

# Allocation of competences in policy sectors key to migrant integration

In a sample of ten OECD countries



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A first step to implement effective migrant integration policies is to know who does what in policy sectors key to integration. Responding to this need, this paper offers policy makers a tool to understand the organisation of public action in key sectors for integration - Employment, Education, Housing, and Health/Welfare – in a sample of 10 OECD countries: Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden and the Netherlands.

The complexity of the division of powers among levels of government calls for coordination mechanisms between actors, whatever the level of decentralisation. Besides, it throws lights on subnational governments' role in integrating migrants and enabling them to participate to local development for the benefits of all. The geographic differences that exist in migrant presence and outcomes mean countries should build on local authorities' knowledge of local realities, aptitudes to coordinate different policy fields at the relevant scale and cooperate with non-governmental organisations.

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# Table of contents

Acknowledgements	3
Executive summary	5
Allocation of competences in policy areas crucial to migrant integration	9
I. Introduction	10
Motivation	10
II. Methodology	13
III. Allocation of competences across levels of government in policy sectors key to migrant integration, and its recent evolution	19
The Employment Sector	19
The Educational Sector	30
The Housing sector	36
The Health and Welfare sector	39
IV. What influences the degree of decentralisation of migrant integration policies?	42
Annex A. Employment sector: migrant rights and allocations of competences	48
Annex B. Education sector: migrant rights and allocations of competences	59
Annex C. Housing and health/welfare sectors: migrant rights and allocations of competences	68
References	76

## FIGURES

Figure 1. Decentralisation, a multidimensional concept	18
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## TABLES

Table 1. Migrant access to employment	48
Table 2. Competent authority for employment policy	53
Table 3. Migrants' access to education	59
Table 4. Competent authority for education policy	63
Table 5. Migrant access to housing, health and welfare	68
Table 6. Competent authority for housing, health and welfare policies	72

# Executive summary

While the challenges and opportunities of migrant integration in host countries have a very strong territorial dimension, little attention is paid to the allocation of competences in integration-related policy sectors across levels of government. However, effective implementation of integration policies requires knowing *who does what* for migrant integration, good coordination across levels of governments and strong local engagement.

**This paper provides a tool for policy makers at the local, regional, national and supra-national levels to identify *who does what* for migrant integration in host societies.** For 10 OECD countries: Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden and the Netherlands, it observes the allocation of competences in key integration-related policy sectors and its recent evolution. There are four policy sectors worthy of particular attention when it comes to migrant integration: Employment, Education, Housing, and Health/Welfare.

As migrants mostly access public services through universal policies, this paper examines their governance structure, in addition to that of policies directly targeting migrants. By definition, universal policies do not target particular population groups and thus often struggle to reach certain population groups, especially the most vulnerable. In this context, non-governmental organisations typically provide the "last mile" between universal policies and targeted populations.

Following, the introduction and methodology sections, the third section of this paper provides policy makers with clear information on which actors are in charge of the four policy sectors key for migrant integration. Examples of interesting distributions of power and the few available evaluations of governance structures' impact on migrant integration are developed. Matrices in the annex (Annexes 1.A, 1.B and 1.C) present a summary of the information on the distribution of competences analysed in section III, for the ten countries and the four aforementioned sectors, including an update on the rights of migrants to access to the various public services. The last section finally explores how three factors linked to migration might provoke decentralisation and centralisation movements in countries. It reveals that factors such as demographic decline or immigration flows, often reshuffle who does what in certain policy sectors such as temporary housing, but that no factor alone can explain or predict all transfers of competences. This is not surprising as the scope of the four studied policy sectors reaches well beyond migrant populations and integration-related issues.

Findings from this paper reveal that the division of powers among levels of government – and the complementary role played by non-governmental actors in fostering migrant integration – varies significantly from country to country and from sector to sector. While in France, New Zealand and Italy mechanisms for selecting and issuing labour permits to migrants are largely managed by central authorities, territorial needs are increasingly taken into account in countries like Austria, Canada, Germany, Spain and Sweden through the decentralisation of some competences, notably those linked to the evaluation of migrants' applications' relevance regarding labour market needs. Similarly, while in all studied countries public actors are in charge of delivering primary and secondary education, in Sweden, the Netherlands, Germany and Austria there is also a heavy reliance on non-governmental organisations to provide early childhood education and care. Overall, an important finding is that subnational governments

often play a key role in integrating migrants and enabling them to participate to local development for the benefits of all.

It is difficult to assess the effects of decentralisation on migrant integration because outcomes are heavily influenced by universal policies from at least four policy sectors and there is a lack of programme evaluation and data collection on how migrants benefit from these policies. Despite this, our study shows that decentralisation can only be trusted to improve migrant integration if consistently designed and implemented along with investment in multi-level coordination. This coordination should include not just government actors, but those civil society, voluntary organisations and business that are often closest to the ground in terms of migrant integration activities.

Thus, whilst this work offers a tool for understanding the organisation of public action in key sectors for integration, it also reveals the complexity of a successful integration process: whatever the level of decentralisation, different levels of government and actors in charge of different policy fields must coordinate. To respond to this **necessity of integrating policies to integrate migrants**, different tools are mobilised by countries. This is the subject of the accompanying document to this work, which analyses policy instruments from Austria, Canada, France, Germany and Italy to illustrate the following categories of practice for multi-level coordination to support migrant integration:

- Reinforcing coordination (financial, human, technical) between levels of governments and private actors such as businesses or NGOs to foster migrant integration and retention: *The Canadian Atlantic Immigration Pilot (AIP)* and the French *Territorial Contracts for the Reception and Integration of Refugees (CTAIR)*.
- Resolving information and evaluation asymmetries: Vienna's (Austria) *Integration and Diversity Monitor* and the German *Network IQ*.
- Illustrating the positive externalities of territorial development policies on migrant integration and social cohesion: The Italian *Inner Areas* strategy and the French *Urban Policy (Politique de la Ville)*.

The methodology used to assess these multi-level governance policy mechanisms offers policy makers a solution to evaluate and improve their own existent policy instruments.

## Key policy messages to enhance migrant integration

### 1. Build on local authorities' aptitudes to coordinate different policy fields and to support local non-governmental organisations.

With its strong territorial dimension (Allain-Dupré et al., 2021<sup>[1]</sup>) and its disproportionate toll on migrants, the COVID-19 crisis has reemphasised the need for policies and programmes, established at higher regional and national levels, to reflect the fact that integration takes place at the local level, where migrants actually live.

To meet the needs of integration, both from the point of view of migrants and locals, action must be taken in several areas of public policy. Improving the integrative performance of these policies cannot be the result of a silo approach. They must be considered together in order to improve migrant integration outcomes. SNGs are best suited to adapt policy mixes to the specific needs and opportunities of their territories, and to supplement this action by turning to NGOs. As shown in this work and the tables provided in the Annex, the role played by SNGs varies according to country and sector but is key for the implementation of integration-related policies.

The COVID-19 crisis has underlined once again how civil society organisations are an essential link in the loop between universal policies and migrant populations. Local businesses also play a crucial role in fostering migrants' access to the labour market. The important contribution of both actors reinforces the

argument for promoting the role of SNGs since they are closer to non-governmental actors and citizens than higher levels of governments.

The joint survey on migrant integration the OECD conducted between June and September 2021 with the European Committee of Regions (CoR) to explore subnational governments' perspective speaks to the timeliness of this work. For all policy sectors studied, at least close to half of the 73 surveyed European SNGs indicated they would like to see a new allocation of competences among levels of government considering the impact of the COVID-19 crisis on migrants. Interestingly, the three sectors for which the most SNGs indicated a desire for a change in the allocation of competences are the ones in which the most SNGs provide specific services for migrants: respectively the temporary housing, language acquisition and social housing sectors.

Overall, for all policy sectors studied, except the health and primary and secondary education ones, at least 75% of the SNGs who want a change in the allocation of competences ask for more decentralisation rather than more centralisation. For the health and primary/secondary sectors, about two-thirds ask for decentralisation rather than more centralisation. The geographic concentration of immigrants in certain areas of OECD countries, and its consequences, which local authorities are best placed to tackle, is likely to be a key reason for this high demand for change. Although integration of new arrivals in an area with high concentration of migrants is often associated with better initial employment prospects, in the longer run, high concentration tends to hamper host-country language acquisition and, in many cases, educational advancement for the children of immigrants (OECD, 2021<sup>[2]</sup>).

Perceptions of migration are also territorialised. Within countries, people's perceptions of migration vary according to the type of area in which they live. Recent analysis shows rural residents tend to hold more negative perceptions about migration than urban residents<sup>1</sup>, although the former could benefit – sometimes even more - from immigration (Charbit and Tharaux, 2021<sup>[3]</sup>). Moreover, the pandemic has led to a rise in anti-immigrant sentiment in some places, with growing cases of discrimination. At the same time, the pandemic and lockdowns have raised awareness of the essential role of the migrant population in certain territories and sectors (Kleine-Rueschkamp and Özgüzel, 2020<sup>[4]</sup>). This could generate a more positive perception of migration in the long term. In any case, as the crisis continues to hit territories unevenly, its impact on unemployment and on public opinion regarding immigration is likely to vary widely from one place to another. It is thus at the local level where public decision-makers need to implement communication strategies that can illustrate the beneficial role migrants play in local communities. Indeed, over two-thirds of SNGs surveyed by the OECD and the CoR indicated they were considering such strategies.

## **2. Address coordination challenges across levels of government and among policy areas through appropriate multi-level governance instruments for integration.**

Beyond building on the local level, successful integration requires coordinated actions across policy domains – notably labour, education, housing and welfare (including health) – levels of government and non-governmental actors. To coordinate, stakeholders must know who is in charge of what. This is the question that this work is devoted to answering.

The policy instruments presented in the accompanying paper, illustrate this necessity. For instance, the French Territorial Contracts for Refugees' Reception and Integration, signed between the French Ministry of the Interior (Dair) and cities or metropolitan areas, aim to improve refugees' integration by bringing together local integration stakeholders to develop a common field diagnosis and select actions to finance. The first and crucial step is thus to identify who are the relevant integration actors in each concerned territory. Similarly, the German funding programme Network "Integration through Qualification (IQ)" exclusively aims to improve migrants' employment outcomes by fostering the recognition of qualifications acquired outside Germany through an enhanced coordination between different actors and levels of government.



### 3. Advance data collection on migrant outcomes, and policies and program evaluation

Clear and consistent data collection on integration outcomes of migrant populations and native residents with immigrant backgrounds can foster informed policy decisions and measuring, and comparing, progress. The fact that country of birth is a strong predictor of lasting inequalities, including across generations for native-born children of immigrants (OECD, 2021<sup>[2]</sup>) signals the importance of having data distinguishing between migrant groups, not only to compare them with natives but also with each other (Van Doren, 2021<sup>[5]</sup>) and across generations. Results from the OECD/CoR joint survey, confirm data on second and third migrant generations is missing. More than 90% of subnational governments indicated they do not collect data on the geographical distribution and integration results of these groups.

Countries and subnational levels of government should develop systems to regularly collect reliable data to ensure that vulnerabilities specific to migrants do not go unaddressed, and that the positive impact of diversity on local development is exploited. The city of Amsterdam for instance conducts a cost-benefit analysis of the Amsterdam Approach to refugees every six months. It compares all costs associated with activities for refugees against all the benefits, such as lower unemployment expenditures, higher tax receipts, more educational benefits and enhanced quality of life (OECD, 2018<sup>[6]</sup>). Results from these analyses feed local communication campaigns, which are key to migrant integration.

As migrant integration involves many actors and various levels of government, coordination efforts need to be strengthened both at the policy implementation and evaluation stages. Institutional arrangements in place at the country level influence whether and how evaluations are conducted, while they affect the dissemination of the results to public decision-makers and inform public opinion. Governments must set up adequate political and administrative systems for evaluation to fully play its role in public governance. All sources of data on migrant outcomes should be exploited, including not just those collected by national statistical organisations but also from settlement service providers and other relevant actors closest to the settlement and integration processes, as was done in Canada following the settlement of Syrian refugees in 2015-16.

Good practices of quantitative and qualitative data collection helping decision-makers reform and improve integration activities through evaluation exist. For instance, Canada's *Atlantic Immigration Pilot (AIP)*, presented in the accompanying paper, produces an array of qualitative and quantitative evidence through document reviews, employment outcomes, site visits, surveys with AIP participants including employers, and tax data from an immigration database that covers employee wages. This type of evaluation serves a dual purpose in providing advice to policy-makers on potential improvements of integration programs and an indication to civil society of the positive impacts of migrant integration in their territory.

There is great potential to take advantage of the experimentation and innovation in integration policy and governance arrangements taking place in OECD countries such as the six policy instruments aforementioned and presented in the accompanying paper. Governments should consider investing in capacity-building programmes that strengthen dialogue across levels of government and with non-government actors. In addition, learning from experiences from other countries and places can definitely contribute to territorial integration policies' outcomes.

Prior to designing coordinated actions, governments of OECD and non-OECD countries not covered by this study are invited to adopt this work's methodology to develop institutional mappings that will allow them to identify multi-level governance challenges. As a second step, they can implement mechanisms fostering vertical, across levels of government, and horizontal, across sectors, coordination, which takes into account the governance specificities of their integration-related policies.

Based on the OECD *Checklist for public action to migrant integration at the local level* (OECD, 2018<sup>[7]</sup>), the accompanying paper to this work presents six multi-level governance instruments that foster coordination in five countries. It will help all levels of government and donors to identify good practices to replicate and pitfalls to avoid, and provide them with ideas of how to improve existing arrangements.

# Allocation of competences in policy areas crucial to migrant integration

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When well integrated, migrants can, through different channels, have a positive impact on regional development and constitute a powerful asset for recovery from the COVID-19 crisis. Yet, the implementation of public policies essential to their integration depends on different governmental actors and, at times, non-governmental ones. To ensure they coordinate and thus improve migrant integration and local society's outcomes, the first task is to identify who is in charge of what in integration-related policy sectors. This report aims to contribute to reach that objective. Based on data from a sample of 10 OECD countries - Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden and The Netherlands - it describes the allocation of responsibilities across levels of government in the labour, education, housing and welfare (including health) sectors, and sheds light on factors that could influence some changes in the allocation of competences. In addition, matrices in the annex (Annexes A, B and C) provide policy makers with practical tools easily usable. This clarification paradoxically reveals the complexity of public action for migrant integration and calls for the implementation of effective mechanisms fostering multi-level coordination. Some are developed in the accompanying paper.

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## I. Introduction

Today, it is clear that migration can benefit rather than cost host societies (OECD, 2021<sup>[2]</sup>). However, the difficulty lies in how to integrate migrants to meet their needs and those of the native-born. Answering this question requires clarifying the role of the various stakeholders of public action, in particular sub-national governments (SNG).

By looking inside ten OECD countries at thirteen sub-policy areas (Box.1) most relevant for migrants and refugees' integration, this qualitative analysis chapter highlights:

1. Which level of government is responsible for integration-related policies;
2. Which decentralised institutional movements characterise policy areas in the last 20 years;
3. What factors can explain the decentralisation and centralisation movements observed.

### Box.1. The policy sectors this report concentrates on

- National Migration Policy

#### Employment sector

- Labour and Entrepreneurship Migration Policies
- Vocational education and training
- Active labour market programmes
- Skills and qualifications recognition

#### Education sector

- Early childhood education and care
- Primary and secondary education
- Tertiary education
- Language acquisition training

#### Housing sector

- Temporary housing
- Social housing

#### Health and Welfare sector

- Health
- Welfare benefits

## Motivation

**Beyond ethical considerations and the richness of cultural diversity, there are several reasons for governments to take a closer look at the integration of migrants and its determinants. First, migrants can bring economic benefits to their host societies.** Those who have equal access to their host society's labour market can for instance generate high fiscal gains. In most OECD countries, on average during the last decade, immigrants have contributed more in taxes and contributions than governments spend on their social protection, health and education (OECD, 2021<sup>[2]</sup>). The majority of countries studied in this paper stand out for the size of the potential fiscal gain that extra-EU migrants could produce under scenarios that feature their better integration: Sweden, The Netherlands, France, Austria, Germany, Italy and Ireland (Belanger et al., 2020<sup>[8]</sup>). Furthermore, third-country nationals' arrival and their

continuous presence can trigger innovations and the blooming of social entrepreneurship (Bianchi et al., 2021<sup>[9]</sup>). In Canada and the Netherlands, the share of foreign-born inventors among patent applicants thus reaches almost 30% (Lissoni and Miguelez, 2021<sup>[10]</sup>). **Yet, available evidence shows the COVID-19 crisis had a disproportionately negative toll on migrants' health and employment outcomes.** Studies in a number of OECD countries found for migrants an infection risk that is at least twice as high as that of the native-born (Scarpetta, Dumont and Liebig, 2020<sup>[11]</sup>). Besides, the crisis and its consequences ended 10 years of continuous progress for immigrants' labour market outcomes (OECD, 2021<sup>[2]</sup>). While employment declined almost everywhere, the gap in the employment rate between foreign-born and native-born widened across OECD countries to reach 2 percentage points on average, while the difference in the unemployment rate is now more than 3 percentage points. Indeed, foreign-born workers have been disproportionately affected by job losses, given their generally more precarious labour contracts (OECD, 2020<sup>[12]</sup>) but also their strong concentration in deeply affected sectors, such as hospitality where they account for 25% of total employment OECD-wide. Overall, experiences from previous economic crises also suggest that the economic downturn associated with the COVID-19 pandemic may have disproportionate and long-lasting negative effects on the integration of immigrants and their children unless appropriate support measures are in place (Scarpetta, Dumont and Liebig, 2020<sup>[11]</sup>) (International Labor Organisation, 2020<sup>[13]</sup>). **Furthermore, negative attitudes towards migration, still widespread in some places before the COVID-19 crisis, might increase.** Today, in a context of economic recession and increasing challenges for maintaining social cohesion, support for proactive integration policies may decline.

**The large geographical disparities in terms of migrant outcomes and native-born perceptions show the challenges to integration are above all local concerns.** Looking first at the employment sector, it makes more sense to acknowledge the plurality of each country's local labour markets rather than speak of a single national one. Indeed, even before COVID-19 hit, the labour market picture was not as rosy as national figures suggested. Persistent disparities existed in labour market performance across cities and regions within countries. For instance in over half of OECD countries, there is a two-fold or more difference in unemployment rates between the best and worst performing regions (OECD, 2020<sup>[14]</sup>) so migrants do not face the same barriers everywhere.

Similarly, the crisis' impact on health has been much territorialised. If later on COVID-19 spread towards less dense regions, in the early phase of the pandemic, densely populated urban areas where migrants tend to concentrate were the hardest hit in terms of health outcomes (OECD, 2021<sup>[15]</sup>). Indeed, in most OECD countries, the share of immigrants in the population is higher in urban areas than in rural ones (OECD, 2021<sup>[2]</sup>), with almost twice as much foreign-born living in OECD countries' capitals than in the rest of the country (Kleine-Rueschkamp and Özgüzel, 2020<sup>[4]</sup>). Finally, it is crucial to consider increases in the negative attitudes towards migration will also vary within countries according to the geographic area in which people live. Rural residents tend to hold more negative perceptions about migration than urban residents do<sup>2</sup> (Charbit and Tharoux, forthcoming<sup>[16]</sup>). As the crisis continues to hit territories unevenly (OECD, 2021<sup>[15]</sup>), geographic disparities in terms of public opinions and attitudes regarding immigrants are likely to increase tangibly. Local actors focused on local conditions are thereby best positioned to coordinate across related policies. For example, based on their understanding of local labour market dynamics, they can help match migrants' skills and training with market demands. Regardless of what level of government is responsible, being able to adapt policies and programmes to local conditions can help create better integration environments.

**Migrants can contribute to territories' recovery and sustainability.** First, the COVID-19 crisis has brought into sharp relief just how much OECD economies depend on migrants. While countries were in lockdown migrants were at the frontline in many essential sectors (14% of key workers across European regions are migrants) and filling unexpected labour gaps in urban areas and rural areas (Kleine-Rueschkamp and Özgüzel, 2020<sup>[4]</sup>). Second, effectively integrating migrants is a way to work towards a strong economic recovery given that since the 1990s, they have been the primary source of population

growth in developed regions. Today, in a context of ageing populations that raises concerns for the sustainability of many European welfare systems, migration can be considered as an important element of a complex recovery and sustainability policy (Belanger et al., 2020<sup>[8]</sup>). By the way, a number of local authorities already encourage refugees to settle in their territory to match local market needs and keep public services running (OECD, 2018<sup>[17]</sup>). In the Austrian regions of Carinthia and Vorarlberg, migrant workforce – skilled and highly skilled as well as in routine occupation – is for instance a decisive factor for larger international companies to remain competitive as well as for family enterprises who have relied on migrant workforce already since decades (Bianchi et al., 2021<sup>[9]</sup>).

**Effective integration measures can open new opportunities for migrants to be part of the recovery.**

Migrant entrepreneurs contribute to economic growth, create jobs and can support the post COVID-19 recovery (OECD/European Union, 2019<sup>[18]</sup>). Some local authorities have evaluated refugees' long-term impact on their economy and found a positive effect (OECD, 2018<sup>[6]</sup>). In Amsterdam, analysis of the integration plan shows that for every euro invested, a minimum of €1.50 was gained (OECD, 2018<sup>[6]</sup>) (LPBL, 2019<sup>[19]</sup>). Moreover, the presence of migrants, particularly high-skilled ones, is associated with higher exports and diversified trade (number of products) of exporting firms, as well as higher patenting activity in highly urbanised areas. Migration also brings social and other benefits to the local level including greater diversity, which is associated with economic growth (Gauci, 2020<sup>[20]</sup>). A number of cities have made the promotion of diversity a key aspect of their marketing and public relations strategies.

**The rationale behind this work is that effective integration unlocks migrant capacities to contribute to local development and brings high returns in economic and social terms.** Fostering migrant integration can thus a win-win for migrants and destination territories' inhabitants and businesses. This holds true for qualified migrants as well as for less qualified ones as by mostly working in sectors with seasonal activity, and in physically demanding jobs under staggered hours, the latter fill in positions neglected by native-born workers (Auriola and Rapoport, 2021<sup>[21]</sup>). Thus in France, the recruitment difficulties of many companies in 2021 (especially in the construction and hotel-catering sectors) are correlated with the low levels of immigration observed since the crisis. Although correlation is not causation, this suggests that immigrant and native workers are more complementary than substitutable and that immigration can relieve certain sectors and / or trades (Auriola and Rapoport, 2021<sup>[21]</sup>). To this end, migrants and their families must be able to go to school, seek treatment, support themselves, find affordable housing and work or create their own business.

Following, the introduction and methodology sections, **the third section of this paper provides policy makers with clear information on which actors are in charge of four main sectors key for integration.** Examples of interesting distributions of power and the few available evaluations of governance arrangements' impact on migrant integration are developed. Matrices in the annex (Annexes 1.A, 1.B and 1.C) present for the ten countries and the four aforementioned sectors a summary of the information on the distribution of competences presented in part III, and describe the rights of migrants to access to the various public services. Such mappings serve to identify relevant interlocutors; help to assess risks of coordination and policy 'gaps'; can uncover overlaps between actors' functions or excessive dependence of some actors on others' decisions, and finally constitute a requisite first step to guarantee accountability vis à vis policy outcomes (Charbit, 2020<sup>[22]</sup>). They allow for easy comparison between countries and thus stand alone as a valuable tool.

The last section of the policy paper finally explores factors that may influence decentralisation movements in integration-related policy sectors. No single one can explain these movements, which in addition are not only caused by migration-issues as policies are universal. In a complementary document, eight coordination gaps identified by the OECD are used to analyse how six pilot policy instruments implemented in five OECD countries improve multi-level governance for migrant-integration in host societies.

## II. Methodology

### ***Choice of countries***

This chapter is based on in-depth desk research on a sample of ten OECD countries, two non-European and eight European: Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden and The Netherlands.

These countries were selected to illustrate the diversity of policy and governance scenarios across the OECD. As such, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand and Sweden are unitary countries, Austria, Canada and Germany are federal ones, and Spain is a quasi-federal country as it is constitutionally a unitary state but, in reality, a quasi-federation with regions having a large degree of autonomy (OECD/UCLG, 2019<sup>[23]</sup>). Furthermore, countries vary in geographical size as well as in terms of native-born and foreign-born population size. While this work is mainly Europe-focused, the OECD selected the cases of Canada and New Zealand to enable some comparisons with countries that, because of their geographical situation, have the means to select in advance of arrival the characteristics of people entering their territory.

### ***A perspective from sub-national governments: results from the OECD/European Committee of the Regions survey***

The European Committee of the Regions (CoR) and the OECD have joined forces to collect and analyse views and experiences of 73 European sub-national governments (SNG) on migrant integration at the sub-national level through a survey. Questions considered: specific services provided for migrants by the respondents in the education, health, employment and housing sectors; respondents' desire of a new allocation of competences among levels of government in these same sectors; changes in perceptions of migration; diasporas' commercial and cultural links with their territories of origin; data collection; and the use of European funds (Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF), European Social Fund (ESF+) and European Regional Development Fund (ERDF)).

It should be noted that 37% of respondents are municipalities of under 50 000 inhabitants, and that while 27 countries are represented in the sample, 41% of respondents are German. These overrepresentations lead to biases in the data that should be borne in mind when considering the overall results.

A first striking result is that for all eight policy sectors studied, at least close to half of the respondents would like to see a new allocation of competences among levels of government considering the impact of the COVID-19 crisis on migrants.

Interestingly, the three sectors for which the most SNGs ask for a change in the allocation of competences are the ones in which the most SNGs provide specific services for migrants: respectively the temporary housing, first domain in which localities receiving migrants must act and innovate, language acquisition and social housing sectors. Indeed, the temporary housing is the first domain in which localities receiving migrants must act and innovate and is the sector in which the most respondents indicated they provide specific services to one or several groups of migrants.

For all policy sectors studied, except the health and primary and secondary education ones, among SNGs who want a change in the allocation of competences at least 75% ask for more decentralisation rather than more centralisation. For the health and primary/secondary sectors, about two-thirds ask for decentralisation rather than more centralisation. These replies may reflect how arrivals of migrants have often forced SNGs – including those that do not have legal competence to care for migrants – to play a role, sometimes without having a legal mandate or specific budget with which to act. Indeed, the following work reveals recent migration waves have not provoked a large re-assignment of integration-related responsibilities even when transfers from central governments may not always cover for SNGs expenses.

In Germany for instance, the central government claims that around 70% of the additional fiscal cost to SNG is covered, while the regional states claim it is closer to 40% (Blöchliger, Dumont and Liebig, 2017<sup>[24]</sup>).

Other key figures reveal that SNGs are aware of the fact contrasting narratives on migration have unfolded during the COVID-19 crisis. Thus, 50% of them noticed a positive change and 45% a negative change in the way people living in their territory perceive migrants. As a result, 70% of them consider using changes in perceptions to support the development of a more positive narrative on migration in their territory. Central governments should give them the means to do so as two contrasting narratives on migration have unfolded during the crisis. The first celebrates the economic and social contribution of immigrants to their host economies, notably as frontline workers in many essential sectors, and exposes their often-precarious living and working conditions. The second focuses on how cross-border movements explain the initial spread of the virus and on rising unemployment among the domestic population, which risks reinforcing negative perceptions of migration. As the crisis continues to hit territories unevenly, its impact on public opinion regarding immigration is likely to vary widely. Transferring some competences and the linked budgets to local policy makers would enable them to implement communication strategies reflecting place-based differences in the context of the national orientations.

In confirmation of the aforementioned point on the need to collect data on migrant outcomes more systematically and frequently, more than 90% of subnational governments indicated they do not collect data on the geographical distribution and integration results of second and third generations of migrants. It would however be a crucial indication to measure the reality of integration, which needs time to be achieved (OECD, 2018<sup>[7]</sup>).

