister's Office. Clarifying the mandate of the Haitian centre of government and its various players would help to overcome this fragmentation to better respond to multidimensional challenges.

In addition, coordination in Haiti is hampered by inadequate levels of institutional collaboration and inherent weaknesses in the planning system. In particular, many councils or bodies, such as the Directors General Forum, seldom or never meet, and a number of networks of officials useful to participants have been allowed to lapse. Moreover, there is a lack of mechanisms for collaboration and communication between some key institutions, such as OMRH and the Ministry of Finance (*Ministère de l'Économie et des Finances* – MEF). On one hand, the large number of sectoral and thematic tables has made it possible to address a wide range of public policy issues, but tends to make coordination and decision-making more complex. Finally, the national planning system is characterised by a lack of coherence between sectoral strategic documents and central national strategies, which undermines the coordination of government action.

The Haitian centre of government faces an additional complicating factor in its decision-making. The weight of development support requires an increased level of coordination to share information and ensure that projects advance national strategic priorities, that funding is aligned with national plans and that monitoring and evaluation frameworks can directly link development support to national strategic impact and results.

Summary of recommendations

1. **Clarify the mandate of the Haitian centre of government and its various players in order to overcome its fragmentation and better respond to multidimensional challenges.**
   - Conduct a review of all laws, rules, decrees and regulations governing the organisation and operation of the institutions of the centre of government.
   - Implement regular functional reviews of centre of government institutions to strengthen monitoring and evaluation and promote an effective and efficient public sector.
   - Formulate a definition which formalises the mandate distinction between line ministries and the coordinating institutions of the centre of government.
   - Communicate across government on the coordination role of the centre of government.
   - Clarify and strengthen the mandate of the OMRH as a player in public governance reform in Haiti.

2. **Strengthen, better define and communicate mechanisms for institutional coordination and collaboration to improve decision-making and the coherence of government action.**
   - Strengthen the Prime Minister's Office's and/or the Council of Minister General Secretariat's strategic role in supporting government policy options' quality and harmonisation prior to submission to the Council of Ministers and the Council of Government, by reviewing the proposed agenda based on various criteria.
   - Define and disseminate "rules of engagement", or a checklist, for collaboration between line ministries and the centre of government in Haiti to improve and sustain collaborative efforts within government.
   - Formalise and strengthen the various coordination mechanisms aimed at harmonising overall State policy.

The Official Development Assistance (ODA) architecture in Haiti is complex, not very transparent and difficult to manage, given the increasing number of players, instruments and funding modalities. To overcome these challenges, the government could consider strengthening the coordination and planning capacity of the Haitian State to improve the alignment of ODA with national priorities through the following initiatives:

3. **Promote the alignment of Technical and Financial Partners (TFP) actions with national priorities:**
   - Develop and implement a national programme for international cooperation and management of external assistance in support of the national development strategy or policy.
   - Establish a coordinating body between the various institutions that interact with TFPs to address the fragmentation of interlocutors on the Haitian side. The government could also designate a unit as the secretariat of this network or committee, which would serve as the main interface between the Haitian government and the TFPs.
   - Strengthen the Directorate for the Coordination of NGO Activities (DCAONG) of the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation (*Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération Externe* - MPCE) to promote greater coherence between donor-funded NGO activities and national priorities, while preserving civic space.
   - Define the framework for public-private partnerships in development programmes.

4. **Create optimal conditions for increased use of state structures in the context of donor cooperation.** Indeed, as this chapter suggests, the current practices of external players often continue to favour non-state structures.
   - The centre of government, with the support of TFPs, could strengthen the state's intrinsic capacities for strategic planning and developmental policy-making.
   - Develop increased coordination of monitoring and evaluation tools for TFP activities and national strategic plans.
   - Integrate and strengthen feedback mechanisms in the policy-making process at the national level and in the context of collaboration with donors, to ensure that evaluations and findings from monitoring reports are taken into account.

5. **Consider extending the implementation period of the State Modernisation Programme 2020-2023 in light of the global Covid-19 pandemic and issues related to political instability**.

Making decisions based on relevant facts and data

The Haitian strategic plans, PME-2023 and PSDH, were built on the successes and failures of the previous strategic plans. Thus, many good practices can be seen in the PME-2023: clear public policy objectives that can be measured by indicators, as well as an explicit logic model, allow for clear monitoring. However, the PME-2023 has methodological limitations and lacks coherence with other planning instruments that could hamper the generation of evidence. This could limit their effectiveness as strategic planning instruments.

In terms of public financial management, the ambitions of the Haitian government and administration are enshrined in the Public Financial Reform Strategy and the Law of 4 May 2016. Over the past twenty years, significant progress has been made in establishing a solid budgetary base. However, challenges remain in putting the fundamentals in place, which need to be well anchored before more ambitious reforms can be considered. Nevertheless, some reforms can be implemented in parallel to move towards multi-annual and performance-based budgeting. These reforms focus on the development of a medium-term budgetary framework and the budget preparation phase.

In the area of monitoring and evaluation of public policies, it is essential to emphasise that the main challenge is to clarify the institutional framework of these two practices. The current system remains fragmented. There is no governmental framework for the practice of evaluation. There is also no explicit definition of evaluation that is shared by all players. A framework to structure and frame monitoring and evaluation practices is needed to promote the production and use of evidence.

Summary of recommendations

1. The strategic planning framework

The Haitian government would benefit from revising the 2018-2023 State Modernisation Programme to improve its internal structure and coherence with other planning instruments such as the budget and the PSDH. This revision could help to:

- Facilitate monitoring and *a fortiori* the implementation of the PME-2023 by defining indicators to measure the "intermediate" objectives of the PME-2023 and by supplementing all PME-2023indicators with elements for their proper interpretation.
- Strengthen and clarify the articulation of the PME-2023 and the PSDH.
- Operationalise the PME-2023 by implementing the ministerial action plans presented at the final seminar of the PME-2023 Phase II Operationalisation Mission held on 23 March 2021 and ensuring that these action plans clarify how the budgetary programmes and investments defined by the government will be used to achieve the PME-2023's objectives.

2. The budget as a tool for implementing strategic objectives

In the interests of better aligning the budgetary cycle with Haitian policy objectives:

- The preparation of the medium-term budgetary framework can be strengthened by carrying out macroeconomic and macro-budgetary forecasts prior to the formulation of the budget, and by strengthening the capacities of the study and programming Units.
- The budget preparation phase can be improved by breaking down the budget allocations of the management entities by sector, giving the management entities sufficient time to prepare their expenditure proposals, and by strengthening coordination and communication between MPCE and the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF).

However, the fundamentals of public finance must not be forgotten, as they form the basis of a budgetary architecture capable of supporting multi-annual and programmatic budgeting. Thus, it is crucial to:

- Pursue the consolidation of a single treasury account in order to minimise the number of entities operating outside the budgetary process.

- Make the budgetary process more transparent.
- Enable Parliament to play a more effective role in approving and monitoring the budget.

3. Monitoring and evaluation of public policies

The Haitian government would benefit from establishing a solid institutional framework for monitoring and evaluating public policies. For this purpose, it should consider:

- Adopting a clear and comprehensive definition of monitoring and evaluation within a formal framework, clearly distinguishing between monitoring and evaluation, clearly specifying the policies covered by these definitions and incorporating these definitions into a formal framework, whether statutory or not.
- Clarifying and completing the government-wide institutional framework for monitoring and evaluating public policies.
- Developing the evaluation function of the centre of government by giving a centre of government institution an explicit mandate to require and coordinate evaluations by line ministries and to promote the use of evaluations at the strategic level.
- Rationalising and clarifying the institutional framework for monitoring in order to specify the mandates of the various players involved in monitoring and their articulation within the institutional framework for monitoring priority policies.
- Organising a single performance dialogue between the centre of government and the line ministries.
- Communicating on the monitoring of priority policies.

Adopting a coherent and strategic approach to local development through more effective decentralisation and deconcentration and better multi-level governance

To address wide socio-economic disparities, the government promulgated in its 1987 Constitution the principles of decentralisation, which are based on three distinct levels of local government (departments, municipalities and municipal sections), with the aim of structuring new administrative, economic, social and political relations. Nevertheless, a number of challenges in multi-level governance are preventing the proper implementation of decentralisation and deconcentration objectives: the inadequacy of the legislative framework for local government, difficulties in making it operational, the lack of consensus and a clear definition of their roles, and the resulting lack of capacity within local government.

In order to promote and improve the effectiveness of decentralisation and deconcentration, within the context of sound public governance, it is essential to create a strong and operational strategic governance framework. This must be supported by planning instruments and underpinned by coordination mechanisms between the various levels of government and an effective system of performance monitoring and evaluation. In this regard, one of the main challenges of multi-level governance that the Haitian government itself has highlighted is its relative inability to translate national strategic decisions into specific policies at the territorial level. Indeed, a range of institutions at the central level are directly and indirectly involved in the management of local authorities in Haiti. The institutional landscape in this area is fragmented, especially through the fragmentation of the political and legal decision-making bodies that govern the management of the local authorities.

At the local government level, it is also necessary to strengthen territorial coordination structures and to implement the national deconcentration policy (*Politique Nationale de Déconcentration* - PND). The aim of

the PND is to gradually change centralised working habits, to involve decentralised players more in decision-making and to bring the administration closer to the people. It could thus guarantee a better distribution of public services throughout the country and thus the balanced development of the country.

Mandate overlaps and difficulties in making the legal framework operational, poor coordination between levels of government and mismatches between local government resources and their legal mandates contribute to this situation.

Summary of recommendations

1. **Clarify the current legal framework for decentralisation and deconcentration through the following initiatives**
   - Conduct a thorough review of the legal and regulatory framework of all laws, regulations and decrees adopted to implement decentralisation and deconcentration.
   - Establish and institutionalise the use of functional reviews to map the responsibilities, programmes and mandates of the central institutions with regard to decentralisation and deconcentration.
   - Clarify the attributions of the different levels of government (national, departmental, municipal and municipal section) to support the proper implementation and functioning of decentralisation.
   - Enable better multi-level governance by strengthening horizontal coordination mechanisms at the local and national levels, integrated into the decision-making process of the national government through increased coordination between levels of government.

2. **Strengthen territorial coordination structures and implement the national deconcentration policy (PND)**
   - Strengthen the operational dimension of the departmental technical council, delegations and vice-delegations order to implement the PND in a coherent and coordinated manner with local departmental and municipal bodies.
   - Decentralise anti-corruption mechanisms and entities.
   - Strengthen the security apparatus at the local community level.

3. **Implement a number of initiatives to clarify and harmonise the current territorial and administrative division.** The government could take the following actions:
   - Develop and communicate formal and objective criteria for territorial division.
   - Disseminate the results of delineation/demarcation exercises.
   - Identify and highlight the social and economic functional territorial areas throughout the country.
   - Formalise coordination mechanisms between local authorities, including associations of elected officials.

4. **Harmonise the responsibilities of local authorities with their human and financial resources:**

- Improve the capacity of municipalities to collect taxes and the current transfer system in order to reduce inequalities in services in the country and promote transparency in the spending of public funds and their impact on the welfare of citizens.
- Improve human resource management in local and regional authorities.

5. **Establish and strengthen strategic planning instruments to raise the effectiveness and efficiency of multi-level governance in Haiti.**
   - Support the preparation and implementation of municipal development plans and ensure their consistency with national strategies.
   - Establish a performance monitoring system for decentralisation and territorial development policies to increase performance and clarity of results for citizens.

Promoting strategic public service management to meet the needs of citizens

The development of a competent civil service is an essential pillar of effective governance responsive to the needs of citizens. Building such a civil service requires laws, enforcement processes and structures to identify, attract, and develop the skills deemed necessary. This requires three elements around which efforts must be concentrated: a competent and effective senior civil service, the strengthening of the notion of merit throughout career management and clearly defined institutional responsibilities for each civil service actor.

The State Modernisation Plan 2018-2023, in some of its working areas, emphasises the importance of these three aspects to modernise the Haitian state and better meet the expectations of citizens. These priorities resonate strongly with the OECD Council Recommendation on Leadership and Capacity in the Public Service. Nevertheless, the Haitian public administration faces many challenges, the resolution of which will determine the success of the implementation of the PME-2023.

The professionalisation of the senior civil service appears to be a first step in the modernisation of the civil service. By the nature of their role, between the design and implementation of public policies, the major Haitian bureaucrats are driving forces in the implementation of the PME-2023. Indeed, PME-2023 can only be achieved if the agents of change, i.e., the managers, act as convinced defenders and advocates of the principles of good human resources management. This requires greater accountability in the appointment process for senior bureaucrats and specialised management of their careers.

This career management must not only apply to senior bureaucrats, but must also be extended to all civil servants. This must be done by strengthening competency management. From identification to utilisation, attraction and development, talent management is a practical application of the concept of merit, ensuring that each job meets the expectations of potential talent and the needs of the administration. Broadening the recruitment process to include candidates from diverse backgrounds is a major challenge in Haiti. Communication strategies need to address more diverse audiences, focusing in particular on youth and reflecting the place of the Creole language in Haiti.

Finally, the PME-2023 needs the stakeholders supporting it to have the necessary tools to assume their institutional responsibilities. Indeed, the OMRH does not have the strategic oversight that the Superior Council of Public Administration and the Civil Service (CSAFP) should in theory provide. HRDs are limited in their functions by their isolation and the lack of protection of their independence and neutrality. The clear definition of institutional responsibilities will certainly be a central issue in the forthcoming establishment of the Haitian territorial civil service.

The recommendations relating to these three themes are based on the PME-2023, the OECD Council Recommendation on Public Service Leadership and Capability and feedback from many OECD countries. They are intended to highlight some of the pathways which must be taken for the professionalisation of the Haitian public service, and thus for the successful implementation of the PME-2023.

Summary of recommendations

1. **Support leaders**
   - Put competencies at the heart of the appointment process for senior bureaucrats.
   - Develop capacity within OMRH and human resources directorates to implement and monitor the laws on the appointment of senior bureaucrats.
   - Enable the emergence of proactive management of the senior public service, with distinct practices reflecting the special position of senior bureaucrats.
   - Raise awareness of the importance of the role of the senior public service in workforce management and forecasting.

2. **Strengthen merit in recruitment and career management**
   - Centralise and make accessible to the greatest possible number of people the various public sector vacancies in Haiti on a dedicated portal.
   - Create, under the supervision of the OMRH, an interdepartmental reference system of competencies to be used job by job, to define in a homogeneous way the different competences common to the jobs of the civil service.
   - Strengthen the introduction of competitions for vacant posts with selection criteria available to all and evaluated on clearly defined principles.
   - Develop standardised, regular and mandatory evaluation of public servants, based on the mastery and reinforcement of competencies, as well as on the achievement of specific, measurable, acceptable, realistic and time-bound objectives.
   - Implement training courses at the central level, with a focus on competencies previously defined jointly by the ministries and the OMRH.
   - Clarify career mobility opportunities within the public service.
   - Ensure good quality jobs for young civil servants, so that Haitian youth are optimally represented in the development of public policies.

3. **Clarify responsibilities and facilitate cooperation in personnel management**
   - Rethink the strategic oversight of the OMRH.
   - Develop the ecosystem of human resources departments (HRDs) and create an interdepartmental human resources network that brings to the OMRH the reality that the HRDs experience on a daily basis.
   - Strengthen the independence and neutrality of the HRDs by organising and protecting their careers, as has been done for public accountants.

Promoting more open, transparent and inclusive government to ensure that public policy reflects the needs of the population

Political, social and economic instability constrains the very possibility of establishing a culture of transparency, accountability, integrity and participation in the country's public life, in other words open government. Institutional strengthening and effective checks and balances are preconditions for any open government reform. The latter has a key role to play in defining and implementing a statutory and regulatory framework to protect civic space and restore stakeholder confidence, which are essential conditions for their collaboration and participation in public decision-making. A supportive framework is all the more crucial as stakeholders themselves face many challenges in the current framework.

Political support for the principles of open government at all levels of governance must be accompanied by a clear commitment at the highest level of government to support the successful implementation of the initiatives promoted. Such leadership is needed to create and embed a change in the culture of governance towards the effective promotion of the principles of transparency, accountability, integrity and participation.

However, it is still difficult to obtain government data and documentation on public actions, procedures and services at all levels. In addition, the use of consultation initiatives and citizen participation mechanisms remains limited at this stage, offering little opportunity for real collaboration between government and civil society. Similarly, public communication management is not yet sufficiently strategic and equipped to contribute fully to the government's public policy objectives and to the more specific reforms aimed at promoting the principles of transparency, integrity, accountability and participation of open government. A gradual and sustained deepening of initial efforts and an increase in the resources allocated to their implementation, both in the short and long term, will be essential to its full deployment.

Summary of recommendations

1. **Establish an enabling environment for open government reforms**
   - Improve understanding of the principles of open government by conducting awareness campaigns that highlight the benefits they can bring to a wide variety of stakeholders representative of society, including groups which are most affected, vulnerable, under-represented or marginalised.
   - Ensure that the statutory and judicial framework of civil rights and freedoms is guaranteed and respected in order to promote and protect the country's civic space.

2. **Establish a governance framework conducive to open government reforms**
   - Consolidate a supportive policy framework for open government principles through specific initiatives and political commitment to these principles and initiatives.
   - Develop a strong institutional framework that facilitates coordination and collaboration with stakeholders.

3. **Consolidate participation mechanisms with stakeholders**
   - Adopt a law on access to information in line with international best practice, to structure the information system and thereby promote transparency and accountability by reducing the culture of secrecy in Haiti. It will be important for the government to ensure that the development

process is communicated in both Creole and French through various means, and that the law and its provisions are also available in both languages.

- Increase proactive disclosure and awareness initiatives within all departments.
- Further encourage citizen consultation initiatives. A special effort must be made to reach the most affected, vulnerable, underrepresented or marginalised groups in society.
- Establish structured mechanisms for participation that promote engagement in public life.

4. **Ensure strategic governance of public communication**
   - Explicitly define, in strategic documents specific to public communication, its objectives, messages, channels, media, means and deadlines, taking into account the linguistic (e.g., French or Creole) and socio-demographic characteristics of Haitian audiences.

5. **Consolidate functions and skills for strategic and effective public communication**
   - Identify and develop the skills of public communicators to meet the needs of Haitian administrations and support professional and effective public communication.
   - Develop a "communicator's manual" or "public communication guide", and guidelines or practical guides to support personnel in the effective and strategic implementation of their missions.
   - Strengthen and professionalise initiatives in the use of all communication tools, including digital tools.

6. **Institutionalise the strategic use of public communication to foster dialogue and strengthen citizen participation in public life**
   - Utilise public communication as a lever to strengthen citizen participation. These citizen exchanges and dialogues must be conducted in French as well as in Creole, and through various channels to strengthen access to information and promote the participation of all in Haitian public life.
   - Promote and encourage citizen engagement through online interactions through the revitalisation of official websites and social networks of Haitian ministries and administrations.
   - Develop analyses of the audience and the uses, behaviours and perceptions of citizens online and on social networks.
   - Strengthen digital skills and the means to implement and monitor them.

1 Contextualising public governance in Haiti

This background chapter provides an overview of the country's historical, social, and economic legacy and helps situate the public governance reform efforts undertaken by the Haitian public administration. This background is intended to provide the basis for an understanding of the most pressing challenges facing the country that could put the country's ability to achieve its goals at risk. The chapter notes the improvement in socio-economic indicators as well as the government's commitment to ambitious reforms and development plans, highlighting the opportunity presented by the successful implementation of public governance reforms to improve public service delivery and promote inclusive growth for all Haitians.

Introduction

The Republic of Haiti lies in the western part of the island of Hispaniola, which it shares with the Dominican Republic, in the Caribbean region. With an area of 27,750 km² (CIA, 2021[1]) and a population of approximately 11.2 million (CIA, 2021[1]), Haiti is one of the most densely populated countries in the region. The country is divided administratively into ten departments, which report to a central government based in the capital, Port-au-Prince (Banque mondiale, 2020[2]). Haiti occupies a unique place in the history of the modern world, as it was the first country to declare its independence after a successful slave revolution (Popkin, 2011[3]).

Since the country's independence on 1 January 1804, recurrent political and economic crises have greatly affected Haiti's governance frameworks. Despite this difficult history, the current government has set several goals to move towards emerging economy status, strengthen the rule of law, foster a more cohesive and inclusive society and renew and modernise public governance (Office de Management et des Ressources Humaines, 2018[4]). The State Modernisation Programme 2018-2023 (*Programme de modernisation de l'État* - PME-2023) and the Haiti Strategic Development Plan (*Plan stratégique de développement d'Haïti* - PSDH) reflect the government's determination to pursue a strong public governance reform agenda and to achieve clear social and economic development goals. These are encouraging signals that provide an incentive for the promotion and support of more effective, efficient, accountable and resilient public governance in Haiti.

Sound public governance is a continuous process of formal and informal interactions within the state and between state players, non-state players and citizens. This process determines how public decisions are made, how public resources are used to perform public actions and how these actions are designed, implemented and evaluated to improve the well-being and prosperity of all. Good public governance also focuses on designing and implementing innovative whole-of-government responses to increasingly multidimensional challenges to improve the performance of national and regional economies for the benefit of citizens, businesses and communities. In this respect, the OECD has gained considerable experience in adapting the principles and practices of the public governance framework to specific political, institutional and cultural realities, whether national, regional or local.

The OECD undertook an eighteen-month Public Governance Review of Haiti (hereinafter "the Review") to assess and diagnose the current governance environment and reform efforts, with a view to making specific recommendations for reforming the public governance framework. The Review proposes to address five topic areas of public governance that reflect and complement the goals of the Haitian government:

- **Improving the capacity to coordinate and lead the design and implementation of multi-dimensional government policies and services, including through the leadership of the centre of government** (CoG), which comprises the Office of the Prime Minister (Primature), the Office of Management and Human Resources (*Office de management et des ressources humaines* - OMRH), the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation (*Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération externe* - MPCE) and the Ministry of Economy and Finance (*Ministère de l'Économie et des Finances* - MEF);
- **Strengthening the use of evidence in strategic and budgetary planning to improve policy development and service delivery**, by more clearly articulating the planning of Haiti's national strategy and budget;
- **Promoting effective multi-level governance for better results, i.e. more effective coordination** between central and local governments, to foster decentralisation;
- **Strengthening the government's capacity to strategically manage the public service workforce, and**

- **Increasing citizen engagement through the promotion of open government and the strategic management of public communication.**

Understanding the economic and political history of Haiti to better comprehend current issues of public governance

The founding of the Republic of Haiti is irrevocably linked to the ideals of General Toussaint Louverture, who championed the idea of an independent Haitian state as early as the end of the 18th century. In particular, he promulgated a new constitution in 1801 that abolished slavery and racial discrimination in all aspects of public life and administration and declared that all those born in the colony were free and equal citizens (Dupuy, 2014[5]). After the Haitian Revolution (1791-1804) against the French colonial empire, Haiti proclaimed its declaration of independence on 1 January 1804, led by Jean-Jacques Dessalines, considered the "Founding Father" of the Haitian nation and proclaimed Emperor by the generals of the revolutionary army (Dubois, 2012[6]). However, the post-independence period was marked by the large compensation demanded by France for its financial losses in Haiti, which affected the financial stability of the country by creating a cycle of indebtedness to French and foreign banks, which had a major impact on the fiscal resources that successive national governments needed to provide public services to the population (Dupuy, 2014[5]). This unique past has left its mark on the Republic of Haiti to this day and makes Haiti a singular historical case.

Moreover, since its independence, the Republic of Haiti has seen periods of economic, political and social transformation and reform, but also successive periods of political instability and internal struggles accentuated by extreme social stratification as well as numerous external interventions. The country's history has profoundly influenced the institutions and functioning of public governance and is a key factor in understanding the current governance challenges it is facing. This section presents the central governance issues in Haiti by examining some of the main milestones in its history, in order to better understand the links between the country's historical legacy and public governance and its challenges, focusing in particular on three aspects: policy capture, centralisation and administrative and economic concentration and, finally, recurrent political instability.

Policy capture at the origin of severe economic and social inequalities

The development of the state apparatus, shaped from the outset by the colonial period, was constructed as a source of power and resources for a small elite in the country, with periods of political instability and the overthrow of the elites. The post-colonial state was characterised throughout the nineteenth century by *"the conflict between political elites for the achievement, exercise and retention of power and the reaction of peasants to working methods and conditions reminiscent of the period of colonial slavery, [which] created problematic relations between the state and society"* (Etienne, 2007[7]).

This framework for the capture of resources and public action by certain elites became particularly institutionalised at the beginning of the 20th century, first with the American presence in Haiti from 1915, and then under the regimes of François Duvalier and his son, Jean-Claude Duvalier. The stranglehold of the traditional Port-au-Prince elite on public action was consolidated during the nineteen years of the US Marines' presence on Haitian territory and resulted in the monopolisation of high public service positions in the hands of the traditional elites (Bellegarde-Smith, 2015[8]). This period was to reverse the socio-economic gains of the Haitian peasantry, who had become detached from the operation of the plantations (Bellegarde-Smith, 2015[8]). While François Duvalier subsequently supported the emergence of a new national bourgeoisie, the Duvalierists (Étienne, 2007[9]), the re-emergence of the traditional elite under the leadership of his son, Jean-Claude, was accompanied by the development of an export-oriented liberal economic model (Lundahl, 2013[10]). The capture of agrarian rent and the development of a low value-added industry contributed to the shaping of a predatory state to the detriment of the majority of the

population, who saw no improvement in the provision of public services (Nicholls, 1986[11]). This capture of resources by an elite, its economic excesses, corruption and the political and economic exclusion of the marginalised populations all contribute to explain the overthrow of the regime by the population in 1986.

Concentration and centralisation of power as an obstacle to development throughout the country

The construction of the administrative organisation of the Haitian territory after independence was also marked by Haiti's colonial heritage. Indeed, Haitian governors were inspired by the colonial model to develop the new state (Mérion, 1998[12]). It was first the Constitution of 1843 that addressed the concepts of Municipality and the territorial organisation of the country, then the law of 1881 which enshrined this desire for decentralisation and deconcentration. Thus, *"in 1806, there were 4 departments, 13 arrondissements and 59 parishes, while in 1843 the evolution was already noticeable with 6 departments, 17 arrondissements and 82 municipalities"* (Mérion, 1998[12]). Nevertheless, despite the efforts of the Haitian administration, the process of decentralisation and deconcentration were obscured by *"the economic, social, administrative and cultural polarisation around the Republic of Port-au-Prince"* (Mérion, 1998[12]).

The concentration and centralisation of power was particularly reinforced by the arrival of François Duvalier, who asserted a strong and authoritarian central power. The centralising orientation of the Duvalier regime was characterised by a spirit of political and administrative control and was based on a system of rentier exploitation of the Haitian countryside (Mérion, 1998[12]). This maintenance of a centralising and authoritarian power was to be continued by his son, Jean-Claude Duvalier.

The end of the Duvalier regime marked a period of significant structural change for the Haitian economy and society, as well as for governance, in the direction of greater democratisation and decentralisation of power, notably with the 1987 Constitution. Parliament was dissolved and replaced by a 61-member Constituent Assembly whose task was to draft a constitution that would suit the social and political requirements of the time (Mérion, 1998[12]).This was the era of the dechoukaj[1], during which civil society organisations demanded social justice and the destruction of Duvalier's dictatorial political apparatus (Gage, 2000[13]). A new constitution was approved by a popular referendum in March 1987. It was intended to curb the concentration and potential abuse of power in government by establishing decentralisation goals, and checks and balances, including a prominent role for Parliament. The new Constitution also sought a territorial rebalancing of public services, as well as a strong decentralisation and deconcentration of public powers. The 1987 Constitution thus provides for a clear separation of executive, judicial and legislative powers and decentralised governance structures (Manigat, 2011[14]).

Despite the institutionalisation of decentralisation and deconcentration ambitions in the 1987 Constitution, the Republic of Haiti was still marked by administrative underdevelopment in the countryside and the centralisation of power in Port-au-Prince. Thus, at the end of the 1990s, "70% of the administrative establishments are based in Port-au-Prince and more than 80 (administrative) employees live and work there" (Mérion, 1998[12]).

Political instability and fragmentation are hindering public governance reform efforts

Finally, the country's history is marked by chronic instability, which has hampered both the reform processes undertaken since independence and economic development. The country experienced a very unstable *post*-independence period, marked by the search for consolidation and legitimisation of the Haitian state. After a civil war between 1807 and 1820, which divided the territory into two distinct zones, it was definitively separated into two states in 1844 (Hector and Hurbon, 2009[15]). From 1858 to 1915, twenty-two presidents, all army generals, succeeded one another, creating a high degree of political instability that affected the country's development (Auguste, 2010[16]). Nevertheless, the 19th century was characterised by attempts to achieve stability and create a uniform administrative system.

This instability continued throughout the 20th century, making it difficult to consolidate democratic governance and political institutions. Following the resignation of Paul Magloire, then President of the Republic of Haiti, five provisional governments followed one another between December 1956 and June 1957 (Étienne, 2007[9]). In this turbulent political framework, the authoritarian regimes of François Duvalier in 1957 and his son Jean-Claude Duvalier, who left power in 1986 following popular revolts, took hold (Étienne, 2007[9]). In the place of parliament, he appointed a military National Governing Council (NGC) which conducted a campaign of violent repression against demonstrations and popular movements and threatened to halt the democratic transition (Étienne, 2007[17]). Following demonstrations, Prosper Avril, a general in the army, was forced to hand over power to Judge Ertha Pascal Trouillot, who was preparing to organise presidential elections.

Democratic institutions and governance were strengthened from the 1990s onwards, although instability remained in a period shaped by a *coup d'État*. The first democratic elections in Haiti were held in December 1990 and were won by Jean-Bertrand Aristide. His party, *Fanmi Lavalas,* is rooted in the long historical struggle of poor Haitians to ensure the right of all Haitians to participate directly in political life and to share more equitably in the distribution of national resources (Étienne, 2007[17]). This brief democratic episode was followed by a military coup led by General Raoul Cédras on 30 September 1991, which established a violent and repressive regime and led to an international embargo (Heine and Thompson, 2011[18]). Democratic institutions were restored in October 1994 when President Aristide was reinstated after a period in exile (Belleau, 2009[19]). Under international and domestic pressure, US President Bill Clinton, backed by the United Nations (UN) and the Organisation of American States (OAS), launched Operation *Uphold Democracy*, which occupied Haiti and reinstated President Aristide (Office of the Historian United States Department of States, n.d.[20]). He was then re-elected in December 2000 in controversial elections marked by massive fraud and low voter turnout (United Nations Development Programme Evaluation Office, 2006[21]).[2]

This period of relative democratic and institutional stability began to falter in 2002. The country was increasingly confronted by a deteriorating economic and security situation (United Nations Development Programme Evaluation Office, 2006[21]). Jean-Baptiste Aristide was facing widespread discontent within society, particularly among the cultural elite, the liberal professions and students, who regularly demonstrated in the streets of Port-au-Prince to denounce the regime's dictatorial drift (Therme, 2014[22]). In January 2004, an armed insurrection in the Gonaives region spread throughout the country (United Nations Development Programme Evaluation Office, 2006[21]). The pressure on President Aristide increased and he finally went into exile on 28 February 2004.

Today: international interventions and stabilisation attempts (2004 - 2021)

The departure of Jean-Bertrand Aristide led to the arrival in June 2004 of MINUSTAH (Mission des Nations unies pour la stabilisation en Haïti - United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti), created by the UN Security Council. While international interventions in Haiti in the 1990s were largely focused on the democratic transition and the protection of human rights, MINUSTAH has a broader mandate and agenda with ambitious goals, including the establishment of the Haitian National Police (Police nationale haïtienne - PNH) and the strengthening of the judiciary and the prison system. In 2017, MINUSTAH was replaced by a smaller UN mission (MINUJUSTH), which aims to reform the country's judicial system. Since October 2019, the UN's political mission, the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (Bureau intégré des Nations Unies en Haïti - BINUH), has replaced MINUJUSTH to support Haiti in the organisation of elections and build the capacity of the PNH, including a focus on promoting respect for human rights (Donais, 2011[23]).

At the same time, the democratic transition that began after Aristide's departure presented a "fruitful" conjuncture for proposing reforms that strengthened the capacity of the State. This is reflected in two key decrees:

- The Decree of 17 May 2005 "On the revision of the general status of the public service", which proposes to rationalise the management of human resources assigned to the various institutions of the public service, to offer high-quality services to the population and to guarantee the principles of equal access to the public service, with the OMRH in particular as a player in the regularisation of the overall framework of the public service.
- The Decree "On the organisation of the central state administration", issued in July 2005 and revised in September 2016, which proposes a new organisational structure for the central state by creating the major strategic bodies such as the Secretariat General of the Office of the Prime Minister as well as those of the Council of Ministers and the Presidency, as well as the mechanisms and bodies for strategic and operational coordination of the central administration.

However, this transition was slowed down by the earthquake of 2010, which profoundly affected the countryy. This devastating event caused unprecedented human and material disasters: over 230,000 people died, 300,000 were injured and 1.5 million Haitians were displaced (Heine and Thompson, 2011[18]). The total value of the damage inflicted that day is estimated at USD 11 billion, including the loss of more than 285,000 homes and the destruction of many historic state buildings (the Presidency, Parliament, the Court of Cassation and fifteen of the seventeen ministries) (Heine and Thompson, 2011[18]). The aftermath of the earthquake has had a major impact on political stability, the potential for economic recovery and hopes for peacebuilding. In response to the earthquake, national and international players agreed to draw up the Action Plan for National Reconstruction and Development of Haiti (Plan d'action pour le relèvement et le développement national d'Haïti - PARDH). This document identifies four key areas of state reform: Economic -Territorial - Social - Institutional, which now form the basis of the operational framework for Reform.

In addition, the National Strategy Document for Growth and Poverty Reduction (*Document de Stratégie Nationale pour la Croissance et pour la Réduction de la Pauvreté* - DSNCRP), drawn up in 2006 to correct the technical and managerial dysfunctions that hinder the efficiency of the public administrative system is being reviewed, corrected and reorganised to take into account the new parameters that now permeate the State Reform. This is the framework for the Strategic Development Plan for Haiti (PSDH).Today, the national administration has made public governance reform a national priority, and the Government has taken action on many major initiatives, including human resource management, open government and multi-level governance. Perhaps the most important initiative in this area has been the development of an integrated national development plan, the Strategic Development Plan for Haiti, with a planning horizon of 2030.

Haiti today: political, economic and social challenges

Constitutional and political factors

The Haitian governmental structure: the search for a balance between the legislative and executive powers

The 1987 Constitution stipulates that Haiti is a Republic where three powers coexist: the legislative, executive and judicial. The President of the Republic, elected by direct universal suffrage, is not only the Head of State but also the head of the executive branch, which gives him the right and the ability to set the country on the path to reform and modernisation. It is indeed the executive branch that has the constitutional responsibility for public administration reform. The President is elected for a five-year term and may be re-elected for a non-consecutive term. The legislative branch is composed of two representative chambers: the Chamber of Deputies, which has 99 seats, and the Senate, which has 30 seats. Constitutionally, Parliament plays a crucial role in the governance of the country. Its responsibilities include appointing the Prime Minister, adopting the government's budget and overseeing the operation of

the ministries and the cabinet. The balance of power between the legislative and executive branches of government addresses the primary concern of the drafters of the Constitution, which was to ensure that the executive powers of the President are checked in order to avoid the concentration of power in the hands of a single individual.

New ambitious reform initiatives

Since the adoption of the Haitian Constitution of 1987, amended in 2012, public governance has been marked by a continuous process of reforms, depending on the national framework, including socio-economic, political and humanitarian factors affecting the country. These reform ambitions are defined by two initiatives: the reform of administrative governance, notably through decentralisation, and economic and fiscal governance, through the reform of public finances, with the aim of being able to offer better public services to Haitian citizens, promote inclusive and sustainable growth and establish an emerging economy by 2030. Indeed, since 2012, Haiti has committed to clear reform goals, in agreement with its international partners. The key text is the Strategic Development Plan for Haiti (PSDH), which sets out a comprehensive framework for reforming Haiti's institutional apparatus, including the state's political and administrative system, economic governance, justice, education, health and the environment. This document facilitates the implementation of the comprehensive State reform and defines the major strategic projects to be carried out for Haiti's emergence by 2030. It constitutes the "new strategic framework for planning, programming and managing the country's development in the short, medium and long term" (MPCE), to which the ongoing interventions of international donors and the administrative and economic reforms are aligned. These contribute to the achievement of its goals and are supported by framework documents such as the State Modernisation Programme 2018-2023 (PME-2023) and the Public Finance Reform Strategy (PFRS).

The PME-2023, designed and piloted by the OMRH, constitutes "the intervention framework that is intended to allow for the coherence and coordination of programmes in the area of state reform, including the promotion of good governance practices". It is also a question of effectively introducing certain commitments and principles of the State that have remained unfulfilled, despite what is provided for in the Haitian Constitution. In order to maintain continuity with previous PCREs, the State Modernisation Programme 2023 (PME-2023) has identified fundamental goals, while integrating the contributions of past experiences and achievements. The PME-2023 has six (6) goals (Office de Management et des Ressources Humaines, 2018[4]):

- to improve the quality of services while developing a relationship of trust between users and the administration;
- to provide a modernised working environment for civil servants by fully involving them in the definition and monitoring of the modernisation project;
- to rethink and optimise public spending to achieve better public service delivery at lower cost;
- to improve human resource management by developing a more attractive and competitive public service that respects equal opportunity, ethical principles and the promotion of merit and excellence;
- to transform the public administration so that it is able to steer the country's development and its emergence by 2030, and
- to establish structures to monitor, expose and combat corrupt practices in order to develop a culture of good public governance.

The implementation of the PME is grouped into 3 pillars, (I) Renewing the administrative system, (II) Strengthening the coordination of government action and territorial governance and, (III) Reforming public finance and economic governance.

Reform players in Haiti: crucial partners for the successful implementation of major public governance projects

Since the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, the idea of reforming and modernising the organisational, management and human resources framework has been a constant goal, embodied by the main players in State reform, namely the institutions at the heart of public governance and those acting in the context of international cooperation, as technical and financial support for reform projects. The main institutions are:

- The Parliament;
- The General Secretariat of the Office of the Prime Minister;
- The Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation (MPCE);
- The Office of Management and Human Resources (OMRH), which is a strategic body under the Office of the Prime Minister;
- The Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), and
- The Commission for Reform of Public Finance and Economic Governance (Commission de réforme des finances publiques et de gouvernance économique - CR/FP-GE), composed of representatives from the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation and the Higher Court of Accounts and Administrative Litigation.

For the past three decades, these institutions have been in constant evolution to reform themselves in order to promote the proper formulation of public policies that meet the criteria of feasibility (capacity to implement them) and prioritisation of the most urgent socio-economic needs.

Societal, economic and environmental challenges to promote good governance

Economic performance and development levels are affected by governance problems and natural and climatic disasters.

Recurrent episodes of institutional and political instability have affected Haiti's economic and social development. Over the past two decades, GDP has grown by an average of 1.3% per year and is estimated to have contracted by 0.9% in 2019 (Banque mondiale, 2020[2]). In addition, Haiti has not fully recovered from the devastating effects of Hurricane Matthew in October 2016, which destroyed part of the country's economy and infrastructure, especially in the South and Southeast regions. Losses and damages were estimated at USD 1,887.9 million, of which USD 773.9 million was in the productive sectors (agriculture, livestock, fisheries, trade, industry and tourism) (Gouvernement de la République d'Haïti, 2016[24]). Moreover, the country suffers structurally from the weakness of its industrial production of consumer goods, which forces it to depend on the outside world and thus makes a large part of wealth creation dependent on agricultural activities. Nevertheless, Haiti has many economic advantages which, if properly exploited, could lead to sustained and sustainable economic growth. Indeed, the country has a young workforce, with 30% of the active population being under 25 years of age, which could constitute important human capital. Moreover, as the most populous country in the region, Haiti represents a major domestic market for the private sector. The country also maintains economic relations with the outside world thanks to an extremely dynamic diaspora. In 2019, economic transfers thus accounted for more than 23% of national GDP (Banque mondiale, 2021[25]). Finally, the country has certain assets in sectors with high growth potential, such as tourism, agriculture and the textile industry (Sánchez Gutiérrez and Gilbert, 2017[26]). In addition, Haitian youth represent a tremendous potential for the country's future, which must be taken into account at the heart of State reforms in order to strengthen their participation in public decision-making and to allow the emergence of public policies and services that fully meet their needs.

Inequality and poverty are major challenges to promoting good governance.

Although extreme poverty has decreased nationally from 31% in 2000 to 24% in 2012 (Banque mondiale, Observatoire National de la Pauvreté et de l'Exclusion Sociale, 2014[27]), it is still a major challenge for the country. Today, an estimated 2.5 million Haitians live in extreme poverty (on less than USD 1.25 per day), mostly in rural areas (USAID, 2020[28]). Inequality is particularly exacerbated by the gap between urban and rural areas. During the period 2000-2012, urban poverty was halved, while poverty levels stagnated in rural areas (USAID, 2020[28]). These areas have an economy largely dependent on small farms, characterised by low-yield agricultural production, and are particularly affected by increasing food pressure, labour shortages and recurrent natural disasters (USAID, 2020[28]). Persistent inequalities and rural poverty also reflect the lack of essential public services (e.g., health, education, mobility and public safety services), compared to the level of services provided in urban areas. This lack of essential services contributes both to the maintenance of these inequalities and to the public's distrust of government, as people are not satisfied with the public services they receive. This may partly explain the difficulties in mobilising revenue at the local level.

In addition, gender inequality is still present in society. Haitian women earn on average 32% less than men, and after remaining low and unchanged for ten years, Haiti's gender equity score (CPIA) dropped in 2016, "signalling a deterioration in the quality of institutions and policies promoting gender equity" (International Monetary Fund, 2020[29]).

High levels of poverty, as well as political, economic and environmental problems, have caused many Haitians to leave. It was estimated in 2015 that *about 1.2 million Haitians were living outside the country* (OECD and Institut interuniversitaire pour la recherche et le développement, 2017[30])*.This figure should be put into perspective with the assets that this population represents for Haiti, which are not being fully exploited by the country. This is particularly true for the investment of remittances, which can be put into education and the agricultural sector to produce virtuous circles. Financial education is also an important asset, which would enable people to invest the money obtained from remittances productively* (OECD and Institut interuniversitaire pour la recherche et le développement, 2017[30])*. Finally, it is essential to develop sustainable job creation policies in Haiti to improve and structure the labour market.*

Lack of trust in the government and weak institutional capacity are weakening the country

Haiti is one of the countries in the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region with the lowest public expenditure per capita, at USD PPP 359 in 2017, in contrast to an average of USD PPP 5138 in the LAC region (OECD, 2020[31]). This translates into limited social investment, with Haiti spending only a small share of its GDP on improving public services and infrastructure. In 2019, only 24% of citizens were satisfied with health services, while 39% were satisfied with education-related services (OECD, 2020[31]). Confidence in the government has remained stable between 2007 and 2018, averaging around 41% (OECD, 2020[31]).

The impact of natural and climatic disasters on the territory

Haiti is exposed to a wide range of natural disasters, including landslides, floods, hurricanes and earthquakes. Although many Caribbean countries face similar threats, the low proportion of robust infrastructure and the lack of good urban planning mean that Haiti's urban areas are the ones most affected by natural disasters in the region, both in human and material terms. Overall, its geographical location prone to hurricanes and tropical storms, combined with its high population density, makes it a particularly vulnerable country. Over the past 30 years, the impact of climate change has worsened weather conditions. Indeed, since 1998, Haiti has been hit by a dozen tropical storms and hurricanes that have caused a great deal of material, physical and psychological damage, as well as the death of a large number of people (University de Fondwa, 2018[32]). In addition, these disasters exacerbate the pressures on the country's

weak infrastructure, including the national health system. In addition, the destruction of infrastructure, such as reduced access to clean water, could lead to major epidemic crises (e.g. cholera).

These natural disasters leave a lasting impact on the country. For example, the January 2010 earthquake caused massive damage to property and infrastructure, particularly in urban areas such as Port-au-Prince; it killed more than 230,000 people and displaced more than 1.5 million. This event had unprecedented societal and economic repercussions, which have strongly affected Haitian public governance. The state lost 17% of its civil servants that day (Forst, 2012[33]), which considerably destabilised the country. This combination of recurrent environmental factors and the destruction of the economic and social situation constitutes a major obstacle to good governance and sustainable and inclusive growth in Haiti.

Anchoring the public governance reform process in continuity

Haiti is currently governed by President Jovenel Moïse, who was elected in 2016 after turbulent elections, which led to ongoing conflict with the political opposition[3]. The latter criticises the lack of clarity of the Haitian electoral calendar and in particular is challenging the end date of the presidential term. This unresolved dispute takes place in the context of a lack of parliamentary quorum since January 2020 and the expiration of the parliament's mandate, in a context in which President Moses has moved to governance by Decree. At the same time, the security situation in Haiti is deteriorating, with crime and kidnappings affecting the population in urban areas, particularly in Port-au-Prince (Bureau intégré des Nations Unies en Haïti, 2021[34]). This unstable security context has also hampered the effective implementation of the State's efforts to reform public governance. In addition, several general elections will be held during 2021 to renew the entire political class, from the president to local authorities.

In this fraught socio-political context, it is essential to stress that the success of public governance reform efforts, including the implementation of the Review's findings and recommendations, depends in part on national political will and the stability of political and socio-economic conditions. This Review therefore provides advice not only for the current government, but for the Haitian national administration as a whole, in the context of a regular and continuous reform process over time.

Public governance in Haiti, a vision for the future and future challenges

The current challenges facing Haiti are multiple: economic, political, social, demographic and climatic. These challenges are not new, but the product of the historical trends described above, and of exogenous events that make the governance framework more complex. In response, it is essential to promote resilient and effective public governance in the face of increasingly unpredictable challenges. In light of these remarks, the Review focuses on coordination between the various government players and technical and financial partners (TFPs) to facilitate the implementation of public governance projects and goals. The general comment is that there has been significant progress in some areas of reform, notably in strengthening the human resources of the public service and in implementing a decentralisation policy. However, the lack of coordination and definition of key reform areas makes it difficult to achieve the goals set by the government. It is essential to promote a clear and unified vision of the goals of reform players in Haiti, as affirmed in framework documents such as the PME-2023 and the PSDH.

A vision for the future: reforming public governance to address socio-economic problems and promote inclusive and sustainable development

The expected results of the Public Governance Review of Haiti include strengthening the capacity of the Government of Haiti to design and successfully implement a reform programme in order to:

- Improve capacity to lead and guide an interdepartmental strategy, as well as to lead a whole-of-government strategy by effectively coordinating administrative silos to set and pursue national

development goals, while more effectively articulating donor-led governance reform activities that pursue these goals;

- Strengthen the links between fiscal strategy and planning to improve policy development and service delivery;
- Strengthen the vertical relationship between central government, departments and municipalities to develop a stronger sub-national administrative capacity;
- Strengthen the capacity of the public service by managing its national, departmental and municipal workforce more strategically, improving planning, recruitment, promotion, mobility and training practices;
- Strengthen citizen engagement and government openness for greater transparency, responsiveness and accountability, and use good monitoring and evaluation practices to improve policies and services where results are unsatisfactory;
- Design and use government-wide monitoring and evaluation frameworks, in particular to increase performance information based on robust targets and indicators;
- Develop and implement the government's strategic plans and fiscal framework to significantly improve capacity and service delivery to citizens, leading to improved outcomes in health, education, safety and security, water and electricity, etc.
- Evaluate the implementation of this programme in terms of its impact on improving outcomes for citizens, so that information on performance can inform further reforms to improve outcomes.

The report is organised into five main areas: coordination, strategic decision-making, multi-level governance, public service management and promoting open government

The Review identifies the key areas in the various fields of public governance that the government has identified as priorities for its reform goals. These topics must be addressed in order to establish an inclusive and accountable public administration that promotes public policies and services that are responsive to the needs of Haitian citizens.

- Chapter 2 looks at improving the **capacity to lead and guide the design and implementation of strategic policies and services across government.** It identifies current problems with the decision-making framework and institutional coordination capacity of the CoG. It also analyses the government's capacity to coordinate the development, implementation and performance monitoring of strategic planning in the context of the significant international support it receives.
- Chapter 3 focuses on **strengthening the strategy and capacity for budget planning and evaluation to improve policy making and public service delivery.** It assesses current government approaches to these issues, with a view to providing advice on how to improve strategic planning and effectively address these challenges. It also makes recommendations on how to develop frameworks and tools for monitoring and evaluating the strategy, including methods for setting performance indicators and results-based targets, in order to measure progress and enable the Government to change course if results are not being achieved.
- Chapter 4 stresses the **importance of promoting fluid and effective vertical relationships between central and local governments, as well as strengthening sub-national administrative capacity.** It includes an analysis of the governance arrangements in place to improve service design, delivery and citizen engagement and to improve impact and outcomes on the ground:
    - Horizontal and vertical relationships between CoG institutions, sectoral ministries and local authorities in a given service area;
    - Strengthening the administrative capacity of municipalities and departments;

  - The vertical relationships between levels of government, and
  - Horizontal coordination between regional/local authorities
- Chapter 5 deals with **capacity building in the public service.** It provides an analysis of the public service with a view to improving its merit, capacity and the efficiency of human resource allocation, particularly in the context of donor-supported activity in this area.
- Chapter 6 deals with **strengthening citizen engagement and opening up government for greater transparency and responsiveness.** Public sector accountability approaches must ensure that citizens have the capacity and opportunity to obtain key information about government activity and performance and to influence the evolution of government policy and the design and delivery of services through effective engagement and participation. From this perspective, the chapter makes recommendations on transparency and civic engagement frameworks at the national and sub-national levels in Haiti.

Conclusion

Given the political, socio-economic and environmental challenges facing Haiti today, contemporary reforms favour a strategic approach to planning, and their implementation strives for coherence and efficiency. This Public Governance Review of Haiti, conducted by the OECD on behalf of the Office of Management and Human Resources, presents five key areas of study within the broader framework of public administration and finance reform: whole-of-government co-ordination, strategic planning and evaluation frameworks, multi-level governance, public service capacity and open government. The topic areas developed in the Review echo and aim to address in a sustainable manner the key challenges to public governance described in this chapter, namely: policy capture, concentration and centralisation of power, political fragmentation and governmental instability.

Thus, the Review's analyses take into account Haitian historical, economic and social factors, as well as the OECD's international experience, to better support the government in achieving the goals of the PME-2023 and the PSDH. This Review also encompasses the goals of donors and TFPs, presenting courses of action that promote inclusive, effective, efficient and resilient public governance, avoiding overlap with external assistance and proposing coordinated projects that meet the current needs of the Haitian government. Building on the framework documents for reform, the five chapters of this report propose model trajectories for public governance reform that should be prioritised to promote sustainable and inclusive socio-economic development for all Haitians.

References

Auguste, G. (2010), *Histoire de mon pays, Haïti 3 et 4*, Éditions Henri Deschamps. [16]

Banque mondiale (2021), *World Bank DataBank*. [25]

Banque mondiale (2020), *The World Bank in Haïti*, https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/haiti/overview. [2]

Banque mondiale, Observatoire National de la Pauvreté et de l'Exclusion Sociale (2014), *Investing in People to Fight Poverty in Haiti : Reflections for Evidence-based Policy Making*, World Bank. [27]

Beauvois, F. (2010), "Monnayer l'incalculable ? L'indemnité de Saint-Domingue, entre approximations et bricolage", *Revue historique*, pp. 609-636. [43]

Beauvois, F. (2010), "Monnayer l'incalculable ? L'indemnité de Saint-Domingue, entre approximations et bricolage", *Revue historique*, pp. pp. 609-636. [46]

Belleau, J. (2009), *Aristide, Jean-Bertrand, Mass Violence & Résistance*. [19]

Bellegarde-Smith, P. (2015), "Haiti and Its Occupation by the United States in 1915: Antecedents and Outcomes", *Journal of Haitian Studies*, pp. 10–43. [8]

Bureau intégré des Nations Unies en Haïti (2021), *Rapport du Secrétaire général*. [34]

Casimir, J. (2009), *Haïti et ses élites : l'interminable dialogue de sourds*, Éditions de l'Université d'État d'Haïti. [36]

CIA (2021), *https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/haiti/#geography*. [1]

Donais, T. (2011), *Reforming the Haitian national: From stabilisation to consolidation*, United Nations University. [23]

Dubois, L. (2012), *Haiti: The Aftershocks of History*, Henry Holt and Company. [6]

Dupuy, A. (2014), *Haïti: From Revolutionary Slaves to Powerless Citizens*, Routledge. [5]

Edmonds, K. (2012), "Beyond Good Intentions: The Structural Limitations", *Critical Sociology*, pp. 439-452. [38]

Etienne, S. (2007), *Chapitre 3. Les élites politiques et le processus de consolidation de l'État haïtien (1804-1858)*, Presses de l'Université de Montréal, http://dx.doi.org/DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/books.pum.15182. [7]

Étienne, S. (2007), *La crise de 1991-1994 ou l'effondrement de l'État haïtien*, Presses de l'Université de Montréal. [17]

Étienne, S. (2007), *Chapitre 5. L'occupation américaine comme conséquence de l'effondrement de l'État haïtien (1915-1934)*, Presses de l'Université de Montréal. [40]

Forst, M. (2012), *Rapport de l'Expert indépendant sur la situation des droits de l'homme en Haïti, Michel Forst*, Nations Unies Assemblée Générale. [33]

Gage, A. (2000), “Dechoukaj en musique : la chute de la dictature haïtienne”, *Critique Internationale*, Vol. 7, pp. 127-142. [13]

Gouvernement de la République d’Haïti (2016), *Evaluation rapide des dommages et des pertes occasionnés par l’ouragan Matthew et éléments de réflexion pour le relèvement et la reconstruction*. [24]

Hector, M. and L. Hurbon (2009), *Genèse de l’État haïtien (1804-1859)*, Éditions de la Maison des sciences de l’homme. [15]

Heine, J. and A. Thompson (2011), *Introduction: Haiti’s governance challenges and the international community*, United Nations University. [18]

International Monetary Fund (2020), *Haïti Selected Issues*. [29]

l’homme, É. (ed.) (2009), *Introduction. Les fondations*. [42]

Le Monde (2003), “Haïti réclame 21,7 milliards de dollars à la France”, *Le Monde*. [41]

Lundahl, M. (2013), *The Political Economy of Disaster: Destitution, Plunder and Earthquake in Haiti*, Routledge. [10]

Manigat, M. (2011), *The legacy of the 1987 constitution: Reform or renewal?*, United Nations University. [14]

McCullough, E. (1987), “Justice Minister Says Duvalier Stole At Least $120 Million”, *Associated Press*. [37]

Mérion, J. (1998), “Le défi haïtien : re-fonder l’Etat à partir de la décentralisation ?”, *Pouvoirs dans la Caraïbe*, pp. 97-133, https://doi.org/10.4000/plc.569. [12]

Montréal, P. (ed.) (2007), *De la résurgence de l’État néopatrimonial haïtien à l’instauration de l’État néosultaniste duvaliérien*, https://doi.org/10.4000/books.pum.15188. [9]

Naud, P. (2007), “La juridicisation de la vie sociopolitique et économique en Haïti. Enjeux et limites”, *Droit et société*, Vol. 65/1, pp. 123-151. [44]

Nesbitt, N. (2005), “The Idea of 1804”, *Yale French Studies* no. 107, pp. pp. 6–38. [35]

Nicholls, D. (1986), “Haïti: the rise and fall of Duvalierism”, *Third World Quarterly*, pp. 1239-1252. [11]

Nicolas, A. (2020), *Le processus d’appauvrissement des classes moyennes en Haïti et ses conséquences économiques et sociales*. [45]

OECD (2020), *Government at a Glance: Latin America and the Caribbean 2020*. [31]

OECD and Institut interuniversitaire pour la recherche et le développement (2017), *Les voies de développement, Interactions entre politiques publiques, migrations et développement en Haïti*. [30]

Office de Management et des Ressources Humaines (2018), *Programme de Modernisation de l’État 2023 (PME 2023) - L’administration au service des usagers*. [4]

Office of the Historian United States Department of States (n.d.), *https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/haiti*. [20]

Sánchez Gutiérrez, G. and R. Gilbert (2017), *Coopération internationale en Haïti: tensions et leçons. Les cas du Brésil, du Chili et du Mexique*, Commission économique pour l'Amérique latine et les Caraïbes (CEPALC), et l'Instituto de investigaciones Dr. José María Luis Mora. [26]

Therme, P. (2014), *Haïti 2003-2012 : les mouvements de contestation populaire face aux logiques de l'aide*, pp. 125-146, https://doi.org/10.4000/cal.3175. [22]

Trouillot, M. (1994), *Haiti's Nightmare and the Lessons of History*, NACLA Report on the Americas. [39]

United Nations Development Programme Evaluation Office (2006), *Case Study Haïti: Evaluation of UNDP Assistance to Conflict-Affected Countries*. [21]

University de Fondwa (2018), "The History of Natural Disasters in Haïti". [32]

USAID (2020), *Haïti Country Profile*. [28]

Wiley-Blackwell (ed.) (2011), *A Concise History of the Haitian Revolution*. [3]

Notes

[1] Commonly translated as "disembowelling", this arrangement illustrates the ambition to "uproot all the bases of the dictatorship" (Hector and Hurbon, 2009[42]).

