

OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE BY REGIME CONTEXT (2010-19)

OECD DEVELOPMENT
POLICY PAPERS

July 2022 **No. 44**



OECD Development Policy Paper

This work is published under the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD. The opinions expressed and arguments employed do not necessarily represent the official views of the OECD member countries.

This document, as well as any data and any map included herein are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area.

The document was authorised for publication by Jeffrey Schlagenhauf, Acting Director of Development Co-operation.

Please cite this paper as OECD (2022), “Official Development Assistance by regime context (2010-19)”, OECD Development Policy Papers, No. 44, OECD Publishing, Paris.

Abstract

This report examines official development assistance (ODA) allocations by regime context, the kind of support donors provide to different regime types and if and how donors respond to processes of democratisation and autocratisation. The analysis covers country allocable ODA provided by all official donors to 124 ODA recipients. The report aims to inform policy discussions on existing ODA allocations by regime type and their underlying rationale. This report also proposes a series of policy questions for further reflection.

Foreword

This paper is the first in a series of initiatives undertaken as part of the Governance Network of the DAC's (GovNet) dedicated workstream in the PWB 2021-2022 that aims to better understand ODA programming in different regime contexts. The purpose of this work is three-fold: to identify current trends in ODA allocations; stimulate discussion among DAC members on the nature and scope of their engagement in different regime contexts; and guide DAC members on how to work more effectively in different regime contexts to deliver more open, democratic and inclusive societies.

GovNet discussed the findings of this paper in the context of the trend towards autocratic governance in developing (and developed) countries, during its plenary meetings in February and October 2021. Going forward, a series of country case studies and thematic research will be delivered as a complement to this work.

Table of contents

OECD Development Policy Paper	2
Abstract	3
Foreword	4
Executive summary	9
1 Introduction	11
2 Methodology and data inclusion	12
3 ODA recipient countries and the global trend towards more autocratic governance	16
3.1. Changes in population in different regime types	16
3.2. Number of countries (regime)	17
3.3. Regime changes (regime ambiguous)	18
4 ODA per regime type: a sharp rise for autocracies	21
4.1. Total ODA flows per regime type	21
4.2. Closed autocracies: Allocation by sector, channels, instruments and donors	24
4.3. Electoral autocracies: Allocation by sector, channels, instruments and donors	30
4.4. Electoral democracies: Allocation by sector, channels, instruments and donors	34
5 Governance support follows the same trend, but more modestly	38
5.1. ODA to governance by regime type	38
5.2. ODA to governance support to closed autocracies	39
5.3. ODA to governance support to electoral autocracies	41
5.4. ODA to governance support to electoral democracies	43
5.5. ODA to governance: ODA to state building and ODA to democracy promotion	45
6 ODA responses to democratisation and autocratisation	54
6.1. Responses to incremental democratisation	54
6.2. Responses to democratic junctures	56
6.3. Responses to incremental autocratisation	59
6.4. Responses to autocratic junctures	63
6.5. Responses to autocratic backsliding	64

References	67
Annex A. Classification of recipients by regime type from V-Dem's Regimes of the World typology, 2010-20	69
Annex B. Classification of recipients from V-Dem's Regimes of the World ambiguous typology, 2010-20	73
Annex C. List of Development Assistance Committee members	77
Annex D. Decomposition analysis	78
Annex E. Closed autocracy decomposition	83

FIGURES

Figure 2.1. Regime classification methodology	14
Figure 3.1. Evolution of population per regime type, 2010-19	16
Figure 3.2. Country classification by regime type according to V-Dem's Regimes of the World classification, 2010-20	17
Figure 3.3. Classification by regime type according to V-Dem's Regimes of the World measure for ambiguous cases classification, 2010-20	18
Figure 4.1. Country allocable ODA flows from all official donors according to V-Dem's Regimes of the World classification, 2010-19	21
Figure 4.2. Decomposition analysis comparing a "constant" and "official" scenario for closed autocracies, electoral autocracies and electoral democracies, 2010-19	23
Figure 4.3. Bilateral ODA flows to closed autocracies from all official donors by sector, 2010-19	24
Figure 4.4. Bilateral ODA flows to closed autocracies from all official donors by type of donor for humanitarian and development aid, 2010-19	26
Figure 4.5. Bilateral ODA flows to closed autocracies from all official donors by channel, 2010-19	27
Figure 4.6. Bilateral ODA flows to closed autocracies from all official donors by type of aid, 2010-19	29
Figure 4.7. Bilateral ODA flows to electoral autocracies from all official donors by sector, 2010-19	30
Figure 4.8. Bilateral ODA flows to electoral autocracies from all official donors by type of donor for humanitarian and development aid, 2010-19	31
Figure 4.9. Bilateral ODA flows to electoral autocracies from all official donors by channel, 2010-19	32
Figure 4.10. Bilateral ODA flows to electoral autocracies from all official donors by type of aid, 2010-19	33
Figure 4.11. Bilateral ODA flows to electoral democracies from all official donors by sector, 2010-19	34
Figure 4.12. Bilateral ODA flows to electoral democracies from all official donors by type of donor for humanitarian and development aid, 2010-19	35
Figure 4.13. Bilateral ODA flows to electoral democracies from all official donors by channel, 2010-19	36

Figure 4.14. Bilateral ODA flows to electoral democracies from all official donors by type of aid, 2010-19	37
Figure 5.1. Bilateral ODA to governance from all official donors according to V-Dem's Regimes of the World classification, 2010-19	38
Figure 5.2. Bilateral ODA to governance to closed autocracies from all official donors by channel, 2010-19	40
Figure 5.3. Bilateral ODA to governance to closed autocracies from all official donors by type of aid, 2010-19	41
Figure 5.4. Bilateral ODA to governance to electoral autocracies from all official donors by channel, 2010-19	42
Figure 5.5. Bilateral ODA to governance to electoral autocracies from all official donors by type of aid, 2010-19	43
Figure 5.6. Bilateral ODA to governance flows to electoral democracies from all official donors by channel, 2010-19	44
Figure 5.7. Bilateral ODA to governance flows to electoral democracies from all official donors by type of aid, 2010-19	45
Figure 5.8. Distribution of support towards state building and democracy promotion across regime types, 2010-19	46
Figure 5.9. Division between state building and democracy promotion support for closed autocracies, 2010-19	46
Figure 5.10. Division between state building and democracy promotion support for electoral autocracies, 2010-19	47
Figure 5.11. Division between state building and democracy promotion support for electoral democracies, 2010-19	48
Figure 5.12. Bilateral ODA to state building flows from all official donors according to V-Dem's Regimes of the World classification, 2010-19	49
Figure 5.13. Principal state building purpose codes from all official donors by regime type, 2010 and 2019	50
Figure 5.14. Bilateral ODA to democracy promotion flows from all official donors according to V-Dem's Regimes of the World classification, 2010-19	51
Figure 5.15. Principal democracy promotion purpose codes from all official donors by regime type, 2010 and 2019	53
Figure 6.1. Evolutions of ODA and ODA to governance in comparison to the Liberal Democracy Index in Tunisia, 2010-19	58
Figure 6.2. Evolutions of ODA and ODA to governance in comparison to the Liberal Democracy Index in Gambia, 2010-19	59
Figure 6.3. Evolutions of ODA and ODA to governance in comparison to the Liberal Democracy Index in Türkiye, 2010-19	61
Figure 6.4. Evolutions of ODA and ODA to governance in comparison to the Liberal Democracy Index in Brazil, 2010-19	62
Figure 6.5. Overview of bilateral ODA flows to the Syrian Arab Republic broken down by humanitarian and development flows as well as DAC and non-DAC, 2010-19	65
Figure 6.6. Overview of bilateral ODA flows to Yemen broken down by humanitarian and development flows as well as DAC and non-DAC donors, 2010-19	66

8 | OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE BY REGIME CONTEXT (2010-2019)

Figure D.1. Bilateral ODA flows to closed autocracies from all official donors for total ODA, development ODA and humanitarian ODA comparing an “official” and “constant” scenario, 2010-19	79
Figure D.2. Bilateral ODA flows to electoral autocracies from all official donors comparing an “official” and “constant” scenario, 2010-19	80
Figure D.3. Bilateral ODA flows to electoral democracies from all official donors comparing an “official” and “constant” scenario, 2010-19	81
Figure E.1. Bilateral ODA flows to closed autocracies from all official donors divided by flows from all closed autocracies	83

TABLES

Table 2.1. Creditor Reporting System purpose codes on government and civil society (ODA to governance) with division into ODA to state building and ODA to democracy promotion	12
Table 2.2. V-Dem’s Regimes of the World classification	13
Table 3.1. Countries with changes in regime type according to V-Dem’s Regimes of the World classification, 2010-20	19
Table 4.1. Division of ODA between humanitarian and development flows	25
Table 4.2. Largest type of aid, donors and recipients for public sector flows to closed autocracies, 2010-2019	28
Table 6.1. Top 10 democratisers from 2010 and 2019 and their changes in regime type	55
Table 6.2. Top 10 democratisers’ evolution of ODA, ODA to governance, state building and democracy promotion from 2010 to 2019	55
Table 6.3. Examples of democratic junctures	56
Table 6.4. ODA to countries experiencing “democratic junctures” in Y2 and Y3 after the event	57
Table 6.5. Top 10 autocratisers and changes in regime type for these countries, 2010-19	60
Table 6.6. Top 10 autocratisers’ change in ODA, ODA to governance, state building and democracy promotion, 2010-19	60
Table 6.7. Examples of autocratic junctures	63
Table 6.8. ODA to countries experiencing “autocratic junctures” in Y2 and Y3 after the event	63
Table 6.9. Autocratic junctures and assessment of whether the situation is characterised by a humanitarian crisis, 2010-19	64
Table A.1. Regime classification 2010-2020	69
Table B.1. Regime classification 2010-2020: ambiguous typology	73
Table D.1. ODA allocation change from 2010 to 2019	78

Executive summary

This paper analyses how ODA relates to different political regime contexts, from closed autocracies to liberal democracies and from gradual democratisation/autocratisation to democratic breakthroughs or breakdowns. The analysis covers 124 countries that were ODA eligible between 2010 and 2019 and that are included in V-Dem's Regimes of the World classification.

The data covers disbursements from all official donors, but only includes country allocable official development assistance (ODA), which represents just over 70% of total ODA disbursements by all official donors. The report does not include ODA reported as regional or unspecified. The majority of the 124 ODA recipient countries and territories are classified as autocratic regimes, and the number is increasing over time: from 68 in 2010 to 75 in 2019. The implications of this trend are accentuated when considering the relative share of the population living in these contexts. In 2019, 79% of the population in the 124 ODA recipient countries and territories lived under an autocratic regime (up from 56% in 2010). For the purposes of this report, trends towards democratisation or autocratisation are not only measured by shifts in regime types (80 of the 124 countries maintained the same regime type over the ten-year period under review), but also through changes in V-Dem's Liberal Democracy Index.

Autocracies consume an increasing proportion of ODA flows, from 64% in 2010 to 79% in 2019. There are two reasons for this. First, the number of electoral autocracies increased from 52 to 57. Second, higher volumes of ODA were disbursed to closed autocracies, with the visible role of non-DAC members. Particularly striking is the 19-fold increase of humanitarian aid to closed autocracies over the ten-year period.

Overall, the regime type does not appear to weigh heavily on ODA allocation decisions. The distribution of ODA between regimes shows that the share of the different purpose codes remains largely consistent across the various regime types. The largest changes in ODA allocations appear to be the result of regime (re)classification rather than policy decisions based on contextual factors. Some differences are acknowledged, for example that closed autocracies require more and increasing volumes of humanitarian aid compared to electoral autocracies and electoral democracies.

The public sector is the principal channel of delivery across regime types; and increasingly so in closed autocracies; project-type interventions are the leading instrument across regime types. Purpose code, channels and instruments do not seem to be tailored to different regime contexts.

ODA demonstrates a consistent pattern in responding to countries that democratise: they were generally rewarded with an increase in ODA, including more governance support. This is not the case for countries that autocratise in which ODA responses are more mixed. The cases reviewed show that ODA is increasing overall. Conversely for governance support, the picture is more uneven, which suggests that other considerations may influence allocation decisions.

Within governance support, the proportions of ODA allocated to state building (around three-quarters) and democracy support (around a quarter) remain consistent across different regime contexts and over the whole period. There is a strong increase in state building support to closed autocracies (193%), but state

building support has a mixed pattern in response to autocratic junctures (e.g. military coup or fraudulent election). Interestingly, the composition of democracy support is highly consistent across regimes.