Finally, the survey asked SNGs questions about their use of European funds to finance migrant-integration. Understanding what has prevented most SNGs to take advantage of these resources is key to understand how to improve their distribution. The European Commission has reinforced existing financial instruments and developed new ones to support Member States and SNGs to respond to the refugee surge and to migrant integration more generally. It will be important to verify if those ameliorate the way in which the next generation of EU funds (2021-2027) will be used for migrant integration. The Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF), for example, covers actions aiming at promoting the effective integration of non-EU nationals. Beneficiaries of the programmes implemented under AMIF can include, among other things, regional state and federal authorities, local public bodies and non-governmental organisations. Yet, the great majority of SNGs who replied to the survey did not apply to the AMIF, European Social Fund (ESF+) and European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). Consequently, only 13.7% of respondents have already significantly benefited from the AMIF to support migrant integration, and 8% from the ESF+. Two SNGs indicated they benefited from the ERDF. Respondents indicated the two same main difficulties in using the three different funds: Administrative burden, followed by a lack of human resources.

### ***Choice of policy sectors***

The predominant role Education, Employment, Housing and Health/Welfare play in shaping local integration processes and in maximising the contributions that immigration can provide for development is outlined in major OECD work: the OECD *Checklist for public action to migrant integration at the local level* (OECD, 2018<sup>[7]</sup>) and the *Local Inclusion Action Tool* (2020<sup>[25]</sup>), developed by the OECD and international partners. Besides, various other existing indexes evaluating integration policies chose these four sectors (Settling IN, Migrant Integration Policy Index –MIPEX-, Inti-Cities, Integrating Cities Benchmark, etc.) as well as migration governance indicators (Migration Governance Indicators, Impala, Demig, UNDESA, IMPIC, etc.).

Recently, the European Commission (2020<sup>[26]</sup>) chose to focus on these four main sectoral areas for its Action plan on Integration and Inclusion 2021-2027. This was done based on broad public and targeted consultations conducted between June and October 2020 among a wide range of actors: Member States, local and regional authorities, social and economic partners, employers, civil society organisations,

foundations, international organisations and migrants, including refugees. Here is the common rationale behind this choice of sectors:

- Employment is a key part of the integration process and is central to the participation of immigrants, to their contributions to their host society, and to making such contributions visible (Council of the European Union, 2004<sup>[27]</sup>). It is recognised as one of the mainstays of the process of integration in terms of access to goods and services with which to ensure a decent standard of living, and contribute to the community. Migrants make up a significant part of the European Union's workforce (European Commission, 2020<sup>[26]</sup>) and the COVID-19 crisis has made their contribution to European economies and labour markets all the more evident. The employment sector is also of great interest to this report as effective inclusion of migrants into the labour market requires the active collaboration of a large variety of actors, including public authorities at the local, regional and national level, civil society organisations, economic and social partners and employers (European Commission, 2020<sup>[26]</sup>).
- Integration policies tend to deal primarily with participation in the labour market. Yet education policies are increasingly recognised as playing a crucial role in helping migrants settle in new countries and environments. From early childhood education and care (ECEC) or language learning to the recognition of qualifications, education is a part of the solution throughout the integration process and one of the most powerful tools for building more inclusive societies (European Commission, 2020<sup>[26]</sup>). Furthermore, education prepares people to better participate in all areas of daily life and to interact with others which not only has positive effects for the individual, but also for the society as a whole (Council of the European Union, 2004<sup>[27]</sup>). Evidence clearly demonstrates that migrants and their children – and the generations that follow them – are better equipped to thrive and contribute to society when they have opportunities to learn and advance wherever they are (OECD/European Union, 2015<sup>[28]</sup>). Furthermore, educated people and the children of educated parents tend to be healthier, more empowered regarding their own lives and their society, and socially more tolerant and resolution seeking (Wils and Bonnet, 2015<sup>[29]</sup>).
- Access to health care is both an individual right and a public health issue. Insufficient access to healthcare services can be a major obstacle to integration and inclusion, affecting virtually all areas of life and shaping the ability to enter employment, education, learning the host country's language and interacting with public institutions (European Commission et al., 2016<sup>[30]</sup>) (European Commission, 2020<sup>[26]</sup>). Migrants are confronted with specific persistent barriers to accessing healthcare services, including administrative hurdles, risk of discrimination, lack of information to navigate the healthcare system, and linguistic and intercultural obstacles. The COVID-19 pandemic shed light on deep-seated inequalities in access to health and welfare services. It has also shown that these inequalities can pose risks to society at large. Ensuring migrants can access mental health services is critical. Refugees in particular are at higher risk of developing mental health problems due to trauma experienced in their country of origin, during their migration journey and upon arriving (OECD, 2019<sup>[31]</sup>). At the onset of the COVID-19 crisis, the incidence of mental distress and mental health conditions increased significantly, in general and specifically among youth, across the OECD (Scarpetta, Colombo and Hewlett, 2021<sup>[32]</sup>).
- Access to housing is a key determinant of successful integration. Housing conditions have a strong impact on employment and education opportunities and on the interactions between migrants and host communities (European Commission, 2020<sup>[26]</sup>). Poor housing conditions and geographic concentration of migrants can exacerbate divisions, which undermine social cohesion. Yet, increasing housing prices, shortages of affordable and social housing, and discrimination in the housing market make it difficult for migrants to find adequate and long-term housing solutions. In addition, the housing conditions of migrants have put them among the most vulnerable during groups the pandemic.



## **Encountered difficulties**

### *Measuring the decentralisation of integration-related competences is a challenge*

Competing definitions of decentralisation, its multi-dimensional nature and the heterogeneity of experiences on the ground renders it difficult to actually measure decentralisation. Various quantitative and qualitative indicators, not always collected or available, are needed to determine the real magnitude of decentralisation, to correctly grasp the trends at play and finally to accurately assess the impact and the outcomes of decentralisation (OECD, 2019<sup>[33]</sup>).

Because the way policies are designed and implemented can largely condition their impact, this report focuses on the allocation of political and administrative responsibilities and less on budgetary ones. This approach could lead to narrower interpretation of which level matters as budgetary responsibilities can be crucial (OECD, 2018<sup>[7]</sup>).

### **The lack of official data on migrant integration outcomes makes it difficult to determine the effectiveness of decentralising competences in related policy areas**

In most countries studied, data on migrant integration' outcomes is not consistently collected. Looking at the primary and secondary educational sector this report gives an illustration of the gaps to fill. According to a European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights report, 10 out of 28 EU Member States capture migration status in education statistics (Kahn, Bidart and Zakoska Todorovska, 2019<sup>[34]</sup>):

- In Spain, national educational statistics do not capture refugee and migrant children, and only partial data related to refugee and migrant children hosted in reception facilities are available.
- In France, refugee and migrant children appear in national education statistics only when they do not speak the language of instruction (French) and require additional language support.
- In the Netherlands, statistics only exist for asylum-seekers.
- In Italy, national educational statistics distinguish only between Italian and non-Italian citizens.
- In Sweden, national education statistics capture all students with foreign background (including second-generation migrants), hence information on differences between recently arrived migrants and refugees and migrant children are not available.
- In Germany, data on refugee and migrant children accessing education is only partially available at the regional level as data collection is not compulsory. More particularly, to get an overview of refugees' access to and success in vocational education and training, six data sources from three different government agencies are needed (Bergseng, Degler and Lüthi, 2019<sup>[35]</sup>). The first is the Integrated Training Reporting system (iABE) and Training Statistics from the Federal Statistical Office (DE Statis). Second, statistics on the Vocational Education and Training (VET) market and applicants to VET, employment statistics and statistics on assistance measures from the Public Employment Service. Finally, statistics on integration courses from the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF). This complexity required to piece together data to generate insights on integration is a systemic barrier to measuring and evaluating integration that policy makers must address.

### **The lack of official impact-evaluation makes it difficult to determine the effectiveness of decentralisation on service delivery, and on integration**

Besides data monitoring migrant socio-economic outcomes, policies and project evaluations can provide valuable information on the effectiveness of decentralisation or centralisation so that appropriate adjustments can be made. Yet, this chapter points to a severe lack of culture of evidence-based policy making within the employment, education, housing, health and welfare sectors. Across the ten countries in the sample, access to reliable information sources, data and evidence on how decentralisation is implemented and on the results of integration-related programmes are very limited. Likewise, few policies

or programmes indicate that they rely on results of evaluations. A handful of evaluations on the decentralisation of practices are presented below but while their impact is measured through different results indicators, comparison among them is a challenge.

Researchers from different fields have tried to understand the reasons for the persistent gaps between the lack of public policy evaluations and the constant, reaffirmed belief in evaluation as a relevant tool to ameliorate service efficiency and transparency. Some have focused on the perception of the political risk that evaluation poses for the decision-maker insofar as evaluation can involve introducing an uncertainty that can be seen as threatening. Consequently, evaluation can give rise to objective strategies of workaround or avoidance, described as "interests in non-evaluation" (Laborier and Gaxie, 2003<sup>[36]</sup>). Besides, objectives of certain policies and programmes as too general, diffuse and even polymorphic, may also render evaluation difficult. When it comes to the theme of migrant integration, the evaluation of public policies involving different levels of governments appear particularly underdeveloped. In 2020, the French General Inspectorate of Administration stressed a specific glaring lack of evaluation of decentralisation policies and programmes involving different actors (Acar and Giguët, 2020<sup>[37]</sup>). The reasons given to explain this deficiency are numerous but a lack of coordination prevails.

## Box 2. Definitions of the main concepts used in the report

- Decentralisation

The definition of decentralisation used by the OECD is the following: “*decentralisation consists in the transfer of a range of powers, responsibilities and resources from central government to sub-national governments, defined as legal entities elected by universal suffrage and having some degree of autonomy*” (OECD, 2019<sup>[33]</sup>).

The main characteristic of a decentralised government are the existence of several governing bodies, which have the power for political, administrative or budgetary decision making at a regional or local level. Generally, the decision maker is a level of government: central/federal, state/province/region, and local/municipality. However, it can also include decision-makers at the provider level (Beazley et al., 2019<sup>[38]</sup>). Indeed, special-purpose sub-national actors such as hospitals or school boards, which often hold responsibilities related to migrant integration are concerned by decentralisation movements.

Figure 1. Decentralisation, a multidimensional concept



Source: (OECD, 2019<sup>[33]</sup>)

- Integration

In this report, integration is understood as a “*dynamic, long-term, and continuous two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of [Member] States*” (Council of the European Union, 2004<sup>[27]</sup>). There is debate on whether integration is a process, an outcome or a combination of both. Considering issues of social cohesion alongside issues of economic forms of integration can reveal particularly important in places where a high premium is placed on social and interpersonal interactions (Gauci, 2020<sup>[20]</sup>). Because there is no common definition of integration, defining success in integration is challenging. The discrepancies between the native-born population’s situation and that of the foreign-born is the baseline principle.

### III. Allocation of competences across levels of government in policy sectors key to migrant integration, and its recent evolution

Today, it is clear that migration can benefit rather than cost host societies (OECD, 2021<sup>[2]</sup>). However, the difficulty lies in how to integrate migrants to meet their needs and those of the native-born. Answering this question requires clarifying the role of the various stakeholders of public action, in particular sub-national governments (SNG).

In this section, the allocations of responsibilities per sector are outlined as well as the few evaluation that exist of the effect of decentralisation and centralisation movements on service delivery and migrants' outcomes.

Migration has traditionally been approached as a national prerogative considered emblematic of national sovereignty and of the State capacity to control its borders (Giraudon, 2009<sup>[39]</sup>) (in the context of increased Europeanisation of migration policies). In all studied countries, the decision regulating the quota of migrants and resettled refugees is a central/federal decision and the responsibility to issue regular permits of stay in a country is with national authorities often through their territorial offices.

While giving authorisation to people to immigrate is a power reserved for the national level in all the studied countries, when integration is broken down into its four main constituent policy areas, sub-national levels of government gain a significantly more prominent role.

#### The Employment Sector

##### ***Labour and Entrepreneurship Migration Policies***

Labour migration policies determine whom is admitted in the country to work, under what conditions and for how long. As they are the migration channel most closely linked to the economic priorities of destination countries, it is particularly interesting to see if their governance structure allow for sub-national territories' needs to be taken into account.

The mechanisms for selecting and issuing permits to labour migrants are largely managed by central authorities. **Yet, territorial needs are increasingly taken into account in countries like Austria, Canada, Germany, New Zealand, and Spain through the decentralisation of some competences, notably linked to the evaluation of applications' relevance.**

- In **Austria**, regional settlement authorities (*Niederlassungsbehörden*) follow Federal laws and are under the administrative jurisdiction for Länder, which often delegate their administration to municipalities. Regional settlement authorities are in charge of assessing and issuing permits to third-country nationals and collaborate with regional offices of the Public Employment Service (*Arbeitsmarktservice* - AMS), which evaluate applications' economic benefits, especially with regard to transfer of investment capital and/or the local creation and safeguarding of jobs and sends its report to the regional settlement authority. Furthermore, while the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs is in charge of drafting the national list of existing shortage occupations since 2018, Länder can draft their own list of shortage occupations. In 2020, every Länder, excluding Vienna and Burgenland, had issued their own local list and added occupations, mostly in tourism (OECD, 2021<sup>[2]</sup>).
- In **Canada**, while based on a unified approach, the constitution enables asymmetric arrangements for Canadian provinces regarding migration matters (OECD, 2019<sup>[33]</sup>). Each province and territory has substantial authorities over immigrant selection and can thus deliver licences to people who meet their occupational standards for regulated jobs. The province of Quebec and the Canadian Atlantic Provinces have set up specific selection criteria and procedures to select migrants

according to the skills they need. In both cases, the final decision to issue a visa remains a federal matter. Building on the experience of regional economic immigration programmes, the country is currently working to develop and implement a Municipal Nominee Program, which would allow local communities, chambers of commerce and local labour councils to select permanent immigrants (OECD, 2021<sup>[2]</sup>).

- In most **German** federal states (regional governments), municipalities issue residency and permission to start a business to migrants depending on their specific needs, and notably if the company fulfils a regional need (Federal Ministry of Economy and Energy, 2020<sup>[40]</sup>). To this end, before granting permission to third-country nationals and holders of temporary residence permits to start a business, the immigration authorities (*Ausländerbehörden*), under authority of the federal states, consult the competent local authorities:
  - Local Trade and Industry authorities (*Gewerbebehörden*), which are either municipal or Länder authorities
  - Public umbrella organisation of professions (*öffentlich-rechtlichen Berufsvertretungen*), which are subject to legal discretion of Länder, but are administratively independent (i.e. chamber of doctors, *Ärzttekammer*)
  - Authorities for recognition of professional qualifications (*Berufszulassungsbehörden*) under Länder jurisdiction.
- In **New Zealand**, since June 2020 fifteen Regional Skills Leadership Groups (RSLGs) were formed to identify and support better ways of meeting future skills and workforce needs in regions and cities. Functioning independently, these groups are regionally based and regionally led, and supported by a team of data analysts, advisors and workforce specialists at the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE). Members are regional industry leaders, economic development agencies, and iwi, worker and government representatives. The groups will provide timely local labour market intelligence inform to central government and regional stakeholder decision making, including to inform immigration policy work and decisions and will build links between labour market interventions, including the reforms of vocational education and the temporary work visa system (Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, 2020<sup>[41]</sup>).
- In **Spain**, the General Secretariat for Migration and Emigration (SGIE), within the Ministry of Employment and Social Security (Meyss), designs and manages the procedures for residence and work permits. Yet, since a 2009 reform, Autonomous Communities (regional authorities) are entitled to grant initial work permits. Furthermore, through the consultative Tripartite Social Committee - overseen by the MeySS - trade unions, employers and national administrations periodically exchange information and debate on migrant integration. The committee must be consulted prior to the approval of the labour market shortage lists and any regulation related to migration.

### ***Vocational education and training***

Vocational education and training (VET) programmes are designed for learners to acquire the knowledge, skills and competencies specific to a particular occupation, trade, or class of occupations or trades. They can be either mainly school-based or work-based (e.g. apprenticeships or dual-system education programmes). Ideally, the skills taught in these programmes are aligned with labour-market demands and thus boost youth employment while helping countries to remain competitive. The importance of VET systems within the educational landscape varies widely across studied countries. Overall in OECD countries, upper secondary education is the most common level at which VET programmes are provided although other efficient systems exist (OECD, 2020<sup>[42]</sup>). In Austria and the Netherlands, more than 65% of upper secondary students participate in vocational programmes whereas in contrast in Canada over 80% of upper secondary students are enrolled in general programmes, mainly because in Canada vocational

programmes are often provided within the post-secondary system (OECD, 2020<sup>[42]</sup>). Evidence shows that countries with well-established VET programmes have been more effective in holding the line on youth unemployment and in providing the skills needed by the labour market (OECD, 2010<sup>[43]</sup>).

Overall, the share of migrant students in upper-secondary VET varies widely, ranging from 8.3% in Denmark (entrants) to 27% in the Netherlands (enrolments) (Jeon, 2019<sup>[44]</sup>). Some of the differences between countries and regions can be attributed to the availability of vocational education, perceptions people hold about it and if migrants have access to it. VET constitute a unique opportunity for migrants to earn qualifications while providing local firms with human capital and potential future employees. VET programmes' capacity to provide a pathway into successful careers is under pressure in several OECD countries, following the arrival of large numbers of asylum seekers in Europe in 2015 and 2016. In Germany, the share of new migrant entrants to dual VET increased from 5.7% in 2009 to 11.9% in 2017, and for refugees from 0.2% to 3.3% (Jeon, 2019<sup>[44]</sup>). In Sweden, while the number and share of native-born entrants in VET has decreased, the number and share of migrant entrants increased in recent years, illustrated by the steady increase of application rates among migrants from 14% in 2011-12 to 18% in 2016-17 (Jeon, 2019<sup>[44]</sup>).

VET are governed by a complex set of actors, often involving several ministries, levels of government, as well as social partners (i.e. employer associations and unions). Education and training providers, which can include public, private and/or non-profit organisations, as well as individual learners and employers also have varying degrees of influence over the how skills policies are designed and delivery across countries (OECD, 2020<sup>[45]</sup>) (OECD, 2016<sup>[46]</sup>).

**This sections considers a wider range of VET programmes than just upper-secondary and reveals some degree of decentralisation takes place all countries of the sample. In Canada, Germany, Italy and Spain regional authorities hold some competencies and some use them to support migrants. In Sweden, municipalities are in charge.**

- In **Canada**, education is decentralised to its 13 Provinces and Territories who have exclusive responsibility for vocational training (Guerrero et al., 2015<sup>[47]</sup>). Interestingly, federal, provincial and territorial governments in most jurisdictions recently committed to harmonise apprenticeship training (post-secondary education) across regions for key trades. This will tackle a negative externality of decentralisation and will require some form of coordination. The interprovincial Canadian Council of Directors of Apprenticeship, which results from a partnership between Canada's federal, provincial, and territorial governments, promotes collaboration and alignment on apprenticeship training and trade certification could play a coordination role. It oversees the Red Seal programme, an interprovincial standards framework covering 56 occupations and regulating the vocational education and training.

As part of the federal government's Budget 2018, a *Skilled Trades Awareness and Readiness* programme was announced. It will encourage underrepresented groups such as newcomers to explore careers in the skilled trades through activities such as career fairs, mentorship, skills training or work placements. The programme is managed in partnership with Provinces, Territories, post-secondary institutions, training providers, unions and employers.

- In **France**, VET is a matter of shared competences between the central government, the regions and representatives of the business world. Regions are responsible for the planning and coherence of vocational training in their territories, except for apprenticeship provisions. Social partners are the main stakeholders systematically involved in VET implementation. They contribute to the elaboration of VET qualifications, participate in examination boards, offer in-company training and contribute financially to VET provision by paying the apprenticeship tax. In practice, ministerial advisory professional committees are formed with the participation of social partners to plan the revision of VET qualifications in line with labour market needs. The 2018 law for the "freedom to

choose one's professional future" reinforced the weight of professional branches in the governance of apprenticeships (OECD, 2020<sup>[42]</sup>).

In complement to universal policies, the HOPE programme (Hébergement, Orientation Pour l'Emploi) created in 2017 allows refugees who signed the integration contract (CIR) to find employment in jobs facing recruitment shortages through vocational training and work placements (Agence nationale pour la formation professionnelle, 2021<sup>[48]</sup>). A Steering Committee made up of skills operators, employers, the National Agency for the vocational training of adults (AFPA), the Departmental Directorate of Social Cohesion (DDCS) of the Department, the Dreets, the OFII and of the Public Employment Services (Pôle emploi) administers the HOPE programme. Coordination is provided by the Asylum department of the general directorate of foreigners in France (Ministry of the Interior). It is funded by partner skills operators and by the State as part of AFPA's public service mission.

- In **Germany**, part-time VET schools in the dual system and full-time VET schools are under the authority of the regional authorities - the Länder - while the rest of VET provision is governed centrally (Ullmann, Toledo Figueroa and Rawkins, 2020<sup>[49]</sup>). In parallel, The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) is in charge of implementing specialised vocational language training and classes for refugees.

Some regional authorities have developed strategies to meet foreign-people's specific needs in terms of skills. The pilot 1+3 VET model in Bavaria, Germany, for instance allows one additional year for intensive language training in addition to the usual three-year apprenticeship (Bergseng, Degler and Lüthi, 2019<sup>[35]</sup>). The Federal Institute for Vocational Education and Training (Bundesinstitut für Berufsbildung) serves as a major instrument for co-operation between the various stakeholders in the VET sector. Furthermore, social partners are involved at all levels, according to the principle of consensus. This largely occurs through the Federal State Boards and the VET Committees of the Chambers. Different German social partners agreed on a tripartite declaration on education and training for refugees with the Ministries for employment, migration, education and research, and business and energy. They issued joint statements with other employers and industrial organisations declaring their intention to work on integrating asylum seekers into the labour market and proposed to create a secure residence title in the German Migration Law for refugees in vocational training that was adopted by the German government in 2018. As many as 34 local and regional craft chambers (*Handwerkskammern*) and numerous other skilled craft organisations have been engaged in initiatives with numerous stakeholders (local authorities, integration networks, employment agencies, etc.) to seek practical ways for training and integration in the labour market of refugees. Over the years, these initiatives contributed to a steadily rising number of refugees taking up a formal vocational training programme in the skilled craft sector, from approximately 12,000 in 2017 to 18,500 in 2018 and 24,000 in 2019 which argues in favour of the implication of local actors in VET programmes (European Commission, 2020<sup>[50]</sup>).

- In **Italy**, while the Ministry of Education, University and Research regulates the VET framework that governs national school programmes in secondary and higher technical training, regions have an exclusive legislative competence in the organisation of the regional VET system (Eurydice Network, 2021<sup>[51]</sup>). This system can then be delegated to provinces and municipalities according to a trend of decentralisation that reserves to the Regions duties of guidance, planning and monitoring and fewer managing duties (Eurydice Network, 2021<sup>[52]</sup>). In this context, regions such as Piedmont and the metropolitan area of Torino have launched multi-stakeholder dialogues with enterprises and vocational teachers to understand better what skills students/employers will need as enterprises transition to greener production.
- In **Spain**, the national government is responsible for establishing the legal framework of vocational training for employment (adult skills programmes) and employers are co-responsible for the design of the training offer and its implementation (Williams et al., 2018<sup>[53]</sup>) (OECD, 2020<sup>[45]</sup>).

Implementation of VET policies is managed by the Autonomous Communities, which may shape (up to 35-45% of) VET curricula based on local/territorial needs (Cedefop, 2019<sup>[54]</sup>).

- In **Sweden**, municipalities have a large responsibility for the provision of adult education including for newly arrived migrants. Many interesting education and training programmes are being developed at subnational level. Introductory programmes are intended for those “youth at risk” who do not have necessary pass grades to go to upper secondary education, migrants are overrepresented in this category (European Commission, 2015<sup>[55]</sup>). Many introductory programmes are vocationally oriented and aim to prepare young people to the labour market. In particular, the Language Programme prepares newly arrived students to learn the Swedish language up to the level required for the next steps. All municipalities are obliged to offer such Programmes but are free to decide how to provide them. The composition of the teaching staff, their profile and competence requirements will for instance depend on the needs of individual students. The National Agency works with schools and counsellors to support the provision and implementation of career guidance. The Agency also provides in-service training with teams from schools, leaders, counsellors, and teachers and also produces materials and disseminates practices. Municipalities are responsible to provide basic funding allocations to school and additional funding is allocated to schools in disadvantaged areas.

In many OECD countries, no matter what level of government is in charge, private actors play a decision-making role. It is notably the case in **Germany**, as mentioned above, as well as in **Austria, Ireland and the Netherlands**.

- In **Austria**, responsibilities for VET at the upper secondary level are quite centralised although private actors plays a role. Pre-vocational schools and most of the school-based VET programmes are under the responsibility of the Ministry of Education. For dual VET, the Ministry of Economy is responsible for the legal bases and employer involvement, while the Ministry of Education is responsible for the complementary school-based training. Social partners are significantly involved (designing the training regulations, carrying out the assessment procedures). The funding of on-the-job apprenticeship training is borne by the firms; government subsidies are also available. Social support offered for refugees during VET differ considerably between the municipalities and the educational institutions. The continued existence of most social support measures depends on the efforts of volunteers and NGOs (Rabl and Hautz, 2018<sup>[56]</sup>).
- In **Ireland**, responsibility for taking decisions and implementing most VET provisions lies with SOLAS, a government agency in conjunction with 16 Education and Training Boards (ETBs). Both entities are agencies of the Ministry of Education established in 2013. Most of the funding is allocated through SOLAS to the ETBs. The ETBs notably provide the Vocational Training Opportunities Scheme (VTOS), which offers a range of free courses to unemployed people over 21, people with refugee status or subsidiary protection and to parents of an Irish-born child (Department of Further and Higher Education, 2021<sup>[57]</sup>). Courses are full-time and can last up to two years, with 30 hours attendance per week. Employer consultation and labour market intelligence play a key role in informing the development of new VET programmes with a view to addressing identified skills needs, including occupations in short supply, in Ireland’s economy.
- In **the Netherlands**, the Ministry for Education, Culture and Science is responsible for setting the legislative framework but through reforms implemented since 2016, vocational schools now benefit from decisive local autonomy and have full responsibility in staffing, setting educational programmes, and organising learning and co-operation with other partners (Eurydice Network, 2020<sup>[58]</sup>). Programmes are designed jointly with local companies to correspond better to regional circumstances and needs. Furthermore, through reforms implemented since 2016 the Ministry has given vocational schools considerably more leeway. They now benefit from decisive local autonomy and have full responsibility in staffing, setting educational programmes, and organise learning and co-operation with other partners. Programmes are designed jointly with local



companies to better correspond to regional circumstances and needs. According to a 2016 study on the Netherlands' vocational education system, this territorialisation of curricula has ensured the relevance of curricula vis à vis regional needs and adapt programmes more flexibly (Cedefop, 2016<sup>[59]</sup>).

### **Active labour market programmes**

Universal labour market activation programmes (ALMPs) have the objective to give more people access to the labour force and good jobs (Immervoll and Scarpetta, 2012<sup>[60]</sup>). They comprise measures that:

- Strengthen people's motivation to look for and make use of existing earnings opportunities (e.g., work incentives, job-search requirements and benefit sanctions);
- Address specific employment barriers on the labour-supply side by improving the capabilities of jobseekers and other policy "clients" (e.g., training and employment rehabilitation);
- Expand the set of earnings opportunities that are available and accessible to jobseekers and those with limited income from work (labour-market intermediation and programmes that support labour demand through wage subsidies or direct job creation).

In recent decades, governments have put increasing emphasis on ALMPs, as opposed to passive labour market policies (i.e. out of work income maintenance, namely unemployment benefits, as well as early retirement schemes), in line with recommendations from the OECD and others (Rubin, forthcoming<sup>[61]</sup>). Most recently, ALMPs have also been important in mitigating the impacts of the COVID-19 crisis, with two-thirds of OECD and EU countries increasing spending on public employment services in 2020 (OECD, 2021<sup>[62]</sup>).