[2] Prevented by the Constitution from running for a second consecutive term in 1995, Jean-Bertrand Aristide backed his closest ally, René Garcia Préval, who was elected president in December of that year.

[3] The drafting of this report and the related fact-finding activities were carried out from February 2019 to June 2021.

2 Whole-of-government coordination led by the centre of government in Haiti

This chapter assesses the institutional capacity of the Haitian centre of government for coordination, including multi-dimensional policy development and implementation, strategic planning and decision making. Despite some progress in this area, the chapter highlights the institutional problems that constrain the government's ability to meet its commitments: the fragmentation of the institutional framework, an anachronistic statutory framework and the limited number of coordination instruments. The significant weight of official development assistance also increases the need for coordination.

Introduction

Recent decades have been marked by the emergence of complex and multidimensional challenges, such as the climate crisis, natural disasters, violent extremism and waves of migration (Lægreid, P. , Sarapuu, K. , Rykkja, L.H. and Randma-Liiv, 2015[1]). Solving these problems is particularly difficult because they arise from complex interdependent systems that go beyond traditional policy domains (Lægreid, P. , Sarapuu, K. , Rykkja, L.H. and Randma-Liiv, 2015[1]). Haiti is one of the countries most exposed to natural hazards, with more than 93% of its area and more than 96% of its population exposed to two or more hazards (Banque mondiale, 2018[2]). Between 1976 and 2012, catastrophic natural events have cost the Haitian economy nearly 2% of its gross domestic product (GDP) per year (Banque mondiale, 2018[2]). Haiti is also experiencing large waves of emigration, with the number of Haitians living abroad peaking at 1.2 million in 2015. Although remittances account for about 25 per cent of Haiti's GDP, emigration is still an under-analysed development factor (OECD/INURED, 2017[3]). Addressing this issue requires not only specific migration and development initiatives, but also the inclusion of migration in the design, implementation and evaluation of all relevant sectoral policies. (OECD/INURED, 2017[3]) The COVID-19 pandemic has also highlighted the vital importance of an effective crisis management coordination system, capable of developing and implementing a coherent response across different levels and silos of government (OECD, 2020[4]).

Addressing these transversal issues requires an integrated and coordinated governance approach that overcomes traditional administrative barriers, so as to design, implement and evaluate multidimensional policy responses through strong and sustainable coordination between administrative units to break down policy silos (OECD, 2020[5]). Without proper coordination between various units, managers may have to make decisions based on erroneous, biased or incomplete information. The resulting policies and services are then likely to fail because they have not been properly assessed in terms of costs, potential benefits and impacts, consistency with existing policies and substantive and procedural legality. The efforts of different institutions may also be contradictory or reduplicating, resulting in a waste of public resources. Finally, a lack of coordination can place an additional burden on citizens by duplicating procedures and adding to bureaucratic processes. Good coordination is therefore seen as a means of creating better policies and services for citizens.

Administrative coordination has always been a challenge for the public sector (Seidman, 1997[6]), a challenge exacerbated by the increase in the size of governments (World Bank Group, 2018[7]) and the atomisation of administrative (Beuselinck, 2008[8]) (M. Alessandro, M. Lafuente and C. Santiso, 2013[9]) structures in recent decades. These phenomena are accompanied by an increase in the number of stakeholders and accordingly divergent interests in the decision-making process (Slack, E., 2007[10]). At the same time, the responsibilities of governments are increasing and becoming more complex (OECD, 2020[5]) (World Bank Group, 2018[7]). For this reason, over the past few decades, co-ordination between different sectors and institutional entities to ensure greater policy coherence has become increasingly important in many OECD and non-OECD countries. The development of stronger coordination mechanisms is now widely recognised as one of the catalysts of good public governance (OECD, 2020[5]).

Effective coordination requires more than the imposition of central government authority and control through a hierarchical system; a set of functional and institutional arrangements affect the ability of the centre of Government (CoG) to achieve the strategic goals defined in the State Modernisation Programme 2018-2023 (*Programme de Modernisation de l'État* - PME-2023) and the Strategic Development Plan for Haiti (*Plan Stratégique de Développemend d'Haïti* -PSDH).

Based on the results of the OECD questionnaire administered in the context of this project (hereinafter "the OECD questionnaire"), desk research and evidence gathered during two fact-finding missions, this chapter provides an overview of how policy-makers can create stronger means of co-ordination to successfully design, implement and evaluate public policy goals. The first part of this chapter assesses the legal, institutional and functional framework of government coordination in Haiti. The second part examines

the implications of the official development assistance system on coordination and decision-making in Haiti. Some policy issues may require the involvement of different players within the central government, but also the involvement of other levels of government, which will be discussed in the following chapters. Thus, this chapter only analyses horizontal coordination, while chapter 4, devoted to multi-level governance, studies coordination between the different levels of government through the national-local axis, as well as horizontal coordination between the different local governments. Chapter 6 on open government deals with engagement and coordination with civil society organisations and citizens.

Achieving the Haitian government's goals depends on increased coordination by the centre of government

The Haitian government's ability to meet the commitments set out in its Strategic Development Plan for Haiti and its PME-2023 depends, in part, on better government coordination. Indeed, in the face of new transversal and multidimensional policy challenges such as the climate crisis, pandemics and economic crises, both OECD and non-OECD countries are increasingly adopting inter-ministerial policy responses (OECD, 2018[11]). These challenges require policy responses that call for an integrated and coherent approach, where implementation involves the contribution of a multiplicity of players, stakeholders, internal and external units and institutions, hence the need for strong and effective coordination. For this purpose, OECD countries have progressively strengthened the institutional and financial capacities of their centres of government (CoG).

The OECD defines the CoG as the highest level support structure for the executive branch of government (presidency, Office of the Prime Minister, and other strategic and transversal institutions and their equivalents) (OECD, 2018[12]). Its primary mandate is "to ensure coherent and prudent government decision-making and to promote strategic and coherent evidence-based policies"[1] (OECD, 2014[13]) (see Box 2.1).

Box 2.1 What is the centre of government?

Depending on the country, the institutions that make up the centre of government (CoG) are the product of various historical, cultural and political forces and accordingly have different names. In its broad functional definition, the CoG not only refers to bodies directly under the head of government, but also includes other bodies or agencies that perform transversal government functions within the national administration,

Traditionally, the functions of the CoG were mainly limited to those of an administrative unit that had the role of supporting the head of government and his cabinet in their daily activities. However, in OECD countries, centres of government are increasingly expanding their strategic role in areas such as coordination, planning, communication and monitoring of policy priorities.

According to the OECD report "Centre Stage 2: The organisation and functions of the centre of government", the five priority tasks of the centre of government identified by OECD countries are:

- supporting the decision-making process of the Head of Government and their Cabinet;
- policy coordination within government, which means that more and more policy priorities and initiatives have to be designed in a transversal manner;
- whole-of-government strategic planning;
- communicating government messages to the public and to government as a whole, and

- monitoring the implementation of government policy.

Source: Alessandro et al. (2013), The Role of the Centre of Government: A Literature Review, https://publications.iadb.org/en/role-center-government-literature-review; OECD (2018), Centre Stage 2: The Organisation and Functions of the Centre of Government in OECD Countries, https://www.oecd.org/gov/report-centre-stage-2.pdf.

In a context in which the governance system is punctuated by socio-economic, political, environmental and humanitarian crises, strategic policy development and political leadership in Haiti is paramount. Many countries weakened by exogenous and endogenous shocks face strategic problems due to an inadequate planning and prioritisation framework for inter-ministerial coordination. In Liberia, for example, the civil wars between 1989 and 2003 killed several million people and devastated the country's economy and infrastructure. The Liberian CoG still faces many challenges, including: sub-optimal functioning that responds to needs in a reactive rather than proactive manner; a lack of standard operating procedures; difficulties in intra- and inter-ministerial cooperation and coordination; and problems in policy development and implementation resulting from the absence of a clear and coherent chain of command (Rocha Menocal and Sigrist, 2011[14]). In these fragile countries, including Haiti, the role of the centre of government and its ability to guide and coordinate the governmental agenda in this environment is accordingly essential.

In addition, centres of government in countries weakened by successive shocks face particular challenges, including increased polarisation, risks of violence, weak state capacity (including human resources), opaque decision-making processes and a plurality of players and institutions involved in policy-making processes (including the technical and financial partners). This means that centres of government cannot be understood in isolation; it is necessary to understand the broader political context and power dynamics in which individuals and institutions operate.

The centre of government in Haiti: an overview

The Haitian executive branch is characterised by its “bicepheral” nature and is very dependent on the legislative branch. The Haitian Constitution of 1987 places executive power in the hands of the President of the Republic, who is the Head of State, and a government headed by a Prime Minister chosen from among the members of the party with the absolute majority in Parliament. The Prime Minister, in agreement with the President, chooses the members of his cabinet, and the President of the Republic chairs the Council of Ministers. Before decisions are taken by the Council of Ministers, proposals are considered by the Council of Government, a body established by tradition and chaired by the Prime Minister. By separating the functions of head of state and head of government, the 1987 Constitution attempts to break with the previous Constitutions that allowed the President to hold both functions. It is the government, and the government alone, that is responsible for conducting the nation's policy. This double-headed executive branch is also subject to greater control by the legislature. In order to limit authoritarian excesses, the 1987 Constitution gives Parliament broad prerogatives to initiate and pass laws and to control the government. In particular, it is up to the Parliament to approve the government's general policy statement presented by the Prime Minister.

As the executive branch is not unitary in Haiti, the support structure at the highest level of the state executive is itself divided into several institutions. The mandates of the latter are defined by their own organic laws or by decrees. The institutions of the centre of government in Haiti are the following:

- The Presidency
  - **The Cabinet of the President of the Republic[2]**: this is an advisory body responsible for assisting the President in his duties. The Cabinet is composed of advisers, consultants and

task managers, who may be called on by the President in all areas, as and when he deems necessary.

- **The General Secretariat of the Presidency**[3]: this ensures the administrative and financial management of the services of the Presidency of the Republic. It organises the archives of the Presidency of the Republic to ensure the continuity of the State, handles the administrative follow-up of all decisions, in particular the bills adopted by the Council of Ministers as well as the laws voted by Parliament, manages the honorary decorations of the Republic, registers the deposit of all the texts of an official or legal nature and ensures, if necessary, their publication in the Official Gazette of the Republic when the presidential responsibility is engaged.
- The Office of the Prime Minister
  - **The Cabinet of the Prime Minister**[4]: this is an advisory body responsible for assisting the Prime Minister in the conception, definition, development and implementation of major government policies.
  - **The Secretariat General of the Office of the Prime Minister**[5]: this is the body responsible for coordinating the various departments of the Office of the Prime Minister. It participates in the coordination and organisation of government work. It also deals with relations with Parliament and the institutions.
  - **The Office of Human Resources Management (OMRH)**[6]: this is responsible for monitoring the performance of the public service through regulation and evaluation. It formulates human resources development policies, regulates the functioning of the public service system and ensures the adaptation and harmonisation of administrative structures and procedures.
- **The General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers**[7] is the administrative support body of the Council of Ministers.
- **The Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation (*Ministère de la Planification et Coopération Externe* - MPCE)**[8]: its mission is to direct, lead and guide the country's economic and social development planning, mobilise external resources and ensure coordination through the various sectoral structures in support of the national development effort.
- **Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF):** [9] The fundamental mission of this ministry is to formulate and conduct the economic, financial and monetary policy of the Haitian State in order to promote the growth and socio-economic development of the country on a sustainable basis. It accordingly ensures the strategic management of the national economy. The MEF manages, in particular, the treasury, the national budget and the State's assets.

The institutions of the Haitian centre of government participate in various formal coordination mechanisms aimed at harmonising the overall policy of the State. In particular:

- **The High Council for Administration and the Public service (*Conseil supérieur de l'administration et la function publique* - CSAFP)** is an entity created by the Decree of 17 May 2005 on the organisation of the central administration of the State, whose organisation and competences are governed by an order of 9 June 2017. It is responsible for examining general questions relating to the development, implementation and evaluation of actions related to the modernisation of the public service. The Council is chaired by the Prime Minister and comprises seven ministers. Its secretariat is managed by the OMRH.
- **The Forum of Directors-General,** established by the Decree of 17 May 2005 on the organisation of the central administration of the State, is a collegiate body chaired by the Secretary-General of the Office of the Prime Minister and brings together all the Directors-General, at the initiative of the Council of Ministers. It is defined as an information body responsible for monitoring, evaluating and harmonising sectoral policies - among themselves and in relation to overall government policy.

- **The interministerial committees** created by the Decree of 17 May 2005 on the organisation of the central administration of the State, including the Government Council.

In addition, the institutions of the centre of government facilitate various coordination networks at the working level. Particular mention should be made for **the network of coordinators of the Studies and Programming** Unit of the Public Investment Directorate within the **MPCE, and the network, under the aegis of the OMRH, of the Ministerial Committees for Administrative Reform (*Comités ministériels de la réforme administrative* - CMRA)**, which, within each ministry, consist of three people, including the head of the Studies and Programming Unit, an administrative manager and a human resources manager (OMRH, 2013[15]).

Analysing the centre of government through the prism of a formal set of decision-making institutions, however, may obscure part of the centre of power and governance (Wild and Denney, 2011[16]). Indeed, public governance is the totality of formal and *informal arrangements* that determine how decisions are made and state actions are implemented (OECD, 2011[17]). In order to situate power and governance in Haiti today, it is accordingly essential not to ignore the informal channels of governance or the actual practices of political players. The coexistence of formal and informal modes of governance is not unique to Haiti and exists in all countries, whether or not they are members of the OECD.

- In Estonia, for example, there is a tradition of informal meetings between the Secretaries General. These meetings were set up because the formal weekly Cabinet meetings did not seem to be sufficient to discuss transversal issues or to establish lasting cooperative links. Traditionally held on a monthly basis, these informal meetings are seen as a key asset as they allow for the exchange of information, increased cooperation and a better understanding of the responsibilities of other departments through open discussion (OECD, 2015[18]).
- At the regional level, the Eurogroup is another example: this informal circle of EU finance ministers influences and steers European economic governance by pre-approving key decisions taken by the Council, thus setting the overall direction of economic governance in the euro area (Røiseland, 2011[19]).

A fragmented centre of government limits the government's ability to address multidimensional challenges

The Haitian government has legally mandated institutions to perform the key functions of the centre of government. However, the legal construction of the latter is governed by an anachronistic statutory framework, resulting in gaps and overlapping mandates. In addition, the CoG is fragmented due to insufficient institutional collaboration and inherent weaknesses in the planning system. These shortcomings limit the government's ability to address multidimensional challenges and achieve its policy goals.

An anachronistic statutory framework that weakens the state apparatus

The statutory framework governing public action in Haiti does not reflect the reality of the decision-making framework. Indeed, the PME-2023 notes that the Haitian administrative system is characterised in particular by "the functioning of administrative institutions in contradiction with the fundamental missions set out in the legal and regulatory framework in force" (Office de Management et des Ressources Humaines, 2018[20]). Previous administrative reform strategies have also identified this problem and attempted to address it. One of the goals of the Framework Programme for State Reform I (2007-2012) and the Framework Programme for State Reform II (2012-2017) was to "renew the statutory framework and harmonise the tasks of ministries and other public bodies".

The weakness of the statutory framework is reflected in three main ways:

- **The organic laws of the relevant ministries are often considered outdated or inadequate.** The interviews conducted for this project highlighted this dimension, with some participants pointing out that when the 2005 Decree was adopted, stakeholders thought that the other organic laws would be revised. For this reason, the European Union conducted an organisational audit of the organic laws of six ministries in 2015: the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation, the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the Ministry of Interior and Local Government, the Ministry of Justice and Security, the Ministry of National Education and Vocational Training and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This audit, the results of which were not made available to the OECD in the context of this Review, has not yet resulted in new legislation, but may provide a basis for future changes.
- **The common practice of creating institutions by decree, rather than by organic laws, hinders their proper functioning, as powers are not clearly defined.** For example, the OMRH, which was created by decree and whose organisation and functioning are defined by the order of May 2009[10], is not the subject of an organic law specifying its attributions. In the absence of such a law, the powers of the OMRH are limited to setting standards and monitoring the compliance of decisions on the movement of personnel in the public service, with little accountability to the public administration. In addition, the missions of senior managers (such as the general coordinator) are usually defined by mission letters or roadmaps that may lack relevance or clarity, for example by contradicting the institutional mandates defined by decree.
- **Some transversal coordination structures exist on paper but meet rarely or not at all,** such as the Superior Council for Administration and Public Service (*Conseil Supérieur de l'Administration et de la Fonction Publique* - CSAFP), the Directors-General Forum, the Human Resources Directors Forum and the Administrative and Financial Directors Forum[11]. These initiatives were extensively canvassed during the fact-finding missions organised under this project and should be encouraged.

This dissonance between the statutory framework and the actual practice of power is also found beyond the CdG. Indeed, at present, the executive has been governing by decree without the input and control of Parliament since 13 January 2020 (Biassiette, 2020[21]). Without a functioning parliament, the dynamics and mandate of the executive are distorted, and any revision of the legal and institutional framework is prevented.

In order to promote a statutory framework adapted to the challenges facing Haiti, the government must review decrees and laws according to three essential criteria: (i) identify decrees that are no longer relevant (outdated or irrelevant decrees); (ii) identify and resolve contradictions between decrees and laws, or between decrees; and (iii) identify and fill any legal gaps. This stocktaking exercise would be useful for the review of the mandates and functionalities of the CoG units and could build on the audits carried out by the EU.

Overlap and duplication of mandates hinder interdepartmental coordination

The fragile statutory framework is a source of duplication and overlapping mandates, fuelled by competition between institutions for resources. Policy coordination requires multi-stakeholder participation and accordingly a strong institutional framework that clarifies the roles and functions of the players. First, clarifying the responsibilities of government ministries and institutions can help promote synergies and avoid duplication (Box 2.2). Second, a formal coordination mandate within the centre of government would provide greater certainty and legitimacy, which could encourage other stakeholders to work with the coordinating body. Finally, formalising a mandate in terms of coordinating the government agenda can raise the political profile of this function and signal a strong political will to foster public policy development in an environment of cooperation and collaboration. A distribution of coordination and monitoring roles at the centre of government must also take into account the capacity or legitimacy of the body dealing with

it. The question is which body at the centre of government should be responsible for coordinating the work of the institutions and ensuring that standards are met.

Box 2.2 Functional reviews to limit overlapping mandates in Kazakhstan

Since 2011, the government of Kazakhstan has taken initiatives to reshape and reorganise its public sector by implementing functional reviews within its institutions. Each year, four different organisations are audited by the National Analysis Centre of the Ministry of National Economy. These reviews are analytical processes, designed to improve and measure the effectiveness and efficiency of a government agency or service. They consist of an inventory, a map and an analysis of the functions performed within these entities. The Ministry of the Economy has also instituted a functional review to identify gaps, redundancies and unnecessary functions in order to estimate the staffing requirements of government agencies. This helps to identify possible efficiency improvements, for example by removing redundant functions. The Ministry of the Economy speaks of "the elimination of unnecessary functions, through the identification of overlapping functions and the consolidation of new functions, in the light of strategic goals and results, but also the transfer of non-core functions to a competitive environment and self-regulatory bodies, [leading to] the formation of an optimal portfolio of functions within each public authority". The aim is to make these reviews a permanent activity covering the entire central administrative system.

For example, in addition to the OECD recommendations on functional reviews, the government of Kazakhstan has been able to adopt several laws that have modernised the performance evaluation system of government agencies. Finally, it created a commission on the evaluation of the performance of government agencies in order to redistribute certain functions more efficiently.

Source: OECD (2017),Towards a More Effective, Strategic and Accountable State in Kazakhstan, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264284005-en.

The overlapping mandates of sectoral ministries are a major handicap to cohesive and coherent **public action on several key government tasks**:

- **Migration issues, for example**, are dealt with by the Directorate of Immigration and Emigration of the Ministry of the Interior, the National Migration Office of the Ministry of Social Affairs and the national police. But none of these players have the responsibility to develop a comprehensive migration policy. Government action in this area is accordingly fragmented, with no centralised data to draw on, other than a basic document produced by the International Organisation for Migration and the Office of the Prime Minister (OECD/INURED, 2017[3]).
- Despite its position at the heart of Haiti's Strategic Development Plan and the PME-2023, the **issue of land use planning** is also the subject of significant overlapping mandates between the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation, the Ministry of the Interior and Territorial Collectivities, the Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Communications, and the Inter-ministerial Committee on Land Use Planning (Comité interministériel d'aménagement du territoire - CIAT), chaired by the Prime Minister (OECD, 2011[22]) (Fédération Internationale des Sociétés de la Croix-Rouge et du Croissant Rouge, 2015[23])(see Chapter 4). Indeed, although CIAT was established in 2009 to address the lack of a coordinating body in this area, the functions of the Technical Secretariat have evolved. Its mandate, initially focused on coordination, is now devoted to the rationalisation of

departmental actions. Indeed, the capacity of the technical secretariat to mobilise high-level expertise and donor resources, combined with the sustainability of its teams, make it a privileged structure for guiding and implementing the government's actions in the field of land use planning.

There are also various overlaps and duplications between the **institutions of the centre of government, notably between the Office of the Prime Minister** and the MPCE. The respective roles and responsibilities of the two institutions in coordinating government action are overlapping and confused. Efforts have already been made to clarify the responsibilities of each institution. In particular, three of the strategic bodies created within the Office of the Prime Minister by the Decree of 17 May 2005 bringing together key functions of the MPCE, the Economic and Social Development Council (*Conseil de développement économique et social* - CDES), the Public Policy Coordination and Monitoring Unit (*Cellule de coordination et de suivi des politiques publiques* - CCSPP) and the Budget Affairs Unit (*Cellule des affaires budgétaires* - CAB), were dissolved in 2016. From a legal perspective, the MPCE has the mandate to coordinate the processes for the drafting of all annual or medium-term plans at the local and national level (Decree of 2 February 2016, Article 2). The MPCE is also responsible for ensuring that sectoral plans are consistent with the government's general guidelines (Decree of 2 February 2016, Article 2). Nevertheless, it appears from the responses to the OECD questionnaire, and from interviews with strategic planning players in Haiti, that the Office of the Prime Minister is also considered responsible for developing the strategic agenda. The Office of the Prime Minister is considered responsible for the "framing" of the plan's development, while the MPCE is responsible for the technical level of the planning process.

Finally, it emerged from the interviews conducted for this project that there is also a **duplication of functions between the Secretary General and the Director of the Office of the Prime Minister** in the coordination of government action. The files handled by the Cabinets of the Prime Ministers do not always pass through the Secretary-General, who accordingly has difficulty in following up certain strategic tasks.

The lack of clear and formalised mandates can hinder coordination in several ways. This can lead to competition for resources, duplication of human and financial effort, and confusion among line departments as they struggle to identify the primary contact at the centre of government. Indeed, in the absence of a clear mandate, the ability of coordinating bodies to fulfil their function depends mainly on personal relationships.

Weak inter-institutional collaboration: the impact of limited coordination on the government's ability to meet its commitments to citizens

A deficit of institutional collaboration limits the government's ability to deliver on its commitments to the public. Indeed, the responses to the OECD questionnaire point to the absence of stable bridges between some key CoG institutions (notably MEF and OMRH) or to significant dysfunctions when such bridges are established.

In particular, the responses to the OECD questionnaire highlight gaps in information sharing. The interviews conducted in the context of this project identified potential explanations for this phenomenon. First, the government has difficulty collecting essential monitoring information on ongoing whole-of-government projects, despite the existence of the Haitian Institute of Statistics and Informatics (Institut haïtien de statistique et d'informatique - IHSI). Second, the information system infrastructure does not allow for easy and optimal sharing of information between institutions. Some participants also mentioned the existence of a "fiefdom" mentality within the institutions, which hinders exchanges.

Moreover, institutional collaboration in Haiti is marked by the preponderance of personal networks, which can act as a catalyst or a brake. Despite OMRH's efforts to promote a culture of meritocracy, favouritism and perceived levels of corruption in Haiti are described as "severe", according to the OECD's 2020 edition of the "Fragile States" series (OECD, 2020[24]). These two distinct phenomena can distort the mechanisms of inter- and intra-institutional collaboration. In the interviews conducted for this project, human resources

managers indicated, in particular, that they were unable to control the recruitment process. Moreover, Haitian legislation makes ministers, secretaries of state and directors general the sole decision-makers in the public sphere. With formal power concentrated in a small number of individuals, there are few entry points for effective collaboration. On the other hand, over-reliance on a small number of people, coupled with high levels of personnel turnover, leaves gaps in institutional memory.

Finally, the national planning system is characterised by a lack of coherence between sectoral strategic documents and central national strategies, which weakens the coordination of government action (see Chapter 3). There are three reference documents in Haiti, in addition to a large number of sectoral strategic documents:

- The Strategic Development Plan for Haiti led by the MPCE and built around four building blocks, describes the country's long-term strategic vision. This document guides multi-year programming (three years) and is accompanied by a three-year Development Framework and a three-year Investment Plan. All policy statements by Prime Ministers that call for a vote in the Haitian Parliament now refer to this. The PSDH has not been updated since 2012, but the revision process led by the MPCE to ensure better conditions for implementation has begun. Indeed, and above all, the breakdown of the PSDH into sectoral strategies and their articulation in multi-year budgetary programming.
- The State Modernisation Programme 2018-2023: the operational phase of PME-2023 will develop a performance measurement framework that will define performance indicators in line with the Haiti Strategic Development Plan (PSDH).
- The strategy for reform of public finance and economic governance.

Despite this plurality of documents, these strategies are not currently standardised or formally aligned with the PSDH or the state budget (GPDEC, 2019[25]). The commission for the reform of the national development planning and management system, set up in 2018 at the MPCE, has indeed designed methodological documents such as the global, sectoral and spatial planning guides, but these are not yet validated, as the inter-institutional consultation phase has not been completed (Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération Externe, 2020[26]). The MPCE also reported the creation, revision and updating of other methodological tools such as manuals, results monitoring frameworks, performance measures to strengthen coordination However, it is worth noting that in 2016, the MPCE prepared and disseminated a Procedural Manual for the Implementation of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Monitoring and Evaluation (planification, de programmation, de budgétisation et de suivi et évaluation - PPBSE) Chain addressed to sector ministries, local authorities and autonomous bodies (Flecher, 2016[27]). The goal of this manual is to establish norms and standardise the actions of the ministries, from the prospective phase to the monitoring and evaluation phase, particularly for the inclusion of investment projects in the three-year State investment programme. The MPCE also has a network of coordinators in the studies and programming unit located in each sectoral ministry, which is responsible for aligning sectoral strategies and programmes with government priorities.

A strong monitoring and evaluation framework for strategic planning instruments could lead to better coordination of government action. Indeed, the goals and performance indicators must be composite, which implies that they refer to a set of policy strands with similar goals to other strategic plans, within a limited timeframe. They can accordingly be used to align planning horizons and strategic planning instruments over time. A strong monitoring and evaluation framework can help ensure greater consistency of planning instruments over time.

The role of technical and financial partners in decision-making in Haiti

The weight of development assistance (ODA) in Haiti means that CoG institutions (including the MPCE) must coordinate to share information, ensure that projects advance national strategic priorities, that funding is aligned with national plans, and that monitoring and evaluation frameworks can directly link ODA to national strategic impact/outcomes. Cooperation in Haiti is not only focused on development, but is also active in the justice, police and security sectors. All of this requires a strong coordination framework, which is why this topic is explored in this chapter. It is also worth noting the preponderance of decentralised cooperation, which should also be monitored at national level to ensure harmonisation.

Supporting development in a fragile framework

Prevalence and characteristics of development assistance in Haiti

ODA is a key source of finance in fragile countries (see Box 2.3) because of its volume and resilience, especially compared to other types of financial flows (foreign direct investment (FDI), remittances, etc.) (OECD, 2020[24]). Indeed, countries and territories affected by violence and institutional fragility often have characteristics that are unfavourable to external investment: they are susceptible to inflation and currency depreciation, they have limited regulatory frameworks, property rights are poorly protected, and essential infrastructure is lacking (Poole, 2018[28]). Domestic revenue mobilisation also faces constraints that increase the dependence of fragile countries and territories on ODA. Many low-income fragile states have undiversified economies and thus a narrow tax base, coupled with limited revenue-raising capacity (Poole, 2018[28]). As a result, these territories are often more vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks and, in some cases such as Haiti, are also exposed to natural and climatic hazards, which periodically result in significant economic shocks.

Box 2.3 Fragility according to the OECD

The OECD defines fragility as the combination of exposure to risk and insufficient adaptive capacity of the state, systems and/or communities under stress to manage, absorb or mitigate that risk. Fragility can lead to negative consequences, including violence, poverty, inequality, displacement and environmental and political degradation. Fragility is measured on a spectrum of intensity and manifests itself in different ways across the economic, environmental, political, security and societal dimensions, with a sixth dimension (human capital) to come in the 2022 edition of the Fragile States report. Each dimension is represented by 8 to 12 indicators - 44 in total for the five dimensions - that measure the risks and coping capacities of fragility. The OECD's multi-dimensional framework on fragility thus captures the intertwining of fragility, risk and resilience, in order to identify where and how international players can help address the root causes of fragility in each dimension, while strengthening sources of resilience.

The 2020 edition of the Fragile States series includes 57 countries and territories, 13 of which are extremely fragile. The framework captures the diversity of contexts affected by fragility and the dimensions of fragility in each framework where performance is encouraging or worrying.

Source: Fragile States 2020, OECD (2020[24]) Publishing, Paris,https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/ba7c22e7-en.

Haiti is one of thirteen territories considered "extremely fragile" in the 2020 edition of the OECD Fragile States series (OECD, 2020[24]). Its fragility, for the five dimensions assessed, ranges from moderate to severe:

- high economic fragility (in particular, fragility in terms of regulatory quality is considered serious)
- Severe environmental fragility
- Great political fragility
- Moderate security fragility
- Great societal fragility

This high degree of fragility limits the country's ability to attract foreign investment and mobilise domestic revenues (see Chapters 3 and 4) and makes it more vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks. In this regard, ODA is an important source of funding, in terms of both volume and resilience to shocks (see Figure 2.1).

Figure 2.1 Official development assistance to Haiti: 2002 - 2019



Source: figure adapted from http://www3.compareyourcountry.org/states-of-fragility/countries/HTI/1062 ; data from OECD (2021) "ODA (Official Development Assistance): Disbursements", OECD International Development Statistics (database), https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-fr (downloaded on 26 January 2021).

The volume of bilateral ODA to countries considered "fragile" has been increasing since 2014, reaching almost USD 81.2 billion in 2019. After remittances, ODA is the second largest external financing flow for fragile countries and territories in 2019 - 2.56 times the volume of FDI (USD 31.7 billion) and 67% of the total value of remittances (USD 121 billion) (OECD, 2020[29]). In extremely fragile countries and territories, its relative weight is even greater: in 2018, total ODA was 11.5 times greater than FDI (USD 2.2 billion) and 2.5 times greater than remittances (USD 13.2 billion) (OECD, 2020[24]).

Haiti stands out among other extremely fragile countries and territories, with foreign funds averaging 2.34 times ODA between 2002 and 2019, with a low of 0.37 in 2010 due to the earthquake (see Figure 2.2). Haiti is thus one of the few extremely fragile territories where foreign funds exceed ODA. However, the relative weight of the latter is likely to increase in all fragile countries, as the COVID-19 pandemic is expected to lead to a significant decline in FDI and remittances, making fragile countries even more dependent on aid (OECD, 2020[24]).

Figure 2.2 Financial flows to Haiti by type (FDI, remittances, ODA): 2002-2019



Source: OECD (2021), "ODA (Official Development Assistance): disbursements", OECD Statistics on International Development (database), https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-fr (downloaded on 26 January 2021); World Development Indicators (2021), "Personal Remittances, Received (Current USD)". https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.CD.DT; World Development Indicators. 2021. "Foreign direct investment, net flows (BoP, current USD)". https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD.

Many fragile countries and territories are dependent on aid, an assessment of this dependency can be based on the ratio of total ODA received to gross national income (GNI), with an average ratio of 57 fragile contexts of 8.5% in 2018 (Desai, 2020[30]). However, this ratio does not take into account the significant variations between countries, especially between fragile and extremely fragile countries. For example, the average ODA/GNI ratio in extremely fragile countries and territories is 19% (Desai, 2020[30]). In Haiti, the ODA/GNI ratio was 10.3% in 2018 and 8.6% in 2019, which is below the average for other extremely fragile territories (Table 2.1). Nevertheless, according to the 2020 edition of the OECD Fragile States series, aid dependency is rated as "severe" in Haiti. Moreover, the volume of ODA to Haiti has fallen in recent years, confirming the need to move away from dependence on aid (Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération Externe, 2020[26]).

Table 2.1 Haiti, dependence on aid: 2017-2019

	Year	Percentage
ODA/Net GNI (%)	2017	11,6
ODA/Net GNI (%)	2018	10,3
ODA/Net GNI (%)	2019	8,6

Source: OECD – DAC, http://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-data/aid-at-a-glance.htm.

ODA in Haiti faces internal challenges and external shocks

The 2018 OECD Fragile States Report highlights the dual complexity of the globalised ODA system, in terms of local failures on the one hand and vulnerabilities in the external aid network on the other. Although the focus is often on endogenous sources of fragility, the external aid network can also be disrupted by external shocks such as economic or health crises, such as the COVID-19 crisis, which further weaken recipient countries.

The historical challenges of international development assistance in Haiti, and in particular after the 2010 earthquake, have been the subject of extensive analysis and reflection by a wide range of scholars and journalists (Katz, 2013[31]) (O'Connor, Brisson-Boivin and Ilcan, 2014[32]) (Schuller, 2012[33]). As in many fragile contexts, results are often harder to achieve and scandals more numerous (OECD, 2018[34]). The working methods of aid agencies (both multilateral and bilateral) are not very successful due to difficulties of access to the country, limited travel or access to the partner government and non-state players (OECD, 2018[34]). These dynamic environments are also usually characterised by high personnel turnover, which can hamper the transfer of information (OECD, 2018[34]), in addition to the continuity problems faced by the recipient government.

At the strategic level, traditional approaches to ODA are based on a partnership between aid agencies and sovereign states (OECD, 2018[34]). In Haiti, this partnership is hampered by weak state capacity and historical trends of resource plundering. In addition, non-state stakeholders, such as non-governmental organisations, play an important role in areas that usually fall under the jurisdiction of the state, adding complexity to the environment in which aid agencies must operate. This dynamic has even earned Haiti the nickname "Republic of NGOs" (Kristoff and Panarelli, 2010[35]). The strategic impact of ODA also depends on aid instruments - funding cycles, logical frameworks, project monitoring and evaluation - which require a degree of stability and predictability that is often lacking in Haiti (OECD, 2018[34]). This sentiment was echoed at a meeting with the technical and financial partners (TFPs) organised in the context of the Review, citing delays of several years for flagship projects.

The management and coordination of ODA in Haiti has been a long-standing challenge

In 2019, nearly 48 countries and multilateral organisations contributed approximately USD 747 million (gross disbursements) to Haiti, or 8.6% of GNI (OECD, 2021[36]). Given the relative and absolute weight of ODA, the effectiveness of these external inputs depends on the modalities, principles and management and coordination that allow for the optimisation of technical and financial partner flows (Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération Externe, 2020[26]). For several decades, the government of Haiti has attempted to frame and formalise its bilateral and multilateral relations through a succession of strategies, framework documents and institutional frameworks.

Since 2004, cooperation has oscillated between the consolidation of public institutions, good governance and projects that exclude the State in favour of civil society or TFP priorities. In addition, the plurality and heterogeneity of players operating in the field pose unique challenges in terms of coordination. This ambivalence and discordance is the product of local instability and the external thinking of international players (Muggah, 2009[37]).

The draft framework for coordination 2004-2006

The late 1990s and early 2000s were characterised by sporadic and uncoordinated actions by bilateral donors to strengthen the government (particularly in the justice and public finance sectors), and by World Bank loan suspensions, justified by political instability and corruption (Muggah, 2009[37]). In 2004, in order to improve coordination, the Interim Cooperation Framework (*Cadre de Coopération Intérimaire* - CCI) was established as a centralised planning and fundraising tool. This innovative mechanism in Haiti included a system for joint identification of needs and implementation of funding for the transition period (2004-2006) (Cadre de Coopération Intérimaire, 2004[38]).

Although CCI stresses governance and institutional development, in the face of local constraints, some players such as the World Bank Institute prefer to "invest in strengthening the role of non-governmental players and promoting collective action" (Muggah, 2009[37]). Despite the establishment of coordination mechanisms at the strategic level (joint committee for coordination of CCI implementation and monitoring, strategic coordination unit in the Office of the Prime Minister), at the operational level (CCI inter-ministerial committee) and at the implementation level (sectoral coordination tables) (Cadre de Coopération

Intérimaire, 2004[38]), the CCI has suffered from a lack of engagement on the Haitian side, limited to periodic public consultations held in Port-au-Prince (Muggah, 2009[37]). Achieving coherence and harmony among the TFPs was ambitious, given the number of players within the CCI. It was established in less than two months in 2004 by 26 partners at a conference jointly organised by the United Nations, the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the European Union (Faubert, 2006[39]). However, a coordination group at agency level, chaired by the World Bank, and a coordination group at field level, chaired by the UN Resident Coordinator, have not been sufficient to harmonise the actions of the TFPs (Cadre de Coopération Intérimaire, 2004[38]) (Muggah, 2009[37]).

National Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (*Document de stratégie nationale pour la croissance et la réduction de la pauvreté* - DSNCRP), 2007-2010

In 2006, the Haitian government presented the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy (*Document de stratégie intérimaire pour la réduction de la pauvreté* - DSRP-I), the result of an agreement between the government and the IMF to support the Growth and Poverty Reduction Service (*Service pour la croissance et la lutte contre la pauvreté* - SCLP) initiatives. In 2007, the IMF guidelines for the Haiti strategy paper were incorporated into the **National Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy**, in order to solicit assistance from heavily indebted poor countries.

in the context of the follow-up report on the Principles of International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations, the OECD organised a multi-stakeholder consultation in May 2009 in Port-au-Prince (OECD, 2010[40]). With regard to the use of state systems, the use of technical implementation units (*Unités Techniques d'Exécution* - UTE) is described by the executive as a system of parallel units that risks undermining the accountability of the authorities and weakening the public sector. However, data from the Paris Declaration monitoring survey shows that the use of public financial management systems was above the average for fragile states. However, these figures were challenged in the national consultation (OECD, 2011[22]). The report also stresses the need to clarify priorities within the DSNCRP in order to accelerate the alignment of TFP actions with national priorities, which is described as too "slow" by the Haitian executive. Despite the existence of strategic (core group, executive committee of technical and financial partners) and operational (22 sectoral groups) coordination mechanisms between donors, the heterogeneity of the players, their disparate inclusion in the coordination mechanisms and the large number of sectoral groups affect the harmonisation of actions.

Interim Haiti Recovery Commission 2010-2012

The 2010 earthquake marked a turning point in cooperation between the government and technical and financial partners. In response to the influx of donations, the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (Commission intérimaire pour la reconstruction d'Haïti - CIRH) was created to manage the emergency funds raised, under the leadership of the Haitian Prime Minister and Bill Clinton as UN Special Envoy. The government also adopted the Action Plan for the Reconstruction and Development of Haiti (Plan d'action pour le relèvement et le développement d'Haïti - PARDH) on 31 March 2010.

As in previous years, the OECD has sought to assess whether the goals of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness have been met in the 2011 Monitoring Report on Principles of International Engagement in Fragile States (OECD, 2011[22]). Once again, participants stressed the risks of substitution of non-state players, the lack of alignment with national priorities and the lack of coordination among donors. In particular, the participants in this exercise stressed the large number of TEUs and the strong labour market distorting effect of this international intervention, which could weaken the public sector. International alignment with the priorities of the PARDH was considered insufficient, particularly with regard to implementation modalities that are often defined unilaterally by donors. Nevertheless, they report that 82 per cent of their technical cooperation was coordinated with national programmes, an improvement over 2007 (OECD, 2011[22]). The massive influx of personnel and ODA following the earthquake also led to a

weakening of existing coordination systems and a loss of institutional memory in favour of a complex cluster system. The drop in the percentage of coordinated missions between lessors to 18% is symptomatic of this dynamic (OECD, 2011[22]).

Coordination between players and the alignment of international actions with national priorities remain a weakness of the external development assistance system in Haiti

In 2012, the Haitian government inaugurated the **Coordination Framework for External Development Assistance** (Cadre de coordination de l'aide externe au développement - CAED) as a joint governance mechanism for external assistance, replacing the CIRH. The CAED is intended to be more in line with the Haitian political will, and is placed under the aegis of the Office of the Prime Minister and the MPCE. This structure consists of a strategic committee called the Aid Effectiveness Committee (Comité d'efficacité de l'aide - CEA), a technical secretariat and topic and sectoral tables, including departmental tables. At the same time, the **External Assistance Management Module** (*module de gestion de l'aide externe* - MGAE) was introduced to make aid flows more transparent, based on the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) aid effectiveness project. The MGAE is the information unit of the CAED, with the goal of promoting transparency and harmonisation of cooperation flows. In this database, the information compiled, processed and disseminated in real time, includes official development assistance and humanitarian aid. In particular, the module conducts a data collection cycle (on a quarterly basis, including funding forecasts) aligned with the budget of the Republic of Haiti.

Use of state structures

The CAED and the MGAE are different from their predecessors in that they are rooted in the structure of the Haitian state. However, current practices of external players continue to favour extra-state structures. The MGAE, for example, although designed for direct data entry by the TFPs, is currently input with information provided through *a* collection template prepared for this purpose (Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération Externe, 2020[26]). The MPCE also specifies that this type of data is more easily collected through the Development Assistance Committee (Development assistance committee - DAC) platform and not the MGAE, as some players have difficulties in sending their updated data within the deadlines required by the Ministry. Initiatives to reform the MGAE data collection process to encourage TFPs to contribute fully to it would accordingly be beneficial, and could eventually allow for a periodic analysis of international cooperation in Haiti (Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération Externe, 2020[26]).

Haiti participated in the 2018 monitoring cycle of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, which is a biannual monitoring exercise established by the Busan Partnership Agreement. This monitoring identifies, in particular, the use of national public financial management systems by development partners in support of cooperation, estimated at only 19% in 2018 (GPDEC, 2019[25]). This is lower than the average of 28 per cent reported by Small Island Developing States (SIDS), with a larger gap in terms of budget performance (GPDEC, 2019[25]).

The provision of funds to NGOs in Haiti is still a controversial element of the international cooperation system. Although NGOs are a group through which much foreign aid flows, there is no updated version of the law governing the activities of NGOs operating in Haiti. The only legal instrument in this regard dates back to 1982 (a law updated by presidential decree in 1989). Mechanisms have been devised in recent years to enable the State to better supervise and control the actions of NGOs, but it has had difficulty implementing them. As of this date, only 651 NGOs have been legally recognised (and thus supervised), of which thirteen have obtained legal recognition in FY 2017-18 and FY 2018-19 (Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération Externe, 2020[26]).

Lack of alignment between donor and national priorities

Haiti does not yet have an official international cooperation policy. Marc Anglade, national coordinator of CAED, said that the government is preparing a public policy for international cooperation and management of foreign aid for the year 2021 (Anglade, 2020[41]). Particular emphasis will be placed on South-South relations, as well as on revitalising the CAED to address the silo management of international aid. The need for greater coordination is all the more obvious as the interlocutors are fragmented on the Haitian side, according to the TFPs concerned. The MPCE is the privileged interlocutor of certain donors (UN, Canada, USA), the MEF is the interlocutor of the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, and the Office of the National Authorising Officer is the interlocutor of the European Union[12]. In addition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for international relations, such as agreements and conventions. A less fragmented interface between international cooperation players and the government could lead to greater coherence between programmes and national priorities (Box 2.4).

Effective management of external assistance is above all about establishing guidelines for development cooperation, clearly defining the political goals of development and the role of each actor in implementing these goals. Despite a legal mandate to do so, the MPCE, which is responsible for mobilising external resources for development, does not have an overview of programmes and projects involving sectors with their own conception of cooperation. This poses a problem of timing, but also of evaluation and monitoring of ODA.

The interviews conducted with stakeholders in the context of this project revealed that the intrinsic flaws of the planning system constitute an obstacle to an optimal alignment of TFP actions with national priorities. Indeed, the 2018 monitoring exercise notes that the quality of national planning is "weak" (57%), particularly with regard to the coherence of national planning with the Sustainable Development Goals, and the link between strategy and budget (GPDEC, 2019[25]). The monitoring exercise concludes, however, that the alignment of development partners with the country's priorities is "average" (60%), with 74% for the goals. The alignment of priorities was found to be weaker in interviews with donors and stakeholders in Haiti. In particular, the Haitian interlocutors perceive an increasingly weak will to harmonise or align the TFPs with national priorities.

The sectoral and thematic tables (*tables sectorielles et thématiques* - TST) are also supposed to serve as consultation and facilitation mechanisms between the ministries and institutions concerned and the TFPs. Unfortunately, the TSTs have done very little in the last two fiscal years due to the increasing insecurity and the global pandemic (Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération Externe, 2020[26]). In addition, there are many different types of TST, which tends to make policy harmonisation more difficult. A revitalisation of this consultation mechanism would accordingly be useful to anchor international cooperation activities in the government's sectoral priorities.

Box 2.4 Aid coordination mechanisms in Rwanda

National ownership of aid management in Rwanda: the external financing unit

Aid coordination and management in Rwanda, which was mainly donor-sponsored in the early 2000s, is now led by the government. Rwanda has indeed been keen to apply the key principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and has integrated them into its approach to managing development cooperation. For this purpose, the country has defined an aid policy based on the concept of national *ownership*, notably through the involvement of the External Finance Unit (EFU) of MINECOFIN, the Ministry of External Finance and Economic Planning.

Created in 2005, the EFU is the pillar of the coordination of the development of Rwanda. It is the main interface between the government and donors, and is responsible for aid coordination in Rwanda. It plays a leading role in the negotiation and management of development partnerships, the evaluation of funding agreements, the assessment of aid quality and effectiveness, and the overall review of the country cooperation portfolio. The EFU coordinates aid within the Rwandan government and manages partnership agreements with the various donors. It is accordingly a focal point for the Rwandan government's efforts to align international aid with its policies and goals, including Vision 2050.

Source: Government of Rwanda, Documentation of Rwanda's Good Practices in Aid Coordination and Management since 2004, MINECOFIN, Final Report, 2015. http://www.devpartners.gov.rw/ ; Keijzer, N, Klingebiel, S, Scholtes, F., Promoting Ownership in a "Post-Aid Effectiveness" World: Evidence from Rwanda and Liberia. Dev Policy Rev. 2020; 38: O32– O49.

Donor coordination mechanisms operate in silos and can lead to duplication of efforts and activities.

According to the interviews conducted in the context of this project with the TFPs active in the field of public governance, the working groups, organised on a topic basis, constitute the main coordination mechanism between donors. Meetings are not regular; the pandemic and the growing insecurity in Port-au-Prince have made them rare. According to participants, there are no formal mechanisms to avoid duplication of activities among donors. In the Haitian context, this poses two additional problems. First of all, the fragmentation of interlocutors on the Haitian side leads some institutions to request technical support from several TFPs in order to maximise their chances. In the absence of formal tools for donor coordination, there is accordingly a significant risk of duplication of effort. Second, the informal and compartmentalised nature of donor cooperation, in a framework of high personnel turnover, makes it difficult to maintain an institutional memory of cooperation and actions.

The tools for monitoring and evaluating the activities of the TFPs are specific to each institution, particularly with regard to goals, indicators and time perspectives. These monitoring and evaluation reports are shared with other players or with the government on an ad hoc basis. Increased coordination in this area could lead to better harmonisation of activities among the TFPs. The key performance indicators of the various monitoring and evaluation frameworks of major national strategic plans (PSDH, PME-2023, etc.) could include the performance indicators designed for ODA investments, as required by international donors. This cannot be done overnight, as it requires strong coordination. This is also discussed in Chapter 3, but it is important to note that it requires institutionalised and sustained coordination.

Conclusion and recommendations

This chapter has argued that centres of government are the cornerstone of public governance systems and proposed a review of the institutional capacities for coordination of the Haitian centre of government, including multidimensional policy definition and implementation, strategic planning, and decision making. In a governance framework punctuated by socio-economic, political, environmental and humanitarian crises, strategic policy development and political leadership in Haiti are paramount. In this sense, better coordination of government policies and actions is of paramount importance for Haiti to achieve its goals. This chapter focuses primarily on the executive branch and its units within the centre of government. State institutions outside the executive branch have accordingly not been studied in depth in the centre of government's analysis of coordination. The need for coordination between the institutions at the centre of government and the autonomous agencies outside the executive branch could, however, be examined during an implementation phase of the Review's recommendations.

The Haitian government has legally mandated institutions to perform key functions of the centre of government, including coordination. Nevertheless, the legal construct of the centre of government is governed by an anachronistic statutory framework, resulting in gaps and overlapping mandates that impede the design, coordination and implementation of transversal government policies. These various overlaps and gaps are visible between the institutions of the CoG and even within some institutions such as the Office of the Prime Minister. Clarifying the mandate of the Haitian centre of government and its various players would help overcome this fragmentation in order to better respond to the multidimensional challenges.

In addition, coordination in Haiti is hampered by low levels of institutional collaboration and weaknesses in the planning system. In particular, some councils or forums do not meet, or meet very little, and various networks of officials useful to participants have been abandoned. In addition, there are no bridges between key institutions such as OMRH and the Ministry of Finance. In contrast to these shortcomings, the large number of sectoral and topic tables tends to make coordination and decision-making more complex. Finally, the national planning system is characterised by a lack of coherence between sectoral strategic documents and central national strategies, which weakens the coordination of government action (see Chapter 3).

The Haitian CoG faces an additional complicating factor in decision-making. The burden of development assistance requires an increased level of coordination to share information, to ensure that projects advance national strategic priorities, that funding is aligned with national plans, and that monitoring and evaluation frameworks can directly link ODA to national strategic impact and results.

Recommendations

The analysis of the government's coordination capacity in Haiti presented in this chapter leads the OECD to make the following recommendations to the Haitian government:

1. **Clarify the mandate of the centre of government and its various players in order to overcome the fragmentation of the centre of government to better respond to multidimensional challenges.**
   - Conduct a review of all laws, rules, decrees and regulations governing the organisation and functioning of the institutions of the centre of government, with a view to reforming the statutory framework to eliminate overlaps, contradictions, duplications and dysfunctions, and to achieve greater clarity in governmental coordination, particularly in order to better respond to the multidimensional challenges facing Haiti. It would be important primarily to:
     - Identify laws, decrees or orders that are no longer relevant (obsolete or not applicable);
     - Identify and resolve contradictions between decrees, laws and orders;
     - Identify and fill any legal gaps in laws and decrees, especially with regard to institutions that do not have a defined legal mandate;
     - Adopt organic laws, if necessary, to strengthen the statutory framework of institutions created by decree and to clarify and institutionalise their mandates.
   - Implement regular functional reviews of core government institutions to strengthen monitoring and evaluation and promote an effective and efficient public sector. These reviews could be conducted under the auspices of a structure within the Office of the Prime Minister, such as the OMRH.
     - Establish and institutionalise the use of functional reviews to identify the responsibilities, programmes and legal mandates of the CoG across the institutions of the centre of government, and within the institutions and units that make up the centre of government (e.g., identifying the functions of units within the Office of the Prime Minister).
     - The ultimate goals of functional reviews are to increase the efficiency and optimise the cost-effectiveness of a government organisation by creating, eliminating or merging functions/units within the institutions that make up the public sector. This eliminates duplication of functions and clarifies mandates by establishing clear lines of responsibility.
     - These reviews can be conducted on a regular basis (annual or biennial) or more sporadically to rotate the evaluations of different institutions. Functional reviews in Kazakhstan are a good example of institutionalisation of reviews in the public sector.
     - As audits were carried out by the European Union in 2016, the government could, with the support of the TFPs, publish them as a first step, review the recommendations, update them and use them as a methodological basis for future audits or functional reviews. In a second phase, a gap analysis between these audits and functional reviews could be conducted in order to develop and institutionalise these reviews.
   - Formulate a definition formalising the distinction in mandate between the sectoral line ministries and the coordinating institutions of the CoG, which could be drafted by the OMRH and/or the Secretariat General of the Office of the Prime Minister:
     - The list of CoG institutions could include: the cabinet of the President of the Republic; the Secretariat General of the Presidency; the Office of the Prime Minister; the Secretariat General of the Office of the Prime Minister; the Office of Management and Human

Resources; the Secretariat General of the Council of Ministers; the ministry of planning and external cooperation; and the Ministry of the Economy and Finance.
    - The coordination mandates of the CoG institutions could cover all major policy and budgetary initiatives developed to implement the integrated medium-term strategies, so that all national decisions on important issues are cross-ministerial, integrated, evidence-based and consistent with the country's policy goals, while reflecting the interests of its citizens.
- Communicate across government on the coordination role of the CoG, to ensure that sectoral departments understand that their specific mandates and policy initiatives are best implemented within a coherent and integrated whole-of-government strategic plan, and that it is accordingly in their interest to work horizontally with these institutions to advance their own agendas.
- Clarify and strengthen the mandate of OMRH as a player in public governance reform in Haiti. In addition to its responsibilities for the operation of the administration and the management of the public service. In the current framework, the responsibilities of the OMRH are limited to the development of standards and the monitoring of compliance of decisions on the movement of personnel in the public service. A strengthening of its competences in the field of State reform and modernisation could clarify the framework for horizontal coordination of the reform, *in* particular through the network of CMRAs and the network of sectoral committees and internal committees for monitoring the PME-2023.