The evidence shown in this report raises some questions for policy making and operations that require further reflection and discussion. These include:

1. How can the DAC identify and respond to democratic backsliding? What are possible early warning signs and responses?
2. How can the DAC better identify and respond to democratic windows of opportunity? What are the opportunities to further democratic consolidation?
3. To what extent are DAC members equipped to respond effectively to sudden regime changes?
4. To what extent might ODA to governance be better tailored to different regime contexts?
5. How can the DAC better engage with non-DAC members on issues related to autocratisation and democratisation from a development co-operation point of view?
6. To what extent can ODA work to enable more effective, inclusive and accountable governments, even in autocratic contexts?
7. How can DAC members continue to respond to the needs of the poor, vulnerable and disadvantaged in autocratic contexts, without reinforcing these regimes?
8. How can the DAC better balance state building and democracy promotion to ensure the effectiveness of governance support?

A series of country studies, thematic policy research and dialogue are anticipated to shed more light on some of these questions, further nuance the overall findings of this aggregate-level quantitative analysis, eventually resulting in policy guidance on how members can take account of different political regime contexts for ODA programming.

1 Introduction

The last two decades of the 20th century were characterised by an expansion of democratic governance worldwide. Official development assistance (ODA) supported this trend with funding for elections, civil society, independent media, human rights, etc. Other ODA instruments such as general budget support were underpinned by partner country acceptance of democratic values and principles. In various ways, ODA linked development to democratic governance.

The pendulum of democratic governance has reversed course in the past 10-15 years, with more and more countries moving towards more autocratic governance. In the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Communiqué of 9-10 November 2020, DAC High Level Meeting members confirmed a strong commitment to “*open, democratic and inclusive societies*” and that they “*will continue to use [their] development co-operation to support democracy, the rule of law and human rights, including freedom of expression and peaceful assembly and association, as essential elements of sustainable development for any society*” (DAC, 2020^[1]). Despite firm and consistent DAC member commitments towards enabling democratic governance, current trends and the underlying drivers behind them reveal long-standing, as well as new and emerging, challenges for development actors in supporting and enabling democratic governance in partner countries.

The primary purpose of the work is to examine the links between ODA flows and regime contexts, both for ODA flows overall and for ODA to governance in particular, with the purpose of clarifying:

- ODA allocations by regime context
- what kind of support donors provide to different regime types
- if and how donors respond to processes of democratisation and autocratisation.

The evidence reflected in this report aims to inform policy discussions on existing ODA allocations by regime type, their underlying rationale and their potential implications, including by identifying specific policy questions for further reflection.

2 Methodology and data inclusion

One hundred twenty-four countries and/or territories¹ were selected based on two criteria: 1) a country or territory was on the DAC ODA recipient list over the full period under study (2010-19); and 2) the countries and/or territories are classified in Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Regimes of the World classification (Lührmann, Tannenberg and Lindberg, 2018^[2]).² The data covers disbursements from all official donors, but only includes country allocable ODA which refers to all flows provided to recipients (this represents just over 70% of total ODA disbursements by all official donors).³ Henceforth, any references to ODA refer to country allocable ODA.

The category ODA to governance refers to the 16 purpose codes under DAC Code 151 (Government and civil society – General), which were separated into 2 categories: 8 purpose codes that are considered to contribute to ODA to state building and 8 purpose codes that are considered to contribute to ODA to democracy promotion, as shown in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1. Creditor Reporting System purpose codes on government and civil society (ODA to governance) with division into ODA to state building and ODA to democracy promotion

DAC code	CRS code	Descriptions
151		Government and civil society – General
		ODA to state building
	15110	Public sector policy and administrative management
	15111	Public finance management
	15112	Decentralisation and support to subnational government
	15113	Anti-corruption organisations and institutions
	15114	Domestic revenue mobilisation
	15125	Public procurement
	15130	Legal and judicial development
	15142	Macroeconomic policy
		ODA to democracy promotion
	15150	Democratic participation and civil society
	15151	Elections
	15152	Legislatures and political parties
	15153	Media and free flow of information
	15160	Human rights
	15170	Women's equality organisations and institutions
	15180	Ending violence against women and girls

¹ Territories include Gaza and West Bank.

² The criteria explain the exclusion of several small island developing states (lack of regime classification) as well as countries like Chile and Oman (no longer ODA-eligible).

³ Bilateral and multilateral ODA flows are not included in this report.

15190	Facilitation of orderly, safe, regular, and responsible migration and mobility
-------	--

The V-Dem classification in this report is used for analytical purposes only and does not reflect the views nor opinions of DAC members towards any of our partner countries. Furthermore, this report is not intended to prescribe or prejudge any development co-operation policies or views of DAC members toward any individual partner country.


The V-Dem Regimes of the World classification system is based on the six criteria for modern representative democracy as identified by Dahl (1998, pp. 85-86^[3]): 1) elected officials; 2) free, fair and frequent elections; 3) freedom of expression; 4) alternative sources of information; 5) associational autonomy; and 6) inclusive citizenship. These criteria are assessed and weighed through a set of V-Dem indicators (Figure 2.1), resulting in a classification of regimes into four types: 1) closed autocracies; 2) electoral autocracies; 3) electoral democracies; and 4) liberal democracies (Table 2.2). To frame backsliding, we use the V-Dem “autocratisation flow chart” as a reference (Lührmann, 2019^[4]).

Table 2.2. V-Dem’s Regimes of the World classification

Liberal democracy	<i>De facto</i> multiparty, free and fair elections; effective legislative and judicial oversight of the executive; as well as protection of individual liberties and the rule of law.
Electoral democracy	<i>De facto</i> multiparty, free and fair elections and achieving a sufficient level of institutional guarantees of democracy, such as freedom of association and freedom of expression.
Electoral autocracy	<i>De facto</i> multiparty elections for the chief executive, but falling short of democratic standards or other violations of Dahl’s institutional requisites for democracy.
Closed autocracy	The chief executive and the legislature are either not subject to elections or there is no meaningful <i>de facto</i> competition in elections.

Source: Lührmann, Tanneberg and Lindberg (2018^[2]), Regimes of the World (RoW): Opening avenues for the comparative study of political regimes, <https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v6i1.1214>. .

Figure 2.1. Regime classification methodology



Source: Lührmann, Tanneberg and Lindberg (2018_[2]), Regimes of the World (RoW): Opening avenues for the comparative study of political regimes, 10.17645/pag.v6i1.1214.

Gaza Strip and West Bank are considered as two separate regimes by V-Dem’s Regimes of the World classification with Gaza Strip, ruled by Hamas, considered to be a closed autocracy while the West Bank, ruled by the Palestinian National Authority, being considered an electoral autocracy. However, both territories are classified as a single recipient of ODA. To resolve this contradiction, an artificial division of ODA was calculated according to the respective population sizes of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.⁴

Syrian Arab Republic data includes large ODA flows that the Republic of Türkiye reported to the OECD and that mainly consist of support to Syrian refugees in Türkiye.

Population data for Eritrea, the Gaza Strip and West Bank were estimated for certain years based on past growth rates due to a lack of accurate data. The accuracy of these are unlikely to change any total

⁴ This approach was validated by OECD statisticians.

population data for different regime categories as these countries/territories account for a very small percentage of the total in respective regime categories.

Other data sources for the analysis are:

- a All data related to ODA from 2010 to 2019 was extracted from the OECD Creditor Reporting System in January 2021 (including data on donors, types of aid, aid flows and different types of ODA), with monetary values expressed in 2018 constant prices. The study looks at overall ODA disbursements then in more detail at ODA to governance (the 16 purpose codes in the 151 category “Government and civil society – General”; Table 2.1).
- b Liberal Democracy Index (LDI) data, regime type data, regime ambiguous data and population data were taken from the V-Dem data set version 11.1 (V-Dem, n.d.^[5]; Coppedge et al., 2020^[6]). The V-Dem data set itself collates data from several sources (e.g. population data are taken from the World Bank data portal).

Data checks were initially conducted by OECD statisticians on the manipulated data to check totals. Accuracy of the data and code was subsequently checked by GovNet team members for each graph and figure mentioned in the text.

Liberal democracies, among the sample 124 countries, were excluded from further analysis as there are very few ODA recipients qualifying as liberal democracies. There were 5 liberal democracies in 2010 among the 124 recipients (Botswana, Costa Rica, Ghana, Mauritius and South Africa), decreasing to 2 in 2019 (Costa Rica and Ghana). This makes it difficult to highlight any trends as compared with ODA trajectories for individual countries.


3 ODA recipient countries and the global trend towards more autocratic governance

This section looks at the broader regime trends over the ten-year period (2010-19) under review in the 124 ODA recipients considered. The global trend towards more autocratic governance is well documented in multiple sets of indicators. The trend in ODA partner countries is no different, with 20 countries shifting to a more autocratic regime type over the period. Of particular concern are the countries that shifted from an electoral democracy to an electoral autocracy.

An increasing share of the population in the 124 sample countries/territories lived under autocratic regimes (Figure 3.1), rising from 56% in 2010 to 79% in 2019. Conversely, the share of people living in democracies declined, from 44% to 21%.

3.1. Changes in population in different regime types

Figure 3.1. Evolution of population per regime type, 2010-19



As of 2019, the largest share of the sample population resided in electoral autocracies (51%, up from 28% in 2018). This is strongly influenced by the reclassification of India (with a population of 1.3 billion) from an electoral democracy to an electoral autocracy in 2018.


The population residing in closed autocracies remained stable from 2010 to 2019, at 29% of the population in the data set.

Finally, the share of the population living in liberal democracies decreased, from 1.5% of the total population of the countries in the data set in 2010 to 0.5% in 2019.

3.2. Number of countries (regime)

A trend of democratic backsliding emerges over the 2010-20 period (Figure 3.2), with a total of 55 regimes classified as democracies in 2010 (50 electoral democracies and 5 liberal democracies) against 49 in 2020 (47 electoral democracies and 2 liberal democracies).⁵ In parallel, the number of closed autocracies slightly increased, from 16 regimes in 2010 to 18 in 2020. The number of electoral autocracies increased from 52 in 2010 to 57 in 2020.

Figure 3.2. Country classification by regime type according to V-Dem's Regimes of the World classification, 2010-20




⁵ In comparison, the full V-Dem data set for 2019 has a total of 179 regimes, 32 of which are classified as liberal democracies (V-Dem, 2021, p. 14_[11]).

3.3. Regime changes (regime ambiguous)

The Regimes of the World measure with categories for ambiguous cases offers a more fine-tuned measure to observe regime change as it distinguishes ten regime categories, by adding upper- and lower-bound measures to the initial four categories, mentioned previously (Figure 3.3). See 6.5. Annex B for a classification by country.

Figure 3.3. Classification by regime type according to V-Dem's Regimes of the World measure for ambiguous cases classification, 2010-20



Democratic backsliding is illustrated by the decrease in the number of liberal democracies and liberal democracies upper bound. Four countries (Albania, Lebanon, Malawi and Montenegro) changed from the electoral democracy lower bound category to the electoral autocracy upper bound category between 2010 and 2020.

Twenty-nine out of 124 countries were classified in a different regime type in 2020 than they were in 2010: 9 democratised and 20 autocratised. Of the 20 countries that autocratised, 12 experienced a democratic breakdown, meaning they shifted from being categorised as a democracy to being an autocracy.

Table 3.1. Countries with changes in regime type according to V-Dem's Regimes of the World classification, 2010-20

Country	Closed autocracy	Electoral autocracy	Electoral democracy	Liberal democracy
Benin				
Bolivia				
Botswana				
Comoros				
Fiji	✓			
Gambia				
Guinea-Bissau				
India				
Lebanon				
Madagascar				
Mali				
Mauritius				
Montenegro				
Myanmar				
Niger				
Nigeria				
Philippines				
Serbia				
South Africa				
Sri Lanka				
Sudan				
Syrian Arab Republic				
Tanzania				
Thailand				
Tunisia				
Turkey				
Uzbekistan				
Yemen				
Zambia				

2010
 2020

The following are examples of democratic breakdowns:⁶

- The Plurinational State of Bolivia experienced a period of political crisis in 2019; this occurred following the contested re-election of President Evo Morales for a fourth term and his resignation after large-scale demonstrations (Mosquera, 2021^[7]). This led to the appointment of Jeanine Áñez

⁶ The case of Türkiye is further developed in Section 6.

as interim President in what was decried as a coup by Evo Morales' supporters, with political polarisation increasing during her tenure (International Crisis Group, 2021^[8]).