In terms of their governance structure, **ALMPs are a shared or exclusive competence of subnational governments in just under half of OECD countries.**

It is important to note that depending on their situation migrants will not be given access to the same employment services and will thus not depend on the same level of government (see Annex A to know more about migrants' rights in all 10 countries). In Sweden for instance, eligibility for income-loss unemployment benefits is contingent on membership in an Unemployment Insurance fund for at least 12 months and a work history requirement (Rubin, forthcoming<sup>[61]</sup>). For those not members of an Unemployment Fund but who meet the work history and job requirements receive a general basic insurance, at a much lower rate. Populations such as youth and newly arrived immigrants often fail to meet these requirements, disqualifying them from unemployment benefits. In 2016, only 21% of the unemployed in Sweden received unemployment benefits, down from 33% in 2007 (OECD, 2018<sup>[63]</sup>). In addition to the ALMPs organised through the PES at the national level, most municipalities organise their own programs aimed at activating recipients of social benefits.

Following the theoretical argument that local public employment offices are better informed about local economic conditions and preferences compared to a central agency, **Austria, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand and Sweden** transferred some responsibilities for core ALMPs i.e. those targeted towards people on unemployment benefits, to local PES branches. These cases illustrate one of this report's general observation: when sub-national levels are given leeway to put in place migrant-specific provisions, some coordination conditions must be reunited to implement a consistent strategy.

In parallel, in Germany, Netherlands and Sweden, ALMPs for other target groups, such as those on social assistance benefits, are fully or partially decentralised.

- In **Austria**, the PES (*Arbeitsmarktservice Österreich - AMS*), is commissioned by the Federal Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs Health and Consumer protection, and assumes its role as an enterprise under public law in close cooperation with labour and employers' organisations. It has deconcentrated structure, with one federal office, regional and local offices responsible for

managing and delivering labour market services. Representatives of employers' and labour organisations (i.e. of the Economic Chamber, the Federal Chamber of Labour, the Austrian Trade Union Federation and the Federation of Austrian Industry) are involved at all levels and make a considerable contribution to forming labour market policy and organisational controlling in the board of governors, the provincial directorates and regional advisory councils (Austrian Public Employment Service (AMS), 2021<sup>[64]</sup>).

The "Early Intervention Programme" aims at integrating newcomers in the Austrian labour market. The AMS commission is in charge of it but deconcentrates the responsibility to Länder offices in order for interventions to take into account the composition of the migrant and resident population (Hosner, Schmoller and Heckl, 2018<sup>[65]</sup>). A research report on the programme has pointed at barriers to formal integration stemming from the fact that within the programme, the responsibility for counselling activities shifts from caseworkers in employment agencies to job centres when the application for asylum is approved although these entities are acting under different legal, financial and organisational frameworks (Büschel et al., 2015<sup>[66]</sup>).

- In **France**, the PES (*Pôle Emploi*) is an autonomous public institute, which operates at the national, regional and local levels. The national level is in charge of design and development of national policies, some implementation of these policies, and evaluation of results. The regional level is responsible for adapting the national strategies to regional needs, while the local level is the client-facing level (Rubin, forthcoming<sup>[61]</sup>). As part of the *Projet de loi relatif à la différenciation, la décentralisation, la déconcentration* (the Bill on differentiation, decentralisation and deconcentration), regions could soon acquire some competences. The text plans to involve regions in the governance of the PES. Besides, six pilot Regions were selected in 2020 to manage, for two years, the PES's action in the field of professional training (Philippe, 2019<sup>[67]</sup>). Regional pilots will consist in pooling disparate knowledge and data from the labour market, through real-time job vacancies observatories, in order to meet the needs of companies, and to adapt the financing of necessary training. Regions will also work with lower levels of sub-national government to offer people receiving unemployment benefits trainings for jobs that are recruiting. A regional employment committee will be set up with a permanent secretariat, which will steer actions, monitor their impacts and adjust accordingly. The health crisis has delayed the implementation of this pilot programme.
- In **Germany**, the Federal Employment Agency (*Bundesagentur für Arbeit* - BA) is the main public provider of employment services, with ten deconcentrated regional directorates responsible for regional labour market policies and coordination with state governments. Under these regional directorates are local employment agencies, which provide services for recipients of unemployment benefit I, an insurance-based time-bound benefit. Recipients of unemployment benefit II, which targets those who have exhausted unemployment benefit I or who are not eligible, are served by job centres under the joint responsibility of the BA and municipalities.

However, in 2005 and 2012 over 100 municipalities have chosen to run these job centres on their own. Unlike their centralised counterparts, these job centres operate completely independently of the BA except for the exchange of unemployment registration data. For all job centres, the federal government covers welfare benefits and costs for active labour market programmes while local authorities fund accommodation costs (Mergele and Weber, 2020<sup>[68]</sup>). Researchers have used this policy reform to identify the causal effect of decentralising job centres using a difference-in-differences estimation. They analysed an aggregate administrative data set comprising the monthly numbers and gross flows of unemployed welfare recipients and vacancies in German districts from 2007 to 2016 analysed. They conclude that job seekers did not benefit from decentralisation, which seems to have decreased the number of new job matches by roughly 17% in the first year and up to 10% during the second to fifth post-reform years (Mergele and Weber, 2020<sup>[68]</sup>). This may have

occurred because without appropriate multi-level governance coordination mechanisms, decentralisation has a limited impact.

- In **Ireland**, the national-level Department of Employment Affairs & Social Protection (including the Public Employment Service - Intreo), the Department of Education & Skills, and Solas: National Training Agency, are responsible for ALMPs. Income and employment support services are delivered via a nationwide framework of 64 Intreo Centre (ICs). These centres act as a single point of contact for all jobseekers and employers, providing financial support and PES services, including labour market activation.
- In **the Netherlands**, the PES, UWV, is part of the central Dutch government and has deconcentrated units in the country. UWV is responsible for helping recipients of income and activation support for unemployed and (partially) occupationally disabled people reintegrate into the labour market. Outside of these core ALMPs, municipalities, however, are responsible for activation and reintegration for people on unemployment assistance (Social welfare: Participation Act) and jobseekers without income support. Indeed, the 2004 Work and Social Assistance Act (WSA) gave municipalities full responsibility for activating and reintegrating social assistance recipients, along with a fixed budget to cover all social assistance expenses. This implies the need for close coordination between the actors responsible for benefit administration and those responsible for employment services and ALMPs.
- In **New Zealand**, the Ministry of Social Development is the main provider of employment assistance and operates the PES, Work and Income New Zealand. It is responsible for both administering the benefit system and delivering or funding ALMPs. It is organised into 11 Regional Offices and over 140 Service Centres. Some responsibilities are also assumed by representatives of private employment agencies and the Recruitment and Consulting Services Association, who since 2009 collaborate with the PES to allow registered jobseekers to access an expanded pool of job vacancies, and give their employer clientele access to a broader pool of potential candidates for (Leighton, Reddy and Zulu, 2020<sup>[69]</sup>).

More recently, Immigration New Zealand (INZ) has commissioned local and regional employment service providers (including Chambers of Commerce, Regional Development Agencies, and Foundations) to expand all newcomer skills matching and job search assistance services to immigrants on a work-to-residence visa who were laid off because of the COVID-19 economic crisis. Each of the agencies commissioned by INZ works with local and regional employers to match the skills and qualifications of unemployed newcomers with relevant opportunities in the region (INZ, 2020<sup>[70]</sup>).

- In **Sweden**, AMLPs are mainly managed through regional and local offices of national ministries or agencies (OECD, 2020<sup>[45]</sup>). Specifically, a 2010 law shifted the responsibility for labour market integration of migrants from regional and local authorities to the national PES with the aim to strengthen efforts in the area (Farchy and Liebig, 2014<sup>[71]</sup>). However, Sweden is currently undergoing a major reform of the PES (OECD, 2019<sup>[72]</sup>). A significant share of their regional and local offices will be closed down and most of the activation and matching policies will be contracted out to independent providers.

Results from a former study on the impacts of a decentralisation decision on services to migrants nurture what we know of governance structures. In 1996, a pilot programme reformed the Swedish local PES committees of 25 municipalities so that the representatives of municipal authorities should constitute the majority of committee members. These committees are advisory bodies, part of the National Labour Market Administration, that aim to adapt labour market policy to local conditions and increase employment levels among outsiders like immigrants. They appoint the budget for the PES offices and decide on their working plans. Researchers used the fact the pilot programme affected the role of only some municipalities to study the effect of decentralising the committees. Their findings seem to indicate decentralisation spurred local initiatives organised by

the municipalities and increased targeting towards labour market outsiders (Lundin and Skedinger, 2006<sup>[73]</sup>). Programmes with a traditionally large share of immigrants are the type of active measure that increased the most in the pilot regions. Yet, the official programme period lasted for only three months, which is too short for employment outcomes and longer-lasting effects to be studied.

Furthermore, privatisation movements can be analysed as an extreme form of decentralisation. In Sweden, support offered to entrepreneurs through the regional units of the semi-public company Almi-IFS offers an interesting case of transfers of competences to non-governmental actors. In 2006, the advisory services of a foundation supporting foreign entrepreneurs, the IFS, were integrated into the governmental organisation ALMI in charge of supporting entrepreneurs (Almi, 2019<sup>[74]</sup>) (Holmquist, Halabisky and Hannig, 2016<sup>[75]</sup>). Since then, ALMI uses IFS intercultural competence and experience working methods, networks and legitimacy towards new entrepreneurs with an immigrant background. The Swedish Agency for Economic and Regional Growth (Tillväxtverket) supports ALMI-IFS financially to provide targeted support to entrepreneurs with a foreign background and has commissioned a series of audits via external consultants. ALMI-IFS was evaluated in 2001, 2003, 2004 and 2006 and the conclusions have been generally positive and taken into account by the organisation. IFS's business grew during the evaluation period, which indicates it fills a need in the market and the number of loans granted to immigrant entrepreneurs increased by 30% between 2007 and 2008, from 590 loans in 2007 to 766 loans the following year (ALMI Business Partner, 2008<sup>[76]</sup>).

In recent decades, **a number of countries have reformed the governance structure of ALMPs by decentralising PESs in pursuit of improved performance, as well as part of broader governance reforms. Canada, Italy and Spain are part of them.** This provides local governments with the autonomy to tailor labour market policies to local needs which should result in better policy outcomes (Mergele and Weber, 2020<sup>[68]</sup>).

- In **Canada**, as part of a broader transformation of intergovernmental relations in Canada in the 1990s, in 1996, the federal government began to negotiate bilateral agreements with the Provinces and Territories to transfer responsibilities for ALMPs. The last of these agreements was reached in 2010 in Yukon (Rubin, forthcoming<sup>[61]</sup>). Consequently, Provinces and Territories have considerable leeway in designing programmes to meet local needs. They do this through Labour Market Development Agreement programmes which, each year, transfer over CAD \$2 billion to the Provinces to run their own active labour market programmes housed within their respective governments. Under these agreements, provinces and territories have the flexibility to design and deliver employment programming that meets the needs of their local labour markets. The Government of Canada works with provinces and territories to ensure this includes individuals from underrepresented groups such as persons with disabilities, women, youth and Indigenous peoples (Rubin, forthcoming<sup>[61]</sup>). Notably, the programme is directly funded by federally mandated employment insurance (EI) contributions from employed Canadians.
- In **Italy**, competences for core ALMPs are shared across levels of government. Through the Jobs Act (2014), Italy has been undertaking a series of labour market policy reforms, including for the institutional framework for ALMPs. While the initial design was intended to centralise the competences for active measures to the national level, the negative results of a 2016 referendum prevented this from happening (Rubin, forthcoming<sup>[61]</sup>). Instead, regions are responsible for steering the local Centres for Employment (*Centri per l'impiego* - CPI), which provide employment services alongside accredited, private providers. CPI refer to the central Agency for Active Labour Policy (ANPAL) of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, which also coordinates the "relocation allowance" in partnership with the public-private network of employment services, in agreement with the Regions (Agenzia Nazionale Politiche Attive del Lavoro, 2021<sup>[77]</sup>). The Ministry of Labour and Social Policy consults with the State-Regions Conference to develop three-year strategies, yearly objectives, and minimum service levels (OECD, 2020<sup>[45]</sup>).

- In **Spain**, the government coordinates the employment policy via the Ministry of Labour and Social Economy. This Ministry is also responsible for outlining the Spanish Strategy of Employment Activation – in partnership with the Autonomous Communities, trade unions and business organisations – and the Annual Labour Policy Plans, which includes the forecasts for the Autonomous Communities and the State PES. The PES (*SEPE*) is responsible for the management, implementation and monitoring of employment policy. This organ designs employment standards and drafts the Strategy for Employment Activation and the Annual Labour Policy Plans. This agency also coordinates the PES Information System and has a coordinating and initiating role in the National Employment System. The Autonomous Communities are involved in designing ALMPs and participate in the outlining of the Spanish Strategy for Employment Activation and the Annual Labour Policy Plans. The Autonomous Communities are responsible for the implementation and management of ALMPs. In addition, city councils (*ayuntamientos*) run free or subsidised training courses for both workers and unemployed people.

The decentralisation of ALMPs hold both potential benefits and drawbacks for migrant integration and success on the job market, although limited rigorous evaluation evidence exists on how these balance out in practice. What seems to matter most is that governance structures come with mechanisms to adjust ALMP to local economic and social conditions.

### ***Skills and qualifications recognition***

Facilitating skills and qualifications (including diploma) recognition is crucial to ensure that migrant skills are used to their full potential. Overall, many migrants arrive with skills that are highly needed in our labour markets, especially in regulated professions such as medical positions, but they often face difficulties in having them valued and finding jobs that reflect their skill level (European Commission, 2020<sup>[26]</sup>). Refugees in particular are more at risk of not having the necessary documentary evidence of their previous learning and qualifications, may have had their education interrupted or may not have participated in formal education (European Commission et al., 2016<sup>[30]</sup>).

**Regarding professional qualifications**, there is in the European Union a system of automatic for seven sectoral professions: nurses, midwives, doctors, dentists, pharmacists, architects and veterinary surgeons (European Commission, 2021<sup>[78]</sup>). Besides this system, recognition of foreign qualifications is spread across various actors including public recognition offices, regulatory authorities, state boards and employers or membership-based organisations, such as employer associations and professional boards. Frequently, competence on recognition depends on the professions, levels and types of qualification and regional or provincial legislation. Against this background, there is usually a complex set of regulations in place, which may present an obstacle in obtaining recognition of qualifications without receiving counselling.

**Regarding academic qualifications**, as all countries studied in this paper are member of the ENIC-NARIC network<sup>3</sup> (European Network of National Information Centres - National Academic Recognition Information Centres), they have national information centres providing migrants with information on mobility and recognition of qualifications. Inside this network, individual governments remain responsible for their education systems and are free to apply their own rules, including whether or not to recognise academic qualifications obtained elsewhere (Your Europe, 2020<sup>[79]</sup>). Depending on the country where migrants want their diplomas to be recognised and the purpose of the assessment, the national ENIC-NARIC centre will either conduct evaluation itself or transfer it to the competent authority.

- In **Spain**, the National Agency of Evaluation of the Quality and Accreditation (ANECA) is the primary body responsible for institutional quality assurance and accreditation of professors but regional accreditation agencies also play varying roles with diverse practices, standards and capacity.

- In **Austria**, Länder are usually the responsible authorities, though procedure for the recognition of competence and diplomas vary depending on the area and the country of certification - that is the EU, EEA and Switzerland or a third country. Universities and higher education facilities are in charge of recognising university diplomas.
- In **Ireland**, in the absence of a national process for recognising prior learning, each educational institution has its own way of facilitating students who wish to have their prior learning recognised (RPL) (National Forum for the Enhancement of Teaching, 2017<sup>[80]</sup>).

Exceptions are **the Netherlands** and **Sweden**, where central authorities are responsible for issuing recognition of previous qualifications (i.e. Swedish Council for Higher Education (UHR) under the Ministry of Education and Research in Sweden). A good practice in this respect is the IQ network in Germany, which targets migrants and fosters horizontal and vertical cooperation among several levels of government.

**Regarding skills recognition**, in Sweden and the Netherlands, employers are involved while in France and Canada it is mostly a regional competence. In Germany, recentralisation took place.

- In **Sweden**, the central government introduced in 2016 the Fast Track initiative to target migrants who already have experience in scarce occupations (20 professions have been identified including: pharmacists, dentists, nurses, physicians, teachers, etc.) but no equivalent qualifications (OECD, 2018<sup>[81]</sup>). The programme combines customised bridging-education in participants' mother tongue with validation of credentials and recognition of prior learning to provide an occupational certificate. An important innovation of the Fast Track initiative is its acknowledgement that language skills need not be a prerequisite – either for recognition of qualifications and prior learning, or for bridging (OECD, 2016<sup>[82]</sup>). The programme is coordinated by the Public Employment Service and involves numerous actors: the Ministry of Labour, in partnership with Swedish Hotel and Restaurant Workers Union, Visita, National Board of Health and Welfare, City of Stockholm, Swedish Teachers' Union, the National Union of Teachers, Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions, Employers' Organisation for the Swedish Service Sector.
- In **the Netherlands**, industrial branches, trade unions and employers' organisations have joined efforts through sectoral collective bargaining to establish 140 training and development funds (O&O-fondsen) used to support employees' educational opportunities and to assess their competences (European Monitoring Centre on Change, 2021<sup>[83]</sup>).
- In **Canada**, regulated occupations require special licences or certificates to work in Canada. Provinces and territories are in charge of giving licences to people who meet their occupational standards for regulated jobs. The requirements can be different across Canada. A 2020 evaluation of the Foreign Credentials Recognition program finds that the multi-jurisdictional (i.e. regionally differentiated) approach to certification presents barriers to systemic change across regions. The federally commissioned report highlights that a duplication of services, fragmentation of resources and lack of clarity around roles and responsibilities, are all symptoms of the current system, and argues in favour of a stronger role of the central node of government. The report also underlines the lack of data collected on the labour market outcomes of internationally trained individuals as an impediment to evaluation (ESDC, 2020<sup>[84]</sup>).
- In **Germany**, in addition to the existing counselling structures, a Service Centre for Professional Recognition (ZSBA) was established in 2020 as the central point of contact in the recognition process for skilled workers living and applying for professional recognition from abroad. The new centre is also intended to increase the transparency of the recognition process for applicants (OECD, 2021<sup>[2]</sup>).

## The Educational Sector

### ***Early childhood education and care***

Early childhood education and care (ECEC) has experienced a surge of policy attention in OECD countries in recent decades, with a focus on children under the age of 3 and the key role ECEC plays in children's development, learning and well-being. Universal or near-universal participation in at least one year of ECEC is now the norm in OECD countries (OECD, 2020<sup>[42]</sup>).

In Canada, past cost-benefit analyses indicate that for every dollar spent on ECEC, benefits for society range from \$1.49 to \$2.78 (Alexander and Ignjatovic, 2012<sup>[85]</sup>). For disadvantaged children, studies estimate benefits to be as high as \$17 for every dollar spent (McCain, Mustard and McCuaig, 2011<sup>[86]</sup>). These results are complemented by the OECD's Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) results that show how 15-year-olds who attended a pre-primary education programme tend to perform better than students who did not attend pre-primary education (OECD, 2017<sup>[87]</sup>).

ECEC can play a fundamental role for the integration of migrant families and children. Beyond the benefits to children themselves, early childhood programs have positive impacts on parents – for example, allowing them to participate in the labour force – and the economy as a whole. They teach children how to live together in diverse societies and facilitate the acquisition of linguistic competences for migrant children, in particular. Furthermore, investing in ECEC has proven effective in tackling poverty and social exclusion, and making sure that all children are given the chance to realise their full potential (European Commission et al., 2016<sup>[30]</sup>). A study evaluating the effect of ECEC attendance by refugee children on their parents' integration in Germany found a significant positive effect, in particular on the social integration of mothers, regardless of the average social integration of refugees in the place of residence (Gambaro, Neidhöfer and Spiess, 2019<sup>[88]</sup>). The size of the estimate is on average around 52% and is mainly driven by improved language proficiency and employment prospects. Regular interactions with ECEC staff and other parents are likely to give refugees the opportunity to practice the host country language and may also provide a grounding into the practicalities of living in the host country, such as fostering job search networks (OECD, 2016<sup>[89]</sup>). Additionally, as with all parents, ECEC services relieve refugees, especially mothers, from childcare duties, freeing up time to participate in employment or training courses as well as to actively engage in the integration process. Overall, results suggest that for mothers with a child attending ECEC, the conditional, average increase in integration is approximately equivalent to an additional three years of residency in Germany (Gambaro, Neidhöfer and Spiess, 2019<sup>[88]</sup>).

**Jurisdiction for ECEC is widely applied at the local level. In France, Spain, Sweden and the Netherlands municipalities hold some responsibilities, while the regional level is responsible in Canada, Austria and Germany.** In the Netherlands and Sweden, private service providers and organisations at the local level also offer childcare, as well as church-affiliated welfare organisations and associations in Germany and Austria. In New Zealand, however, responsibilities for funding, monitoring, curriculum development and setting minimum regulatory standards in ECEC are at national level competences (Bloem, 2016<sup>[90]</sup>).

Municipal level:

- In **France, Italy and Sweden** municipal authorities are responsible for the operation of pre-school classes (OECD, 2019<sup>[91]</sup>). In Sweden, each municipality is different because of the decentralised approach where municipalities provide services based on the needs of the community. Services are funded through tax and each municipality has a different income taxation rate (OECD, 2019<sup>[92]</sup>).
- In **Spain**, local authorities work with the ministries of Autonomous Communities (regions) to monitor early childhood education and care, as well as compulsory and special education schools.
- In **the Netherlands**, municipalities cooperate with school boards to implement national policies. They are responsible for authorising and monitoring childcare facilities and implementing “before and early school education”. In relation to migrant integration, they are in charge of organising and monitoring civic integration courses, financed by the central government, devising personal integration plans with each migrant, authorising and monitoring childcare facilities.

Regional level:

- In **Canada**, Provinces and Territories have full legal power to oversee ECEC. Some provinces and territories have separate departments or ministries: one having responsibility for elementary-secondary education and another for postsecondary education, adult learning, and skills training (Council of Ministers of Education, 2021<sup>[93]</sup>). That said, the federal government has recently signed agreements with most of the provinces and territories to significantly reduce the cost of early learning and childcare and increase the number of caretakers and early learning educators (Department of Finance Canada, 2021<sup>[94]</sup>).
- In **Germany**, the ECEC sector is governed through the Federal Ministry of Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth (BMFSFJ) and corresponding Länder-level ministries (Ullmann, Toledo Figueroa and Rawkins, 2020<sup>[49]</sup>). National and Länder authorities are responsible for setting minimum standards, such as space requirements, staff qualifications and child-staff ratios. Länder develop their own curricula based on a national Common Framework for Early Education. Non-state providers, generally non-profit, run most centres and appear to have considerable autonomy. In 2018, at just over 3%, the share of German ECEC centre leaders reporting that the local, regional or national authorities had significant responsibility in making decisions regarding staff appointment or dismissal was the second-smallest among participating countries (OECD, 2019<sup>[92]</sup>).

A federal programme “Focus on Language & Integration Day-care Centres” (*Schwerpunkt-Kitas Sprache & Integration*) of the BMFSFJ ran from 2011 to 2015. Based on studies that have shown language skills have a significant influence on further education and entry into working life, it integrated reinforced language education for young children in about 4,000 focus day-care centres across the country (BMFSFJ, 2020<sup>[95]</sup>). Language experts trained the pedagogical staff of day-care centres in teaching practices and worked directly with families. It was implemented as a priority in institutions with a high proportion of children from educationally disadvantaged families or with a migrant background. The federal programme set a noticeable impetus and was taken up by Länder in their education plans. Results from the Universities of Bamberg and Berlin’s evaluation confirm the positive effects on children’s language development. Building on that success, the BMFSFJ launched in 2016 the ongoing programme “Language-Daycare: Because language is the key to the world” (*Sprach-Kitas: Weil Sprache der Schlüssel der Welt ist*) (BMFSFJ, 2020<sup>[95]</sup>). This illustrates the positive impact national programmes can have when adapted to local characteristics by lower level of governments.

- In **Austria**, Länder have jurisdiction over the funding and regulation of early childcare while municipalities are providers of related services, along with associations, religious-affiliated organisations or private companies, to a lesser extent.



### ***Primary and secondary education***

**Across studied countries, competencies in the education domain are allocated to different levels of government. In all cases except Canada, the design of the educational system and its curricula is a competency of the national government but some powers and responsibilities have been allocated to regional, local authorities and/or schools.**

#### Regional level:

- In **Austria**, the Federal Ministry of Education Sciences and Research is responsible for designing the framework for primary and secondary education policy where the Länder are tasked with making laws to implement the national framework. Under the 2017 Autonomiepakt (autonomy-pact), schools have more autonomy in choosing class sizes, determination of lecture times, opening hours, and cooperation with other schools, staff recruitment and training. In 2017 around 45% of decisions were taken at the school level and 55% at the state level (OECD, 2018<sup>[96]</sup>). At the primary and secondary education level, some Länder have implemented after school preparatory classes for migrant children or summer language classes in schools, such as in Vienna.
- In **Canada**, provincial and territorial governments have exclusive responsibility for all levels of education (except adult education), under the Canadian Constitution. Canada does not have a federal department or national system of education. In 2017, 33% of decisions in lower secondary education were under the responsibility of the Provincial level and most of the rest is devolved to either local administrations or school boards (Guerriero et al., 2015<sup>[47]</sup>).
- In **Germany**, the 16 Länder and the federal government jointly govern education. The Länder takes most schooling decisions: organisation, planning, management and supervision of the entire school system, as well as teacher recruitment and remuneration. In 2017, 63% of decisions in lower secondary education were under the responsibility of the Länder, while on average across the OECD the regional level only took 10% of decisions (Ullmann, Toledo Figueroa and Rawkins, 2020<sup>[49]</sup>). Several Länder have implemented preparatory classes for newcomer migrants to prepare them for regular classes. Classes are implemented by schools under municipal supervision, which can complement the Länder' approach by providing social workers, school psychologists, migration advisors, media and cultural educators (etc.) as well as educational partnerships with venues for extracurricular activities such as theatres, museums and libraries.
- In **Spain**, Ministries (or departments) of the 17 Autonomous Communities (regions) are free to develop and manage their education systems within the common education framework established at the national level (Williams et al., 2018<sup>[53]</sup>). Autonomous Communities and the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sport make most schooling decisions in Spain, leaving relatively little discretion to school-level actors. Yet, Autonomous Communities can agree on the delegation of management competences for certain education services.

#### Local level:

- In **France**, municipalities are responsible for primary schools and sub-regional authorities (*départements*) for lower secondary institutions. More than half of the decisions at lower secondary level in France are taken at central level, compared to one-quarter on average across OECD countries (Charbonnier et al., 2020<sup>[97]</sup>).
- In **Italy**, municipalities are responsible for the provision of primary education and of pre-school (OECD, 2019<sup>[91]</sup>). In order to improve services, small municipalities sometimes join as consortia or associations of municipalities. Schools have a high degree of autonomy: they define curricula, widen the educational offerings, organise teaching (during school time and tutor groups) and every three years, schools draw up their own 'three-year educational offer plan' (*Piano triennale dell'offerta formativa*).

- **In Sweden**, it was considered necessary to deregulate the schooling sector to make it possible to adjust better to local economic and demographic conditions (Ahlin and Mörk, 2008<sup>[98]</sup>). The country undertook major national reforms that allow much greater freedom in decision-making at local levels and only prescribing broad goals, nationally. The country is now classified as one of the most decentralised in the OECD. The central state sets goals for the system and monitors their implementation. The central steering is then interpreted and elaborated by the elected municipalities, as well as by the approved private organisers of independent schools, which have freedom to determine how best to reach national goals taking local needs and circumstances into account. A 2011 OECD survey suggested that 18% of decisions in Sweden were taken centrally, 35% locally, and 47% at school level (Pont et al., 2015<sup>[99]</sup>). Classes for migrant children in their mother tongue are offered in some municipalities. More investments to support the capacity of municipalities were announced in 2017 for integration programmes. Based on migrants' previous schooling and assessed level of literacy and numeracy, school principals decide what grade to place them in and develop an appropriate education plan (Peterka et al., 2017<sup>[100]</sup>).
- **In the Netherlands**, municipalities implement national policies, cooperating with school boards. In relation to migrant integration they are responsible for:
  - Organising and monitoring civic integration courses, financed by the central government.
  - Devising personal integration plans with each migrant.
  - Implementing “Before and early school education”, financed by the Ministry for Education, Culture and Sciences.