2. **Strengthen, better define and communicate mechanisms for institutional coordination and collaboration to improve decision-making and coherence of government action.**
    - Strengthen the strategic role of the Office of the Prime Minister and/or the Secretariat General of the Council of Ministers in supporting the quality and harmonisation of the government's policy options prior to the Council of Ministers and the Council of Government, by reviewing the proposed agenda from different aspects. This review could include checks on process, consistency with the government's programme, consultation with relevant stakeholders, legal compliance, regulatory standards and cost.
    - Define and disseminate "rules of engagement", or a checklist, for collaboration between line ministries and the centre of government in Haiti to improve and sustain collaborative efforts within government, including:
        - Defining and articulating a common outcome;
        - Establishing common or synergistic strategies;
        - Clarifying the roles and responsibilities of each actor;
        - Introducing compatible policies, work methods and procedures to operate across administrative boundaries;
        - Developing mechanisms for monitoring, evaluation and reporting of results;
        - Strengthening institutional accountability for collaborative efforts through institutional strategies and reporting and
        - Strengthening individual accountability through performance management systems.
    - Formalising and strengthening the various coordination mechanisms aimed at harmonising overall State policy:
        - Defining a sustainable strategy to overcome the difficulties preventing the various councils and forums from meeting or allowing them to dissolve, notably the CSAFP, the DG Forum, the HRM Forum and the Forum of administrative and financial directors. Reforming these mechanisms if necessary to optimise their operation;

- Strengthening, by codifying and formalising if necessary, the various networks in place, in particular the network of UEPs, CMRAs and HRMs.
- Creating an inventory of TSTs, as well as criteria for their creation, merger and dissolution;
- Building communication bridges where they are lacking, particularly between OMRH and MEF, as co-managers of the entire public service workforce; and

As this chapter suggests, the ODA architecture in Haiti is complex, not very transparent and difficult to manage, given the increasing number of players, instruments and funding modalities. To overcome these challenges, the government could consider strengthening the coordination and planning capacity of the Haitian state to promote better alignment of ODA with national priorities by:

3. Promoting the alignment of TFP actions with national priorities:

- Developing and implementing a national programme for international cooperation and management of external assistance in support of the national development strategy or policy. This initiative will establish the parameters of cooperation in Haiti, with a view to helping local players understand the national cooperation mechanisms, and will also set the milestones and benchmarks that TFPs and NGOs will have to follow and respect.
- In order to remedy the fragmentation of interlocutors on the Haitian side, the government could set up a coordination body between the various institutions that interact with the TFPs. The government could also designate a unit as the secretariat of this network or committee, which would serve as the main interface between the Haitian government and the TFPs. This would allow the government to speak through a single body to overcome the fragmentation of interlocutors on the Haitian side.
  - This body would serve as a forum for dialogue and contact for the management of external aid, on the one hand by coordinating with the relevant interlocutors within the government (Office of the Prime Minister, MAF, MEF, etc. and sectoral ministries) and, on the other hand, by being the privileged interlocutor of the donors
  - This body would be responsible, inter alia, for negotiating and managing development partnerships, evaluating funding agreements, assessing the quality and effectiveness of aid and aligning projects with national priorities. This mechanism could accordingly be a focal point for the Haitian government's efforts to ensure the coherence of international aid with its policies and goals, particularly the PSDH and the PME-2023.
  - The secretariat unit would lead the coordination of this body, ensure the sharing of key documents and TFP programmes, while providing a single interface point.
- Strengthening the Directorate for Coordination of NGO Activities (*Direction de la Coordination des Activités des ONG* - DCAONG) of the MPCE to promote greater coherence between donor-funded NGO activities and national priorities, while preserving civic space and preventing restrictive control or politicisation of NGO activities:
  - The DCAONG could strengthen policy coherence at all levels of government by verifying that the activities of NGOs receiving public funds are consistent with the core values set out in the Constitution and relevant legal and policy frameworks.
  - The DCAONG could commit to further institutionalising coordination and dialogue with NGOs and monitoring of their activities by sector ministries (e.g., through spot checks, dialogue forums, regular feedback from NGOs to the DCAONG through an activity report, or the establishment of a feedback mechanism for the public to report concerns), and to provide strategic guidance on the goals of public funding of Haitian civil society.

    - Encouraging the External Cooperation Directorate of the MPCE to work jointly with the DCAONG for an even greater coordination and monitoring of development projects.
  - Defining the framework for public-private partnership in development programmes.

4. **Creating optimal conditions for increased use of state structures in cooperation with donors.** Indeed, as this chapter suggests, the current practices of external players often continue to favour non-state structures.
   - The centre of government, with the support of the TFPs, could strengthen intrinsic capacities for strategic planning and development policy-making, particularly by:
     - Implementing capacity-building programmes and training in development planning, financial analysis, and understanding the aid architecture in Haiti;
     - Implementing the recommendations in Chapter 3 on strategic planning.
   - Developing greater coordination of the tools for monitoring and evaluating the activities of the TFPs and the national strategic plans (see recommendations in Chapter 3), particularly the goals, indicators and time perspectives.
     - The key performance indicators of the various monitoring and evaluation frameworks of major national strategic plans (PSDH, PME-2023, etc.) could include the performance indicators designed for ODA investments.
     - Generalising the use of MGAE as a key tool for coordination with TFPs. A discussion with the donors should be initiated in order to identify the reasons why the MGAE is not used systematically, and to make the necessary changes to oblige the TFPs operating in Haiti to provide the necessary information concerning their actions through the MGAE. A clear and up-to-date database will allow for better management of projects at the government level, and better allocation of financial resources to avoid duplication or inefficient projects.
   - Integrating and strengthening feedback mechanisms in the policy-making process at the national level and in collaboration with donors, to ensure that evaluations and findings from monitoring reports are taken into account.

5. **Considering extending the timeframe for implementation of the 2018-2023 State Modernisation Programme** in light of the global Covid-19 pandemic and issues related to political instability. Basing this extension on a realistic assessment of the resources and time needed to implement it. An extension would be all the more relevant if the government wishes to pursue an implementation phase of the review, as the recommendations of this project are primarily intended to support the implementation of the PME-2023.

References

Alexandre, D. (2020), *Rapport non-publié de contexte interne*. [44]

Anglade, M. (2020), *Comment combattre l'inefficacité de l'aide dans un État fragile?*, https://www.effectivecooperation.org/system/files/2020-12/FR%20Haiti%20Story%20of%20Progress.pdf. [41]

Badie, B. (ed.) (2011), *Informal Governance*, Sage, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/260042216_Informal_Governance. [19]

Banque mondiale (2018), *Les villes haïtiennes : des actions pour aujourd'hui avec un regard sur demain*, http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/791721516635425309/pdf/Haitian-cities-actions-for-today-with-an-eye-on-tomorrow.pdf. [2]

Beuselinck, E. (2008), *Shifting public sector coordination and the underlying drivers of change: a neo-institutional perspective*, KU Leuven, Leuven. [8]

Biassiette, G. (2020), *Haïti : un président sans soutien et sans Parlement*, https://www.la-croix.com/Monde/Ameriques/Haiti-president-sans-soutien-sans-parlement-2020-01-13-1201071397. [21]

Cadre de Coopération Intérimaire (2004), *Mécanisme de Coordination de l'Assistance Au Développement en Haïti*, http://www.bme.gouv.ht/tse/tseinfo.pdf. [38]

Desai, H. (2020), *States of fragility and official development assistance*, OECD Publishing. [30]

Faubert, C. (2006), "Case study Haiti - Evaluation of UNDP assistance to conflict-affected countries", https://www.oecd.org/countries/haiti/44826404.pdf. [39]

Fédération Internationale des Sociétés de la Croix-Rouge et du Croissant Rouge (2015), *Impact des obstacles réglementaires à la fourniture d'abris d'urgence et de transition après une catastrophe*, https://www.ifrc.org/PageFiles/198142/Haiti%20Shelter%20Report%20FR%20v3.pdf. [23]

Flecher, J. (2016), *PPBSE, pour une gestion axée sur les résultats*, https://lenouvelliste.com/article/165641/ppbse-pour-une-gestion-axee-sur-les-resultats. [27]

GPDEC (2019), *Country and territory monitoring profiles: Haiti*, https://www.effectivecooperation.org/system/files/2020-06/Haiti-online2018.pdf. [25]

Haïti Libre (2015), *Politique : Vers la refonte de la loi organique de 6 ministères régaliens*, https://www.haitilibre.com/article-14828-haiti-politique-vers-la-refonte-de-la-loi-organique-de-6-ministeres-regaliens.html. [42]

Katz, J. (2013), *The big truck that went by: How the world came to save Haiti and left behind a disaster*, St. Martin's Press. [31]

Kristoff, M. and L. Panarelli (2010), *Haiti: A republic of NGOs?*, https://www.usip.org/publications/2010/04/haiti-republic-ngos. [35]

Lægreid, P. , Sarapuu, K. , Rykkja, L.H. and Randma-Liiv, T. (2015), "New coordination challenges in the welfare state", *Public Management Review*, Vol. 17/10.1080/14719037.2015.10293447, pp. 927-939, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2015.1029344. [1]

M. Alessandro, M. Lafuente and C. Santiso (2013), "The Role of the Center of Government - A Literature Review"*, Institutions for Development, Technical Note*, Inter-American Development Bank, Washington DC, https://publications.iadb.org/handle/11319/5988. [9]

Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération Externe (2020), *Rapport de Mise en Oeuvre du Programme d'Investissement Public et des Résultats de Développement*. [26]

Muggah, R. (2009), "Du vin nouveau dans de vieilles bouteilles", *Télescope - Revue d'analyse comparée en administration publique*, Vol. 15/2, pp. 41-52. [37]

O'Connor, D., K. Brisson-Boivin and S. Ilcan (2014), "Governing failure: development, aid and audit in Haiti", *Conflict, Security & Development*, Vol. 14/3, pp. 309-330. [32]

OECD (2021), "Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements", *OECD International Development Statistics* (database), https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en (accessed on 21 May 2021). [36]

OECD (2020), "Building resilience from the centre: the role of the Centres of Government in the COVID-19 crisis". [4]

OECD (2020), *Policy Framework on Sound Public Governance: Baseline Features of Governments that Work Well*, Éditions OCDE, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/c03e01b3-en. [5]

OECD (2020), *States of Fragility 2020*, Éditions OCDE, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/ba7c22e7-en. [24]

OECD (2020), *States of fragility by OECD - Financial flows*, http://www3.compareyourcountry.org/states-of-fragility/flows/2/1062. [29]

OECD (2018), *Centre Stage 2*. [12]

OECD (2018), *États de fragilité 2018*, Éditions OCDE, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264308916-fr. [34]

OECD (2018), *OECD Public Governance Reviews: Paraguay: Pursuing National Development through Integrated Public Governance*, Éditions OCDE, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264301856-en. [11]

OECD (2015), *OECD Public Governance Reviews: Estonia and Finland. Fostering strategic capacity across governments and digital services across borders.*, Éditions OCDE, Paris. [18]

OECD (2014), *Centre Stage: Driving Better Policies from the Centre of Government*, Éditions OCDE, Paris, https://www.oecd.org/gov/Centre-Stage-Report.pdf. [13]

OECD (2011), *Policy Framework for Investment User's Toolkit - Chapter 10. Public Governance*, Éditions OCDE, Paris, http://www.oecd.org/investment/toolkit/policyareas/publicgovernance/41890394.pdf. [17]

OECD (2011), *Rapport 2011 sur l'Engagement International dans les États Fragiles - République d'Haïti*, https://www.oecd.org/fr/pays/haiti/48697932.pdf. [22]

OECD (2010), *Suivi des Principes d'engagement international dans les États fragiles et les situations précaires - Rapport Pays 4: Haïti*, https://www.oecd.org/countries/haiti/44654672.pdf. [40]

OECD/INURED (2017), *Interactions entre politiques publiques, migrations et développement en Haïti*, Les voies de développement, Éditions OCDE, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264278844-fr. [3]

Office de Management et des Ressources Humaines (2018), *Programme de Modernisation de l'État 2023 (PME 2023) - L'administration au service des usagers*. [20]

OMRH (2013), *Lancement Officiel des Comités Ministériels de la Réforme Administrative (CMRA)*, http://www.omrh.gouv.ht/Media/Others/6-Notes/rapportCMRA.pdf. [15]

Poole, L. (2018), "Financing for Stability in the post-2015 era", *OECD Development Policy Papers*, No. 10, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/c4193fef-en. [28]

Rocha Menocal, A. and K. Sigrist (2011), *Capacity Gaps at Centres of Government – Coordination, Implementation Monitoring, Communications and Strategic Planning in Post-Conflict and Fragile Situations. Country Case Study: Liberia.*, Overseas Development Institute. [14]

Schuller, M. (2012), *Killing with kindness: Haiti, international aid, and NGOs*, Rutgers University Press. [33]

Seidman, H. (1997), *Politics, Position, and Power*, Oxford University Press. [6]

SIGMA (2018), *Principe d'administration publique*, http://www.sigmaweb.org/publications/Principles-ENP-FR.pdf. [43]

Slack, E. (2007), "Managing the Coordination of Service Delivery in Metropolitan Cities: The Role of Metropolitan Governance", *Policy Research Working Paper*, No. 4317, The World Bank, Washington DC. [10]

Wild, L. and L. Denney (2011), *Centres of government in fragile and post-conflict states: A Literature Review*, https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/8496.pdf. [16]

World Bank Group (2018), "Improving Public Sector Performance: Through Innovation and Inter-Agency Coordination", http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/833041539871513644/Improving-Public-Sector-Performance-Through-Innovation-and-Inter-Agency-Coordination. [7]

Notes

[1] Translation by the author.

[2] Decree of 17 May 2005 on the organisation of the central administration of the State.

[3] Decree of 17 May 2005 on the organisation of the central administration of the State.

[4] Decree of 17 May 2005 on the organisation of the central administration of the State.

[5] Decree of 1 February 2016 amending the Decree on the organisation of the central administration of the State.

[6] Decree of 1 February 2016 amending the Decree on the organisation of the central administration of the State.

[7] Decree of 17 May 2005 on the organisation of the central administration of the State.

[8] Decree of 1 February 2016 amending the Decree on the organisation of the central administration of the State.

[9] Decree of 13 March 1987 amending the Decree of 31 October 1983 on the reorganisation of the Ministry of the Economy and Finance.

[10] Order of 25 May 2009 on the organisation and operation of the Office of Management and Human Resources known as OMRH.

[11] Internal background report by D. Alexandre.

[12] Interviews conducted for this project.

3 Use of evidence in strategic planning and budgeting in Haiti

Haiti has adopted two major inter-ministerial strategies, which aim to make the country an emerging power by 2030. Their implementation will be based, among other things, on the development of a multi-year budget in line with the country's strategic priorities, the foundation for which is currently being laid. Capacity building and the establishment of an institutional framework for monitoring and evaluation would also make it possible to better measure the performance of public initiatives in relation to the country's development goals.

Introduction

Haiti has set ambitious development goals, formalised in a multi-level strategic planning framework, with the intention of making the country an emerging power by 2030. This means that the Strategic Development Plan for Haiti 2012-2030 (PSDH) has become the reference framework for the country's long-term development, while the State Modernisation Programme 2018-2023 (PME-2023) aims to strengthen the effectiveness of public intervention. For strategic planning to be effective, the public policy priorities it proposes must be specific and measurable and limited in number. Haiti's whole-of-government strategies, however, suffer from methodological problems that affect their implementation.

The budget is also a powerful planning tool, reflecting the government's strategic priorities. Effective multi-year budgeting has a major role to play in this regard. In Haiti, legislative reforms have led to significant progress in this area, although the fundamentals of public finance still need to be consolidated. Performance budgeting is another way to ensure that the budget is aligned with the country's strategic priorities. It allows governments to check on a regular basis that the strategic goals, for which budgetary resources have been allocated, have been achieved. However, there is still a long way to go before public finances are managed in this way in Haiti. Multi-year budgeting must be firmly established, and the foundations for a programme budget must be laid. Performance budgeting can only be considered once these steps have been taken. In addition, the practice of gender budgeting, in its contribution to gender equality, is an important dimension of performance budgeting. This is a key subject of study for the OECD, which has published several reports in this area, such as "Gender budgeting in OECD countries" (Downes, Von Trapp and Nicol, 2017[1]). However, gender budgeting is not the focus of this chapter, which is devoted to the use of evidence in strategic planning and budgeting. Once the basic elements of performance budgeting are in place, Haiti can consider implementing gender budgeting. In addition, the topic of gender budgeting in the Haitian context has been studied by many national and international institutions and is accordingly deliberately left outside the scope of this Review.

The establishment of a robust system for monitoring and evaluating public policies will also be essential to improve public intervention with regard to Haiti's development goals. Monitoring and evaluation provide crucial evidence of the performance of public policies, which can improve their implementation and increase their transparency for stakeholders and citizens. In Haiti, the institutional framework for monitoring and evaluation will need to be strengthened and clarified to further embed the practices within government. Capacity-building and skills development will also be essential to make monitoring and evaluation a reality in Haiti, especially in the context of the country's post-crisis recovery.

In this context, this chapter looks at how the foresight, planning, programming, budgeting, monitoring and evaluation chain is implemented in Haiti within the context of the PSDH and the PME-2023. The first section analyses these two whole-of-government strategies with regard to good planning practices that enable the proper implementation of the public policy goals they enshrine. The second section analyses the Haitian government's efforts to align the budget cycle with strategic planning. Finally, the third section examines how Haiti can put in place a solid system for monitoring and evaluating public policies.

Haiti has set ambitious development goals, formalised in a multi-level strategic planning framework, which has methodological limitations

Haiti has embarked on a process of structural reform, anchored in two main whole-of-government strategic documents

For several decades now, Haiti has faced great political instability, in addition to various health crises and natural disasters. Haiti was particularly hard hit by the earthquake of 12 January 2010, which devastated the country's infrastructure. On the economic front, the country suffered two consecutive years of recession

in 2019 and 2020 (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2020[2]). For 2021, the Haitian government is stimulating recovery through strong public investment and job creation policies, as well as an expansionary fiscal policy. However, the COVID crisis is slowing down these efforts considerably and is expected to cause, in particular, a 5.4% contraction in GDP in 2020.

It is in this context, and more particularly in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake, that the government has shown its ambition to undertake far-reaching reforms in order to improve governance, develop the economy and strengthen the fabric of Haitian society. In recent years, the Haitian government has embarked on a process of structural reform to improve development management (Gouvernement d'Haïti, 2020[3]). These efforts are reflected in the continuation of State reform, the renewal of the national development planning and management system and the improvement of budgetary programming for "*the implementation of the PPPBSE chain (Prospective, Planning, Programming, Budgeting, Monitoring and Evaluation*)" (Gouvernement d'Haïti, 2020[3]).

In line with the development planning approach implemented in the country since the 2000s, the government has formalised these reform projects in a transversal, multi-year strategic document: the Haiti Strategic Development Plan for Haiti for 2030 (*Plan Stratégique de Développement d'Haïti* - PSDH) (Gouvernement de la République d'Haïti, 2012[4]). The realisation of the PSDH's vision to have the country emerge by 2030 requires its implementation through successive three-year investment plans (*Plans triennaux d'investissement* - PTI), which are the tools for its execution in the medium term and the articulation between these goals and the budget. However, since the adoption of this development strategy, the Haitian state has only been able to perform one PTI, that of 2014-2016 (Gouvernement d'Haïti, 2020[3]).

In order to support these ambitions and successfully implement the public governance reforms essential to achieving Haiti's development goals, the government elected in 2017 has developed the State Modernisation Programme 2018-2023 (*Programme de Modernisation* – PME 2023). There are other strategic planning documents in Haiti, such as the Reform of Public Finance and Economic Governance Strategy (*Stratégie de réforme des finances publiques et de gouvernance économique* - SRFP) put in place by the decree of 9 October 2015 (Journal Officiel de la République de Haiti, 2015[5]). The Government of Haiti has also developed strategic programming instruments in collaboration with the technical and financial partners to clarify the goals and expected results of international development assistance. This is the case, for example, with the Sustainable Development Framework (*Cadre de développement durable* - CDD 2017-2021), which expresses the common will of the Republic of Haiti and the United Nations to place the country on the path of sustainable development (Gouvernement d'Haïti et Nations Unies, 2017[6]). However, the PSDH and the PME-2023 are the main transversal instruments for the country's development in the medium and long term.

As such, Haiti's efforts are in keeping with growing government interest in long-term planning, both at the national and territorial levels (Máttar and Cuervo, 2017[7]). This global trend is related to two main factors:

- **At the international level**, governments wish to be accountable for achieving the sustainable development goals of the UN 2030 Agenda (ONU, 2015[8]).
- **At the national level**, governments recognise the need to ensure continuity of development policies across electoral cycles.

Box 3.1 presents some examples of these long-term strategic planning approaches.

Box 3.1 Comparative approaches to long-term strategic planning

There are many long-term strategic planning instruments developed by international organisations or governments.

- **The 2030 Agenda** is a development agenda adopted in 2015 by the 193 members of the United Nations, which aims to foster peace and prosperity through the eradication of poverty and the transition to sustainable development. This universal programme is broken down into 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 169 priority targets. Each goal is associated with a number of statistical indicators to monitor its achievement at the local, national and international levels.
- **The African Agenda 2063** is a blueprint for transforming the African continent into a global powerhouse, based on sustainable and inclusive development. Its aspirations include economic prosperity based on sustainable development, good governance and the maintenance of peace and security. In order to achieve the goals set out in this plan, Agenda 2063 is broken down into several medium-term implementation plans.
- At the national level, many governments have developed long-term strategic planning documents. **In South Africa, for example, the National Development Plan 2030** identifies key challenges to accelerate the country's development, including the eradication of poverty and reducing inequality. The document states that the plan will be implemented in three phases and that the strategic planning instruments of the various government institutions and entities must be aligned with it.

Source : https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/; https://au.int/fr/agenda2063; https://www.gov.za/issues/national-development-plan-2030

The implementation of a new development logic with the PSDH in 2012

In 2012, with the help of the technical and financial partners (TFPs), the government added further depth to the four main initiatives or building blocks of the PARDH in the Strategic Development Plan for Haiti (PSDH) (Gouvernement de la République d'Haïti, 2012[4]). The Haitian PSDH has thus become Haiti's overall strategic reference framework for planning the country's development. The PSDH is based on four main pillars: strong economic growth, a balanced development framework, social reform to reduce inequalities and improve social cohesion and institutional reform through the in-depth reforml of public institutions and administrations. Box 3.2 provides more information on the development and content of the strategy.

Box 3.2 Haiti's Strategic Development Plan (*Plan Stratégique de Développement d'Haïti* –PSDH) to 2030

The PSDH 2030 is the planning document setting out in detail the vision for Haiti's emergence by 2030. Its objectives include:

- "Accelerated economic growth and strong job creation, without which our environmental and social vulnerability will increase";
- "A decrease in our population growth, which slows our standard of living and increases the pressure on natural resources";
- "Wiser use of land to protect the country's natural and cultural heritage, improve housing conditions and reduce environmental degradation";
- "A better spatial distribution of development efforts to counter the current strong centralisation of the country";
- "Greater social redistribution of the fruits of economic growth, which is necessary to meet social needs, especially in education and health";
- and "a significant strengthening of the rule of law, both in terms of justice and security and in terms of respect for the law."

Since 2012, the PSDH has been the reference tool for the Haitian state's long-term planning. It consists of four major projects: territorial restructuring, economic restructuring, social restructuring and institutional restructuring, which are implemented through 32 programmes.

In particular, it is implemented successively through seven three-year PSDH implementation frameworks, each accompanied by a three-year investment programme (PTI).

Source: Haiti Strategic Development Plan (2012-2030).

The institutional dimension of the PSDH is linked to the PME-2023, which reflects the current government's goals for modernising the State

In order to revive the momentum for modernising the state apparatus and improving public governance, which had stalled after the failure of two state reform framework plans, the new Haitian government adopted the State Modernisation Programme in 2018 for a period of five years (PME-2023). This programme, supported by the Office of Management and Human Resources (*Office de Management et des Ressources Humaines* - OMRH), which reports to the Prime Minister, aims to create a dynamic for the transformation of public intervention and to establish a relationship of trust between users and the administration. The PME-2023 has 6 main goals:

- "To improve the quality of services while developing a relationship of trust between users and the administration´;
- "To provide a modern working environment for civil servants by involving them fully in the definition and monitoring of the modernisation project´;
- "To rethink and optimise public spending to achieve better delivery of public services at lower cost´;
- "To improve human resources management by establishing a more attractive and competitive public service that respects equal opportunities, gender equality and equity, the rights of people with disabilities and special needs, ethical and professional principles and the promotion of merit and excellence";

- "To transform the public administration so that it is able to propel the country's development and its emergence by 2030", and
- "To establish structures that prevent, expose and combat corrupt practices in order to develop a culture of good governance".

The PSDH and the PME-2023 have methodological limitations that could limit their effectiveness as long- and medium-term strategic planning instruments

The operationalisation of a strategic planning instrument depends primarily on the definition of clear and measurable public policy goals and their budgeting (OECD, 2018[9]) . In Haiti, as the PSDH 2030 is a long-term planning instrument, its operationalisation must be based primarily on a linkage with medium-term strategic planning instruments such as the PME-2023. However, while the PME-2023 contains clear and measurable goals, the articulation of this programme with the PSDH on the one hand, and with the budget on the other, is insufficient – which thus risks compromising the operational implementation of these strategies.

The PME-2023 has clear public policy goals that can be measured by indicators

The definition of quality public policy goals is a necessary precondition for the implementation of any strategy. The goals indicate the direction of the reforms to be carried out and underpin the actions to be implemented. In principle, a strategic plan should present general goals (broad area of reform) and more specific goals (concrete results on an aspect of the general goal). A goal should be stated in clear language, without jargon or complex phrases, so that it can be understood by all stakeholders and the general public (OECD, 2018[9]) . In general, the quality of a goal can be assessed according to the "SMART" model:

- Specific: a goal must be concrete, describe the results to be achieved, be targeted and contribute to the resolution of the problem;
- Measurable: a goal must be expressed numerically and quantifiably in relation to a predefined benchmark or target;
- Achievable: a goal must be a stimulus for action and improvement of the existing situation, but it must also be achievable to serve as a management tool;
- Realistic: a goal must be realistic in terms of the time available to achieve it and the resources available;
- Timeframe: the *period of time* for achieving a goal must be specified.

It is the indicators, associated with their targets and reference values, that make a goal measurable and deployable over time. It is necessary to define explicit goals in terms of expected results. The more ambiguous a goal is in terms of its results, the more difficult it will be to associate a relevant indicator with it (Schumann, 2016[10]).

The goals defined in the PME-2023 are thus broken down into three levels: a general level, the "axis", and two more specific levels, the "immediate results" and the "expected results". This tiered approach is supported by a clear logical model, which allows for solid milestones to be set for the implementation of the PME-2023 and its evaluation. Indeed, the different levels of goals in a strategy must follow a logical hierarchy. Developing a causal chain (a theory of change) or logical model helps to understand how an intervention, programme or public policy is expected to bring about a particular change and have an impact. It is accordingly an evidence-based causal analysis that theorises how public policy inputs should lead to intended impacts and goals (Groupe des Nations Unies pour le Développement Durable, 2017[11]). Box 3.3 below explains in more detail how the development of a theory of change or logical model can facilitate the implementation and evaluation of a programme, policy or strategy.

Box 3.3 The benefits of a theory of change and a logical model

A theory of change is a method for tracing or identifying the ways in which a public intervention (policy, programme, project, etc.) or series of interventions will lead to specific changes, based on evidence-based causal analysis. It has several goals:

1. The evaluability of the programme or public policy - both for implementation and for outcomes - is enhanced by identifying appropriate metrics.
2. The intentions of the policy or programme designers are clearly stated, and are explicit and open to discussion.
3. The underlying logic of the assumptions made in the theory - for example, the theory that undertaking a certain activity will lead to a certain outcome - can be clearly examined.
4. The realism of the assumptions made in the programme or policy can be tested against broader evidence of successful programmes, thereby assessing the likelihood of success.
5. Evaluation officers can test whether the programme or policy meets their needs, and providers and practitioners administering the programme can test their own assumptions and expectations against the original intentions of the programme designers.
6. Key parameters (e.g. who the programme is intended for) can be easily defined, reducing the likelihood that the programme will be used inappropriately or inefficiently.
7. The main elements - of content and/or implementation - that are considered essential to the effectiveness of the programme can be identified.
8. Activity traps can be identified and avoided.
9. The most important features of the programme deployment model can be captured, allowing for delivery that adheres to the original model and helps prevent programme drift during scaling.

Source: Adapted from United Nations Development Group - UNDG (2017[11]), *Theory of Change: UNDAF Companion Guide.* https://undg.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/UNDG-UNDAF-Companion-Pieces-7-Theory-of-Change.pdf Ghate, D. (2018), « Developing theories of change for social programmes: co-producing evidence-supported quality improvement », Palgrave Communications, Vol.4/1, p. 90, http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/s41599-018-0139-z

In addition, each "expected result" of the PME-2023 is associated with one or more performance (*output*) indicators to measure its achievement. However, "intermediate results" are not associated with *outcome* indicators. The development of such indicators would facilitate the implementation and monitoring and evaluation of the PME-2023 (see section three for more information on monitoring and evaluation of the PME-2023). In addition, for an indicator to provide decision-makers with relevant information on the achievement of the policy goal, it must be accompanied by elements that allow for its correct interpretation (OECD, 2018[9]). These elements include the reference value or baseline of the indicator and the final target values for defining its satisfaction.

There is no clear and explicit logical framework for the articulation of long and medium term strategic planning instruments

Clearly and explicitly articulating strategic planning instruments enables governments' limited resources to be focused on a few policy priorities, while clarifying how these efforts contribute more broadly to other stated ambitions. In Haiti, the existence of several whole-of-government strategies is not a problem in itself, as they have different time horizons. However, clarifying their relationship through a logical model would ensure their effectiveness.

This means that the articulation between the PME-2023 and the PSDH is an issue. Indeed, the State Modernisation Programme is in line with the PSDH. The PME-2023 states that "the State Modernisation Programme (PME-2023) [...] is consistent with the various projects of the PSDH" (Gouvernement d'Haïti, 2018[12]). The PME-2023 itself states that it "*will be aligned with the PSDH to maximise the chances of its successful anchoring on existing implementation arrangements*". Indeed, the articulation of the different strategic planning instruments of a country is an important issue in order to concentrate efforts and public resources on a limited number of goals to be achieved.

However, there is currently no explicit logical framework to ensure the articulation and coherence of these two documents. The inclusion of indicators with clear final target values in the PME-2023, as well as in the PSDH, would also help to clarify the articulation between these two instruments.

The operationalisation of the PME-2023 in an action plan and its articulation with the budget remain to be established

International good practice stresses the need to develop action plans in conjunction with strategic planning to define the timetable for implementation, responsibilities and budget for each goal. The PME-2023 requires sector ministries to develop an action plan, assess the cost of implementing the goals assigned to them, and establish an implementation schedule. These action plans were presented at the final seminar of the PME-2023 Operationalisation Mission Phase II held on 23 March 2021.

The use and follow-up of these action plans will be essential to clarify the terms of implementation of the PME-2023, to ensure the articulation of this plan with the budget and to lay the foundations for the monitoring and evaluation system of this plan. Similarly, the gradual introduction of performance-based budget programming will make it possible to improve the linkage of the PME-2023 with the budget and *a fortiori* its implementation. The next section of this chapter details the precise terms of such an articulation.

Strategic decision-making requires access to solid, credible data

More generally, policy-making requires access to solid and credible evidence. This includes encouraging research and good records management. The government has a research and documentation centre (*Centre de Recherche et de Documentation* - CREDOC), which forms part of the Office of the Prime Minister. The Haitian government could rely on CREDOC to access information useful for strategic decisions.

The Haitian government is working to implement performance-based budgeting, prior to which some fundamentals need to be put in place

The budget cycle could further support the implementation of the Haitian government's policy goals

The strategic phase of the budget is essential to align the budget with the strategic priorities of governments

The OECD recommendation on budgetary governance (see Box 3.4) states that budgets should be closely aligned with medium-term policy priorities through two main mechanisms:

- Organising and structuring budget allocations to ensure that they are consistent with goals,
- Developing the medium-term dimension of the budget process.

This articulation corresponds to the goal of **the strategic phase of the budget,** which aims to balance the limited resources available against the government's spending aspirations and arbitrate between the

various policy priorities of the government that cannot be achieved simultaneously in a single financial year. While not a strategic plan, the budget is thus a planning tool to achieve the goals set by the government (Long and Welham, 2016[13]).

In an annual budget cycle, the strategic phase of the budget usually begins with the presentation of the budget overview, which expresses a request for policy orientation from the administration. The quality of the data on which the analysis of past fiscal years is based is critical to the credibility of the budget forecasts. From the overview presented, the government clearly communicates the goals and budgetary constraints. The managing sectors and services then establish their costs and forward them to the budgetary authority which ensures these expenditures by individual departments are aligned with the priorities set by the government. The strategic phase ends with the publication of a "budget circular" (*circulaire budgétaire*) indicating the budget ceilings and including other guidelines for the preparation of the budget for the institutions responsible for expenditure. This is the beginning of the budget preparation phase.

Box 3.4 The 2015 OECD Recommendation on Budgetary Governance

Closely align budgets with the medium-term strategic priorities of government:

- developing a stronger medium-term dimension in the budgeting process beyond the traditional annual cycle;
- organising and structuring the budget allocations in a way that corresponds readily with national objectives;
- Recognising the potential usefulness of a medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF) in setting a basis for the annual budget, in an effective manner which:
  - has a real force insetting boundaries for the main categories of expenditure for each year of the medium-term horizon
  - is grounded upon realistic forecasts for baseline expenditure (i.e. using existing policies), including a clear outline of key assumptions used
  - shows the correspondence with expenditure objectives and deliverables from national strategic plans; and
  - includes sufficient institutional incentives and flexibility to ensure that expenditure boundaries are respected
- nurturing a close working relationship between the Central Budget Authority (CBA) and the other institutions at the centre of government (e.g. prime minister's office, cabinet office or planning ministry), given the inter-dependencies between the budget process and the achievement of government-wide policies;
- considering how to devise and implement regular processes for reviewing existing expenditure policies, including tax expenditures (see recommendation 8 below), in a manner that helps budgetary expectations to be set in line with government-wide developments.

Source: adapted from the OECD *Council Recommendation on Budgetary Governance.* (OECD, 2015[14])

Important reforms in this direction are underway

Improved budgeting and strategic planning are key reforms for public finances in Haiti. One of the main expected results of Axis 8 of the PME-2023, dedicated to the overall budgetary framework is the following:

"The main economic and social development sectors have sectoral strategies and multi-year programmes with budget allocations in line with public policies and the resources available to the State" (Gouvernement d'Haïti, 2018, p. 61[12]). Similarly, improving budgetary planning, *through* a medium-term expenditure framework, and introducing programme-based budgeting are two of the main areas identified by the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) in its reform of the public finance strategy.

OECD discussions with the Haitian administration have indicated that the legislative framework has been amended, including by the law of 4 May 2016 on the process of drafting and executing finance laws, to modernise the budget cycle in Haiti and move it from a means-based to a results-based approach. Legislative reforms in the budgetary area have been among the most successful in recent years in Haiti. The Law of 4 May 2016 (République d'Haiti, 2016[15]) establishes a medium-term budgetary framework, with a three-year horizon, in line with the three-year investment programmes (PTIs).The Act also introduced programme-based budgeting and a medium-term expenditure framework.

In practice, however, these instruments are not yet operational. In a pilot experiment, the budget programmes of two ministries have been introduced and presented in the Finance Bill 2018-2019. In regard to the progress of a medium-term budgetary framework, overall financial projections are not yet available. In the OECD questionnaire administered to the Haitian authorities in the context of this Review (hereinafter "the OECD questionnaire"), the Office of the Prime Minister states that there are no institutional mechanisms in place to ensure the harmonisation of strategic planning and resource allocation in the annual or medium-term budgetary goals. This is not a new problem: it was pointed out in the latest available report on *Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability* (PEFA) regarding[1] alignment with the document National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (Stratégie nationale pour la croissance et la réduction de la pauvreté - DSNCRP) (Morachiello and Lopke, 2012[16]) and more recently in a World Bank report (2016[17]).This is primarily due to a lack of capacity and resources. In addition, there are no institutional incentives in Haiti to ensure compliance with spending limits, as recommended by the OECD (OECD, 2015[14]).

The interviews revealed that the programming and study units (*Unité d'Étude et de Programmation* - UEP) still lack capacity in budgeting and strategic planning. The sectoral strategic plans are not sufficiently developed. In the budget preparation phase, these plans should include cost reports. However, the latest available PEFA report indicates that cost reports, where they exist, cover only a small portion of the Haitian government's expenditure (Morachiello and Lopke, 2012[16]). In addition, multi-annual cost reports are one of the foundations of the medium-term budgetary framework. These are almost non-existent in Haiti (Morachiello and Lopke, 2012[16]). On the other hand, public policy goals, in line with the priorities defined by the government, which are themselves aligned with the PSDH, are rarely associated with the determination of expenditures (Morachiello and Lopke, 2012[16]). This is primarily due to the lack of human resources in the UEPs: many of them are not functional. In response to this difficulty, the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation (*Ministère de la Planification et Coopération Externe* - MPCE), the central actor in strategic planning, centralises and coordinates strategic budgeting through the Unit Coordinators' Forum. It holds regular working sessions with UEPs to discuss technical issues and strategic priorities. The MPCE is accordingly involved in strategic budgeting through an informal coordination mechanism.

Similarly, there is a lack of resources to identify and carry out public investments. The World Bank (2016[17]) report shows that preliminary analyses of investment projects are not sufficiently developed. Financial and strategic documentation for many investment projects is lacking, making it impossible to establish an adequate link to strategic planning. In addition, some projects are abandoned midway or transformed, creating a deviation from the strategic plans. For this reason, the IMF (Fonds Monétaire International, 2019[18]) calls for an investment plan that would facilitate medium-term budgeting. For Fiscal Year (FY) 2017-18, the MPCE, which is in charge of most of the capital expenditure, is thus the department with the lowest budget performance rate for FY 2017-18 (Commission économique pour l'Amérique latine et les Caraïbes, 2019[19]).

Macroeconomic and macro-fiscal forecasts are also essential to ensure the credibility of a medium-term fiscal framework. These are still new in Haiti and need to be further developed. A team dedicated to macroeconomic and macrofiscal forecasting was created in 2013. A multi-year macroeconomic framework was prepared for the first time in FY 2018-19 (Commission économique pour l'Amérique latine et les Caraïbes, 2019[19]). The absence of a number of data, including national accounts data since end-2018 (Fonds Monétaire International, 2020[20]), and the lack of sophistication of the forecasting model used - highlighted during the OECD fact-finding mission - suggest that the macroeconomic forecasting work needs further refinement. The macro-budgetary aspect is just beginning to be introduced. Only the tax revenue projections were inserted in the preparation for the 2018-2019 financial year. Projections of government expenditure and overall budget balances are planned for the coming years.

Strengthening the fundamentals of public finances is an essential condition for the implementation of programmatic and results-based budgeting

Effective treasury management and budget implementation, whole-of-government budgeting, comprehensive and reliable budget reporting and the certainty of administrative entities that funds will be available for planned expenditures are fundamental elements that must be in place to manage an annual budget and to consider multi-year budget management. If carefully designed, the medium-term budget framework can clearly illustrate the impact of existing government policies on revenues and expenditures. It is also a tool to monitor the introduction of new policies and to track budget implementation on a multi-year basis. It provides a transparent basis for the implementation of accountability and for the preparation of more detailed, results-based budgets. It is used to assess government accountability and to prepare detailed, results-based budgets (Commission économique pour l'Amérique latine et les Caraïbes, 2019[19]). The basic principles presented in this section must become self-evident to the Haitian state before considering programmatic budgeting first and performance budgeting second.

Treasury management efforts in Haiti must not be relaxed

Treasury management in Haiti is a long-standing weakness, identified in the latest available PEFA report (Morachiello and Lopke, 2012[16]), a World Bank report (Groupe de la Banque Mondiale, 2016[17]) and a recent IMF report (Fonds Monétaire International, 2019[18]). Its importance is recognised in the PME-2023 plan: For example, "ensuring the consolidation of the single treasury account" is one of the goals of Axis 9 on treasury and public accounting (Gouvernement d'Haïti, 2018, p. 62[12]). This is also a clear goal of the MEF in its reform of public finance strategy.

Much work has already been done with the assistance of the IMF to consolidate the government's account balances in the Single Treasury Account (Fonds Monétaire International, 2019[18]). The continued existence of several dozen accounts with the Bank of the Republic of Haiti, however, complicates cash management planning. Traditionally, this persistence is often due to the refusal of some managing services to lose control of their account. There are many reasons for this: among others, the lack of confidence in centralised management of financial funds or the desire to preserve a form of opacity in the use of public funds by avoiding the administrative controls of the budgetary authority. A single cash account is an effective mechanism for planning, managing and monitoring budget implementation. Such an account streamlines payments and reduces the backlog of new expenditures. It would also reduce the cost of financing the government by the Central Bank and improve financial transparency.

In the absence of a single, comprehensive cash account, the release of cash based on liquid funds rather than on budget could persist, which is a constraint to strategic budgeting. Government agencies have little reason to pursue the strategic phase of the budget if the funds they can receive do not match their budget proposals. The certainty required by the administrative sectors is also based on credible macroeconomic and fiscal forecasts.

Transparency of public finances must be increased

The Review of past budget years at the beginning of the strategic phase should be based on financial and accounting reports. The seventh principle of the OECD Recommendation on Budgetary Governance states that "these reports play a fundamental role in transparency and can, if well designed, provide useful messages on performance and value for money to inform future budget allocations" (OECD, 2015[14]).

The coverage and quality of financial accounts should be improved to facilitate the monitoring of public finances. The government's financial transactions table (FTT), published monthly, has some weaknesses, including limited coverage, a high level of aggregation and inaccurate classification (Fonds Monétaire International, 2019[18]). The creation of some institutions by decree, such as OMRH, is an obstacle to their inclusion in the budget. Similarly, better disclosure of certain budgetary expenditures, as well as the accounts of autonomous agencies and public enterprises, would improve transparency (Fonds Monétaire International, 2019[18]).

Budgetary control and performance need to be improved

Effective parliamentary oversight of the budget is one of the goals of Axis 10 on external oversight and transparency of the PME-2023 (Gouvernement d'Haïti, 2018[12]). The involvement of the legislature in the development of the budget is essential. It must be able to discuss policy priorities and contribute to the arbitration of the resources available to the State to implement these priorities. The Haitian statutory framework institutes a fixed budgetary calendar (Table 3.1) but the budget is rarely ratified by Parliament (Morachiello and Lopke, 2012[16]) (Fonds Monétaire International, 2019[18]), as Parliament is seldom sitting. When this is the case, it is either incomplete or submitted too late in the fiscal year. This means that since the year 2016, only one finance law has been approved by Parliament. In the absence of such approval, the State must renew the last budget ratified by Parliament.

Table 3.1 The budget calendar in Haiti

15 October - 30 November	Beginning of the strategic phase: the determination of the budgetary perspectives leads to the circular defining the main lines of the budgetary policy and recalling the norms and constraints of the appropriation forecasts.
30 November	Top-down phase of the strategic phase: the circular defining the main lines of the budgetary policy, and reminding the standards and constraints of the credit estimates, is distributed to the managing departments.
15 January - 1 February	Bottom-up phase of the strategic phase: the managing departments send the budget and investment proposals to MEF and MPCE.
15 March - 1 April	Third stage of the strategic phase: the first phase of the budget conferences aims to align sectoral spending with the strategic priorities identified by the government. This step is completed by the distribution of a letter to set the final and detailed credit limits.
15 April - 30 June	Detailed budget preparation phase
30 June	Introduction of the Finance Bill in Parliament
28 September	Promulgation of the Finance Act by the President of the Republic

Note: This budget calendar is simplified
Source: (Morachiello and Lopke, 2012[16])

The use of letters of transfer (*lettres de virement*) to pay for government expenditures should be reduced. The increase in the use of this exceptional expenditure procedure in recent years, which circumvents internal expenditure control, undermines budgetary transparency and accountability.

Budget performance in Haiti is still a significant challenge (Commission économique pour l'Amérique latine et les Caraïbes, 2019[19]; Groupe de la Banque Mondiale, 2016[17]). Poor budget management control is traditionally associated with higher levels of expenditure arrears, but also with a lack of budget credibility and poor quality of budget preparation. The implementation rate of capital expenditure in Haiti is particularly low. Indeed, between 2013 and 2018, this rate was about 41% (Commission économique pour l'Amérique latine et les Caraïbes, 2019[19]). These difficulties reflect the lack of resources needed to identify and implement public investments, as discussed above (Fonds Monétaire International, 2019[18]).

It is important to lay the foundations for more ambitious reforms

In parallel with the completion of the public finance fundamentals described above, Haiti can better articulate the strategic planning and budget cycles in order to move towards modern public financial management. This articulation is a challenge in all countries, including the most developed ones. For example, the harmonisation of time horizons within the European Union is not yet complete (Downes, Moretti and Nicol, 2017[21]). The EU's medium-term budgetary framework, known as the "Multiannual Financial framework", has a seven-year horizon, while the main strategic planning tool, "Europe 2020", has a ten-year horizon. Synchronising these two horizons would strengthen the alignment between budgeting and planning. In addition, the OECD noted the importance of reviewing the Europe 2020 strategic plan at mid-term, and of using this assessment to conduct a public expenditure review.

The reforms underway in Haiti - programme-based budgeting, the medium-term budget framework, the medium-term expenditure framework, strategic planning - provide the basis for this linkage between strategic goals and the budget cycle. The points discussed below are essential for these reforms to support a budget architecture that is synchronised with strategic planning. The experience of Thailand, South Korea and Romania can accordingly be instructive for the reform of public finances underway in Haiti.

Articulating the timing of strategic planning and budget preparation

The medium-term budgetary framework is theoretically prepared between July and November of each year by the MEF (Commission économique pour l'Amérique latine et les Caraïbes, 2019[19]). After its presentation to the Council of Ministers and approval, it is transmitted to the sectors so that they can in turn prepare their medium-term budgetary framework.

In preparing the budget, the indicative expenditure envelopes contained in the circular of 15 October requesting ministries and agencies to submit their budget proposals must be broken down by sector. The latest available PEFA report suggests (Morachiello and Lopke, 2012[16]) that this is not the case in practice and that it is not envisaged in the budget preparation procedures manual.

In the past, managing departments and agencies have had limited time to develop their budget proposals (Morachiello and Lopke, 2012[16]).It is crucial that these entities have sufficient time to develop expenditure estimates. Managing departments and agencies must feel fully involved in and accountable for the budget process, including its contribution to strategic planning. This then affects the credibility of the budget and its implementation. This involvement is also crucial to the success of a programmatic structure (Box 3.6).

The fact-finding mission also revealed that the macroeconomic framework for budget planning was carried out between March and June, in parallel with the preparation of the budget. However, these macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts form the basis for a medium-term budgetary framework, which is normally prepared between July and November. This lack of consistency over time does not allow for a credible medium-term budgetary framework. This work by the Economic Studies Directorate must accordingly be carried out further ahead of the budgetary calendar.

Linking budget documentation to strategic planning

A functional classification of expenditures in the budget nomenclature promotes consistency between the budget cycle and strategic planning by measuring progress against strategic goals. It also promotes transparency vis-à-vis Parliament, citizens and the technical and financial partners.

In 2011, a functional classification was not yet in place in Haiti (Morachiello and Lopke, 2012[16]). The budgetary nomenclature included only an administrative classification and an economic classification. A functional classification has since been established (Groupe de la Banque Mondiale, 2016[22]). This classification is similar to the 12-category *Classification of the Functions of Government* (COFOG) developed by the OECD.

For budgeting to have a real strategic dimension, a functional classification must allow for the analysis of past budget years and the determination of budgetary perspectives for future years. This classification is present in the last two available schedules of the Finance Acts, i.e., those for financial years 2017-18 and 2020-21. It is also included in the latest available schedules to the Finance Bill, which are for the year 2017-18. However, in order to encourage budgetary accountability and transparency, this functional classification of performed expenditures should be made public on a regular basis. This is not the case today: only a very aggregated classification by nature is available. Discussions have revealed that efforts are underway to improve the fiscal nomenclature, in partnership with the IMF.

Strengthening institutional coordination

Lack of coordination affects the reliability and completeness of financial information

Externally funded capital expenditures, such as donor funds, constitute the vast majority of the total capital budget. Indeed, the 2017-2018 Supplementary Budget Act indicates that they account for 54.6% of that budget. However, *reporting* on projects funded and funds implemented is very incomplete (Commission économique pour l'Amérique latine et les Caraïbes, 2019[19]). This is a long-standing problem. For example, the 2012 PEFA report indicated that information on revenues and expenditures of donor-funded projects is not included in the monthly budget performance reports, nor in the annual budget performance reports submitted by the MEF (Morachiello and Lopke, 2012[16]). In 2017, the Haitian government established a partnership framework for tax reform and public financial management to improve coordination between the various technical and financial partners and the Haitian administration (Fonds Monétaire International, 2019[18]). Such a tool should facilitate the integration of donor-funded projects into the budgeting process. In addition, Haiti can learn from the good practices of a number of African countries, such as Uganda and Tanzania (Collaborative Africa Budget Reform Initiative, 2008[23]).

There is no monthly MEF budget performance report covering all administrations (Morachiello and Lopke, 2012[16]). Each jurisdiction generally publishes monthly reports on revenues and expenditures. This lack of clarity undermines budgetary transparency because it prevents policy makers, citizens and Parliament from having an overall infra-annual view of the country's budgetary situation.

Interviews with the Haitian administration revealed that a channel of communication between the Higher Court of Accounts and Administrative Disputes (CSCCA) and the General Inspectorate of Finance (IGF) located within the MEF, which was previously non-existent, is being established. This communication would ensure the transfer of information between internal and external auditors and thus improve the quality of financial reporting.

Lack of coordination hampers budget preparation, especially with regard to the predictability of expenditure

Responses to the OECD questionnaire also suggest that during the budget preparation phase, MEF does not have all the information necessary to ensure the authenticity of the budgets submitted by line ministries.

The latest available PEFA report (Morachiello and Lopke, 2012[16]) stresses that capital and operating budgets are separate processes. The MEF is in charge of the operating budget, while the MPCE manages the capital budget. These two institutions are not yet sufficiently coordinated to estimate the recurrent costs of capital expenditures (Commission économique pour l'Amérique latine et les Caraïbes, 2019[19]). From this perspective, the organisational structure of Thailand, East Timor and South Korea established to articulate budgeting and strategic planning is illuminating (Box 3.5).

Public investment programmes (PIPs) rarely include donor investment projects (Groupe de la Banque Mondiale, 2016[17]). These could result in unforeseen costs to the national budget. The 2012 PEFA points out that "budget support and project aid forecasts are not comprehensive and are not communicated to the MPCE and MEF departments in time to be taken into account in the budget law" (Morachiello and Lopke, 2012, p. 17[16]).

Box 3.5 Three organisational models of medium-term budgeting: the examples of Thailand, South Korea and Romania

A strategic planning agency separate from the budget authority in Thailand

The medium-term fiscal framework in Thailand is prepared by four institutions that form the Fiscal Policy Committee. The Fiscal Policy Office within the Department of Finance is responsible for revenue, public debt and cash management, as well as sub-annual monitoring and *reporting*. The Budget Office is responsible for budget policy, planning and performance, and budget and expenditure estimates. The Central Bank of Thailand and the National Economic and Social Development Board are jointly responsible for macroeconomic forecasting. The Central Bank manages economic analysis and advice while the Council is the strategic planning agency.

A common budgeting and planning authority: the Economic Planning Commission in South Korea

In South Korea, from the early 1960s to the early 1990s, the Economic Planning Commission was responsible for strategic planning as well as budgeting. This institution was attached to the Deputy Office of the Prime Minister. The Commission has put in place a medium-term strategic plan, called the Economic Development Plan, with a five-year horizon, in which budgetary constraints are integrated. The Economic Planning Commission is also responsible for coordinating the design and implementation of these plans.

In Romania, the Ministry of Public Finance oversees the preparation of the medium-term budget.

The Romanian Ministry of Public Finance is responsible for the management of public finances in accordance with national and European rules. In this context, it prepares the fiscal and budgetary strategy, which sets out the country's medium-term fiscal framework. The Ministry of Public Finance also sets spending limits and prepares the Finance Bill by collating the proposals of the spending authorities. The Ministry also cooperates with the National Strategy and Forecasting Commission, which is a separate entity subordinate to the General Secretariat of the Government. It is officially responsible for the main macroeconomic projections, such as GDP or sectoral demand.

Source: (Blazey et al., 2021[24]); (Nicol and Park, 2020[25]), (Choi, 2015[26]).

Developing sectoral strategic plans

During the fact-finding mission, the Haitian administration has indicated that the budget cycle is aligned with the long-term strategic planning, i.e. the PSDH. However, the PSDH is too vague to facilitate the allocation of budgetary resources and the selection of investment projects. One obstacle is the lack of prioritisation in terms of importance and feasibility. Sectoral strategic plans, with strategic goals, should accordingly play a key role in budget planning. The OECD fact-finding mission to the Haitian administration revealed that efforts are underway to harmonise sectoral policies and strategies. It should be noted that some managing services are more advanced than others in developing multi-year strategic plans. These include the Department of Education and the Department of Public Health and Population.

In addition to contributing to a medium-term budget and expenditure framework, sectoral strategic plans can serve as an anchor for programme budgeting (Downes, Gay and Kraan, 2018[27]).Indeed, in many countries, programmes are selected in the context of a policy "cascade", starting from high-level strategic and development goals that feed into specific medium-term outcome goals, which in turn feed into ministerial or sectoral goals and associated outcome targets. International experience also indicates that reclassification of the budget on a programmatic basis is best achieved with well explained multi-year budget estimates, preferably formulated in terms of results. Once a medium-term, programme-based sector strategy is developed, countries can assign clear organisational and managerial responsibilities for achieving the selected plans and goals. Haiti can draw on the experience of East Timor, where medium-term planning is a precondition for the introduction of programme budgeting (Box 3.6).

The development of programme-based budgeting, and subsequently performance-based budgeting, are clear goals for the Haitian administration. But the road to achieving these goals is long. This chapter has detailed some of the aspects of a modern budget architecture, relating to the link between budgeting and strategic planning, that need to be understood in order to move forward on this path.

Box 3.6 Integration of the budget into medium-term planning in East Timor

A strategic planning agency involved in budget planning, but separate from the budget authority.

The Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Unit (PMU) is an agency within the Office of the Prime Minister of East Timor. It is responsible for coordinating, organising and supervising the planning, monitoring and evaluation process of all government policies and programmes, including the state budget. The PMU ensures that the annual plan is consistent with the strategic development plan and that the sectoral programmes are consistent with the annual plan and the strategic development plan. The Ministry of Finance is the budgetary authority that prepares and executes the budget. Management departments are responsible for developing sector plans and submitting budget proposals to the Ministry of Finance and the PMU for analysis. They are also responsible for monitoring the implementation of the annual plan and budget by their departments and for sending quarterly and annual reports on results to the PMU.

The gradual introduction of a programme-based budget

Following the approval of the Strategic Development Plan, which is the long-term strategic plan for East Timor, the Office of the Prime Minister took the initiative to develop a government planning process around programmes. For this purpose, it launched a pilot project in 2016 to establish a programmatic classification, in ten ministries and 15 autonomous agencies. One of the goals of the latter is to link programmes to the overall goals and vision defined in the strategic development plan and relevant sectoral plans. Sectoral, annual or medium-term plans were not yet fully integrated into budget planning. In particular, PMU trained departments on how to develop their programme structure, costing and

monitoring. East Timor has also opted for a simplified approach, in which budget programmes correspond to ministerial portfolios, rather than being inter-ministerial or transversal.

The main difficulties encountered in this implementation

One of the main lessons learned from the experience of OECD countries and East Timor is to avoid information overload for managing ministries and autonomous agencies. During the preparation of the budget, the latter are often offered two frameworks for expressing their budgetary proposals: on the one hand, the structure by programme, and on the other, the traditional structure by budget item. Given the limited time available to complete these documents, the process of preparing annual and medium-term strategic plans must be streamlined and understood from the outset. For this reason, programme budgeting should be done downstream of strategic planning. The second lesson is the importance of information loops between participants so that reform is not understood as a "vertical" policy. The adherence of all participants to the programme structure is sometimes not achieved. All participants must feel responsible for the programmatic structure of the budget, not just its performance. The mechanisms of institutional coordination and ownership by ministries and autonomous agencies thus play a major role in the implementation of a programme budget.

Source: (Downes, Gay and Kraan, 2018[27]).

Establish a robust system of monitoring and evaluation of public policies to improve public intervention and increase transparency

In addition to improving the quality of public financial management, monitoring and evaluation are used to improve the achievement of national development goals by providing critical evidence on how well the government is implementing these goals, and what has worked and what has not in the pursuit of these goals. Monitoring and evaluation also provide essential information to citizens on the performance of public policies.

A strong monitoring and evaluation system is essential to achieving the results of strategic planning

Monitoring and evaluation are two distinct practices

Monitoring and evaluation are two distinct practices, with different methods and goals. This means that monitoring aims to facilitate strategic planning and inform public decision-making by measuring the performance of reforms and identifying stress points and bottlenecks. It also strengthens the accountability of public decision-makers and public information on the proper use of resources (OECD, 2019[28]). Unlike evaluation, monitoring is accordingly characterised by routine and continuous data collection processes (Table 3.2).While policy evaluation aims to show the extent to which the observed outcome can be attributed to the policy intervention, monitoring provides descriptive information without establishing a causal link between a policy intervention and the observed outcomes.