- In the United Republic of Tanzania, President Magufuli embarked on a process of autocratisation after his election in 2015, as the “government ... cracked down on its critics ... in the opposition, the press and civil society” (Freedom House, 2021^[9]). Several laws were passed, including the Media Services Act, which “grants the government broad authority over media content and the licensing of outlets and journalists” (Freedom House, 2021^[9]).
- In the Philippines, democratic backsliding became prominent after Rodrigo R. Duterte was elected president in 2016. Measures that were taken include weaponising the legal system to attack political opponents, threatening the leaders of key accountability institutions, threatening mainstream media with lawsuits and non-renewal of franchises, raising the specter of declaring martial law nationwide and the rise in extrajudicial killings as part of the “war on drugs” campaign (Timberman, 2019^[10]).
- In India, freedom of the media, academia and civil society were curtailed first and to the greatest extent, with most of the decline occurring following the victory of the Bharatiya Janata Party in the 2014 elections (V-Dem, 2021, p. 20^[11]).
- In Benin, attacks on independent media happened following the election of Pierre Talon in 2016, with several opposition-linked television and radio stations being shut down (The Economist, 2021^[12]). More recently, in 2018, the government passed laws making it more cumbersome to be a candidate in elections and raising the cost of registration (The Economist, 2021^[12]).


4 ODA per regime type: a sharp rise for autocracies

This section looks at how much ODA was disbursed across regime types and the sectors it prioritised. It shows trends over the ten-year period and where possible, the trends are explained by identifying countries, donors, sectors and/or programmes that drove the changes over time. A second objective is to see how the composition of ODA differed across various regime types. This shows a sharp rise of humanitarian aid to closed autocracies in the past few years. The allocation of ODA to electoral democracies and electoral autocracies by sector, instrument and channel was very similar.

4.1. Total ODA flows per regime type

There is a clear increase in ODA flows to autocracies, from 64% in 2010 to 79% in 2019, primarily as a result of ODA flows to closed autocracies, which almost tripled (+178%), but also because an increasing number of recipient countries are now classified as electoral autocracies (+41%) (Figure 4.1).

Figure 4.1. Country allocable ODA flows from all official donors according to V-Dem's Regimes of the World classification, 2010-19



The increase in funds going to closed autocracies is due to the inclusion of Syria and Yemen in this category (in 2013 and 2016, respectively), as well as increased funding to Jordan, all three of which received substantial humanitarian funding. Of the 178% increase in ODA going to closed autocracies between 2010 and 2019, Syria and Yemen accounted for 48% and 21% respectively, while all other closed autocracies accounted for 31% of the increase. In a counterfactual scenario without the inclusion of these two recipients, ODA to closed autocracies would have increased by 55% from 2010 to 2019 (6.5. Annex D). Syria accounted for 31% of all ODA received by closed autocracies in 2019 (USD 10 423 million) while Yemen accounted for 13% (USD 4 551 million). ODA to Jordan tripled, from USD 1 152 million in 2010 to USD 3 075 million in 2019. Out of total flows of USD 46 384 million for Syria, USD 18 655 million for Yemen and USD 23 166 million for Jordan when these countries were classified as closed autocracies, the proportion allocated to humanitarian aid was 89% for Syria, 47% for Yemen and 17% for Jordan.

The increase in ODA to electoral autocracies can largely be attributed to democratic backsliding, given the inclusion of India as an electoral autocracy from 2018 (USD 6 049 million in 2019) and increased funding to Bangladesh (from USD 2 023 million in 2010 to USD 5 558 million in 2019) and Ethiopia (USD 3 481 million in 2010 to USD 5 068 million in 2019). Other major ODA recipients in this category were Tanzania (USD 2 347 million in 2019) and Myanmar (USD 2 151 million in 2019).


In parallel, there was a decrease in ODA flows to democracies, from 36% of the total to 21% over the same period.

The decrease in flows towards electoral democracies (-18%) can be attributed both to the reclassification of certain countries as electoral autocracies and due to ODA cuts to certain electoral democracies. India, Mali, the Philippines, Tanzania and Türkiye accounted for large proportions of ODA to electoral democracies and were reclassified as electoral autocracies. But there are also cases of ODA cuts to countries that remain electoral democracies, such as Indonesia (from USD 3 178 million in 2010 to USD 1 604 million in 2019) and Liberia (from USD 1 739 million in 2010 to USD 617 million in 2019).

The decrease in funding to liberal democracies (-63%) was mostly due to the reclassification of Botswana, Mauritius and South Africa from liberal to electoral democracies between 2010 and 2019. In short, it is not the case that funding to liberal democracies decreased, but that countries that were formerly liberal democracies changed their regime classification.

Interestingly, the proportion of ODA going to the social sectors (health and education) stayed fairly consistent as a proportion of total ODA support across different regime types (with a decrease in proportion over time for closed autocracies) and did not increase to the same extent as humanitarian ODA. This seems to confirm our main finding that regime type is not a significant determinant of aid allocations.

Figure 4.2. Decomposition analysis comparing a “constant” and “official” scenario for closed autocracies, electoral autocracies and electoral democracies, 2010-19



A short decomposition analysis for different regimes was devised comparing an “official” scenario, which denotes ODA allocation according to regime type, to a “constant” scenario (in which all regimes stay the same from 2010 to 2019 according to a 2010 baseline) (Figure 4.2). This analysis was made to better understand whether ODA changes are due to changes in ODA allocation or regime reclassification. More details on the methodology are available in 6.5. Annex D.

- **Closed autocracies:** the overall increase in ODA was mostly due to the reclassification of Syria and Yemen from electoral to closed autocracies. It is spearheaded by increases in humanitarian ODA from 2015.
- **Electoral autocracies:** the similarity between the “constant” and “official” line was due to the fact that reclassifications from electoral democracy to electoral autocracy and from electoral autocracy to closed autocracy cancelled each other out in monetary terms.
- **Electoral democracies:** the large decrease from 2018 to 2019 was due to the reclassification of several recipients from electoral democracy to electoral autocracy (democratic backsliding): Albania, Benin, Bolivia, India, Mali and Malawi. This occurred mostly as a result of development rather than humanitarian ODA.


Most changes in allocation within regime types were due to regime reclassification rather than changes in the intra-regime ODA composition.

4.2. Closed autocracies: Allocation by sector, channels, instruments and donors

Allocation by sector

ODA to closed autocracies increased by 178% over the period and was mostly allocated to humanitarian aid (34%), followed by social infrastructure and services (29%), economic infrastructure and services (14%), and commodity aid/general programme assistance (7%) (Figure 4.3).⁷

Figure 4.3. Bilateral ODA flows to closed autocracies from all official donors by sector, 2010-19



Humanitarian aid saw a 19-fold increase in ODA allocations to closed autocracies during this period, passing from 7% of ODA allocated to closed autocracies in 2010 to 48% in 2019. This can in large part be attributed to the reclassification of Syria and Yemen from electoral autocracies to closed autocracies (Responses to autocratic backsliding). Most of this aid was spent on conflict-affected countries, including Syria (USD 9 437 million, or 58% of the total), Yemen (USD 3 024 million), South Sudan (USD 1 084 million), Somalia (USD 948 million) and Sudan (USD 590 million). There was a particularly large increase in humanitarian aid between 2015 and 2016 (from USD 6 361 million to USD 10 936 million) resulting from increased humanitarian aid related to Syria and the classification of Yemen as a closed autocracy in that year.

Social infrastructure and services increased by 64% in absolute volume, but its relative share of the total plummeted from 45% to 24%. The increase was concentrated in certain purpose codes, including “public sector policy and administrative management” (from USD 221 million in 2010 to USD 955 million in 2019);

⁷ The category of commodity aid/general programme assistance includes purpose names for general budget support-related assistance and food assistance as well as import support for capital goods and commodities.

“civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution” (from USD 44 million in 2010 to USD 509 million in 2019) and “basic health care” (from USD 181 million in 2010 to USD 462 million in 2019). The three largest beneficiaries among closed autocracies accounted for 44% of total social infrastructure support: Jordan (17%), the People’s Republic of China (hereafter “China”) (16%) and Morocco (11%). At the same time, the countries to which support for social infrastructure increased the most over the ten-year period are Jordan (+USD 1 189 million), Somalia (+USD 425 million) and Lao People’s Democratic Republic (+USD 208 million).

The needs that occur in extremely fragile, often conflict-affected, closed autocracies (Somalia, South Sudan, Syria and Yemen) are undoubtedly justified from a humanitarian perspective, but this ODA does not address the structural governance problems that remain in place.

Jordan is a case that merits more detailed analysis. ODA to Jordan (development rather than humanitarian support) has sharply increased, while the Liberal Democracy Index for Jordan has remained stable at a very low level.

Allocation by donor


To better understand how donors are allocating ODA flows, a division of total flows was made to account for flows allocated for the purposes of humanitarian aid and those for development (Table 4.1). This same division and analysis was also made for electoral autocracies and electoral democracies.

Table 4.1. Division of ODA between humanitarian and development flows

Humanitarian ODA	Purpose codes under Sector VIII. Humanitarian Aid
Development ODA	All other purpose codes

This division was made to better understand if DAC donors (List of Development Assistance Committee members for a list of the 30 DAC members) or other donors were responsible for the increase or decrease in flows to different regime types.

Figure 4.4. Bilateral ODA flows to closed autocracies from all official donors by type of donor for humanitarian and development aid, 2010-19



Humanitarian ODA increased by 10 263% for non-DAC donors between 2010 and 2019, passing from USD 97 million to USD 10 069 million, while it increased eightfold (+713%) for DAC donors (Figure 4.4).⁸ Among non-DAC members, this large-scale increase was mainly due to ODA disbursed by Türkiye (USD 27 095 million, or 78% in this category), the United Arab Emirates (USD 2 986 million; 9%) and Saudi Arabia (USD 1 756 million; 5%). Almost all ODA disbursed by non-DAC members was related to Syria (79%) and Yemen (12%). The sharp increase in 2015 also results from non-DAC member reporting to the OECD. Syrian Arab Republic data includes large ODA flows that the Republic of Türkiye reported to the OECD and that mainly consist of support to Syrian refugees in Türkiye. Among DAC members, 75% of ODA for humanitarian aid was disbursed by four donors: the United States (USD 14 086 million, or 37% in this category), Germany (USD 5 752 million; 15%), the United Kingdom (USD 4 719 million; 12%) and EU institutions (USD 4 364 million; 11%). Most DAC humanitarian flows were related to Syria (36%), South Sudan (19%), Somalia (15%) and Yemen (12%).

With regard to development ODA from 2010 to 2019, non-DAC flows doubled, from USD 3 126 million to USD 6 421 million between 2010 and 2019, while DAC development flows increased by 38%. Among non-DAC donors, 65% of development flows to closed autocracies were due to the United Arab Emirates (USD 12 059 million; 25%), the International Development Association (USD 7 179 million; 15%), Saudi Arabia (USD 5 231 million; 11%), the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (USD 3 230 million; 7%), and the Asian Development Bank (USD 3 094 million; 7%). These non-DAC


⁸ The percentage increase for non-DAC humanitarian flows to closed autocracies is 10,263% which means that the 2019 number is approximately 102 times larger than the number in 2010.

flows were spent in a wider variety of regimes including Yemen (19%), Viet Nam (12%), Morocco (12%), Jordan (11%) and Egypt (10%). Among DAC members, 77% of ODA for development flows to closed autocracies are disbursed by Germany (USD 16 203 million; 17%), the United States (USD 15 721 million; 17%), Japan (USD 15 120 million; 16%), EU institutions (USD 13 473 million; 15%) and France (USD 11 337 million; 12%). The largest recipients of development ODA flows from DAC donors were Morocco (18%), China (17%), Jordan (15%) and Viet Nam (11%).

Allocation by channel

Most funding to countries with a regime classified as closed autocracy was channelled through the public sector (59%), followed by multilateral organisations (20%); non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society (11%); university, college or other teaching institutions (2%); and the private sector and other⁹ (7%) (Figure 4.5).

Figure 4.5. Bilateral ODA flows to closed autocracies from all official donors by channel, 2010-19



Note: NGO: non-governmental organisation

Most of the increase in ODA financing to countries classified as closed autocracies was channelled through the public sector and multilateral organisations.

The 167% increase in public sector ODA was mostly channelled through central and recipient governments. This increase is most visible from 2016 onwards as a result of ODA flows to the Syria crisis (most of these flows were funding from Türkiye for humanitarian aid) and Viet Nam (reclassified as a closed autocracy in 2016 and receiving a mixture of development ODA from Japan and the International Development Association).