Furthermore since 2013, educational institutions are receiving more autonomy in implementing government policies at all education level since 2013, for example they can be responsible of recruitment and retention of international students (Bilgili, 2019<sup>[101]</sup>). There is also a great variety of actors involved in integration of migrants in the education sector in the country. In 2016, a national law made it compulsory for all primary and secondary schools to contribute to the integration of their students and promote active citizenship. The law obliges schools to conclude agreements and develop strategies with municipalities against segregation and in promotion of integration. Even though these general overarching objectives exist, there are neither clear guidelines nor rules on how schools can address the issues of social integration and active citizenship (Bilgili, 2019<sup>[101]</sup>).

When it comes to the early school-leaving rate, the Netherlands has managed to limit the gap between native-born and foreign-born children born outside the EU+. To address early school leaving among adolescents, the Dutch government adopted a national policy and developed targeted and decentralised programmes, coordinated by an Early School Leaving Taskforce in the Ministry of Education (UNICEF, 2017<sup>[102]</sup>). The Dutch strategy is based on “long-term performance agreements” between the Ministry of Education, municipalities and schools, which set up early school leaving reduction targets for municipalities and schools. Under the leadership and support of the Ministry of Education, local stakeholders develop approaches and interventions to reduce absenteeism and early school leaving (UNICEF, 2017<sup>[102]</sup>). Crucial elements for the success of the policy were the basis for mandatory regional monitoring and reporting tools, as well as the adoption of an integrated approach, linking schools with social services, municipalities and business sector which led to enhanced early signalling and effective prevention of early school leaving.

#### School level:

- **In Ireland**, schools and the central government take almost all educational decisions with only a very limited regional layer of educational administration (Golden et al., 2020<sup>[103]</sup>). In 2015, schools took responsibility for 85% of decisions related to curriculum, and 51% for resource-related matters (Golden et al., 2020<sup>[103]</sup>).

- In **New Zealand**, schools are among the most autonomous across OECD countries. Since 1988, there has been a devolution of management responsibilities to schools along with increased power for the Ministry to intervene in failing schools since 2001 (Zapata et al., 2013<sub>[104]</sub>). The central government notably funds schools to develop programmes that best meet the needs of non-English speaking students.

These cases demonstrate an acknowledgment that school-level autonomy may lead to greater educational outcomes. Relatedly, a study on the relation between administrative and fiscal decentralisation and education system performance found on average a positive relationship linking administrative and fiscal decentralisation with performance, as measured by PISA tests (Lastra-Anadón and Mukherjee, 2019<sub>[105]</sub>). This is regardless of whether one looks at the sub-central share of taxes collected, revenue, spending, tax autonomy or decision-making power. The relationship between school autonomy and average PISA outcomes is also positive. These results are directionally similar for unitary and federal countries, although slightly stronger and more consistent for unitary countries.

### ***Tertiary education***

The gap in access to tertiary education for migrants has significant consequences as it provides individuals with the potential to increase their skills, confidence, knowledge, and resources for personal development, as well as economic and social prosperity and mobility (Ellis, Oreja and Jankowski, 2021<sub>[106]</sub>).

**While tertiary education is a national governments' competency often administered through Ministries of higher education and research, some form of decentralisation takes place in all studied countries.**

#### Responsibilities delegated to the regional level:

- In **Canada**, Province and Territories' departments or ministries of education are responsible for the organisation, delivery, and assessment of postsecondary education. Some provinces and territories have separate departments or ministries: one having responsibility for elementary-secondary education and another for postsecondary education, adult learning, and skills training (Council of Ministers of Education, 2021<sub>[93]</sub>). Publicly funded universities are largely autonomous; they set their own admissions standards and degree requirements and have considerable flexibility in the management of their financial affairs and programme offerings.
- In **Germany**, Länder govern higher education. Although each higher education institution (HEI) has a considerable amount of autonomy, there is some variation between the Länder, both in terms of legislation and standards of practice. In order to balance institutional autonomy with policy coherence, the Länder conduct multi-annual target agreements negotiated with HEI. The Federal Ministry of Education and Research works with Ministries of Research in Länder to design tertiary education policy and, since 2014, ensures funding to universities. Since 2015, universities have launched programmes and initiatives to facilitate access of newly arrived migrants to their curricula, such as language classes and mentor-activities, relying on volunteers from the university.

#### Responsibilities delegated to the university level:

- In **Austria**, public universities are autonomous and negotiate goals and funding with the federal ministry based on "institutional strategic plans" (OECD/European Union, 2019<sub>[107]</sub>). This arrangement has evolved over time. Public universities used to be state agencies managed by the federal ministry. In 2002, the University Act introduced autonomy and the adoption of a new public management approach, based on a more managerial, corporate-style. The governance of universities of applied sciences (UAS) enjoy a different governance system than that of public universities. Provincial and municipal governments are closely involved in several UAS governing boards and the private sector is able to participate in the design and delivery of their higher education services (OECD/European Union, 2019<sub>[107]</sub>)

- In **France**, universities have administrative, financial, pedagogical and scientific autonomy. They have the power to determine their status and internal governance structures. A 2013 law established clusters of universities and other higher education institutions across the country, to encourage a more regional approach to strategic governance and foster institutional collaboration (Charbonnier et al., 2020<sup>[97]</sup>).
- In **Italy**, universities are autonomous within the regulatory framework foreseen by the law and the strategies promoted by the Ministry of Education, University and Research. Autonomy provides universities with the possibility to define their own governance structure and internal organisation, develop their own mission and strategy, plan programmes and award degrees, develop their own research activities, and engage in economic and social activities contributing to communities and territories (OECD/European Union, 2019<sup>[108]</sup>).
- In **Ireland**, Higher education institutions (HEIs) have high levels of academic freedom and autonomy regarding their internal affairs despite accountability measures having been strengthened by the Department of Education and Skills and the Higher Education Authority in recent years (Golden et al., 2020<sup>[103]</sup>).
- In **New Zealand**, universities are autonomous, publicly funded institutions. Along with institutes of technology, polytechnics, and wānanga, universities are Tertiary Education Institutes (TEIs) under the Crown Entities Act 2004 (Universities New Zealand, 2021<sup>[109]</sup>). The Tertiary Education Commission (TEC) funds and monitors their performance and is accountable to the Minister for Tertiary Education, Skills and Employment.
- In **Spain**, universities operate independently from Spanish governments, regardless of whether they are public or private (Williams et al., 2018<sup>[53]</sup>). Individual higher education centres have thus established programmes targeting refugee students.
- In **Sweden**, the independent Higher Education Authority is responsible for quality assurance of higher education and research, official statistics on higher education and monitors compliance with laws and regulations among universities and university colleges, while the Swedish Council for Higher Education is in charge of preventing discrimination and promoting equal treatment and widened participation at universities. Within these parameters, universities and university colleges remain separate state entities and make their own decisions about the content of courses, admissions, grades and other related issues. Higher education institutions also have some autonomy to decide on their own organisation and allocation of resources (Peterka et al., 2017<sup>[100]</sup>).
- In **the Netherlands**, educational institutions are receiving more autonomy in implementing government policies at all education level since 2013 (Bilgili, 2019<sup>[101]</sup>). For instance, universities may apply for residence permissions for third country nationals who wish to join their degrees. In this way, Dutch universities play a unique role in migrant integration that is normally the job of specific actors in government or local service provision.

### ***Language acquisition training***

Many past research have underlined the importance of language in migrants' integration process, particularly in the initial period of arrival when migrants need orientation to re-organise their lives. Language proficiency is clearly a key driver of immigrant integration as it increases job opportunities and facilitates social and political participation. In the Netherlands, researchers found language training offered to refugees significantly increased their lifetime earnings (Arendt et al., 2020<sup>[110]</sup>). Furthermore, positive effects in terms of improved schooling outcomes for male children of refugees are transmitted to the next generation. Similarly in France, results from a study show the language training hours assigned to migrants through the compulsory *Contrat d'accueil et d'intégration* significantly increases their labour force participation, especially for individuals with higher levels of education (Lochmann, Rapoport and

Speciale, 2018<sup>[111]</sup>). There is thus a strong case to understand how to best provide language training to immigrants, as this can contribute to closing the large employment and earnings gap.

In half of the countries studied in this paper – Austria, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands – refugees and third country nationals are compelled by host countries' integration agreement they sign to obtain a certain language proficiency level and to follow language classes in case they do not succeed.

- In **Austria, Canada, France, Germany** and **Ireland** the federal government through its national integration authority (respectively the ÖIF, the IRCC, the OFII and the BAMF) is in charge of subsidised (and in some cases compulsory) language classes.
- In **Italy**, language classes are provided within reception centres (the SPRAR and CAS systems) or by Provincial Centres for Adult Education (CPIA) under regions' responsibility.
- **The Netherlands** provides a good example of the decentralisation of powers regarding language courses. Although the national level through the Ministry of Education is today responsible, the new Civic Integration Act that will come into effect in 2022 designs municipalities as responsible for organising newcomers' integration, including regarding language trainings (OECD, 2021<sup>[2]</sup>) Municipalities will be able to select the language schools and contact newcomers themselves, enabling them to look more closely at the type of support beneficiaries need or the type of integration process that would suit them best. With this new allocation of competences, the central government hopes to ameliorate newcomers' situation whose specific characteristics are currently not taken that into account (European Website on Integration, 2020<sup>[112]</sup>). The new system laid out by the Civic Integration Act gives more space for personal integration plans. There will be three learning routes, taking into account some differences within migrant cohorts.

Interestingly in complement or in place of national programmes, in all studied countries the local level and especially municipalities can offer language support:

- In **Austria**, additional language learning initiatives, which include parents outreach, are delivered in early childcare facilities by municipalities.
- In **Canada**, some Provinces and Territories offer language classes to temporary workers, students or new citizens.
- In **Germany**, municipalities complete the federal offer, especially when federal courses were at capacity like in 2015/2016.
- In **New Zealand**, the federal government provides funding to non-governmental organisations to provide English language to adult refugees.
- In **Spain**, in absence of a national programme, several programmes deployed by Autonomous Communities and municipalities provide language courses.
- In **Sweden**, municipalities can apply for grants from the national level to fund language development programmes.
- In **Ireland**, some Education and Training Board (ETB) provide language courses in response to demands at local level.

## The Housing sector

### *Temporary housing*

**Temporary housing is a national competence in France, Spain and New Zealand while various decentralisation arrangements involving municipalities exist in Austria, Canada, Germany, Italy Sweden and the Netherlands.** In all cases, non-profit organisations are highly involved in the provision of this service.

- In **Austria**, the federal government has been in charge of temporary housing since the 2004 Basic Welfare Support Agreement (*Grundversorgungsvereinbarung*) but delegates its implementation to municipalities, who are not afforded the competence of designing policies or propositions of their own.
- In **Canada**, newcomer service providers that deliver the Resettlement Assistance Programme are responsible for arranging temporary accommodation for refugees (hotels, temporary reception centres) (Damaris, 2019<sup>[113]</sup>). Municipalities and local non-profit associations can set up housing portals that allow private individuals and property owners to offer suitable and affordable housing to newcomers. The Resettlement Assistance Programme (RAP) for refugees provides temporary accommodation (hotels, temporary reception centers), as well as intensive assistance in searching for permanent housing and help to move in (Damaris, 2019<sup>[113]</sup>).
- In **France**, the prefect, who represents the national government at the local level, is responsible for the implementation of right-to-emergency accommodation. Temporary housing centres for refugees (*Centre provisoire d'hébergement* - CPH) exist since 2006 and can illustrate the lack of evaluation that migrant-related policies suffer from. CPH are part of the national reception system (DNA), as one of the last reception structures that punctuate the journey of some of the beneficiaries of international protection. In 2020, 8,710 places existed. In practice, the management of reception systems is entrusted to third parties: non-profit associations, foundations etc. (Arnell and Morisset, 2019<sup>[114]</sup>). Their expenses are borne by the central government. They develop partnerships with local authorities, associations and local public services. Each establishment must obtain authorisation from the Prefect of the Department for the opening of reception capacities (Minitère de l'Intérieur, 2019<sup>[115]</sup>). All centres are supposed to conduct internal and external evaluations. The internal assessment is materialised by an activity report transmitted annually to the local state services as well as to the reception department for asylum seekers and refugees of the asylum directorate. The external evaluation involves an external body, authorised by the National Authority for Health. Yet, not all centres seem to conduct internal quality evaluations. Furthermore, no evaluation of the governance of the CPH system has taken place nor has a centralisation of CPHs individual assessment that would have helped to underline best practices.
- In **Germany**, Länder are responsible for temporary housing but delegate this task to municipalities although since 2016 there tends to be a centralisation of temporary housing on the Lander level, with AnkER centres for example.
- In **Italy** although since 2015 new national guidelines for temporary housing are in place, the government has not introduced national funding or a national strategy in this domain. In this context, municipalities have traditionally been responsible for planning, managing and delivering housing programmes and services (Jessoula et al., 2019<sup>[116]</sup>).
- In **Sweden**, the 2016 Settlement Act made it mandatory for municipalities to receive a specific number of refugees and organise their accommodation. The policy was meant to increase the capacity for refugee settlement but seems to lead to inequalities on the local level. Indeed, local discourses on refugee settlement, structural factors such as housing opportunities and the size and location of municipalities are contributing to a differentiation of housing standards and terms for refugees (Emilsson and Öberg, 2021<sup>[117]</sup>). A great majority — 221 of 290 — of the municipalities indicate they have a shortage of housing for refugees (National Board of Housing, Building and Planning, 2019<sup>[118]</sup>). As a result, many local housing solutions are temporary (Meer et al., 2021<sup>[119]</sup>). In metropolitan regions, almost no municipality offers permanent contracts.

### **Social housing**

**In Austria, Canada, France, Ireland, New Zealand, the Netherlands national governments regulate social housing but local authorities have leeway, notably in how they chose to support migrants.**

Regional authorities:

- In **Canada**, Provinces and Territories administer 80% of the agreements with social housing providers (Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation, 2018<sub>[120]</sub>). Some municipalities collaborate with local non-profits to set up housing portals.
- In **Germany**, responsibility for legislation on social housing promotion was transferred in 2006<sup>4</sup> from federal government to the Länder (Federal Ministry for Interior, 2020<sub>[121]</sub>). Since then, Länder set their own legislation in this area and have financial discretion on social housing promotion.
- In **Spain**, Autonomous Communities - along with a municipal responsibility in the case of Barcelona - are responsible for housing regulation the provision of public housing, as well for managing the health system and designing territorialised polices, including for non-Spanish people.

Local authorities:

- In **Austria**, federal law and Länder' law regulate access to social housing and municipalities are traditionally competent for service provision. They can apply different rules on third country nationals' access to public housing such as different lengths of stay or a requirement of previous stay in the relevant municipality.
- In **France**, regions and departments provide social housing. In some cases, municipalities can take these functions. For example in Ile-de-France, the central government, local authorities and *Action Logement* (a scheme for employers' participation in the construction effort) finance social housing. Depending on the funding they provide, funders have quotas of reserved apartments, which they allocate to candidate tenants. An allocation commission (*Commission d'Attribution des Logements* - CAL) carries out the allocation of social housing. Composed of representatives of the lessor, a representative of the town hall where the housing is located and a representative of the state, the CAL meets at regular intervals and examines files of applicants meeting the criteria for each available housing unit. Mayors can propose candidates based on the accommodation reserved for them. DIHAL (Inter-ministerial Delegation for Accommodation and Access to Housing) is responsible for piloting the national platform for refugee housing and the European resettlement programme (DIHAL, 2021<sub>[122]</sub>).
- In **Ireland**, the Department of Housing, Planning and Local Government reviewed access to social housing for immigrants, and in 2012 issued revised guidelines in access to social housing supports for non-Irish nationals. Local authorities support refugees to find housing with the help of support workers and volunteers (The European Web Site on Integration, 2019<sub>[123]</sub>).
- In **Italy**, public authorities, like Municipalities and Regions, own and manage public housing stock from different points of view. Regions have the power to issue laws that regulate access criteria and distribution of economic resources, and municipalities are responsible for issuing calls for tenders for the submission of access applications and for selecting people to whom housing is assigned. Their activities have traditionally targeted low-income households. Municipalities own social rental dwellings and, in limited scenarios, they manage them directly. The severe underfunding of the public housing sector causes a low level of new supply and problematic maintenance and management of the stock.

The decentralisation of competences of social housing policies in Italy is an example of how the transfer of competences can create systems not responsive to migrant needs. Because of the distribution of competences, application requirements vary among regions, sometimes even among municipalities within the same region. In some places, this happens to the detriment of immigrants with low incomes as some regions/municipalities require a minimum seniority of work and/or residence to access the public housing application procedure. The Lombardy region for instance required 5 years of residence (UNHCR, SUNIA and ASGI, 2021<sub>[124]</sub>), while some regions require documents translated and certified by the Italian Embassy, demonstrating the absence of real estate properties abroad or in the country of origin.

In **New Zealand** besides state-owned housing, local councils provide a range of rental housing through a separate system.

- In **Sweden**, municipalities have been the owners of public housing companies since 2001 (Housing Europe, n.d.) and are responsible for housing for unaccompanied minors since 2019. (The Local, 2019).
- In the **Netherlands**, private housing associations cooperate with municipalities in the scope of agreements, for example for the management of social real estate (community centres, community libraries and shelters).

## The Health and Welfare sector

### Health

**Decision-making in health care tends to remain concentrated largely within central governments**, which have considerable power across many aspects of the delivery of health services, notably regarding the policy aspects of health care. Setting minimum regulations/standards in hospitals was the responsibility of the central government in all countries except Canada.

**This strong centralisation of health responsibilities exists despite a general trend towards decentralisation of health care over the last 20 years.** Spain, for example, has moved competences steadily towards the sub-national level. Austria, Canada, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden have a heavily decentralised healthcare system. Although for most countries the sub-national share has remained roughly stable or increased over the last two decades, Germany, Ireland and Sweden have centralised responsibilities (James et al., 2019<sup>[125]</sup>) (de Biase and Dougherty, 2021<sup>[126]</sup>).

Interestingly, the role of central governments in healthcare does not vary markedly between federal and unitary countries although sub-national government decision-making power tends to be higher in federal than in unitary countries. Besides, Canada, Germany and Spain have low levels of shared responsibilities despite these countries being federal.

**In Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the Netherlands national governments oversee health policies while local actors implement services related to health care.**

- In **Austria**, the Federal Ministry of Social Affairs, Health, Care and Consumer Protection designs the framework for access to basic health care. In Austria, 31% of decisions in health care are taken by the central level of government, 53% by the regional one and 16% by other actors<sup>5</sup> (James et al., 2019<sup>[125]</sup>).
- In **Canada**, health care is a shared responsibility between the central (federal) and sub-national (provincial and territorial) governments. However, the provincial and territorial governments have most of the responsibility for delivering health care services. About 14% of decisions in health care are taken by the central level of government against 86% by regional governments (James et al., 2019<sup>[125]</sup>). Separately, the Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship has discretion to provide full or partial coverage of health-care costs to an individual or group of individuals facing exceptional and compelling circumstances.
- In **France**, the central government sets the national health strategy and allocates budgeted expenditures to Regional Health Agencies (ARS), which represent the Ministry of Solidarity and Health in the regions and are responsible for implementing and adapting national policies to their regional characteristics (demographic, epidemiological, geographic) by establishing regional health programmes (PRS). Over the past two decades, the state has been increasingly involved in controlling health expenditures. Regarding migrant health, the programme “Health pathways of migrants and newcomers” involves numerous actors: associations, health professionals, Regional



Health Agencies (ARS), health insurance funds, the Regional Departments of Youth, Sports and Social Cohesion (DRJSCS) and the departments of the Ministry of Solidarity and Health.

- In **Germany**, 37% of decisions in health care are taken by the central level of government, 20% by the regional level, 3% by the local level and 40% by other actors (James et al., 2019<sub>[125]</sub>). Besides, the Federal Ministry of Health and the Federal Commissioner for Migration, Refugees and Integration work with the Health Ministries and Integration Ministries in Länder.
- In **Ireland**, 58% of decisions in health care are taken by the central level of government and 42% by other actors (James et al., 2019<sub>[125]</sub>). In 2017, the Office for Promotion of Migrant Integration (OPMI) created a Communities Integration Fund as part of the Migrant Integration Strategy. Through it, the Office for the Promotion of Migrant Integration (OPMI) offers grants of between €1 000 - €5 000 to local and national groups carrying out integration initiatives with particular emphasis on those with local and regional impact (Office for the promotion of migrant integration, 2020<sub>[127]</sub>). Activities may include measures to increase mutual understanding between the host community and migrants; actions to introduce migrants to Irish society and enable them to adapt to it, or measures to encourage migrant participation in civil and cultural life. In 2020, the Department of Justice announced €500,000 in funding for community integration projects. From the outset, it was recognised that a 'light touch' in terms of monitoring would need to be applied, due both to the size of individual amounts being allocated and the potential administrative limitations of small community groups. Yet in some places, positive results of decentralisation programmes are already available.
- In **Italy**, regional and local institutions oversee social and health policies, under the guidance of the Ministry for Health. About half of decisions in health care are taken by the central level of government, 40% regionally, 7% at the local level and 3% by other actors (James et al., 2019<sub>[125]</sub>).
- In **New Zealand**, 45% of decisions in health care are taken by the central level of government, 52% by the regional level and 3% by other actors (James et al., 2019<sub>[125]</sub>).
- In **Spain**, the Ministry of Health and Social Services establishes national guidelines in terms of health policy and distributes funding to Autonomous Communities which take the great majority of decisions (77% against 23% for the central level (James et al., 2019<sub>[125]</sub>)).
- In **Sweden**, the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs is responsible of health policies and regional councils and, in some cases, local councils or municipalities are responsible of healthcare provision.
- In **the Netherlands**, the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport, and private insurance companies manage the health system. Thus, 30% of decisions are taken by the central level of government, 7% by the local level and 63% by other actors (James et al., 2019<sub>[125]</sub>). Until a 2003 austerity measure, the national government provided health care education targeting migrants. Since then, a limited number of local projects managed by NGOs have emerged.

**Interestingly, in order to tackle the COVID-19 crisis, many countries changed the repartition of competences across levels of government.** They moved from an approach that was applied nationally when the crisis hit in spring 2020, to a more territorial and differentiated approach across regions (Allain-Dupré et al., 2021<sub>[11]</sub>). In this way, they adapt crisis responses to local needs and limit the costs of national lockdowns. In many countries studied in this report, specific measures regarding masks, school and restaurant closures and full lockdowns have been adopted for specific localities or regions to limit their economic impact, e.g. in Canada, France, Germany, Italy and Spain. While such a differentiated territorial approach is natural in federal countries, where health responsibilities are largely decentralised, it is increasingly seen in a number of unitary countries. Since mid-2020, regional and local governments have been more actively adjusting their response measures to the local context (Allain-Dupré et al., 2021<sub>[11]</sub>). At the same time, Dougherty et al. (2020<sub>[128]</sub>) found re-centralisation of healthcare to be twice as frequent as decentralisation across OECD and partner countries. These decisions are interesting when compared to

findings from a paper which explored the relationship between the degree of administrative decentralisation across levels of government in healthcare decision-making and healthcare spending, life expectancy and hospital costs (Dougherty et al., 2019<sub>[129]</sub>). The results indicate that a moderate degree of decentralisation reduces public health spending and increases life expectancy – saving public resources and improving outcomes – as compared to a situation with very low decentralisation. However, “excessive decentralisation” is associated with higher public spending on health and lower life expectancy – reversing cost-saving and outcome-enhancing effects – as compared to a situation with an intermediate degree of decentralisation (Dougherty et al., 2019<sub>[129]</sub>).

Results from these movements reveal that regardless of the degree of centralisation, intergovernmental coordination is crucial. Indeed, a country can - to the extent possible – reach an efficient equilibrium as long as intergovernmental coordination mechanisms are in place and effective works. **Due to the involvement of multiple levels of government in healthcare, the substantial number of overlapping responsibilities and the complex and political implications of the COVID-19 outbreak, it is thus crucial for governments to implement institutional mechanisms to improve multilevel coordination.** For instance, the carrying out of vaccination campaigns, mostly led by national governments, are generally conducted in coordination with sub-national governments and health agencies to better address local needs and demographic differences. Lack of coordination across levels of governments revealed challenges to implementation.

### **Welfare benefits**

Regarding the provision of welfare benefits, there are different types of governance arrangement amongst the studied countries. **In Ireland, New Zealand, Spain and the Netherlands, national governments are in charge of managing and financing some welfare assistance, while in Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Italy and Sweden national and local governments work together to deliver welfare benefits.**

- In **Austria**, either the federal government or provinces set schemes and have laws in place. Municipalities are responsible for the administration the minimum social security scheme (BMS). They follow federal law and are funded at the federal level by the Federal Ministry for Social Affairs, Health, Care and Consumer Protection. The Federal Ministry for Labour, Family and Youth is in charge of youth welfare laws, policies for childminder, family allowances and childcare benefits.
- In **Canada**, the central government provides up to 6 months of income support through the Resettlement Assistance Programme (RAP) (Damaris, 2019<sub>[113]</sub>) while the provinces and territories have most of the responsibility for delivering healthcare and other social services.
- In **France**, the minimum income scheme (RSA) is managed and financed by departmental councils and the central government although there have been debates about a total recentralisation as the different departments were not seen to be investing themselves in this policy area (Chérèque and Chauffaut, 2016<sub>[130]</sub>). Furthermore, *Garantie Jeunes* is managed by a partnership between local missions, the central government, firms and local partners. Moreover, local missions maintain a special relationship with Pôle emploi. Since 2008, a multi-year agreement of objectives (CPO) has been in place between the central government and each local mission.
- In **Germany**, implementation of welfare assistance lies with Länder, which often delegate this task to municipalities. In addition, job centres jointly run by the municipal authorities and the Federal Employment Agency, or by the municipal authorities, provide tax-based benefits pursuant to the Second Book of the Social Code. This legislation aims to integrate the long-term unemployed and recipients of basic income support (pursuant to the Second Book of the Social Code) into the labour market (Tangermann and Grote, 2018<sub>[131]</sub>).

- In **Italy**, municipalities are in charge of disbursing the national welfare and poverty allowance while the National social security institute coordinates the unemployment benefits and the Ministry of work and social policies is responsible for the “Citizenship income”.
- In **Sweden**, the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs supervises the social insurance agency (Försäkringskassan) while municipalities are in charge of a specific social assistance scheme (Ekonomiskt bistånd) for those who are not entitled to unemployment aid.

Prior to designing coordinated actions, governments of OECD and non-OECD countries not covered by this study are invited to adopt this work’s methodology to develop the institutional mappings that will allow them to identify multi-level governance challenges. As a second step, they can implement mechanisms fostering vertical, across levels of government, and horizontal, across sectors, coordination, which takes into account the governance specificities of their integration-related policies.

Based on the OECD *Checklist for public action to migrant integration at the local level* (OECD, 2018<sup>[7]</sup>), the accompanying paper to this work presents six multi-level governance instruments that foster coordination in five countries. It will help all levels of government and donors to identify good practices to replicate and pitfalls to avoid, and provide them with ideas of how to improve existing arrangements.

#### IV. What influences the degree of decentralisation of migrant integration policies?

The international comparison conducted in this paper first reveals that the allocation of responsibilities for universal policies that matter most for migrant integration (in the labour, education, housing and welfare sectors), varies greatly from country to country and from sector to sector. Large differences exist in terms of responsibilities carried out by SNGs, of local decision-making powers, of resources available to meet particular vulnerable communities’ needs, including the ability to raise own-source revenues, and also in terms of how implicated are non-governmental actors. Additionally, various degrees of upward and downward accountability, and various ranges of central government control exist.