Table 3.2 Comparing the evaluation and monitoring of public policies

Follow-up	Evaluation
Continuous process (leading to **operational** decision making)	**Episodic** process (leading to **strategic** decision making)
Monitoring systems are adapted to the general issues of public **policy** design	Tailored to a **specific** problem
The **measurements** are **developed** and *the* data collected through **routine processes.**	Measures are **customised** according to the assessment
Attribution is generally **assumed** to be	**Attribution** of observed results and a key **evaluation issue**
Resources are part of the programme or organisational infrastructure	**Targeted resources** are mobilised for each evaluation
Use of information evolves according to **needs and priorities**	The goals of an evaluation are **determined** upstream

Source: adapted from McDavid, J.C. and Hawthorn, L.R.L. (2006), Programme evaluation and performance measurement, an introduction to practice, Thousand Oaks, California: Sage, in Open (OECD, 2019[28]) *Government in Biscay*, https://doi.org/10.1787/e4e1a40c-en

Conversely, the specific goal of evaluation is to inform decision-makers about the success or otherwise of a public policy and to determine whether there is a causal link between the observed results and the policy in question. In this respect, assessment is an episodic process, tailored to a specific problem, with actions and resources targeted and personalised according to the assessment (OECD, 2020[29]). Evaluation, however, shares common goals with monitoring, namely to determine whether government efforts are achieving the intended results, whether value for money is being achieved, and for communication with citizens and other stakeholders.

Monitoring and evaluation have complementary goals

A robust policy monitoring system provides policymakers with the tools and evidence needed to detect bottlenecks in policy implementation, adjust policy performance, and communicate policy outcomes to citizens. For example, OECD and non-OECD countries have developed their policy monitoring practices with a view towards accountability and performance management, but also to communicate with citizens and improve the achievement of development goals (see Box 3.7).

Box 3.7 The rationale for developing a public policy system

The practice of monitoring public policies has developed since the 1990s in OECD countries with a view to making public management more accountable and efficient.

In the **United States**, the *Government Performance and Result Act* of 1993, strengthened in 2010, aims to improve government performance management. In particular, it requires federal agencies to engage in a performance approach by measuring and reporting their results through the development of multi-year strategic plans, an annual performance plan and an annual performance report.

In **Canada**, a modern comptrollership initiative has been underway since 1997. A new management accountability framework (cadre de gestion pour la reddition de comptes - CRG) was thus adopted in

2003, and a results-based management policy has been implemented since 2016 through a results-based budget allocation.

This trend has been complemented by a desire to better communicate and showcase government results.

In the **United Kingdom**, this led to the creation in 2001 of a *Delivery Unit* attached to the Prime Minister, in a framework of citizen dissatisfaction with the quality of their public services. This mechanism was set up to monitor and measure the implementation of reforms assigned to ministries and agencies. It is an effective tool for communication, transparency and accountability in government.

In **Colombia**, the national system for the evaluation of management and results (SINERGIA) aims to improve the effectiveness of the formulation and implementation of the national development plan. This mechanism includes a monitoring component based on the use of a system of indicators associated with the Plan's goals at the strategic, sectoral and management levels. This monitoring is applied at the central level but also at the territorial and decentralised levels, in order to provide global information on the performance of public policies in the country.

Many non-member countries have also adopted a policy monitoring framework to better monitor the performance of their policy instruments.

In **South Africa**, the Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation aims to empower officials and managers, improve public policy planning and get departments working towards common goals. This system is based on performance targets for each ministry and a system of indicators associated with government performance targets.

Source: Based on information from the United States Office of Management and Budget, the Treasury Board Secretariat of Canada, the Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation of the Republic of South Africa (OECD, 2018[30]), the Public Governance Review of Paraguay (Lafuente and Gonzalez, 2018[31]) and Do Delivery Units deliver?

Similarly, the evaluation of public policies is an essential governance tool to ensure that reforms carried out contribute to the improvement of public services and the well-being of citizens. For this purpose, evaluations aim to objectively measure the extent to which the results observed are attributable to the public policies implemented. In this way, the evaluation contributes to the dissemination of a culture of results within the administration, to the accountability of public decision-makers and to the achievement of long-term government goals (OECD, 2020[29]).

The institutional framework for monitoring and evaluation (M&E) is fragmented

A strong institutional framework for policy monitoring and evaluation enables the formalisation and systematisation of practices that are isolated and uncoordinated in their absence. The institutionalisation of the M&E system accordingly aims to establish standards and guidelines for methods and practices (Gaarder and Briceño, 2010[32]) and can provide effective incentives for the conduct of quality assessments and the systematic collection of performance monitoring data (OECD, 2020[29]). Although there is no single approach in the way countries have institutionalised their M&E practices, a strong institutional framework should include:

- One or more clear and comprehensive definitions, anchored in a formal framework. These definitions must clearly distinguish between monitoring and evaluation, which are complementary but distinct practices, and specify the policies involved.

- A practice anchored in a political and statutory framework, either at a specific level of the hierarchy of norms (law, regulation, etc.), or through strategic documents or dedicated guidelines.
- Identification of the institutional players responsible for overseeing or conducting monitoring and evaluation, as well as their resources and mandates.
- Macro-level guidance on "who, when and how" monitoring and evaluation of public policies should be carried out.

In Haiti, there is no definition of monitoring or evaluation that is shared by the different components of government

According to data collected by the OECD, (OECD, 2020[29]) the majority of OECD countries (23 out of 25) have one (11 countries) or more (12 countries) official definitions of policy evaluation (see Figure 3.1). In some countries, this definition is anchored in a statutory or regulatory framework. This is the case in Japan, where the government law on the evaluation of public policies, provides a definition of evaluation (Law No. 86 of 2001), while in Argentina, Decree 292/2018, designates the players responsible for developing the evaluation of social policies and programmes (Ministerio de Planificación Nacional y Política Económica, 2018[33]). Other countries define evaluation in methodological guides, as is the case in Colombia.

Figure 3.1 Countries with a formal definition of evaluation



Note: n = 41 These are responses to the question "Has your government adopted a formal definition of public policy evaluation?", Source: OECD Public Policy Evaluation Survey (2018).

In Haiti, there is no such *shared* definition. However, the adoption of a clear and precise definition is an important step in the institutionalisation of evaluation. Indeed, this enables a common understanding of the issues, goals and tools to be mobilised to implement the evaluation, not only within the public sector, but also between all the players of the system, such as the TFPs and civil society organisations (CSO).

For example, while the content of evaluation definitions could vary from country to country, a few key concepts are found in most of the definitions analysed by the OECD (OECD, 2020[29]), namely

- Evaluation criteria (impact, effectiveness, efficiency, etc.),
- The type of public policies involved (projects, programmes, plans, etc.),
- The characteristics of the evaluation, which include the quality criteria of the evaluation, the type of measures expected, the method of conduct and the players involved.

Haiti's monitoring and evaluation system forms part of a clear institutional landscape that primarily involves the MPCE and sector ministries

The Decree of 17 May 2005 on the organisation of the central government administration sets out the general regulatory framework for the national system for monitoring and evaluating public policies. Several players at the level of the centre of government (CoG) thus play an important coordinating and promotional role in this area. These are:

- **The Office of Human Resources Management** (OMRH) is responsible, in particular, for "*ensuring the performance of the public service system through regulation and evaluation*". This responsibility is entrusted to it by Article 113 of the 2005 Decree. However, it is limited to the monitoring and evaluation of measures related to the public service.
- **The Public Policy Coordination and Monitoring Unit** (*cellule de coordination et de suivi des politiques publiques* - CCSPP), which "*monitors and evaluates government action and contributes to the preparation of strategic reflection files, primarily on issues relating to good governance*". This unit, attached to the Prime Minister, was nevertheless disbanded in 2016 due to potential duplication with the MPCE mandate.
- **The Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation** (*Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération Externe* - MPCE) is responsible for "*monitoring and evaluating the plans and programmes developed by the Ministry*". This planning coordination role is confirmed by the Decree of 2 February 2016 organising the MPCE (Gouvernement d'Haiti, 2016[34]). The MPCE is accordingly the main actor for coordinating and promoting monitoring and evaluation within government.

In addition to these new players at the centre of government, line ministries are responsible for monitoring and evaluating sectoral public policies, through **the study and programming units** (UEP) (Article 63 of the 2005 Decree). The box below (Box 3.8) provides more information on how UEPs work.

Box 3.8 Study and programming units (UEPs) in Haiti

The UEPs are central State services whose powers are defined in Article 63 of the Decree of 17 May 2005 on the organisation of the central State administration.

The UEPs serve as the main point of contact for the Ministry of Planning and Cooperation within each sectoral ministry. They are responsible for monitoring and evaluating sectoral public policies on behalf of the MPCE. The capacities of these units vary considerably from one department to another. There is currently no consistent competency framework for personnel working in these units.

Source: Decree of 2 February 2016 on the organisation of the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation; Decree of 17 May 2005 on the organisation of the central administration.

Finally, in Haiti, the TFPs play an important role in the monitoring and evaluation of public policies. However, the initiatives carried out by the TFPs in this area do not seem to contribute to the Haitian national system of M&E and accordingly, *ultimately*, to the improvement of the use of evidence in national policy-making.

There is a separate monitoring system for the PME-2023

In Haiti, in addition to the mandates of these players, there are specific systems for monitoring the government's priority policies, formalised in the PSDH and the PME-2023. This means that a specific governance is created to ensure the monitoring and evaluation of the PME-2023, composed of the following players

- A strategic steering committee chaired by the Prime Minister and composed of the sectoral ministries and the OMRH, which ensures the steering of the PME-2023 at the highest political level;
- An operational steering committee, chaired by the OMRH, and composed of the sectoral and sub-sectoral committees of the ministries, which develops the monitoring processes in the ministries and evaluates the results of the implementation;
- Sectoral committees in each department, composed of Directors General and UEPs, which develop a monitoring plan and communicate internally and externally on progress.

There is no inter-ministerial legal or policy framework for monitoring and evaluation in Haiti

A majority of the countries surveyed by the OECD (29 countries, including 23 OECD countries) have developed a legal framework for whole-of-government evaluation. The fact that more than two-thirds of the countries surveyed have developed such a legal framework shows the importance attached to systematising this practice. However, OECD countries have anchored evaluation at several levels in the hierarchy of standards. The OECD (2018) survey indeed shows that evaluation can be recognised at the highest level of the hierarchy of norms, in a law or even in the constitution, but it is not a necessity.

In France, for example, the practice of public policy evaluation is affirmed at the constitutional (Article 47-2 on the mandate of the Court of Auditors), legal and regulatory levels (see Box 3.9).

Box 3.9 The legal framework for the evaluation of public policies in France

France has established a statutory framework for policy evaluation integrated at three different levels: the Constitution, primary legislation and secondary legislation.

At the constitutional level, Article 47-2 entrusts the supreme audit institution, the Court of Auditors, with the task of assisting Parliament and the Government in the evaluation of public policies. The results are made available to government and citizens through the publication of evaluations. Evaluation activities are also defined in Articles 39 and 48 of the Constitution.

Regarding primary legislation, Articles 8, 11 and 12 of Organic Law No. 2009-403 on the application of Article 34-1 of the Constitution require that legislative proposals be subject to an ex ante *impact assessment.* The results of the assessment are then attached to the legislative proposal as soon as they are sent to the Supreme Administrative Court (the Council of State).

At the level of secondary legislation, Article 8 of Decree No. 2015-510 provides that any draft law affecting the missions and organisation of the State's deconcentrated services must be the subject of

an impact study. The main goal is to verify the consistency between the goals pursued by the proposal and the resources allocated to the decentralised services.

In addition, France has a number of circulars from the Prime Minister on evaluation. On 12 October 2015, the circular dealt with the assessment of standards, and in May 2016 with the impact assessment of new bills and regulatory texts.

Source: OECD Study (2018), Constitution of the Fifth Republic, respective Articles on Légifrance (https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr).

Similarly, several OECD countries have developed a transversal statutory or regulatory framework to organise performance monitoring. This is the case in the United States under the *Government Performance and Results Modernisation Act.*

In Haiti, there is no coherent statutory framework underpinning the system of evaluation and monitoring of public policies across government[2]. In addition, as the example of the CPPCC shows, some of the public administration decrees that anchor the institutional mandate of monitoring and evaluation players are not up to date.

There is no general or specific guidance for conducting monitoring or evaluation

Other countries have chosen to place these practices within a policy *framework*. A policy framework is generally a document or set of documents that provide strategic direction, principles and a plan of action for government on a specific sector or issue. Public policy frameworks could or could not include legislative acts, as well as ministerial acts in the form of guidelines, for example (OECD, 2020[29]). The existence of such a policy framework demonstrates the importance that governments attach to these practices as vehicles for improving public policy and, *ultimately*, development. These policy frameworks make it possible, above all, to define the goals and concrete methods for implementing monitoring or evaluation: who are the players, what policies are to be evaluated or monitored, and what is the timetable for implementing M&E.

Therefore, like half of the countries surveyed by the OECD (21 in total, including 17 OECD member countries), Benin has developed such a public policy framework for whole-of-government evaluation. The following box (Box 3.10) provides more information on this framework.

Box 3.10 The policy framework for evaluation in Benin

Benin has rooted the practice of evaluation in a *solid policy* framework through the National Evaluation Policy 2012-2021 (NEP (République du Bénin, 2012[35])) and more recently the National Evaluation Methodology Guide (Bureau de l'Évaluation des Politiques Publiques et de l'Analyse de l'Action Gouvernementale, 2017[36]). This NEP sets out an overall framework for the purpose and goals of evaluations, the standards and principles to be followed in their conduct, and the measures available to implement them. In this sense, the NEP 2012-2021 institutionalises the practice of evaluation by contributing to the development of formal, systematic and aligned evaluative practices in terms of methodology and use of results across government (Gaarder and Briceño, 2010[32]).

Sources: in the text.

The latest PSDH implementation report indicates that the Haitian government intended to develop "*methodological documents [on] the results framework for monitoring the PSDH and public policies and the ODD*". However, these initiatives have not been successful due to the economic and social difficulties faced by the country in recent years (Gouvernement d'Haïti, 2020[3]). There is a *Manual of Procedures on the Management of Public Investments* (Government of Haiti, 2014), which applies exclusively to public investment projects and focuses on a summary monitoring of the financial and physical implementation of projects.

The terms (players, methodology and sequencing) and tools for monitoring are still unclear, which can significantly constrain the effectiveness of performance monitoring. There is no methodological document organising whole-of-government monitoring. This means that if the governance of the monitoring of the PME-2023 is explained in this document, its exact methodology and all the players involved are not specified. Indeed, if the committees presented above are mandated to validate the monitoring reports (called "evaluation" in the PME-2023, but more likely monitoring reports) and to take concerted decisions on the way forward, they do not seem to be involved as such in several key stages of the monitoring value chain: data collection and updating of indicators, consolidation of progress scorecards and proposal of scenarios concerning the way forward In the event of implementation difficulties. In other words, they are decision-making bodies, which are an indispensable part of a performance monitoring system, but which cannot function without their operational or administrative counterparts.

Laying the foundations for a robust public policy evaluation system by institutionalising practice

A system can be defined as "a set of elements linked together by a dynamic that produces an effect, creates a new system or influences its elements" (OECD, 2017[37]). More specifically, a public policy evaluation system can be defined as "a system in which evaluation is a normal part of the life cycle of public policies and programmes, conducted in a systematic and rigorous manner, and whose results are used in decision-making processes and made available to the public" (Lázaro, 2015[38]).

To establish such a system, the first step is for governments to institutionalise the practice of evaluation in order to give an explicit mandate to public players (see Box 3.11).

Box 3.11 The three pillars of a strong policy evaluation system

A good public policy evaluation system is developed through the following three dimensions:

- **Institutionalisation:** refers to the process of integrating evaluative practices with more formal and systematic approaches. This could include establishing a system of evaluation in government settings through specific policies or strategies (Lázaro, 2015[38]; Gaarder and Briceño, 2010[32]).
- **Quality:** refers to policy evaluations that are technically rigorous and well governed, i.e., independent and responsive to the decision-making process (Picciotto, 2013[39]).
- **Use:** occurs when evaluation results lead to a better understanding or a change in the design of the evaluation topic, or when evaluation recommendations inform decision-making and lead to a change in the evaluation topic.

Source: Lázaro (2015[38]), Gaarder and Briceño (2010[32]), Ledermann (2012[40]), and Picciotto (2013[39]).

Providing a statutory framework and general guidance for the conduct of the evaluation

The Haitian government could benefit from the adoption of a law defining a framework for the implementation of monitoring and evaluation throughout the government, in order to build political consensus, beyond electoral cycles, on the importance of M&E for the country (OECD, 2020[29]). The relevance of this law is heightened in a period of electoral transition.

In addition, the Haitian government could benefit from the adoption of a directive or methodological guide to clarify the role of players in M&E, as well as to provide guidance at the global level on "by whom, when and how" monitoring and evaluation of public policies should be carried out. This type of guidance is useful for ensuring that departmental resources are focused on monitoring and evaluating high-stakes social and economic policies, as well as for planning the human and financial resources that will be devoted to the M&E.

Streamlining the functioning of the players and strengthening the role of the centre of government in evaluation

In the majority of countries surveyed by the OECD, the centre of government[3] (CdG) has a major role to play in coordinating the evaluation practices of ministries. Indeed, the various structures of the centre of government are strategically positioned to disseminate a culture of evaluation throughout the administration, as well as to coordinate the action of the various ministries, agencies and sectoral institutions (OECD, 2020[29]). In addition, the coordination capacities of the CdG are all the more important as governments will have to assess the impact of economic aid and health policies (Figure 3.2).

Figure 3.2 An institution within the executive branch with governmental competences in the field of public policy evaluation



Note: These are the country responses to the question "Which executive branch institutions have governmental competencies in evaluation? ".
Source: OECD (2018), Survey of Public Policy Evaluation.

Haiti could thu strengthen the centre of government's evaluation function. Indeed, since the disappearance of the Unit for the coordination and monitoring of public policies, no executive institution has an explicit mandate to require evaluations by sectoral ministries and to coordinate their implementation.

However, in a country like Haiti, the role of the MPCE is still important in coordinating evaluations. The MPCE is responsible for evaluating the contribution of sectoral programmes to Haiti's development. In addition, the MPCE is particularly well placed to coordinate evaluations conducted by the TFPs and to promote their use within the administration. The MCPE's role in promoting evaluations could accordingly be strengthened. For example, the MPCE could be explicitly mandated to encourage sectoral departments (in effect, its network of UEP) to conduct evaluations.

Rationalisation of the players involved in monitoring and clarification of methodologies would enable better use of the results, which is important for crisis recovery.

As mentioned in the previous sections, performance monitoring can serve three distinct purposes:

- It contributes to *operational decision-making by providing* elements for measuring performance and identifying delays or difficulties in implementation (i);
- It also *contributes to the goal of reporting* on the use of resources, the internal efficiency of management processes or the results of public policies (ii);
- Finally, it *contributes to the goal of transparency*, by showing citizens and stakeholders the extent to which governments' efforts are producing the desired results (iii).

Each of these goals requires a separate organisation for performance monitoring. In Haiti, the existing systems seem to be based primarily on the production of monitoring reports, documents whose purpose is primarily to report to a decision-making body on the activities implemented to achieve the goals set by the community. This is the case, for example, with the PME-2023 evaluations, which are in fact monitoring reports, and which are prepared for consideration by the various PME-2023 Monitoring Committees. In addition, operational decision-making is not facilitated by this format, which is not well suited to the task. Finally, the implementation reports of the PME-2023 and the PSDH are not made public; accordingly, they do not contribute to the communication of government results.

Streamline players and organise a single performance dialogue between the centre of government and line ministries

First, for performance monitoring to be an effective management tool, it must be carried out regularly and frequently enough to enable decision-makers and public officials to adjust their actions or resources in response to implementation difficulties (OECD, 2018[9]). This exercise is accordingly closely linked to the day-to-day management of public policies and their implementation. In addition, it is important to streamline monitoring systems to minimise the additional costs associated with this task (OECD, 2018[9]). Haiti could accordingly set up a single performance dialogue on all its priority policies: PME-2023, PSDH, Sustainable Development Goals. For this purpose, it would be appropriate to:

- Clarify the responsibilities of the different players in the performance dialogue and
- Develop useful tools for decision making.

The respective responsibilities of the different players in the performance dialogue along the monitoring value chain need to be clarified: coordination and promotion of monitoring, data collection, data analysis, *reporting* and use of data. In Senegal, for example, the Operational Monitoring Office (*Bureau opérationnel de suivi* - BOS), located at the level of the Presidency of the Republic, is responsible for coordinating the monitoring of the implementation of the *Plan Sénégal Émergent 2035* at the intergovernmental level. It is accordingly responsible for steering the Plan before the Presidency, and in particular before the Council of Ministers, which decides on the corrective measures to be adopted. The BOS relies on the steering

committees of the sectoral ministries, which are responsible for providing it with data on the implementation of the *Plan Sénégal Émergent* goals relating to their area of competence. The following box (Box 3.12) provides a detailed view of this system.

Box 3.12 Monitoring of the Emerging Senegal Plan (Plan Sénégal émergent - PSE) by the Operational Monitoring Office

The "Plan Sénégal Emergent" (PSE) is a programme for the economic transformation of Senegal by 2035, with a triple goal of inclusive growth, human development and good governance. In the "inclusive growth" section, the plan is broken down into six key sectors (agriculture, fisheries and agri-food; energy; social economy; logistics and industrial pole; mining and fertilisers; multiservice pole and tourism) and 27 flagship projects and 17 flagship reforms to promote economic growth, with the ten-year goal of multiplying GDP per capita by 1.5.

The Bureau de Suivi du Plan Sénégal Emergent (BOS), which is the delivery unit of the PSE, aims to monitor the implementation and coordination of the 27 flagship projects and 17 flagship reforms of the PSE in order to ensure results. Placed under the aegis of the minister in charge of monitoring the PSE, the BOS is an entity with a limited lifespan and an evolving mandate that can be adapted to the needs of the government. The BOS is responsible for implementing a systematic approach to monitoring the progress of the programme through three areas of intervention:

- **Project structuring and reform:** the BOS leads the implementation of the plan's key priorities and assists departments in developing a measurable implementation plan.
- **Operational monitoring and problem solving:** the BOS monitors the implementation of the plan's key priorities, thereby ensuring transparency. It also facilitates the decision-making process, thanks to his contacts at the highest level of the State, which enable it to unblock problematic situations.
- **Impact assessment:** BOS assesses the effects and impacts of flagship projects and reforms on target populations, which enables it to understand the net benefits of a programme and compare it to different options, as well as to optimise the implementation of future programmes.

Alongside the BOS, other governance bodies enable the effective monitoring of the PSE. While the Strategic Orientation Committee chaired by the Head of State defines and adjusts the strategic direction of the plan, the Council of Ministers takes decisions on transversal issues and corrective actions. Finally, the Departmental Steering Committee provides updates on the status of the project, makes decisions on sectoral and operational issues and tracks results and decisions on corrective actions. The effective involvement of the Head of State in some of these monitoring bodies, the strong governance structure and the methodological tools adapted to the nature of the projects enable effective monitoring of the PSE.

Source:http://senegal-emergent.com/fr/dispositif.

Establishing appropriate tools for performance dialogue

In addition, performance dialogue tools must be useful for decision-making. Indeed, performance monitoring should encourage administrations to address implementation issues at their level. This implies that it should make it possible to provide concrete solutions to the difficulties identified: adjustment of the resources dedicated to a programme or policy, decision-making by the Minister or the President, etc. At present, monitoring in Haiti is based on *reports* that make it possible to report on the implementation of

each priority policy document (PME-2023, PSDH, ODD, etc.), but whose format is not conducive to operational decision-making.

In conclusion, Haiti would benefit from a *single* performance dialogue between the centre of government and line ministries, based on the Senegalese model. Two main functions would be identified: a steering coordination function, which could be carried out by the centre of government, and a data collection, analysis and use function, which would be carried out by the departments. In order to strengthen the strategic steering of the follow-up at the level of the centre of government, a single actor could be responsible for this coordination function, irrespective of the strategic document concerned. This clarification of responsibilities strengthens the coordination role of the centre of government in the post-crisis period of COVID-19 insofar as it implies building a coherent response to the crisis, which takes into account the costs and benefits of recovery strategies, and which steers the implementation efforts of public players as closely as possible, to enable their rapid adjustment.

This performance dialogue could be conducted on a quarterly basis at sector level. If the implementation problem is not overcome after two quarters, it could be placed at the CoG level twice a year. Any implementation issues requiring inter-ministerial coordination and the mobilisation of additional resources could be submitted to the Council of Ministers once a year. It could be based on the information system currently deployed for monitoring the PME-2023 and the PSDH, which assigns to each ministry the responsibility of contributing to the validation and regular updating of the data related to that ministry, according to a pre-established format and mechanism for collecting, validating and aggregating the data.

Communicate on the monitoring of priority policies in a transparent manner

The communication goal related to performance monitoring could be served initially by the publication of readable and synthetic versions of the progress reports of strategic documents. In addition, the Government of Haiti could select key indicators for reporting, which could be published on a single platform. Indeed, greater publicity of monitoring results can increase pressure on decision-makers to implement public policy priorities and follow up on recommendations more systematically. However, the monitoring reports of the PME-2023 and the PSDH are not systematically made public. The first step to improve transparency and public information would accordingly be to put these reports on a platform, preferably a single one, to facilitate access to the information.

For this, Haiti can draw inspiration from the *Benin.Opendataafrica.org* platform. The following (Box 3.13) gives more information about this platform.

Box 3.13 The *Benin opendataafrica* platform

The African Development Bank (AfDB) open data platform, set up in 2013 in the context of the African Information Superhighway project, covers 14 African countries, including Benin, available at *Benin.opendataafrica.org*. This platform brings together the country's socio-economic statistical data on a multitude of priority policies, ranging from economic development and climate change to food security and gender equality.

This platform aims to intensify the collection, management, sharing and analysis of statistical data in the country and on the African continent. These data are deposited and regularly updated by international development organisations, including the IMF. Users can view development indicators and perform analysis at the national or regional level, or use the platform's presentation templates.

The *Opendataafrica* platform promotes good governance and administrative accountability. As the data on the platform meets the best international standards, it facilitates decision-making based on reliable

information. The data also enable for the monitoring of the Millennium Development Goals at the national level.

Finally, the platform links Benin's national organisations (such as the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Analysis), international development organisations (AfDB, IMF) and a global user community of researchers, experts and legislators.

Sources : https://benin.opendataforafrica.org/ ; https://www.afdb.org/fr/news-and-events/the-afdbs-open-data-platform-achieves-continent-wide-coverage-12108.

Good monitoring and evaluation depends above all on the existence of sufficient skills and capacity within government

In order to establish a monitoring and evaluation system that can produce credible and relevant data and analysis, skills and capacity are needed. Capacity can be defined as "the totality of forces and resources available within government". It refers to the organisational, structural and technical systems, as well as the individual competencies that create and implement policies that meet the needs of the public, in accordance with policy orientations (OECD, 2008[41]).In contrast, the notion of competence refers to the technical qualification of a person.

Above all, performance monitoring requires sufficient resources and capacity to collect data regularly, calculate indicators, analyse data, etc., which requires a critical mass of well-trained personnel and managers. In Haiti, these resources are in principle *located* in the UEPs. The creation of dedicated units in sectoral ministries is an important step towards resource mobilisation. However, at the departmental level, there appears to be a significant lack of technical expertise in the UEPs. These are difficulties often encountered in an administrative setting for a country of relatively small size at the international level and with limited resources. This report can only recommend that agreements with the TFPs be pursued to obtain additional resources to fill these capacity gaps.

Above all, the evaluation of public policies requires the technical skills necessary to carry them out. To address the lack of skills among evaluators, there is accordingly a need to strengthen learning at the individual level through training and the creation of knowledge-sharing networks. Finally, the establishment of exchange programmes between public servants (through secondments) and academics is a relatively inexpensive way to strengthen knowledge sharing between government and the scientific sphere (Results for America, 2017[42]). These exchanges can be accompanied by the creation of doctoral contracts headed by academics from the country to conduct evaluations.

Conclusion and recommendations

In order to accelerate its economic and social development, Haiti has adopted two key whole-of-government strategic planning instruments in recent years: the PSDH and the PME-2023. Nevertheless, several areas of reform still need to be explored in order to strengthen this strategic planning and its implementation. First, the link between long-term planning and medium-term state reform needs to be improved. Most importantly, these strategic documents and the public policy goals they enshrine must be integrated into the budget. The latter is an essential planning tool. Over the past decade, Haiti has made some progress, through legislative reforms, in establishing a medium-term fiscal framework. These elements, as well as some of the fundamental principles of public finance, should be taken for granted before moving to performance budgeting in order to link public policy goals and the budgetary framework more explicitly. Finally, the establishment of robust public policy monitoring and evaluation systems will be

essential to better measure the performance of public policies and the country's progress in its development plan.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are based on the three analytical topics presented in this chapter:

1. The Strategic Planning framework

The Haitian government would benefit from revising the State Modernisation Programme 2018-2023 to improve its internal structure and coherence with other planning instruments such as the budget and the PSDH. This review could be used to:

- Facilitate the monitoring, and *a fortiori* the implementation, of the PME-2023, by:
  - Defining indicators to measure the "intermediate" goals of the PME-2023, which are *ultimately* those that will measure the results of the PME for citizens and stakeholders.
  - Supporting all the indicators of the PME-2023 with elements allowing for their proper interpretation, i.e. making it possible to understand whether this indicator has been achieved or not, who is responsible for this result and who is responsible for the collection of data related to its calculation. These elements include the baseline and reference values of the indicator and the final target values for defining its achievement, as well as the institution responsible for monitoring and meeting it, its calculation formula and the source of the underlying data.
- Strengthening and clarifying the articulation of the PME-2023 and the PSDH by:
  - Developing an explicit logical framework to ensure the articulation and coherence of these two documents, which could be presented as an annex to the PME-2023.
  - Including indicators with clear final target values in the PME-2023, as well as in the PSDH, which would also make it possible to clarify, for example in the form of a table, the articulation between these two instruments.
  - Specifying, in the introduction to the PME-2023, that one of the goals of this programme is to facilitate the implementation of the PSDH in its governance and public administration dimension.
- Make the PME-2023 operational by:
  - Implementing the departmental action plans presented at the final seminar of the PME-2023 operationalisation mission phase II held on 23 March 2021.
  - Ensuring that these action plans clarify how the budgetary programmes and investments defined by the government serve to achieve the goals of PME-2023 by defining clear deliverables and timelines.

2. The budget as a tool for implementing strategic goals

To better align the budget cycle with Haitian policy goals:

- The preparation of the medium-term budgetary framework can be strengthened by:

- macroeconomic and macro-budgetary forecasting prior to the elaboration of the budget, not during it,
- Capacity building of UEPs. Greater expertise in these entities would facilitate the preparation of sector strategic plans and annual and multi-year cost statements.

- The budget preparation phase can be improved by:
  - Distribution of budgetary items for managing bodies by sector,
  - Enable sufficient time for the managing bodies to prepare their spending proposals. The responsibility of these entities in the budget process facilitates the credibility of the budget and its performance in the short term.
  - Strengthened coordination and communication between MPCE and MEF to ensure consistency between operating and capital expenditures

However, the fundamental principles of public finance should not be forgotten, as they form the basis of a budgetary architecture capable of supporting multi-annual and programme-based budgeting. This means that it is essential to:

- Pursue the consolidation of a single treasury account to minimise the number of entities operating outside the budget process,
- Make the budget process more transparent, *by*:
  - A functional classification of expenditures incurred.
  - Coordination with donors to integrate their investment projects into financial reporting.
- Enabling Parliament to play a more effective role in approving and monitoring the budget. This is one of the goals of the PME-2023.

3. Monitoring and evaluation of public policies

The Haitian government would benefit from establishing a solid institutional framework for monitoring and evaluating public policies. To do so, it must:

- Adopt a clear and comprehensive definition, integrated into a formal framework, of monitoring and evaluation by:
  - Clearly distinguishing between monitoring and evaluation, which are complementary but distinct practices, in order to create a shared understanding of the challenges of these tools within the public sector. In particular, the definition of evaluation can include some key concepts such as the evaluation criteria (impact, effectiveness, efficiency, etc.), the type of public policies targeted (projects, programmes, plans, etc.) and the characteristics of the evaluation,
  - Clearly specifying the policies covered by these definitions,
  - Integrating these definitions into a formal framework, whether statutory or not.
- Clarifying and completing the whole-of-government institutional framework for monitoring and evaluating public policies by:
  - Enacting a law establishing a framework for implementing monitoring and evaluation across government to build political consensus, beyond electoral cycles, on the importance of evaluation to the country.
  - Defining global guidelines, in a statutory or regulatory framework for example, to clarify the role of players in the field of monitoring and evaluation, and give guidelines at the global

level concerning "by whom, when and how" the monitoring and evaluation of public policies should be done.

- Developing the evaluation function of the centre of government by giving a centre of government institution or the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation an explicit mandate to:
  - Require that evaluations be conducted by sectoral ministries,
  - Coordinate evaluations carried out by sectoral ministries, when they concern policies that cut across several ministries
  - And promote the use of evaluations at the strategic level.
- Streamlining and clarifying the institutional framework for monitoring to:
  - Clarify the mandates of the different players involved in monitoring and their articulation in the institutional framework for monitoring priority policies,
  - Identify the players involved, the methodology and the performance monitoring tools for each of the goals pursued in this task:
    - Operational decision making;
    - Accountability and
    - Transparency.
- Organise a single performance dialogue between the centre of government and sectoral ministries by:
  - Establishing a performance dialogue between the centre of government and sector ministries to monitor the implementation of the PME-2023 and the PSDH.
  - Introducing a performance dialogue to resolve implementation issues at the lowest possible decision level:
    - Conducting the performance dialogue on a quarterly basis at the sectoral level. Redirecting unresolved implementation issues after two quarters to the CoG twice a year,
    - Referring to the Council of Ministers any implementation issues requiring inter-ministerial coordination and mobilisation of additional resources.
  - Describing the terms of this performance dialogue in a methodological monitoring guide making it possible to:
    - Clarify the respective responsibilities of the different players in the performance dialogue along the monitoring value chain and
    - Distinguishing clearly in this dialogue between the steering coordination function - which is the responsibility of the centre of government - and the data collection, analysis and use function - which is the responsibility of the ministries and agencies and their sectoral committees.
  - Developing dashboards in a format that enables rapid and operational decision making.
- Communicating on the monitoring of priority policies in a transparent manner by:
  - Publishing easily understood summaries of the progress reports of the strategic documents and
  - Selecting key indicators on which to communicate and putting them online on a single internet platform.

References

Blazey, A. et al. (2021), “Budgeting in Thailand”, *OECD Journal on Budgeting*, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/819aebb7-en. [24]

Bureau de l’Évaluation des Politiques Publiques et de l’Analyse de l’Action Gouvernementale (2017), “Guide Méthodologique National d’Évaluation”. [36]

Choi, J. (2015), *How to integrate planning and budgeting ? Focusing on Korean experience*, https://www.slideshare.net/OECD-GOV/how-to-integrate-planning-and-budgeting-jaehyuk-choi-oecd-secretariat. [26]

Collaborative Africa Budget Reform Initiative (2008), *Putting aid on budget. Good practice note: Using country budget systems*, https://www.cabri-sbo.org/uploads/files/Documents/report_2008_cabri_transparency_and_accountability_use_of_country_systems_english_putting_aid_on_budget_-_good_practice_note_-_using_country_systems.pdf. [23]

Commission économique pour l’Amérique latine et les Caraïbes (2019), *Renforcement institutionnel de la Direction Générale du Budget (DGB) et modernisation de la gestion budgétaire en Haiti*. [19]

Downes, R., E. Gay and D. Kraan (2018), “Budgeting for a sustainable future Towards a roadmap of budgetary governance reform in Timor-Leste”, *OECD Journal on Budgeting*, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/budget-17-5j8mnzvd2rmn. [27]

Downes, R., D. Moretti and S. Nicol (2017), “Budgeting and performance in the European Union : A review by the OECD in the context of EU budget focused on results”, *OECD Journal on Budgeting*, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/budget-17-5jfnx7fj38r2. [21]

Downes, R., L. Von Trapp and S. Nicol (2017), *Gender budgeting in OECD countries*. [1]

Economist Intelligence Unit (2020), *Country Report*. [2]

Fonds Monétaire International (2020), *Request For Disbursement Under the Rapid Credit Facility*, International Monetary Fund, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2020/04/20/Haiti-Request-for-Disbursement-Under-the-Rapid-Credit-Facility-Press-Release-Staff-Report-49353. [20]

Fonds Monétaire International (2019), *Staff report for the 2019 Article IV consultation*, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2020/04/20/Haiti-2019-Article-IV-Consultation-Staff-Report-and-Statement-by-the-Executive-Director-for-49351. [18]

Gaarder, M. and B. Briceño (2010), “Institutionalisation of government evaluation: balancing trade-offs”, *Journal of Development Effectiveness*, Vol. 2/3, pp. 289-309, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19439342.2010.505027. [32]

Gouvernement de la République d’Haïti (2012), *Plan Stratégique de Développement d’Haïti: tome I*. [4]

Gouvernement d’Haiti (2016), *Décret organisant le Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération Externe*. [34]

Gouvernement d'Haïti (2020), *Rapport de mise en oeuvre du Plan Stratégique de Développement de Haiti pour les exercices 2017-2018 et 2018-2019*. [3]

Gouvernement d'Haïti (2018), *Programme de modernisation de l'Etat 2018-2023*, http://www.omrh.gouv.ht/Media/2-DocumentsStrategiques/fp/PME-2023_20190313_09h31.pdf. [12]

Gouvernement d'Haïti et Nations Unies (2017), *Cadre de développement durable 2017-2021*. [6]

Groupe de la Banque Mondiale (2016), *Better Spending, Better Services : : A Review of Public Finances in Haiti, Overview*, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/24690. [17]

Groupe de la Banque Mondiale (2016), *Manuel d'utilisation de la base de données BOOST d'Haïti*, http://isdatabank.info/haiti/Haiti_BOOST_Manuel.pdf. [22]

Groupe des Nations Unies pour le Développement Durable (2017), *Theory of change: UNDAF campanion guidance*, https://unsdg.un.org/resources/theory-change-undaf-companion-guidance (accessed on 20 March 2020). [11]

Journal Officiel de la République de Haiti (2015), *Décret du 9 Octobre fixant les règles fondamentales relatives à la nature, au contenu, à la procédure d'élaboration, de présentation et d'adoption, de la loi des finances*. [5]

Lafuente, M. and S. Gonzalez (2018), *Do delivery units deliver? Assessing Government Innovation*, http://www.iadb.org. [31]

Lázaro, B. (2015), *Comparative study on the institutionalisation of evaluation in Europe and Latin America*, Eurosocial Programme, Madrid, http://sia.eurosocial-ii.eu/files/docs/1456851768-E_15_ENfin.pdf (accessed on 9 July 2019). [38]

Ledermann, S. (2012), "Exploring the Necessary Conditions for Evaluation Use in Program Change", *American Journal of Evaluation*, Vol. 33/2, pp. 159-178, http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1098214011411573. [40]

Long, C. and B. Welham (2016), *Organiser une phase stratégique dans le processus budgétaire*, https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/11505.pdf. [13]

Máttar, J. and L. Cuervo (2017), "Planifcación para el desarrollo en América Latina y el Caribe", https://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/42139/10/S1700693_es.pdf (accessed on 17 February 2020). [7]

Ministerio de Planificación Nacional y Política Económica (2018), *Manual de Evaluación para Intervenciones Públicas*, https://documentos.mideplan.go.cr/share/s/6eepeLCESrKkft6Mf5SToA (accessed on 5 August 2019). [33]

Morachiello, E. and N. Lopke (2012), *Evaluation PEFA Haiti 2011*, https://www.pefa.org/node/1811. [16]

Nicol, S. and A. Park (2020), *SDG Budgeting in Romania: Linking Policy Planning and Budgeting to Support the Implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)*, https://www.oecd.org/gov/budgeting/oecd-review-of-sdg-budgeting-in-romania.pdf. [25]

OECD (2020), *Improving governance with policy evaluation*, https://doi.org/10.1787/89b1577d-en. [29]

OECD (2019), *Open Government in Biscay*, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/e4e1a40c-en. [28]

OECD (2018), *OECD Public Governance Reviews: Paraguay : Pursuing National Development through Integrated Public Governance*, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264301856-en. [30]

OECD (2018), *Toolkit for the preparation, implementation, monitoring, reporting and evaluation of public administration reform and sector strategies: guidance for SIGMA partners*, http://www.oecd.org/termsandconditions. (accessed on 18 June 2019). [9]

OECD (2017), *Systems Approaches to Public Sector Challenges : Working with Change*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264279865-en. [37]

OECD (2015), *Recommendation du Conseil sur la gouvernance budgétaire*, https://www.oecd.org/mena/governance/Recommandation-du-Conseil-sur-la-gouvernance-budg%C3%A9taire.pdf. [14]

OECD (2008), *Ireland: Towards an Integrated Public Service*. [41]

ONU (2015), *Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*, https://sdgs.un.org/2030agenda. [8]

Picciotto, R. (2013), "Evaluation Independence in Organizations", *Journal of MultiDisciplinary Evaluation*, Vol. 9/20, p. 15. [39]

République d'Haiti (2016), *Loi remplaçant le Décret du 16 février 2005 sur le processus d'Elaboration et d'Exécution des lois de finances*, http://www.sgcm.gouv.ht/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/LOI-REMPLACANT-LE-DECRET-DU-16-FEVRIER-2005-SUR-LE-PROCESSUS-DELABORATION-ET-DEXECUTION-DES-LOIS-DE-FINANCES.pdf. [15]

République du Bénin (2012), *Politique Nationale d'Evaluation 2012-2021*. [35]

Results for America (2017), *100+ Government Mechanisms to Advance the Use of Data and Evidence in Policymaking: A Landscape Review*. [42]

Schumann, A. (2016), *Using Outcome Indicators to Improve Policies: Methods, Design Strategies and Implementation, OECD Regional Development Working Papers,*. [10]

Notes

[1] A PEFA report was written in 2019 but is not public. The 2012 report is accordingly the latest available.

[2] A methodological guide for monitoring public investment is said to exist, according to the OECD questionnaire, but it has not been made public or shared with the OECD teams.

[3] The term centre of government refers to the administrative structure that serves the executive (i.e. the President or Prime Minister and the government as a whole). The centre of government is known by many different names in different countries: Secretariat General, Cabinet Secretariat, Chancellery, Office/Ministry of the Presidency, Cabinet Office, etc. In many countries, the centre of government is composed of several units with different functions. In almost all cases, it has a unit that serves the head of government exclusively, not the centre of government as a whole. There are also many names for this unit: Office of the Prime Minister, Secretariat of the Prime Minister, etc.

4 Multi-level governance in Haiti

This chapter provides an overview of the current political, administrative and financial situation of Haitian local governments and the main multi-level governance mechanisms in Haiti. The first section presents an overview of subnational capacities in the context of the country's decentralisation process, highlighting the existence of fiscal and public management challenges, while the second section focuses on multi-level coordination mechanisms. The chapter makes recommendations for implementation using a comprehensive and integrated approach. It takes the example of public water management policies to illustrate the problems of multi-level governance in Haiti.

Introduction: a country marked by strong regional inequalities

Haiti is a heterogeneous country in terms of development, whether from an economic, social or territorial perspective. The country is located on the western third of the island of Haiti, its territory being organised into ten departments, 42 districts, 146 municipalities,[1] 58 quartiers and 572 municipal sections. Decentralised administration is broken down into three levels of territorial authorities defined by the 1987 Constitution: departments, municipalities and municipal sections. The territorially deconcentrated administration is located at the department and district level. Under the current legal framework, only the central government and the municipalities have their own resources, which come from taxes.

As in most Latin American and Caribbean countries, there are significant inequalities between the capital and the rest of the country. The Port-au-Prince metropolitan area is home to 40% of the population, 70% of businesses, 90% of banking institutions, 50% of hospitals and over 30% of schools (Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération Externe, 2019[1]). The least populated department (Nippes) has only 342,000 inhabitants over 1,267 km^2 (Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération Externe, 2019[1]).

Urbanisation in Haiti is a relatively recent phenomenon. Whereas in 1950 only 10% of the population lived in urban areas, the urbanisation rate reached 57% in 2015 (Banque mondiale, 2018[2]). Between 1950 and 1980, the number of city dwellers grew four times faster than the rural population (Banque mondiale, 2018[2]). Between 2000 and 2015, Haiti's urban population grew faster than the average for Caribbean countries; its size doubled (Banque mondiale, 2018[2]). This unbridled urbanisation has blurred the traditional urban-rural divide, leading to the marginalisation of some urban areas. In the absence of human and financial resources to deal with it, the massive rural exodus of recent decades has generated an increase in precariousness and misery in the less well-off areas of the country's cities (Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération Externe, 2019[1]).

Income inequality is still the highest in the region, although improvements have been recorded in the cities (Banque mondiale, 2018[2]). The Gini coefficient remained constant, revealing persistent inequality, at about 0.6 between 2001 and 2012 (Banque mondiale, 2018[2]). Between 2002 and 2012, inequality decreased in urban areas (from 0.64 to 0.59), while it increased in rural areas (from 0.49 to 0.56) (Banque mondiale, 2018[2]). A study by the Inter-American Development Bank, using satellite imagery and mobile phone data, found wide regional inequalities in terms of poverty (Banque interaméricaine de développement, 2020[3]). The best performing municipalities are primarily located in the West, where Port-au-Prince lies, while the municipalities in the North-West have been experiencing an increasingly critical situation for the past five years. The study also reveals a high concentration of poverty, with one in four less fortunate Haitians living in just ten municipalities.

Decentralisation is a key element of the public sector reform that has been deployed to address these inequalities, as it involves the transfer of a range of powers, responsibilities and resources from central government to elected local authorities (OECD, 2019[4]). The term decentralisation generally covers three interconnected aspects: political, administrative and fiscal decentralisation. In practice, decentralisation policies are often difficult to categorise, as all these aspects (political, administrative and fiscal) are usually present simultaneously (OECD, 2020[5]). Decentralisation reforms can be motivated in various ways. In some countries, decentralisation can be seen as a reaction to previous strong centralisation or even authoritarianism, in order to promote and preserve democratic gains (Hooghe et al., 2016[6]). In others, it aims to improve the efficiency of public services and optimise the use of resources (OECD, 2020[5]). Decentralisation should also promote public governance that is more accountable and transparent, has greater integrity and involves greater participation by civil society. Deconcentration is another form of multi-level governance and should not be confused with decentralisation. Deconcentration is the delegation of authority to a lower level within the same administrative structure. In this sense, in most countries, the central government establishes regional offices for planning, control and coordination purposes and for the granting of permits and licences (OECD, 2020[5]). Deconcentrated levels of central government could coexist with regional or local administrations that are fiscally autonomous.

The Constitution of March 1987 establishes the Republic of Haiti as a decentralised unitary state and defines the main principles on the basis of which decentralisation and deconcentration policies can be formulated[2]. This decentralisation/deconcentration pairing was conceived as the foundation of the administrative process of the new state after the fall of the dictatorship. Its implementation is based on the creation of new structures and institutions, in particular the three levels of territorial authorities, structuring the new administrative, economic, social and political relations[3]. More than thirty years after the promulgation of the Constitution, the decentralisation and deconcentration policies described and announced have only been partially implemented, undermined by the lack of material resources and ambiguous legal framework. Nevertheless, decentralisation is still a clear strategic priority for the Government of Haiti as a tool for mitigating marginalisation and promoting democratisation (Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération Externe, 2019[1]). Two national strategic planning tools in Haiti are local in scope: the Strategic Development Plan for Haiti (*Plan Stratégique de Développement d'Haïti* - PSDH) and the State Modernisation Programme 2018-2023 (*Programme de Modernisation de l'État* - PME-2023). Two of the four PSDH projects particularly affect local authorities and their administration: the territorial reorganisation project and the institutional reorganisation project. Despite the important place given to local authorities in the State's strategic reform documents, actions have been slow to materialise. This means that local governance, decentralisation and deconcentration are areas of shared governance. It is accordingly necessary that a coherent institutional framework be put in place taking into account the transversal nature of the mission.

Despite the real opportunities offered by governance reforms at several levels, they also present challenges. The difficult situation of the Haitian state must accordingly be taken into account, as decentralisation policies carry particularly salient risks for fragile and polarised contexts (see Table 4.1).

Table 4.1 Risks related to decentralisation

Domain	Risks
Administrative and economic	● With a large number of small local governments, externality problems can intensify. To solve this problem, large-scale equalisation/transfer systems could be necessary, which could complicate the funding system. ● Economies of scale: if subnational governments are not able to cooperate with each other and are not allowed to outsource the production of services, inefficient service delivery could result. ● Overlapping responsibilities: if functions are not clearly assigned, duplication of services can generate administrative costs. ● Lack of capacity: adequate human and technical capacity is a precondition for successful decentralisation. Without sufficient capacity at the local level, decentralisation can be a risk, particularly in terms of equity. ● Destructive competition: competition between sub-national governments for taxpayers can lead to a "race to the bottom", which can have a negative effect on services. ● Macroeconomic stability: if the central government is weak, it may not be able to resist local bailout demands. ● Inequalities: without policy measures that build the capacity of poor regions, the benefits of decentralisation may only benefit the most developed and prosperous regions.
Policy	● Capture by local elites: particularly in low-income countries, local jurisdictions could be vulnerable to capture by local elites, who could then receive a disproportionate share of public goods spending. ● Takeover by central elites: sub-national governments, especially in fragile countries with weak democratic traditions, could be unable to resist pressure from a corrupt central government, for example if the transfer system is used to strengthen the position of ruling parties. ● Low political participation: political participation can be low especially if subnational governments lack real autonomy over spending and taxation. ● Lack of solidarity: unless major inequalities are addressed through a system of transfers and equalisation, decentralisation could increase accusations of favoritism. This could reduce consensus and agreement between regions, and ultimately increase political tensions at the local and national level. ● Risk of slow development and stagnation, if decentralisation results in more vetoes in important decisions.

Source: Table adapted from OECD (2019[4]) Making Decentralisation Work: A Handbook for Policy Makers, OECD Studies in Multilevel Governance, OECD Publishing, Paris.

To understand the persistence of these territorial inequalities and regional difficulties in Haiti, it is important to analyse the institutional framework and current capacities of the Haitian administration at the local level, its dynamics, as well as the political and administrative relations between the central government and the local authorities. In this regard, the first part of this chapter analyses the current political, administrative and financial situation of local governments in the context of the country's decentralisation process. The second part focuses on the main mechanisms of multi-level governance and territorial development. Throughout this chapter, the issue of water management will be used as an example where relevant.

Competences and resources of local authorities: between principles and realities

Decentralisation can have positive effects on countries that use it, ranging from more efficient allocation of resources to improved quality and efficiency of public services. Recent empirical studies also indicate that decentralisation can reduce regional inequalities by creating more effective regional development policies (OECD, 2019[4]). Nevertheless, decentralisation is not a panacea. The process can be difficult to implement because of its complex and systemic nature. This is highlighted in the policies for decentralisation of water management (see Box 4.1). Indeed, this way of organising relationships between levels of government has advantages, but also risks in terms of efficiency (public policy and service delivery), representation (political governance) and national unity (OECD, 2017[7]). Haiti's multi-level governance reforms reflect this ambivalence, oscillating between increased autonomy for local authorities and renewed central government control over local governance bodies. Some of the benefits of decentralisation and deconcentration policies are, however, particularly desirable in the Haitian context, where they reduce conflict by opening up new avenues of political participation to citizens (USAID, 2009[8]), address poverty and wide territorial inequalities and reduce the central budget by decentralising spending in a framework of severe fiscal constraints (OECD, 2017[7]).

Box 4.1 Why decentralise water management?

Decentralisation in the field of water and sanitation is justified by three arguments:

- Decentralisation in this area would increase the responsibility of local authorities and, in so doing, ensure a better match between government decisions and the demands of the people in the water and sanitation sector;
- The transfer of this competence to the local level could enable the population to play a more active part in the decision-making process, with the aim of strengthening democracy through decentralisation policies;
- Excessive standardisation and uniformity of norms in regimes based on so-called state management, to the benefit of subsidiarity and diversification of offers in regimes based on decentralisation.

However, there are limits to the sharing of responsibilities in the water sector:

- Faced with the complexity of water systems, local authorities often have difficulty understanding their role (lack of experience and resources);
- The failure of technical and administrative territorial services, which are not able to provide the support requested by the municipalities or which seek to slow down the transfer of competences to local governments;

- The lack of articulation between decentralisation policies in the water sector and sector reform projects, perhaps due to the weakness of the legal framework. Donor and NGO practices can add to the confusion between sectoral and territorial logics.

Source: Naulet, (2012[9])*Decentralisation and drinking water and sanitation services: what strategies to strengthen municipalities for access to services. Introduction,* Debates & Controversies Collection.

The division of powers between the different levels of government

A historically highly centralised country

There is no universal consensus on the ideal level of decentralisation or on the optimal multi-level governance structure (OECD, 2017[7]).The nature and scope of decentralisation and devolution approaches depend on the complex relationships between levels of government, which are themselves the product of historical, political and economic factors. Throughout its history, Haiti has been characterised by a strong dynamic of centralisation, both political and administrative, which intensified under the Duvalier dictatorship (Dorner, 1998[10]). Any analysis must accordingly take into account the fact that the Haitian decentralisation process is relatively recent, having begun only after the promulgation of the Constitution in 1987. Multi-level governance in Haiti is accordingly part of a historical framework marked by both authoritarianism and the strong centralisation of political, administrative and financial powers in Port-au-Prince, its capital (Fleur-Aime and Thomas, 2016[11]).

The French colonial state developed in Santo Domingo with a military-administrative bureaucracy designed to serve resource extraction and exploitation. This centralising and authoritarian model formed the basis of the model put in place by the political elites at the time of Haiti's independence in 1804, which aimed to maintain control over the system of extraction and production of goods for export (Sauveur, 2007[12]). Haiti adopted the territorial organisation of the French colonial state (departments, districts, municipalities replacing the colonial parishes), whose local entities struggled to emerge in the face of a strong and centralising executive power. In parallel to this permanent centripetal force during the 19th century, the weaknesses (Cadet, 2001[13]) of the State limited its capacity to "occupy, organise and control territorial space" (Dorner, 1998[10]) (Sauveur, 2007[12]). The American occupation that began in 1915 reinforced this centralisation dynamic, given the creation of an army combined with a restriction of the autonomy of local entities (Dorner, 1998[10]). Similarly, between 1957 and 1986, the Duvalier dictatorship's model of political domination was based on an ever greater concentration of systems of violence and control. Some local governance initiatives, such as the Rural Administration Councils (*Conseils d'administation des sections rurales* – CASER), were carried out, but they have primarily served to strengthen the influence of central government at the local level (Dorner, 1998[10]).

The first significant step towards political decentralisation took place with the fall of the dictatorship. The fall of the Duvalier regime in 1986 was accompanied by demands for profound changes on the part of citizens, characterised as a "demand for decentralisation" (Dorner, 1998[10]). This demand stems from the strong centralisation of power and the concentration of public services in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince, which is the product of two administrative deficiencies: the under-administration of the country in rural and provincial areas, and the "maladministration" within the administrative apparatus[4]. The Constitution of March 1987 was intended as a response to this demand for "de-marginalisation", by making the Republic of Haiti a decentralised unitary State and by defining the main principles on the basis of which a decentralisation policy and a deconcentration policy could be formulated. The goals of territorial governance are accordingly multiple: to ensure the presence of the State throughout the territory by means of a service administration, to promote development at both the local and national levels, and finally to break with exclusion by advocating participation and consultation.

The ambiguity of the legal framework reflects the limits of the consensus on the role of local authorities in Haiti

The conception of the Republic of Haiti as a decentralised unitary state is a major innovation of the 1987 Constitution (Cadet, 2001[13]). The main components are as follows:

- The creation of the statute of local authorities (Const. art.61);
- The accompaniment of decentralisation by the deconcentration of public services with delegation of power (Const. art. 87-4), and
- The development of principles of participation and consultation aimed at breaking with exclusion (Const. preambles 5-7; art. 81, 87-2, 87-3, 87-5, 217).

Article 61 of the Constitution recognises three territorial authorities: the department, the municipality and the municipal section (see Table 4.2). Each decentralised community has a deliberative structure (the assembly) and an implementation structure (the council). The councils are responsible for governing, managing and administering the local territories, and the assemblies for deliberating and controlling their activities.