⁹ The other category regroups several categories, including “PPPs and networks”, other and non-specified channels.

The 615% increase for multilateral organisations was mainly channelled through the World Food Programme (33%), the United Nations Children’s Fund (15%), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (9%) and the United Nations Development Programme (8%). Somalia, South Sudan, Syria and Yemen were the main recipients.

The 168% increase for NGOs and civil society was channelled mostly through donor country-based NGOs (USD 14 786 million, representing 65%) followed by international NGOs (USD 3 419 million at 15%). The largest recipients of these funds were for organisations operating in Somalia, South Sudan, Syria and Yemen. The use of channels is in line with the sharp increase of ODA flows for humanitarian aid, which was channelled largely through multilateral organisations.

Table 4.2. Largest type of aid, donors and recipients for public sector flows to closed autocracies, 2010-2019

Recipient	Donor	Type of aid	Amount (Million USD)	Percentage of total public sector aid to closed autocracies
Syrian Arab Republic ¹⁰	Türkiye	Project-type interventions	27,149	22
Viet Nam	Japan	Project-type interventions	4,627	4
China (People’s Republic of)	Germany	Project-type interventions	4,095	3
Viet Nam	International Development Association	Project-type interventions	3,475	3
Morocco	France	Project-type interventions	2,888	2
Egypt	United Arab Emirates	General budget support	2,854	2
Yemen	Saudi Arabia	General budget support	2,689	2
Morocco	Germany	Project-type interventions	2,520	2
Yemen	United Arab Emirates	General budget support	2,455	2
Cuba	Spain	Debt relief	2,444	2

Source: OECD Credit Reporting System


Allocation by instrument

Over the ten-year period, project-type interventions accounted for over two-thirds of ODA to closed autocracies (68%), followed by contributions to specific-purpose programmes and funds managed by implementing partners (12%), other (11%),¹¹ and general and sector budget support (10%) (Figure 4.6).

¹⁰ Syrian Arab Republic data includes large ODA flows that the Republic of Türkiye reported to the OECD and that mainly consist of support to Syrian refugees in Türkiye.

¹¹ The other category includes: administrative costs not included elsewhere; basket funds/pooled funding; core support to NGOs, other private bodies, public-private partnerships (PPPs) and research institutes; debt relief; development awareness; donor country personnel; imputed student costs; not applicable; other technical assistance; recognised refugees; refugees/asylum seekers in donor countries; and scholarships/training in donor country.

Figure 4.6. Bilateral ODA flows to closed autocracies from all official donors by type of aid, 2010-19



Project-type interventions increased in absolute volume practically every year, with a large increase from 2015 to 2016. The five largest recipients (Syria, Morocco, Jordan, Viet Nam and China) accounted for two-thirds of the total flows. The largest purpose codes of intervention were “material relief assistance and services” (flows accelerated from 2013), “emergency food assistance” (flows accelerated from 2016), “road transport”, “rail transport” and “primary education”.

Budget support fluctuates from year to year, but showed an overall increase during this period. Just over half (54%) of all budget support provided to closed autocracies went to Jordan (USD 6 039 million) and Yemen (USD 5 306 million). Outlier data, from 2013, are due mostly to Egypt, which was classified as a closed autocracy in 2013 following the coup d’état by the Egyptian army.


Contributions to specific-purpose programmes and funds managed by implementing partners increased eightfold over the period, with three countries – Yemen, South Sudan and Syria – accounting for 63% of disbursements. In total, 79% of funds in this category were for humanitarian aid.

4.3. Electoral autocracies: Allocation by sector, channels, instruments and donors

Allocation by sector

ODA to electoral autocracies increased by 41% over the study period and was principally distributed to social infrastructure and services (43%), followed by economic infrastructure and services (20%), humanitarian aid (11%), and production sectors (7%) (Figure 4.7).

Figure 4.7. Bilateral ODA flows to electoral autocracies from all official donors by sector, 2010-19




Economic infrastructure and services increased by 128% over the time period. This is mostly due to ODA allocated to “rail transport”, “road transport”, and “energy policy and administrative management”. The largest increases occurred in India (+USD 3 403 million), Bangladesh (+USD 1 325 million), the Philippines (+USD 906 million), Egypt (+USD 638 million), Pakistan (+USD 620 million), Kenya (+USD 583 million) and Ethiopia (+USD 489 million).

Social infrastructure and services increased by 35% over the period. About half of the increase can be attributed to six purpose codes: “higher education”, “basic health care”, “infectious disease control”, “water supply – large systems”, “malaria control” and “vocational training”. The largest increases were seen in Tanzania (+USD 1 434 million), India (+USD 1 403 million), Bangladesh (+USD 1 209 million), Mali (+USD 849 million) and Myanmar (+USD 828 million).

Allocation by donor

In the case of electoral autocracies, despite the increase in ODA flows, the balance between humanitarian ODA and development ODA stayed relatively stable. The percentage allocated for development ODA stayed close to 90% of total ODA (Figure 4.8).

Figure 4.8. Bilateral ODA flows to electoral autocracies from all official donors by type of donor for humanitarian and development aid, 2010-19



The two largest DAC donors to electoral autocracies for humanitarian and development ODA alike were the United States and EU institutions. The United States provided 39% of all humanitarian aid to electoral autocracies while the EU provided 17%. Humanitarian ODA from DAC donors was distributed to a large number of countries, with the six largest recipients accounting for 51% of ODA received (Iraq 11%, Ethiopia 9%, Sudan 9%, Democratic Republic of the Congo [DRC] 8%, Pakistan 7% and Afghanistan 7%). Development ODA by DAC donors mainly came from the United States (24%), followed by the EU (17%) and Japan (15%). The main recipients of development ODA by DAC donors were Afghanistan (11%) and Türkiye (6%). Other important recipients were Ethiopia, the DRC, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Mozambique, Myanmar, Viet Nam and Kenya.


Among non-DAC donors, there was a large increase in both humanitarian ODA (+851%) and development ODA (+83%). Most humanitarian ODA from non-DAC donors was provided by multilaterals like the International Development Association (USD 2 541 million; 24%), the United Nations Children’s Fund (USD 1 758 million; 17%), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (USD 1 280 million; 12%) and the World Food Programme (USD 1 212 million; 11%). The largest recipients of humanitarian ODA included Bangladesh (9%) and Pakistan (8%). Most development flows by non-DAC donors came from multilateral donors, including the International Development Association (USD 73 890 million; 38%), the Global Fund (USD 18 336 million; 9%) and the Asian Development Bank (USD 15 924 million; 8%) as well as the United Arab Emirates (USD 14 847 million; 8%). Recipients were well distributed among different

electoral autocracies; the largest was Ethiopia (9%), followed by Bangladesh (8%), Pakistan (7%) and Egypt (7%).

Allocation by channel

Most funding for electoral autocracies was channelled through the public sector (56%), followed by multilateral organisations (18%); NGOs and civil society (13%); other¹² (10%); the private sector (2%); and university, college or other teaching institutions (2%) (Figure 4.9).

Figure 4.9. Bilateral ODA flows to electoral autocracies from all official donors by channel, 2010-19



The volume of ODA channelled through the public sector to electoral autocracies increased by 52% between 2010 and 2019 (from USD 29 592 million to USD 45 081 million). Most of these public sector funds were disbursed through recipient governments. Bangladesh (USD 23 256 million), Ethiopia (USD 22 539 million), Pakistan (USD 21 271 million) and Egypt (USD 20 159 million) were the largest recipients.

The volume of ODA channelled through multilateral organisations to electoral autocracies increased by 74% between 2010 and 2019 (from USD 8 960 million to USD 15 609 million). A large portion of total ODA volume was channelled through the World Food Programme (18%), the United Nations Children’s Fund (16%), the United Nations Development Programme (13%), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (7%), and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, among others. Funds channelled through multilateral organisations were fairly well distributed among different electoral autocracies.


Allocation by instrument

Bilateral ODA flows to electoral autocracies steadily increased year-on-year. Project-type interventions accounted for 71% of ODA to electoral autocracies during the reporting period, followed by contributions

¹² The other category regroups several categories, including “PPPs and networks”, other, and non-specified channels.

to specific-purpose programmes and funds (9%), budget support (9%), other¹³ (7%), and debt relief (4%) (Figure 4.10).

Figure 4.10. Bilateral ODA flows to electoral autocracies from all official donors by type of aid, 2010-19



The increase in ODA for project-type interventions between 2018 and 2019 (from USD 48 034 million to USD 57 370 million) was mostly due to the reclassification of Bolivia, India, Malawi and Mali from electoral democracies to electoral autocracies.

The four largest recipients of budget support among electoral autocracies were Pakistan, Egypt, Mozambique and Ethiopia (together accounting for 31% of all budget support to electoral autocracies).

¹³ The other category includes: administrative costs not included elsewhere; basket funds/pooled funding; core support to NGOs, other private bodies, PPPs and research institutes; development awareness; donor country personnel; imputed student costs; not applicable; other technical assistance; recognised refugees; refugees/asylum seekers in donor countries; and scholarships/training in donor country.

In total, 45% of the contributions to specific-purpose programmes and funds were for the humanitarian aid sector.¹⁴ The five largest recipients of these contributions (Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Iraq, the DRC and Sudan) accounted for over 50% of the flows.


Debt relief decreased from 10% of total ODA to electoral autocracies in 2010 to less than 1% in 2019.

4.4. Electoral democracies: Allocation by sector, channels, instruments and donors

Allocation by sector

The share of ODA to electoral democracies decreased by 18% between 2010 and 2019. Social infrastructure and services (-16%) and economic infrastructure and services (-2%) decreased at a lower rate than overall ODA. ODA for electoral democracies going towards action related to debt (-95%), commodity aid/general programme assistance (-68%), multi-sector/cross-cutting (-40%) and production sectors (-24%) decreased at a higher rate than the general ODA trend. Humanitarian aid (+143%) and administrative costs, refugees and other (+332%) experienced important increases, but remained a minor part of the aid envelope going to electoral democracies (Figure 4.11).

Figure 4.11. Bilateral ODA flows to electoral democracies from all official donors by sector, 2010-19




¹⁴ Excluding multi-purpose hazard aid.

Social infrastructure and services remained stable (at 44-46% of ODA to electoral democracies between 2010 and 2019). The three purpose codes with the largest decrease were “STD control including HIV/AIDS” (-USD 796 million), “water supply and sanitation – large systems” (-USD 589 million), and “primary education” (-USD 486 million). The electoral democracies with the largest decrease were Indonesia (-USD 449 million), Peru (-USD 164 million), the Solomon Islands (-USD 148 million) and Namibia (-USD 106 million). The reclassification of India, Mali, Tanzania and Zambia from electoral democracies to electoral autocracies also played an important role in the decrease in these categories, as these countries were respectively the first-, second-, fourth- and fifth-highest recipients of ODA to social infrastructure and services among electoral democracies in 2010.

Allocation by donor

The decline in ODA flows to electoral democracies was largely a result of a decline in DAC development ODA. Development ODA accounted for at least 93% of the total share of ODA to electoral democracies in all years except 2015 (where it accounted for 91%) (Figure 4.12).

Figure 4.12. Bilateral ODA flows to electoral democracies from all official donors by type of donor for humanitarian and development aid, 2010-19




In the case of development flows, there was a 32% decline from DAC donors, which explains why ODA to electoral democracies decreased over the 2010-19 period. This can be explained, in large part, due to the reclassification of India as an electoral autocracy in 2018 (flows to India for development from DAC donors were over USD 4 000 million in 2017 and 2018 alike) as well as the decrease in ODA for development to Indonesia (from USD 3 020 million in 2018 to USD 1 381 million in 2019). The largest recipients of ODA development flows from DAC donors included India (12%), Indonesia (8%) and four countries that accounted for 4% of the total (Brazil, Colombia, Nigeria and Tanzania). The largest DAC donors to electoral

democracies were the United States (20%), the EU (18%), Japan (15%), Germany (13%) and France (10%), accounting collectively for 76% of the total. In the case of non-DAC donors, the largest recipients included India (15%) and Nigeria (12%), with the largest donors being multilateral institutions (the International Development Association [43%] and the Global Fund [12%]).

Allocation by channel

Most funding for electoral democracies was channelled through the public sector (64%), followed by NGOs and civil society (11%); multilateral organisations (9%); other (10%); university, college or other teaching institutions (3%); and the private sector (2%) (Figure 4.13).