This brings us to question the existence of an optimal level of decentralisation that should drive governments’ governance decisions. The debate that oppose the interest of having economies of scale and scope (through centralisation) to having policies tailored to local matters (through decentralisation) does not provide a universal response, all the more so for the problems of integration cover at least four public sectors. In practice, all the countries observed show a certain degree of decentralisation and the SNGs always play a role in integration. The key question is therefore that of the *Why* and *How* of governance systems (OECD, 2019<sup>[33]</sup>).

If an optimal allocation of competences for migrant integration does not exist, what drives countries’ decentralisation and centralisation decisions? This brief last section explores three explanatory factors directly linked to migration, which could account for the diversity of decentralisation situations and movements:

- Countries’ historical approach to migration, illustrated by countries status as historically settlement or non-settlement;
- Immigration flows;
- Countries’ willingness to be prepared to face megatrends such as demographic decline.

The general literature concerning the differences between federal and unitary countries is not covered because countries’ degree of legal unification does not stand out as a convincing explanatory factor to governance arrangements. Indeed, decentralisation of integration-related competences exists in all types of countries and some policies unitary states decentralised more integration-related powers than federal ones.

## 1. Settlement / Non-settlement

Post-Second World War, in many European countries such as France, Germany and the Netherlands, the concept of “guest worker” emerged to describe foreign-born workers filling labour gaps in seasonal and manufacturing jobs through short-term low-skill recruitment programmes. Consequently, policies based on the premise that foreign-born workers would return to their country of origin after some time did not include integration components for neither the workers nor their families. Countries like Italy, Ireland and Spain developed economically later and thus came out of the war as emigration countries. In Italy for instance, due to the low number of newcomers until the 1990s, immigration was simply not a political concern. Only in 1998 was the Turco-Napolitano law that placed more emphasis on integration introduced (Schmidtke and Zaslove, 2013<sup>[132]</sup>). Similarly, it was not until the mid-1990s that Ireland’s growing economy fostered a high demand for migrant labour and the country started to attract a large share of immigrants (Laczko et al., 2006<sup>[133]</sup>). Until 2003, local employers could recruit as many non-EU workers as they wished, from whatever countries they wanted, and for any job, regardless of the skill level required (Ruhs, 2005<sup>[134]</sup>). Migration policies being virtually always employer-led meant the national level did not implement integration programme until recent years. Because the topic of integration raised after permanent migration movements actually took place and because foreign-born workers were not meant to settle and integrate the local community, the aforementioned countries are commonly designated as non-settlement.

An opposite pattern is observed in two countries from our sample, commonly called settlement countries: Canada and New Zealand (OECD, 2021<sup>[2]</sup>). These countries have had in place migrant selection mechanisms for decades, and are at the forefront of adapting them to specific territorial and labour market needs. They select migrants who want to settle, following annual immigration targets, and based on applicants’ characteristics, deemed to contribute to, and facilitate, integration in the host country. Important characteristics are age, knowledge of the host country language, minimum levels of educational attainment, work experience, availability and demonstration of funds, presence of family in the host country, having an occupation deemed to be in shortage and having a prior job offer from an employer in the host country. Those admitted for settlement can reside in the receiving country without virtually any limitations regarding duration of stay or exercise of an economic activity, and are expected to become part of the resident population. Their dependants, if admitted, are also included in this category (OECD, 2006<sup>[135]</sup>). In Canada, approved permanent residence applications give the right to access pre-arrival services helping to get education, work experience and credentials recognised. Similarly, refugees selected for resettlement can benefit from pre-departure medical services before they leave for Canada.

**However, while by definition settlement and non-settlement countries’ historical approach to migration is different, this does not seem to determine the allocation of competences in integration-related domains.** Indeed, variations exist between the two settlement-countries studied in this paper. While for instance Canada’s Provinces and Territories have exclusive responsibilities for all levels of education (except adult education), in New Zealand the national Ministry of Education sets out priorities and direction for educational agencies and providers, and has since 2001 recentralised power to intervene in failing schools (see Annex B.). Besides, there are similarities between some settlement and some non-settlement countries studied: Schools in New Zealand are amongst the most autonomous across OECD countries, as are those in Ireland.

## 2. Demographic change

OECD territories are confronted by various megatrends that predominantly affect the local level and stand out for the territorial diversity of their impacts and responses they call for. The impacts of climate change and demographic decline are particularly challenging and territorialised. Specific place-based policies will be vital in mitigating the effects of those impacts on the most vulnerable regions (OECD, 2021<sup>[136]</sup>).

We will focus on the effects of population decline and ageing which are already significant across and within OECD countries (OECD, 2020<sup>[137]</sup>). In most countries, elderly dependency rates<sup>6</sup> remain significantly lower in metropolitan regions compared to other regions (OECD, 2020<sup>[137]</sup>). Very large concentrations of

the elderly (population is greater than 30%) can be observed in small and less urbanised regions of three countries studied in this report: eight in Canada, two in Germany and one in Spain. Furthermore, in Canada, France and Spain, the difference between the region with the highest and the lowest share of elderly population is above 20 percentage points. Migration can help contrast, but not reverse, processes of de-population, mitigate labour shortages and support, at least partly, the financing of pension systems and public services to the extent that integration, in particular through jobs is achieved. Indeed, migrants are often younger than the local population, especially in places with high concentrations of the elderly. Germany's residents with a migration background were for instance on average 31.3 years old in 2020, while those without a migration background were 40.9 years old (Federal Statistical Office, 2021<sup>[138]</sup>).

Several local authorities taking stock of local transformations adapted their policies accordingly to seize this opportunity, instead of waiting for a regional or national plan. Results from a survey investigating Norwegian municipalities' motivations to receive and settle refugees between 2014 and 2016 underlines a clear difference in large and small municipalities' answers. Oslo and the four other big cities gave priority to solidarity considerations, while the smallest municipalities held that they could benefit from the arrival of refugees (Søholt and Aasland, 2019<sup>[139]</sup>). Furthermore, small municipalities in the German federal state of North-Rhine Westphalia, in particular in the south, have been facing steady population decline within recent decades (OECD, 2018<sup>[17]</sup>). In the region, the town of Altena faced the fastest population decline; from 2000 to 2015, the city alone lost 20.8% of its population (4 600 inhabitants) and was by 2015 at risk of losing a substantial part (-22.6%) of its population until 2030 (Müller, 2015<sup>[140]</sup>). To mitigate this population decline and shortages in industry and public service provisions, the city decided to double the quota of asylum seekers allocated to the town and invested in attracting and retaining migrants. In 2015, the city started encouraging migrants to stay in the city and to activate their potential of matching local labour market needs. As a result, the net migration balance of that year was, for the first time in many years, positive (OECD, 2018<sup>[17]</sup>). Although before 2015 no support structure for migrants existed, under the leadership of the city's mayor, a vision for migrant inclusion in the city's social and economic landscape developed, setting the course for successful integration. Similarly, in reaction to the challenges facing its labour market – which has an ageing population and workforce shortages in certain areas such as care services, hospitality and construction – the city of Solna, Sweden, successfully advances migrant integration and retention (Li, 2019<sup>[141]</sup>).

**Overall, there seems to be an already visible impact of demographic decline on the allocation of competences in the reception and early integration policy domains. Yet, this does not seem to extend to other integration-related policy fields.** In some places, it seems that demographic decline pushed central governments to step in to attract and retain international migrants in smaller communities. It is the case of Sweden, where in 2016 the central government recentralised the power to control the geographical repartition of refugees in the country. The national level since then decides which municipalities receive refugees and has the obligation to organise accommodation for them (for four years) (Meer et al., 2021<sup>[119]</sup>). This decision was taken to spread hosting responsibilities across the country more evenly, and to direct migrants in territories where they are most needed.

In other countries, the effects of demographic decline provoked transfers of competences to SNGs. Regional policy makers in Canada and New Zealand have been playing larger roles in their national immigration programs in order to balance the fact that immigrants tend to gravitate toward larger regions and urban areas. While in both cases immigration policy remains under federal jurisdiction, greater inputs are now solicited at the regional and even local or municipal level (Akbari and MacDonald, 2014<sup>[142]</sup>). Under Canada's Provincial Nominee Program (PNP), a Province or Territory nominates an individual for immigration to Canada who will reside in that same province or territory. The relevant individual must have the skills, education, and work experience needed to make an immediate economic contribution to the nominating province or territory. The federal government has signed PNP agreements with several provinces, with the objective of retaining immigrants to less populated areas meeting a skilled labour

shortage. The allocation of competences is also undoubtedly affected by the fact integration challenges faced by migrants differ extensively from one place to another, depending also on migrants' characteristics.

Finally, migration, climate change and demographic decline are not independent considerations. Climate change influences populations' emigration decisions through its economic and environmental impacts. For instance, by depressing rural wages, raising agricultural prices, shaping exposure to hazards, and stressing ecosystems in developing countries can motivate the population to emigrate (World Bank, 2018<sup>[143]</sup>). As seen above, while some territories can no longer provide their inhabitants with the means for a decent life, other face demographic decline. However, and as this work shows, there is no global system that allows migrants who want to, to be integrated into destination territories that need them. Some national and sub-national governments are nevertheless already orienting their policies towards attracting and retaining talent where they are the most needed and in particular young prime-aged migrants, who constitute half of OECD immigrants (OECD, 2021<sup>[2]</sup>). It is for instance the case of Altena in Germany or Solna in Sweden, as well as of Canada, which building on the experience of existing regional economic immigration programmes - such as the Atlantic Immigration Pilot presented in the joint document – is currently working on a new Municipal Nominee Program. This program will allow local communities, chambers of commerce and local labour councils to select permanent immigrants according to their local needs.

However, we must also ask ourselves the question of the long-term attractiveness of the host territories, themselves increasingly subject to the impacts of climate change. Some authors (Khanna, 2021<sup>[144]</sup>) adopting a foresight approach stress that the future wealth and resilience of territories and countries will be closely linked to their capacity to attract and integrate youth. In doing so, adopting a place-based approach to consider integration policies is not only a necessity for their implementation, but in the longer term for the construction of strategies for attracting and integrating migrants in places that are safe from climate change's impact.

### 3. Immigration flows

In the last decades, OECD countries from the sample used in this work had to react to unanticipated migratory flows: 5 million additional people migrated permanently to OECD countries in 2016, up 7% compared with 2015 (OECD, 2018<sup>[7]</sup>). In Italy for instance, the foreign-born population has multiplied by fourteen between 1990 and 2015, (from 356 159 in 1991 to about five million in 2015) (OECD, 2019<sup>[91]</sup>) with around one third of foreign residents originating from EU and 3 714 136 (2017) from non-EU countries (ISTAT, 2018<sup>[145]</sup>). In Sweden, the share of foreign-born increased by 51% from 2010 to 2020 (OECD, 2021<sup>[146]</sup>).

The distribution of newcomers is territorially imbalanced, including inside cities (OECD, 2018<sup>[7]</sup>). Between 2005 and 2015, the share of the foreign-born population grew in 80% of OECD regions but with large geographic variations, ranging from an increase of 12 percentage points in some regions to a decrease of 9 percentage points in others (OECD, 2018<sup>[7]</sup>). Regions in the north of Italy and Germany as well as the south of Sweden recorded particularly large increases in the population share of migrants, between around 5 and 12 percentage points (OECD, 2018<sup>[7]</sup>).

These uneven geographic repartitions seem to have influenced the distribution of powers regarding integration. This is the case because somehow, local authorities, whatever their legal competences and resources, bear the brunt of the work associated with migrant arrivals. Large inflows of migrants and refugees in certain locations can affect local resources and constrain the capacity of SNGs to provide infrastructure and services. As a result, a number of SNGs engage with integration measures and practices that fall outside of their field of competence. Along this line, EURO CITIES notes how *the recent scale of arrivals and the slow reaction of national authorities have often left cities at the forefront, forcing them to play a role without having either a legal mandate or any specific budget to do so* (Mayer, 2017<sup>[147]</sup>).

Historically, strengthening integration at the local level has often been a first step for countries that do not yet have a national policy on integration (OECD, 2021<sup>[2]</sup>). Austria's capital, Vienna, has had an integration strategy since the 1990s while integration was only institutionalised nationally as an autonomous policy field in 2011 with the creation of a State Secretariat for Integration within the Ministry of Interior (OECD, 2018<sup>[148]</sup>) (Permoser and Rosenberger, 2012<sup>[149]</sup>). Similarly, the North-Rhine Westphalia German federal state, which was after World War II one of the main destination points for foreign workers because of its extensive manufacturing sector, has been a trendsetter regarding the introduction of integration ministries in other lander (e.g. Lower Saxony, Hesse, Schleswig Holstein, Baden-Wuerttemberg and Berlin) (Schmidtke and Zaslove, 2013<sup>[132]</sup>). Since that time, every national government of the studied countries has formulated integration strategies, although some strategies from more recent immigration destinations await to be fully implemented. The Immigrant Council of Ireland for instance highlighted in 2020 the ongoing gap between a well-written integration framework and its practical implementation (Migrant Integration Policy Index, 2020<sup>[150]</sup>).

**Therefore, migration flows and their consequences at the local level have pushed some central governments to rebalance responsibilities in the temporary housing sector.** Some governments recentralised some powers, while other decentralised some. Sweden issued the Reception for Settlement Act on 1 March 2016, centralising the power to control how many recognised and resettled refugees will be assigned to a municipality, which then has the obligation to receive and organise accommodation for them (for four years) (Søholt and Aasland, 2019<sup>[139]</sup>). This decision was taken to spread hosting responsibilities across the country more evenly and to ensure migrants would not enter into competition with local workers. At the same time, central governments from other countries recognised the new challenges and opportunities brought by migration need to be managed locally and shifted downwards part of its responsibilities. Thus, in the Netherlands the responsibility for refugee housing has been devolved to the local level. Similarly, building on a pre-existing decentralised reception network involving municipalities and third-sector organisations, the Italian Ministry of the Interior in collaboration with the National Association of Italian Municipalities (ANCI) launched the SPRAR system, now renamed SIPROIMI (Protection System for beneficiaries of international protection and for unaccompanied foreign minors). Local authorities, which choose to participate in the SPRAR network, apply for short-term grants for projects to pursue reception activities (Meer et al., 2021<sup>[119]</sup>). This system reflects territorial disparities, as the number of migrants hosted within the SPRAR system is higher in the South than in the North and Centre of Italy. The French Territorial Contracts for the Reception and Integration of Refugees (CTAIR), presented in the accompanying document, are also an example of decentralisation movements that took place following 2015 immigration movements. While in France the integration of refugees is predominantly meant to take place through access to universal policies, the government, through its Inter-ministerial Delegate in charge of the reception and integration of refugees, signed in 2019 contracts (CTAIR) with cities or metropolitan areas to improve refugees' integration. Thanks to a financial support, these contracts transfer to local authorities some competences without modifying the allocation of competences (see the CTAIR case in the accompanying report).

Results from the survey conducted by the OECD and the European Committee of the Regions (CoR) seem to show SNGs aspire to these changes in the distribution of powers regarding housing. In comparison with other integration policy allocation of competences, three times more SNGs asked for a change in the allocation of competences for temporary housing compared to those who do not want one. A great majority of respondents ask for more decentralisation: 30% towards the local level and 18% towards the regional level. In parallel, governments are recognising the new challenges and opportunities brought by migration and the need to locally manage and shift downwards part of their responsibilities.

**It seems none of the four factors alone can explain the allocation of competences in integration-related policy sectors.** This is not surprising as the scope of these sectors reaches well beyond migrant populations and integration issues. Factors influencing their governance arrangements are therefore likely to cross-pollinate with factors shaping policy sectors that traditionally address native-born and resident

populations. To find out more, comparative matrices that can be found in Annex will enable the reader to understand which actor does what.

What is important is that SNGs have had to integrate policies that otherwise operate in silos. Regardless of the degree of decentralisation, they play a *de facto* role in integrating migrants. This must be recognised by intergovernmental and multi-actor coordination mechanisms that make SNGs' voice audible and allow integration-related policies to reflect local needs of migrants and native-born populations. The fact that integration is now being exacerbated by global megatrends – notably climate and demographic change – amplifies the fact integrating sub-national government action into a multilevel governance framework is a key part of renewing social cohesion while ensuring territories' resilience.



## Annex A. Employment sector: migrant rights and allocations of competences

Table 1. Migrant access to employment

RR: Refugees  
 EU: Migrants originating from European Union countries  
 Non-EU: Migrants originating from countries outside the European Union

Country	1.1 Labour migration	2.1. Vocational education and training	3.1. Active Labour Market programmes	4.1 Skills and qualifications recognition
AUSTRIA	<p><b>RR, EU</b> (including Croatian nationals since 2020): have common law access to the labour market<sup>1</sup></p> <p><b>TCN</b>: those who belong to one of the following groups<sup>2</sup> can combine work and residence permission through the Red-White-Red Card points system<sup>3</sup>, introduced in 2011:            Very Highly Qualified Workers            Skilled Workers in Shortage Occupations<sup>4</sup>            Other Key Workers            Graduates of Austrian Universities and Colleges of Higher Education            Self-employed Key Workers            Start-up Founders  <b>Other TCN</b>: employers can apply for an employment permission (Beschäftigungsbewilligung) for a specifically described job position<sup>5</sup>.</p>	<p><b>EU</b>: have access to vocational training.</p> <p><b>TCN</b>: depending on their residence permit. Under family reunification, they have access to vocational training.</p> <p><b>RR</b>: vocational preparation and guidance are offered as part of the integration year<sup>6</sup>. Yet, RR have only a few opportunities for getting access to regular programmes<sup>7</sup> as full-time VET schools require a successful school graduation certificate, which many refugees cannot prove, and apprenticeship companies determine further admission requirements such as language skills that refugees can rarely meet.</p>	<p><b>RR, EU, TCN</b>: General counselling on labour market integration, vocational training and education are available.</p> <p><b>RR, EU, TCN</b>: The Mentoring for Migrants project, launched in 2006 brings together experienced mentors from the business world and people from a migrant background and help them become integrated into the Austrian labour market. Mentees must notably be in Austria for less than ten years<sup>8</sup>.</p>	<p><b>RR, EU, TCN</b>: have access to countries national information centres providing information on mobility and recognition of academic/professional qualifications to migrants.</p> <p><b>EU</b>: some profession qualifications acquired in the EU, EEA or Switzerland are automatically recognised<sup>9</sup>.</p> <p>To access regulated professions, higher education qualifications<sup>10</sup> acquired outside the EU must be evaluated<sup>11</sup></p>

Country	1.1 Labour migration	2.1. Vocational education and training	3.1. Active Labour Market programmes	4.1 Skills and qualifications recognition
<b>CANADA</b>	<p><b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> need a work permit to work legally in Canada and a Social Insurance Number.</p>	<p><b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> Foreign nationals are required to obtain a study permit for engaging in vocational education or training that is more than 6 months in duration at a designated learning institution<sup>12</sup>.</p> <p>VET is primarily offered at the post-secondary level in public or private technical and vocational institutes or colleges. While some provinces have their own qualifications framework, the most popular vocational qualifications are the Red Seal credentials that are recognised across all provinces.</p> <p>As part of the federal government's Budget 2018, the Skilled Trades Awareness and Readiness Program was introduced. It will encourage underrepresented groups such as newcomers to explore careers in the skilled trades.</p>	<p><b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> can access Job Bank's services, the Canada's national employment service, which has several tools and services that can help newcomers connect with employers.</p> <p>Recent immigrant youth can benefit from the Youth Employment and Skills Strategy (YESS) program, which provides funding to organisations to deliver a range of activities that help youth to overcome barriers to employment and develop a broad range of skills and knowledge<sup>13</sup>. The program has a national stream and a regional one.</p>	<p><b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> The foreign credential recognition is compulsory if: Immigrating to Canada as a Federal Skilled Worker Coming to Canada to work in a certain profession or trade (regulated occupations) Coming to Canada to study. Approved permanent residence application give the right to access pre-arrival services helping to get education, work experience and credentials recognised in Canada. Regulated occupations require special licences or certificates to work in Canada.</p>
<b>FRANCE</b>	<p><b>RR, EU:</b> do not need one to take up work.</p> <p><b>TCN:</b> need a long stay visa or a specific work permit requested by the employer before arriving in France. Work permits may be refused if the unemployment rate for this profession, in the region concerned, is too high according to an updated list of shortage occupations<sup>1415</sup>.</p>	<p><b>TCN:</b> need a work permit to start an apprenticeship and a work-study program.</p> <p><b>RR:</b> The HOPE programme (Hébergement, Orientation Pour l'Emploi) created in 2017 allows refugees who signed the integration contract (CIR) to find employment in jobs facing recruitment shortages through vocational training and work placements<sup>16</sup>.</p>	<p><b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> All migrants can access trainings, and the back-to-work assistance allowance (ARE) as well as local plans for reinsertion and employment (PLIE) targeting job seekers and an active solidarity income (RSA) beneficiaries.</p> <p><b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> migrants can access the Youth Guarantee (Garanties Jeunes) programme designed for NEET<sup>17</sup> youth aged 16-25 who have a residence permit valid for work. It is a one-year contract during which NEET young people are supported in their efforts to find employment.</p> <p><b>RR:</b> can access special Youth Guarantee programmes adapted to their situations<sup>18</sup>.</p>	<p><b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> All migrants can request an attestation of diploma comparability (Free of charge of refugees)/ All migrants who have exercised at least one year of salaried, self-employed/voluntary activity related to the content of the envisaged certification can access Validation of prior experience (VAE) programmes; All migrants registered at the Public Employment Service can access the Professional skills evaluation (ECCP) to obtain an assessment report to use in a recruitment process; All migrants who have work experience relevant to the intended graduate programme can access Validation of professional accomplishment (VAP) programme that allows direct access to university training without having the required diploma, by validating professional experience, training courses, or even personal achievements. Regulated occupations require special licences or certificates to work in France.</p>

Country	1.1 Labour migration	2.1. Vocational education and training	3.1. Active Labour Market programmes	4.1 Skills and qualifications recognition
<b>GERMANY</b>	<p><b>RR, EU:</b> have common law access to the labour market</p> <p><b>TCN:</b> have to hold both a residence and a work permission, which they can apply for once having obtained a job/apprenticeship/training/enrolment in university or other tertiary education.</p>	<p><b>RR, EU:</b> have access to common law vocational training.</p> <p><b>TCN:</b> have access to vocational training under the same rule as labour market access. They must hold both a residence and work permission. After successful completion of vocational training, third-country nationals may be issued a residence permit for job search, for up to one year, under specific circumstances.</p> <p><b>RR:</b> Refugees can access specialised vocational language training and classes.</p>	<p><b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> Can access general services available to all - such as individual counselling. Some Jobcenters have special counselling units with tailored support for migrants.</p> <p><b>RR:</b> can access specific programs/initiatives aiming at facilitating their integration into the labour market. Several Jobcentres have made recognised refugees a target group.</p>	<p><b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> can access computer-assisted tests. As of 2019, the tests exist for eight professions in six languages and are offered by all Public Employment Services, which also provide feedback and follow-up advice. In some cases; costs of the recognition procedure as well as further training can be covered for migrants.</p> <p><b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> Many professions fall under the regulated profession category<sup>19</sup>. The Recognition Act entitles all immigrants to have their qualifications verified within three to four months for professions regulated on a federal level, which includes around 600 occupations<sup>20</sup>. The 16 states have their own recognition laws in place for professions regulated at a state level. Individuals with insufficient income can benefit from the recognition grant.</p> <p><b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> The “<a href="#">Integration through Qualification (IQ)</a>” programme advises on the recognition of foreign professional qualifications, on the necessity of making an adaptation or post-qualification and offers qualification courses in order to balance out essential professional differences and achieve full recognition of foreign qualifications. It is funded by the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs as well as the European Social Fund (EFS).</p>

Country	1.1 Labour migration	2.1. Vocational education and training	3.1. Active Labour Market programmes	4.1 Skills and qualifications recognition
<b>IRELAND</b>	<p><b>TCN:</b> Foreigners who are not from the EU or from Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway or Switzerland, need a special employment permit to work in Ireland and to register with the Garda National Immigration Bureau for permission to live in Ireland. TCN who have been granted a separate right of residence may be exempted from needing an employment permit.</p>	<p><b>RR:</b> <u>The Vocational Training Opportunities Scheme (VTOS)</u> provides a range of free courses to unemployed people over 21, people with refugee status or subsidiary protection and to parents of an Irish-born child. Courses are full-time and can last up to two years, with 30 hours attendance per week.</p> <p><b>RR:</b> <u>The Refugees Integration Programme</u> provides them vocational training.</p> <p><b>RR:</b> <u>can access Training Support Grant (TSG)</u> to take up short-term training that is not available from a State provider.</p> <p><b>RR:</b> Adults are entitled to free, approved, <u>Post-Leaving Certificate (PLC) courses</u> under the VTOS<sup>21</sup>. PLC courses are full-time programmes for young people who have completed their Leaving Certificate and adults returning to education. The course lasts one to two years and leads to an award on the National Framework of Qualifications. The courses develop technical and practical skills for an industry recognised qualification, offering an alternative route to higher education.</p>	<p><b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> EU and non-EEA citizens with Stamp 4 residence permission (temporary permit) can access <u>Job Path</u>, the job-seeking support service<sup>22</sup>, <u>Local Employment Services</u>, which provide a local access point to the full range of services and facilities that are available to help jobseekers to enter or return to employment and <u>Job Clubs</u>, which provide trainings<sup>23</sup>.</p> <p><b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> <u>EPIC (Employment for People from Immigrant Communities)</u> is an employment programme which helps migrants to integrate into Irish society, by providing specialised support in interviews, CV and Cover letter preparation, training or work experience placements.</p>	<p><b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> Newcomers can access the "<u>Quality and Qualifications Ireland</u>" for the recognition of vocational skills accredited in other countries. However, many lack sufficient support to get their foreign qualifications recognised or gain new professional and language skills<sup>24</sup>.</p> <p><b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> <u>Recognition of prior learning (RPL)</u> allows for access, transfer and progression within higher education to take account of any current and relevant knowledge and skills students can demonstrate<sup>25</sup>. There is no set national process for recognising prior learning. A national framework for RPL, to be recognised by all higher education institutions, has been set out as an objective in the National Strategy for Higher Education to 2030.</p>
<b>ITALY</b>	<p><b>RR:</b> International protection holders have access to the job market just like Italian citizens.</p> <p><b>EU:</b> need simply to have a "stay permit" obtained from the immigration office at the local or regional Police station, and a tax code (Codice Fiscale).</p> <p><b>TCN:</b> must obtain a work visa before entry, which, after entry, will be converted into an authorisation to work, and eventually into a residence permit.</p>	<p><b>RR, TCN:</b> can access specific internship programmes</p> <p><b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> The 2017 National Integration Plan for People Entitled to International Protection aims to create a training system that supports access to education and employment specifically for unaccompanied minors.</p> <p><b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> various programmes exist to facilitate the transition of young migrants to the labour market through traineeships and other types of VET support (FORWORK, INSIDE, PERCORSI, Coordinamento Nazionale Nuove Generazione Italiane, Programme integra<sup>26</sup>).</p>	<p><b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> can access, especially in large cities, Public Employment Service desks dedicated to resolving job-related issues encountered by migrants.</p> <p><b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> The Relocation allowance is an indirect aid to the unemployed, a voucher which is not credited to the worker, but to the employment service which finds a new job for the person concerned<sup>27</sup>.</p>	<p><b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> All citizens who wish to obtain authorisation to work and hold foreign qualifications obtained in a non-EU country, have to apply for the recognition of their qualifications.</p> <p>With regard to the recognition of professional qualifications obtained abroad, the protocol differs when dealing with professions that are regulated in Italy.</p>