Table 4.2 Organisation and legally established powers of local governments in Haiti

Decentralised local authorities	Legally defined organisations	Legally established powers
Department (Const. p. 76 to 87-5 175 -192, 217 & 218) Territory comprising several districts and municipalities	3 member **departmental** council Indirect elections **Departmental Assembly** Indirect elections **Interdepartmental Council** one (1) representative from each departmental assembly	**Political and administrative competencies** - Draft the department's development plan in collaboration with the central administration
Municipality (Const. Art. 66 to 74, 175 & 218) Territory comprising the city, districts and municipal sections	**City Council** 3 members elected by universal suffrage **Municipal Assembly** Each ASEC appoints a representative to form the municipal assembly (indirect election)	**Political and administrative competencies:** - Improve the living environment by providing basic social services - Ensure the safety and security of people and property - Promote and enforce human rights - Ensure good environmental management - Ensure socio-cultural cohesion through the organisation of socio-cultural and sports activities.
Municipal Section (Const. Art. 62 to 65; 218 and 249)	**Administrative Council of the Municipal Section (*Conseil d'administration de la section communale* - CASEC)** 3 members elected by universal suffrage **Municipal Section Assembly (*assemblée de la section communale* - ASEC)** elected by direct universal suffrage	**Political competences:** - Mobilise and motivate the population to defend their rights with municipal and state authorities. - Mobilise the population in the improvement of the living environment - Carrying out minor infrastructure works Community

Note: Internal background report by T. Cantave.
Source: Table adapted from the background report prepared by Tony Cantave for this project.

The Constitution establishes the existence of these three territorial authorities, but does not define the concept of territorial authority itself. For example, it grants the department the status of a legal person and administrative and financial autonomy to the municipality (Const. art. 66), but the municipal section is not governed by a precise legal framework. Many laws and decrees have tried to correct this deficiency, in

particular the law of 4 April 1996 on the organisation of the municipal section, as well as the decrees of February 2006 [5](often called "the local authorities charter") (See Box 4.2 on the responsibilities attributed to the local authorities in water management). Although the 2006 decrees contain considerable institutional innovations, they have not been ratified by Parliament and their implementation is only partial (Paul and Charleston, 2015[14]). This lack of clarity regarding the legal framework for local government is illustrated by the fact that several draft laws on decentralisation are currently in circulation; two bills have been proposed, one by the Chamber of Deputies and the other by the Senate, but have not been voted on or validated; and two presidential commissions on decentralisation have been set up since 2009, whose reports have not been subject to follow up[6].

Box 4.2 Legal responsibilities of local authorities in public water management

The 2006 Decrees on Decentralisation give local authorities a number of rights and responsibilities in water management:

- The mission of the municipal section is to be the first level of decision-making and management of natural resources;
- The municipality coordinates strategic planning for its sections and has primary responsibility for land use planning and surface water resource protection, and
- Finally, the department coordinates the strategic planning of its municipalities and contributes to governance at the national level.

The orders list the responsibilities assigned to each level of governance, but do not specify how to coordinate the different activities and levels of governance.

In January 2009, the Haitian Parliament approved the new framework law for the drinking water and sanitation sector (*Eau potable et assainissement* - EPA). This framework law created, under the supervision of the Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Communications, the National Directorate of Drinking Water and Sanitation (*Direction nationale de l'eau potable et de l'assainissement* - DINEPA), which is responsible for managing drinking water in Haiti. Four regional drinking water and sanitation boards (*Offices régionaux de l'eau potable et de l'assainissement* - OREPA) were also created. The framework law nevertheless aims to decentralise drinking water services, and specifies that in the "medium and long term", municipalities will manage all drinking water and sanitation systems.

Sources: Stoa, R. (2014[15]) "Subsidiarity in principle: Decentralisation of Water Resources Management", Utrecht Law Review; Martinez, A. (2019[16]) Protecting Sources of Urban Water Supply in Haiti: An Institutional Analysis", Journal of Water, Sanitation and Hygiene for Development, vol. 9/2, pp. 237-246.

The legal construction of decentralisation is pulled by centrifugal forces, which hinder the implementation of an effective decentralisation policy. Indeed, the Constitution seems to favour the autonomy and free administration of local authorities, by assigning to the Higher Court of Auditors and Administrative Disputes (*Cour supérieure des comptes et du contentieux administratif* - CSCCA) the responsibility of administrative and financial control of these institutions. The legal texts that followed, aimed at completing the constitutional framework, also granted administrative autonomy to the local authorities, but tended to place this local power under the control of the central State (Cadet, 2001[17]): on the one hand, by attributing to the Ministry of the Interior and Local Government (*Ministère de l'Intérieur et des collectivités Territoriales* - MICT) a "supervisory control over local authorities" through the Directorate of Local Government, and on the other, by attributing to the delegations and vice-delegations a supervisory role over municipalities

(Cadet, 2001[17]). In particular, the 1987 Constitution reinstated the delegation at the departmental level and created a vice-delegation at the district (*arrondissement)* level, with powers limited to "the coordination and control of public services" (Const. art. 86). However, the Decree of 17 May 1990 entrusted these deconcentrated structures with control over the people and acts of community bodies. There thus seems to be a certain tension between the constitutional framework, which advocates for an ambitious decentralisation policy characterised by strong autonomy for local authorities, and the subsequent texts framing decentralisation.

Table 4.3 Deconcentrated administration in Haiti

Territory	Deconcentrated administrative structure
Department	**Delegation** Constitution, Art. 85-86 Decree of 17 May 1990 Coordination and control of government action
District (*arrondissement*)	**Vice-delegation** Constitution, Art. 85-86 Decree of 17 May 1990 - Coordination and control of government action - Provision of technical assistance

Source: Table adapted from the background report prepared by Tony Cantave for this project.

The responsibilities of local and regional authorities should be clarified

A clear division of powers between central and local government is essential for governments to meet their commitments and be accountable to their citizens (OECD, 2019[4]). Consensus on the responsibilities of each level of government is all the more desirable in the case of functions for which responsibility is shared between several levels of government, such as education, health or social protection. The lack of a clear division of powers between local and regional authorities contributes to inefficient administration and perpetuates inequalities in the provision of public services, as well as difficulties in meeting infrastructure needs (OECD, 2019[4]).

Governance in Haiti is weakened by a dissonance between the distribution of competences at the legal and empirical levels. This contrast is apparent in water management (see Box 4.3). More than three decades after the promulgation of the 1987 Constitution prescribing a decentralised state, institutional and administrative reforms have been only partially achieved. The 2018-2023 State Modernisation Programme (PME-2023) highlights a number of elements that hinder the articulation and coordination of public intervention: in particular, the weakness of the legal framework governing local authorities and creating confusion, the difficulty of applying the legal framework, the lack of coherence in the division of local authorities, the insufficient harmonisation of the texts relating to the competences of local entities, as well as conflicts of competences in certain areas between the various local authorities, on the one hand, and central government, on the other (Office de Management et des Ressources Humaines, 2018[18]). The goal of PME-2023 is to address these challenges in order to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of public interventions, while facilitating the active participation of civil society.

Box 4.3 Public water management in practice: the preponderance of central power

Although the 2009 framework law aimed to transfer water management to municipalities in the medium and long term, it is clear that local authorities are not taking on this role more than a decade later. Institutions at the central level are generally considered responsible for this sector (in particular the Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development, and the Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Communications).

The legal instruments that transfer water management competencies to local authorities do not develop a strategy for water management, nor do they provide local authorities with the financial or human resources necessary to perform a successful and sustainable decentralisation strategy.

Although many environmental, social, economic and political factors prevent effective water resources management in Haiti, the dissonance between legislative goals and the mechanisms to support them relegates the principle of subsidiarity to a theoretical ambition.

Sources: Stoa, R. (2014[15]) "Subsidiarity in principle: Decentralisation of Water Resources Management", Utrecht Law Review; Martinez, A. (2019[16])"Protecting Sources of Urban Water Supply in Haiti: An Institutional Analysis", Journal of Water, Sanitation and Hygiene for Development, vol. 9/2, pp. 237-246.

The absence of a framework law weakens the implementation of effective decentralisation in Haiti. This is evidenced by the fact that many of the territorial institutions provided for in the Constitution have only been partially established (Table 4.4). At the departmental level, neither the council nor the assembly is functional, and the interdepartmental council still does not exist. The municipal assemblies on which these structures should depend do not exist either, as the indirect elections necessary for their creation have never taken place. Municipal councilsare functional, but the lack of elections is hindering their functioning. Indeed, in the absence of municipal elections in 2019, President Moïse appointed by orders published on 3 July 2020, in *Le Moniteur spécial* N°14, new "municipal commissions" in 141 municipalities of the country (Vixamar, 2021[19]). This mechanism had also been used in 2013 in the absence of elections, under the name of "interim executive officers" (OFPRA, 2015[20]). Finally, at the municipal section level, municipal section councils and municipal section assemblies are functional. The interdependence between the organisation of complex elections (direct, indirect and multi-level) and the proper implementation of constitutional provisions on decentralisation is a challenge; the organisation of elections in a polarised and post-conflict framework is indeed frequently a source of violence (Brancati and Snyder, 2011[21]). The Review aims to analyse multi-level governance and decentralisation strategically from the perspective of the national government. Accordingly, a technical assessment of institutional arrangements within departments and municipalities, as well as reflections on the number of levels of government and the bodies provided for at each level, fall outside the scope of this Review.

Table 4.4 Establishment of the decentralised territorial institutions provided for in the Constitution

Haitian local authorities	Legally defined territorial institutions	Level of functionality
Department	General Council	Non-functional (indirect elections not having taken place)
	Departmental Assembly	Non-functional (indirect elections not having taken place)
	Interdepartmental Council	Non-functional
Municipality	municipal council	Functional (last elected in 2017, "city commissions" in place, appointed by statute).
	Municipal Assembly	Not functional (indirect elections never held)
Municipal section	Administrative Council of the Municipal Section (CASEC)	Functional (last elected in 2017)
	Municipal Section Assembly (ASEC)	Functional (last elected in 2017)

Note: Internal background report by T. Cantave.
Source: Table adapted from the background report prepared by Tony Cantave for this project.

There are overlaps and dysfunctions in the exercise of local government responsibilities. Since the departmental bodies are not functional, the political and administrative competencies assigned to them (e.g., preparation of the departmental development plan) are not exercised. Municipalities, although functional, have a large number of political, administrative and operational competencies that they struggle to assume due to financial and human resource constraints. The competences of the municipal sections remain unclear, and are primarily responsibilities in terms of support (CNRA, 2002[22]). In addition, there are overlaps and duplications in the definition of competences between the municipal sections and the municipalities (CNRA, 2002[22]). This dynamic was also confirmed by stakeholders during the interviews conducted by the OECD, who pointed out a lack of harmonisation of texts on the competences of local entities (shared competences, complementary actions).

Conflicts of competence between local authorities are amplified by the pitfalls of the current territorial division. The boundaries of all territorial divisions, although sometimes known on the ground, are very poorly defined from a legal perspective. Nevertheless, the Technical Secretariat of the Interministerial Committee on Land Management (*Secrétariat Technique du Comité Interministériel de l'Aménagement du Territoire*) is currently carrying out a nationwide demarcation exercise to resolve these contradictions. This situation has led to numerous conflicts between officials of neighbouring territorial entities, land issues and difficulties in managing territorial issues at the central level[7]. In addition, administrative territorial divisions do not systematically (or frequently) reflect functional territorial areas[8]. For example, there are significant differences in terms of population and area of the territories, so that some local authorities could have a larger area and population than higher-level territories: for example, some 60 municipal sections have an area of over 100 km^2, while some 40 municipalities have a smaller area. At the departmental level, the differences are also very significant, with the smallest department (Nippes) covering 1,267 km^2 for 342,000 inhabitants, and the largest (West) 5,000 km^2 for 4,000,000 inhabitants[9]. While there is no standard size for local administrative divisions, the OECD suggests that traditional administrative boundaries correspond to the places where people actually live, work and meet (OECD, 2017[7]). A coherent goal could be to define local administrative divisions according to social and economic functional areas.

The effective exercise of their responsibilities by local authorities is difficult to envisage without a clarification of their attributions (see Box 4.4) and a significant strengthening of their capacities. The provision of models of administrative structures and management tools adapted to the needs of local authorities, the training of elected officials and personnel, the development of procedures and the

strengthening of financial management are accordingly essential for the proper functioning of decentralised institutions.

Box 4.4 Clarifying responsibilities between levels of government: the OECD criteria

In 2019, the OECD published *Making Decentralisation Work: a Handbook for Policy Makers*[10], which provides an overview of current trends in decentralisation, including the design and implementation of decentralisation reforms. The report identifies ten guidelines for making decentralisation work and promoting regional and local development. **One of these guidelines is the clarification of the responsibilities of the different levels of government, in order to help decentralisation take hold and function properly.**

There are eight essential criteria that a government can use to ensure that the responsibilities of different levels of government are clear:

- a clear delimitation of the hierarchy of legislative acts: a Constitution, national legislation and decrees and agreements;
- a division of powers in shared functions, e.g. who sets policy? Who sets the standards? Who is responsible for monitoring? Who is responsible for funding, etc.
- the establishment of institutional mechanisms for shared functions and sub-functions, such as consultation, burden sharing and conflict resolution mechanisms;
- decentralisation of sub-functions within each function;
- empowering sub-national governments to adopt integrated approaches to local economic development;
- a separation of decision-making for capital and operating expenditures;
- the authority to hire, fire and set the terms of reference and day-to-day management/supervision of its own employees, and
- the separation of decision-making between the different levels on planning, policy and finance.

Source: OECD (2019[4]) - Making Decentralisation Work: A Handbook for Policy Makers, OECD Studies in Multilevel Governance, OECD Publishing, Paris.

The municipal fiscal framework increases regional inequalities and hinders local autonomy

How public services and goods are financed, and how funds are allocated between different levels of government, are key elements of effective multi-level governance. However, tax reforms are difficult to design and implement, so they tend to be the "weak link" in multilevel governance reforms (OECD, 2017[7]). In order to fulfil their responsibilities, local and regional authorities in Haiti need adequate financial resources. Low local revenues, the legal framework defining local governments and their functions, and an inadequate framework of central grants and transfers make it difficult for local authorities to fulfil the role envisaged by the legal framework. In order to correct this state of affairs, three approaches can be envisaged: increasing tax revenues for greater autonomy, *earmarked* transfers[11], or *non-earmarked* or *general* transfers[12]. Striking the right balance between these three mechanisms can enable local authorities to fulfil their mandates.

Empowering local governments for successful decentralisation

Local governments function best when residents finance the local services they access through local taxes and fees (Blöchliger and Charbit, 2008[23]). Consistency between local revenue mobilisation and expenditure promotes accountability and responsiveness to local needs, particularly when the majority of revenue is own-source or co-mingled tax revenue (OECD, 2019[4]).

In Haiti, only the municipalities have financial autonomy by right and receive their own resources from taxes. In accordance with the Decree of 15 January 1988, the General Directorate of Taxes (*Direction Générale des Impôts*- DGI) of the Ministry of the Economy and Finance collects on behalf of the municipality the following taxes:

- Property tax on built-up properties (dating from the law of 5 April 1979)
- Commercial and professional licence (dating from the Decree of 28 September 1987)
- Fence alignment costs
- House numbering tax
- Gaming tax
- Building Permits
- Right of burial in cemeteries
- Tax on materials and goods on the public highway

Although the law of 15 January 1988 mentions about ten taxes, the vast majority of municipal revenue comes from the property tax on built-up areas (*contribution foncière des propriétés bâties* - CFPB) and commercial and professional taxes. Indeed, according to a 2018 World Bank report, property and patent taxes accounted for 98.1% of total collections (62.5% for property tax and 35.6% for authorisations to exercise a non-salaried activity, or *patente* in French) in 2013 (Banque mondiale, 2018[2]). Interviews with stakeholders also revealed that these revenues are quite secure and predictable, unlike the resources received from central government grants and technical and financial partners.

Taxes collected are largely insufficient to meet the needs of the majority of municipalities, and are primarily concentrated in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince. With the exception of this metropolitan area, state subsidies (intergovernmental transfers) account for between 80 and 95% municipality revenues (Banque mondiale, 2018[2]). This discrepancy between the metropolitan area and the rest of the country can be explained in part by the fact that the patente and the CFPB favour, by definition, the most urbanised areas. Municipalities also have real difficulties in mobilising these revenues, either because the tax rate is perceived as too high for the citizen in relation to his or her income, or because of the low level of service provided. Awareness campaigns or actions to clarify the link between these taxes and the improvement of services perceived by the population would accordingly be necessary. Indeed, resource mobilisation in Haiti is part of a specific historical narrative in which the state is trying to facilitate the transition from a perceived predatory state to a service provider state. In addition, initiatives such as a building census to obtain a better estimate of the tax base could also help municipalities improve their ability to collect these taxes. A survey of built properties conducted by the Ministry of the Interior and local government (MICT) in 2015 identified 20 municipalities that have the potential to increase their CFPB-derived revenues in the short term (Banque mondiale, 2018[2])[13]. Box 4.5 presents the case of fiscal decentralisation in Sweden, where the rate of municipal fiscal autonomy is among the highest in the OECD.

The lack of intergovernmental coordination also weakens municipalities' financial autonomy. Local revenues collected by the DGI are first deposited in the Public Treasury's account at the Central Bank, which is the Bank of the Republic of Haiti (BRH), before being transferred to the accounts of the municipalities with the agreement of the Treasury Department (Banque mondiale, 2018[2]). This system sometimes leads to significant delays in transfers, and also creates difficulties in obtaining visibility of available resources. In order to remedy this type of problem, the USAID Lokal+ project in the municipalities

of Saint-Marc and Carrefour, for example, had created a computer system linked to the DGI allowing for better visibility of the resources available to these municipalities. An expansion of this type of programme would benefit all municipalities.

The increased autonomy of municipalities comes with two main risks: inequalities in service delivery and lack of accountability in the absence of a framework for transparency. To address the risk of inequality, regulations such as minimum service standards can be created by the central government, while leaving the design and implementation of public service responsibilities to local authorities (OECD, 2019[4]). A strong framework of fiscal transparency is also essential to fostering local accountability (OECD, 2019[4]).

With regard to the measures taken to improve the financial autonomy of the municipalities, the MICT and the Commission for the Reform of Public Finance and Economic Governance (CRPP-GE) reported the following, in particular[14]

- The recruitment, training and deployment of territorial financial controllers (CFT) in the districts, for technical support in public finance and accounting, and
- Support for municipalities in terms of good financial governance (budget, administrative account, budget performance and control tools).

Box 4.5 Local government funding in Sweden: significant financial autonomy

Sweden's multi-level governance framework is characterised by asymmetric decentralisation. Indeed, Sweden is one of the most decentralised countries in the world in terms of service provision and spending: about 25% of the country's GDP is spent by sub-national governments, and sub-national governments have autonomy over spending, taxation and decision making. In Sweden, almost all redistribution tasks have been transferred from central government to counties and municipalities.

This enables an overall coordination capacity, appropriate incentives and fiscal equalisation, which are essential criteria for the success of the decentralisation policy, and which allow for equitable welfare throughout the country.

Income tax revenues, intergovernmental grants and fees are the main sources of revenue for Swedish municipalities and counties. Tax revenues account for more than 50% of sub-national revenues, a much higher share than in most EU or OECD countries, where the average share is 44%. This sub-national funding system is primarily based on own resources, and the system provides a solid funding base for all sub-national governments, while allowing autonomy in decision-making at the local level. This blended funding programme also uses a "Robin Hood" component (central government taxes wealthier jurisdictions and transfers these funds to poorer jurisdictions through vertical equalisation). Sweden also uses a mechanism of grants to local authorities based on specific criteria. In addition to a transfer system based primarily on general grants, some discretionary grants are used. The so-called "structural" subsidies are linked to regional policy and are intended to strengthen the income of municipalities with minor populations, declining populations and/or difficult labour markets. The structural grants primarily benefit municipalities in the most remote areas, for example in Norrland County.

Source: OECD (2017[24]), Sweden 2017: Monitoring Progress in Multi-Level Governance and Rural Policy, OECD Territorial Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris.

The majority of municipalities depend on transfers and subsidies from the central state

The alignment of responsibilities and revenue is a concern in most OECD countries. Indeed, in the majority of cases, subnational expenditures are significantly higher than subnational tax revenues, indicating a budgetary gap that is filled by other revenue sources, such as transfers (OECD, 2019[4]). In almost all OECD countries, expenditure is more decentralised than revenue, partly because governments at the central level need more resources than direct expenditure to ensure equity and balanced development. This dynamic generates a vertical tax gap, which states address through conditional or[15] unconditional transfers[16].

Faced with the struggle of the majority of municipalities to generate sufficient local revenues, local authorities are required to ensure their functioning through grants and transfers (Banque mondiale, 2018[2]). The legal framework governing these transfers includes the framework Decree on Decentralisation of 1 February 2006, the Act of 20 August 1996 on contributions to the Local Government Management and Development Fund, and the Act of 28 May 1996 on fiscal transfers to municipalities. This means that despite financial autonomy at the legal level, the majority of municipalities depend on transfers from the central state, which itself has budgetary difficulties. The Local Government Management and Development Fund (*Fonds de gestion et de développement des collectivités territoriale* - FGDCT), created in 1996, is the main source of access for local governments to the financial resources necessary for their development. The fund is financed by allocations and grants from central government, taxes on air travel, gambling, telephone calls, cigarettes, etc. Although the Interdepartmental Council is required by law to distribute these funds, the Ministry of the Interior and Local Government currently assumes this responsibility. Public grants from this fund can take two forms (Cadet, 2001[13])

- the allocation of the operating budget, or
- budget allocation for equipment and development.

These transfers are neither linked to improved performance in any of the service delivery areas, nor are they entirely needs-based, but are essentially based on the status of the municipalities (Banque mondiale, 2018[2]). However, the municipalities with the capacity to effectively enjoy the status of financial autonomy (autonomous municipalities in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince, Carrefour, Pétion-Ville and Delmas) do not receive operating costs from the central State (CNRA, 2002[22]). The operating grants are then staggered according to the status of the municipalities: departmental capitals, district capitals and other municipalities (CNRA, 2002[22]).

This transfer system suffers from a lack of transparency and reliability. Indeed, according to a World Bank report, the monitoring of transfers made to the municipalities is very limited. Cash transfers to the local authorities are made on a monthly basis, and primarily cover the running costs of the local authorities, with a minority of funds going to investment projects (Banque mondiale, 2018[2]).

Local authorities can also obtain resources from municipal funds (also called local development and land use funds) managed by the Minstry of Planning and External Cooperation, as well as from technical and financial partners and NGOs. In addition to these formalised mechanisms, interviews conducted by the OECD for this project also revealed that line ministries regularly fund local governments on sectoral projects. As in Haiti, in order to correct regional inequalities and enable local authorities to fulfil their legal mandates, OECD countries frequently resort to transfers between levels of government. These transfers can be of two types: earmarked or non-earmarked/general. Am earmarked transfer is granted on the condition that it is used only for a specific purpose. Non-earmarked transfers can be spent as if they were the recipient local authority's own tax revenues. Governments use these transfers to achieve three main goals (Bergvall et al., 2006[25]) :

- Fund services at the local level: enabling local authorities to finance a range of basic services; providing (new) services imposed by central government or achieving standards imposed by central government.

- Subsidise services that have spillover effects on other jurisdictions: some public services have spillover effects (or externalities) on neighbouring jurisdictions, e.g., pollution control (water or air), interregional highways, first aid services (which can be used by neighbouring regions), etc. Local governments tend to under-invest in these services and infrastructure projects. Accordingly, the central government must provide incentives or financial resources to address these under-supply issues.
- Equalisation, which aims to enable local authorities to provide similar services for roughly the same tax effort, thus reducing inequalities between regions.

In practice, intergovernmental transfers often have several simultaneous goals, which can easily lead to inefficiencies or ineffectiveness (Bergvall et al., 2006[25]). It is accordingly important to clearly identify the goals of the transfers at the design stage, so that the characteristics of the transfer that contribute to each of these goals can be monitored and controlled independently (see Table 4.5).

Table 4.5 Which intergovernmental transfers for which goals?

Goal	Recommended transfer type
Funding of services	Non-earmarked transfer
Subsidise services that have an impact on other jurisdictions	Earmarked Matching Transfer: Matching grants are contingent on normative or actual expenditures for the services to which the grants are allocated, or on the collection of local revenues related to those services).
Equalisation	Non-earmarked vertical or horizontal transfer

Source: Bergval et al. (2006[25])"Intergovernmental transfers and decentralised public spending", OECD Journal on Budgeting, vol. 5.

Equalisation can take the form of vertical transfers (from central to local governments) or horizontal transfers (from better-off to poorer local authorities). Across the OECD, equalisation transfers average about 2.5% of gross domestic product (GDP) and 5% of public expenditure and have a strong redistributive impact (Blöchliger and Charbit, 2008[23]). Box 4.6 provides some information on the experience of OECD countries in developing central government equalisation mechanisms to reduce regional inequalities and encourage local development.

Box 4.6 Overview of Equalisation Systems in OECD Countries

In OECD countries, Equalisation has a strong redistributive effect: on average, it reduces inequalities by more than two-thirds and in some countries - such as Australia, Germany and Sweden - income inequalities are virtually eliminated. Fiscal equalisation depends on a range of institutional factors such as the size and number of sub-national governments, their distribution, the allocation of expenditures and the fiscal resources allocated to each jurisdiction, in particular. Whereas equalisation is now recognised as a necessity in a growing number of countries (it even has constitutional status in some countries such as Canada, Germany, Italy, Spain and France), it is often technically and politically debated and contested. This is particularly true for horizontal equalisation, which limits local autonomy. The rules and criteria are constantly being adapted. The debates have taken on greater importance with the crisis and the worsening of territorial inequalities.

Focus on the transfer system in France

In France, the global operating grant (*dotation globale de fonctionnement* - DGF) is by far the main operating grant from the State to local authorities. The reform of the budgetary architecture carried out within the context of the 2004 Finance Act led to a doubling of its volume. It is the linchpin of financial relations between the State and local authorities. In 2014, it amounted to €40.1 billion. In total, it comprises 12 allocations (4 for municipalities, 2 for public establishments of inter-municipal cooperation (*établissements publics de coopération intercommunale* - EPCI), 4 for departments and 2 for regions) which are themselves broken down into several parts or fractions.

For each category of local authorities, it can be divided into two parts: the flat-rate part, which corresponds to a common core received by all beneficiary local authorities, and the equalisation part, whose components are paid to the most disadvantaged local authorities. In the context of the DGF of municipalities and EPCIs, this second component corresponds to the development grant, which is itself composed of four fractions: the inter-municipal grant, the urban solidarity and social cohesion grant (*dotation de solidarité urbaine et de cohésion sociale* - DSU), the rural solidarity grant (*dotation de solidarité rurale* - DSR) and the national equalisation grant (*dotation nationale de péréquation* -DNP). In addition to the flat-rate allowance, the departments receive compensation allowances, urban equalisation allowances (*dotation de péréquation urbaine* - DPU) and minimum operating allowances (*dotation de fonctionnement minimale* - DFM). The DGF of the regions is composed, more simply, of a lump-sum allocation and an equalisation allocation.

A closer look at Equalisation in Canada

Canada uses vertical revenue equalisation, which means that the federal government is fully responsible for equalisation payments. The principle of Equalisation is enshrined in the Canadian Constitution: "Parliament and the Government of Canada are committed to the principle of equalisation to ensure that provincial governments have sufficient revenues to provide public services at reasonably comparable levels of taxation" (section 36(2) of the Constitution). Before any adjustments are made, a province's per capita Equalisation entitlement is equal to the difference between its fiscal capacity and the average fiscal capacity of all provinces, the so-called "10-province standard. The goal is to allocate funds to the less prosperous provincial governments so that the provinces are on an equal footing. In the 2018-2019 year, the federal government made nearly USD 19 billion in such payments.

Source: Blöchliger and Charbit (2008[23]) "Fiscal Equalisation", *OECD Journal: Economic Studies*, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/eco_studies-v2008-art8-en; Local Government (2018), Dotation globale de fonctionnement, https://www.collectivites-locales.gouv.fr/dotation-globale-fonctionnement-dgf (Collectivités locales, 2018[26]); OECD, Powerpoint "Decentralisation, Provincial Fiscal Autonomy and Equalisation in Canada" http://www.oecd.org/berlin/40995205.pdf; (OECD, 2008[27])Roy-César "Canada's Equalisation Formula" (2013) (Roy-César, 2013[28]).

Good human resource management in local authorities is essential for effective decentralisation

One of the main multi-level governance challenges facing the Republic of Haiti, and identified in several interviews with government officials as the main obstacle to effective decentralisation, is the lack of administrative competences and capacity at the sub-national level (see Chapter 5). The Decree of 1 February 2006 on the territorial public service, which aims to institutionalise the latter on the same footing as the central public service, in particular by establishing a permanent cadre of jobs, a Higher Council of the Territorial Public service (*Conseil supérieur de la fonction publique territoriale* - CSFPT), the National Institute of Territorial Administration (*l'Institut national de l'administration territoriale* - INAT) and Regional Management Centres of the Territorial Public service (*Centres de gestion régionaux de la fonction publique territoriale* - CGR/FPT), has never been implemented. The State Modernisation Programme 2018-2023

(PME-2023) stresses, in particular, that the lack of a territorial public service is a handicap to the proper functioning of local authorities and the sustainability of their actions (Office de Management et des Ressources Humaines, 2018[18]). Community employees are paid less than their central government counterparts, who are themselves paid very little compared to their peers in international organisations. The priority goal of the PME-2023 is accordingly to "strengthen the administrative, technical and operational capacities of local authorities to improve local governance" (Office de Management et des Ressources Humaines, 2018[18]).

In Haiti, unlike other countries engaged in a decentralisation process, operational local governments, which have personnel, function with human resources that are not part of a public service. This means that local government employees are not considered officials. This situation of job insecurity in a framework of severe financial constraints can be a factor favouring favouritism and nepotism to the detriment of merit and competence and increasing the risk of embezzlement and corruption. The lack of a stable and permanent territorial public service also creates challenges in terms of high turnover of interlocutors for users, loss of competences and lack of institutional memory due to the absence of a local information system.

It is difficult to envisage local authorities effectively exercising their responsibilities without significant capacity building. The provision of models of administrative structures and management tools adapted to the needs of local authorities, the training of elected officials and personnel, the development of procedures and the strengthening of financial management are accordingly essential for the proper functioning of decentralised institutions.

Creation of a strategic framework for multi-level governance in Haiti

Strengthen vertical coordination mechanisms

For effective multi-level governance, a dense network of political and technocratic interactions at all levels of government is required. This requires the development of formal rules, as well as informal, vertical and horizontal processes of consultation, coordination, cooperation and joint decision-making (OECD, 2019[4]). Interactions in these forums can be cooperative and consultative, and in some cases coercive, depending on the power relations between different levels of government in a country (OECD, 2019[4]). Multi-level governance involves managing the interdependence between levels of government through governance tools such as dialogue platforms, partnerships/contracts between levels of government, co-funding, etc.

Central coordination of players involved in local government management

A series of state institutions at the central level are directly and indirectly involved in the management of local authorities in Haiti. The institutional landscape in this area is fragmented, marked by the centrifugal forces that characterise the legal framework of local authorities (see section 2.1). Strengthening the coordination of government action at the territorial level is accordingly one of the goals of Pillar 2, Axis 5, of the PME-2023. The main players at the central level involved in the management of local authorities are the following:

- The Decree of 17 May 1990 entrusts the **Ministry of the Interior and Local Authorities (MICT)** with the supervision of local authorities, under the control of its Directorate of Local Governments (*Direction des Collectivités Territoriales* - DCT). Within the central administration, the MICT steers the policy of decentralisation, deconcentration and local development.
    - The DCT is accordingly responsible for the technical and administrative strengthening of local authorities, the preparation of local budgets and local taxation.

  - The Delegation and Vice-Delegation Coordination Unit (*Unité de coordination des délégations et vice-délégations* - UCDVD) strengthens the delegations and vice-delegations, coordinates their activities, liaises with headquarters and facilitates their operation.
  - The MICT also has under its control the two deconcentrated organs of the Haitian public administration: the delegates appointed in each departmental capital and the vice-delegates appointed in each district (*arrondissement*) capital (Const. Art 85). This local structure represents the executive power at the local level, ensures the stability of the institutions and exercises the State's supervision over the local authorities (Decree of 17 May 1990; art. 6).
- **The Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation (MPCE)** is responsible for the country's planning systems to optimise resources and achieve Haiti's development goals. The Decree of 2 February 2016 organising the MPCE assigns key responsibilities for coordination with local governments to the departments:
  - Coordinate the development and implementation of the national spatial planning scheme;
  - Support the development and implementation of local development strategies and local and regional development plans, and
  - Support local authorities in their development planning activities and provide technical support for this purpose.
- The Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) is responsible for formulating and implementing the State's economic and financial policy. **At the local level, the MEF** is responsible for "exercising financial control over local authorities". In addition to its general management, MEF has several directorates that maintain relations with the local authorities:
  - Treasury Board;
  - The General Taxation Directorate (DGI);
  - General Administration of Customs (*Administration générale des douanes* - AGD);
  - The Inspectorate General for Finance (*Inspection générale des finances* - IGF), and
  - The Economic and Social Assistance Fund (*Fonds d'assistance économique et sociale* - FAES
- **The Higher Court of Audit and Administrative Litigation (CSCCA)** is responsible for "auditing the accounts of the various public bodies making up the central administration and the decentralised administrations of the State" (Decree of 23 November 2005, art. 5); "certifying the general accounts of the nation, including the accounts of the central administration and those of the local authorities" (Decree of 23 November 2005, art. 5). As regards administrative litigation, the CSCCA arbitrates disputes between "the State and local authorities, the administration and public officials, public services and citizens" (Const. art. 200-1).

In this context of institutional complexity and plurality, the responsibilities of central institutions are not clearly defined and actions are poorly coordinated, leading to conflicts of competence that are detrimental to local authorities. This fragmentation is particularly visible in the field of water management (see Box 4.7). Of particular note:

- The powers relating to the financial control of local authorities should be clarified. Indeed, the Constitution, as well as Article 5 of the Decree of 23 November 2005 on the organisation and functioning of the CSCCA, entrusts it with the responsibility of "exercising administrative and jurisdictional control over public resources", whereas the MEF is also responsible for exercising financial control over local authorities. In addition to the overlapping responsibilities, the CSCCA also lacks the human and financial resources to conduct annual audits of municipalities, which increases the accountability deficit (Banque mondiale, 2018[2]).
- The administrative fragmentation of the land registry system is an obstacle to better urban planning. Whereas the cadastral office is located in the Department of Public Works, geo-spatial imagery is located in MPCE, and the land transaction registry is located at the DGI within the MEF (Banque

mondiale, 2018[2]). In addition to the implications for land use planning, the land registry system also has implications for municipal finances and local governance capacities.

- The institutional landscape is also complicated by coordination mechanisms that end up replacing ministries. In order to improve coordination between key institutions in the field of spatial planning, the Inter-ministerial Committee on Spatial Planning (*Comité interministériel d'aménagement du territoire* - CIAT) was created in 2009. However, this mechanism, which includes ministers under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister, is not really functional. In addition, the CIAT technical secretariat (*secrétariat technique du CIAT* - ST-CIAT) tends to replace CIAT and even the ministries responsible for spatial planning. This dynamic is all the more established as ST-CIAT benefits from a stable personnel, and a capacity to mobilise high-level expertise that enables it to access important resources from donors.

Box 4.7 Fragmentation of the institutional landscape of water management: overlaps, gaps and duplications

The institutional landscape of water management in Haiti is symptomatic of this framework of complexity and fragmentation. Despite the 2009 framework law, no less than seven ministries are currently involved in water management. These players and their responsibilities are presented below.

Institution	Responsibilities
Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development (Ministère de l'agriculture, des ressources naturelles et du développement rural - MARNDR)	Responsible for irrigation infrastructure, flood and drought warning systems, meteorology and agro-climatic data management.
Department of the Environment (Ministère de l'Environnement - MDE)	Coordinate, support, supervise and regulate water quality controls and administer training programmes.
Minister of Public Works, Transport and Communications (Ministère des Travaux publics, Transports et communications - MTPTC)	In charge of the Peligre hydroelectric system and keeps an eye on water through DINEPA.
Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation (Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération externe - MPCE)	Responsible for the development and implementation of national planning policies that include water.
Ministry of Public Health and Population (Ministère de la Santé publique et de la Population - MSPP)	It manages water quality, monitors waterborne diseases and is responsible for primary sanitation.
Ministry of the Interior and Territorial Collectivities (Ministère de l'Intérieur et des Collectivités territoriales - MICT)	Guides town halls responsible for sanitation and road services.
Ministry of Trade and Industry (Ministère du Commerce et de l'Industrie - MCI)	In order to protect consumers, it regulates the quality and packaging of treated water to be sold on the market.
Interministerial Committee on Regional Planning (Comité interministériel d'aménagement du territoire - CIAT)	Under the direction of the Office of the Prime Minister, it aims to harmonise and coordinate government actions in the field of land and basin planning (MARNDR, MTPTC, MDE, MICT, MPCE and MEF).
National Directorate of Drinking Water and Sanitation (Direction nationale d'eau potable et d'assainissement - DINEPA)	Under the MTPTC, responsible for implementing the 2009 Water Supply framework Law, coordinating donor assistance, regulating water service providers, and facilitating the decentralisation of water supply management. Chairman of the National Sanitation Committee.
Regional drinking water and sanitation offices (Offices régionaux d'eau potable et d'assainissement - OREPA)	Deconcentrated structures of DINEPA.
National Water Resources Service (Service national des ressources en eau - SNRE)	Under the supervision of the Ministry of Environment
Water committees (Comités d'approvisionnement en eau potable - CAEP).	Manage drinking water supply systems in rural and some urban areas.

As in most countries, the water sector in Haiti is managed by numerous laws, decrees, policies and institutions. Unfortunately, the weakness of the legal framework gives rise to some confusion as to the responsibilities of the institutions, and does not enable for the systematic allocation of human and financial resources in proportion to the responsibilities of the players. As a result, the role played by the

different players in the water sector is still unclear. The result of fragmentation at the national level is a disconnect between legal mandates and actual institutional capacities. This results in tensions between departments and a tendency to pursue policies that are not strategically placed within a coordinated management framework:

- Overlap between MDE and MARNDR: the 2006 Decree on environmental management gives MDE clear competencies in water resources management. However, the Decree does not establish which institution is the main interlocutor of the local authorities in this sector, nor does it allocate the financial means that will enable the MDE to accomplish its mission. MARNDR retains expertise on irrigation systems because of its mandate on agriculture, and has its own policy on watershed management. In addition, because of MARNDR's historical role in resource management, and its technical and financial capacity, it still has some competence in the sector.
- Overlap between CIAT Technical Secretariat and sectoral ministries: CIAT, MARNDR and MDE describe similar responsibilities for natural resource and watershed management.
- Water quality management: the MSPP, DINEPA and MCI, supported by the World Health organisation (WHO), have been working on a draft Decree establishing regulations on drinking water quality. However, other institutions active in this sector were not consulted, which leads to inconsistencies. For example, the text assigns responsibilities for basin protection to public and private water users without regard to the authority of MDE or DINEPA. Similarly, in the proposed legislation, the area surrounding the water sources would be declared public domain, establishing a reserved area of protection, without regard to the MPCE, MTPTC or the land use planning mandate of local authorities.

Source: Widmer, J. et al. (2018[29])*Vision for Water in Haiti*,https://epi.ufl.edu/media/epiufledu/haiti/Haiti-Water-Summit_English.pdf; Stoa, R. (2014[15]) "Subsidiarity in Principle: Decentralisation of Water Resources Management", Utrecht Law Review; Martinez, A. (2019[16]) "Protecting Sources of Urban Water Supply in Haiti: An Institutional Analysis", Journal of Water, Sanitation and Hygiene for Development, vol. 9/2, pp. 237-246.

Better integration of central and local coordination mechanisms in the decision-making process

Vertical coordination mechanisms in Haiti are primarily consultative and *ad hoc.* The framework for territorial consultation is structured around the territorial authorities with the support of the technical and territorial services and the delegations and vice-delegations. In principle, there is a departmental technical council, departmental consultation tables, municipal consultation tables and national sectoral and topic tables:

- **The Departmental Technical Council** (*Conseil Technique Départemental* - CTD) (Decree of 17 May 1990, art. 34) is composed of the departmental delegate who chairs the council, the district vice-delegates, the secretary general of the delegation and the directors of all the deconcentrated ministerial services. This is where the State's territorial action takes place, and its operationalisation is accordingly essential.
- **The municipal consultation tables** include agents of the deconcentrated structures of the State, executives of the municipal administration, executives of NGOs and organised civil society. However, they are not yet operational, and if they were, they could contribute to the construction of the municipal social space. In this regard, the MPCE is planning a pilot experiment for the implementation of these tables.
- **The departmental sectoral tables** in the context of development planning and territorial animation (see Table 4.6). This approach to consultation has been widespread since 2006. However, political

instability, favouritism and the lack of competences of certain agents make it difficult for the issue tables to function properly.

Table 4.6. Departmental sectoral tables

	Agriculture	Health	DSO	Education	TPTC	Type
North	5	3	2	-	-	1
Southeast	4	3	4	1	2	
South	2	1	2	-	-	-
Artibonite	-	-	-	-	-	1
Nipples	-	1	-	-	-	-
Grande-Anse	1	-	-	-	-	-
Other departments	3	1	-	-	-	-

Source: (Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération Externe, 2020[30]).

- **The national sectoral and thematic tables** constitute a formal framework for consultation between State entities, the sectoral ministries concerned, the private sector, civil society organisations and technical and financial partners (Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération Externe, 2013[31]). Sectoral tables have had great difficulty in meeting over the past three years, particularly because of the increased insecurity, which forced some technical and financial partners to close their agencies, and the COVID-19 pandemic (Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération Externe, 2020[30]).

In addition to these ad hoc mechanisms, each ministry with a territorial vocation also has a departmental directorate coordination unit, which liaises between the ministry's central services and the departmental directorates (Decree of 2005 on the organisation of the central administration of the State, art. 66). In addition,the Office of management and Human Resources (Office de Management et des Ressources Humaines - OMRH), a strategic coordination body attached to the Prime Minister, is responsible for steering the reform of the state. Within the context of the promotion of deconcentration, with reference to the decree on its organisation and functioning, the OMRH is required to:

- identify and develop implementation strategies and action plans for administrative devolution;
- propose and promote the implementation of administrative, regulatory or legislative measures contributing to the strengthening of deconcentration at all territorial administrative levels;
- prepare and propose any administrative, regulatory or legislative measure aimed at strengthening the delegations and vice-delegations, and
- conduct an annual assessment of the degree of devolution from central government.

Vertical coordination mechanisms are accordingly not formalised in the legal and regulatory texts in the case of consultation tables. Their role is broadly defined, but their operation is determined on a case-by-case basis according to the terms and resources provided by each table (Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération Externe, 2013[31]). In particular, it is not clear how these mechanisms fit into the decision-making process. Because operating procedures are not defined, they are not required to meet regularly or to make the content of their discussions public. The articulation between the municipal, departmental and national mechanisms does not seem to be formalised either. The government could accordingly explore a number of avenues to improve the effectiveness of these consultation mechanisms, in order to anchor them in the decision-making process in a more sustainable manner.

In addition to the consultation mechanisms already in place, other mechanisms can also be deployed to strengthen coordination between the central and local levels. Other tools used by OECD member countries include partnership agreements, formal contracts, national and regional guidelines and monitoring of

service delivery through indicators (OECD, 2019[4]). An overview of how these mechanisms are used in OECD member countries is provided in Box 4.8.

Box 4.8 Good practices in intergovernmental coordination at the OECD

Creating a culture of cooperation and transparent communication is essential to institutionalise sustainable and effective multi-level governance. The establishment of appropriate coordination mechanisms between different levels of government can take various forms, for example through tools such as dialogue platforms, fiscal councils, standing commissions, intergovernmental consultation boards and contractual arrangements. Here are some concrete cases of unitary countries that have developed good practices in multi-level governance:

- In France, territorial strategies are formalised by contractual agreements between the different levels of government, through the State-Region plan contracts, which provide for co-decision and co-funding of interventions.
- In Italy, there are three separate conferences, State-Regions, State-Local and State-Regions-Local, which serve as intergovernmental forums.
- Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden have regular meetings between central and local governments. Local local authorities (through their associations) are involved in discussions on public policy issues and their implementation. Finland offers financial incentives for inter-municipal cooperation in service provision.
- In 2015, Portugal created the Territorial Dialogue Council chaired by the Prime Minister, where central and local government authorities are represented, to facilitate further dialogue on important policies. In addition to permanent consultative forums, *ad hoc* committees and commissions also serve to facilitate dialogue between governments and civil society on certain thorny issues.
- In New Zealand, the Local Government Commission is a permanent independent body of inquiry into local reform established by the Government Act 2002 and is specifically designed to build a relationship across party lines in the context of multi-level governance needs.

Source: OECD (2019), Making decentralisation work: A Handbook for Policy Makers, OECD Studies in Multilevel Governance, OECD Publishing, Paris.

Since most responsibilities are shared between different levels of government, it is crucial to put in place governance mechanisms to manage these common responsibilities. Creating a culture of cooperation and regular communication is essential for effective multi-level governance and the success of reforms in the long term. However, the introduction or reform of these mechanisms carries risks:

- the multiplication of coordination mechanisms without a clear role in the decision-making process (OECD, 2019[4]) ;
- The creation of consultative or cooperative forums that can replace traditional formal administrative structures, and
- In a highly polarised political context, an open and transparent system of intergovernmental coordination involving broad participation is likely to be costly, time-consuming and lead to deadlock (OECD, 2019[4]).

Successful experiences of horizontal coordination between local authorities deserve to be generalised

Horizontal coordination at the local level can take various forms, depending on the characteristics of the local authorities, the policy goals and the investments targeted. These coordination mechanisms at the local level can range from integration dynamics, such as municipal or regional mergers, to more flexible arrangements such as the establishment of joint authorities, inter-municipalities, coordinated investment strategies, cooperation in urban areas, rural-urban partnerships, cross-border cooperation and platforms for dialogue and cooperation between jurisdictions (OECD, 2019[4]). Encouraging sub-national horizontal coordination is essential to effectively deliver public services and investments, to increase effectiveness and efficiency through economies of scale, and to enhance synergies between the policies of neighbouring (or otherwise related) local authorities.

The strengthening and expansion of local cooperation and coordination mechanisms would be particularly welcome in Haiti. Indeed, in a context in which the territorial division is contested and leads to conflicts of competence between local authorities, cooperation agreements could enable the establishment of physical infrastructures whose benefits often go beyond the limits of individual departments or municipalities, as well as investments in human resources where administrative and functional limits do not necessarily coincide. In addition, inter-municipal cooperation could enable low-income municipalities to benefit from economies of scale in terms of facilities (e.g. water, waste, energy), transport and telecommunications infrastructure. Services can also be shared: support and administrative functions, environmental services and park maintenance, joint public procurement, front-line services, especially to customers, etc. In this sense, the State Modernisation Programme 2018-2023 presents in axis 6 pillar 2 the promotion of intermunicipal practices as one of the priority goals of decentralisation (Office de Management et des Ressources Humaines, 2018[18]).

The most common coordination mechanisms between local authorities in Haiti are associations of elected officials and local representatives. In recent decades, municipal territorial authorities and municipal sections have created associations such as the National Federation of Mayors of Haiti (*Fédération nationale des maires d'Haïti* - FENAMH), the National Federation of CASECs (*Fédération nationale des CASEC* - FENACA), the National Federation of ASECs (*Fédération nationale des ASEC* - FENASEC) and the National Federation of Women Mayors of Haiti (*Fédération nationale des femmes maires d'Haïti* - FENAFEMH). There is also an association of specific territories, the National Association of Border Mayors (*Association nationale des maires frontaliers* - ANMF). FENAMH has established itself as the interlocutor of local authorities with the government and is also recognised as the privileged interlocutor of the technical and financial partners. The multiplication of these associations makes it difficult to coordinate with elected officials and sometimes creates confusion when it comes to choosing an interlocutor. This risk could be increased tenfold with the establishment of all the decentralised bodies, the Interdepartmental Council in particular, which could overlap or duplicate the actions of the federations. However, the government could consider formalising existing mechanisms. In Canada, the annual Premiers' Conferences were first used as an informal forum for horizontal coordination, before being formalised in 2003 (OECD, 2019[4]).

There have been some successful experiences with intercommunality in Haiti, but they have been rare and suffered from limited funding. The most successful experience is the result of a project financed by Canadian cooperation: the intercommunality of the Palmes region (see Box 4.9). Other experiments of this type, such as Camp-Perrin/Maniche or Cône de la Presqu"Ile du Sud, have unfortunately not lasted due to a lack of financial and technical resources.

The legal framework for intermunicipality in Haiti is still to be defined. The notion of intermunicipality was born from the search for economies of scale in waste management, the Decree of 3 March 1981 specifying that the management of household waste could be carried out by the municipalities or groups of municipalities. Inter-municipality is also provided for in the 2006 decrees, but there are no specific regulations. Despite the lack of a legal framework, several studies have already been carried out by the

government, as well as practical workshops at the local level on inter-municipality and inter-territoriality. However, these documents were not shared with the OECD.

Box 4.9 Intercommunity of the Palmes region in Haiti

Shortly after the earthquake that shook Haiti on January 12, 2010, local elected officials from the municipalities of Petit-Goâve, Grand-Goâve, Léogâne and Gressier came together to create the country's first inter-municipal experiment: the Community of municipalities of the region of Palmes (*Communauté de municipalités de la région des Palmes* - CMRP), bringing together approximately 450,000 inhabitants. The creation and development of this intercommunality aimed to meet the challenges of reconstruction and economic development of the territory in order to formalise a sustainable territorial development project. Indeed, by presenting itself as a united decision-making body, the CMRP aimed to become the main partner for donors and international organisations wishing to operate in the region. Using the principle of inter-communality, the CMRP project is designed to be permanent, both in terms of decision-making and implementation of development projects.

In order to promote a sustainable and innovative management method, the CMRP has organised itself by creating an administrative and technical service of the inter-community of Les Palmes (*Direction administrative et technique de l'intercommunalité des Palmes* - DATIP), in order to pool the means, resources and competences of the different municipalities. This governance structure has allowed for democratic participation through several stages of decision-making. First with the Inter-municipal Council acting as a deliberative body, then with the Executive Committee acting as a pre-decisional body, and finally with the Consultative Council, a body of participatory democracy. This unifying policy has given priority to the recognition of common needs, thus avoiding competition for resources among several municipalities.

This successful collaboration has enabled CMRP to quickly plan and implement civil engineering projects in the areas of waste management, land use planning and water management. CMRP has succeeded in establishing a functional core group, based on technical support using financial resources offered by national and international agencies. This means that DATIP manages the preparation, planning and supervision of projects, while implementation is primarily carried out by municipal personnel. DATIP is also responsible for securing funding agreements and, if necessary, seeking additional resources from donors interested in implementing projects in the region.

Despite being a success, the CMRP still faces challenges:

- fundraising, as the initiative is still dependent on international support or government funding;
- strengthening its links with government institutions to advance legislation on decentralisation, and
- the development of the capacities of the municipalities in the region, which will be better able to participate in development projects and maintain the effectiveness of the CMRP.

Source: Federation of Canadian Municipalities, Case study: governing and developing in intercommunality: the experience of the Communauté des municipalités de la région des Palmes (CMRP) in Haiti, May 2014.

Increased coordination at the local level, however, carries certain risks (OECD, 2019[4]), particularly in the Haitian context. Indeed, encouraging inter-municipality, cooperation at the community level or mergers of municipalities, with transfers of funds or other financial incentives, can be very costly for the central state,

if not impossible. This can lead to the creation of inefficient structures without adequate technical support. In addition, cooperation at the community level can lead to a democratic deficit if the decision-makers of these bodies are appointed by the member organisations instead of being elected by the citizens. Indeed, the multiplication of structures can generate a governance structure that is unclear to citizens, and problems of accountability. Finally, the administrative complexity of governance at the local level can lead to organisational problems and administrative silos that are difficult to manage, especially in the absence of a territorial public service.

Nevertheless, the central level of government has a key role to play in promoting and maintaining cooperation and coordination arrangements between local and regional authorities. In particular, central institutions can ensure that services are provided at an adequate scale or by translating national strategic decisions into concrete and effective policies at the territorial level.

Strengthening multi-level governance through planning instruments

Local development strategies can be a useful tool for vertical coordination and multi-level governance. In this regard, one of the main challenges of multi-level governance that the Haitian government itself has highlighted is its relative inability to translate national strategic decisions into concrete policies at the territorial level. Two national strategic planning tools are local in scope in Haiti: the Strategic Development Plan for Haiti (PSDH) and the State Modernisation Programme 2018-2023 (PME-2023), successor to the State Reform Framework Programmes (*Programmes cadre de réforme de l'État* - PCRE) I and II.

Two of the four PSDH projects are particularly relevant to local authorities and their administration: the territorial reorganisation project and the institutional reorganisation project.

- The territorial reform component aims to improve the rational use of land in rural and urban areas, to provide essential infrastructure and facilities for national, regional and local economic development, while ensuring sustainable development. Two of the seven programmes that make up this worksite received disbursements in financial year 2019-20: This is the case for "regional planning and development" and "establishment of the national transport network". However, the budgetary item for these two programmes amounts to more than twelve billion gourdes, which demonstrates the degree of political will in these areas (Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération Externe, 2020[30]). The National Land Use Plan (*Schéma national d'aménagement du territoire* - SNAT) is also being finalised following a series of consultation workshops held in the country's ten geographical departments (Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération Externe, 2013[31]). The SNAT aims to make up for the country's delay in effectively taking decentralisation and territorial players into account in the land use planning process.
- The institutional reform component includes revising the legal framework, strengthening the legislative and judicial branches and independent institutions, modernising public administration, including the administration of justice and security, increasing the number of decentralised officials, strengthening local authorities and strengthening civil society. Decentralisation received only 1% of the disbursements for this project from 2017 to 2019, and 0% from 2019 to 2020 (Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération Externe, 2013[31]).

The 2018-2023 State Modernisation Programme led by the Office of management and Human Resources (OMRH) is a follow-up to the other two state reform programmes developed by OMRH: PCRE I (2007-2012) and PCRE 2 (2012-2017). These three strategies include initiatives or goals concerning the place and role of local and regional authorities in the State:

- PCRE I (2007-2012): institutionalisation of local authorities and capacity building, including administrative organisation and the municipal planning framework.

- PCRE II (2012-2017): reorganising and restructuring the deconcentrated services of the State to ensure better local management and provide quality services to the population; distribute, through decentralisation, powers and responsibilities between the centre and the periphery.
- State Modernisation Programme 2018-2023: pillar 2 on strengthening coordination of government action and territorial governance; pillar 3 axis 7 on resource mobilisation and governance of local finances.

Despite the prominence given to local authorities in the State's strategic reform documents, actions have struggled to materialise due to a lack of political will and committed financial and human resources. In particular, the goals of PCRE I and II seemed potentially too ambitious given the country's institutional capacities. The PME-2023 is characterised by a formulation process mobilising stakeholders and national expertise, which has more tools to perform these reforms, but whose actions are not linked to the budget in a formal way.

In order to achieve the government's goals in terms of decentralisation and deconcentration, the establishment of a system for monitoring the performance of decentralisation and territorial development policies could be beneficial (OECD, 2019[4]). These systems must be kept simple, with a reasonable number of requirements or indicators to effectively measure the performance of decentralisation, in order to provide clear results to citizens in terms of jobs, education, health, competitiveness, etc. Currently, the PSDH monitoring report produced by the MPCE only tracks disbursements by the territorial reconstruction programme, and identifies achievements completed or underway. The PME-2023 includes a monitoring framework with expected results, actions to be undertaken and performance indicators. However, as mentioned in Chapter 2, the "intermediate outcomes" are not associated with *outcome* indicators (see Chapter 2 for more information on monitoring and evaluation of the PME-2023).

Finally, Haiti has municipal development plans (*plans communaux de développement* - PCDs) which, in principle, must be consistent with other national and sectoral strategic planning documents. For their preparation, the MPCE developed and disseminated a model methodological framework for the municipal development plan (2012). The preparation of PCDs is not mandatory and is not a condition for access to central government transfers. Their usefulness in linking national and local strategies is limited by two main aspects. Firstly, although the methodological framework prepared by the MPCE stresses the importance of aligning the PCD with national strategies, including the PSDH, there is no mechanism to ensure alignment, whether through indicators, specific areas or otherwise. However, all strategies must be approved by MPCE, which is itself a control measure. Secondly, the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) is not involved in the preparation or validation of the PCDs, which are accordingly not linked to budgetary considerations. This is particularly important because, as mentioned above, the vast majority of municipalities are not financially self-sufficient and depend on transfers and subsidies.