Figure 4.13. Bilateral ODA flows to electoral democracies from all official donors by channel, 2010-19



The volume of ODA channelled through the public sector to electoral democracies decreased by 25% between 2010 and 2019 (from USD 23 142 million to USD 17 251 million). The reclassification of India from an electoral democracy to an electoral autocracy in 2019 also explains the large-scale decrease from 2018 to 2019.


The volume of ODA channelled through multilateral organisations to electoral democracies increased by 53% between 2010 and 2019, due mostly to increased flows through the United Nations Capital Development Fund (+USD 293 million), the World Food Programme (+USD 250 million) and the World Health Organization (+USD 99 million).

Allocation by instrument

Project-type interventions accounted for 76% of ODA to electoral democracies, followed by other (11%),¹⁵ budget support (9%), and contributions to specific-purpose programmes and funds (4%) (Figure 4.14).

¹⁵ The other category includes: administrative costs not included elsewhere; basket funds/pooled funding; core support to NGOs, other private bodies, PPPs and research institutes; debt relief; development awareness; donor country personnel; imputed student costs; not applicable; other technical assistance;

Figure 4.14. Bilateral ODA flows to electoral democracies from all official donors by type of aid, 2010-19



Project-type interventions for electoral democracies hovered between 69% of total support in 2010 and 78% in 2018. The important decrease in support provided to electoral democracies between 2018 and 2019 is reflected in the decrease in project-type interventions. The decline of USD 9 479 million between 2018 and 2019 is principally due to the reclassification of a number of countries from electoral democracies to electoral autocracies: India (-USD 5 243 million), Mali (-USD 1 185 million), Malawi (-USD 1 138 million), Bolivia (-USD 648 million) and Benin (-USD 424 million). There was also a 42% decline in project support to Indonesia.

Budget support accounted for 8-13% of total ODA support to electoral democracies on a yearly basis, but decreased from 2010 to 2019.

Contributions to specific-purpose programmes and funds experienced important fluctuations from 2010 to 2015 before reaching a peak in 2015 and subsequently decreasing. Humanitarian aid purpose codes (excluding multi-hazard response preparedness) accounted for approximately 37% of all contributions in this category of ODA for electoral democracies (less than for electoral and closed autocracies).

recognised refugees; refugees/asylum seekers in donor countries and scholarships/training in donor country.


5 Governance support follows the same trend, but more modestly

This section takes a closer look at how governance support differs across regime types in volume and composition. The classic governance codes (“151 category” in the OECD Creditor Reporting System) are divided into two groups as explained in Methodology and data inclusion (Table 2.1): state building and democracy promotion. This allows one to assess if the composition of governance support is somehow adapted to varying regime types. The analysis shows a sharp increase in governance support to closed autocracies, mainly delivered through the public sector.

5.1. ODA to governance by regime type

There was an increase in ODA to governance support to autocracies from 65% of total governance flows in 2010 to 73% in 2019, almost entirely a result of the increase in ODA to governance to closed autocracies (+150%) (Figure 5.1).

Figure 5.1. Bilateral ODA to governance from all official donors according to V-Dem’s Regimes of the World classification, 2010-19



The increase in ODA to governance to closed autocracies from 2016 can be attributed to Jordan, which accounted for almost half of all ODA to governance in closed autocracies as of 2016. ODA to governance to Jordan was mostly for the “public sector policy and administrative management” purpose code (76% of all governance support to Jordan). Out of the USD 11 348 million of governance ODA to closed autocracies, 35% was provided to Jordan, followed by Somalia (11%), Gaza Strip (10%), South Sudan (8%) and Morocco (6%), with these countries/territories accounting for approximately 70% of total governance support to closed autocracies.

ODA to governance increased by 7% to electoral autocracies between 2010 and 2019, but experienced important fluctuations from 2013 onwards. The distribution of ODA to governance among electoral autocracies was highly concentrated, with four recipients accounting for 40% of total flows: Afghanistan (24%), Pakistan (6%), Iraq (6%) and Bangladesh (4%). In particular, the sudden increase from 2018 to 2019 mainly went to Afghanistan (+USD 268 million), Kenya (+USD 89 million) and Cameroon (+USD 85 million), among others.

The level of ODA to governance to democracies decreased from 35% of total governance flows in 2010 to 27% in 2019 largely due to reduced support to electoral democracies.

ODA to governance in electoral democracies fluctuated between 2010 and 2018, then declined from USD 3 824 million to USD 3 242 million between 2018 and 2019. This decline was mostly due to a decrease in funding to Indonesia (-USD 436 million), Nepal (-USD 140 million) and Mexico (-USD 83 million) as well as the reclassification of Albania, Benin, India, Malawi and Mali from electoral democracies to electoral autocracies between 2018 and 2019.


The steep decline in ODA to governance in liberal democracies (-63%) was due to the decline in support to Ghana (which alone accounted for 72% of support to liberal democracies included in this data set) and due to country reclassification.

5.2. ODA to governance support to closed autocracies

Channels

There was a significant increase in bilateral ODA to governance to closed autocracies during the period under study (Figure 5.2). Most ODA to governance funding for closed autocracies was channelled through the public sector (55%). Other ODA to governance for closed autocracies was channelled through NGOs and civil society (19%), multilateral organisations (14%), other (8%), and the private sector (4%).

Figure 5.2. Bilateral ODA to governance to closed autocracies from all official donors by channel, 2010-19



Note: NGO: non-governmental organisation.

The amount of ODA to governance channelled through the public sector increased by 237% over the period, with more than half going to Jordan.


Most flows to NGOs and civil society were for governance support to China, Jordan, Somalia and South Sudan. These resources were mostly channelled through donor country-based NGOs (71%). The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the United Nations Development Programme were the main multilateral channels.

Instruments

The instruments to deliver ODA to governance to closed autocracies changed composition over the ten-year period. Project-type interventions dominated (above 64%) until 2017, after which there was a strong rise of sector budget support (from 10% in 2016 to 51% in 2019) (Figure 5.3). The sharp increase in sector budget support was due almost entirely to the increase in flows provided to Jordan in 2017 (USD 577 million), 2018 (USD 750 million) and 2019 (USD 743 million), all under three projects under the “public sector policy and administrative management” purpose code.¹⁶ Other large sector budget interventions were for “public finance management” in Viet Nam in 2018 (USD 118 million) and for Uzbekistan in 2019 (USD 174 million).

¹⁶ In 2017, USD 12 million in sector budget support was also provided to Jordan for “legal and judicial development” purpose name. This amount was equal to USD 1 million and USD 10 million in 2018 and 2019 respectively for the same purpose name.

Figure 5.3. Bilateral ODA to governance to closed autocracies from all official donors by type of aid, 2010-19



Specific-purpose programmes and funds managed by implementing partners almost doubled in the 2010-19 period, with most of these programmes implemented in Somalia (USD 334 million) and Gaza Strip (USD 188 million).

5.3. ODA to governance support to electoral autocracies


Channels

Afghanistan (16%), Pakistan (8%) and Iraq (7%) were the main recipients of ODA to governance for electoral autocracies.

Most ODA to governance funding was channelled through the public sector (48%), then multilateral organisations (22%), NGOs and civil society (17%), other (11%), and the private sector (2%) (Figure 5.4).

Governance support channelled through the public sector decreased by 12% between 2010 and 2019. However, there was a 95% increase in the share of ODA to governance delivered by multilateral organisations, from USD 950 million in 2010 to USD 1 849 million in 2019.


Figure 5.4. Bilateral ODA to governance to electoral autocracies from all official donors by channel, 2010-19



Instruments

Project-type interventions show an irregular though slightly downward trend (Figure 5.5). The largest recipients of project aid were Afghanistan (USD 7 194 million), Iraq (USD 2 943 million), Pakistan (USD 2 337 million) and Bangladesh (USD 2 146 million). Project-type interventions were mostly for “legal and judicial development” (USD 9 792 million), “public sector policy and administrative management” (USD 7 763 million), “decentralisation and support to subnational government” (USD 5 772 million), and “democratic participation and civil society” (USD 5 082 million). Interestingly, the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Programme accounted for at least 15% of all project-type interventions to electoral autocracies (USD 5 795 million) over this period. This programme seeks to address the challenge of illicit drugs, combat transnational crime and corruption as well as strengthen criminal justice institutions.

Figure 5.5. Bilateral ODA to governance to electoral autocracies from all official donors by type of aid, 2010-19



Specific-purpose programmes and funds fluctuated between 10% (2010) and 22% (2012) of ODA to governance to electoral autocracies.


Sector budget support oscillated between 4% of total support in 2012 to 16% in 2015 and was fairly evenly distributed amongst multiple countries, including Pakistan (USD 870 million), Viet Nam (USD 621 million), Nigeria (USD 496 million), Mozambique (USD 315 million), Tanzania (USD 305 million), Rwanda (USD 281 million) and Honduras (USD 240 million). Eighty per cent of all sector budget support to electoral autocracies was for “public finance management” (USD 3 306 million) and “public sector policy and administrative management” (USD 1 529 million).

5.4. ODA to governance support to electoral democracies

Channels

In the case of electoral democracies, the most used channels for the disbursement of ODA to governance were public sector institutions (USD 20 492 million; 58%) and NGOs and civil society (USD 6 712 million; 19%) (Figure 5.6).

Figure 5.6. Bilateral ODA to governance flows to electoral democracies from all official donors by channel, 2010-19




The volume of ODA to governance channelled through public sector institutions in electoral democracies decreased by 13% from 2010 to 2019, with Mexico (USD 1 751 million), Colombia (USD 1 689 million) and Indonesia (USD 1 488 million) being the largest recipients. The volume of ODA to governance channelled through NGOs and civil society decreased by 9% from 2010 to 2019, while the volume of flows to multilateral institutions increased by 7% over the same period.

Channels

Project-type interventions were dominant in governance support to electoral democracies (between 64% and 76%) (Figure 5.7). In electoral democracies, most project-type interventions were for “legal and judicial development” (USD 7 466 million; 30% of the total), “public sector policy and administrative management” (USD 4 512 million; 18%), “decentralisation and support to subnational government” (USD 2 900 million; 12%), and “democratic participation and civil society” (USD 2 689 million; 11%). The largest project here was also the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Programme (17% of total ODA to governance support to electoral democracies, with large amounts going to Colombia and Mexico).

Figure 5.7. Bilateral ODA to governance flows to electoral democracies from all official donors by type of aid, 2010-19




Sector budget support to electoral democracies underwent important fluctuations, from 8% in 2011 to a high of 20% in 2013. The peak in 2013 was due to the provision of sector budget support to Guatemala (USD 154 million), Bolivia (USD 101 million) and Paraguay (USD 61 million). These countries only received sector budget support in 2013.¹⁷ Most sector budget support (87%) was for “public finance management” (USD 2 101 million), “public sector policy and administrative management” (USD 1 066 million), and “decentralisation and support to subnational government” (USD 714 million).

5.5. ODA to governance: ODA to state building and ODA to democracy promotion

Over the entire period, **almost three-quarters of total ODA to governance went to state building (73%)** and **approximately one-quarter (27%) to democracy promotion** (Figure 5.8). The absolute volume of the different types of governance support changed over time, but the proportions remained remarkably stable, including across the different regime types. This indicates that the composition of governance support was not adapted to the very different regime contexts.

¹⁷ USD 1 million was provided to Guatemala in 2014.


Figure 5.8. Distribution of support towards state building and democracy promotion across regime types, 2010-19



Share of state building and democracy support across regime types


In closed autocracies, there is a trend of increasing support to state building versus democracy promotion (Figure 5.9), with a first peak reached in 2014 (77:23 ratio) and subsequent increases from 2016 onwards. The peaks in 2014 and from 2016 onwards were due to the large amount of state building support to Jordan in the form of cash transfers by the United States (e.g. in 2014 with a value of USD 414 million).

Figure 5.9. Division between state building and democracy promotion support for closed autocracies, 2010-19




For electoral autocracies, the ratio of democracy promotion to state building support was higher in 2018-19 (32:68 and 34:66) than in previous years by a few percentage points (Figure 5.10). This was due to an increase in support to several electoral autocracies, including Afghanistan, Bangladesh, the DRC, Ethiopia, Iraq and Ukraine.

Figure 5.10. Division between state building and democracy promotion support for electoral autocracies, 2010-19



The fact that proportions remain relatively stable over time, with the exceptions identified above, and across very different regime contexts raises the question of whether governance support is sufficiently adapted to different regime contexts.

Figure 5.11. Division between state building and democracy promotion support for electoral democracies, 2010-19




Composition of state building support by regime type

State building support was concentrated in “public sector policy and administrative management” and “legal and judicial development” in closed autocracies. Moving along the regime continuum, support becomes more diversified.