Country	1.1 Labour migration	2.1. Vocational education and training	3.1. Active Labour Market programmes	4.1 Skills and qualifications recognition
NEW ZEALAND	<p><b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> people are entitled to work if they are New Zealand or Australian citizens, or they have a residence visa, work visa or a condition on their temporary visa showing they are allowed to work<sup>28</sup>.</p> <p><b>RR:</b> All quota refugees are given permanent resident status upon entering New Zealand.</p>	<p><b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> resident visa holders are classified as domestic students in New Zealand<sup>29,30</sup>. They only pay local fees for tertiary education.</p> <p><b>RR:</b> New Zealand's onshore reception programme includes professional training.</p>	<p><b>RR:</b> New Zealand's onshore reception programme has a focus on employment support for working age refugees. Refugees aged 16 and 17 years may also participate in these sessions if they are not interested in starting tertiary studies.</p> <p><b>RR:</b> While looking for work, refugees can get financial help and get help to prepare for and find work (CV writing, identifying suitable jobs, and preparing for interview)<sup>31</sup>.</p>	<p><b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> The International Qualification Assessment (IQA) assesses the tertiary or vocational upper-secondary qualifications awarded outside of New Zealand.</p> <p>Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition Arrangement is a non-treaty arrangement between the Commonwealth, state and territory governments of Australia and the government of New Zealand, signed in 1996 and allowing full qualification recognition for citizens qualified in registered occupations.</p>
SPAIN	<p><b>TCN:</b> Workers who are not from EU countries need to obtain a Work Visa to be able to work in Spain.</p> <p><b>TCN:</b> The Public Employment Agency publishes every three months a list of jobs<sup>32</sup> for which employers have recruitment difficulties and for which the obtention of a work visa is thus made easier<sup>33</sup>.</p>	<p><b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> The Spanish education system offers VET in lower, secondary, upper secondary and tertiary education.</p> <p><b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> can access free or subsidised training courses.</p>	<p><b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> The Spanish State Employment Service benefits and subsidies are available to workers from the EU, the EEA or Switzerland who reside in Spain, and workers from other countries who reside and work legally in Spain<sup>34</sup>.</p>	
SWEDEN	<p><b>RR, EU and migrants from Nordic countries:</b> have the right to work in Sweden like any other citizen.</p> <p><b>TCN:</b> need a residence permit, and employers can apply online for their employees' residence permit. The expansion labour immigration from non-EU countries is a key priority since 2006.</p>	<p><b>RR, EU:</b> can access to VET like any other citizen.</p> <p><b>TCN:</b> need a residence permit and a labor permit to access VET. They can apply before entering Sweden and only with existing offers by company or school.</p> <p><b>RR:</b> The Introduction programme is an education and training plan for newly arrived refugees who are between 20 and 64 years, compulsory since January 2018.</p> <p><b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> Introductory programmes are intended for young people who do not have necessary pass grades to go to upper secondary education. Most are vocationally oriented and aim to prepare young people to the labour market. It targets "youth at risk" and migrants are overrepresented in this category<sup>35</sup>.</p>	<p><b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> Assistance and possible training for job search are provided to people legally residing in Sweden, who are registered to find employment with the Swedish Public Employment Agency (Arbetsförmedlingen).</p>	<p><b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> The Fast-track program targets migrants who have already some experiences in in scarce occupations but no an equivalent qualification. It consists in "on-the-job-training", combined with language learning and the recognition of qualifications. There are tracks for social scientists and workers, for teachers, for professions in health and medical care, and for chefs.</p>

Country	1.1 Labour migration	2.1. Vocational education and training	3.1. Active Labour Market programmes	4.1 Skills and qualifications recognition
THE NETHERLANDS	<p>RR, EU: can access the labour market like any other citizen</p> <p>TCN: must hold a work and a residence permit, usually applied for by the employer.</p>	<p>RR, EU, TCN: People legally residing in the Netherlands can access to the Secondary Vocational Education<sup>36</sup>.</p> <p>TCN: Only those without a residence permit coming from Suriname, Indonesia, or South Africa can move to the Netherlands to take up VET studies<sup>37</sup>.</p>		<p>EU: Facilitation of recognition for certain shortage professions, such as doctors, pharmacists, dentists, midwives, and nurses with certain qualifications obtained in Europe.</p> <p>RR, EU, TCN: Massive Open Online Course (MOOCs) prepare international students to obtain certificates required for admission.</p> <p>RR: After recognition, the "screening and matching interview" determines refugees' educational background of refugees.</p>

Table 2. Competent authority for employment policy

Country	1.1 Labour migration	2.1 Vocational education and training	3.1 Active Labour Market programmes	4.1 Skills and qualifications recognition
AUSTRIA	<p>The regional settlement authorities (Niederlassungsbehörden) are in charge of assessing and issuing permits - including the Red-White-Red card - after migrants have applied for labour market access to embassies and consulates<sup>38</sup>.</p> <p>They are under the administrative jurisdiction of <u>Länder</u>, which often delegate their administration to <u>municipalities</u><sup>39</sup>. Regional settlement authorities consult with the <u>local Public Employment Service (AMS)</u><sup>40</sup>, which gives an expert opinion on the economic benefits applications.</p>	<p>School-based VET programmes are under the responsibility of the <u>Ministry of Education</u>. The <u>Länder education directorates</u> are responsible for enforcing school legislation, including quality assurance, school supervision and education control.</p> <p>Dual VET are under the responsibility of <u>the Ministry of Economy</u>, in charge of the legal bases and content of the company-based part, and of the <u>Ministry of Education</u>, in charge of the complementary school-based training. <u>Social partners</u> are also significantly involved (designing the training regulations, carrying out the assessment procedures, funding the company-based part).</p> <p>The <u>Federal Ministry of Digitalisation and Business Location (BMW)</u> monitors vocational training, submitting a report to the <u>National Council</u> every two years<sup>41</sup>.</p> <p>The <u>AMS</u> can assist individuals in finding a vocational training position<sup>42</sup>.</p> <p>Social support offered for refugees during VET differ considerably between the municipalities and the educational institutions. The continued existence of most social support measures depends on the efforts of <u>volunteers/NGOs</u><sup>43</sup>.</p>	<p>The <u>AMS</u>, under the jurisdiction of the <u>Federal Ministry of Labour, Family and Youth</u> is in charge of the Early Intervention Program. The <u>AMS</u> is deconcentrated into <u>9 Länder offices</u> and 98 regional organizations in order for interventions to take into account the composition of the migrant and resident population, resulting in better-targeted programmes<sup>44</sup>.</p> <p>General counselling on labour market integration, is provided by <u>NGOs</u>, funded by the <u>Austrian Integration Fund (ÖIF)</u>. The ÖIF is a partner of the Federal Chancellor of Austria and runs integration centres located Austria offering information and counselling services<sup>45</sup>.</p> <p>The "Mentoring for Migrants" programme is a joint initiative of the <u>Federal Economic Chamber (WKO)</u> in cooperation with the <u>ÖIF</u> and the <u>AMS</u><sup>46</sup>.</p>	<p>For higher education qualifications (diplomas/degrees) and academic titles recognition, <u>the National Academic Recognition Information Centre ENIC NARIC AUSTRIA</u> is responsible<sup>47</sup>.</p> <p>For recognition of qualifications to access regulated trades and professions, <u>Länder</u> and in some cases, also the <u>chambers or federal ministries</u> are responsible.</p> <p>The competent authority for the recognition of trade and craft qualifications in the case of establishment is the locally competent Provincial Governor.</p>

CANADA	<p><u>Each province and territory</u> has substantial authorities over immigrant selection and can thus deliver licences to people who meet their occupational standards for regulated jobs. The final decision to issue a visa remains a <u>federal matter</u>.</p> <p><u>Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada</u> (IRCC) issues work permits, and business permits.</p>	<p><u>Provinces and territories</u> have exclusive responsibility for vocational training<sup>48</sup>.</p> <p><u>The Canadian Council of Directors of Apprenticeship</u> serves as an interprovincial body to promote collaboration and alignment on apprenticeship training and trade certification. It oversees the Red Seal program. It is a partnership between Canada's <u>federal, provincial, and territorial governments</u>.</p> <p>The Skilled Trades Awareness and Readiness Program will be managed in partnership with <u>provinces, territories, post-secondary institutions, training providers, unions and employers</u>.</p>	<p><u>Provinces and territories</u> have considerable leeway in designing programs specifically to meet local needs. They do this through Labour Market Development Agreement programs which, each year, transfer over CAD \$2 billion to the Provinces to run their own active labour market programs housed within their respective governments. The program is federally funded. <u>Provincial and territorial governments and Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC)</u> on behalf of the <u>Employment Insurance Commission</u> deliver Job Bank services. <u>Service Canada regional offices</u> work to carry out ESDC's mandate<sup>49</sup>.</p> <p>The YESS is a <u>federal</u> initiative delivered in collaboration with <u>11 federal departments and agencies</u>, including <u>ESDC</u><sup>50</sup>.</p> <p><u>Immigrant-serving organisations</u> help newcomers settle in Canada. Governments fund them and their services are free.</p>	<p>For higher education qualifications (diplomas/degrees) and academic titles recognition, <u>the National Academic Recognition Information Centre ENIC NARIC Canada</u> is responsible<sup>51</sup>.</p> <p>The <u>federal government</u> provides funding to governments and organisations through the Foreign Credential Recognition Program (FCRP) to support foreign credential recognition in Canada.</p> <p>Regulated occupations require special licences or certificates to work in Canada. <u>Provinces and territories</u> are in charge of giving licences to people who meet their occupational standards for regulated jobs. The requirements can be different across Canada<sup>52</sup>.</p>
FRANCE	<p><u>The Ministry of Interior</u> is competent for regulations related to visas, foreign nationals' entry, stay and work in France. Until April 2021, the Regional Directorates for the Economy, Employment, Labour and Solidarity (DREETS) were responsible for issuing work permit applications to foreign nationals. This competence has been transferred to <u>seven interregional platforms</u>, attached to departmental prefectures under authority of the Ministry of the Interior<sup>53</sup>.</p>	<p>VET is a matter of shared competences between <u>the State, the regions and representatives of the business world</u>.</p> <p><u>Regions</u> are responsible for the planning and coherence of vocational training in their territories, except for apprenticeship provision.</p> <p><u>Social partners</u> contribute to the elaboration of VET qualifications, participate in examination boards, offer in-company training and contribute financially to VET provision by paying the apprenticeship tax. Ministerial advisory professional committees are formed with the participation of social partners to plan the revision of VET qualifications in line with labour market needs. The 2018 law for the "freedom to choose one's professional future" reinforced the weight of professional branches in the governance of apprenticeship<sup>54</sup>.</p> <p>A Steering Committee made up of <u>skills operators, employers, the National Agency for the vocational training of adults (AFPA), the Departmental Directorate of</u></p>	<p><u>The National Employment Agency, Pôle Emploi</u>, is responsible of unemployment benefits. Yet, six <u>Regions</u> were selected in 2020 by the Prime Minister to test, for two years, to locally manage the PES's (Pôle Emploi) action in the field of professional training. The new Regional Guidance Agency, for its part, will be responsible for informing young people, early on, which sectors are recruiting.</p> <p><u>Municipalities</u> offer the PLIE (Plans Locaux pluriannuels pour l'Insertion et l'Emploi)<sup>56</sup>.</p> <p><u>Local missions</u> implement the Youth Guarantee (Garanties Jeunes)<sup>57</sup> in partnership with, the State, firms and local partners. This program is co-financed by the State and the skill operators of the professional branches concerned<sup>58</sup> and by the European Social Fund to which skills operators, in charge of supporting vocational training, must report to notably in terms of</p>	<p><u>The ENIC-NARIC France</u> deal with diploma recognition requests and has implemented a specific procedure for the recognition of qualifications held by refugees<sup>59</sup>.</p> <p><u>The Ministry of National Education, Higher Education and Research committees</u> assess the level and possible equivalence of diplomas obtained in third countries. <u>Advice Relay Points (PRC)</u>, placed under the responsibility of the <u>Regional Councils</u>, welcome and inform about the Validation of prior experience (VAE) process.</p> <p><u>The National Employment Agency, Pôle Emploi</u>, manages the professional skills evaluation ECCP through a service provider.</p> <p><u>The Regional Agencies of Health (ARS)</u> are responsible for health regulated professions<sup>60</sup>.</p>

		<p><u>Social Cohesion (DDCS) of the Department, the Drees, the OFII and of Pôle emploi</u> administers the HOPE programme. Coordination is provided by the Asylum department of the general directorate of foreigners in France (Ministry of the Interior). It is funded by partner skills operators and by the State as part of AFPA's public service mission<sup>55</sup>.</p>	<p>indicators monitoring and results.</p>	
<b>GERMANY</b>	<p>The <u>federal government</u> has legislative jurisdiction over migrant access to the labour market.</p> <p><u>Länder</u> have the administrative and financial authority. They can set regulations within the scope of federal law. Länder usually delegate this task to <u>municipalities</u>.</p> <p>For a residence for the purpose of gainful employment, the approval by the <u>Federal Employment Agency (BA)</u> is always required.</p>	<p>Part-time VET schools in the dual system and full-time VET schools are under the authority of the <u>Länder</u>, while other VET provision is governed <u>centrally</u><sup>61</sup>.</p> <p><u>The Federal Institute for Vocational Education and Training (Bundesinstitut für Berufsbildung)</u> serves as a major instrument for co-operation between the various stakeholders in the VET sector.</p> <p><u>Social partners</u> are involved at all levels, according to the principle of consensus.</p> <p><u>The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF)</u> implements specialised vocational language training and classes.</p>	<p><u>Jobcentres</u> deliver general services available to all - such as individual counselling.</p> <p><u>Centralised job centres</u> are consortia of the <u>Federal Employment Agency (BA)</u> and <u>municipalities</u>. They set yearly goals in accordance with local demands and consultation with local stakeholders (representatives of local chamber of commerce and industry, local welfare organisations, local craft organisations, local trade unions and municipal administration for local economic development)<sup>62</sup>.</p> <p><u>Decentralised job centres</u> operate completely independently of the FEA except for the exchange of unemployment registration data. District governments only sign target agreements with their respective state governments, their sole de-jure supervisors<sup>63</sup>.</p>	<p><u>The Federal Employment Agency (BA)</u> developed the MySkills computer-assisted tests, offered by all Public Employment Services, which also provide feedback and follow-up advice.</p> <p>A <u>Service Centre for Professional Recognition (ZSBA)</u> was established in 2020 as the central point of contact in the recognition process for skilled workers living and applying for professional recognition from abroad<sup>64</sup>.</p> <p><u>The Central Office for Foreign Education (ZAB)</u> is the central authority for the evaluation of foreign qualifications in Germany<sup>65</sup>. These include school-leaving certificates, vocational qualifications and academic degrees. It is the German ENIC NARIC institution.</p> <p>The "<u>Integration through Qualification (Network IQ)</u>" programme is funded by the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (BMAS) as well as the European Social Fund (EFS).</p> <p>"Recognition in Germany" is an initiative of the <u>Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF)</u> that works closely with the Network IQ<sup>66</sup>.</p>
<b>IRELAND</b>	<p><u>The Department of Business, Enterprise and Innovation</u> administers labour migration policy in co-operation with the <u>Department of Justice and Equality</u>.</p> <p><u>The Expert Group on Future Skills Needs (EGFSN)</u> advises the Irish Government on the current and future skills needs of the economy and on other labour market issues that affect Ireland's enterprises and employment growth<sup>67</sup>.</p>	<p><u>Education and Training Boards (ETBs)</u> provide The Vocational Training Opportunities Scheme (VTOS) and Post Leaving Certificate (PLC) courses<sup>70</sup>.</p> <p>Responsibility for taking decisions and implementing further education and training, which includes most VET provision, lies with <u>SOLAS</u>, in conjunction with the <u>16 ETBs</u>. Most of the funding is allocated through SOLAS to the ETBs.</p> <p>Both SOLAS and ETBs are agencies of the Minister for</p>	<p><u>The Department of Social Protection (DSP)</u> provides employment support and advice to jobseekers nationwide through 62 public employment Intreo Centres, which have some freedom to shift funds between budgets lines<sup>72</sup> and through <u>Contracted Public Employment Services (CPES)</u>, notably responsible for the operation of the JobPath service, the Local Employment Services (LES) and Job Clubs. In 2020, the DSP had contracted for the provision of 22 Local Employment Services and 40 Job</p>	<p><u>Quality and Qualifications Ireland (QQI)</u> is a national agency responsible for qualifications and quality assurance in further education and training and higher education. It is supported by NARIC Ireland<sup>76</sup>.</p> <p>Each <u>educational institution</u> has its own way of facilitating students who wish to have their prior learning recognised (RPL). To foster the use of RPL, a <u>RPL Practitioner Network</u> was set up, which brings together practitioners working in the area of RPL<sup>77</sup>.</p>



	<p>Since 2019 a <u>Labour Market Advisory Council</u> advises the Minister for Social Protection and the government on the efficient operation of the labour market<sup>68</sup>. The Council comprises experts from academia, the community and voluntary sector, industry and trade union organisations<sup>69</sup>.</p>	<p><u>Education</u>.</p> <p>Since 2016, and the reform of apprenticeship, Ireland's Higher Education Authority also plays a role in the oversight of VET programmes that are delivered in institutes of technology<sup>71</sup>.</p> <p><u>Employer consultation and labour market intelligence</u> play a key role in informing the development of new VET programmes with a view to addressing identified skills needs.</p>	<p>Clubs with local community/development companies and other organisations around the country<sup>73 74</sup>.</p> <p>The <u>Migrant Rights Centre (MRC)</u> provides support to migrant workers and their families nation wide.</p> <p><u>Business in the Community Ireland</u>, funded by the Department of Justice and Equality and the ESF manages the Employment for People from Immigrant Communities (EPIC) programme in partnership with <u>businesses, state agencies and NGOs</u><sup>75</sup>.</p>	<p>The <u>Department of Education</u> is responsible for coordinating the recognition of professional qualifications in Ireland<sup>78</sup>.</p> <p>SOLAS is in charge of recognising qualifications for recognised professions.</p>
ITALY	<p><u>Single Desks for Immigration</u> (Sportello Unico per l'Immigrazione) are structures, active in each prefecture, responsible for issuing working permits to non-EU foreign citizens residing abroad, within the quotas provided for by the "flow-decree". They are also in charge of the Integration Agreement in case of entry for work or family reasons.</p>	<p>The <u>Ministry of Education, University and Research (MIUR)</u> sets the framework for VET in national school programmes (technical and vocational schools). <u>Regional school offices</u> (USR), a branch of the Ministry of education at regional level, collaborate with the Regions and local authorities for the VET offer, for adult education, for the higher technical education and for school-work relationships.</p> <p><u>Regions</u> have exclusive legislative power on the regional VET system (sistema di istruzione e formazione professionale – IFP)<sup>79</sup> which can be delegated to provinces and municipalities according to a trend of decentralisation that reserves to the Regions duties of guidance, planning and monitoring and fewer managing duties<sup>80</sup>. They can change up to 20% of the content of students' vocational curricula, set at the national level. <u>Schools</u> adapt their educational offer to the local cultural, social, and economic requirements<sup>81</sup>.</p> <p>The European Social Fund enables various projects facilitating migrants' transition to the labour market<sup>82</sup>.</p>	<p><u>Regional employment agencies</u> are run by the <u>Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare</u>. <u>State-run offices (Uffici di collocamento)</u> deal with unemployment and job seekers.</p> <p><u>ANPAL (the central agency for active labour policy)</u> of the Ministry of Labour, coordinates the relocation allowance in partnership with the public-private network of employment services, in agreement with the Regions and Autonomous Provinces.<sup>83</sup></p> <p><u>Centres for Employment (CPI)</u> aim at matching labour demand and supply: assess the competences of jobseekers and define the path for integration in terms of vocational training and job placement opportunities. CPIs are managed by <u>Regions</u> and refer to the ANPAL.</p>	<p>The <u>NARIC</u> provides credential information services, which Italian higher education institutions can use to support their autonomous evaluation of applicants' foreign qualifications<sup>84</sup>.</p> <p>The bodies in charge of the management of recognition procedures for professional qualifications obtained abroad, including those obtained by holders of international protection, are the <u>Foreign Office, other Ministries</u> according to the sector, and the <u>Service Institution</u> (Conferenza dei Servizi).</p>
NEW ZEALAND	<p>The government agency "<u>Immigration New Zealand</u>", under the authority of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, assesses visa applications from people who wish to visit, work, study, or live permanently in the country, creates the shortage skills list and enforces immigration</p>	<p>The <u>Ministry of Education</u> develops strategic policy for the tertiary sector and international education, including Vocational Education.</p> <p>The 2020 reform of Vocational Education<sup>86</sup> introduced six new industry-led and governed <u>Workforce Development Councils</u> (WDCs), in which industry are represented, notably to deliver a forward strategic view of the future</p>	<p><u>Public Employment Service</u> partners with the representative body for private employment agencies, the Recruitment and Consulting Services Association, to allow jobseekers registered with the PES to access an expanded pool of job vacancies that would not otherwise have been available to them, and gave PrEAs</p>	<p><u>New Zealand Qualifications Authority (NZQA)</u> is responsible for managing the Qualifications Framework, administering the secondary school assessment system, independent quality assurance of non-university tertiary education providers and qualifications recognition and standard setting for some specified unit standards<sup>91</sup>.</p> <p>Under the Education and Training Act 2020, NZQA's</p>

	<p>law. The Immigration (COVID-19 Response) Act 2020 introduced new powers under which the <u>Minister of Immigration</u> can change conditions on classes of visas and grant new visas to classes of people<sup>85</sup>.</p>	<p>skills needs of industries, develop qualifications and help shape the curriculum of vocational education. They also provide advice on investment in vocational education and determine the appropriate mix of skills and training for the industries they cover. The 2020 reform established 15 independent <u>Regional Skills Leadership Groups</u> to provide advices about the skills needs of the regions to the Tertiary Education Commission (TEC), Workforce Development Councils (WDCs), and local vocational education providers. <u>Training Organisations (ITOs)</u> are industry groups that develop and manage training qualifications. There are over 30 of them in New Zealand<sup>87</sup>.</p>	<p>access to a broader pool of potential candidates for their employer clients<sup>88</sup>. The government agency “<u>Work and Income</u>”, under the authority of the Ministry of Social Development, administers unemployment benefits through its service centres<sup>89</sup>. It delivers financial help and back-to-work trainings to refugees<sup>90</sup>.</p>	<p>functions include recognition of overseas educational and vocational qualifications<sup>92</sup>. It is the National Education Information Centre (<u>NEIC</u>).</p>
<p>SPAIN</p>	<p><u>The General Secretariat for Migration and Emigration (SGIE)</u>, within the Ministry of Employment and Social Security (Meys), designs and manages the procedures for residence and work permits. <u>The Autonomous Communities</u> are entitled to grant initial work permits. Applications are submitted to the Immigration Office of the province where the services are to be provided<sup>93</sup>. <u>The Tripartite Social Committee</u>, overseen by the <u>MEySS</u>, is a consultative forum through which <u>trade unions, employers and national administrations</u> periodically exchange information and have debates on migrant integration. It must approve the labour market shortage list and any regulation related to migration. A new <u>Ministry of Inclusion, Social Security and Migration</u> was created in 2020. He is notably responsible for improvements and simplifications migrants’ legal access to the labour market<sup>94</sup>.</p>	<p><u>The Ministry of Education and Vocational Training (MEFP)</u> establishes basic requirements for the dual system.  Implementation of VET policies is managed by the <u>Autonomous Communities</u>, which may shape (up to 35-45% of) VET curricula based on territorial needs.  <u>Regional Councils for Vocational Training</u> develop regional plans, evaluate offerings, and propose improvements in VET<sup>95</sup>.  <u>Employers</u> are co-responsible for the design of the training offer and its implementation<sup>96</sup>.  In addition, <u>city councils</u> (ayuntamientos) run free or subsidised training courses or both workers and unemployed people.</p>	<p>The <u>PES</u> (Servicio Publico de Empleo Estatal), is overseen by the Ministry of Employment and Social Security and remains centralised.</p>	<p>Recognition is coordinated at the <u>national level</u> through calls for recognition applications for certain professions and evaluation procedures are managed at the <u>regional level</u>.</p>

SWEDEN	<p>The <u>Swedish Migration Agency</u>, under the Ministry of Justice, administers resident permits including applications for work visa and business permits. Operational activities are organised in six geographical regions: North Sweden, Mid Sweden, Stockholm, West, East and South Sweden. Employers must obtain approval from the relevant <u>trade union</u> before the worker can apply for a work permit to the Agency.</p>	<p><u>Swedish National Agency for Higher Vocational Education</u> (Ministry of Education and Research) monitors the higher vocational education, alignment with labor market needs and quality checks of courses and programs.</p> <p><u>Municipalities</u> are responsible for offering and organising VET and for outreach to local adults who have the right to participate in the basic education<sup>97</sup>.</p> <p><u>Private entities</u> may also be approved as organisers and run independent upper secondary schools.</p> <p><u>Employers and industry representatives</u> play a significant role in the planning of a higher VET programme and have an influence on its content<sup>98</sup>.</p> <p><u>Swedish Migration Agency</u> issues residence certificates for higher vocational education, Embassy/Consulates.</p> <p><u>The Public Employment Service</u> coordinates the Fast-track program.</p> <p><u>Municipalities</u> play an important role in financing the schools and deciding on the format and type of introductory programmes based on the local needs<sup>99</sup>.</p>	<p>A 2010 law shifted the responsibility for labour market integration of migrants from regional and local authorities to the <u>national Public Employment Service (PES)</u><sup>100</sup>.</p> <p><u>The PES</u> (Ministry of Labour) coordinates the “Introduction programme” with <u>municipalities</u> in charge of the provision of language training and civic orientation<sup>101</sup>.</p>	<p>Central government is responsible for issuing recognition of previous qualifications through <u>the Swedish Council for Higher Education (UHR)</u> under Ministry of Education and Research in Sweden).</p> <p>The Fast-track programme is coordinated by the <u>Public Employment Service (PES)</u> and involves numerous actors: the Ministry of Labour, in partnership with Swedish Hotel and Restaurant Workers Union, Visita, National Board of Health and Welfare, City of Stockholm, Swedish Teachers' Union, the National Union of Teachers, Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions, Employers' Organisation for the Swedish Service Sector.</p>
THE NETHERLANDS	<p><u>Immigration and Naturalisation Service of Netherlands (IND)</u>, subordinated to the Ministry of Justice and Security<sup>102</sup>, issues work permits and the Public Register of Recognised Sponsors willing to hire employees from abroad.</p>	<p>The <u>Ministry for Education, Culture and Science</u> is responsible for setting the legislative framework law.</p> <p><u>Vocational schools</u> now benefit from decisive local autonomy and have full responsibility in staffing, setting educational programs, organising learning and co-operation with other partners<sup>103</sup>.</p> <p>Programs are designed jointly with <u>local companies</u> to correspond better to regional circumstances and needs.</p>	<p><u>Municipal job centres</u> have considerable leeway in designing programs specifically to meet local needs.</p>	<p>The <u>Netherlands Organisation for International Cooperation in Higher Education (Nuffic)</u> takes in charge recognition of qualifications.</p> <p>The <u>Foundation for Cooperation on Vocational Education, Training and Labour Market (SBB)</u> appointed by the ministry of Education, Culture and Science and the ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, evaluate qualifications obtained abroad.</p> <p><u>Industrial branches, trade unions and employers' organisations</u> have joined efforts through sectoral collective bargaining to establish 140 training and development funds (O&amp;O-fondsen) used to support employees' educational opportunities and to assessment their competences<sup>104</sup>.</p>

# Annex B. Education sector: migrant rights and allocations of competences

Table 3. Migrants' access to education

RR: Refugees  
 EU: Migrants originating from European Union countries  
 Non-EU: Migrants originating from countries outside the European Union