In addition, the intervention of senators and deputies who are members of the Haitian Parliament in programmes and projects instead of the municipal administrations mandated for this purpose could also hinder the alignment of municipal projects and plans with national priorities. During the interviews for this project, some stakeholders pointed out that sometimes during the budget year, irrespective of the priorities set by the government and municipalities, deputies and senators propose their own projects, which are in contradiction with the goals and expected results of regular development programming. In this sense, proceeding with a written validation of the budgetary programming of projects and programmes, in advance, by the most representative political parties before they are presented for a vote in Parliament could remedy this problem.

Conclusion and recommendations

This chapter reviews the current political, administrative and financial situation of Haitian local governments and the main multi-level governance mechanisms that have been created to date in Haiti. In order to

overcome deep socio-economic inequalities, the government promulgated in its 1987 Constitution principles of decentralisation based on three distinct levels of local governance (departments, municipalities and municipal sections), with the aim of structuring new administrative, economic, social and political relations. However, the inadequacy of the legislative framework for local government, the difficulties in making it operational, the lack of consensus and clear definition of their roles, and the resulting lack of capacity of local government, are hindering the proper implementation of the goals of decentralisation and deconcentration.

To promote effective decentralisation and deconcentration, integrated with good public governance, it is essential to create a strong and operational strategic governance framework, supported by planning instruments, and based on vertical coordination mechanisms and an effective performance monitoring and evaluation system. In this regard, one of the main challenges of multi-level governance that the Haitian government itself has highlighted is its relative inability to translate national strategic decisions into concrete policies at the territorial level. Indeed, a number of institutions at the central level are directly and indirectly involved in the management of local authorities in Haiti. The institutional landscape in this area is fragmented, marked by the centrifugal forces that characterise the legal framework governing local government.

To make deconcentration effective, it is also necessary to strengthen the territorial coordination structures and to implement the National Deconcentration Policy (*politique nationale de déconcentration* – PND). The goal of the PND is to gradually change centralised working habits, to involve decentralised players more in decision-making, and to bring the administration closer to the population, thus ensuring a better distribution of public services throughout the country and, consequently, balanced development.

This chapter has attempted to offer some ideas to explain the persistent high levels of regional inequality in Haiti, and to identify significant limitations in the administrative and fiscal capacity of local governments to perform their missions. Overlapping and ineffective legal frameworks, poor coordination between levels of government, and mismatches between local government resources and their legal mandates all contribute to this situation.

Recommendations

The analysis of the multi-level governance framework in Haiti presented in this chapter leads the OECD to make the following recommendations to the Haitian government:

1. **Clarify the current legal framework for decentralisation and deconcentration through the following initiatives:**
   - Conduct a thorough review of the legal and regulatory framework of all laws and regulations and decrees adopted to implement decentralisation and deconcentration, in order to eliminate overlaps, duplications and dysfunctions, with a view to achieving greater clarity and transparency in decentralisation and deconcentration.
   - Establish and institutionalise the use of functional reviews to map the responsibilities, programmes and mandates of central institutions with regard to decentralisation and deconcentration. These reviews could be organised under the auspices of a structure within the Office of the Prime Minister, such as the OMRH.

  - These reviews would have two main strands of action: Review the responsibilities and actions of central government ministries and institutions operating in the field of decentralisation and deconcentration, in order to promote synergies and avoid duplication.
  - The ultimate goals of functional reviews are to increase the efficiency and optimise the productivity of a government organisation by creating, eliminating or merging functions and units or programmes within the institutions that make up the public sector. This eliminates overlapping functions and programme duplication, and clarifies mandates by establishing clear lines of accountability.
  - These reviews can be conducted on a regular basis (annually or every two years), or more sporadically, so as to rotate the evaluation of different institutions. These examinations could be part of the more comprehensive functional examinations recommended in Chapter 2 of this report.
- Clarify the attributions of the different levels of government (national, departmental, municipal, municipal section) in order to help the proper implementation and functioning of decentralisation. There are some key criteria that a government can use to ensure that the responsibilities of different levels of government are clear (OECD, 2019[4]) :
  - A clear delineation of the powers attributed to the different levels of government by the Constitution, national legislation, decrees, ordinances or agreements;
  - A clear division of powers in shared functions, e.g. who sets policy? Who sets the standards? Who is responsible for monitoring performance? Who receives the funding? Who is the service provider? Who is responsible for monitoring and evaluating the service? How can citizens give their opinion on services?
  - The establishment of institutional mechanisms for shared functions and sub-functions, such as consultation, burden sharing and conflict resolution mechanisms;
  - Decentralisation of sub-functions within each function;
  - Empowering sub-national governments to adopt integrated approaches to local economic development;
  - A separation of decision-making for capital and operating expenditures, and
  - The power to hire, fire and set the terms of reference and day-to-day management or supervision of its own employees.
- Enable better multi-level governance by strengthening horizontal coordination mechanisms at the local and national levels, integrated into the decision-making process of the national government through increased coordination between levels of government:
  - Revitalised horizontal collaboration and coordination within the national government on decentralisation and deconcentration issues is essential to functional vertical coordination. This coordination function can be carried out by a standing interdepartmental committee, with formal terms of reference and a secretariat.
  - Clarify the role of the municipal, departmental and national consultation tables in the decision-making process and define their operating procedures (frequency of meetings, dissemination of resolutions, linkages between the various levels).
  - Other mechanisms can also be deployed to strengthen coordination between the central and local levels: partnership agreements, formal contracts, national and regional guidelines, and monitoring of service delivery through indicators.

2. **Strengthen territorial coordination structures and implement the national deconcentration policy**
   - Strengthen the operational dimension of the departmental technical council, delegations and vice-delegations in order to implement the national deconcentration policy in a coherent and coordinated manner with local departmental and municipal bodies.
   - Decentralise anti-corruption mechanisms and entities.
   - Strengthen the security apparatus at the local community level.

3. **Implement a number of initiatives to clarify and make more coherent the current territorial and administrative division.** The government could implement the following actions:
   - Develop and communicate formal and objective criteria for the territorial division, including:
     - Criteria justifying the creation and/or division of a municipality.
     - The use of cooperation and collaboration mechanisms such as inter-municipality, inter-territoriality and municipal merger, to strengthen and support the initiatives established by the government.
   - Disseminate the results of the delimitation/demarcation exercises, with the main goal of ensuring that these territorial boundaries are the same for all public policy sectors and that they are used consistently.
   - Identify and highlight the social and economic functional territorial areas throughout the country.
     - Identify functional areas and address take them into account in the country's investment policy, and
     - Make available to the public information on the provision and coverage of services, needs, quality and efficiency of services in the territory.
   - The government could formalise coordination mechanisms between local authorities, including associations of elected officials. In particular:
     - Take advantage of the durability and stability of the associations of elected representatives, by involving them more in the decision-making process, particularly in the absence of certain decentralised bodies, and
     - In order to avoid the risk of confusion in the choice of interlocutors, the government could initiate a reflection on the evolution of the role of the associations of elected representatives, in the event that certain decentralised bodies such as the interdepartmental council are established.
     - This reflection could include independent bodies to make these mechanisms more inclusive and to involve other expertise and representations.

4. **Aligning the responsibilities of local authorities with their human and financial resources:**
   - At the fiscal level, the central government could improve both the capacity of municipalities to collect taxes and the current transfer system, in order to reduce inequalities in services across the territory and to promote transparency in the spending of public funds and their impact on citizens' welfare.
     - There are initiatives that could enable municipalities to increase their tax base and raise more revenue. These initiatives could include the following activities:
       - Identify buildings in municipalities to increase CFPB revenues in the short term;

  - Improve visibility on available resources, based on the USAID Lokal+ project in the municipalities of Saint-Marc and Carrefour, through a computer system linked to the DGI, and
  - Set up communication and awareness-raising operations to increase revenue mobilisation.
- Make an inventory of the recommendations and advice given in this area since 2010, in order to assess which reforms have already been made, which are no longer relevant, and which can still be made.
- Define the specific missions of the DGI and the town halls in terms of taxation in order to get out of the current confusion that is detrimental to the autonomy of the municipalities, particularly for the census of built-up properties.
- Strengthen the transparency and monitoring mechanisms of the Local Government Management and Development Fund and other community transfer mechanisms.
- Base the Local Government Management and Development Fund on the concept of equalisation so that each region can benefit from the human and financial resources necessary to provide a basket of services that meet equivalent standards throughout the country.
- Explore the possibilities of fiscal harmonisation between different levels of government with relevant stakeholders (including local governments), with a view to establishing a policy of harmonisation of common rules and powers for all local governments.

- Improve human resource management in local governments to enable more effective decentralisation
  - Institutionalise the territorial public service in the same way as the central public service, in accordance with the Decree of 1 February 2006.
  - Implement a real training strategy for elected officials and local government personnel. This initiative can be carried out under the leadership of the OMRH.

5. Establish and strengthen strategic planning instruments to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of multi-level governance in Haiti.

- Support the preparation and implementation of municipal development plans and ensure their consistency with national strategies:
  - Define formalised monitoring systems (e.g., monitoring plans or tables) or coordination mechanisms to ensure alignment between PDCs and national strategies, including indicators, intermediate targets and specific benchmarks;
  - Involve the Ministry of Economy and Finance in the preparation or validation of PDCs, so that they are linked to budgetary considerations;
  - The national government, supported by the TFPs, could also accompany municipalities more closely in developing the competences needed to design, implement and monitor the performance of projects planned in the PDCs, and
  - As some municipalities do not have the technical or financial means to develop a CDP, an asymmetric decentralisation approach (the fact that sub-national administrations at the same level have different political, administrative or budgetary competences) could be used.
  - Include, in the same way as the MICT, the MPCE in the negotiation and implementation of decentralised cooperation agreements which must be aligned with the PSDH and the various municipal plans.

- Establish a performance monitoring system for decentralisation and territorial development policies in order to increase performance and clarity of results for citizens (see chapter 3).
  - These systems must be kept simple, with a reasonable number of requirements or indicators measuring the performance of decentralisation in an effective way, in order to provide clear results to citizens in terms of employment, education, health, competitiveness, etc.
  - Develop non-financial qualitative and quantitative indicators, in line with the non-financial goals of the PSDH.
  - Develop a monitoring framework for PME-2023 intermediate outcomes linked to outcome indicators.

References

Banque interaméricaine de développement (2020), *Estimation et prévision de la pauvreté et des inégalités de revenus en Haïti en utilisant l'imagerie satellite et les données du téléphone mobile*, https://publications.iadb.org/publications/french/document/Estimation-et-prevision-de-la-pauvrete-et-des-inegalites-de-revenus-en-Haiti-en-utilisant-limagerie-satellite-et-les-donnees-du-telephone-mobile.pdf. [3]

Banque mondiale (2018), *Les villes haïtiennes: des actions pour aujourd'hui avec un regard sur demain*, http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/791721516635425309/pdf/Haitian-cities-actions-for-today-with-an-eye-on-tomorrow.pdf. [2]

Bergvall, D. et al. (2006), "Intergovernmental transfers and decentralised public spending", *OECD Journal on Budgeting*, Vol. 5. [25]

Blöchliger, H. and C. Charbit (2008), "Fiscal equalisation", *OECD Journal: Economic Studies*, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/eco_studies-v2008-art8-en. [23]

Brancati, D. and J. Snyder (2011), "Rushing to the polls: the causes of premature postconflict elections", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 55/3, pp. 469-492. [21]

Cadet, C. (2001), *Haïti face aux défis de la décentralisation*, Commission Nationale à la Réforme Administrative. [13]

Cadet, C. (2001), *Haïti face aux défis de la décentralisation*, Commission Nationale À la Réforme Administrative. [17]

CNRA (2002), *Problématique de la décentralisation et réalité des collectivités territoriales*, https://docplayer.fr/15003685-Problematique-de-la-decentralisation-et-realite-des-collectivites-territoriales.html. [22]

Collectivités locales (2018), *Dotation globale de fonctionnement*, https://www.collectivites-locales.gouv.fr/dotation-globale-fonctionnement-dgf. [26]

Dorner, V. (1998), *La décentralisation en haïti*, https://doi.org/10.4000/apad.565 (accessed on 20 Février 2021). [10]

Fleur-Aime, T. and W. Thomas (2016), *La question de la décentralisation en Haïti : Contexte historique et perspectives*, http://www.omrh.gouv.ht/decentralisation (accessed on 20 février 2020). [11]

Hooghe, L. et al. (2016), *Measuring Regional Authority: A Postfunctionalist Theory of Governance*, Oxford University Press, http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198728870.001.0001. [6]

Martinez, A. (2019), "Protecting sources of urban water supply in Haiti: An institutional analysis", *Journal of Water, Sanitation and Hygiene for Development*, Vol. 9/2, pp. 237-246. [16]

Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération Externe (2020), *Rapport de Mise en Oeuvre du Programme d'Investissement Public et des Résultats de Développement*. [30]

Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération Externe (2019), *Haïti: Cadre de planification territoriale*, https://intranet.ht.undp.org/documentation/images/655d1a0981442855d.pdf. [1]

Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération Externe (2013), *Cadre de Coordination de l'Aide externe au Développement d'Haïti*, https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/STC-PresentationPWCadreCoordinationAideExternefinal9.11.12ok%29.pdf. [31]

Naulet, F. (2012), *Décentralisation et services d'eau potable et d'assainissement: quelles stratégies de renforcement des communes pour l'accès aux services - Introduction*. [9]

OECD (2020), *Decentralisation and Regionalisation in Portugal: What Reform Scenarios?*, Éditions OCDE, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/fea62108-en. [5]

OECD (2019), *Making Decentralisation Work: A Handbook for Policy-Makers*, OECD Multi-level Governance Studies, Éditions OCDE, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/g2g9faa7-en. [4]

OECD (2017), *Multi-level Governance Reforms: Overview of OECD Country Experiences*, OCDE Multi-level Governance Studies, Éditions OCDE, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264272866-en. [7]

OECD (2017), *Sweden 2017: Monitoring Progress in Multi-level Governance and Rural Policy*, Éditions OCDE, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264268883-en. [24]

OECD (2008), *Decentralization, Provincial Tax Autonomy and Equalization in Canada*. [27]

Office de Management et des Ressources Humaines (2018), *Programme de Modernisation de l'État 2023 (PME 2023) - L'administration au service des usagers*. [18]

OFPRA (2015), *Haïti - Autorités municipales et manifestations en 2013*, https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/56e15d0a4.pdf. [20]

Paul, B. and C. Charleston (2015), "Les collectivités territoriales: analyseurs du processus démocratique bloqué en Haïti", *Haïti Perspectives*, Vol. 4/3, http://www.haiti-perspectives.com/pdf/4.3-colletivite.pdf. [14]

Roy-César, É. (2013), *Canada's Equalization Formula*, Canada Library of Parliament. [28]

Sauveur, P. (2007), *Les élites politiques et le processus de consolidation de l'État haïtien (1804-1858)*, Presses de l'Université de Montréal, https://doi.org/10.4000/books.pum.15182. [12]

Stoa, R. (2014), “Subsidiarity in Principle: Decentralization of Water Resources Management”, *Utrecht Law Review*. [15]

USAID (2009), *Democratic Decentralization Programming Handbook*, https://urban-links.org/wp-content/uploads/Democratic-Decentralization-Handbook.pdf. [8]

Vixamar, J. (2021), *L’analyse de l’état de la décentralisation haïtienne au vu de la théorie de décentralisation : le constat d’un effet d’affichage*, http://lenational.org/post_free.php?elif=1_CONTENUE/tribunes&rebmun=1763. [19]

Widmer, J. et al. (2018), *Vision pour l’eau en Haïti*, https://epi.ufl.edu/media/epiufledu/haiti/Haiti-Water-Summit_French.pdf. [29]

Notes

[1] Internal background report by T. Cantave.

[2] Internal background report by T. Cantave.

[3] Internal background report by D. Alexandre.

[4] Internal background report by T. Cantave.

[5] These decrees adopted on 1 February 2006 and published in the Official Journal on 14 June 2006 concern: the overall framework of decentralisation; the organisation and functioning of the municipal sections; the organisation and functioning of the departments; the territorial public service.

[6] Internal background report by D. Alexandre.

[7] Internal background report by T. Cantave.

[8] A functional region is an autonomous economic unit according to specific criteria (travel patterns, water supply, land use, economic development, school districts, urban and rural areas, etc.).

[9] Internal background report by T. Cantave.

[10] Translation by the author.

[11] A grant that is awarded on the condition that it is used only for a specific purpose.

[12] Transfers that can be spent as if they were the recipient subnational government's own (unrestricted) tax revenues.

[13] Municipal fees that could be set by municipal bylaws could be an important source of revenue for some municipalities, but the OECD has not received sufficiently detailed information on this framework. This means that this Review does not address this issue beyond the recognition of the existence of this power in the Act. In addition, public financial management issues, including at the local level, have been the subject of much work funded by donors such as the regional development banks and the World Bank. For this reason, this study deliberately excluded these issues from its scope.

[14] Internal background report by D. Alexandre.

[15] A grant that is awarded on the condition that it is used only for a specific purpose.

[16] Transfers that can be spent as if they were the recipient local authority's own (unrestricted) tax revenues.

5 Strategic management of the public service in Haiti

This chapter analyses the human resource management system, which is a cornerstone of good governance, at the central level. In particular, it examines the role of senior officials, the shortcomings of the recruitment and career development system and the possibilities for improving institutional arrangements for human resources management. The chapter focuses on the concept of merit and incorporates the three pillars of the OECD recommendation on public service leadership and capability.

Introduction

Public service plays an essential role in promoting economic growth and welfare. Among other things, it provides sanitation services, runs schools and hospitals and attracts investment. This critical role explains why governments must be able to attract and recruit, train and retain public servants with the required competences.

This chapter highlights the role of leaders as key players in public administration reform, the importance of merit-based recruitment processes and career development opportunities and the need for effective inter-organisational cooperation to achieve them. It is encouraging that the State Modernisation programme 2023 (*Programme de Modernisation de l'État*- PME-2023) includes measures that address these three issues and reflects the spirit of the OECD Recommendation on Public Service Leadership and Capability. Nevertheless, the purpose of a plan is to be implemented, and in this regard, the Haitian public administration faces many challenges. Prioritisation of goals and effective communication between stakeholders will be essential to ensure a coherent approach to the implementation of the PME-2023.

Many OECD countries are working on similar issues, but Haiti's ability to implement good human resource management practices faces particular constraints. The 2010 earthquake profoundly affected the Haitian public service, resulting in the loss of more than 16,000 officials and the relocation of many others (PNUD, 2010[1]). This event has turned the public employment market upside down, posing considerable problems in terms of supply and demand. On the supply side, Haiti has found itself in a situation of rebuilding the public service. New officials were expected to have specific competences and capacities to respond to the short-term humanitarian crisis and long-term public governance challenges. On the demand side, the needs and expectations of the Haitian population have become more acute. This dual challenge explains the emphasis placed by the Haitian government on providing quality services to citizens, for example in the *C*harter of Commitment for the Provision of Quality Services to the User (*charte d'engagement pour les prestations de services de qualité à l'usager*) (OMRH, 2018[2]).

Through the Working Party on Public Employment and Management (PEM), the OECD has worked with many countries to build a strong, flexible and forward-looking public service. This chapter describes public employment in Haiti and the legal provisions that govern the main aspects of human resource management. This discussion refers to the OECD Recommendation on Public Service Leadership and Capability (OECD, 2019[3]). Recognising the need for a transversal approach to managing public sector employees, the OECD Council adopted the Recommendation on Public Service Leadership and Capability in 2019 (Figure 5.1). The Recommendation is a legal instrument to guide Members and partners in the development of a competent and well-managed public sector workforce based on effective organisation and practices.

Figure 5.1. OECD Recommendation on Public Service Leadership and Capability



Source: OECD (2019), Recommendation of the Council on Public Service Leadership and Capability, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0445.

As outlined in the 2023 State Modernisation Programme of the Office of Management and Human Resources (*Office de management et des ressources humaines* - OMRH), the renewal of the public service requires better forward-looking management of human resources and services (Office de Management et des Ressources Humaines, 2018[4]). Such a reform seems urgent, as the country is ranked 168 out of 198 countries in the 2019 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International, 2020[5]).

Such a level of mistrust in public action could hinder the best possible quality of service delivery to citizens. To meet this challenge, public management of human resources must achieve a higher level of transparency, emphasising the importance of meritocracy. Indeed, a professional public service can only exist if meritocratic procedures underpin a healthy public service culture. This meritocratic principle affirms the loyalty of its agents to the citizens and not to possible benefactors, which strengthens citizens' trust in the administration and encourages qualified candidates to apply for public positions. The reform projects launched by the PME-2023 are in line with this.

Overview of the Haitian public service

Article 236-2 of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Haitian public service is based on a career system. Employees of the public service or occupants of permanent posts have the status of officials. However, the administration can use contract personnel to fill non-permanent posts if necessary. The OMRH counted 31 contract personnel per 100 officials for the year 2016-2017, the last year for which figures were available (OMRH, 2018[6]). OMRH suggests that this trend "runs counter to the spirit and letter of the Constitution which enshrines a career public service", but in fact most OECD countries - even where there is a predominantly career public service - use a variety of contractual arrangements, as pointed out by Figure 5.2.

Figure 5.2 Officials and other central government employees, 2018



Note: Data for Denmark, Israel, Japan, Mexico and New Zealand are for 2019. Data for France, Germany, Korea and Poland are for 2017. Data for the United States, Italy and Latvia are for 2016. Data for Slovenia are for 2015. Data on other public sector employees were not available for Hungary, Norway and the Slovak Republic. For Korea, data for officials were compiled by the Ministry of Personnel Management and data for "other public employees" by the Ministry of Employment and Labour. For Portugal, "other government employees" includes fixed-term professional and managerial personnel. Officials defined as officials under a specific public statutory framework or other specific provisions are referred to in Denmark as "tjenstemænd".
Source: OECD (2019), *Government at a Glance*.

As of 31 December 2017, nearly 82,000 people were employed as officials (permanent agents of the public service) in Haiti. More recent estimates provided to the OECD in the context of the OECD questionnaire administered to the Haitian authorities for the purpose of this Review (hereinafter "the OECD questionnaire") put this figure closer to 71,000, or 76.4% of the public service workforce. Women accounted for 28.6%of the total and 35.8% of senior positions (OMRH, 2018[6]). As the regional public service is in the process of being established, local authority employees are not included. Data from the "SysPay" payroll system indicate that almost two-thirds of central government employees are between 35 and 55 years of age, compared to the OECD average of 55% (OECD, 2020[7]). The personnel working in the central administration is divided into four main groups or sectors: cultural, economic, political and social. The social sector accounts for the largest share (60%), with most of these employees (one in three) working in the Ministry of Education and Vocational Training. This is followed by the political, economic and cultural sectors.

The Office of Management and Human Resources is the main actor in human resources management

The Office of Management and Human Resources, established by the Decree of 17 May 2005 on the organisation of the central State administration, is one of the main human resources management bodies, as indicated in Box 5.1. Following the March 2018 international forum on state reform, the OMRH prepared the PME-2023. Human resources are essential to the implementation of the programme's three pillars:

- Renewal of the administrative system;
- Strengthening government coordination and local governance, and
- Reform of public finance and economic governance.

The OMRH has direct responsibility for the implementation of the renewal of the administrative system and fulfils a support and coordination function for the other two pillars with line ministries, which are involved

as players in the reform (Office de Management et des Ressources Humaines, 2018[4]). As the strategic arm of the Office of the Prime Minister, the OMRH must both promote and coordinate, at the inter-ministerial level, all reform initiatives undertaken in the different administrations (Office de Management et des Ressources Humaines, 2018[4]).

Box 5.1 Responsibilities of the Office of Management and Human Resources

Legislation and regulations: To propose to the Prime Minister public policies and legislative and regulatory measures aimed at improving the organisation and operation of the administration and the public service, to follow up on them and to ensure that they are applied and respected.

Modernisation: To propose to the Higher Council for Administration and the Public service initiatives for modernising the administration and the public service and ensuring their coherence, with a view to improving the quality of public service and the efficiency of the organisation and personnel of the ministries, decentralised services and autonomous administrative, cultural and scientific bodies;

Training: To define and monitor national training policy so that the policies and programmes of the National School of Public Policy Administration and other public service training schools meet the needs of the public service;

Technical cooperation: To coordinate the technical cooperation programmes implemented in the ministries, decentralised services and autonomous administrative, cultural and scientific bodies in the areas of institutional strengthening and management of public services;

Miscellaneous: To exercise all other powers deriving from the Constitution and the laws of the Republic, in particular those relating to

- (i) access to the public service and the recruitment, promotion and mobility of officials;
- (ii) job classification and remuneration of incumbents in the public service;
- (iii) comprehensive workforce management involving the maintenance of a central public service personnel file;
- (iv) the establishment of management frameworks for, in particular, human resource planning, contract management and performance assessment in the public service.

Source: Office of Management and Human Resources, http://www.omrh.gouv.ht/attributions (accessed on 2 February 2020).

Merit as a guiding principle in the public service

As noted in Box 5.2 the concept of merit as applied to the public sector means that people with the right competences and capacities can access and thrive in public sector jobs. Meritocratic governments reward talent rather than personal relationships. Lack of merit can lead to bad policies and waste of public resources. In the long term, this can lead to a diminished capacity for the public service and distrust of government. If citizens and public servants feel that recruitment, remuneration and promotion systems serve the interests of a few rather than society as a whole, this constitutes a major failure of public governance. This is a challenge for all jurisdictions, although the problem is particularly acute in Haiti.

The affirmation of meritocracy contributes to the professionalisation of the public service, which should lead to greater capacity in the medium term. Professionalisation is a way to reduce favouritism and private interests in favour of a public service for citizens (OECD, 2018[8]).

Box 5.2 Merit in the public service

A public service selected and managed on the basis of merit, as opposed to nepotism and political patronage, has many benefits. Hiring people with the right competences for the job generally improves performance and productivity, which translates to better policies and services that, in turn, make societies happier, healthier and more successful (Cortazar, Fuenzalida and Lafuente, 2016[9]). Meritocracy has also been shown to reduce corruption (Dahlstrom, Lapuente and Teorell, 2011[10]) ; (Meyer-Sahling and Mikkelsen, 2016[11]).

The establishment of merit systems reduces the possibility of favouritism and nepotism and is also the basis for developing a culture of integrity. Favouritism, nepotism and patronage are forms of corruption when they result in the use of public funds to enrich individuals on the basis of their family ties, political affiliations or social status. In some extreme cases, public positions could be created to provide a source of revenue to reward political allies without any related work obligation. In other cases, public sector positions can be purchased and sold "under the table".

Merit-based systems significantly reduce these risks by making positions transparent and requiring a clear rationale for their existence. First, they make it more difficult to create "ghost" positions (i.e. positions that are not needed, where people are not doing essential work), created to reward friends and allies. Second, objective and transparent decision-making processes make it more difficult to appoint people to positions for which they are not qualified. People can always try to influence the system unfairly, but the recourse mechanisms and control functions ensure that the rules are applied and that there are negative consequences for those who try to cheat.

Source: OECD (2020), OECD Handbook on Public Integrity, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/84581cb5-fr.

The affirmation of merit within the Haitian public administration has been widely recognised as an essential step in building public sector capacity. For example, RAND refers to the need to develop a "merit-based promotion system" (Crane et al., 2010[12]), while the IMF has called for improved human resource capacity and "merit-based promotions" (IMF, 2012[13]). Capacity development interventions have largely tended to encourage and strengthen an independent public service with merit at its heart - or, as the UNDP summarises it "a career public service, with political control but without political interference, with job security and career development, recruited and promoted on the basis of technical merit as opposed to political patronage, a hierarchical division of labour and rules-based decision-making" (UNDP, 2015[14]). The urgent need for action on human resource management was also highlighted in the 2018 speech by the US Ambassador to Haiti:

> *This week, the President presented to partners the top priorities - the seven priority areas of his government, which include: state reform - including the recruitment of skilled young people on a competitive basis to revitalise and modernise the public administration and the establishment of a results-oriented human resources management system (Ambassade des Etats-Unis en Haiti, 2018[15])*

Analysis of merit-based reforms in various institutional contexts suggests that agreements to reduce patronage in human resource management practices in the public service serve to limit the importance of personal relationships between candidates and recruiters. The goal of this chapter is accordingly to present three key areas of public administration reform related to human resource management and to examine international examples of good practice in relation to the Haitian context.

It should be noted that the goal is not to propose a simple transposition of these practices to the entire Haitian public administration, but rather to highlight the means that promote the establishment of a competent and efficient public service. Merit is a central concept in the OECD analysis. The following sections will accordingly examine how the merit principle can and should have a place in the following areas:

- **Leadership** can be a driving force for public sector reform in Haiti - but this group must be supported.
- **Formalising recruitment systems and developing career opportunities** are essential to attracting talent and building confidence in the system.
- **Clarification of institutional coordination, including strengthening the role of human resources departments** within ministries.

Haiti's senior public service must be strengthened and supported to improve its performance

The challenge of professionalisation

The professionalisation of the senior public service, like that of the public service as a whole, is based on meritocratic human resource administrative processes which contribute to the development of public sector capacity. This professionalisation of the senior public service is essential to limit the influence of private interests and favouritism, which are two major obstacles to the creation of a public service at the service of citizens. In general, increased professionalism has been shown to be a crucial element in reducing the risk of corruption in bureaucratic environments (Charron, 2017[16]), as well as in improving citizens' trust in government institutions and in the women and men who run them (Charron, 2016[17]).

According to Evans and Raunch (Evans, 1999[18]), meritocracy in the public sector emerges from a depoliticised recruitment process, allowing senior officials - or "grands commis" in Haiti - to develop a sense of loyalty to their peers rather than to politicians and to consider careers based on performance rather than political interference.

The OECD Recommendation of Council on Public Service Leadership and Capability provides an insightful framework for building the capacity of public service leaders. It includes the following:

1. Clarify expectations of senior public servants as politically impartial leaders of public entities who are trusted to deliver on the priorities of political authorities and to uphold and embody the highest standards of integrity without fear of political reprisal;
2. Consider merit-based criteria and transparent procedures for the appointment of senior officials, and hold them accountable for results;
3. Ensure that senior public servants have the mandate, competences and conditions necessary to provide non-partisan, evidence-based advice and truthful language to political leaders and
4. Strengthen the leadership competences of current and potential senior officials (OECD, 2019[3]).

In the same vein, the PME-2023 states the importance of competence building of the senior public service as a condition for its implementation and success. Among the factors for successful implementation of the PME-2023 is the need for "real commitment from the highest political and administrative levels" (Office de Management et des Ressources Humaines, 2018[4]). For this purpose, the PME-2023 gives priority to strengthening the management capacity of the public administration, which in turn depends on strengthening the capacity of senior officials. Indeed, a managerial capacity based on the principles of good human resources management can only be developed if they are strong advocates and promoters of these principles, capable of leading and adapting to a complex environment. In the short term, a well-

functioning senior public service would provide a solid basis for strengthening the organisation and coordination of the country's various administrations. Pilot projects on the design of career management for senior officials, from appointment to departure from the public service, including competency-based promotion processes, could be implemented in some pre-identified jurisdictions. Other countries, such as France, have also set up interdepartmental working groups to define the necessary competences, for each position in turn.

Politicisation of the recruitment process for senior officials

The Haitian senior public service is characterised by a significant degree of politicisation in the recruitment process for senior officials. According to information provided by the Haitian administration in the context of this project, the process of appointing senior officials is left solely to the discretion of the government of the day, with no public definition of the criteria or selection process. Other OECD countries are also characterised by a high degree of politicisation of their senior appointments processes, but in this case senior public service systems combine political appointments to senior positions with guarantees that the necessary competences for the job are acquired; politicians are also held to some degree of accountability in a process that must be transparent (see Box 5.3).

Box 5.3 Towards a high public service system in Brazil

The Brazilian system of presidential governance gives the government complete autonomy in the appointment of many executive positions. However, the country has begun to demand a certain degree of transparency in this process and has imposed certain restrictive conditions on it, in order to assert a certain degree of merit and thus restore efficiency and confidence. A recent OECD report identifies the steps:

- Some positions of responsibility are reserved for existing officials.
- Minimum criteria are established to guide ministers in their appointment decisions. They do not have to follow them, but they have to explain why. This ensures a minimum level of public accountability that was previously non-existent.
- Some federal government institutions have established more comprehensive and meritocratic career paths and appointments for their senior officials, which are examples to follow.
- Civil society has worked with state players to promote merit-based recruitment in the hope of building capacity and embedding this principle in the culture of Brazilian public administrations.

Source: OECD (2019), Innovation Skills and Leadership in Brazil's Public Sector: Towards a Senior Civil Service System, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/ef660e75-en.

This relative politicisation of appointments, if it does not interfere with the mission of senior officials, enables greater consistency between political projects and their administrative implementation. Whatever the motivation, this appointment process must remain based on merit, stability in the position and independence (Gerson, 2020[19]), merit being interpreted here in terms of competences and knowledge of the administrative machinery. Equally essential to a well-performing senior public service are the concepts of stability, which makes possible an appointment process that is separate from the political calendar, and independence, which ensures that the work is based on evidence and not on political will. This independence is reflected, for example, in many OECD countries by the existence of a document defining the managerial responsibilities of senior officials, in terms of financial management, human resources or crisis management, as shown in Figure 5.3.

Figure 5.3 Existence of a law or document setting out in detail the managerial responsibilities of senior government officials



Note: Responses from 33 OECD countries.
Source: OECD (2020), Leadership Module of the Survey of Public Service Leadership and Competence.

Nevertheless, the degree of politicisation of the recruitment process mentioned only concerns the appointment of a few personalities, and generally coexists with more robust recruitment processes in which the meritocratic dimension is central. For example, almost two-thirds of OECD countries recruit very high-level officials (D1 and D2 level according to the International Labour Organisation categorisation) through competitive examinations for specific positions. In only eight countries, such as Haiti, do political leaders have discretionary control over the process of appointing or hiring senior officials (OECD, 2020[20]).

Specialised career management for senior officials

In addition, the second component of the strategy for building the capacity of the senior public service must be the development of career opportunities for senior officials. Discussions with Haitian interlocutors indicated that the position of Director General, given its highly political nature, was usually the last position held before leaving the public service. In addition to its negative effects on the constitution of a talent pool, such a practice undermines the existing rules on illegal interest taking for former senior officials working in the private sector, as well as the independence and neutrality of the public service.

Another characteristic of the senior public service common to OECD countries, but absent in Haiti, is the existence of specific human resource management mechanisms. Haiti does not have a specific employment framework for senior officials. Because of their responsibilities, they are often confronted with more sensitive situations than other public servants, which often leads to adapted human resources practices. This means that Haiti is not implementing any of the four measures mentioned in Figure 5.4. In addition, performance assessment of senior officials is an area of reform that has only been sketched out in Haiti, which is hindering the adoption of related human resource (HR) management policies, such as performance bonuses, individualised training paths, or competency-based mobility opportunities. As noted in Figure 5.4, Box 5.4 and Box 5.5 some OECD countries have developed specific management frameworks for officials.

Figure 5.4 Differences between the management of positions for senior officials and other public servants



Note: Number of OECD countries that report using the practice mentioned. Data collected for 34 OECD countries.
Source: OECD (2020), Leadership Module of the Survey of Public Service Leadership and Competence.

Box 5.4 Executive Recruitment Mission in France

The Executive Recruitment Mission, which reports to the Secretary General of the Government, is tasked by the Prime Minister with professionalising the appointment and support of senior executives and thus contributing to the performance of the State's public services. The posts concerned are the most senior posts in the administrative hierarchy of the State and its public establishments, whose holders are appointed by the Council of Ministers. This category includes directors of central administration, prefects, rectors, ambassadors and directors of large public institutions. The Executive Recruitment Mission is responsible for coordinating the identification of potential short-term senior government officials, professionalising the appointment process, providing support to senior and aspiring senior officials and promoting gender diversity.

Source: Government website, https://www.gouvernement.fr/mission-cadres-dirigeants.

More generally, and despite the existence of certain corps (senior registrars, for example), there is no "*culture de corps*" in Haiti that would make career prospects and salary scales more easily understandable. An interministerial reflection could be carried out on the constitution of dynamic professional categories,

making the contractual terms more transparent for each public agent. In this regard, the OMRH indicated that it was working on a project to organise the public service into occupational categories for all categories A, B, C and D.

Box 5.5 Support the identification and training of senior officials

Korea: The Korean government has implemented a mandatory competency assessment process for all senior officials. Before candidates can be appointed to a management position, they must pass a series of one-day assessment interviews, supervised by a group of specially trained assessors. These assessments include exercises that simulate policy and management problems. The programme is managed and controlled by the department responsible for personnel management. According to this data, external candidates performed less well than internal candidates. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, internal candidates have more experience with the types of policy issues tested in the exam. Secondly, internal candidates have better access to available preparatory training. Thirdly, the legislation has limited the number of possible applications from external candidates.

Estonia: The Public Service Centre of Excellence was created to support executive functions within the public sector. Initially focused on competency development, the Centre has gradually expanded its mandate to include a broader set of interventions throughout the employee life cycle, including competency modelling, relationship management with potential candidates, recruitment, competency assessment, participation in interview panels, mentoring and leadership programmes, and follow-up assessment activities. Leadership programmes have expanded from General Secretaries to the lower levels of the senior public service, and some programmes have also been developed for high-potential future senior officials.

Source: Gerson (2020), "Leadership for a High-Performing Public Service", OECD Working Papers on Public Governance, Vol. 40, https://doi.org/10.1787/f87e7397-fr.

Strengthen the recruitment system and improve career management in Haiti

In both the public and private sectors, recruitment can be seen as a balancing act between supply and demand, with each market having its own particularities. On the demand side, potential candidates need to know about job opportunities and the selection criteria for applying for these positions. The lack of information about the job and the conditions of access to it can indeed limit the quantity and quality of applications. Whereas this could now be taken for granted in many OECD governments, this minimum level of transparency is an essential step in strengthening public sector integrity and capacity. A lack of transparency can potentially lead to a demand problem, opening the door to nepotism and cronyism - both of which can create a vicious cycle by weakening the capacity of the workforce, undermining confidence in the recruitment system and discouraging candidates from applying.

A long-term approach to human resources management is essential to the effective functioning of jurisdictions, as it helps to attract and retain candidates with the required competences. The recruitment process is not limited to the signature of a contract, but includes the steps of attracting candidates, selecting them, retaining them and managing their departure. The ability of the public sector to attract the necessary talent depends on the consistency and clarity of this process over the long term.

Once candidates have been recruited and have joined the public service, managers and leaders have an important role to play in ensuring that they can make full use of their talents. In the Haitian context, it is

essential to ensure that new employees remain in the public service, develop new or lateral competences and perform well. In Haiti, where the lack of competitive salaries, described in the inventory of axis 3 of the PME-2023, is a hindrance, a brain drain has been noted towards non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and international organisations that provide better wages (Bureau de l'évaluation du Programme des Nations Unies pour le Développement, 2006[21]). This difficulty should lead managers to work on other criteria for motivating employees, such as career advancement, i.e. the possibility of being promoted and taking on new responsibilities.

The Haitian administration would benefit from competence-based recruitment

The driving force of a successful public service is the importance of competences. Many OECD countries are still under fiscal pressure from the austerity waves of the 2010s, and are now facing an ageing public service. Similar problems are also encountered in Haiti, hence the need to optimise the competences of agents. Strategic personnel management can help administrations achieve their goals effectively, provided that the tasks and competences required for each job are explicitly detailed (OECD, n.d.[22]). These competences can be acquired by jurisdictions in a number of ways, as outlined in Figure 5.5.

Figure 5.5. Talent management in the public service

Source: OECD (2017), Competencies for a well-performing public service, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264280724-en.

All OECD governments face the need to recruit people with different types of competences and capacities. Governments compete with the private sector for highly specialised experience, such as lawyers or computer experts. At the same time, these administrations must also develop tools to recruit more and more people with competences in areas where qualifications do not exist: the ability to solve problems, to negotiate outcomes acceptable to different interest groups, or to co-create new ways of working. This could be more difficult than theory suggests, as many public sector recruitment systems have been designed to ensure that candidates' technical knowledge in specific areas is treated in a standardised way in order to

respect the merit principle. This dimension is reflected in the debate in many OECD countries about the renewal of competitive examinations to regulate access to specific parts of the public service, as indicated in Box 5.6.

Box 5.6 Renewal of competitions in France and Spain

Spain: In its efforts to attract talent, in partnership with the country's universities, the Spanish public service has launched a consultation to rethink selection processes, including the organisation of competitions (the main method of recruitment). Even if there are still many candidates, we note that the tests are still far too academic and motivate increasingly few young people.

France: For the past ten years, the supervisory authority has been content to modernise certain administrative competitions on a case-by-case basis, without giving any overall consideration to their attractiveness. Recognising this gap, the government convened three working groups between April and July 2019, which focused on five areas: (i) Making public service positions and competitive examinations more readable and attractive (overhaul of communication, partnerships with the public employment service, etc.); (ii) Developing a policy of identifying and supporting talent pools to promote diversity (development of apprenticeships, better links with universities, etc.); (iii) Modernising the organisation of competitive examinations (recognition of professional experience, development of competitive examinations based on qualifications, etc.); (iv) Professionalising the recruitment process; (v) Strengthening social dialogue on recruitment and attractiveness policies.

Sources: https://www.mptfp.gob.es/portal/funcionpublica/secretaria-general-de-funcion-publica/Actualidad/2020/12/2020-12-03_01.html; https://www.senat.fr/rap/a19-146-6/a19-146-66.html.

In the context of the OMRH's formalisation of competitive recruitment processes in the Haitian public service, strengthening the role of competencies in recruitment and career progression is essential. In this respect, the second pillar of the Council Recommendation on Leadership and Competence in the Public Service recommends investing in public service capacity through the following measures:

- Continuously identifying the competences and capacities needed to translate the policy vision into services that add value to society;
- Attracting and retaining employees with the competences and abilities required in the labour market;
- Recruiting, selecting and promoting candidates through transparent, open and merit-based processes to ensure fair and equitable treatment;
- Developing the necessary competences and capacities by creating a culture and environment conducive to learning within the Public Service, and
- Evaluating, rewarding and recognising performance, talent and initiative (OECD, 2019[3]).

This pillar of the recommendation is accordingly directly linked to Title VIII, Article 236.1 of the Haitian Constitution, which states that: "The law governs the public service on the basis of ability, merit and discipline". Axis 3 of Pillar 1 PME-2023 on public service renewal attempts to modernise and clarify the scope of this article. It identifies the challenges in terms of career management and related aspects on the one hand, and the role of the recruitment process and human resources departments on the other. These are key factors for the successful implementation of the PME-2023.

Haiti's efforts to improve the recruitment system focus on strengthening the use of competitive examinations as a method of entering the public service. This is to reduce the opportunity for direct appointment of personnel where there is no clear need for a role, no clear description of the work to be performed and no reference to a minimum experience or skill level.

For example, in 2018, the OMRH launched a competition to recruit architects and engineers - two key professions for which employment opportunities in the public sector have traditionally been less attractive than in the private sector. This *corps* of civil engineers and architects, which included only six women out of approximately 100 men, was tasked with building the capacity of town halls in the area of construction and improving the resilience of municipalities to the consequences of natural disasters.

The issue of broadening recruitment processes to include candidates from diverse backgrounds and adapting selection criteria to ensure that different types of competences can be assessed in a transparent manner are questions that many OECD governments are asking, and which are also being asked in Haiti. The actual recruitment process starts before the final decision is made, with the communication of existing offers and the selection process. In Haiti, communication strategies need to reach more diverse audiences, focusing in part on youth and reflecting the place of the Creole language in Haiti.

More than half of the OECD countries have predefined selection criteria, which are generally available to all applicants (see Figure 5.6). This is generally simplified by the creation of competency frameworks that enable the establishment of a job classification system.

Figure 5.6 Determining selection criteria in OECD countries



Source: OECD (2020), Public Service Leadership and Competence Survey Recruitment Module.

However, these procedures are prepared upstream and require the involvement of institutions such as the OMRH and human resources directors (HRD). In order to make generalised competitive recruitment effective and transparent, the chain of decision-making must be clearly established so that supervisors do not have the ability to arbitrarily impose recruitment decisions on their subordinates. In this respect, some countries, such as France, have introduced legislation to ensure that the constitutional principle of equal access to public employment through competitive examination is respected. In this context, the selection of candidates is made by an independent and sovereign jury on the basis of written and oral tests to assess the merits, competences and abilities of the candidates on the basis of goal evaluation criteria. In particular, the gender and professional diversity of the panels is a key factor in ensuring the effectiveness and

impartiality of the process. On completion of the competition, successful candidates will be appointed to a post by the Human Resources Management Department in such a way as to match, as far as possible, their competences to the needs of the employer.

This level of transparency in the decision enables administrations to define their exact needs in terms of tasks and candidates to know what competences are required or need to be developed. It supports the rest of the recruitment process with pragmatic and strategic elements, while limiting the risks of recruiting outside the established procedures.

In OECD countries, a fundamental shift is taking place in the recruitment paradigm from an overemphasis on the candidate's education to a focus on competences (OECD, n.d.[22]). This means that public services must be able to assess the competences of candidates from the moment they apply. Competitions, whether for entry into the public service, for a specific job category or for a specific position, can facilitate this paradigm shift - while ensuring that the values of professionalism and fairness are respected (OECD, n.d.[22]). However, in Haiti, a number of recruitments are linked to direct appointments, bypassing the selection procedures in place and the supervision of the OMRH. This practice highlights the need for a change in administrative culture to facilitate the use of competitive examinations and to ensure that they become one of the main options for recruitment to decision-making bodies. In addition, in a predominantly male Haitian administration, the issue of equal opportunity and gender equality in the public service, which is highlighted in the PME-2023, requires an acceleration and deepening of the pilot projects carried out in certain ministries.

Career management as a motivating factor for public servants

A merit-based public service is the key to an effective public service that serves citizens. The OECD Recommendation on Public (OECD, 2017[23]) Integrity thus encourages the development of a professional, merit-based public sector committed to public service values and good governance, in particular to:

1. ensure human resource management that consistently applies fundamental principles, such as merit and transparency, to support professionalism in the public service, and that prevents favouritism and nepotism, protects against undue political interference and mitigates the risk of abuse of power and misconduct, and
2. ensure a fair and transparent system of selection, recruitment and promotion, based on goal criteria and a formalised procedure, as well as an evaluation system that promotes transparency and public service ethics.

The introduction of the concept of merit in the public service also creates an esprit de corps that values performance and competence, thus playing a central role in the personal motivation of the most competent officials (Charron, 2017[16]). Finally, the professionalisation of the public service through merit enables officials to focus on their work and long-term career prospects, rather than stagnating at a certain hierarchical level - as is often the case in Haiti - and being tempted by external opportunities (OECD, 2020[24]). However, this meritocratic dimension of career management must be present at all stages of an official's career, from recruitment to exit, through dynamic career development based on performance assessment and training. This meritocratic career management requires a clear and transparent definition of the different positions, the associated tasks and the required competences.

Career management is also seen as a fundamental pillar of employee development and motivation to enter and remain in the public sector. This whole area of human resource management seems to be neglected, despite the existence of administrative structures. This means that although there are individual performance assessment tools in Haiti, there is no formal and systematic performance assessment that is mandatory for officials. However, it is a useful source for identifying training needs, which is essential in the promotion process. There could be some aversion to evaluation, but this can be overcome by setting up in-depth interviews, moving away from simple formal evaluation. These interviews can be conducted

jointly with the human resources director (HRD) and the manager. However, they must go hand in hand with career prospects, built on career frameworks linked to grades or steps, which are still too often lacking in Haiti, despite a few exceptions such as the one mentioned above.

This lack of mandatory performance evaluation leads to a real weakness in professional mobility in Haiti, where a large proportion of Haitian officials remain in the same position for a long time, with no prospect of promotion. This lack of mobility, and the resulting stagnation in the same job, discourages the best people and prevents institutions from training their personnel in the necessary competences. Moreover, this situation is aggravated by the lack of an explicit policy on retirement and pensions, for which HRDs lack resources. Indeed, the survey conducted in the context of this project revealed a marked indeterminacy of minimum and maximum retirement ages. All government employees, whether public servants or contract workers, are eligible for the government pension plan. However, there is no mandatory retirement age defined by law. The existing system accordingly poses two problems: on the one hand, a lack of visibility of personnel members' pension rights and, on the other, a tendency to prefer not to retire in view of the drop in purchasing power that this could entail.

Clarify institutional responsibilities for human resources management

In OECD countries, central human resource management institutions, similar to the OMRH, have different missions. However, they are generally responsible for policies related to recruitment and promotion, the implementation of which they delegate to departments and other administrations. This leads to a more or less decentralised process, in which the central human resources institution accompanies, advises and possibly supervises the other institutions. A central human resources management (HRM) institution with a strong role and capacity enables more effective delegation of certain HRM measures (OECD, 2012[25]). In addition to the human and financial capacity and the policy framework, this means that the central HRM institutions must assume a cooperative role with other institutions in terms of logistical support, definition of guidelines and evaluation or feedback.

As noted in the Recommendation on Public Service Leadership and Capability, cooperation can only exist if there is a clear definition of the responsibilities of each stakeholder. This definition must be accompanied by verification and control mechanisms, allowing each stakeholder to maximise its usefulness within the public administration.

The first part of this chapter examined the role of leaders in managing public servants. The second part focused on the role of recruitment and career management systems in the development of an effective public service. For both to work, it is essential to know how the organisations responsible for personnel management work together. The OECD Council Recommendation on Public Service Leadership and Capability stresses the importance of clearly defining institutional responsibilities for workforce management in order to enhance the effectiveness of the public employment system, including by:

1. defining institutional competencies to set and oversee common minimum requirements for merit-based workforce management;
2. delegating appropriate flexibility to individual agencies and departments, managers and/or supervisors to tailor their workforce management to their strategic goals;
3. establishing appropriate communication and information sharing mechanisms between the institutional players of the public employment system and;
4. ensuring that each institutional actor in the public employment system has the necessary mandate and resources to function effectively.

This part of the recommendation echoes Pillar 2, axis 5 of the PME-2023 on strengthening government coordination. Indeed, this axis stresses the need to ensure the proper implementation of the prerogatives of institutions, including the OMRH, and to establish a framework to strengthen the dialogue between

central institutions and regional authorities. In Haiti, responsibilities for personnel management could be clarified at two levels: on the one hand, to enable the human resources directors of the ministries to fulfil their functions as defined by Article 72 of the Decree of 17 May 2005 on the organisation of the central administration of the State, and on the other, to ensure inter-organisational cooperation between OMRH, the Ministry of the Interior and Local government (*Ministère de l'Intérieur et des Collectivités Territoriale*s - MICT) and the Higher Council for the Administration of the Public Service (*Conseil supérieur de l'administration de la function publique* - CSAFP). The latter is responsible for examining general issues relating to the modernisation of the public service, but the scope, results and current status of this body are poorly defined and invested.

The organisational responsibility for personnel management in the Haitian public service at the central level is officially the responsibility of the OMRH. Within the MICT, the Local Government Directorate (*Direction des Collectivités Territoriales* – DCT) is the administrative and technical link between the State and local governments. This Directorate is responsible, in particular, for steering the executive's policy on decentralisation, deconcentration of State administrative services and local development. This includes planning and organising training courses for regional managers in cooperation with the competent bodies.

Marginalised human resources directors in Haiti

Human resources directors play an essential role in the supervision of all stages of a person's career and in the management of the human resources of the State and its administrations. It is accordingly essential that this function be valued and respected by line managers. Within OECD membership, the role of HRDs has evolved considerably over the past decades, from a primarily salary function to a range of responsibilities related to work organisation, career development and training and change management. As noted in Box 5.7, several OECD countries have put in place initiatives to support and strengthen the HR sector. This development justifies the importance of HRDs in the public service and the centrality that their function should have. However, this role seems to be clearly devalued in Haiti.

HRDs in Haiti operate in a conflicting environment, often subject to political pressures and the existing regulatory framework. They are not protected and can be pressured or transferred if they do not obey the demands of their superiors, despite a law on arbitrary dismissal. Human resources departments can accordingly be purely formal and not be able to fulfil their missions. It accordingly seems urgent in Haiti to provide HRDs with a status that protects them from potential pressures, to create an independent body responsible for protecting their rights, those of officials, and the meritocratic aspect of the system, while depoliticising the HR function, as is the case for public accountants. At the same time, Haiti could consider supporting HRDs with professional training on modern human resource management methods. This is particularly important for HRDs so that they can implement development practices for public servants and support large officials in developing and implementing HR strategies.

The OMRH thus finds itself in a position wherein it can neither act as the manager of a unified national human resources policy nor as the overseer of further coordination of jurisdictions in the HR field. Nevertheless, examples of cooperation between HRDs and OMRH exist and could be replicated and intensified. This is the case, for example, of the competition for departmental commissioners, which was conducted by HRDs with the support of the OMRH throughout.

Box 5.7 Supporting the human resources function in public administrations

Many OECD governments recognise that building institutional human resource capacity is essential for public administrations to fulfil their missions:

Australia: the Australian Public Service Commission (APS) commissioned a review of its human resource capabilities in 2017. The Review found that the human resources function was a critical component of the best performing areas of the public service. It concluded that people working in the human resources sector, and in particular human resources managers, should develop specialised competences and play a more distinct role in planning and operational decisions.

Canada: the Policy on Workforce Management provides deputy ministers with the fundamental support needed to recruit and retain high-performing officers, thereby ensuring good governance and quality services to Canadians, as well as an inclusive, safe and barrier-free workplace that embodies public service values such as respect for people and democracy, integrity, responsible management, and excellence in action and decision making. The policy defines the human resources goals and expected results, the role of other government organisations and the consequences of non-compliance.

France: human resources (HR) are an important lever for the performance and modernisation of public intervention. The HR sector is accordingly at the heart of transformations, which concern both the professionalisation of its players and the renewal of its functions focused on new strategic, forward-looking and steering missions. Based on the comment of an image deficit in the sector, which leads to difficulties in recruiting and retaining agents, in a framework of permanent transformation of the professions, the General Directorate of the Public service has developed an "*action plan for the transformation of the HR function*" in 2019. This ambition is reflected first of all in the opening in 2020 of a project that forms part of the government's priority reforms, aimed at modernising the recruitment function. An "*interministerial plan to transform the recruitment function*" has produced concrete deliverables such as: the basis of an "employer brand" to promote the sector and develop its attractiveness; a guide to structuring the recruitment function; an interministerial recruitment training market; an "*induction toolbox*"; methods and tools for describing needs, sourcing and managing recruitment pools. These actions will be extended in 2021 to support the transformation of the HR function, processes and businesses.

Ireland: the third pillar of the people *Strategy for the Public Service 2017-2020* focuses on strengthening the human resource capacity of managers and better positioning the human resource functions to contribute to organisational goals.

United Kingdom: The UK Public service has established a set of minimum standards and expectations for various public sector roles, including human resource management. This norm forms part of a set of operational standards that define the government's management expectations. Standards can include both mandatory and advisory elements.

Source: **Australia:** https://www.apsc.gov.au/redesigning-hr; **Canada** https://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-fra.aspx?id=32621; **France**, https://www.fonction-publique.gouv.fr/files/files/publications/coll_outils_de_la_GRH/guide-transformation-de-fonction-RH.pdf; **Ireland**, https://assets.gov.ie/7232/1bd4d30f2003444a9ca59f1cf87afc28.pdf; **United Kingdom**: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/818838/6.5721_CO_Government_HR_Functional_Standard_FINAL_GOV.UK.pdf.

Another area of potential collaboration between the OMRH and the HRDs concerns the poorly developed training offer of the Haitian public service. These two entities must be able to work together, sometimes with the training directorates of certain ministries, to allocate clear budget lines for the entire public service, based on the competences needs of each ministry.

Figure 5.7 illustrates how OECD countries structure their institutional responsibilities for learning and development. The distribution is fairly even between countries where a single government institution is responsible for learning and development (e.g. Italy), countries where responsibility is delegated to sectoral ministries (e.g. Denmark), and countries such as France, where there is strong coordination between different central and federal levels. In Haiti, greater coordination of learning and development efforts across ministries could help address common needs while reducing costs through economies of scale.

Figure 5.7 Body responsible for the promotion, coordination and administration of learning in the core public administration



Source: OECD (2016), Survey of Strategic Human Resource Management in Central and Federal Governments.