The increase in ODA to state building was due almost entirely to the increase in flows to closed autocracies (+193% from 2010 to 2019) (Figure 5.12).

Figure 5.12. Bilateral ODA to state building flows from all official donors according to V-Dem's Regimes of the World classification, 2010-19




The increase in ODA to state building to closed autocracies was due almost entirely to Jordan (43% of total flows to closed autocracies) and concentrated in the “public sector policy and administrative management” purpose code, with large cash transfers for monetary policy and macroeconomic support mostly from the United States, specifically for the purposes of health, education and water. These were likely cash transfers to provide incentives for Jordan to continue hosting large numbers of Syrian refugees (Jordan hosted around 670 000 Syrian refugees as of August 2021) (UNHCR, 2021^[13]).

Flows to electoral autocracies experienced a high level of variation in the 2010-19 period, but overall flows only decreased by 2% over the period, while electoral democracies saw a 14% drop. Figure 5.13 for more detail on state building variation in 2010 and 2019.

Flows to liberal democracies decreased by 61% as a result of the reclassification of three countries and a decline in funding to Ghana.

Figure 5.13. Principal state building purpose codes from all official donors by regime type, 2010 and 2019



Note: The percentages should be totalled across regime categories (e.g. closed autocracy) rather than by purpose code.

Support to electoral democracies tended to be more evenly distributed over different purpose codes, although it mainly went to “public sector policy and administrative management” as well as “legal and judicial development”.

In closed autocracies, most support was concentrated in fewer purpose codes, particularly in 2019. In closed autocracies, most state building support was for “public sector policy and administrative management” (increasing from 43% in 2010 to 63% in 2019).


The level of support to “legal and judicial development” decreased for closed and electoral autocracies but remained stable for electoral democracies. It was the largest area of support to electoral autocracies in 2010, but that was no longer the case in 2019.

Composition of democracy support by regime type

The composition of democracy support to various regime types differed relatively little across regime types and most support went to “democratic participation and civil society”. Over the ten-year period, support to “elections” declined while support to “human rights” and “women’s rights organisations” increased.

There was a 72% increase in democracy promotion flows to closed autocracies between 2010 and 2019 (Figure 5.14). The main recipients of these flows were Somalia (14%), Jordan (13%), South Sudan (11%), China (10%), Morocco (9%) and Syria (8%).

Figure 5.14. Bilateral ODA to democracy promotion flows from all official donors according to V-Dem’s Regimes of the World classification, 2010-19



The classification of Lebanon, Mali, Myanmar, Tanzania and Ukraine as electoral autocracies after 2010 as well as increased democracy support to Bangladesh and Ethiopia explain the upward trend for this regime type. The same reclassification of countries seems to account for most of the decrease in democracy support to electoral democracies.

A decrease in ODA flows to Ghana and the reclassification of South Africa from a liberal to an electoral democracy explains the 69% decrease in flows for liberal democracies. The most striking observation is that the distribution of ODA over different purpose codes varied very little across different regime types and the differences became smaller over the decade (Figure 5.15)


Donors seemed to offer quite similar packages of support to quite different regime contexts, while it could be assumed that the needs and opportunities were not the same.

The purpose code “Democratic participation and civil society” was the largest across the three regime types. The five largest donors of this type of ODA are all DAC donors: the United States (24%), the EU (16%), Sweden (13%), the United Kingdom (9%) and Germany (8%), together accounting for 70% of all flows regardless of the regime type. Democracy support also tended to be delivered through relatively small projects.

The level of support for “elections” has declined over time, in all regimes types, and especially in electoral autocracies. Support for “human rights” and “women’s rights organisations and movements, government institutions” has gained more weight over time, especially in electoral autocracies.

The “Other” category also saw its share increase as a result of the creation of two new purpose codes which were created after 2010: “ending violence against women and girls” and “facilitation of orderly, safe, regular, and responsible migration and mobility”.

Figure 5.15. Principal democracy promotion purpose codes from all official donors by regime type, 2010 and 2019



6 ODA responses to democratisation and autocratisation

This section looks at how ODA, ODA to governance (and its two sub-components “state building” and “democracy promotion”) respond to incremental democratisation, democratic critical junctures as well as processes of incremental autocratisation and autocratic critical junctures. Our findings highlight that **ODA flows in response to democratisation and democratic critical junctures increase, while no such uniform trend was visible in the case of incremental autocratisation and autocratic junctures.** In the case of autocratisation and autocratic junctures, this could be due to the fact that responses hinge on other factors, including foreign policy and geopolitical interests of donor governments.

6.1. Responses to incremental democratisation

Analysing ODA data, ODA to governance, ODA to state building and ODA to democracy promotion among the top 10 democratising countries in the period 2010-19 shows that ODA responds positively to processes of democratisation. This was measured in terms of how ODA and its sub-components changed for the countries with the largest difference between their Liberal Democracy Index (LDI) in 2010 and in 2019 (Table 6.1)

The LDI is a V-Dem indicator which “captures both electoral and liberal aspects of democracy” with measurements ranging from 0 (lowest) to 1 (highest) (Alizada et al., 2021, p. 13^[14]). The index measures, among other aspects, the quality of elections, individual rights, media and freedoms of association, checks and balances on the executive arm of government, respect for civil liberties, the rule of law, and the independence of the legislature and the judiciary.

Table 6.1. Top 10 democratisers from 2010 and 2019 and their changes in regime type

Recipient	LDI 2010	LDI 2019	Difference	Regime in 2010	Regime in 2019
Tunisia	0.104	0.646	0.542	Electoral autocracy	Electoral democracy
Armenia	0.191	0.636	0.445	Electoral autocracy	Electoral autocracy
Gambia	0.118	0.437	0.319	Electoral autocracy	Electoral democracy
Myanmar	0.034	0.266	0.232	Closed autocracy	Electoral autocracy
Niger	0.182	0.388	0.206	Closed autocracy	Electoral democracy
Sri Lanka	0.243	0.435	0.192	Electoral autocracy	Electoral democracy
Madagascar	0.088	0.268	0.18	Closed autocracy	Electoral autocracy
Ecuador	0.305	0.479	0.174	Electoral democracy	Electoral democracy
Fiji	0.109	0.274	0.165	Closed autocracy	Electoral autocracy
Georgia	0.36	0.512	0.152	Electoral democracy	Electoral democracy

Note LDI: Liberal Democracy Index.

The biggest democratisers were relatively small countries in terms of population. In seven out of ten countries, this involved a change of regime type (with Niger shifting two regime types). The other three countries democratised, but still remained in the same regime type.

A scoring system was created for Table 6.2 to calculate percentage increases and decreases in ODA attributed to these countries. This same scoring system was used for subsequent tables: green is a significant increase in ODA, brown a mild increase or decrease, and red a substantial decrease.

Table 6.2 shows that ODA in response to a process of democratisation led to increases in the four categories. The only exceptions are Ecuador, showing a slight decrease in ODA to governance support, and Sri Lanka, which experienced a decline in ODA flows and ODA to state building.

Table 6.2. Top 10 democratisers' evolution of ODA, ODA to governance, state building and democracy promotion from 2010 to 2019

Recipients	ODA	ODA Gov	State building	Democracy promotion
Armenia	67%	15%	17%	12%
Ecuador	154%	-18%	-26%	-13%
Fiji	105%	245%	504%	171%
Gambia	124%	62%	87%	24%
Georgia	13%	52%	84%	5%
Madagascar	68%	197%	194%	210%
Myanmar	483%	644%	3 219%	396%
Niger	116%	185%	387%	45%
Sri Lanka	-21%	4%	-43%	62%
Tunisia	96%	1 188%	863%	3 948%

Note: The color labels denote: green > 20%; brown < 20% and > -20% and red < -20%.

6.2. Responses to democratic junctures

Countries that experienced critical junctures (e.g. a new Constitution, a peace agreement, free and fair elections) were analysed to gain a better understanding of how ODA and some of its sub-components relate to such junctures in the two to three years after the event(s). All percentage increases were compared to the baseline year, which corresponds to the year in which the democratic critical juncture occurred. Sudden changes in Liberal Democracy Index (LDI) often correspond to critical junctures as identified in Table 6.3.

Table 6.3. Examples of democratic junctures

Country	Year	Event(s)
Burkina Faso	2016	Peaceful transfer of power with the first presidential elections since the departure of Blaise Compaore held in November 2015.
Fiji	2015	Peaceful return to democracy after the promulgation of a new Constitution in 2013 and the Fijian general elections of 2014 which saw Frank Bainimarama continue in power (this time after being elected).
Gambia	2017	Transition to democracy with elections held at the end of 2016.
Georgia	2013	Peaceful transition of power and transition to a parliamentary republic.
Mali	2014	Peaceful transition of power after the 2013 Malian presidential elections, which marked a turning point after the 2012 coup by the military in Mali.
Moldova	2010-11	Transition period and end of a political crisis with the holding of a presidential election in 2011 after an initial failed attempt.
Nepal	2014	The Nepali Congress Party wins the second Constituent Assembly elections and the Congress leader is elected prime minister in early 2014.
Niger	2011	Presidential and parliamentary elections held one year after the military coup in 2010.
Sri Lanka	2015	Presidential elections in Sri Lanka and peaceful transfer of power to the opposition (attempts of a coup by the losing side were also aborted).
Tunisia	2011-12	Tunisian Revolution.

Table 6.4. ODA to countries experiencing “democratic junctures” in Y2 and Y3 after the event

Recipients	ODA (Y2)	ODA (Y3)	Gov (Y2)	Gov (Y3)	State (Y2)	State (Y3)	Dem (Y2)	Dem (Y3)
Burkina Faso	4%	13%	36%	80%	68%	140%	-5%	3%
Fiji	36%	10%	81%	52%	338%	327%	45%	14%
Gambia	-25%		-75%		-80%		-32%	
Georgia	-13%	-13%	-3%	23%	21%	43%	-36%	-6%
Mali	11%	22%	31%	67%	34%	103%	26%	13%
Moldova	-18%	27%	32%	139%	91%	274%	-26%	4%
Nepal	34%	53%	8%	14%	3%	-5%	17%	43%
Niger	22%	43%	30%	57%	89%	118%	-44%	-20%
Sri Lanka	-8%	-14%	-30%	-25%	-58%	-74%	3%	33%
Tunisia	-20%	-23%	-53%	-47%	-73%	-56%	73%	10%

Note: The color labels denote: green > 20%; brown < 20% and > -20% and red < -20%.


The allocation of ODA two or three years after the occurrence of a critical juncture is mixed, with four countries experiencing a fairly consistent level of ODA (in “brown”), three/four receiving more ODA and one/two experiencing declines in ODA. There is a slightly more supportive trend in year three than in year two in many cases.

Most countries with democratic junctures benefited from increased ODA allocations to state building. This is not the case in terms of ODA to democracy promotion, where allocations were uneven, and even four instances – Gambia, Georgia, Moldova and Niger – in which ODA to democracy promotion declined two years after the juncture. Surprisingly, Gambia and Tunisia, two countries that are said to have democratised the most over the period, saw declining ODA and ODA to governance support, following their critical junctures (except for ODA to democracy promotion to Tunisia two to three years after the event).

Short case studies for Gambia and Tunisia explore in greater detail donor responses to the respective democratic junctures.

Tunisia's LDI increased rapidly over the period under review (Figure 6.1), from 0.104 in 2010 to 0.649 in 2012 as a result of the Jasmine Revolution, which led to the overthrow of Ben Ali in early 2011; the dissolution of "the State Security Division and other offices of the political police"; the setting up of an independent electoral commission; and the holding of free, transparent and fair elections in October 2011 (Zoubir, 2015^[15]). This culminated in the promulgation of a new national Constitution in January 2014.

Figure 6.1. Evolutions of ODA and ODA to governance in comparison to the Liberal Democracy Index in Tunisia, 2010-19




There was a slight ODA increase after the Revolution in 2011. However, in the following years, ODA flows decreased, only passing the 2012 levels in 2017 (with USD 1 391 million). In contrast, ODA to governance seems to have responded immediately to the events, increasing from USD 19 million in 2010 to USD 148 million in 2012. Upon closer examination, the largest share of this increase can be attributed to a USD 110 million project for anti-corruption reforms in 2012 although there are several democracy promotion projects of smaller volume in response to the Tunisian revolution. State building support and overall ODA followed a somewhat different pattern from democracy support, showing a bump in 2012, followed by a drop in 2013, then an incremental increase.