Country	1.1 Primary education	2.1 Secondary Education	3.1 Tertiary education	4.1 Language classes	5.1 Early child care
AUSTRIA	Compulsory from 6 to 15 years old, regardless of title <sup>105</sup> .		<p><b>EU:</b> Equal access (free of charge likewise to any other citizen).</p> <p><b>RR:</b> equal access, but preparatory studies (Vorbereitungsstudium) might be conditional and cost 450 euros<sup>106</sup>.</p> <p><b>TCN:</b> have to pay tuition fees (726.72 EUR per semester). Preparatory studies (Vorbereitungsstudium) are conditional for non-Austrian-citizens and cost 1150 euros<sup>107</sup>.</p>	<p><b>RR, TCN:</b> compulsory as part of the integration agreement signed with the Austrian Integration authority (Österreichischer Integrationsfonds, ÖIF) upon arrival, which compels newly arrived to obtain at least a language level of A2 in German after two years of residence<sup>108</sup>. Participation in language classes is thus compulsory for these groups of migrants. Courses' fees can be reimbursed on a case-by-case basis by local authorities.</p> <p><b>EU:</b> ÖIF classes are also open to migrants from EEA and Switzerland.</p> <p><b>RR, TCN, EU:</b> Mother-tongue teaching is available in schools. In 2017/2018, these lessons were held in 26 languages.</p>	<p>Available to all children over one year old legally residing in Austria.</p> <p>The last year of kindergarten (children aged 5 years) is compulsory for all children whose main residence is Austria and parents do not have to pay fees for 20 hours per week (since 2010)<sup>109,110</sup>.</p> <p>Some provinces offer additional free childcare for certain age groups.</p>

Country	1.1 Primary education	2.1 Secondary Education	3.1 Tertiary education	4.1 Language classes	5.1 Early child care
CANADA	<p><b>RR, TCN, EU:</b> Depending on the province or territory, children may start at the age of 5 or 6 and continue until they are between 16 and 18.</p> <p>Adults who have not completed elementary or secondary education can take adult education programs.</p>		<p><b>RR, TCN, EU:</b> Foreign students can study in Canada if they are enrolled at a designated learning institution and they have enough money to pay for their tuition fees, living expenses and return transportation. Foreign credential recognition is compulsory.</p> <p><b>RR:</b> After one year, refugees who receive permanent resident status upon arrival, are eligible to apply for the same grants available to any other permanent residents or Canadian citizen<sup>111</sup>.</p>	<p><b>RR, TCN, EU:</b> Since 1992 free English language classes (Language Instruction for Newcomers to Canada (LINC)) and French ones (Cours de langue pour les immigrants au Canada (CLIC))<sup>112</sup> are available for permanent residents and refugees. Not eligible people have different options depending on their province or territory. Some offer language classes to temporary workers, students or new citizens.</p>	<p>No universal access. For those with a valid work permit, Immigration Canada will issue a permit to children within each respective family allowing them to register for free in a public school.</p> <p>Cost: Subsidies exist for people who can find a day space (RR, TCN, EU).</p> <p>Quebec is the only province to have a universal child daycare program, where the cost of daycare is subsidised.</p> <p>The federal government has recently signed agreements with most of the provinces and territories to significantly reduce the cost of early learning and childcare and increase the number of caretakers and early learning educators<sup>113</sup>.</p>
FRANCE	<p>Compulsory (since 2019) for every child from 3 to 16 years old regardless of residence title.</p> <p><b>RR:</b> Contribution to expenses related to children's schooling, canteen, or transport are available.</p> <p><b>EU,TCN,RR:</b> Teaching units for newcomer allophone students provide mainstream classes and language support</p>		<p>Open to foreigners, provided that they have the baccalauréat or equivalent, and level B2 in French.</p> <p><b>RR:</b> benefit from a reduction/exemption on registration fees and universities reserve places for them.</p>	<p><b>RR,TCN:</b> The "Republican Integration Contract" (CIR) binds them to reach the objective level A1 (from 200 up to 600 hours of classes).</p>	<p>Unconditional free access for all children between 3 and 5 years old<sup>114</sup>.</p>
GERMANY	<p>Compulsory regardless of residence title starting from 6 years old.</p>		<p>Migrants can apply for access to tertiary education but might have to provide proof that they have successfully completed some course modules at a higher education institution or pass a test, and prove that they have a sufficient command of the German language.</p> <p><b>RR:</b> Since 2015, exempted from presenting (in full) their educational certificates to gain admission to higher education.</p> <p><b>RR:</b> if they do not have the necessary qualifications, they can attend a free foundation course to prepare for the university qualification assessment examination<sup>115</sup>.</p> <p><b>RR:</b> German universities are eligible to apply for funding from the German Academic Exchange Services in order to help cover the cost of integrating young refugees<sup>116</sup>.</p>	<p><b>RR:</b> federal integration courses (Integrationskurse), composed of 600 hours of official language and 60 hours of orientation courses, are compulsory since the Immigration Act of 2005.</p> <p><b>EU,TCN:</b> may have access to federal integration courses, but do not have legal right since 2005.</p>	<p>Early childhood education is optional.</p> <p>As soon as a child is one year old he has a legal right to a place in a kindergarten or day-care centre (since 2013). This also applies to children with a temporary residence permit.</p>

Country	1.1 Primary education	2.1 Secondary Education	3.1 Tertiary education	4.1 Language classes	5.1 Early child care
IRELAND	Compulsory from 6 to 16 years old <sup>117</sup> .  <b>RR, TCN, EU:</b> Extra resources exist in schools for non-English-speaking children, who can have free access to mother tongue supports <sup>118</sup> .		<b>TCN:</b> are granted student permit if enrolled in a full-time course on the Interim List of Eligible Programmes and if can prove university fees have been paid and that they have at least €7,000 available per year to cover for their expenses, as well as evidence of private health insurance <sup>119</sup> . <b>RR:</b> have the same right to access education and training as Irish citizens. They are entitled to free tertiary education if they have been living in Ireland for 3 years or more <sup>120</sup> . <b>EU:</b> The new Migrant Integration Strategy (2017-2020) extends free fees initiative for third level education. Certain Non EU nationals and RR are also deemed to meet the nationality requirement of the Scheme <sup>121</sup> .	<b>RR:</b> Adults are entitled to free English language and literacy classes <sup>122</sup> .  In the absence of a national strategy, publicly funded English language provision has developed organically, on a part-time basis, dependent on the initiative of local Education and Training Board providers, and in response to demands at local level <sup>123</sup> .	The Free Pre-school Year in Early Childhood Care and Education programme (ECCE) grants free and universal two-year programme to all children between 2 and 5 years old <sup>124</sup> . More than three-quarters of all children attend private institutions <sup>125</sup> . <b>RR:</b> childcare funding is provided to enable parents to be free to attend language and orientation courses within their reception centre for 60 weeks <sup>126</sup> .
ITALY	Compulsory, free and universal from the age of 6 years old up to 16 years old <sup>127</sup> . Qualified teachers of Italian as well as cultural mediators are meant to be present in each school with foreign pupils.		All migrants can access tertiary education under some conditions. They must send a pre-registration request to the chosen University, delivering it to the Italian diplomatic consular representation in their country or to the administrative office of the University, in the case of refugees. International students are not entitled to tuition-free education.	Since 2012, all applicants for long-term residence permits must sign the Integration Agreement with the Italian State. Migrants commit to acquire within two years A2 level knowledge of Italian <sup>128</sup> .	Childcare is available to all children living in Italy, regardless of nationality. A 2015 law aims to generalise access to preschool for all children.
NEW ZEALAND	Compulsory and universal from 6 to 16 years old. Free for domestic students up to 19 years of age (visa holders are classified as domestic students).		Migrants can access tertiary education but must live in New Zealand for at least three years before they are eligible to apply for student loans. The Refugee Study Grant has been abolished in 2010 but individual university initiative exist.	English for speakers of other languages (ESOL): students qualify for funding if they are migrants to New Zealand, or they have a refugee background, or they are New Zealand-born students with at least 1 parent of migrant or refugee background (only eligible in years 0 to 4) <sup>129</sup> . <b>RR:</b> Refugees receive more intensive funding support for the first two years of English language learning, followed by three years of standard funding <sup>130</sup> . <b>RR:</b> The Centre for Refugee Education provides an on-arrival 6-week education programme for the 1000 refugees who come to New Zealand each year under the government quota scheme.	New Zealand offers integrated programmes that include education and childcare services <sup>131</sup> . There is no legal entitlement to a place in ECEC but all children aged 3-5 years have fully subsidised access to pre-primary education/ECEC for up to 20 hours per week <sup>132</sup> . The government subsidises children who attend Early Children Education for up to 6 hours a day (a total of 30 hours per week).

Country	1.1 Primary education	2.1 Secondary Education	3.1 Tertiary education	4.1 Language classes	5.1 Early child care
SPAIN	Compulsory and universal for all children under 16 registered in the Padron <sup>133</sup> .		The access requirements consist of: (1) Specific tests or being in possession of a specific certificate; (2) Homologation or validation of the studies of the country of origin. Few universities have put in place plans to facilitate the access of refugee students to university, as requested by the Conference of Rectors of Spanish Universities 2015. Foreign students studying in Spain have the possibility to apply to certain scholarships offered by public bodies (Ministry of Education, City Councils, Autonomous Communities) and private bodies (Foundations, Banks, etc.). Some universities also offer scholarship for foreigners.	Spain is not currently implementing a national integration programme for third-country nationals on its own, but funds are annually earmarked through a call for tenders <sup>134</sup> .	ECEC is available to all 0 to 6 year-old children. It is of voluntary nature and it is divided between a first (ages 0 to 3 years) and second cycle (ages 3 to 6 years), which is free <sup>135</sup> .
SWEDEN	Compulsory and universal from 6 to 16 years old <sup>136</sup> . In some places, children of migrants can access classes in their mother tongue.		<b>RR, TCN, EU:</b> can apply to Swedish universities like national citizens. <b>TCN:</b> have to pay an application fee (900 SEK) and tuition fees. The amount of tuition fees differs depending on the university.	<b>RR, TCN, EU:</b> The language class SFI (Swedish for Immigrants) is open to all residents in Sweden. <b>RR, TCN, EU:</b> Swedish for professionals classes is Swedish education with a focus on professional language. The courses are free for students and paid for by some municipalities <sup>137</sup> . "Better Language Development in Preschools" reform was introduced in 2019 to strengthen and stimulate the learning of Swedish language.	Preschool is offered to all parents who are legally residing in Sweden for children ages one to five. It is not free of charge and the amount of municipal subsidy for preschool depends on the child's age and whether the parents work, study, are unemployed or on parental leave for other children <sup>138</sup> .
THE NETHERLANDS	Compulsory regardless of residence title between the ages of 5 and 16 <sup>139</sup> . Since 2006, primary and secondary schools must contribute to the integration of their students since 2006.		Migrants have equal access to apply to university. Applicants from outside the EU must demonstrate that they are able to provide financially for themselves for at least one year <sup>140</sup> .	<b>TCN (with exceptions), RR:</b> are provided "Integration courses", which include Dutch language training free of charge <sup>141</sup> . After three years of stay, refugees are obliged to take a "Civic Integration Examination", which also test command of Dutch language. The is planning to increase the language requirement for the application of a permit 'humanitarian non-temporary' and 'permanent stay', as well as applications for naturalisation, from level A2 to level B1. However, the change in language requirement to level B1 will probably not occur in 2022 <sup>142</sup> .	Childcare is accessible to all parents who are legal residents. It is not free of charge but residents, EU citizens or Non-UE citizens having a work or a residence permit are eligible for child-care benefits <sup>143</sup> . Some ECEC focus on children from 2,5 till 5 years old who are at risk of an educational disadvantage <sup>144</sup> .

Table 4. Competent authority for education policy

Country	1.2 Primary education	2.2 Secondary Education	3.2 Tertiary education	4.2 Language classes	5.2 Early child care
<b>AUSTRIA</b>	<p>The Federal Ministry of Education, Science and Research has competence for funding and supervising the entire educational system of general and vocational schools, and for all University Colleges of Teacher Education<sup>145</sup>.</p> <p><u>Länder</u> are competent in making laws to implement the national framework for primary and secondary education<sup>146</sup>. Some have implemented after school preparatory classes for migrant children or summer language classes in schools.</p> <p>Under the 2017 <i>Autonomiepakt</i> (autonomy-pact), <u>schools</u> have more autonomy in choosing class sizes, determination of lecture times, opening hours, cooperation with other schools, staff recruitment and training.</p>	<p>The Federal Ministry of Education, Science and Research has competence for funding and supervising the entire educational system<sup>147</sup>.</p> <p><u>Public universities</u> are autonomous and negotiate their performance agreements with the federal ministry. Before 2002, universities were state agencies managed by the federal ministry<sup>148</sup>. The federal ministry and public universities now negotiate goals and funding based on “institutional strategic plans”.</p> <p><u>Universities of applied sciences (UAS)</u> are organised as public-private partnerships with the aim of facilitating innovation in study programmes. The <u>private sector</u> can participate in the design and delivery of higher education. <u>Provincial and municipal governments</u> are closely involved in several UAS governing boards<sup>149</sup>.</p>	<p>The <u>ÖIF</u>, which is under the supervision of the Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs is in charge of language classes as part of the integration agreement signed by recognized refugees and third-country nationals, which compels them to obtain at least an A2 level in German after two years of residence<sup>150</sup>.</p> <p>The ÖIF is in charge of the Mentoring for Migrants program in cooperation with the <u>the Federal chamber of commerce (WKO)</u> and the <u>Public Employment Service (AMS)</u><sup>151</sup>.</p> <p>Additional language learning initiatives, which include parents outreach, are delivered in early childcare facilities by <u>municipalities</u>.</p>	<p>Governance of the childcare system is highly decentralised. Legislation and implementation are exclusively within the authority of the nine <u>federal Länder</u><sup>152</sup>.</p> <p><u>Municipalities</u> are providers of early childcare services, along with <u>associations, religious-affiliated organizations</u> or – to a smaller extent - <u>private companies</u>. Municipalities also monitor occupancy;</p> <p><u>The Federal Ministry of Education, Science and Research</u> is in charge of training early childhood education teachers and promoting the educational character of early childhood education.</p>	
<b>CANADA</b>	<p>No ministry or department of education at the federal level<sup>153</sup>. <u>Provincial and territorial governments</u> have exclusive responsibility since 1867 for all levels of education (except adult education). In the 10 provinces and 3 territories, departments or ministries of education are responsible for the organisation, delivery, and assessment of postsecondary education.</p> <p>Some provinces and territories have separate departments or ministries: one having responsibility for elementary-secondary education and another for postsecondary education, adult learning, and skills training<sup>154</sup>. In 2017, 33% of decisions in lower secondary education were under the responsibility of the Provincial level and most of the rest is devolved to either <u>local administrations or schools</u><sup>155</sup>.</p>	<p><u>Publicly funded universities</u> are largely autonomous; they set their own admissions standards and degree requirements and have considerable flexibility in the management of their financial affairs and program offerings. Both the <u>federal government</u> and the <u>provincial or territorial governments</u> have programs that provide low-cost loans, grants and scholarships for students.</p>	<p><u>The federal government</u> through Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) funds free language classes (LINC and CLIC)<sup>156</sup>.</p> <p>Not eligible people have different options depending on their province or territory. Some offer language classes to temporary workers, students or new citizens.</p>	<p><u>Provinces and territories</u> have full legal power to oversee ECEC. Some provinces and territories have separate departments or ministries: one having responsibility for elementary-secondary education and another for postsecondary education, adult learning, and skills training. As of June 2021, eight provinces and territories have placed early childhood learning and development under the umbrella of education<sup>157</sup>.</p> <p><u>The federal government</u> recently signed agreements with most provinces and territories to significantly reduce the cost of</p>	



Country	1.2 Primary education	2.2 Secondary Education	3.2 Tertiary education	4.2 Language classes	5.2 Early child care
					early learning and childcare <sup>158</sup> .
FRANCE	<p>The <u>Ministry of National Education</u> is responsible for the school system<sup>159</sup>.</p> <p><u>Municipal authorities</u> are responsible for the operation of primary classes.</p>		<p>The <u>Ministry of National Education</u> is responsible for the school system<sup>160</sup>.</p> <p><u>Regional authorities</u> are responsible for the general planning of training, the operation of high schools, vocational high schools, and establishments for special education.</p> <p><u>Departmental authorities</u> are responsible for the operation<sup>161</sup> of ordinary secondary schools.</p>	<p>The <u>Ministry of Higher Education, Research and Innovation</u> is responsible for tertiary education and research.</p> <p><u>ENIC-NARIC France</u> centres can deliver document attesting to the level of studies followed and validated in foreign countries.</p>	<p>The “<u>French Immigration and Integration Office</u>” (OFII) is responsible within the Ministry of Interior for organising, financing, and monitoring language learning under the CIR.</p> <p><u>Employment centre (Pôle emploi), departmental Council, Centre communal d'action social (CCAS) and local mission</u> provide language training.</p>
GERMANY	<p>The <u>16 Länder and the federal government</u> jointly govern education.</p> <p>The <u>Länder</u> take most schooling decisions (: organisation, planning, management and supervision of the entire school system, as well as teacher recruitment and remuneration). In 2017, 63% of decisions in lower secondary education were under the responsibility of the Länder, compared to 10% at state level on average across the OECD<sup>162</sup>. Several Länder have implemented preparatory classes for newcomer migrants to prepare migrants for regular classes.</p> <p><u>Municipalities</u> must ensure that a well-balanced choice of education is available in their area<sup>163</sup>.</p> <p>Classes are implemented by</p>	<p>The university education are mainly in the remit of the <u>Länder</u>.</p> <p>The <u>Federal Ministry of Education and Research</u> also plays a significant role - for example through award of scholarships or since 2014 by ensuring funding to universities. It provides special programs and grants to support universities accepting refugee students such as the German Academic Exchange Services.</p> <p><u>Higher education institution</u> enjoy a considerable amount of autonomy although there is some variation between Länder, both in terms of legislation and standards of practice. To balance institutional autonomy with</p>	<p>Integration courses are offered by over 1,300 local language schools and are funded by the <u>Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF)</u>.</p> <p><u>Municipalities</u> and <u>third sector actors</u> have completed the federal offer, especially when federal courses were at capacity, excluding European migrants and third-country nationals, in 2015/2016 for example.</p> <p><b>RR:</b> By 2019, the <u>German Federal Ministry of Education and Research</u> had launched two programs, at a cost of 100 million Euros, to improve the availability of language courses<sup>164</sup>.</p>	<p>The ECEC sector is governed through the <u>Federal Ministry of Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth (BMFSFJ)</u> and corresponding <u>Länder-level ministries</u><sup>165</sup>.</p> <p>National and Länder authorities are responsible for setting minimum standards, such as space requirements, staff qualifications and child-staff ratios. Länder develop their own curricula based on a national Common Framework for Early Education.</p> <p><u>Municipalities</u> are competent to implement it.</p> <p>Yet, German pre-school education is largely offered by <u>privately-run day-care centres</u> that appear to have considerable autonomy. In 2018, at just over 3%, the share of German ECEC centre leaders reporting that the local, regional or national authorities had significant responsibility in making decisions regarding staff appointment or dismissal<sup>166</sup>.</p>	<p><u>Municipal authorities</u> are responsible for the operation of pre-school classes.</p>

Country	1.2 Primary education	2.2 Secondary Education	3.2 Tertiary education	4.2 Language classes	5.2 Early child care
	schools under municipalities' supervision, which can complement Länder's approach by providing social workers, school psychologists, migration advisors, media and cultural educators, etc. as well as educational partnerships with venues for extracurricular activities such as theatres, museums and libraries.	policy coherence, Länder conduct multi-annual target agreements negotiated with HEI. Since 2015, universities have launched programs and initiatives to facilitate access of newly arrived migrants to their curricula, such as language classes or mentor-activities, relying on volunteers from the university.			
IRELAND	<p>Schools and the central government take almost all educational decisions with only a very limited regional layer of educational administration<sup>167</sup>. In 2015, schools took responsibility for 85% of decisions related to curriculum, and 51% for resource-related matters<sup>168</sup>.</p> <p>The Minister for Education and Skills defines the curriculum with the advice of the National Council for Curriculum and Assessment (NCCA). The NCCA leads developments in curriculum and assessment and supports the implementation of changes resulting from this work<sup>169</sup>.</p> <p>The Department of Education supports the development of overall policy relating to assessment, curricula, and guidance by providing syllabuses, guidelines for teachers, circulars to schools, prescribed material for the examinations as well as financial support<sup>170</sup>.</p>		<p>The Minister for Education and Skills sets policies, identifies objectives and outcomes and determines overall funding for the sector<sup>171</sup>.</p> <p>The Higher Education Authority (HEA) oversees compliance with governance requirements, allocates funding to Higher Education Institutions, ensures accountability for funding and resolves governance issues<sup>172</sup>. It advises the Minister on the development of higher education and research and is accountable to the Minister for the achievement of national outcomes<sup>173</sup>.</p> <p>The Higher Education Institutions are separate, corporate entities with substantial autonomy in law and in practice. They are accountable, through the HEA, to the State.</p>	<p>Some Education and Training Board (ETB) provide language courses in response to demands at local level<sup>174</sup>.</p> <p>The Department of Education and Skills is responsible of the education part of the Migrant Integration Strategy (2017-2020). It provides additional educational resources for pupils who are learning English as an additional language in primary and post-primary schools.</p> <p>The Further Education and Training Authority SOLAS distributes further education and training grants to the ETBs through a strategic funding process covering all of their further education and training programmes, including adult literacy<sup>175</sup>.</p>	The Department of Children, Equality, Disability, Integration and Youth administers the free Pre-School Year scheme <sup>176</sup> .
ITALY	<p>Municipalities are responsible for the provision of primary education<sup>177</sup>. In order to improve services, small municipalities sometimes join as consortia or associations of municipalities.</p> <p>Schools have a high degree of autonomy: they define curricula,</p>		<p>Since 1989, universities are autonomous and can define their own governance structure and internal organisation, develop their own mission and strategy, plan programmes and award degrees, develop their own research</p>	<p>The Provincial Centres for Adult Education (CPIA) are autonomous school institutions, divided into territorial networks, usually on a provincial basis, in accordance with regional school</p>	<p>Municipalities are responsible for the provision of pre-school<sup>182</sup>. In order to improve services, small municipalities sometimes join as consortia or associations of municipalities.</p>

Country	1.2 Primary education	2.2 Secondary Education	3.2 Tertiary education	4.2 Language classes	5.2 Early child care
	widen the educational offer, organise teaching (school time and groups of pupils) and every three years draw up their own 'three-year educational offer plan' (Piano triennale dell'offerta formativa). As regards the admission of foreigners and refugees at local level, the role played by individual educational institutions is very important.		activities, and engage in economic and social activities and contributions to communities and territories <sup>178</sup> . The Association of European Universities has listed 15 Italian universities developing actions to improve refugee access to higher education <sup>179</sup> .	planning. All foreigners, from the age of sixteen, can access specific language training courses <sup>180</sup> . The teaching of the Italian language can also be improved within <u>reception centres</u> : the SPRAR and CAS systems <sup>181</sup> .	
NEW ZEALAND	<u>The Ministry of Education</u> sets out priorities and direction for education agencies and providers in the field of early learning, primary, secondary and tertiary education. It also funds state-schools, notably to develop programmes that best meet the identified needs of students from non-English speaking backgrounds. <u>Schools</u> in New Zealand are among the most autonomous schools across OECD countries. Since 1988, there has been a devolution of management responsibilities to schools along with increased power for the Ministry to intervene in failing schools since 2001 <sup>183</sup> .		<u>Universities</u> are autonomous, publicly funded institutions <sup>184</sup> .  <u>The Tertiary Education Commission (TEC)</u> funds and monitors their performance. TEC is accountable to <u>the Minister for Tertiary Education, Skills and Employment</u> <sup>185</sup> .	<u>The Government</u> provides funding to NGOs to provide English language and support services to adult refugees <sup>186</sup> .	Responsibilities for funding, monitoring, curriculum development and setting minimum regulatory standards are at the national level <sup>187</sup> .
SPAIN	Education is regulated at the national level and provided at the regional level <sup>188</sup> .  <u>Ministries (or departments) of the 17 autonomous communities</u> are free to develop and manage their education systems within the bounds of the national policy framework <sup>189</sup> .  Municipalities have no direct governance of schools, even though the Autonomous Communities can agree on the delegation of management competences for certain education services <sup>190</sup> .		<u>Universities</u> operate independently, regardless of whether they are public or private <sup>191</sup> . Some have established programs for the incorporation of refugee students as well as Spanish classes for migrants. Some also developed private scholarships with a limited number of places for people with matching profiles <sup>192</sup> .  Apart from some national research funding, <u>autonomous communities</u> distribute the public funding that public universities receive based mostly on enrolments.	In absence of a national programme, several programmes deployed by <u>autonomous communities and municipalities</u> provide language courses <sup>193</sup> .  In addition, <u>the Ministry of Education through the Cervantes Institutes</u> , provides specific Spanish courses accessible to migrants <sup>194</sup> .	<u>Education departments of the Autonomous Communities and municipalities</u> are responsible for ECEC.  The <u>state and regional educational bodies</u> establish the educational guidelines <sup>195</sup> .