A local level public service in the making

In its function of overseeing the management of the State's human resources, the OMRH must accordingly strengthen its capacity to collaborate with other institutions. Cooperation between OMRH and the Ministry of the Interior and Local Government (MICT) has paved the way for the creation of a regional public service in Haiti. The experience of the OECD in this area can be instructive, particularly with regard to administrative competence building in the context of decentralisation (see Box 5.8). Haiti is in the process of setting up its regional public service. Equally important, at the local and regional level, is to strengthen merit by analysing the accountability mechanisms of leaders to the people, the way they manage the recruitment of local personnel and key human resource responsibilities such as training and development.

In France, specific institutions have been created to oversee and manage the various aspects of recruitment and training at the subnational level, and to promote public service in the regions as a career opportunity.

- The National Centre for Local public service (*Centre national de la fonction publique territoriale* - CNFPT) is a decentralised joint public institution whose training and employment missions help to support local authorities and their employees in their public service mission. It has three main

missions: training, comment and the organisation of competitions for the A+ job categories. The National Institute for Local Studies (*Institut national des études territoriales* - INET), in conjunction with the CNFPT's Competitive Examinations and Executive Mobility Department, supports executives throughout their professional careers: training guidance, career advice and mobility assistance.

- INET also contributes to the collective reflection on regional issues by producing studies and books, or by organising events. The INET provides initial training for successful candidates in the competitions for administrators, chief engineers, library curators and heritage curators, as well as continuing education for local authority senior managers in all fields: administrative, technical, cultural and medico-social.
- The management centres (*centres de gestion*): these are local public establishments of an administrative nature, managed by regional employers and created at departmental level (or interdepartmental level for the Ile-de-France region). They are entrusted with certain tasks relating to the recruitment and management of local level personnel, without relieving local authorities of their decision-making powers. Rather, their role is to promote, through various forms of intervention, the uniform and equitable application of the regional public service statute. The centres are primarily made up of the local authorities that are "affiliated" to them. This membership, which is accompanied by the payment of a fee, is compulsory for the smallest local authorities, i.e. municipalities and public establishments employing less than 350 officials, and optional for other local authorities. In principle, non-affiliated local authorities, i.e. primarily the larger ones, perform the tasks assigned to the centres by law. However, they could choose to use the centres for some of these tasks. In addition, some of the compulsory tasks carried out by the centres concern all local authorities, whether or not they are affiliated.

Box 5.8 Making Decentralisation Work: a Handbook for Decision Makers

What are the risks and pitfalls to avoid?

- There is no single, uniform solution. Capacity-building programmes should be tailored to the needs of individual local government bodies, based on a careful assessment of local needs.
- Capacity should not be seen as a constraint on the proper functioning of government, affecting the transparent and reasoned distribution of power among governments. Capacity bottlenecks can be overcome over time, while in the short term these capacity gaps could be filled by borrowing or contracting capacity from subnational government associations, higher levels of government or the private sector, for example.
- Capacity-building programmes often lack a long-term dimension. Building and strengthening sub-national capacity is a long-term commitment that requires sustained resources and political commitment from both sub-national and central/federal levels of government.
- Capacity-building programmes are often too narrow, focusing on training and technical assistance, without a full diagnosis of the different dimensions involved.

What are the recommendations?

- Governments should seek to build the capacity of public officials and institutions through a systemic approach, rather than focusing solely on technical assistance.
- The central government should regularly assess the capacity challenges in different regions and adapt policies to build capacity to meet the different needs of the territories. Personnel training covering local public finance management should be introduced and should be mandatory.

Mandatory training for budget personnel on budgeting methods, budget design, budget performance, revenue analysis and strategic planning should also be introduced.

- The distribution of formal or standardised guidance documents in areas such as planning, project appraisal, procurement or monitoring and evaluation is very beneficial.
- The promotion of open and competitive recruitment and merit-based promotion, as well as measures such as the adoption of specific salary scales for necessary areas of technical expertise, are useful measures.
- The creation of multi-jurisdictional public agencies specialised in the necessary areas of expertise helps to build sub-national capacity.

Source: OECD (2019), Making decentralisation work. A Handbook for Policy Makers, OECD Studies in Multilevel Governance, OECD Publishing, Paris. https://doi.org/10.1787/g2g9faa7-en.

Conclusion and recommendations

It is necessary for the success of the PME-2023 to start modestly with the simplest solutions, which seem "within reach", while keeping in mind long-term changes. For instance, political appointments can work provided there are clear rules about the goals and criteria for appointment, so that political appointees are supported by an independent and professional senior public service to which they are accountable. In the short term, specialised training could be provided to senior managers, and in the longer term, a body could be created to make recommendations on the direction and management of this group. With respect to recruitment, a clear priority in the transition to an entry-level competition is to ensure that the examination tests the required competencies and that those responsible for assessment have the independence to make decisions based on merit. This goal can only be achieved if the responsibilities of each actor in public personnel management are clearly defined.

Recommendations

The following recommendations build on the three topics of analysis presented in this chapter. They are based on the State Modernisation Plan 2023, information gathered by the OECD from its Haitian counterparts and the OECD Council Recommendation on Leadership and Competence in the Public Service.

1. Supporting leaders

Given their central role between the design and implementation of public policies, senior officials have a particular role to play in the implementation of the various aspects of the PME-2023. As the OECD Recommendation on Leadership and Capability in the Public Service states, building the capacity of public service leaders is essential to developing a culture and leadership guided by values such as merit. To implement this recommendation, Haiti could consider the following actions:

- Putting competencies at the heart of the appointment process for senior officials. The professionalisation of the senior public service can only be achieved if it has the competencies necessary for its missions. Professional, strategic and managerial competencies can be

integrated into the conditions of appointment and reinforced through specific training programmes.

- Developing capacity within the OMRH and human resources directorates to implement and monitor laws on the appointment of senior officials. The creation of senior public service inspectorates could be a first step towards the professionalisation of the public service.
- Enabling the emergence of proactive management of the senior public service, with distinct practices reflecting the special position of senior officials. These practices could better meet their specific needs, for example in terms of training.
- Raising awareness on the importance of the role of the senior public service in workforce management and forecasting.

2. Strengthening merit in recruitment and career management

In accordance with Article 27 of the Decree of 17 May 2005, the Office of management and human resources must have the tools necessary for proactive management of personnel members and their careers. Putting competency management at the centre of its missions can lead to a more dynamic management of agents and to a professionalisation of the public service, as highlighted in the OECD Recommendation on Leadership and Competence in the Public Service. To implement this recommendation, Haiti could consider the following actions:

- Centralising and making accessible to the greatest number of people the various job offers of the public sector in Haiti on a dedicated portal. The purpose of such a measure is to make career opportunities more widely known to all applicants, thereby enabling the public service to attract the best potential candidates.
- Creating, under the supervision of the OMRH, an interdepartmental reference system of competences to be used for each position, to define in a homogeneous way the different competences common to public service positions.
- Strengthening the introduction of competitions for vacant posts with selection criteria open to all and evaluated on clearly defined bases. These competitions could lead to the creation of talent pools with the necessary competences.
- Developing a standardised, regular and mandatory evaluation of public servants, based on mastery and reinforcement of competencies, as well as on the achievement of specific, measurable, acceptable, realistic and time-bound goals.
- Implementing training offerings at the central level, focusing on competencies previously defined jointly by the ministries and OMRH. Training must be accessible to as many people as possible to develop and bring out the necessary competences.
- Clarifying career opportunities within the public service.
- Ensuring quality positions for young officials, so that Haitian youth are best represented in the development of public policies.

3. Clarify responsibilities and facilitate cooperation in personnel management

The Haitian public service is affected by a lack of cooperation and the absence of a clear definition of the role of each actor in human resources management. Axis 5 of PME-2023 on strengthening government coordination specifically addresses the need to clarify institutional responsibilities for workforce management, as highlighted in the OECD recommendation on public service leadership and competence. To implement this recommendation, Haiti could consider the following measures:

- Rethinking strategic oversight of the OMRH. Theoretically, the organisation of the Haitian public service should be based in part on the Superior Council for Administration and Public Service (*Conseil supérieur de l'administration et de la fonction publique*), which is responsible for formulating and evaluating general policies relating to public administration and human resources, and which has authority over the OMRH. In practice, this body does not take part in the majority of decisions linked to its mandate. Consideration should be given to overseeing the OMRH in order to effectively identify and drive the changes needed to implement the PME-2023.
- Developing the ecosystem of human resources departments, and create an interdepartmental human resources network that brings to the OMRH the reality that HRDs experience on a daily basis. Such a network would enable for more agile coordination between the creation of public policies and their implementation, and would promote the professionalisation of the HR sector.
- Strengthening the independence and neutrality of HRDs by organising and protecting their careers, as has been done for public accountants.

References

Ambassade des Etats-Unis en Haiti (2018), *Discours de l'Ambassadeur Sison à la Cérémonie d'Ouverture du Forum International sur la Réforme de l'Etat*, https://ht.usembassy.gov/fr/discours-de-lambassadeur-sison-la-ceremonie-douverture-du-forum-international-sur-la-reforme-de-letat/. [15]

Bureau de l'évaluation du Programme des Nations Unies pour le Développement (2006), *Evaluation of UNDP Assistance to conflict-affected countries: Case study Haiti*, https://www.oecd.org/countries/haiti/44826404.pdf. [21]

Charron, N. (2017), "Careers, Connections, and Corruption Risks: Investigating the Impact of Bureaucratic Meritocracy on Public Procurement Processes", *The Journal of Politics*, http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/687209. [16]

Charron, N. (2016), "Measuring Meritocracy in the Public Sector in Europe: a New National and Sub-National Indicator", *European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research*, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10610-016-9307-0. [17]

Cortazar, J., J. Fuenzalida and M. Lafuente (2016), *Sistemas de mérito para la selección de directivos públicos: ¿Mejor desempeño del Estado?: Un estudio exploratorio*, http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0000323. [9]

Crane, K. et al. (2010), *Building a More Resilient Haitian State*, RAND Corporation, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.7249/mg1039srf-cc.18.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A6cc9360645ab4b484a8bb86cfc967d46. [12]

Dahlstrom, C., V. Lapuente and J. Teorell (2011), "The merit of meritocratization: Politics, bureaucracy, and the institutional deterrents of corruption", *Political Research Quarterly*, Vol. 65/3, pp. 656-668, http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1065912911408109. [10]

Evans, R. (1999), “Bureaucracy and Growth: A Cross-National Analysis of the Effects of “Weberian” State Structures on Economic Growth”, *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 64/5, pp. pp. 748-765, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2657374. [18]

Gerson, D. (2020), “Leadership pour une haute fonction publique performante: Vers un système de haute fonction publique dans les pays de l’OCDE”, No. 40, Éditions OCDE, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/f87e7397-fr. [19]

IMF (2012), *Haiti: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper—Progress Report*, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2012/cr1275.pdf. [13]

Meyer-Sahling, J. and K. Mikkelsen (2016), “Civil Service Laws, Merit, Politicization, and Corruption: The Perspective of Public Officials from Five East European Countries”, *Public Administration*, Vol. 94/4, pp. 1105-1123, http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/padm.12276. [11]

OECD (2020), *Enquête sur la composition des effectifs des administrations centrales ou fédérales*. [7]

OECD (2020), *Manuel de l’OCDE sur l’intégrité publique*, Éditions OCDE, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/84581cb5-fr. [24]

OECD (2020), *Module sur le leadership de l’enquête sur le leadership et les aptitudes de la fonction publique*. [20]

OECD (2019), *Recommendation of the Council on Public Service Leadership and Capability*, http://dx.doi.org/OECD/LEGAL/0445. [3]

OECD (2018), *OECD Public Governance Reviews: Paraguay: Pursuing National Development through Integrated Public Governance*, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264301856-en. [8]

OECD (2017), *Recommandation de l’OCDE sur l’intégrité publique OECD/LEGAL/0435*. [23]

OECD (2012), *Developing Human Resource Management Strategies to Support Strategic Agility in the Public Sector*. [25]

OECD (n.d.), *OECD Public Governance Reviews*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/22190414. [22]

Office de Management et des Ressources Humaines (2018), *Programme de modernisation de l’Etat 2018-2023*, http://www.omrh.gouv.ht/Media/2-DocumentsStrategiques/fp/PME-2023_20190313_09h31.pdf. [4]

OMRH (2018), *Charte d’engagement pour les prestations des services de qualité à l’usager*, http://www.omrh.gouv.ht/Media/2-DocumentsStrategiques/fp/CHARTE_D_ENGAGEMENT_POUR_LES_PRESTATIONS_DE_SERVICES.pdf. [2]

OMRH (2018), *Rapport sur les effectifs de la fonction publique en Haiti*, http://www.omrh.gouv.ht/Media/news/rfph_201802.pdf. [6]

PNUD (2010), *1 Year Later*, https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/crisis-prevention-and-recovery/haiti_one_year_later.html. [1]

Transparency International (2020), “Corruption Perceptions Index”, Website accessed 29 January 2020, https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2019/index/hti#. [5]

UNDP (2015), *Restore or reform? UN support to core government functions in the aftermath of conflict*, https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/crisis-prevention-and-recovery/Executive_Summary_Public_Administration.html. [14]

6 Open government and strategic management of public communication in Haiti

This chapter analyses the institutional and public policy framework in Haiti for open government and the principles of transparency, accountability, integrity and participation which underpin it. It also aims to assess the regulatory framework for strategic public communication, which is a key element of open government. Based on the results of this analysis, the chapter offers recommendations that will enable the Haitian government to better integrate these principles into the public policy cycle and to communicate in a more effective and inclusive manner.

Introduction

Governments around the world have taken ownership of open government principles and initiatives for several years. The latter is seen as a catalyst for achieving broader policy goals such as more effective public governance, stronger democracy, more inclusive growth and the restoration of citizens' trust in public administrations. Open government is also mobilised to address urgent large-scale challenges, such as environmental, migration and economic issues, humanitarian or health crises (notably the COVID-19 pandemic), or severe socio-economic inequalities, in a context in which citizens demand a more transparent and accountable public sector offering better services. Open government rethinks the role of the state in a changing modern society and redefines public policy making with a focus on citizens. By giving citizens the opportunity to express themselves, to be heard and to be taken into account in the formulation of public policies, these efforts increase the inclusiveness, acceptability and quality of decisions that are closer to the needs of citizens.

Strategic management of government public communications is another key factor in the success of an open government policy. The COVID-19 pandemic has underlined the importance of its role, particularly in Haiti with the initiatives put in place by the government to keep the population very regularly informed of developments. It has also increased the urgency of reforms in this direction. Moreover, the strengthening of citizen participation and dialogue with them favours the implementation of the administrations' missions in response to the population's expectations.

Open government: transparency, accountability and participation

The benefits of open government for inclusive growth

In order to face new challenges to public intervention, such as the erosion of citizens' trust in their leaders and dissatisfaction with democratic institutions, a new culture of public governance has gradually emerged, known as "open government". It urges governments to put citizens and other stakeholders at the centre of public policy. The OECD defines open government as "a culture of governance that promotes the principles of transparency, integrity, accountability and stakeholder participation for the benefit of democracy and inclusive growth" (OECD, 2017[1]) (see Box 6.1).

Box 6.1 Definition of open government principles

- **Transparency**: government transparency refers to stakeholder access to data and information - proactively and reactively disclosed - about the actions of public servants and their outcomes, as well as openness in decision-making.
- **Accountability**: accountability refers to a relationship that involves both the duty of public actors to provide transparent information about their actions, activities and performance and their responsibility. The concept also refers to the right of citizens and stakeholders to have access to this information, on the one hand, and to have the possibility to question governments and to reward or sanction their performance through electoral, institutional, administrative and social channels, on the other.
- **Integrity**: integrity refers to the conformity of actions with shared values, principles and ethical standards to uphold the public interest, giving it priority over private interests.
- **Stakeholder participation**: stakeholder participation refers to all the ways in which stakeholders can be involved in the policy cycle and in the design and delivery of services, from

sharing information to planning consultations and enhancing involvement and collaboration at all stages of the decision-making process. A stakeholder is any interested or affected party, e.g. individuals - irrespective of their age, gender, sexual orientation, religious and political affiliations - civil society organisations (CSO), journalists, trade unions, universities, etc.

Sources: OECD (2017[2]), Open Government: Global Framework and Outlook, OECD Publishing, Paris. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264280984-fr; OECD (2017[3]), Council Recommendation on Public Integrity, http://www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/Recommandation-integrite-publique.pdf; OECD (2017[1]), OECD Council Recommendation on Open Government ,https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/fr/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0438.

By placing citizens and society as a whole at the heart of government activities, open government enables progress towards a new paradigm of governance, which has profound implications for the way in which political systems, governments and public administration are run. Citizens are seen as real players, rather than mere users of public services, who, by participating fully in the democratic life of their country and community, can contribute to the search for public policy solutions and ensure that the decision-making process is responsive to needs. Governments engaged in ambitious open government reforms identify several benefits, including the following:

- **Tailor-made and more responsive policies**: the possibility for stakeholders to contribute their expertise and views at all stages of the policy cycle makes public policies more likely to achieve desired goals.
- **Better designed and delivered public services**: applying the principles of transparency and accountability to all public services enables users to identify shortcomings and make improvements, thereby improving the efficiency and relevance of the services provided.
- **Greater legitimacy of government**: If government decision-making is transparent, accountable, honest and participatory, stakeholders tend to be more supportive of proposals and government action is legitimised.
- **Building trust**: each of the principles of open government is designed to build trust in public actors. Trust is a crucial element for the success of many policies, programmes and regulations that depend on the cooperation and support of citizens.
- **A step towards inclusive growth**: the implementation of open government principles is also essential for an equitable distribution of the fruits of growth in society. These principles, applied to all citizens, including the most disadvantaged, make it possible to reduce the inequalities in access to opportunities and the asymmetry of information that increase inequality and reinforce exclusion (OECD, 2017[2]).

All actors in society, whether civil society organisations (CSOs), the private sector, journalists, the media or citizens themselves, have their own views on the public policy issues that affect them. Their active participation in decision-making strengthens their commitment to the policies and reforms suggested and thus contributes to a more targeted use of limited public resources.

In interviews with government and civil society representatives in Haiti, a lack of understanding of the principles of open government was highlighted, as well as the persistence of a culture of secrecy that permeates the public administration. It is accordingly necessary for the government raise awareness to promote these principles and the positive effects they can have on the well-being of Haitians.

In addition, having a single, clear and accepted definition of what open government is generally, essential for initiating reforms in this area. The public is thus informed of the main dimensions, scope and limits of the concept, which facilitates a common understanding and use of the concept, bringing all stakeholders and public officials together around the same goals. This convergence makes possible a robust analysis

of the impact of open government strategies and initiatives across institutions and levels of government. It facilitates international comparisons of open government strategies and initiatives (OECD, 2017[2]). It can also help to strengthen the ownership and participation of state and non-state actors involved in reforms and open government initiatives. For this purpose, a common definition needs to be established, recognised, communicated and accepted by all, including the public sector, citizens, CSO, the private sector, the media, etc. Haiti could consider co-constructing a single definition with all stakeholders, taking into account the political, cultural and socio-economic context of the country. It is important to include a wide range of stakeholders representative of society, including the most affected, vulnerable, underrepresented or marginalised social groups, such as youth, women, rural populations and illiterate citizens.

Building on the collective experiences of its members and partners, the OECD Council approved the Recommendation on Open Government in 2017 to support governments in this effort (OECD, 2017[1]). Through ten provisions, the recommendation defines the characteristics of an enabling environment for efficient, effective and integrated governance of open government (Box 6.2).

Box 6.2 Summary of the provisions of the OECD Recommendation on Open Government

1. Develop and implement open government strategies and initiatives in collaboration with stakeholders to foster commitment from politicians, parliamentarians, senior officials and other public officials;
2. Ensure the existence and implementation of the necessary open government legal and regulatory framework, with adequate oversight mechanisms in place to ensure compliance;
3. Ensure the successful operationalisation and take-up of open government strategies and initiatives;
4. Coordinate, through the necessary institutional mechanisms, open government strategies and initiatives - horizontally and vertically - to ensure that they are aligned with and contribute to all relevant socio-economic objectives;
5. Develop and implement monitoring, evaluation and learning mechanisms for open government strategies and initiatives;
6. Actively communicate on open government strategies and initiatives, as well as on their outputs, outcomes and impacts, to ensure that they are well-known within and outside government;
7. Proactively make available clear, complete, timely, reliable and relevant public information and data that are: free of cost, available in open and non-proprietary machine-readable formats, easy to find, understand, use and reuse and distributed through a multi-channel approach;
8. Grant all stakeholders equal and effective opportunities to be informed and consulted and actively involve them in all phases of the public policy cycle and service design and. This should be done with adequate time and at a minimal cost, while avoiding duplication between initiatives. In addition, a special effort must be made to reach the most relevant, vulnerable, underrepresented or marginalised social groups, while avoiding undue influence and policy capture;
9. Promote innovative ways to effectively engage with stakeholders to source ideas and co-create solutions and seize the opportunities provide by digital government tools, including open government data;

10. While recognising the roles, prerogatives and, overall the independence of all concerned parties, and according to their existing legal and institutional frameworks, explore the possibility of moving from the concept of open government to that of the open state.

Source: OECD (2017[1]), *Recommendation of the OECD Council on Open Government*, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/fr/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0438.

An enabling environment for open government reforms

A stable socio-political context creates an enabling environment for the implementation of open government reforms. Protected civic space - defined as the set of legal, political, institutional and practical conditions necessary for non-state actors to access information, express themselves, associate, organise and participate in public life - is a necessary precondition for good governance and open government (OECD[4]).

In Haiti, political and social instability, combined with extreme poverty, massive unemployment, vulnerability to natural disasters, pervasive corruption and high levels of insecurity, prevent the government from implementing quality public policies and providing basic public services (HRW, n.d.[5]) (Banque mondiale, n.d.[6]). This complex framework of instability makes it very difficult to establish a culture of transparency, accountability, integrity and participation in the country. Breaking the political deadlock and holding elections to re-establish a legislative power to create effective checks and balances are indispensable preconditions (for more details, see Chapter 1).

In this difficult framework, citizens' trust in the national government in Haiti is low, at 37% according to the 2018 Gallup *Trust in Government* report (Figure 6.1). It has fallen from 2017 (44%), but has risen from 2016 (15%) (Gallup, 2019[7]). According to the survey, trust in government is strongly correlated with citizens' approval of the direction of their country and perceptions of corruption in government. For example, in May 2019, the Higher Court of Accounts and Administrative Disputes (*Cour supérieure des comptes et du contentieux administrative* – CSCCA) announced the president's alleged involvement in a massive corruption scandal, sparking widespread protests (Freedom House, 2020[8]).

Figure 6.1 Confidence in the national government in Haiti (2006-2018)



Source: (Gallup, 2019[7])*Trust in Government | Gallup Historical Trends*, https://news.gallup.com/poll/5392/trust-government.aspx.

Trust is the foundation on which the legitimacy of public institutions rests; it is essential for maintaining social cohesion. It is important to the success of a wide range of public policies that depend on public reaction and attitudes. In particular, trust leads to greater compliance with government decisions, regulations and the tax system (OECD[9]).

Despite occasional democratic advances and the inclusion in the Constitution of the protection of certain fundamental rights and freedoms, such as freedom of the press, expression and assembly, the Haitian state has historically restricted civic space. In February 2021, the organisation CIVICUS, which measures the state of civic space around the world, classified the country in the "constrained" (CIVICUS[10]) category, meaning that "civic space is strongly contested by those in power, who impose various legal and practical obstacles limiting the full enjoyment of fundamental rights" (CIVICUS[11]). In addition, *Freedom House*, a non-governmental organisation (NGO) that measures the political and civil freedom of countries, classifies Haiti as "partially free" (Freedom House, 2021[12]) and says that the work of journalists is hampered by threats and violence, government interference, lack of financial resources and difficult access to information (Freedom House, 2020[8]). The global report on freedom of expression prepared by Article 19 judges freedom of expression in Haiti to be "limited" due to the lack of government transparency and the absence of protection for journalists, communicators and human rights defenders (Article 19, 2020[13]). Moreover, while the Constitution protects freedom of assembly, this right is often breached in practice by police forces, who regularly use excessive force to disperse demonstrators, but are rarely investigated or prosecuted. Human rights defenders and NGO activists working on sensitive issues are exposed to threats and violence, creating a climate of fear (Freedom House, 2020[8]).

Protecting civic space and restoring stakeholder confidence are preconditions for closer and more constructive collaboration with government and participation in public life. The government must ensure that the legal and judicial framework of civil rights and freedoms is guaranteed and respected in order to promote and protect civic space. This implies the adoption of measures to ensure respect for freedom of expression, assembly, association, privacy and protection against discrimination. Haiti, like most countries, has an Office for the Protection of the Citizen (*Office de la protection du citoyen et de la citoyenne* - OPC) which acts as an independent ombudsman for the promotion and protection of human rights. The OPC, established in 1987, is responsible for ensuring that the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens guaranteed by the Constitution are respected. It is thus empowered to investigate and make recommendations in cases of abuse by the public administration (OPC, n.d.[14]). However, according to interviews conducted during the OECD fact-finding mission, the Office has neither the means nor the capacity to respond to the needs that exist in Haiti or to protect and promote adequate civic space in the country.

Haiti could empower the OPC to conduct investigations and encourage greater collaboration between the OPC, national authorities and other stakeholders to raise awareness among officials and better identify the needs of citizens. Box 6.3 provides examples of ombudsmen working with stakeholders.

Box 6.3 Ombudsmen's collaborative initiatives with stakeholders

The OECD report on the role of ombudsmen in open government found that some ombudsmen are working with other actors to collect complaints. This is the case of the **Irish Ombudsman**, who relies on the trained personnel of the Citizens' Information Centres to receive complaints. **The National Ombudsman of Spain** and **the Ombudsman of the Basque Country (Spain)** collaborate with civil society in the drafting of special reports. The Basque Ombudsman has also organised joint activities and involved NGOs in his strategic programming. **The Ombudsman of Wallonia and the Wallonia-Brussels Federation (Belgium)** works with stakeholders to identify systemic problems, including

quarterly meetings with the Walloon Anti-Poverty Network to identify the difficulties of people experiencing poverty.

Institutions dealing with human rights issues have concluded cooperation agreements with civil society organisations. **The People's Advocate of Romania** has signed collaboration protocols with 35 NGOs in the field of prevention of torture in prisons. These protocols govern the conditions of cooperation, such as the duty of confidentiality. Similarly, **the Ombudsman of Serbia** cooperates with NGOs in this specific area. The **defence counsel of the Rights of the Republic** has also signed agreements with NGOs and professionals who support his work in handling complaints and carrying out awareness-raising activities. For example, he has signed seven agreements with judges, students, researchers, philosophers, young officials, cartoonists and teachers to strengthen the education of children and young people. **The Chancellor of Justice of Estonia** cooperated with NGOs in the organisation of the event "With and for children" and established an advisory body to the Chancellor with representatives of children and youth organisations.

Source: OECD (2018[15]), *The Role of Ombudsmen in Open Government*, http://www.oecd.org/gov/Ombudsman-Report-FR.pdf.

Establishment of a governance framework conducive to open government reforms

Consolidating a policy framework that supports open government principles

A governance framework conducive to open government reforms is necessary for their implementation. This requires strong public policies, legal and institutional frameworks and high-level leadership. The policy framework for open government reforms sets out a roadmap of principles and terms, while the transversal nature of open government reforms requires political commitment and strong leadership to ensure greater policy coherence. Political commitment reflects the decision of leaders to use their power, influence and personal involvement to ensure that reforms, programmes and initiatives receive the attention, resources and political support necessary to overcome resistance to change, internal and external opposition and blockages (OECD, 2017[2]).

However, Haiti's executive and legislative leaders seem to lack legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens, due to the many problems associated with their elections. On the one hand, political transitions remain difficult due to elections that are regularly disrupted by violence, marred by accusations of fraud and postponed (Freedom House, 2020[8]). Civil society groups have complained of fraud in the vote count, inconsistent voter lists and attempts to disenfranchise voters. The Provisional Electoral Council (*Conseil électoral provisoire* - CEP), responsible for managing the electoral process, is suspected of lacking impartiality due to the influence of the executive branch (Freedom House, 2020[8]). On the other hand, the country is experiencing a sharp decline in voter turnout. Turnout in the last parliamentary elections in 2015 was historically low at 18%, compared to 60% in 2000, 28% in 2006 and 23% in 2011. Similarly, the turnout in the 2016 presidential election was 18%, compared to 78% in 2000, 59% in 2006 and 22% in 2011 (IDEA, n.d.[16]). All this undermines open government reforms and does not enable for effective and efficient stakeholder participation in public life.

For open government to deliver the intended benefits, senior politicians must strive to demonstrate their commitment to a change in the culture of governance and to concrete actions inside and outside government, including all stakeholders. In several countries, this commitment is often promoted in high-level policy documents or in an open government strategy[1]. In Haiti, the principles of transparency, accountability and stakeholder participation, are mentioned in the *State Modernisation Programme 2018-2023 (Programme de modernisation de l'État* - PME-2023*).* The PME-2023 is a strategic document that describes the reform of public governance in the country, with the main goal of creating a modern state that meets the needs of users of public services. It recognises the importance of developing a culture of

transparency, accountability and participation in the development and implementation of public policies and services (Gouvernement d'Haïti, 2018[17]).

The PME-2023 sets out goals to reinforce some of the principles of open government. They are linked to Axis 1 (improving the delivery of public services to users), Axis 6 (subnational governance) and Axis 10 (external control and transparency). This last axis, in particular, has two goals: on the one hand, the establishment of external control in budgetary matters, carried out by several actors and including the citizens; on the other hand, measures to guarantee the effectiveness of external control mechanisms (Gouvernement d'Haïti, 2018[17]). To meet these goals, a data portal on budgetary expenditures was set up by the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) with the support of the World Bank. The government has also indicated its intention to draw up a citizen's budget with the support of the technical and financial partners (TFPs). Nevertheless, efforts are still needed to strengthen transparency and anti-corruption mechanisms. As will be explained in the next section, existing programmes are very limited, lack effectiveness and structure, and do not reach the entire population.

It is good practice to draft these documents through a participatory and inclusive process to ensure that they reflect the demands and needs of civil society. For the creation of PME-2023, representatives of civil society were involved in the development committee during the design, implementation and evaluation phases. This is the first time that the government has involved stakeholders in the development of a strategic plan, in response to the findings of the evaluation of the previous reform programme, which highlighted, among other challenges, a lack of stakeholder ownership. According to the Office of Management and Human Resources (OMRH), this cooperation also aimed to contribute to a more open government by improving "transparency of public intervention, consultation and dialogue with civil society, and citizen participation" (Gouvernement d'Haïti, 2018[17]).However, OECD interviews with different actors show that the civil society involved in this committee was not representative in terms of gender, regions and sectoral areas. In addition, although the committee stated that it was consulted in the design of the PME-2023, its involvement in the implementation and evaluation appears to have been limited.

Whereas these measures are the first steps towards a more open and participatory government, considerable efforts are still needed to achieve the goals of the PME-2023. For Haiti, a long-term commitment to these reforms should necessarily involve concrete initiatives and political commitment to open government principles and initiatives. Stronger engagement of high-level public authorities, such as the President, ministers, legislators and other relevant political figures, in the principles and initiatives could help strengthen the commitment of all stakeholders. This is necessary to encourage a change in the culture of governance and to overcome the culture of secrecy in Haiti[2]. Tunisia is a good example of high-level political commitment to several of these reforms (see Box 6.4).

Box 6.4 High-level political commitment to open government in Tunisia

Nine years after the 2011 revolution, Tunisia has significantly improved its governance and embarked on ambitious reforms to further open up the government. The country became eligible and joined the Open Government Partnership (OGP) in January 2014; it was the second country in the MENA region to do so. Since then, Tunisia has implemented three national action plans under the OGP, enacted an law on information access in 2017, and created an access to information commission to support the rollout of this law. In October 2020, the country launched the consultation phase for the 4th National Action Plan of the OGP. This process involved the participation of a wide range of stakeholders, including independent institutions and civil society organisations.

In 2019, Tunisia formally acceded to the OECD Council Recommendation on Open Government. In November 2020, Tunisia launched the process of developing the first-ever national strategy for open

government, as well as a civic space analysis at a joint event co-chaired by the Ministers of Public Service and Relations with Constitutional Institutions and Civil Society.

Source: (Présidence du gouvernement de la République tunisienne, n.d.[18]), http ://www.ogptunisie.gov.tn/fr/.

Develop a strong institutional framework to facilitate coordination and collaboration with stakeholders

The transversal nature of open government reforms requires the involvement, within a strong institutional framework, of a variety of public sector and civil society actors for their implementation. The majority of OECD countries (77%) have an office within government responsible for horizontal co-ordination of open government reforms. These offices could have different functions, including, as appropriate, the development of high-level policy documents, their implementation, monitoring or evaluation of their impact. The institutional location of these offices is critical to their political support and consistency with government policy priorities (OECD, 2017[2]).

In Haiti, although two ministries have a mandate that links them to stakeholders, there is no structure in place to work with them. On the one hand, the OMRH has among its attributions the improvement of the relationship of the administration with the users of public services, notably through e-governance (OMRH, n.d.[19]). One of its offices, the Administrative Information Centre (*Centre de Renseignements Administratifs* - CRA), is responsible for providing users with information on the services and procedures of government departments and agencies (OMRH-CRA, n.d.[20]). On the other hand, the NGO Coordination Directorate within the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation (*Ministère de la planification et de la coopération externe* - MPCE) has the role of maintaining the NGO register. It could be useful for Haiti to ensure that collaboration with stakeholders is effectively implemented. For this purpose, Haiti could consider assigning this role to two existing agencies:

- A high-level office or individual who ensures that open government initiatives, including NGO and stakeholder participation, have the necessary political support and are in line with the government's strategic priorities, e.g. the Office of the Prime Minister (*primature*);
- An office or a person responsible for the operational and technical part of the initiatives in direct contact with the NGOs, and with the power to mobilise and bring together the various actors of civil society, for example the OMRH through its CRA.

It is important that this mandate and its implementation be accompanied by a clear roadmap with the resources - both financial and human - needed to achieve it. Better coordination with NGOs can, on the one hand, help the government to better channel external aid (see Chapter 2). Strengthening relations with NGOs will also enable for greater stakeholder involvement in the development, implementation and monitoring of public policies and services. Haiti could, for example, follow the example of Benin, which has two structures within government to facilitate coordination and collaboration with stakeholders and the open government programme (see Box 6.5).

Box 6.5 Institutional framework for stakeholder participation in Benin

Benin has two ministries responsible for stakeholder relations and open government initiatives. Within the Presidency of the Republic, the Bureau of Analysis and Investigation (BAI) is responsible for providing high-level advice and instructions to ensure that initiatives are in line with government priorities. The BAI's responsibilities include providing technical assistance on governance, preparing technical notes on programme and project design, contributing to the definition of reform goals, analysing economic and financial programmes and organising and supervising audit missions.

In addition, two structures within the Ministry of Justice and Legislation play a key role in open government initiatives in Benin. The Directorate of Institutional Relations, Policy and Social Dynamics is responsible for the government's institutional relationship with NGOs. It sets the strategy and direction for civil society competence building. It is responsible for relations with NGOs, political parties, institutions of the Republic, trade unions and for civic and citizen training. On the other hand, the Centre for the Promotion of Civil society Organisations is the operational arm of the government's relationship with NGOs. Its goal is to strengthen the capacity of NGOs in the field by providing them with the necessary advice and support. Its overall goal is to act as an interlocutor of the government in the field to facilitate the implementation of NGO activities. The two structures, the Directorate and the Centre, work in close collaboration.

Source: Secretariat General of the Government of Benin (Bénin, 2016[21]), *Decree No. 2016-366 of 16 June 2016 on the creation, powers, organisation and operation of the Bureau of Analysis and Investigation*, https://sgg.gouv.bj/doc/decret-2016-366/.

Consolidate participation mechanisms with stakeholders

Stakeholder participation initiatives help governments to ensure that these public policies and services are responsive to the needs and demands of citizens. These initiatives should be implemented throughout the public policy and service delivery cycle: priority setting, development process, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Stakeholder participation is particularly important when trust in public institutions is low and governments seek to restore their relationship with citizens (OECD, 2017[2]).

Recognising that there are different forms of citizen and government participation, the OECD has developed a typology to classify them. This can range from the provision of information, which is the most basic form of participation, to the full involvement of stakeholders in the co-production of a public policy or service. Citizen participation increases with the level of participation (OECD, 2017[2]).

The OECD Recommendation on open government recognises that in order to generate inclusive participation that meets the needs of all citizens and stakeholders, efforts must be made to include the most affected, vulnerable, under-represented or marginalised social groups, such as youth, women, rural populations and illiterate citizens, while taking into account their linguistic and demographic characteristics (OECD, 2017[1]). This ensures a wide range of views and expertise, which will ultimately result in more coherent and effective policy development, service design and delivery. In order to help governments overcome the challenges of inclusive and effective participation of citizens and stakeholders, the OECD has established, in particular, *10 guiding principles for open and inclusive policy-making, one of which specifically refers to inclusion in the following terms: "All citizens should have equal opportunities and multiple channels to access information, be consulted and participate. Every effort should be made, within reason, to involve as many citizens as possible*" (OECD, 2009[22]).

Information

According to the OECD Recommendation on open government, information is the "initial level of participation characterised by a one-way relationship in which governments produce information and share it with stakeholders. This concept covers both the provision of information on request and "proactive" measures taken by public authorities to disseminate information" (OECD, 2017[1]). In practical terms, transparent disclosure of information and data enables citizens to have a voice and input in setting priorities, to engage in effective monitoring of government measures and to have informed dialogue and participation in decisions that affect their lives. Law on information access provide a framework for this first level of participation, as they cover both the provision of information on request and proactive measures to disseminate information.

The right of access to public sector information is the foundation of open governance reforms. This right makes governments accountable to citizens for their decisions, while enabling citizens to better understand the role of government and the decisions made on their behalf and to choose their representatives more effectively (OECD, 2017[2]). At present, 120 countries around the world, including all OECD countries, have adopted access to information legislation. Their provisions, as well as their degree of implementation, depend largely on the specific characteristics of each country and its legal, administrative and political system. However, most of them share similar provisions (see Box 6.6).

Box 6.6 Provisions of access to information legislation

- First, the law must clearly state its **goals** and **scope**: in almost all OECD countries, the law guarantees access to information generated by the central government and the executive, but some laws also cover state-owned enterprises, the legislative and judicial branches or sub-national levels. These laws also specify the terms for proactive and reactive disclosure of information.
- **Disclosure is said to be proactive** when information is made available to the public by the government without prior request from citizens. Such a mechanism is essential to enhance transparency and openness and to reduce the costs of information request procedures. The vast majority of OECD countries proactively disclose budget documents, ministry annual reports and audit reports. Countries should ensure that this information is relevant, up-to-date, reliable and reusable. In most OECD countries, this information is published either on a single site such as a central portal, or on the website of each ministry or institution, or on both.
- In contrast, **reactive** disclosure refers to the right to request information that is not made public online and the duty of the public authority to respond. These provisions describe the application procedure, including who could file the application, the possibility of anonymity, whether a fee is charged and the time limit for responding to the application. The laws also describe, in a limited way, the legitimate reasons for exempting certain information from disclosure. International standards in this area recognise, for example, that reasons of national security or protection of personal data are valid reasons for exemption from disclosure.
- Access to information legislation also generally provides a procedure for requesters to appeal and/or review the **decision if their request is denied.** In addition to the possibilities of appeal, the laws **usually designate the body or bodies responsible for ensuring the implementation and enforcement of the law.** These bodies could take the form of an independent information commission (also called an agency, body, or ombudsman) with a specific mandate for access to information, transparency or anti-corruption. It can also mediate access to information among other issues (e.g. human rights, discrimination, etc.). Other

countries assign these tasks to a central government authority, or establish access to information offices to respond to requests for access to information and/or proactive disclosure of information.

Source: (OECD, 2017[2]) Open Government: Global Framework and Outlook, OECD Publishing, Paris. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264280984-fr.

The right of access to information is recognised by Article 40 of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of Haiti:

> *The State is required to publicise through the spoken, written and televised press, in Creole and French, laws, decrees, international agreements, treaties, conventions and everything related to national life, with the exception of information relating to national security (République d'Haïti, 1987[23]).*

However, Haiti does not currently have a law on access to information. According to the government, a bill is awaiting a vote in Parliament, but the state of the legislature is preventing its passage. Moreover, this proposal is not known to any of the non-governmental actors with whom the OECD has spoken.

Haiti's adoption of a law on access to information in line with international best practice is accordingly crucial to structuring the information system to promote transparency and accountability and to reduce the culture of secrecy in Haiti. The government has recognised the importance of institutionalising the right of access to information. In addition, the development of a law on access to information through a participatory process (involving stakeholders: civil society, private sector, media, etc.) would provide a unique opportunity to demonstrate the Haitian government's commitment to the principles of transparency and participation. In order to reach the most vulnerable, underrepresented or marginalised social groups, it will be important for the government to ensure that the development process is communicated in Creole and French through various means and that the law and its provisions are equally available in both languages. Haiti could follow the example of Chile, which has a common format for requesting access to information applicable to the entire public administration and available in the country's five official languages (Conseil pour la transparence de Chili[24]). The Organisation of American States, of which Haiti is a member, has adopted a model law on information access that could serve as an example (OEA, 2020[25])to follow and Haiti could also learn from Morocco, which used a participatory process to draft its law on access to information (Box 6.7).

Box 6.7 Process of drafting the law on access to information in Morocco

Before its presentation to the Council of Government in August 2013, there were several stages to the preparation of the bill, which began in 2012:

- Preparation of a first draft law on access to administrative documents by the Administrative Reform Department.
- Comparative study of several foreign laws on access to information and analysis of the standards and principles in force within international organisations (United Nations Development Programme, UNESCO, European Union).
- Establishment of an inter-ministerial committee and organisation of a series of meetings (32 meetings) devoted to the preparation of the legal and regulatory framework of the right of access to information.

- Study and revision of the draft law by World Bank experts in a series of meetings with members of the inter-ministerial committee (6 meetings).
- Review session of the draft law with the Department of Reform and experts from the World Bank and the United Kingdom (7 meetings).
- Multi-stakeholder consultation: the draft law was then published on the website of the Secretariat General of the Government between 26 March and 24 April 2013 and citizens, civil society organisations and interested people were invited to express their opinions, comments and suggestions. The government also organised a national meeting in June 2013 on "the right to information: a lever for participatory democracy" with the participation of several stakeholders.
- Collection and incorporation of comments and proposals from citizens and civil society organisations into the draft law.

All of these steps have contributed to improving the bill and building stakeholder support.

Source: Government of Morocco.

In practice, it is still very difficult to obtain government documents and data on measures, procedures and public services at all levels of government. Existing information systems in public administration are inefficient and unstructured. Although each department has a website, the formats and information are not consistent and many of the pages on these sites are empty. In addition, access to the country's laws, decrees and legal acts is difficult. This general lack of information was identified as one of the most important obstacles to building a culture of transparency and accountability by government and civil society representatives interviewed by the OECD. It is hindering access to public processes and services and also contributes to widespread public distrust of government. However, the Department has made some proactive efforts in disclosure and education. Examples include the budget expenditure data portal set up by the MEF and the communication unit set up by the Public Finance Directorate (MEF[26]). Initiatives have been taken in the field of public procurement to ensure the transparency of procedures, with the provision of standard documents or the publication of the award notice. In addition, the National Public Procurement Commission (*Commission nationale des marches publics* – CNMP) has undertaken awareness-raising activities such as the day of exchange with journalists, or the essay competition open to the public on the theme "Transparency in public procurement as a tool in the fight against corruption" (CNMP[27]). These proactive disclosure efforts are a step in the right direction to improve transparency.

Pending the adoption of a law on access to information, which would provide an overall structure for information systems in Haiti, the government could further develop initiatives within all ministries, such as the MEF, to ensure that relevant information and data are available to citizens. Given the low rate of Internet penetration in Haiti (32% of the population (Banque mondiale[28])), these initiatives should be accompanied by awareness campaigns for citizens as well as training for officials to raise their awareness of the importance of transparency, in the wake of the CNMP. Haiti could follow the example of budgetary transparency in Cameroon to disclose and raise awareness among citizens in this area (Box 6.8).

Box 6.8 Encouraging citizens through budget transparency in Cameroon

With support from the World Bank, the North West region of Cameroon has been piloting an initiative to promote greater budget transparency. Its goals were:

- Simplification, analysis and disclosure of budgets at several levels (national, regional, divisional, municipal, school and health centre)
- Strengthening or raising awareness and developing the capacity of public officials and local and regional institutions to promote public dialogue on public spending by encouraging demand-driven governance.

A steering committee chaired by the regional governor coordinated the creation of simplified budget templates that can be used to collect budget information. The templates are designed to convey the most important information at a glance: available resources and their expenditure between competing functions as well as performance indicators. Training was also provided to the officials concerned on the importance of budget transparency and on how to fill in the templates correctly. Budget templates were completed for 117 institutions in the region (schools, health centres and local councils) and this information was widely disseminated through leaflets, notice boards and the media.

In addition, a series of information meetings on the public budget were held to inform citizens about the resources available to the institutions, their origin and the nature of their expenditure. At each meeting, the budgets were read and citizens were given the opportunity to ask questions and comment on the information provided. To encourage public participation in budget dissemination meetings, a local NGO facilitated an innovative process of community-wide awareness raising, mobilisation and competence building.

The project evaluations showed that as a result:

- The public has become aware of the importance of budget disclosure, the role and responsibilities of public institutions and the accountability of public servants for the way public funds are spent.
- Cases of poor prioritisation and waste of resources were revealed and cases of corruption were uncovered, leading in one case to the return of misappropriated funds.
- Citizens have become aware of the constraints faced by the institutions by hearing officials explain the difficulties they encounter in carrying out their duties.
- Awareness of the importance of linking budgets and expenditures to performance indicators has increased and there is a better understanding of the need to set performance targets that are in line with realistic expectations in relation to available resources.
- Public servants - and mayors in particular - have reported improved relations with their constituents and increased trust between citizens and themselves.

Source: OECD (forthcoming), *Supporting Open Government Principles and Practices at the Local Level in Jordan.*

Consultation

The OECD Recommendation defines consultation as "an additional level of participation, characterised by a two-way relationship in which stakeholders provide feedback to government and vice versa. Consultation is based on a prior definition of the issue on which advice is sought and involves the provision of relevant information and feedback on the outcome of the process" (OECD, 2017[1]). Consultation initiatives help governments better understand the needs of the population in order to provide services or reduce red tape.

The typical example of these practices is that of comments on bills or proposals for legislation. As noted in the *Regulatory Policy Report: OECD Outlook 2018*, involving stakeholders in regulation enables authorities to gather information to inform their decisions, which helps to anticipate unintended effects and practical implementation problems (2018[29]). The report found that "almost all OECD countries have integrated stakeholder engagement into their legislative and regulatory processes, creating and extending a duty to consult for new laws or regulations" (OECD, 2018[29]). This consultation can be based on various mechanisms such as advisory groups, formal consultations with social partners, physical public meetings and online portals. Most OECD countries use a combination of these mechanisms.

In Haiti, there is no general legal framework for systematically involving stakeholders in the legislative and regulatory process. However, Parliament and the executive can set up consultation tools on sectoral areas, as already provided for in several regulations. For example, Article 97 of the 2005 Decree on the organisation of the central government administration provides for the possibility of establishing advisory councils within ministries. These could bring together different representatives involved in the sector concerned "to gather opinions on the department's policies, programmes and projects" (MEF, 2005[30]). However, since their creation is not mandatory, there is no incentive for services to use this tool. Discussions with the government indicate that no department has yet established an advisory board. Other sectoral examples include the Environmental Management and Regulation of Citizen Behaviour for Sustainable Development Decree 2006, which provides for public hearings and environmental assessments in articles 58, 69 and 70 (Me. Boniface Alexandre, 2006[31]).In addition, Article 217 of the Constitution states that "the executive must provide for a method of consultation with local authorities on any matter relating to local finances" (République d'Haïti, 1987[23]).However, neither the interviews nor the documents received confirmed the practical use of these tools.

However, some informal consultation initiatives can be noted. For example, the CRA, with support from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), has developed a website that maps utilities with a fact sheet providing all relevant information to users. This site also offers surveys and forums by topic to gather user feedback to improve services. However, several services do not have their data sheet and the site has not been updated since 2016. This suggests that user feedback through the website is not effectively and systematically taken into account. In addition to the website, the CRA is also expected to provide information to users by telephone or *on site* (OMRH-CRA, n.d.[20]). Discussions during the OECD fact-finding mission indicated that the CRA is under-resourced, which prevents it from providing information to users effectively. Another relevant consultation initiative piloted by OMHR is the "Charter of Commitment for Quality Service Delivery to the User" implemented in 2018. This charter encourages six pilot ministries to improve services to users through a series of measures aimed at simplifying internal procedures and moving towards greater transparency and accessibility. Among these measures, the ministries have committed themselves to "consider the user as a customer at the centre of the public service" by putting in place consultation tools such as complaints services or monthly reports on customer satisfaction (OMRH, 2018[32]). Some departments have made progress in their commitments, for example the National Archives and the National Identification Office have put on their websites the addresses and contact numbers for handling complaints (Archives nationales d'Haïti[33]) (Office national d'identification, n.d.[34]).

Overall, examples of consultation and mechanisms for citizen participation remain very limited. Interviews indicate that on the few occasions when stakeholders were given the opportunity to participate, they did not know whether their comments were ultimately taken into account and did not receive feedback on the measures taken. Indeed, the government has recognised the need for a legal framework to organise participation mechanisms.

To address this situation, on the one hand, Haiti could develop the informal initiatives underway. This means that the creation of advisory councils should be encouraged in all departments. The government also needs to ensure that the CRA has sufficient capacity to effectively provide information about public services, whether on the Internet, by telephone, or in person and to gather feedback from users to improve service delivery. Accordingly, the use of the Charter could be generalised to all departments, while setting

up a follow-up of its implementation, for example by publishing indicators of the progress made. On the other hand, the government could introduce systematic and formal stakeholder consultation throughout the public policy cycle, for strategic initiatives and plans as well as for draft or proposed legislation. This could be done by considering the adoption of a Decree or law that creates a duty to consult stakeholders for any new law or regulation. In addition, it should make a special effort to reach out to the most affected, vulnerable, underrepresented or marginalised social groups in society, to ensure that a wide range of views and competences are taken into account, for example by ensuring that all opportunities for participation are communicated in Creole and French. Similarly, it would be useful to develop a document or manual for public servants that would provide guidelines for participation. Box 6.9 provides a non-exhaustive list of elements that could be included in such a document.

Box 6.9 Considerations for a stakeholder consultation initiative

The following elements should be considered when conducting stakeholder engagement initiatives:

- **Goals of the consultation**: what are the expected results?
- **Geographic scale**: is the consultation national, regional or local?
- **Stakeholders involved**: who is affected by the public policy or service being consulted (social, geographical, professional, gender, etc.)? How can we ensure that each of these groups is represented?
- **Participation mechanism:** What is (are) the appropriate mechanism(s) for reaching all identified stakeholders?
- **Time**: what length of time seems reasonable to fully involve all stakeholders?
- **Responsible Entity**: Which government entity is responsible for conducting the consultation? Is it able to mobilise and commit the necessary resources?
- **Role of each participant**: what specifically is expected of each participant (officials, stakeholders)?
- **Resource requirements and associated costs**: Do the officials whose participation is required to perform the consultation have adequate technical resources? Are they sufficiently trained? What is the associated cost?
- **Communication plan**: how best to inform and raise awareness among stakeholders about the participation initiative? How will its results and impact be communicated afterwards? What means of communication will be used (government website, website of the ministry in charge, official publication or newspaper, social networks, print media, television, radio, etc.)?
- **Monitoring and evaluation**: what mechanisms will be used to learn from the initiative, to compare achievements to outcomes and to report on costs incurred?

It could be useful to detail these different elements in a framework document for all public authorities likely to set up participation initiatives. This document can take different forms depending on the country (strategy, charter, internal circular, guide, manual, etc. or even law).

Source: OECD (2017[2]), Open Government: Global Framework and Outlook, OECD Publishing, Paris. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264280984-fr.

Engagement

According to the OECD Recommendation, engagement refers to a system of government in which "stakeholders have the opportunity and the means (information, data, digital tools, etc.) to collaborate in all phases of the public policy cycle and in the design and delivery of public services" (OECD, 2017[1]). In these partnerships, stakeholders work with government to contribute to the public policy agenda, shape the dialogue in the decision-making process and improve public services. However, the responsibility for the decisions made lies with the government. This requires a commitment by governments to respect the contributions of stakeholders and to make them more accountable in public life (OECD, 2019[35]).

In Haiti, stakeholder engagement is low. As mentioned earlier, civil society representatives were involved in the PME-2023 drafting committee and participated in the design, implementation and evaluation phases. The MEF, for its part, has indicated its willingness to develop a citizen budget, but the process has not yet begun.

To go beyond the initiative taken with the PME-2023, it is necessary for Haiti to create structured mechanisms for participation that promote engagement in public life. A first step in this direction is the institutionalisation and recognition of NGOs in order to provide a framework for their activities, to avoid their proliferation and thus to promote better collaboration. For this purpose, the government could identify the priorities and needs of NGOs so that they can contribute more to the development of the country. Haiti could be inspired by the example of Benin, which organised in 2018 a general assembly of Beninese civil society organisations (Box 6.10).

Box 6.10 States General and national consensus of Beninese civil society organisations

In the context of the National Development Plan (*Plan national du développement* - PND), published in 2018, Benin has made efforts to institutionalise CSO with the organisation of the general assembly (*États généraux* - EG) of civil society. Held in Cotonou in December 2018, the goal of the EGs was "to bring out a national consensus, both on the concerns and priorities of Beninese CSO and on concrete measures to be implemented by other actors, especially the state, to increase their contributions to development effectiveness at the national level".

The EGs were organised around four main topics related to the CSO: 1) the concept of civil society; 2) their legal, representation and partnership framework; 3) their effectiveness and funding; and 4) their internal governance. The conclusions of these reflections led to a position paper entitled "The National Consensus of Beninese CSO". The main resolutions of the Consensus are as follows:

- **Concept of civil society**: four components (or classifications) of civil society: 1) associations (youth, development, women, traditional leaders, religious denominations, media, etc.); 2) NGOs; 3) socio-professional organisations; and 4) trade unions.
- **The legal, representative and partnership framework**: the need to adopt a law on freedom of association, taking into account the guidelines of the African Union and the definition of the EG; the establishment of an Observatory of ethics and deontology of civil society.
- **Efficiency and funding**: importance of CSO competence building; CSO awareness of tax provisions.
- **Internal governance**: alternation is an essential principle; the need to develop a study to define the terms of regulation and self-regulation of CSO.

Although the resolutions or recommendations of the Beninese CSO National Consensus are not binding on the government, they represent a clear and consensual direction to facilitate the leadership of CSO in the country.

Source: Programme for the Strengthening and Participation of Civil Society (RePASOC), U. (2018[36]), *National Consensus of Beninese CSO*, https://mdscbenin.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Le-Consensus-de-Cotonou-Les-Etats-Généraux-de-la-Société-Civile-du-Bénin-Final.pdf.

Giving citizens the opportunity to participate in and contribute to the functioning of their government is particularly important at the local level, where most citizens have more direct contact with public services and the administration in general. Indeed, local governments often have greater flexibility in the way they deliver public services and implement national policy goals. It is also at this level that the participation of individuals and civil society groups is likely to have the greatest impact.

In Haiti, although the government carries out certain initiatives with civil society at the local level, it is with the associative sector and the support of TFPs that the commitment can be strongest in certain areas (for example, environmental protection or women's rights). Within the context of the measures provided for in axis 6 of the PME-2023, the MEF and the Ministry of the Interior and Local Government (*Ministère de l'Intérieur et des Collectivités Territoriales* - MICT) must involve civil society and the private sector in local public interventions with the aim of improving local governance (Gouvernement d'Haïti, 2018[17]). A notable example from the associative sector is citizen participation through the Makòn, which is a space for dialogue where community organisations can intervene in public life. The project carried out in Cap Haitien by CCFD-Terre Solidaire and the French Development Agency (*Agence Française de Développement* - AFD), aims to strengthen the capacities and expression of civil society to co-construct local public policies (AFD[37]). Another ADEMA project in the Bas-Nord-Ouest of Haiti, supported by AFD and the European Union, aims to support the decentralisation process by promoting the emergence of participatory governance. The project aims to build the capacity of local authorities and support local civil society to contribute to local public policy making (AFD[38]). These examples illustrate the importance of the Haitian voluntary sector in promoting open government principles at the local level. Government could consider working with these networks to support and expand initiatives that encourage local participation. As communication around the initiatives and their content is crucial, the following section will analyse how the government can use communication as a lever for participation and awareness.