In Gambia, the LDI increased significantly over the decade (Figure 6.2), but especially from 2016 (0.112) to 2018 (0.438). In January 2017, Yahya Jammeh was ousted and a transfer of power through elections took place for the first time since independence in 1965. Several reforms followed, including the establishment of the Truth, Reconciliation, and Reparations Commission to investigate crimes conducted under Jammeh's 22-year rule, a reform of the intelligence agency, the declaration of repressive legislation

as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, and increased liberties of the press and citizens to criticise the government and discuss politics (Zoubir, 2015^[15]).

Figure 6.2. Evolutions of ODA and ODA to governance in comparison to the Liberal Democracy Index in Gambia, 2010-19



The increase in ODA closely paralleled the process of democratisation in the country, with an increase in ODA in 2017 (USD 321 million), much of which was provided through general budget support worth USD 47 million, and projects in “public sector policy and administrative management” (+USD 29 million) and “road transport” (+USD 24 million). However, despite the continued increase of the LDI in 2018-19, the level of ODA dropped, from USD 321 million in 2017 to USD 241 million in 2019.

ODA to governance increased from USD 7 million in 2010 to USD 45 million in 2017, before dropping to an average of USD 14 million in 2018 and 2019. Counterintuitively, there was less support given to state building after 2017 as visible in the decline in funds for “public sector policy and administrative management”. In the case of democracy promotion, support stayed constant at a low level especially for the “democratic participation and civil society” purpose code but decreased overall.

6.3. Responses to incremental autocratisation

ODA responses to gradual autocratisation show no discernible trend.

The top 10 autocratising countries were identified as those with the largest decline in LDI (Table 6.5). The top 10 list includes countries with high geographic diversity and large populations (e.g. Brazil, India and Türkiye). Seven out of ten of these countries shifted from an electoral democracy to an electoral autocracy, a change labelled as a “democratic breakdown” (Alizada et al., 2021, p. 19^[14]). This points to a critical challenge and raises the question of whether donors could do more to stem breakdowns.

Table 6.5. Top 10 autocratisers and changes in regime type for these countries, 2010-19

Recipient	LDI 2010	LDI 2019	Difference	Regime 2010	Regime 2019
Türkiye	0.397	0.109	-0.288	Electoral democracy	Electoral autocracy
Brazil	0.786	0.523	-0.263	Electoral democracy	Electoral democracy
Serbia	0.506	0.26	-0.246	Electoral democracy	Electoral autocracy
India	0.568	0.369	-0.199	Electoral democracy	Electoral autocracy
Benin	0.552	0.379	-0.173	Electoral democracy	Electoral autocracy
Thailand	0.342	0.178	-0.164	Electoral autocracy	Closed autocracy
Nicaragua	0.213	0.058	-0.155	Electoral autocracy	Electoral autocracy
Zambia	0.431	0.279	-0.152	Electoral democracy	Electoral autocracy
Comoros	0.32	0.185	-0.135	Electoral democracy	Electoral autocracy
Philippines	0.409	0.298	-0.111	Electoral democracy	Electoral autocracy

Note: LDI: Liberal Democracy Index.

In terms of ODA allocations to these countries, overall ODA increased for four out of ten recipients, stayed fairly stable for five and decreased in the case of Nicaragua (Table 6.6), which shows that autocratisation does not tend to be met with a decline in overall ODA, but rather the contrary. This is somewhat different for ODA to state building (eight out of ten declining), where a majority of the top 10 recipients saw a decline in flows. At the same time, surprisingly five out of the top 10 autocratising countries received higher amounts of ODA to democracy promotion. This suggests that ODA responses to processes of autocratisation are not uniform.

Table 6.6. Top 10 autocratisers' change in ODA, ODA to governance, state building and democracy promotion, 2010-19

Recipients	ODA	ODA gov	State building	Democracy promotion
Benin	1%	38%	61%	-1%
Brazil	10%	-24%	-43%	-19%
Comoros	54%	-49%	-46%	-55%
India	39%	-45%	-65%	24%
Nicaragua	-30%	-64%	-82%	-27%
Philippines	15%	-8%	-25%	22%
Serbia	50%	38%	52%	10%
Thailand	13%	20%	-39%	119%
Türkiye	120%	-52%	-90%	58%
Zambia	11%	-14%	-51%	45%

Note: The color labels denote: green > 20%; brown < 20% and > -20% and red < -20%.

Short case studies for Brazil and Türkiye show in greater detail donor responses to gradual autocratisation.

Türkiye's LDI deteriorated slowly from 2010 to 2013 (Figure 6.3), followed by a rapid and strong decline from 2013 (0.35) to 2017 (0.11). It then stabilised at a very low level. The start of the strong decline coincides with large-scale protests that took place in 2013. Zihnioglu argues that the aftermath of these protests is marked by the degradation of the legal and political environment for civic activism in Türkiye.

After being prime minister from 2003, Erdogan became Türkiye's president after the 2014 presidential elections. In 2016, following a failed military coup d'état against his government, a state of emergency – lifted in mid-2018 – was declared.¹⁸ Finally, in 2017, the Turkish constitution was amended as the result of a referendum resulting in the replacement of the existing parliamentary system and office of the Prime Minister by a presidential system and an executive presidency.

Figure 6.3. Evolutions of ODA and ODA to governance in comparison to the Liberal Democracy Index in Türkiye, 2010-19



Despite a rapid decline in the LDI, the amount of ODA allocated to Türkiye consistently increased until 2016 (USD 5 167 million) after which it declined (USD 2 832 million in 2019). The largest amount of ODA to Türkiye was for “formal sector financial intermediaries”¹⁹ (USD 8 162 million) and “rail transport”

¹⁸ France 24, “Two years after failed coup, Turkey ends state of emergency”, *France 24*, 19 July 2018. [Two years after failed coup, Turkey ends state of emergency \(france24.com\)](https://www.france24.com/en/turkey/20180719-turkey-ends-state-of-emergency)


¹⁹ All formal sector financial intermediaries; credit lines; insurance, leasing, venture capital, etc. (except when focused on only one sector).

(USD 4 343 million). The main donor was the EU, which provided USD 7 440 million for “formal sector financial intermediaries” and USD 3 023 million for “rail transport”.

ODA to governance declined between 2013 (USD 139 million) and 2014 (USD 30 million) then sharply increased from 2016 (USD 38 million) to 2018 (USD 256 million). Most of the increase between 2016 and 2017, during a period of repression, was for democracy promotion, particularly for “democratic participation and civil society” (USD 303 million).

The LDI in Brazil started declining in 2015 (Figure 6.4), two years prior to the election of Jair Bolsonaro as President. This decline was the result of an increase in political polarisation due to the impeachment of former President Dilma Rousseff for allegedly manipulating government accounts. The election of Jair Bolsonaro further contributed to the decline of the LDI on account of attacks against the media and the militarisation of politics (Vandenberghe and Marques Pereira, 2021^[16]; Barbosa, 2021^[17]).

Figure 6.4. Evolutions of ODA and ODA to governance in comparison to the Liberal Democracy Index in Brazil, 2010-19



ODA for Brazil peaked in 2012 at USD 1 556 million, subsequently decreasing to USD 649 million in 2019. This is largely due to a decrease in ODA flows for “environmental policy and administrative management”, “electric power transmission and distribution”, “sanitation – large systems” and “rail transport”.

ODA to governance bears little relation to the evolution of the LDI, oscillating yearly between USD 31 million and USD 39 million. Interestingly, most support was for democracy promotion: “democratic participation and civil society” (USD 135 million), “human rights” (USD 106 million), and “media and free flow of information” (USD 39 million).

6.4. Responses to autocratic junctures

An analysis of the evolution of ODA, ODA to governance, and its sub-components state building and democracy promotion was conducted two and three years after the occurrence of autocratic junctures.²⁰ All percentage increases were compared to the baseline year, which corresponds to the year in which the autocratic critical juncture occurred (Table 6.7).

Table 6.7. Examples of autocratic junctures

Country	Year	Event(s)
Brazil	2016	2015-16 protests in Brazil, polarisation of society and eventual removal from office of Dilma Rousseff (Brazil's President) in 2016.
Guinea-Bissau	2012	Coup d'état by the armed forces before the presidential elections.
Libya	2014	Beginning of the Libyan civil war.
Maldives	2013	2013 Maldivian elections see Abdulla Yameen become president – wide-scale infringements on human rights and enactment of autocratic measures follow.
Thailand	2014	Coup d'état led by the armed forces.
Türkiye	2014	2013 Gezi Park protests, 2013 corruption scandal and election of Erdogan in 2014 as president.

Table 6.8. ODA to countries experiencing “autocratic junctures” in Y2 and Y3 after the event

Recipients	ODA (Y2)	ODA (Y3)	Gov (Y2)	Gov (Y3)	State (Y2)	State (Y3)	Dem (Y2)	Dem (Y3)
Brazil	-24%	-32%	-5%	-16%	-36%	-9%	2%	-17%
Guinea-Bissau	38%	36%	31%	50%	96%	222%	-2%	-36%
Libya	5%	146%	-28%	195%	35%	356%	-59%	114%
Maldives	38%	46%	10%	-31%	18%	-54%	-15%	48%
Thailand	-5%	-7%	-24%	27%	-39%	13%	-6%	44%
Türkiye	27%	21%	26%	380%	149%	4%	-8%	484%

Note: The color labels denote: green > 20%; brown < 20% and > -20% and red < -20%.

Responses are mixed for ODA. In three (Y2) and four (Y3) cases, there is an increase of ODA following an autocratic juncture. In Libya and Thailand, sudden shifts towards more autocratic governance had only limited effects on ODA flows (except for Libya three years past the events, when a strong ODA increase can be noted resulting from a surge in humanitarian aid from USD 0.3 million in 2010 to USD 59 million in 2014). Only Brazil saw its ODA reduced.

As for governance support, there is also no clear pattern. Standing out are the sharp increases of governance support to Libya (195%) and Türkiye (380%) in year three after an initial decline by 28% for Libya. In the case of Libya, this is mostly support for state building, while ODA in Türkiye was predominantly

²⁰ For autocratising countries, instances of an LDI evolution equal to or less than 0.08 were highlighted as a cut-off point and subsequently linked to critical juncture events.

for democracy promotion. Most other countries experienced either a slight reduction in ODA to governance or a slight increase.

The uneven nature of ODA allocations following autocratic junctures (Table 6.8) suggests that donors do not have strategies to respond to instances of autocratisation and that responses hinge on other factors, almost certainly foreign policy.


6.5. Responses to autocratic backsliding

Another approach to analysing the reaction of overall ODA to critical junctures is to gauge how donors (in aggregate) react to countries undergoing a period of autocratic backsliding. This refers to countries regressing from electoral autocracies to closed autocracies as a result of critical junctures including the beginning of a civil war or a coup d'état (Table 6.9).

Table 6.9. Autocratic junctures and assessment of whether the situation is characterised by a humanitarian crisis, 2010-19

Country and year	Event leading to autocratic backsliding	Humanitarian Crisis
Egypt (2013)	Military coup	No
Guinea-Bissau (2013)	Military coup in 2012	No
Libya (2014)	Accepted year of the beginning of the Libyan civil war	Yes
Madagascar (2010)	Transitional government after the 2009 Malagasy coup d'état	No
Niger (2010)	Military coup	No
Syrian Arab Republic (2013)	Two years after the beginning of the civil war	Yes
Thailand (2014)	Military coup	No
Yemen (2016)	2nd year of the civil war	Yes

Figure 6.5. Overview of bilateral ODA flows to the Syrian Arab Republic broken down by humanitarian and development flows as well as DAC and non-DAC, 2010-19




ODA to Syria from 2010 to 2019 was largely characterised by increasing humanitarian aid. This coincides with the start of the civil war in Syria, which is ongoing and has led to a large-scale displacement crisis (with a total of 6.8 million refugees and 6.7 million internally displaced) (World Vision, 2021^[18]).

ODA allocation for humanitarian aid increased for both DAC and non-DAC donors (Figure 6.5). DAC humanitarian aid stabilised from 2013 and slowly decreased from 2016. For non-DAC donors, the start of ODA reporting by Türkiye in 2015 explains almost all of the expansion of humanitarian aid to Syria, which increased from USD 2 116 million in 2015 to USD 7 245 million in 2019. ODA provided by Türkiye consisted of a mix of Turkish semi-aggregate data and material relief assistance and services (more than USD 6 500 million in 2018 and 2019 alike).