Country	1.2 Primary education	2.2 Secondary Education	3.2 Tertiary education	4.2 Language classes	5.2 Early child care
SWEDEN	<p>The <u>central government</u> holds overall responsibility is in charge of developing curriculum, national objectives and guidelines.</p> <p>The <u>Ministry of Education and Research</u> is responsible for the government's education and research policies. The ministry works on issues including school performance, conditions for teachers and study financing<sup>196</sup>.</p> <p><u>Municipalities</u> implement national legislative framework and set up schools. Some offer classes for migrants children in their mother tongue (i.e. in Berglund).</p>		<p>The <u>central level</u> holds overall responsibility for higher education and research, and decides on the goals, regulations and allocation of resources. Education and research are the remit of the Ministry of Education and Research<sup>197</sup>.</p> <p>Within these parameters, <u>universities</u> remain separate state entities and make their own decisions about the content of courses, admissions, grades and other related issues. They also have some autonomy to decide on their own organisation and allocation of resources<sup>198</sup>.</p>	<p><u>Komvux</u> and <u>Folkuniversitetet</u> offers Swedish for Immigrants education in Swedish for immigrants.</p> <p><u>Municipalities</u> apply for grants from the "Better Language Development in Preschools" program to increase participation in preschools, on language development efforts and for staff training<sup>199</sup>.</p>	<p><u>Municipalities</u> provide preschool services<sup>200</sup>.</p>
THE NETHERLANDS	<p>Overall responsibility for the education system lies with the State, specifically the <u>Minister of Education, Culture and Science</u><sup>201</sup>.</p> <p><u>Municipalities</u> implement national policies in cooperation with school boards. They are responsible for school buildings and allocate additional funding to support pupils who require extra support<sup>202</sup>.</p> <p>The general trend since 2013 is to give <u>educational institutions</u> more autonomy to implement government policies<sup>203</sup>.</p>		<p>Government-funded institutions are funded by the <u>Ministry of Education, Culture and Science</u><sup>204</sup>.</p> <p>The general trend since 2013 is to give <u>educational institutions</u> more autonomy to implement government policies<sup>205</sup>. Universities may for instance apply for residence permissions for third country nationals who wish to move to the Netherlands for their studies.</p>	<p>The <u>Institute for the Implementation of Education</u>, part of the Ministry of Education, coordinates the civic integration exams, and provides loans for participating to the integration courses<sup>206</sup>.</p> <p>The new Civic Integration Act that will come into effect in 2022 design municipalities as responsible for organising newcomers' integration, including regarding language trainings<sup>207</sup>.</p>	<p>The <u>Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment</u> is responsible for children in childcare and playgroups up to the age of 4; and the <u>Ministry of Education, Culture and Science</u> is responsible for children in kindergartens aged 4 and older, as well as for all targeted ECEC programmes for disadvantaged children<sup>208</sup>.</p> <p><u>Municipalities</u> are responsible for authorising and monitoring childcare facilities and implementing "before and early school education".</p>

## Annex C. Housing and health/welfare sectors: migrant rights and allocations of competences

Table 5. Migrant access to housing, health and welfare

RR: Refugees  
 EU: Migrants originating from European Union countries  
 Non-EU: Migrants originating from countries outside the European Union

Country	1.1 Temporary housing	2.1. Social housing	3.1. Health	4.1 Welfare benefits
AUSTRIA		<p><b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> According to the areas migrants can access social housing. In some municipalities, individuals must prove that their main residence was in the municipality for at least 2-4 years<sup>209</sup>.</p> <p><b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> Since 2019, foreigners can only apply for subsidized housing after legally residing in the country for at least five years<sup>210</sup> and after they have received a certificate of participation in integration measures and classes from the ÖIF.</p> <p><b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> Migrants can access counselling services to find long-term accommodation.</p>	<p><b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> Employed or self-employed individuals have to contribute to the health care system, regardless of residence title<sup>211</sup>. In doing so, the contributor receives full health care, which can be extended to his/her children and spouse.</p> <p><b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> Migrants who are recipients of unemployment benefits or social welfare allowances benefit from full basic healthcare coverage, on the same basis of Austrian citizens who are entitled to unemployment benefits or BMS schemes.</p> <p><b>TCN:</b> Those who neither have access to unemployment benefits or social welfare, nor are in work are not able to obtain public health care benefits. While they have to procure the full costs of insurance themselves, they can ask for reduction under specific circumstances. Some un-bureaucratic and free medical care services</p>	<p><b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> can access maternity benefits under exactly the same conditions as those applied for resident nationals<sup>212</sup>.</p> <p><b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> Families with children usually receive family support, independently of the employment status and prior contributions. Austrian citizenship is not an eligibility requirement for parent or child<sup>213</sup>. Recipient(s) can receive family support even if the child physically lives in the EU/EEA/Switzerland, as long as the main financier of the child's livelihood resides in Austria.</p> <p><b>RR:</b> have access to student allowances for primary and secondary education on the same basis as Austrian citizens.</p> <p><b>EU:</b> have access if their country of origin is under the European Convention on Social and Medical Assistance.<sup>214</sup></p> <p><b>TCN:</b> have access to student allowances if one parent was liable to income tax in Austria for at least 5 years and also lived in Austria for five years.</p> <p><b>EU, TCN:</b> Since 2019 foreigners can only apply for Guaranteed minimum resources (BMS) after five years of residence in Austria<sup>215</sup>. This income support scheme provides a certain minimum level of support for those who do not have access to other funds or to social benefits through the employment-</p>

Country	1.1 Temporary housing	2.1. Social housing	3.1. Health	4.1 Welfare benefits
			also exist.  <b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> Migrants can access special counselling	based social insurance system <sup>216</sup> . It is subject to Landers' legislation, introducing some extent of variation across states. Some places have additional requirements for foreigners, such as participation in language and orientation courses in Lower Austria or different residence requirements (residence permit for more than 4 months in Carinthia <sup>217</sup> ) <sup>218</sup> .
<b>CANADA</b>	<b>RR:</b> The Resettlement Assistance Program for refugees provides temporary accommodation <sup>219</sup> , as well as intensive assistance in searching for permanent housing and help to move in.	<b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> Some municipalities and local nonprofits set up Housing portals that allow private individuals and property owners to offer suitable and affordable housing to newcomers <sup>220</sup> . <b>RR:</b> waiting lists for subsidized social housing are open to refugees who meet criteria based on income or special needs, such as major health issues or disabilities, as they are to any other permanent resident or Canadian citizen.	<b>RR:</b> can access the Interim Federal Health Program (IFHP) that provides limited, temporary coverage of health-care benefits. <b>RR:</b> those selected for resettlement can benefit from pre-departure medical services before they leave for Canada <sup>221</sup> .	<b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> After a waiting period of 3 months, newcomers become eligible to the federal-provincial benefit for low-income families with minor children <sup>222</sup> . <b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> Foreigners can benefit from the Working Income Supplement, paid to low-income families with at least one dependent child, if they have resident of Canada for income tax purposes throughout the year. <b>RR:</b> Refugees referred for resettlement benefit from one year of financial support <sup>223</sup> .
<b>FRANCE</b>	<b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> Regular foreigners can benefit from emergency accommodation on the same basis as French citizens. <b>RR:</b> The temporary accommodation centres (CPH) provide 8710 places for refugees for a duration of 9 months <sup>224</sup> . However, most of these centres are oversubscribed and families face difficulties in finding accommodation <sup>225</sup> .	<b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> Regular foreigners can apply for social housing on the same basis as French citizens. <b>TCN:</b> Migrant workers' home (FTM) target lone workers in possession of a valid residence permit <sup>226</sup> .	<b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> Anyone who works or lives in France in a stable and regular manner, or has a refugee status, has access to the basic and supplementary Universal Health Care Cover. <b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> the "Health pathways of migrants and newcomers" programme aims to inform, prevent, screen, orientate and integrate into the common law health care system <sup>227</sup> . <b>RR, TCN:</b> Medical examination is imposed on people admitted in France.	<b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> The "Housing Solidarity Fund" provides financial assistance to people who have difficulties paying for housing expenses, without any prior condition of residence in the department <sup>228</sup> . <b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> Foreign nationals may claim certain social benefits paid on the principle of legal residence, independently of any exercise of an economic activity. <b>TCN:</b> must have had a residence permit allowing them to work for at least 5 years, or 10 years in some cases, to benefit from these benefits: <i>Revenu de solidarité active</i> (RSA), a benefit for unemployed people <i>Prime d'activité</i> , a monthly bonus which helps workers with low revenues <sup>229</sup> <i>Allocation de Solidarité aux Personnes Âgées</i> (ASPA), a benefit for elderly people <i>Allocation Supplémentaire d'Invalidité</i> (ASI), a benefit for disability Family allowances, provided that their children live with them in France.

Country	1.1 Temporary housing	2.1. Social housing	3.1. Health	4.1 Welfare benefits
GERMANY	Temporary housing is available to asylum seekers only.	<p><b>RR:</b> have universal access to social housing  <b>EU, TCN:</b> can access these services if their main residence is in Germany and have residence permission.  <b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> migrants can access services to assist them in finding an apartment, at the local level.  <b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> "Integration im Quartier" (Social Integration in the Neighborhood) was launched in 2017.</p>	<p><b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> Migrants have access to common law healthcare. The German healthcare system is based on a solidarity model and it is mandatory for everyone residing in Germany to have a health insurance.  <b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> Intercultural training enable medical staff to improve migrant access to medical services</p>	<p><b>RR:</b> can access rent top-ups and family allowances  <b>EU, TCN:</b> can access rent top-ups and family allowances if they have proof of their main residence being in Germany and have residence permission.</p>
IRELAND	<b>RR:</b> The Irish Refugee protection programme provides accommodation in Emergency Reception and Orientation Centres and housing once refugees' status is confirmed.		<p><b>RR:</b> The Irish Refugee protection programme provides free medical care in public hospitals and an assigned doctor.  <b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> The Second National Intercultural Health Strategy (2018-2023) provides a comprehensive and integrated approach to addressing the many unique, health and support needs experienced by the increasing numbers of health service users from diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds and who live in Ireland.</p>	<p><b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> To access the following benefits migrants fulfil the Habitual Residence Condition<sup>230</sup>, which means that applicants must show they are both resident in and have a proven close link to Ireland:  Housing Assistance Payments are made by local authorities on behalf of the recipient directly to the landlord. The recipient will then pay a rent contribution to the local authority. The rent contribution is based on income and the ability to pay.  Rent Supplement payments are paid to people living in private rented housing who cannot pay the full rent themselves<sup>231</sup>.</p>
ITALY		<p><b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> All migrants having a regular residence permit of at least two years, and a regular job, can access public housing under the same condition as Italians<sup>232</sup>.  <b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> Public Residential Housing (ERP) are publicly owned dwellings rented out to individuals or families in need.  <b>RR:</b> The 2017 National Integration Plan for People Entitled to International Protection aims at ensuring that regional or local residential housing plans include paths for people entitled to protection who are exiting from the reception system<sup>233</sup>.</p>	<p><b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> All citizens of States not belonging to the European Union, legally resident in Italy and registered with the National Health Service (SSN), are guaranteed parity of treatment and full equality of rights and duties, in line with Italian citizens.  <b>RR:</b> The 2017 National Integration Plan for People Entitled to International Protection notably aims at:  Defining specific pathways dedicated to each clinical condition, with particular attention to psychiatric cases and PTSD, by augmenting the number of free services offered  Increasing the use of intercultural staff and cultural mediators in health clinics and hospitals</p>	<p><b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> The citizenship income<sup>234</sup> accessible to TCN and refugees having a long-term residence permit and having lived at least 10 years in Italy of which the last two years continuously.  <b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> The social allowance is granted to EU citizens registered in the registry office of their municipality of residence, non-EU citizens with an EC long-term residence permit<sup>235</sup> and foreign citizens or stateless people with refugee or subsidiary protection status. The allowance is suspended if the holder stays abroad for more than 29 days. One year after the suspension, the benefit is withdrawn<sup>236</sup>.  <b>RR, EU, TCN:</b> Household allowance are available to domestic workers and employed domestic workers.</p>

Country	1.1 Temporary housing	2.1. Social housing	3.1. Health	4.1 Welfare benefits
NEW ZEALAND	RR: Through the resettlement program refugees stay at the Mangere Refugee Resettlement Centre in Auckland for 6 weeks <sup>237</sup> .	RR, EU, TCN: Government-subsidized social housing is accessible to New Zealand citizens or permanent residents.  RR: Suitable furnished government-subsidised or private housing are reserved for quota refugees in their settlement communities for when they leave the Mangere Centre <sup>238</sup> .	RR, EU, TCN: Free or subsidized health and disability services are accessible to permanent residents, holders of a work visa lasting at least 2 years and refugees <sup>239</sup> .  RR: At the Mangere Refugee Resettlement Centre refugees receive comprehensive medical screening before becoming permanent residents eligible for funded health care <sup>240</sup> .  RR: can access Interpreting Services Language line when seeing a doctor or dentist or going to hospital.	RR, EU, TCN: The family allowance is accessible to parents, caregivers, and families with dependent children who meet the residency criteria.  RR, EU, TCN: The emergency maintenance allowance is an aid to single parents experiencing hardship who are not eligible for other benefits because of residency or age.  RR, EU, TCN: migrants aged 16 to 17 can access the Independent youth benefit if they have lived continuously in New Zealand for at least 24 months and must be in secondary education, in training, unemployed, sick, injured, disabled or pregnant.  RR: Quota refugees are eligible to receive an applicable benefit at the same rate as benefits provided to unemployed New Zealanders and may be eligible for additional assistance
SPAIN	RR: are hosted up to 6 months in Refugees Reception Centres (CARs) and by care facilities <sup>241,242</sup> .	RR, EU, TCN: Migrants can access social housing like nationals but there are few available places.	RR, EU, TCN: Residence permit in Spain gives automatic access to social security <sup>243</sup> .	RR: have access to social welfare under the same conditions as Spanish nationals <sup>244</sup> .  RR: receive financial support from the state when they live in the reception centres and a monthly allowance to cover during the first 6 months the costs of rent and living expenses after they move to private housings. Refugees can apply for an extension of the financial assistance if they have special needs or vulnerabilities, but the allowance can only be paid for a maximum of two years after their arrival <sup>245</sup> .
SWEDEN	Housing is considered a social right. RR: It is mandatory for municipalities to receive a specific number of refugees and organise their accommodation. Temporary solutions are most of the time offered.	RR, EU, TCN: Social housing is accessible to anyone who is aged 18+ and has a Swedish personal identity number or coordination number.	RR, EU, TCN: Health care rights are accessible to those who are registered in Sweden. Information in hospitals and i.e. waiting rooms and staff is increasingly multilingual.	RR, EU, TCN: Sick insurance, pensions and parental insurance and allowances to parents are accessible to migrants legally residing in Sweden, if they fulfil certain criteria.  RR, EU, TCN: Social benefits are accessible for those who are not eligible for unemployment benefits  RR: Introduction benefits are accessible for refugees who have just obtained a resident permit and are part of the "Introduction programme". Benefits may include housing allowances.
THE NETHERLANDS	Temporary Housing is only available for asylum seekers.	RR: Once refugees get their residence permit they must move to the municipality and house determined by the government. In principle, refugees cannot refuse this house.	RR, EU, TCN: Health insurance is compulsory for everyone in the Netherlands.  RR, EU, TCN: Health care benefits are available for people who are unable to pay the monthly contribution to the public health care system.  RR, EU, TCN: the national government does no longer provide interpretation services.	RR, EU, TCN: Welfare assistance is accessible to refugees as to any other citizens, and to EU citizens after 5 years of residence. Third country nationals with short or long-term residence permission can generally claim social welfare benefits like any other citizen.  RR, EU, TCN: Rent benefits are available to all legal residents over 18 years old. The only criterion for eligibility is income threshold (in 2019 less than €38,000 per year).



Table 6. Competent authority for housing, health and welfare policies

Country	Temporary housing	2.1 Social housing	3.1 Health	4.1 Welfare
AUSTRIA	<p>The federal government is in charge of temporary housing but delegates its implementation to <u>municipalities</u>, which work partly in co-operation with NGOs<sup>246</sup>.</p>	<p>Federal law and <u>Länders'</u> law regulate access to social housing.</p> <p><u>Municipalities</u> are traditionally competent for providing it<sup>247</sup>. They can apply different rules on TCNs' access as for example different lengths or required previous stay in their municipality.</p> <p>The ÖIF is in charge of attesting the "integration efforts" through the deliverance of a certificate needed by recognised refugees and third-country nationals to have equal access to social housing.</p> <p><u>Social housing</u> exists in the form of dwelling administered by limited profit housing associations and dwellings administered by municipalities (predominately in Vienna)<sup>248</sup>.</p>	<p>The Federal Ministry of Social Affairs, Health, Care and Consumer Protection designs the framework for access to basic health care. It acts as a coordinator between the most important stakeholders in the health care system<sup>249</sup>.</p> <p><u>Länder</u> are responsible for the operation of hospitals and pre-clinical emergency care (along with local authorities).</p> <p><u>Municipalities</u> play only a minor role as public payers and are not involved in financial governance and regulation<sup>250</sup>.</p> <p>In recent years, there has been a trend towards centralising planning through the development of national plans and targets, while concomitantly decentralising detailed planning and implementation.</p> <p>Overall, 31% of decisions in health care are taken by the central level of government, 53% by the regional one and 16% by other actors<sup>251</sup>.</p> <p>The Target-Based Governance Commission (B-ZK) defines legally binding targets for the health system and negotiates formal agreements between stakeholders<sup>252</sup>. It comprises all important health actors – the federal government, social health insurance funds and the Länder.</p>	<p>Benefits under social insurance law and general benefits are the responsibility of <u>the federal government</u>, while the <u>provinces and local authorities</u> are responsible for a major part of the housing, social services, childcare facilities and the means-tested minimum income<sup>253</sup>.</p> <p>The Federal Minister for Women, Family, Youth and Integration in the Federal Chancellery is in charge of youth welfare laws, policies for child-minders, family allowances and childcare benefits<sup>254</sup>.</p> <p>All levels of government - the federal government, Länder, and municipalities - may delegate tasks to <u>social welfare organisations</u>, such as Diakonie and Caritas.</p>
CANADA	<p><u>Newcomer service providers</u> deliver the Resettlement Assistance Program and are responsible for arranging temporary accommodation for refugees<sup>255</sup>.</p>	<p><u>Provinces and Territories</u> administer 80% of the agreements with social housing providers<sup>256</sup>.</p> <p>Some <u>municipalities</u> collaborate with <u>local non-profits</u> to set up housing portals that allow private individuals and property owners to offer suitable and affordable housing to newcomers.</p> <p>The Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) is Canada's national housing agency.</p>	<p>Health care is a shared responsibility between the <u>central and provincial governments</u>.</p> <p>14% of decisions in health care are taken by the central level of government against 86% by regional governments<sup>257</sup>.</p> <p>The Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship has discretion to provide full or partial coverage of health-care costs to an individual or group of individuals facing exceptional and compelling circumstances.</p>	<p>The <u>central government</u> provides income support through the Resettlement Assistance Program (RAP) while <u>the Provinces and Territories</u> have most of the responsibility for delivering healthcare and other social services<sup>258</sup>.</p>

FRANCE	<p>Prefects are responsible for the implementation of the right to emergency accommodation.</p> <p><u>French Office for Immigration and Integration (OFII)</u> coordinates within the Ministry of Interior the CPH managed by <u>public or private legal entities</u> and funded by the <u>State</u>.</p>	<p><u>Regions and departments</u> provide social housing. In some cases, <u>local authorities</u> can take these functions, for example in Ile-de-France.</p> <p>The <u>State, local authorities and Action Logement</u> (a scheme for employers' participation in the construction effort) finance social housing. Depending on the funding they provide, funders have quotas of reserved apartments, which they allocate to candidate tenants.</p> <p>The <u>Inter-ministerial Delegation for Accommodation and Access to Housing (DIHAL)</u> is responsible for piloting the national platform for refugee housing and the European resettlement programme<sup>259</sup>.</p> <p>The <u>social housing (HLM) organisations</u>, in return for public aid, build and manage social housing.</p> <p>The <u>municipalities</u> also have obligations to build social housing<sup>260</sup>.</p>	<p>The health system remains largely under the control of the <u>Ministry of Health and Social Affairs</u><sup>261</sup>.</p> <p>The <u>Regional Health Agencies (ARS)</u>, which represent the Ministry of Solidarity and Health in the regions, are responsible for implementing and adapting national policies to their regional characteristics.</p> <p>"Health pathways of migrants and newcomers" involve numerous actors: <u>associations, health professionals, Regional Health Agencies (ARS), health insurance funds, the Regional Departments of Youth, Sports and Social Cohesion (DRJSCS) and the departments of the Ministry of Solidarity and Health</u>.</p>	<p>In France, the minimum income scheme (RSA) is managed and financed by departmental councils and the State<sup>262</sup>.</p> <p>The family allowance funds (CAF) and the agricultural social security funds (MSA) receive, register and process applications, calculate entitlement (liquidation) and pay out the RSA. They may be delegated by the departmental councils to provide support to certain groups.<sup>263</sup></p> <p>The CAFs distribute the "Prime d'activité".</p> <p>The <u>Garantie Jeunes</u> is managed by a partnership between local missions, the State, firms and local partners. Local missions maintain a special relationship with Pôle emploi.</p>
GERMANY	<p><u>Länder</u> are responsible for temporary housing but delegate this task to <u>municipalities</u>.</p> <p>Since 2016, the <u>federal government</u> has reimbursed Länder for the costs of temporary housing for asylum seekers.</p>	<p>Responsibility for legislation on social housing promotion was transferred in 2006<sup>264</sup> from federal government to the <u>Länder</u><sup>265</sup>. Since then, Länder set own legislation in this area and have financial discretion of social housing promotion.</p> <p>Financial assistance by the <u>Federal Ministry of Interior, Construction and Community</u> is provided to Länder for the construction and maintenance of social housing.</p> <p><u>Municipalities</u> are in charge of implementing social housing/ long-term housing. They work with <u>associations</u> on the local level.</p>	<p>37% of decisions in health care are taken by the <u>central level of government</u>, 20% by the <u>regional one</u>, 3% by the <u>local one</u> and 40% by other actors<sup>266</sup>.</p> <p>The Federal Ministry of Health and the Federal Commissioner for Migration, Refugees and Integration work with the Health Ministries and Integration Ministries in Länder.</p>	<p><u>Länder</u> are in charge of implementing welfare assistance, such as rent top-ups, but delegate this task to <u>municipalities</u>.</p> <p>In addition, <u>job centres</u> jointly run by the municipal authorities and the Federal Employment Agency or, by the municipal authorities provide tax-based benefits.</p>
IRELAND		<p>The <u>Department of Housing, Planning and Local Government</u> reviewed access to social housing for immigrants.</p> <p>Local authorities support refugees to find housing with the help of support workers and volunteers<sup>267</sup>.</p> <p>The <u>Office for the Promotion of Migrant Integration</u> at the Department of Justice and Equality is the authority leading the governance of migrant integration in Ireland. It is responsible for the Migration Integration</p>	<p>58% of decisions in health care are taken by the <u>central level of government</u> and 52% by <u>other actors</u><sup>268</sup>.</p> <p>The <u>Department of Health</u> is responsible for the delivery high quality health services and getting best value from health system resources<sup>269</sup>.</p> <p>The <u>Health Service Executive (HSE)</u>, is a public agency that runs the public health service and operates a network of local health offices and health centres<sup>270</sup>. It has four Regional Health Forums, which includes representatives from the city and county councils within that area.<sup>271</sup> It is responsible of</p>	<p>The <u>national government</u> are in charge of managing and financing some welfare assistance, notably Rent Supplement Payments and social benefits through the Department of Social Protection.</p> <p><u>Local authorities</u> support refugees to find housing with the help of support workers and volunteers and some of them provide the Housing Assistance Payment<sup>273</sup>.</p>

		Strategy (2017-2020).	the second National Intercultural Health Strategy (2018-2023). The <u>Communities Integration Fund</u> , created by the Office for Promotion of Migrant Integration as part of the Migrant Integration Strategy, finances local and national integration initiatives <sup>272</sup> .	
ITALY	Guidelines for temporary housing are in place since 2015 but no national strategy or funding exists. In this context, <u>municipalities</u> have traditionally been responsible for planning, managing and delivering housing programs and services.	<u>Municipalities and Regions</u> own and manage public housing stock. <u>Regions</u> have the power to issue laws that regulate access criteria and distribution of economic resources Municipalities are responsible for issuing calls for tenders for the submission of access applications and for selecting people to whom housing is assigned. Thus application requirements vary among <u>regions</u> , sometimes even among <u>municipalities</u> within the same region <sup>274</sup> . The <u>Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport</u> , is responsible for establishing the framework of principles and general aims of public housing <sup>275</sup> .	<u>Regional and local institutions</u> oversee social and health policies <sup>276</sup> , under the guidance of the Ministry for Health. 50% of decisions are taken by the <u>central level</u> of government, 40% by the <u>regional one</u> , 7% by the <u>local one</u> and 3% by <u>other actors</u> <sup>277</sup> . <u>Local health authorities</u> are responsible for the NHS registration <sup>278</sup> .	<u>Regional and local institutions</u> oversee social policies, under the guidance of the Ministry for Health. <u>Municipalities</u> are responsible of housing and of disbursing the national welfare/poverty allowance <sup>279</sup> . <u>The National social security institute</u> coordinates the unemployment benefits and the Ministry of work and social policies is responsible the “Citizenship income”. <u>The Ministry of Labour and Social Policies</u> is responsible for monitoring the implementation of the Reddito di Cittadinanza, provided by the INPS, the primary social security institution <sup>280</sup> .
NEW ZEALAND	The <u>Mangere Refugee Resettlement Centre</u> is in charge of temporary housing for refugees <sup>281</sup> .	The <u>national agency Housing New Zealand</u> provides subsidised rental housing through state-owned housing. <u>Local councils</u> also provide a range of rental housing, through a separate system. <u>The Ministry of Social Development</u> is responsible for: assessing whether candidates qualify for social housing and deciding “priority rating”; assessing income-related rents; funding Housing New Zealand and community housing providers. <u>40 community housing organisations</u> such as churches, iwi and housing trusts provide subsidised rental housing and emergency housing.	45% of decisions in health care are taken by the <u>central level</u> of government, 52% by the <u>regional level</u> and 3% by <u>other actors</u> <sup>282</sup> . <u>The Minister of Health</u> has overall responsibility for the health and disability system. <u>The 20 District health boards (DHBs)</u> are responsible for providing or funding health services in their district. However, their abolishment in favour of a single national body similar has been announced <sup>283</sup> . Community Services Card helps covering costs of health care and are available to refugees. <u>The Citizens Advice Bureau Language Link</u> helps newcomers with different issues amongst which income support and health services.	The <u>national government</u> is in charge of managing and financing some welfare assistance, through the government agency, “Work and Income” under the authority of the Ministry of Social Development.
SPAIN	Refugees Reception Centres (CARs) and care facilities are managed by <u>specialised non-profit organisations</u> , subsidised for this purpose by <u>the</u>	<u>Autonomous Communities</u> , along with a municipal responsibility in the case of Barcelona, are responsible for housing regulation the provision of public housing.	<u>The Ministry of Health and Social Services</u> establishes national guidelines in terms of health policy and distributes funding to <u>Autonomous Communities</u> which take the great majority of decisions (77% against 23% for the central level) <sup>285</sup> .	The national government is in charge of managing and financing welfare assistance, through the Ministry of Inclusion, Social Security and Migration responsible for the provision of social assistance.

	<u>Directorate General for Migration</u> <sup>284</sup> .			
SWEDEN	<p><u>Municipal housing companies</u>, owned by <u>local municipalities</u>, are an important provider of housing<sup>286</sup>.</p> <p>The <u>Swedish Migration Agency</u> calculates and decides the numbers of refugees that shall be settled into each region. It is then up to the regional County Administrative Board to negotiate with its municipalities and decide the number for each municipality<sup>287</sup>.</p>	<p><u>Municipal housing companies</u>, owned by local municipalities, are an important provider of housing. They are required to organise accommodation for refugees within two months after a decision is made on allocating people in the frame of the dispersal programme. The law does not contain regulation or guidance on what accommodation municipalities should provide<sup>288</sup>.</p>	<p>The <u>Ministry of Health and Social Affairs</u> is responsible of health policies.</p> <p><u>Regional councils</u> and, in some cases, <u>local councils or municipalities</u> are responsible of healthcare provision.</p>	<p>The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs supervise the Social Insurance Agency while municipalities are in charge of a specific social assistance scheme for those who are not entitled to unemployment aid. The Public Employment Service and the Social Insurance Agency jointly implement the “Introduction benefits” for refugees.</p>
THE NETHERLANDS	<p>The <u>Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers</u> (COA) manages reception centres<sup>289</sup>.</p>	<p><u>Private non-profit housing associations cooperate with municipalities</u> in scope of agreements for the management of social real estate. Those housing organisations have a legal task to give priority to housing households with lower incomes and are supervised by the national government<sup>290</sup>. Municipalities supervise the construction of homes in consultation with housing associations<sup>291</sup>.</p>	<p>The <u>Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport</u>, and private insurance companies manage the health system. 30% of decisions are taken by the <u>central level of government</u>, 7% by the <u>local level</u> and 63% by <u>other actors</u><sup>292</sup>.</p> <p>The <u>municipal public health departments</u> are responsible for prevention, social support and youth care. Private health insurers are responsible for purchasing and remunerating all curative health services that are covered by basic health insurance.</p>	<p>The <u>national government</u> is in charge of managing and financing welfare assistance in (DigiD).</p>

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## Notes

<sup>1</sup> In the IPSOS/Anna Lindh survey, living areas are defined by subjective self-descriptions. Participants were asked to self-report which of the four categories they felt best described their living area (rural area or village, small or middle-sized town, suburbs of large town or city, large town or city). This is different from the OECD classification of small regions into predominantly urban, intermediate, and predominantly rural, that is based on population density at grid level.

<sup>2</sup> In the IPSOS/Anna Lindh survey, living areas are defined by subjective self-descriptions. Participants were asked to self-report which of the four categories they felt best described their living area (rural area or village, small or middle-sized town, suburbs of large town or city, large town or city). This is different from the OECD classification of small regions into predominantly urban, intermediate, and predominantly rural, that is based on population density at grid level.

<sup>3</sup> Which were respectively established in close collaboration with UNESCO and the Council of Europe, and the European Union

<sup>4</sup> As part of a reform package in 2006 (Föderalismusreform, SEE)

<sup>5</sup> Results from a questionnaire circulated to inform a 2019 OECD report show the allocation of responsibility for decisions in healthcare. It is important to note these numbers do not reveal the number of shared responsibilities, which would have helped to identify complex frameworks and overlapping responsibilities. The “Other actors” answer gave the opportunity for countries to express the presence of any non-governmental significant decision-making actor. They include public and private health insurance funds, and public and private service providers, particularly hospitals.

<sup>6</sup> Elderly dependency rate is defined as the ratio between the elderly population and the working-age population (15-64 years), multiplied by 100.

## Notes Annex

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