Strategic management of public communication

The strategic and effective management of public communication is an essential lever for a policy of openness of the administration at all levels of governance. It is both a means of action, transparency and accountability and a contribution to citizens' participation in public life. In this way, it can help build their trust in the government, which is known to be low in Haiti (37% according to the *Gallup 2018 Trust in Government report* (Gallup, 2019[7])).

Public communication is defined as any communication activity or initiative undertaken by public institutions in the public interest (OECD, 2020[39]). These measures include the dissemination of information and consultation and dialogue with stakeholders. They could also include activities aimed at understanding the role of institutions, their competences and their functioning, at animating democratic life, at reporting on public policies, at informing on public services or at enlightening on collective issues in order to change behaviour (Cap'Com, 2020[40]). Public communication is thus distinguished from political communication, which concerns political debate, elections or political parties and personalities.

The Haitian government has been proactive in this area. This has resulted in the establishment, within ministries and administrations at various levels, of functions, units, cells or other entities dedicated to communication, as well as the development of specific tools, including digital ones with the creation of websites and social network accounts. This commitment was made as early as 2012, in the second Framework Programme for state reform 2012-2017 (*Programme cadre de réforme de l'État* - PCRE-II)[3], which included the development of a whole-of-government communication plan.

Strategic use of communication can usefully support the overall public policy goals of the government and individual institutions (e.g. support for change, increased transparency, improved public services, etc.) and their initiatives, amplify their impact and make them more participatory, while the authorities met expressed their willingness to strengthen the human, financial and technical resources needed for greater effectiveness. Efforts in this direction would deepen the dialogue with citizens and clarify and support coherent and strategic directions at the level of government and specific public bodies, as well as the goals of modernising and opening up the administration.

In addition, increased awareness and integration of the strategic role of public communication is essential to strengthen the transparency, accountability and inclusiveness of the Haitian government. They imply the recognition of its transversal role, not only internally, within administrations and between governments, but also externally, vis-to-vis the public, civil society and the media, as well as the private sector and all stakeholders.

In order to use the full potential of public communication as a lever to achieve these goals, the following elements could be given particular attention in the Haitian context:

- A clarification of the strategic orientations of public communication
- An inventory and development of communication functions and their resources
- The use of communication as a lever for participation.

Clarification of strategic guidelines for public communication

Explicit strategic guidelines are needed to ensure coherence and guide the measures and initiatives of public communicators. A strategic approach is defined as the framework that defines the orientation of all communication measures. It includes the definition of the goals to be achieved, the construction of messages, the choice of channels and tools used, the identification of target audiences, budget proposals and the implementation schedule. In other words, this framework (national, local or institutional) defines the general approach and direction of the initiatives to be carried out, as well as the short, medium and long-term goals (OECD, 2017[2]).

More concretely, it is usually a written document, with a defined and time-limited validity, explicitly mentioning the fields covered and providing a unique and coherent description of a solution to a problem. The goal of a strategy is to answer the questions "What? "Why?" and "By whom?". It is linked to the communication plan, a document that provides details to answer the questions "When?" and "How?" This includes assigning specific goals to the various activities.

In Haiti, the interviews conducted during the fact-finding mission show that most ministries have units, entities, or *at least* functions, dedicated to communication. They are responsible for autonomous implementation of information dissemination measures for their own institution, although the Council of Ministers is seen as a mechanism that can help coordinate messages from different administrations. Whereas some ministries, such as the Ministry of Communication, can count on a large number of professional communicators and journalists, these resources sometimes seem to be much more limited in other structures. The range of tasks performed by these dedicated functions varies: it always includes media relations management, but can sometimes also include resources for digital communication, campaigns or campaign planning.

At the level of the Haitian central government, the development of communication strategies is the skill considered the most complex by all the administrations that responded to the OECD questionnaire on this subject. In addition, the Office of Management and Resources Management (OMRH) and the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) both highlight the challenges of implementing a communication plan.

Of the ministries that responded to the OECD questionnaire, the Office of the Prime Minister mentions a plan, the OMRH and MEF add a strategy and MEF also indicates that it has a schedule of communication activities in place. The responses to the questionnaire indicate similar goals within the Office of the Prime Minister and MEF, which correspond to the priorities mentioned in a meeting with the Ministry of Communication (Figure 6.2).

Figure 6.2 Main goals of public communication in four Haitian administrations



Note: Only those responses that were selected at least once from the 19 options are shown on the graph. The four administrations that responded or were questioned on this subject are: the Office of the Prime Minister, the OMRH, MEF and the Ministry of Communication. MEF provided a total of 9 responses, instead of the 5 requested. The Ministry of Communication has indicated 3 goals in the context of the meetings organised during the peer review mission. The OMRH did not provide data for this question.
Source: OECD 2020 questionnaire; discussions during the fact-finding mission.

However, the guidelines defined do not yet constitute a public communication strategy in terms of the above definitional elements. For the time being, the existing guidelines do not provide for the formulation of explicit goals, including the public policies to which communication activities contribute and their direction, which would then be set out consistently in the plans. Moreover, these orientations are supported by still limited human and financial resources (see next section).

Efforts are nevertheless being made to develop a more strategic approach to public communication in Haiti. At the level of the government as a whole, the administrations interviewed emphasise the responsibilities assigned and, consequently, a distinction between the efforts of the Ministry of Culture and Communication in coordinating and implementing whole-of-government communication on the one hand and the Office of the Prime Minister in setting public policy priorities on the other. Nevertheless, discussions with the media, civil society and other actors in Haiti indicate that when these responsibilities are understood from outside the government, they are not easily identified in terms of articulation, dissemination and specific goals.

Exchanges with the Ministry of Communication indicate that an action plan is drafted at the beginning of the year and an annual report is prepared at the end of the year at the level of the institution. However, the monitoring and management of Haitian public and political events affects and sometimes slows down its performance. In addition, although the plan includes activities to achieve the government's vision over the

coming year and the implementation structures are permanent and functional, political instability and appointments at the highest political and administrative levels can also affect priorities and implementation.

However, it is important to clarify the goals and, in the longer term, a public communication policy or strategy, as well as responsibilities in this area, both within central government and with respect to citizens, civil society and the media. Discussions with actors in the media and civil society ecosystem have highlighted the need to intensify efforts to ensure clarity not only in terms of measures taken and goals pursued, but also in terms of the various responsibilities assigned in the field of communication, within government and sometimes even within administrations. *At a minimum*, clear and publicised goals will help define expectations and improve understanding among all agents and stakeholders of the Haitian administration's responsibilities, points of contact, messages and measures in disseminating information and engaging with the public.

In this sense, in the longer term, the Haitian government could consider making explicit, clarifying and consolidating its strategic management of public communication in a formal framework or in a public document, through a communication strategy and associated plans. Several OECD countries have opted for explicitly defining goals, audiences, activities, timetables and budgets in the context of communication strategies and plans. This is the case, for example, of the expectations formulated in the UK communication strategy (Box 6.11). By more precisely defining strategy and goals, including by audience, the Haitian government's communication activities can be more precisely tailored to reach the targeted audiences. This could involve mapping and selecting the best channels and formats to achieve this, particularly to reach more isolated, vulnerable or less digitally literate audiences, while taking into account their language and demographic characteristics.

Box 6.11 The UK government's communication strategy

The UK Government's Communications Strategy (2019-2020) set out three key challenges and defined the respective solutions and goals to overcome them:

1) Raising the standards

- Implement an ambitious portfolio of new improvement programmes to drive the transformation of the department and the agency.
- Improve government marketing through a series of events, training and media buying measures.
- Accelerate the transformation of digital competences and culture to drive innovation and help communications professionals devote time and resources to improving individual and team competences.

2) Strengthening democracy

- Combat misinformation and false information with sustainable models that provide long-term strategic responses.
- Build partnerships with government departments and a network of embassies to provide support to governments and institutions at the international level.

3) Providing services to communities

- Launch whole-of-government campaigns, such as the "*Prepare to Leave the EU*" campaign, to disseminate important information to citizens.

- Implement a series of campaigns to publicise measures in areas such as education and competences, economy and industry, health and welfare, housing and social mobility.

Source: https://communication-plan.gcs.civilservice.gov.uk/.

A clear and explicit definition of the communication strategy is another precondition for effective coordination of measures within government. Coordination efforts are emerging. Some responses to the OECD questionnaire stressed that the Councils of Government were seen as an opportunity for coordination but that further synchronisation efforts would be needed to improve the impact of the measures undertaken. Interviews conducted during the fact-finding mission revealed that the activities of the Ministry of Communication are transversal in nature, with regular links to the communication departments of other Haitian institutions. One example of this practice is the establishment of "Press Mondays", a weekly meeting coordinated by the ministry during which the head of an institution addresses the population and journalists, including those from the diaspora and the provinces, to tell them about its major projects. The Office of the Prime Minister and the Presidency have also carried out similar measures, or supported the communication of other institutions.

It is essential that these measures and all communication activities are supported by coordination mechanisms. They will create synergies and avoid duplication of effort, but above all they will ensure consistency in communications, as the understanding of government messages can be affected by the multiplicity of voices and angles chosen.

Beyond the political meetings of the council of government, the establishment of formal or informal coordination mechanisms specific to the activities of communicators can support their strategic action. These can take the form of regular interministerial coordination meetings, or steering committees, networks of communication directors or referents in charge of communication functions in the Haitian administrations, meeting at a defined frequency. It can also be a more informal online forum or group (online platform, WhatsApp group, etc.), but accessible to one or more people for each administration, allowing them to share updates and information with colleagues in other administrations. In OECD countries, these tools are used to co-ordinate and share information and experiences, to create synergies and more synchronised measures between ministries and to avoid duplication of efforts. Many OECD member and partner countries have opted for such tools, such as the WhatsApp group for communication officers in Morocco, or the various networks set up by Canada or Belgium for example (Royaume de Belgique, 2020[41]).

An inclusive and participatory process for setting goals or formulating future strategies would be beneficial. In the longer term, it would enable for a more coordinated and coherent whole-of-government approach by surveying and bringing institutions together (e.g., through a survey, a scoping conference, an interdepartmental meeting or cell, or a steering committee). It could also improve the transparency and inclusiveness of the government's communication strategy towards society at large by involving citizens and stakeholders. They could help to better identify the information, policy areas or public services that interest them most, while receiving feedback on how their preferences and ideas can be taken into account and implemented in government communications activities.

Clarifying this strategic approach - in terms of goals, responsibilities and measures to be taken - is also a key factor in making a clearer distinction between public and political communication. Discussions during the fact-finding mission, as well as the analysis of the content of digital communication tools (see last section), show that the messages disseminated, whether in the press or through digital media and channels, are often focused on the activities of ministers and elected officials. They currently cover little in the way of public services, interaction or dialogue with the public. There is accordingly a risk of confusion

between public communication and political communication, which can undermine the impartiality of the messages disseminated and affect citizens' confidence. In the Netherlands, the government's communication principles emphasise this distinction. Public communication should:

> *" focus on public policy and organisations, not on the image of ministers, secretaries of state or other public servants. The emphasis is on advertising and clarification (Government of the Netherlands, 2017[42]). "*

Identification and development of communication functions and dedicated resources

Ensuring the presence and value of communication functions and allocating dedicated resources to them, is essential for the effective and strategic management and implementation of public communication, both within and between administrations and with citizens and stakeholders. The Haitian government has taken the measure of what is at stake in this area and has begun a long process of transforming the way it operates and disseminates information. Although, despite limited financial resources, functions and units have already been put in place, the comments already made about the challenges and the need to strengthen the strategic approach are largely due to structures, competences and training that need to be consolidated.

Haitian administrations continue to face the challenge of providing information in a responsive and proactive manner to journalists and citizens and of strengthening dialogue with them. They are accordingly encouraged to strengthen existing arrangements, increase professionalisation and improve communication functions and related competences to facilitate interaction with different stakeholders.

Nevertheless, the decision to create dedicated functions and entities in the organisation charts of central public authorities attests to the recognition of the role of communication in public intervention. It appears from the mission's discussions that specific cells, teams or entities, or communication functions, have been set up not only within the agencies formulating the responses to the OECD questionnaire, but also in most administrations.

More specifically, certain responsibilities for public communication have been defined and assigned within the three administrations that responded to the OECD questionnaire; these cover their communication planning, campaigns and media relations at this stage. The clarification of all responsibilities (e.g. strategy, evaluation, digital communication, crisis communication, etc.) and positions can be based on the identification of public communication professions and the description of their main goals and activities in a defined framework or in a directory, such as those developed in Canada or France (Box 6.12).

The existence of these specific professions also makes it possible to define and simplify the levels of decision-making and to increase the effectiveness of the procedures for validating and applying public communication. Establishing specific functions, explicitly defining the links between them and their hierarchies, makes it possible to clarify everyone's responsibilities. Once the communicators are in place, discussions during the fact-finding mission showed that clarification of individual responsibilities and reporting relationships, particularly by framing them in the form of mission letters, can lead to better identification of contact points and a more effective approach. This could, for example, take the form of delegating decisions or signatures to communication officers for certain day-to-day measures, while the most sensitive issues could be subject to validation by the highest administrative and political officials within the various ministries.

Box 6.12 The Communications Careers Inventory for the Public Service in Canada and France

In Canada and France, professional directories constitute specific frameworks to describe the various competences required and valued by public communication professionals.

Canada

In Canada, the responsibilities of communications functions include developing and implementing communications and information strategies, analysing advertising needs and developing plans, publicising activities and events and maintaining media relations. In addition, specific tasks include collecting, researching and preparing internal and external communication material, evaluating strategies and organising interviews and press conferences. Communications professionals must also act as a spokesperson for their organisation at all times, as well as conduct public opinion research and behavioural analysis to identify the interests and concerns of key constituencies within their organisation.

France

The directory of public communication professions in France defines the competences required, for example, to develop and manage the institution's overall communication strategy, or to supervise its implementation, coordination and evaluation. The specific functions are responsible for animating internal and external networks, communicating in crisis situations, designing and implementing global communication campaigns, managing the budget and setting up a system for evaluating communication measures.

Source : https://www.jobbank.gc.ca/marketreport/skills/20991/22409 ; https://www.fonction-publique.gouv.fr/responsable-de-communicationFrance.

In order to accompany these developments and to encourage the identification and professionalisation of public communication functions, the replies to the questionnaire and the discussions during the fact-finding mission underline the need for a diagnosis and for additional efforts to promote these professions. First of all, identifying them is a key step in ensuring that the human and financial resources allocated enable for the implementation of the strategic goals and orientations and the effective implementation of communication measures. Secondly, it is essential to ensure that communicators" competences remain up to date with the latest developments throughout their careers, particularly in a constantly changing media environment. Discussions highlighted the awareness of the importance of these efforts, which converge with recent initiatives by OMRH to strengthen communication functions and provide training.

Regular competence building activities are accordingly encouraged to support professional and strategic public communication in line with the goals and tools used. In many OECD countries, public communicators are regularly offered opportunities to improve their competences in areas such as media relations, digital communication, strategic use of social media and content creation and writing (Box 6.13).The OMRH and the Haitian administrations will be able to rely on this training to strengthen existing functions. More technical aspects such as crisis communication, campaigning or *media training* will be gradually introduced as the range of methods and procedures within the institutions expands.

Box 6.13 Examples of training courses for national public communicators in the Netherlands

The Academy of Public Communication in the Netherlands supports the central government in the professionalisation and training of officials in this field. It is the centre of knowledge and expertise in the field of government communication, helping personnel to update their professional knowledge, informing them of trends and developments, designing learning paths and creating interdepartmental networks.

The courses are grouped together in a coherent training programme, called the "*Learning Line*". The goals are to standardise the training of communication officers, to improve employability within government and to improve networking. The Academy offers a wide range of courses and training, including:

- An introductory course in national government communications
- Professional training for experienced writers, press officers and speechwriters
- Modules on how to do things, visual communication and professional environmental management.
- Learning trajectory for strategic consulting and management
- Course on podcasts and content creation.

In addition, the Academy organises meetings to stimulate knowledge sharing through webinars on current issues, annual conferences on government communication, as well as learning networks around specific topics (such as inclusion or Instagram) in which participants share their knowledge in recorded online meetings. In addition to training courses, learning networks and knowledge webinars, the Academy offers an online platform, *Ons CommunicatieRijk*, where communicators can share their knowledge, ask questions and find colleagues.

Source:https://www.communicatierijk.nl/vakkennis/aanbod-academie-voor-overheidscommunicatie; https://www.government.nl/ministries/ministry-of-general-affairs/organisation.

Public communicators could also rely on the guides, guidelines and toolkits made available by the administration. Whereas such instruments do not yet exist in Haiti, many OECD members and partners have developed manuals or charters, such as the *Guide to Public Communication in Morocco,* which was developed and disseminated nationally in February 2021 (Box 6.14). The creation of a network of Haitian public communicators could also help them share their measures, challenges and successes and capitalise on practices and experiences that have been or are being implemented.

Box 6.14 The guide to public communication in Morocco

Following the recommendations of the *Voice of the Citizen report in Morocco*, the Department of Public Administration Reform, in collaboration with the OECD and the network of public communicators in Morocco, has developed a *Guide to Public Communication in Morocco.* This guide supports public communicators in their efforts and measures to:

- Defining the boundaries between political and public communication

- Mapping the professions and competences of public communicators
- Raising awareness and supporting government actors on the role of public communication in the development of public policies.
- Improving the transparency of public policies and promote citizen participation.

It provides an overview of the strategic approach, planning, media selection and measurement tools. It also discusses in more detail the different areas of activity in this field (internal, media, events, digital, regional and crisis) and presents an ethical charter for public communication in France and a framework for crisis communication, among other good practices from OECD countries.

Source : https://www.mmsp.gov.ma/uploads/documents/GuideCommunicationPublique_09022021_Fr.pdf.

Using communication as a lever for participation

Responses to the questionnaire and discussions during the fact-finding mission indicate that the means of communication used by Haitian administrations, including digital, are traditionally used to disseminate government information to the population. Their use to increase participation, citizen and civil society engagement is still limited, although efforts are being made in this spirit. Nevertheless, the exchanges with peers highlighted the importance of such initiatives and the strategic nature of the digital communication tools that are rapidly developing for this purpose.

The replies to the questionnaire from the Office of the Prime Minister, the OMRH and MEF emphasise that the mechanisms for disseminating information to citizens, the media and between administrations are similar. Most of the tools used are consistent with the means that seem to be most consulted by Haitians (AyiboPost, 2019[43]; UNESCO, 2021[44]) or employed in the administrations. In their efforts to reach the public, the three jurisdictions note, for example, that they focus on public displays and national radio. In terms of media relations, radio interviews are also favoured by the three jurisdictions. The OMRH prioritises telephone calls and press interviews. In terms of interdepartmental communication, emails, broadcasting, setting up or defining joint communiqués are the most common.

These traditional means could be used more as tools to promote participation in Haiti, in a two-way communication between the government and the citizens. Tools such as meetings, interpersonal interactions or call centres have the potential to support administrations' efforts to better understand citizens and their needs and to provide information in a more strategic, efficient and innovative way. They also have the potential to reach digital divide populations who are illiterate or vulnerable and less present on media such as digital tools, in the language that is appropriate to them and in the formats that they prefer. In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, governments such as those of Finland and Slovenia relied on these means of public exchange to disseminate information, including to the most isolated populations. In Slovenia, given the large rural population and the existence of a digital divide, the call centre has established a dialogue with categories of the population that are usually difficult to reach, not only to publicise emergency measures and policies, but also to gather the concerns, expectations and needs of the population.

In addition, an inclusive use of communication to promote Haitian public policies and services relies on the dissemination of information and dialogue with all communities and audiences that make up Haitian society, including the most vulnerable. It is accordingly important that it takes into account the linguistic specific characteristics of the population. This includes communicating not only in French but also in Creole to promote information and participation by all citizens, given that almost the entire population speaks Haitian Creole and that Creole has been constitutionalised (République d'Haïti, 1987[45]). In Morocco, the *Guide to Public Communication* recommends, for example, that messages be concise, short and tailored

to the target audience using official languages and dialects so that messages are as close as possible to the target audience and enable full participation (Royaume du Maroc, 2021[46]).

In a framework marked by the rise of digital technology, the responses to the questionnaire highlight, with regard to interdepartmental relations, an increased use of digital tools to facilitate the circulation and negotiation of information, with OMRH and MEF mentioning the use of social networks in this area. It is also worth noting that both institutions emphasise the use of their websites for public relations and that for press relations, the channels chosen by the Office of the Prime Minister also include the use of emails and WhatsApp groups.

The State's modernisation plan includes major efforts to digitise the operation of Haitian administrations. This transformation aims to facilitate access for all to public services and information, but it can also help bring the administration closer to the citizens in order to strengthen their involvement.

Strategically used digital communication creates or strengthens a special bond between individuals and public organisations. Digital tools enable a great speed, even instantaneousness of dissemination, interaction and exchange, in both directions and as close as possible to citizens' expectations. In addition, digital tools offer a wide range of channels, expanding the scope of public communication to more demographically diverse audiences, including younger people who make up a significant portion of the population (median age 24). The Internet penetration rate is indeed 37% nationwide, with a notable growth in the number of users, of 16% between 2020 and 2021 (DataReportal, 2021[47]).

To further engage young people, a participatory approach to communication is essential, while paying attention to tone and style, so as to treat them as equals, by linking to influencers, for example bloggers or influencers they can relate to on their preferred social networks (OECD, 2019[48]). This approach was favoured by Italy in the management of the COVID-19 pandemic. The government has relied on influencers through partnerships on Instagram and Facebook to ensure that young people have broad access to reliable information and can find answers to their questions and concerns.

When public communication is used to enhance transparency and engagement, it notably amplifies the reach of formal opportunities for participation (such as elections, political consultations, or certain local or national decisions and other innovative mechanisms for citizen participation). In this way, it helps to inform the public of opportunities to provide input and ideas to the government, or to provide third-party input to the government. By establishing structured dialogues and consultations with external stakeholders, the Haitian government could ensure the institutionalisation of clear and strategic communication, helping organisations and public officials to expand their interactions with individuals, other public officials, as well as businesses and third parties, through structured feedback mechanisms as well as service delivery opportunities, meetings, etc.

The challenges of communicating in a way that engages stakeholders in a meaningful way include reporting on the actors consulted, their contributions and the government's response (OECD, 2020[49]). Stakeholder involvement in the design, development and implementation of policies and regulations has been shown to increase compliance and acceptance of these decisions (OECD, 2020[49]). However, this requires communication on how these procedures will be conducted, what their goals are, what outcomes are envisaged, how the input provided by the public will be and has been taken into account following the consultations, in order to set expectations in a transparent manner throughout the process. This could take the form of brochures or rapid access to transparent guidelines or guidance notes.

The promotion of transparency is a common public communication goal mentioned by the Office of the Prime Minister and MEF in response to the questionnaire. However, some websites have empty pages or sections or are under construction due to lack of resources, means or time to design or update them.[4] They can lead to a perceived limitation in the scope of information available as well as expectation; they can even affect trust and the ability to effectively engage citizens on these platforms.

Increased ownership of social networking sites and networks will be achieved by strengthening resources and competences in this area. To make them more dynamic and interactive, administrations can rely on the regular publication of infographics or video sequences. These visual elements make it possible to reach audiences who prefer this type of medium or who cannot access written content, given that 38% of the population is illiterate (DataReportal, 2021[47]). Nevertheless, the digital divide in Haiti underscores the need to continue to use other means to reach the most isolated or vulnerable populations, in the channels and media they consult, as mentioned above and in particular *through* radio, television, print media or face-to-face interactions.

This ownership can also be fostered by activities that mobilise citizens' opinions through consultations, surveys and other participatory mechanisms, such as the consultation platform developed in Belgium (Box 6.15). The initiative to hold a public forum on the OMRH website is to be commended. Future efforts to ensure its interactive nature could help increase transparency and participation *through* the website.

Box 6.15 The online consultation platform *MonOpinion* in Belgium

The Belgian federal platform for citizen consultation, called *MonOpinion,* enables the organisation of participatory processes, such as calls for ideas, participatory budgets or surveys. Its aim is to increase citizens' interest in politics through the platform's interactive activities, which enable for discussion with the public and stimulate debate on various digital media. To actively participate in a debate, citizens can make proposals, comment on those of others, react, vote for or against arguments or share them, follow specific initiatives and recommend some to other users. Once the consultation is closed, a presentation of the results is put online.

Consultations can be local or national in scope. For example, the platform was used in 2018 by the federal government for a month, around the theme "How to stop *fake news*? ". The purpose of the consultation was to provide citizens with food for thought on misinformation, while allowing them to vote on eight official proposals and present their own suggestions to the public. It concluded with an evaluation of the 71 proposals made, the results of which were taken into account by the Government in the corresponding decisions.

Source : https://monopinion.belgium.be/ ; https://monopinion.belgium.be/processes/stopfakenews?locale=fr.

Discussions during the peer review mission highlighted the challenges of two-way exchange between administrations and citizens, civil society and the media. In particular, they noted the need to use communication as a lever for renewed engagement between all these actors, based on accessibility of information, dialogue and the use of different communication channels, including social networks, in a more differentiated, targeted and strategic way according to their respective audiences.

In this sense, strengthening the participatory nature of digital communication tools will increase the collection of diverse opinions and user feedback for the development, refinement, implementation, reform and evaluation of public policies. It will also help to revitalise democracy and strengthen citizens' confidence in the administration. Some countries, such as Brazil, have deployed such mechanisms to ensure a dialogue on the implementation of the right of access to information, in particular. For example, the *Fala.br* platform enables citizens to request access to information, file complaints or claims against administrations, interact with the authorities by expressing their satisfaction or dissatisfaction and making suggestions to improve or simplify public services (République du Brésil, 2021[50]).

The analysis of the use of these tools showed that the administrations that responded to the questionnaire are regularly active on Twitter and Facebook. In practice, their Twitter and Facebook accounts had, as of 17 February 2021, several tens of thousands, or even more than a hundred thousand subscribers (Twitter account of the Office of the Prime Minister), who are thus informed of their news, with varying frequency. However, if accounts are regularly updated, interaction could be enhanced and responses to questions posed by users could be more systematic. Indeed, the study of empirical data from public accounts in OECD countries has shown that the quantity of posts does not determine the impact or popularity of an account on social networks and that institutions that actively seek interaction obtain higher subscription rates (Mickoleit, 2014[51]).

Beyond Twitter and Facebook, activity is still lower on other platforms (e.g., YouTube, LinkedIn, etc.), with fewer subscribers, few interactions, or even disabled comments, as on some YouTube accounts. This lack of opportunity for interaction can lead to a perception among citizens that there is an avoidance or absence of dialogue, that the information published on these governmental means of communication is opaque, or even that they are not truly transparent and participatory.

In addition, the nature and tone of messages on social networks contribute greatly to their strategic and effective use. Differentiated publications according to target audiences (formulated for young people, or users of a specific public service, for example) and analysis of the audiences and uses of the different accounts of each administration could strengthen visibility and engagement on these channels, as the resources and competences of the dedicated functions increase.

Responses to the OECD questionnaire indicate that certain groups are targeted by communication activities. Nevertheless, it emerges from the exchanges and campaigns observed that the messages formulated *through* the various communication channels, particularly digital ones, are the same, whatever the specific uses and audiences[5]. This is due in particular to the weakness of data collection on the uses and audiences of their digital channels and more broadly of their communication tools. This analysis is essential to better understand their audiences, interact with them on their website pages and social network accounts, evaluate their requests and comments and thus better adapt the content, tone and format of the messages they broadcast. To support these efforts, social networks offer, for example, analytical reports that enable the reach of publications to be evaluated, as well as the impact and interactive nature of tools and messages.

In OECD countries, for similar initiatives, the digital presence of public institutions relies in particular on the recruitment or training of dedicated teams, capable of engaging in strategic thinking to inform, mobilise and engage all categories of the population (OECD, 2017[2]). Discussions during the fact-finding mission highlighted the fact that Haitian administrations do not yet have the capacity to use digital communication tools in a professional manner. To support team building or the establishment of a dedicated function, digital competences can be included in job descriptions during recruitment. They could also appear in training plans, or in the diagnostic and functional improvement efforts of the OMRH, for example.

Training modules can be offered to create or consolidate the competences of Haitian public communicators, as is done in the Netherlands, Canada and many OECD countries (Box 6.16). In the longer term, as digital communication competences become more firmly established in jurisdictions, a digital toolkit could also be put in place to enable adequate knowledge and use by all, as well as sustainability.

Box 6.16 Training in digital communication tools in Canada

The Canada School of Public Service (CSPS) offers a number of digital training courses to strengthen digital competences and strategic management of digital communication. It offers the following courses in particular:

- "Discover Digital", on the impact of emerging methodologies, with a focus on standards and their relevance to public service. Public servants are exploring new approaches to creating a dedicated toolbox in an administrative framework.
- "Digital in Practice", which provides an overview of the new Government of Canada standards and their impact on the work standards of public servants, addressing the competences required to adapt to these new realities.
- Exploration of data visualisation, with the aim of learning these techniques to present clear and precise messages.

Source: (EFPC, 2020[52]).

In the longer term, Haitian administrations could adopt charters or guidelines on the use of their digital tools, or even develop a digital communication strategy, including social networks, to ensure strategic, effective and ethical management. In particular, it emerged from the discussions that Haitian public communicators would like to be able to rely on more harmonised methods, "elements of language", etc. Following the example of instruments developed in some OECD member and partner countries, the guidelines could cover, in particular, the following points:

- The legal and regulatory framework affecting the use of digital tools (access to information, private data, intellectual property, rights of use of visuals, freedom of expression, etc.).
- The risks and challenges of using them, as well as the benefits of strategic use of social networks.
- The terms of the online presence.
- The goals pursued and the techniques to be used to achieve them, in particular to increase transparency, integrity, accountability and participation.
- The choice of the different social networks and media according to the goals and targets.
- The pace or timing of publications.
- Records, levels and response times to solicitations.
- The procedures for implementing, validating and moderating messages and responses to comments/interactions from Internet users.
- Evaluation and impact measurement mechanisms.

These materials can also help communicators to counter misinformation, such as the COVID-19 "infodemia" and to anticipate possible misrepresentation, misrepresentation, violence, or hate, beyond the request for information or participation in public exchanges. This is one of the main challenges highlighted by administrations in response to the OECD questionnaire. Such guidelines can help clarify how to respond while maintaining interaction and reliability of information. They can complement the initiatives taken in 2020 in the context of crisis communication, aimed at informing and answering the population's daily questions.

In the longer term, with the resources and structures deployed in this regard, the strategic management of communication by Haitian administrations could usefully complement other frameworks, approaches and

measures put in place to combat online misinformation at the level of society at large. However, public communication can contribute effectively to the fight against misinformation in four ways (Figure 6.3): strategies and coordination mechanisms in this field, the identification of misinformation and disinformation, measures resulting from regulation in this field and initiatives involving stakeholders, in a collective and holistic approach to the phenomenon (OECD, 2020[39])as demonstrated by examples such as the recent rebuttals by the head of the Moroccan government in the context of the health crisis or of a campaign carried out in the United Kingdom in this area (Box 6.17). The contribution of public communication to combating misinformation and disinformation is, however, a necessary but insufficient step; it must be accompanied by measures to ensure that the framework of media and civic ecosystems creates an environment conducive to a concerted, multi-stakeholder approach to these phenomena.

Figure 6.3. Measures to address misinformation and disinformation



Source: (OECD, 2020[39])

Box 6.17 How to combat online misinformation in the UK

In the UK, misinformation is recognised as a potential threat to national security, with an increasing number of actors seeking to influence the British public. In response, the government launched the "*Do not Feed the Beast*" campaign to raise awareness and educate citizens about reading and disseminating information online. The aim is to highlight the various ways in which the public can detect false information before it spreads.

For this purpose, the government has provided citizens with the S.H.A.R.E. checklist to ensure that they are not contributing to the dissemination of harmful content in 5 steps. These steps include checking:

- Sources;
- The title of the content in question;
- Facts;
- If the images have been retouched and
- If the URL and content contain errors.

The government has also worked with social networking companies to reach out to all types of audiences and raise awareness in a fun way, through advertisements and funny videos. The unit also

works with experts on disinformation from civil society and academia to build up a comprehensive picture of the extent and impact of disinformation.

Source : https://www.loc.gov/law/help/social-media-disinformation/uk.php#_ftn90 ; https://www.computerweekly.com/news/252480802/Coronavirus-Dont-fall-for-fake-cures-warns-UK-government.

Conclusion and recommendations

The unstable political, social and economic context in Haiti affects the very possibility of establishing a culture of transparency, accountability, integrity and participation in the public life of the country. Institution building and effective checks and balances are preconditions for open government reform. It additionally has a key role to play in defining and implementing a legal and regulatory framework to protect civic space and restore stakeholder confidence, which are essential conditions for their collaboration and participation in public decision-making. A framework to promote their work is all the more central as they themselves face many challenges in the current situation.

Political support for open government principles at all levels of governance must be accompanied by a clear commitment at the highest level of government to support the successful implementation of the initiatives promoted. This leadership is needed to bring about and embed a change in the culture of governance towards the effective promotion of the principles of transparency, accountability, integrity and participation.

However, it is still difficult to obtain documents and data on measures, procedures and public services at all levels. In addition, the use of consultation initiatives and citizen participation mechanisms is still limited at this stage, offering little opportunity for real collaboration between government and civil society. Similarly, public communication management is not yet sufficiently strategic and equipped to contribute fully to the government's public policy goals and to the more specific reforms aimed at promoting the principles of transparency, integrity, accountability and participation of open government. The gradual and sustained deepening of the initial efforts and an increase in the resources allocated to their implementation, both in the short and long term, will be essential for their full deployment.

Recommendations

In order to create a culture of governance that promotes the principles of transparency, integrity, accountability and stakeholder participation, the Haitian government can consider the following measures:

1. **Creating an enabling environment for open government reforms**

- **Improving understanding of the principles of open government by conducting awareness campaigns that highlight the benefits they can bring.** Haiti could also consider the development of a single definition forged in collaboration with all stakeholders, taking into account the political, cultural and socio-economic context of the country. This can help to increase ownership and commitment of state and non-state stakeholders involved in reforms and open government initiatives. It is important to include a wide range of stakeholders representative of society, including the most affected, vulnerable, underrepresented or marginalised social groups, such as youth, women, rural populations and illiterate citizens, while taking into account their linguistic and demographic characteristics.
- **Ensuring that the legal and judicial framework of civil rights and freedoms is guaranteed and respected in order to promote and protect the country's civic space.** This implies the adoption of measures to ensure respect for the freedoms of expression, assembly and association, the right to privacy and protection against discrimination. One way to achieve this is to increase the resources of the OPC for conducting surveys. In addition, it is important to encourage greater collaboration between the OPC, national authorities and other stakeholders in order to raise awareness among officials and better identify the needs of citizens.

2. **Establishment of a governance framework conducive to open government reforms**

- **Consolidating a supportive policy framework for open government principles through concrete initiatives and political commitment to these principles and initiatives, for example by including them in policy documents** or through an open government strategy, perhaps in conjunction with an anti-corruption strategy. Increased commitment to the principles and initiatives by high-level public authorities, such as the President, ministers, legislators and other relevant political figures, could increase stakeholder participation. This is necessary to initiate a change in the culture of governance towards the principles of transparency, participation, integrity and accountability and at the same time to overcome the culture of secrecy still present in Haiti.
- **Develop a strong institutional framework that facilitates coordination and collaboration with stakeholders, with a mandate for two existing bodies:** a high-level office or person who ensures that open government initiatives, including participation involving NGOs and stakeholders, get the necessary political support and are in line with the government's strategic priorities (e.g. the Office of the Prime Minister), on the one hand and an office or person in charge of the operational and technical part of the initiatives in direct contact with NGOs, capable of mobilising and bringing together the different members of civil society (e.g. the OMRH through its CRA), on the other. It is important that this mandate and its implementation be accompanied by a clear roadmap and the necessary resources - financial and human - to achieve it. Improved coordination with NGOs can help the government better channel external

assistance. Strengthening relations with NGOs will also enable greater stakeholder involvement in the development, implementation and monitoring of public policies and services.

3. Consolidating participation mechanisms with stakeholders

- **Adopting a law on access to information in line with international best practices, in order to structure the information system and thus promote transparency and accountability by reducing the culture of secrecy in Haiti.** In addition, the drafting of such a law through a participatory process (involving stakeholders: civil society, private sector, media, etc.) would be a unique opportunity to demonstrate the Haitian government's commitment to the principles of transparency and participation. In order to reach the most vulnerable, underrepresented or marginalised social groups, it will be important for the government to ensure that the development process is communicated in Creole and French through various means and that the law and its provisions are equally available in both languages.
- **Increase proactive disclosure and outreach initiatives within all departments to ensure that relevant information and data is made available to citizens.** Given Haiti's low Internet penetration, these initiatives should be accompanied by citizen awareness campaigns as well as the necessary training of public officials to communicate the importance of transparency.
- **Further encourage citizen consultation initiatives.** On the one hand, Haiti could generalise ongoing efforts and encourage the creation of advisory boards in all ministries. The government also needs to ensure that the CRA has sufficient capacity to effectively provide information about public services, whether on the Internet, by telephone, or in person and to gather feedback from users to improve service delivery. The service commitment charter could also be used in all departments, with monitoring of its implementation, for example by publishing progress indicators. On the other hand, the government could introduce systematic and formalised stakeholder consultation throughout the policy cycle on policy initiatives and plans as well as on draft or proposed legislation. This could be done by considering the adoption of a Decree or law that creates a duty to consult stakeholders for any new law or regulation. In addition, it should make a special effort to reach out to the most affected, vulnerable, underrepresented or marginalised social groups in society, to ensure that a wide range of views and competences are taken into account, for example by ensuring that all opportunities for participation are communicated in Creole and French. Similarly, it would be useful to develop a document or manual for officials providing guidelines for participation.
- **Establish structured mechanisms for participation that promote engagement in public life.** A first step in this direction would be to institutionalise and recognise the role of NGOs in order to provide a better framework for their activities, to avoid their proliferation and thus to promote better collaboration. For this purpose, the government could identify the priorities and needs of NGOs so that they can contribute more to the development of the country. The government could consider working with the Haitian community network to support and develop more initiatives to encourage local participation. It is important that opportunities for participation be available in both French and Creole to ensure that they reach a larger portion of the population and that they are truly inclusive mechanisms.

4. Ensuring strategic governance of public communication

- **Explicitly defining, in strategic documents specific to public communication, its goals, messages, channels, media, means and deadlines.** The major issues and goals must then

be broken down into more specific guidelines, for example in a plan that makes them operational, according to the responsibilities of the administrations and in synergy with the guidelines set at national level. The definition of a strategic approach supports a targeted approach to messages and audiences that takes into account the linguistic (e.g., French or Creole) and socio-demographic characteristics of Haitian audiences, including the most vulnerable and their preferences in terms of media and communication channels. Drafting and making these documents available to all could **clarify the distinction between public and political communications, their respective goals and outcomes.** They will also contribute to enhancing the transparency and accountability of information dissemination activities and more broadly of public intervention. In the longer term, with the institutionalisation of these practices, these documents would define not only the activities but also a budgeting of their costs, while clarifying the responsibilities, the coordination of measures, the expected results and impacts, as well as the indicators and measurement tools to be used to monitor and evaluate their implementation in the light of the goals set by the strategies

5. Consolidating functions and competences for strategic and effective public communication

- **Identifying and developing the competences of public communicators to meet the needs of Haitian administrations and support professional and effective public communication.** The government could thus continue the efforts initiated by the OMRH to analyse and valorise the communication functions and ensure the presence, development and strengthening of capacities in this area, for example, in the context of a training plan for the whole government or for each of the administrations. Innovative approaches (e-learning courses open to all, toolkits, interactive training in minor groups) can help build competences. These modules could focus on press relations and digital media, given the current preponderance of media use in public communication, content creation, or the animation and management of social networks, for example. Relying on a catalogue or directory of professions would make it possible to better identify needs and recruitment and to offer the various communication functions adequate training throughout their career within the Haitian administration.
- **Developing a "communicator's handbook" or "public communication guide"**, similar to the one used in Morocco, or practical guidelines or guides to support personnel in the effective and strategic implementation of their missions. The drafting of these documents or guidelines is also an opportunity to define guidelines that set the framework, the terms of the online presence, the procedures and the adaptation of messages to digital practices. This could also take the form of a charter, guide or guidelines for the use of social sites and networks, in particular to ensure their consistency and effectiveness in relation to the goals set, with the appropriate techniques, language and tone, while respecting the framework and the legal and regulatory framework in place. These guidelines could include elements relating to ethics, terms and principles of interaction with users and the conduct of public communicators and stakeholders.
- **Strengthening and professionalising initiatives in the use of all communication tools, including digital.** This includes, on the one hand, the promotion of information sharing and dialogue with the public and within administrations, through websites, platforms, national (or local) portals and social networks. It is also a question, on the other, of taking up the challenge of diversifying the information and data provided by the administrations, as well as the channels and media of dissemination, in order to inform citizens not only about the current state of the administrations, but also about their decisions, opinions, the public services provided and activities, budgets and funding, or more generally about sectoral public policies.

6. **institutionalising the strategic use of public communication to foster dialogue and strengthen citizen participation in public life**

- **Using public communication as a lever to strengthen citizen participation.** Haitian administrations could, for example, consider innovative uses of traditional venues and channels such as radio, press, public signage and public gatherings, in order to meet and engage with citizens in the places and on the channels of communication where they are located, especially given the digital divide and the socio-demographic characteristics of segments of the Haitian population. Spaces and moments of debate can be organised in town hall squares, on popular radio stations, taking into account the places where citizens gather and their habits, or festivities and the public agenda. These exchanges will take place in both French and Creole in order to strengthen access to information and promote the participation of all in Haitian public life.
- **Promoting and encouraging citizen engagement through online interaction.** This will involve revitalising the official websites and social networks of Haitian ministries and administrations, in particular through regular updates, the use of computer graphics, photographs and video sequences, but also, in the longer term and as these collaborative practices become established, through the integration of links to other resources or participatory mechanisms (such as forums, consultations, etc.) On institutional sites, as resources increase, administrations could encourage the development of contributory spaces where citizens could comment, give their opinion or assessment and ask questions, as in the case of the OMRH's initial efforts in this direction.
- **Developing analyses of the audience and the uses, behaviours and perceptions of citizens online and on social networks.** This is based on analytical tools, in some cases already available, or even provided by the sites and social networks and on the demographic, sociological and cultural data of the regions and their audiences, so that online communication responds effectively to the expectations of the various categories, including those who are more isolated, vulnerable or less comfortable with these channels. In addition, the use of these analyses will enhance the development of more targeted and effective messages, with the format, tone and media tailored to specific audiences, such as youth or illiterate people and their preferences for accessing and using public information.
- **Strengthening digital competences and the means to implement and monitor them.** These capabilities can be included in job descriptions and training plans of jurisdictions. These could focus on specific techniques (e.g. *web design*, data security, forum moderation and online interaction, etc.). Finally, it will be useful to encourage the exchange of good practices with other public communicators to learn from experiences and support these efforts.

References

AFD (n.d.), *Améliorer la participation citoyenne à travers le Makòn*, https://www.afd.fr/fr/carte-des-projets/ameliorer-la-participation-citoyenne-travers-le-makon?origin=https://www.afd.fr/fr/page-region-pays/haiti (accessed on 11 March 2021). [37]

AFD (n.d.), *Une citoyenneté active et des acteurs locaux renforcés pour un développement concerté des territoires | AFD - Agence française de développement*, https://www.afd.fr/fr/carte-des-projets/une-citoyennete-active-et-des-acteurs-locaux-renforces-pour-un-developpement-concerte-des-territoires?origin=https://www.afd.fr/fr/page-region-pays/haiti (accessed on 12 March 2021). [38]

Archives nationales d'Haïti (n.d.), *Services et Tarifs des Archives Nationales d'Haïti*, https://archivesnationales.gouv.ht/fr/assets/pages.php?id=7 (accessed on 25 March 2021). [33]

Article 19 (2020), *The Global Expression Report*, https://www.article19.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/GxR2019-20report.pdf (accessed on 11 March 2021). [13]

Assemblée nationale d'Haïti (2008), *loi portant sur la Déclaration de Patrimoine par certaines catégories de Personnalités Politiques, de Fonctionnaires et autres Agents Publics de 2008*, http://www.oas.org/juridico/PDFs/mesicic4_hti_loi_pat.pdf (accessed on 11 March 2021). [56]

AyiboPost (2019), "La radio reste le média préféré des Haïtiens. Ce n'est pas par hasard!", https://ayibopost.com/en-2019-la-radio-reste-le-media-prefere-des-haitiens-ce-nest-pas-hasard/ (accessed on 8 March 2021). [43]

Banque mondiale (n.d.), *Haïti Présentation: Contexte*, https://www.banquemondiale.org/fr/country/haiti/overview#1 (accessed on 24 March 2021). [6]

Banque mondiale (n.d.), *Utilisateurs d Internet (% de la population) - Haïti | Data*, https://donnees.banquemondiale.org/indicateur/IT.NET.USER.ZS?locations=HT (accessed on 11 March 2021). [28]

Bénin, S. (2016), *Décret N° 2016-366 du 16 juin 2016 portant création, attributions, organisation et fonctionnement du Bureau d'Analyse et d'Investigation*, https://sgg.gouv.bj/doc/decret-2016-366/ (accessed on 9 April 2020). [21]

BID (2020), *Consultations publiques: Le pas à pas: Cadres réglementaires et juridiques applicables en Haïti*, https://publications.iadb.org/publications/french/document/Consultations-publiques-Le-pas-a-pas-Cadres-reglementaires-et-juridiques-applicables-en-Haiti.pdf (accessed on 11 March 2021). [57]

Cap'Com (2020), *Qu'est-ce que la communication publique ?*, https://www.cap-com.org/quest-ce-que-la-communication-publique (accessed on 27 November 2020). [40]

CIVICUS (n.d.), *Ratings - Tracking conditions for citizen action*, https://monitor.civicus.org/Ratings/ (accessed on 25 May 2020). [11]

CIVICUS (n.d.), *Tracking conditions for citizen action: Haiti*, https://monitor.civicus.org/country/haiti/ (accessed on 11 March 2021). [10]

CNMP (n.d.), *Avis généraux*, https://cnmp.gouv.ht/avisgeneraux/index (accessed on 11 March 2021). [27]

Conseil pour la transparence de Chili (n.d.), *Portail de transparence*, https://www.portaltransparencia.cl/PortalPdT/descargar-formulario-de-solicitud-de-informacion (accessed on 31 May 2021). [24]

DataReportal (2021), *Digital in Haiti: All the Statistics You Need in 2021*, https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2021-haiti (accessed on 19 February 2021). [47]

EFPC (2020), *Catalogue d'apprentissage*, https://www.csps-efpc.gc.ca/Catalogue/index-fra.aspx (accessed on 14 December 2020). [52]

Freedom House (2021), *Global Freedom Scores: Countries and Territories*, https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores (accessed on 11 March 2021). [12]

Freedom House (2020), *Freedom in the World 2020: Benin (La Liberté dans le Monde 2020: Bénin)*, https://freedomhouse.org/country/benin/freedom-world/2020 (accessed on 22 April 2020). [54]

Freedom House (2020), *Haiti: Freedom in the World 2020 Country Report*, https://freedomhouse.org/country/haiti/freedom-world/2020 (accessed on 11 March 2021). [8]

Gallup (2019), *Trust in Government*, https://news.gallup.com/poll/5392/trust-government.aspx (accessed on 17 February 2021). [7]

Gouvernement d'Haïti (2018), *Programme de modernisation de l'État 2018-2023 (PME-2023)*, http://www.omrh.gouv.ht/Media/2-DocumentsStrategiques/fp/PME-2023_20190313_09h31.pdf (accessed on 11 March 2021). [17]

Government of the Netherlands (2017), *THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATION*, https://www.government.nl/documents/directives/2017/03/01/the-principles-of-government-communication (accessed on 26 March 2021). [42]

HRW (n.d.), *World Report 2019: Haiti*, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/haiti# (accessed on 24 March 2021). [5]

IDEA (n.d.), *Haiti | International IDEA*, https://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-view/125/40 (accessed on 11 March 2021). [16]

Josué Pierre-Louis (2019), *La participation de la société civile à une réforme administrative : l'expérience du Programme de Modernisation de l'État PME-2023 en cours en Haïti*, https://publications-prairial.fr/rif-nova/index.php?id=903 (accessed on 25 March 2021). [58]

Me. Boniface Alexandre, P. (2006), *Décret portant sur la gestion de l'Environnent et de Régulation de la Conduite des Citoyens et Citoyennes pour un Développement Durable de 2006*, https://anap.gouv.ht/documents/D%C3%A9cret-Cadre-Environnement.pdf (accessed on 11 March 2021). [31]

MEF (2005), *Décret portant organisation de l'Administration centrale de l'Etat*, https://www.oas.org/juridico/PDFs/mesicic4_hti_dec_org.pdf (accessed on 10 May 2021). [30]

MEF (n.d.), *Dernières données*, http://www.mef.gouv.ht/index.php?page=Derni%C3%A8res%20donn%C3%A9es (accessed on 11 March 2021). [26]

Mickoleit, A. (2014), "Social Media Use by Governments: A Policy Primer to Discuss Trends, Identify Policy Opportunities and Guide Decision Makers", *OECD Working Papers on Public Governance*, No. 26, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jxrcmghmk0s-en. [51]

OCDE (ed.) (2019), *Faire participer les jeunes au Gouvernement ouvert : Guide de communication*, https://www.oecd.org/fr/sites/mena/gouvernance/Young-people-in-OG-FR.pdf (accessed on 15 October 2020). [48]

OEA (2020), *Inter-American Model Law 2.0 on Access to Public Information*, http://www.oas.org/en/sla/dil/docs/AG-doc_5718-20_ENG.pdf (accessed on 4 December 2020). [25]

OECD (2020), *Manuel de l'OCDE sur l'intégrité publique*, Éditions OCDE, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/84581cb5-fr. [49]

OECD (2020), *Transparence, communication et confiance : Le rôle de la communication publique pour combattre la vague de désinformation concernant le nouveau coronavirus*, https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/view/?ref=135_135223-duu3s3o3df&title=Transparence-communication-et-confiance-Le-role-de-la-communication-publique-pour-combattre-la-vague-de-desinformation-concernant-le-nouveau-coronavirus (accessed on 27 November 2020). [39]

OECD (2019), *Open Government in Biscay*, OECD Public Governance Reviews, Éditions OCDE, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/e4e1a40c-en. [35]

OECD (2018), *Le rôle des médiateurs en matière de gouvernement ouvert*, http://www.oecd.org/gov/Ombudsman-Report-FR.pdf (accessed on 25 March 2021). [15]

OECD (2018), *Politique de la réglementation : Perspectives de l'OCDE 2018*, Éditions OCDE, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264305458-fr. [29]

OECD (2017), *Gouvernement ouvert: Contexte mondial et perspectives*, Éditions OCDE, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264280984-fr. [2]

OECD (2017), *Recommandation du Conseil sur l'intégrité Publique*, http://www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/Recommandation-integrite-publique.pdf (accessed on 22 April 2020). [3]

OECD (2017), *Recommandation du Conseil sur le gouvernement ouvert*, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/fr/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0438 (accessed on 8 April 2020). [1]

OECD (2009), *Principles to Support Practice*, OECD Publishing, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264048874-8-en. [22]

OECD (n.d.), *Civic Space Framework*, https://www.oecd.org/gov/open-government/oecd-observatory-of-civic-space-brochure.pdf. [4]

OECD (n.d.), *Trust in Government*, http://www.oecd.org/gov/trust-in-government.htm (accessed on 11 March 2021). [9]

Office national d'identification (n.d.), *(No Title)*, http://oni.gouv.ht/# (accessed on 6 April 2021). [34]

OMRH (2018), *Charte d'engagement pour les prestations de services de qualité à l'usager*, http://www.omrh.gouv.ht/Media/2-DocumentsStrategiques/fp/CHARTE_D_ENGAGEMENT_POUR_LES_PRESTATIONS_DE_SERVICES.pdf (accessed on 12 March 2021). [32]

OMRH (n.d.), *Les attributions de l'OMR*, http://www.omrh.gouv.ht/attributions (accessed on 12 March 2021). [19]

OMRH-CRA (n.d.), *Qui sommes-nous?*, http://www.servicespublics.gouv.ht/site/staticContent/typeContent/QUISOMMESNOUS (accessed on 10 May 2021). [20]

OPC (n.d.), *Compétences et attributions*, https://www.opchaiti.com/competence-et-attribution (accessed on 11 March 2021). [14]

Présidence du gouvernement de la République tunisienne (n.d.), *Open Government Partnership – Tunisie*, http://www.ogptunisie.gov.tn/fr/ (accessed on 12 March 2021). [18]

Programme Renforcement et Participation de la Société Civile (RePASOC), U. (2018), *États Généraux de la Société Civile au Bénin*, http://www.repasoc.bj/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Les-Etats-Ge%CC%81ne%CC%81raux-de-la-Socie%CC%81te%CC%81-Civile-au-Be%CC%81nin_Cotonou2018.pdf (accessed on 9 April 2020). [36]

République d'Haïti (1987), *Constitution de la République d'Haïti*, http://www.oas.org/juridico/PDFs/mesicic4_hti_const.pdf (accessed on 11 March 2021). [23]

République d'Haïti (1987), *Constitution de la République d'Haïti*, http://www.oas.org/juridico/PDFs/mesicic4_hti_const.pdf (accessed on 11 May 2021). [45]

République du Brésil (2021), *Fala.BR - Plataforma Integrada de Ouvidoria e Acesso à Informação*, https://falabr.cgu.gov.br/publico/Manifestacao/SelecionarTipoManifestacao.aspx?ReturnUrl=%2f (accessed on 26 March 2021). [50]

Royaume de Belgique (2020), *COMMnet, le réseau des communicateurs fédéraux*, https://fedweb.belgium.be/fr/a_propos_de_l_organisation/communication/a_propos_de_la_communication_federale/reseaux/commnet (accessed on 26 March 2021). [41]

Royaume du Maroc (2021), *Guide de la Communication Publique*, https://www.mmsp.gov.ma/uploads/documents/GuideCommunicationPublique_09022021_Fr.pdf (accessed on 19 February 2021). [46]

RSF (n.d.), *Haïti*, https://rsf.org/fr/haiti (accessed on 11 March 2021). [53]

Transparency International (2020), *Corruption Perception Index 2020*, https://images.transparencycdn.org/images/CPI2020_Report_EN_0802-WEB-1_2021-02-08-103053.pdf (accessed on 12 March 2021). [55]

UNESCO (2021), *Les radios communautaires un outil de résilience pour Haïti*, https://fr.unesco.org/news/radios-communautaires-outil-resilience-haiti (accessed on 8 March 2021). [44]

Notes

[1] An open government strategy is a document that sets out the open government agenda and includes key initiatives, as well as short-, medium- and long-term targets and indicators. Open government initiatives are actions taken by a public institution to achieve specific goals, ranging from the development of legislation to the implementation of specific activities such as online consultations, participatory budgeting or the co-production of public services (OECD, 2017[2]).

[2] According to the fact-finding mission.

[3] PME 2018-2023, p.14.

[4] Analysis as of 17 February 2021 of the websites and social media accounts of the departments that responded to the OECD questionnaire.

[5] Analysis as of 17 February 2021 of the websites and social media accounts of the departments that responded to the OECD questionnaire.

OECD Public Governance Reviews

HAITI

STRENGTHENING PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION FOR RESILIENT AND SUSTAINABLE GOVERNANCE

The government of Haiti is undertaking public governance reforms to support sustainable growth and inclusive socio-economic development. This Review analyses areas such as whole-of-government co-ordination, the links between budgeting and planning, and the decentralisation process to improve development outcomes to which all levels of government in the country contribute. It also assesses the management of the civil service and the implementation of open government strategies and initiatives to involve citizens in the policy cycle. This Review provides concrete recommendations, aligned with key national strategic documents such as the State Modernisation Programme 2018-2023 and Haiti's Strategic Development Plan, to support public governance reform in Haiti.

USAID FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

PRINT ISBN 978-92-64-76449-1
PDF ISBN 978-92-64-36214-7

2021