Interestingly, in the case of DAC donors, ODA for development to Syria increased from USD 168 million in 2010 to USD 845 million in 2019 largely as a result of ODA for “civilian peace building”, “conflict prevention and resolution” (USD 1 141 million), “multisector aid” (USD 808 million), “higher education” (USD 756 million), and for “refugees/asylum seekers in donor countries” (USD 400 million).

Figure 6.6. Overview of bilateral ODA flows to Yemen broken down by humanitarian and development flows as well as DAC and non-DAC donors, 2010-19



In Yemen, there was a gradual increase in development and humanitarian ODA alike from 2011 onward (Figure 6.6). The start of the civil war in 2014 between the internationally recognised government led by Hadi and the Houthis marks a turning point in Yemen. However, it must be highlighted that the country was already experiencing a period of instability following the overthrow of President Saleh in early 2012. At present, Yemen is experiencing a protracted humanitarian crisis, with over 4 million internally displaced and more than 20 million people in need of humanitarian assistance (more than two-thirds of the population) (UNHCR, 2021^[19]).

There was a 30-fold increase in humanitarian aid between 2010 and 2019, from USD 107 million to USD 3 024 million, largely as a result of the start of the civil war, after which yearly allocations increased rapidly. DAC and non-DAC donors alike followed a similar trend of providing humanitarian ODA to Yemen after 2016 with some temporary dips (2016-17 for non-DAC and 2017-18 for DAC members).

In the case of development aid, there was a tripling of allocations over the period, from USD 647 million in 2010 to USD 1 527 million in 2019 largely thanks to non-DAC donors. Indeed, in the same period, the annual amount provided by DAC donors increased more slowly, from USD 202 million to USD 363 million. Among non-DAC donors, the allocation of development aid to Yemen was dominated by the United Arab Emirates (USD 4 056 million) and Saudi Arabia (USD 3 782 million). In particular, the largest interventions included budget support from Saudi Arabia (USD 2 710 million) and the United Arab Emirates (USD 2 613 million) and project-type interventions financed largely by the International Development Association (USD 2 161 million) and the United Arab Emirates (USD 1 406 million).

References

- Alizada, N. et al. (2021), *Autocratization Turns Viral: Democracy Report 2021*, V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden, https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/files/dr/dr_2021.pdf. [14]
- Barbosa, C. (2021), “Relembra 7 vezes em que o governo Bolsonaro se espelhou no Brasil da ditadura militar (in Portuguese)”, Brasil de Fato, <https://www.brasildefato.com.br/2021/03/31/relembra-7-vezes-em-que-o-governo-bolsonaro-se-espelhou-no-brasil-da-ditadura-militar>. [17]
- Coppedge, M. et al. (2020), *V-Dem Codebook v10*, Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. [6]
- DAC (2020), *DAC High Level Meeting Communiqué 2020*, <https://www.oecd.org/dac/development-assistance-committee/DAC-Joint-Statement-COVID-19.pdf> (accessed on 11 March 2022). [1]
- Dahl, R. (1998), *On Democracy*, Yale University Press. [3]
- Freedom House (2021), *Tanzania*, Freedom House, <https://freedomhouse.org/country/tanzania/freedom-world/2021>. [9]
- International Crisis Group (2021), “Bolivia: Shifting loyalties complicate route to reconciliation”, web page, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/andes/bolivia/bolivia-shifting-loyalties-complicate-route-reconciliation>. [8]
- Lührmann, A. (2019), *V-Dem Annual Democracy Report 2019: Democracy Facing Global Challenges*, V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden, https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/files/dr/dr_2019.pdf. [4]
- Lührmann, A., M. Tannenbergs and S. Lindberg (2018), “Regimes of the World (RoW): Opening avenues for the comparative study of political regimes”, *Politics and Governance*, Vol. 6/1, pp. 1-16, <https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v6i1.1214>. [2]
- Mosquera, J. (2021), “Understanding political and social unrest in Bolivia”, web page, ACLED, <https://acleddata.com/2021/03/24/understanding-political-and-social-unrest-in-bolivia>. [7]
- The Economist (2021), “Benin’s democratic beacon dims”, 10 April, <https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2021/04/08/benins-democratic-beacon-dims>. [12]

- Timberman, D. (2019), "Philippine politics under Duterte: A midterm assessment", Carnegie Endowment, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/01/10/philippine-politics-under-duterte-midterm-assessment-pub-78091>. [10]
- UNHCR (2021), "Total registered Syrian refugees", *Operational Data Portal*, August 2021. [13]
- UNHCR (2021), "Yemen emergency", March 2021, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, <https://www.unhcr.org/yemen-emergency.html>. [19]
- Vandenberghe, F. and J. Marques Pereira (2021), "Jair Bolsonaro is betting on chaos in Brazil", *Open Democracy*, <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/democraciaabierta/jair-bolsonaro-betting-on-chaos-in-brazil>. [16]
- V-Dem (2021), *Autocratisation Turns Viral: Democracy Report 2021*, V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden, https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/files/dr/dr_2021.pdf. [11]
- V-Dem (n.d.), *The V-Dem Dataset*, <https://v-dem.net/vdemds.html> (accessed on 14 March 2022). [5]
- World Vision (2021), "Syrian refugee crisis: Facts, FAQs, and how to help", World Vision Inc, <https://www.worldvision.org/refugees-news-stories/syrian-refugee-crisis-facts>. [18]
- Zoubir, Y. (2015), "The democratic transition in Tunisia: A success story in the making", *Conflict Trends*, Issue 1, pp. 10-17, African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), <https://media.africaportal.org/documents/ACCORD-Conflict-Trends-2015-1.pdf>. [15]

Annex A. Classification of recipients by regime type from V-Dem's Regimes of the World typology, 2010-20

Table A.1. Regime classification 2010-2020

Note: The color coding stands as follows: **CA** – Closed autocracy; **EA** – Electoral autocracy; **ED** – Electoral democracy; **LD** – Liberal democracy.

Recipient	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Afghanistan	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Albania	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	EA	ED
Algeria	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Angola	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Argentina	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
Armenia	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Azerbaijan	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Bangladesh	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Belarus	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Benin	ED	ED	ED	LD	LD	ED	ED	ED	ED	EA	EA
Bhutan	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
Bolivia	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	EA	EA
Bosnia and Herzegovina	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
Botswana	LD	LD	LD	LD	LD	LD	LD	ED	ED	ED	ED
Brazil	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
Burkina Faso	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	EA	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
Burundi	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Cabo Verde	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
Cambodia	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Cameroon	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Central African Republic	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Chad	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
China (People's Republic of)	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA
Colombia	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
Comoros	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Congo	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Costa Rica	LD	LD	LD	LD	LD	LD	LD	LD	LD	LD	LD
Côte d'Ivoire	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	ED	ED	ED	ED	EA
Cuba	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA

70 | OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE BY REGIME CONTEXT (2010-2019)

Recipient	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA
Democratic Republic of the Congo	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Djibouti	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Dominican Republic	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
Ecuador	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
Egypt	EA	EA	EA	CA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
El Salvador	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
Equatorial Guinea	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Eritrea	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA
Eswatini	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA
Ethiopia	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Fiji	CA	CA	CA	CA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Gabon	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Gaza Strip	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA
Gambia	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	ED	ED	ED
Georgia	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
Ghana	LD	LD	LD	LD	LD	ED	ED	LD	LD	LD	LD
Guatemala	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
Guinea	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Guinea-Bissau	EA	EA	EA	CA	EA	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
Guyana	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
Haiti	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Honduras	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
India	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	EA	EA
Indonesia	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
Iran	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Iraq	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Jamaica	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
Jordan	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA
Kazakhstan	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Kenya	EA	EA	EA	EA	ED	ED	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Kosovo	ED	EA	EA	EA	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
Kyrgyzstan	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Lao People's Democratic Republic	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA
Lebanon	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	EA	EA	EA
Lesotho	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
Liberia	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
Libya	CA	CA	EA	ED	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA
Madagascar	CA	CA	CA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Malawi	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	EA	ED
Malaysia	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Maldives	ED	ED	ED	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	ED	ED
Mali	ED	ED	EA	EA	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	EA	EA
Mauritania	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Mauritius	LD	LD	LD	LD	LD	LD	LD	ED	ED	ED	ED

Recipient	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Mexico	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
Moldova	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
Mongolia	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
Montenegro	ED	ED	ED	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Morocco	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA
Mozambique	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Myanmar	CA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Namibia	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
Nepal	ED	ED	EA	EA	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
Nicaragua	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Niger	CA	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
Nigeria	EA	EA	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
North Macedonia	ED	ED	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	ED	ED	ED	ED
Pakistan	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Panama	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
Papua New Guinea	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Paraguay	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
Peru	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
Philippines	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	EA	EA	EA
Rwanda	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Sao Tome and Principe	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
Senegal	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
Serbia	ED	ED	ED	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Sierra Leone	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
Solomon Islands	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
Somalia	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA
South Africa	LD	LD	LD	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
South Sudan	NA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA
Sri Lanka	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
Sudan	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	CA	CA
Suriname	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
Syrian Arab Republic	EA	EA	EA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA
Tajikistan	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Tanzania	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Thailand	EA	EA	ED	EA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA
Timor-Leste	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
Togo	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Tunisia	EA	EA	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
Türkiye	ED	ED	ED	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Turkmenistan	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Uganda	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Ukraine	ED	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	ED
Uzbekistan	EA	EA	EA	EA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA
Vanuatu	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
Venezuela	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Viet Nam	CA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA
West Bank	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Yemen	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA
Zambia	ED	ED	ED	ED	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA

72 | OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE BY REGIME CONTEXT (2010-2019)

Recipient	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Zimbabwe	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA

Annex B. Classification of recipients from V-Dem's Regimes of the World ambiguous typology, 2010-20

Table B.1. Regime classification 2010-2020: ambiguous typology

Note: The color coding stands as follows: **CA – Closed autocracy**; CAUB – Closed autocracy upper bound; EALB – Electoral autocracy lower bound; EA – Electoral autocracy; EAUB – Electoral autocracy upper bound; EDLB – Electoral democracy lower bound; ED – Electoral democracy; EDUB – Electoral democracy upper bound; LDLB – Liberal democracy lower bound; LD – Liberal democracy

Recipient	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Afghanistan	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Albania	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EAUB	EDLB
Algeria	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Angola	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Argentina	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
Armenia	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EAUB	EAUB	EAUB
Azerbaijan	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Bangladesh	EAUB	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Belarus	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Benin	EDUB	EDUB	EDUB	LDLB	LDLB	ED	ED	ED	ED	EAUB	EA
Bhutan	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB
Bolivia	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	EAUB	EA
Bosnia and Herzegovina	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB
Botswana	LDLB	LDLB	LDLB	LDLB	LDLB	LDLB	LDLB	EDUB	EDUB	EDUB	EDUB
Brazil	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
Burkina Faso	ED	ED	ED	ED	EDUB	EA	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
Burundi	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Cabo Verde	EDUB	EDUB	EDUB	EDUB	EDUB	EDUB	EDUB	EDUB	ED	ED	ED
Cambodia	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Cameroon	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Central African Republic	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Chad	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
China (People's Republic of)	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA
Colombia	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
Comoros	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	ED	ED	EA	EAUB	EA	EA	EA	EA

Recipient	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Congo	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Costa Rica	LD	LD	LD	LD	LD	LD	LD	LD	LD	LD	LD
Côte d'Ivoire	EA	EA	EAUB	EAUB	EAUB	EAUB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EA
Cuba	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA
Djibouti	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Dominican Republic	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	ED
Ecuador	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	EDLB	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
Egypt	EA	EA	EA	CA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EALB	EALB	EALB
El Salvador	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
Equatorial Guinea	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Eritrea	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA
Eswatini	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA
Ethiopia	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Fiji	CA	CA	CA	CA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Gabon	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Gaza Strip	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA
Gambia	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EAUB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB
Georgia	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	EDUB	ED	ED
Ghana	LDLB	LDLB	LDLB	LDLB	LDLB	ED	EDUB	LDLB	LDLB	LDLB	LDLB
Guatemala	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
Guinea	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EAUB	EA	EA	EA	EA	EALB
Guinea-Bissau	EAUB	EAUB	EA	CA	EAUB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB
Guyana	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	EDLB
Haiti	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Honduras	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EAUB	EA	EA	EA	EA
India	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	EDLB	EDLB	EAUB	EAUB
Indonesia	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	EDUB	ED
Iran	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Iraq	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Jamaica	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
Jordan	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA
Kazakhstan	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Kenya	EA	EA	EA	EAUB	EDLB	EDLB	EAUB	EAUB	EA	EAUB	EAUB
Kosovo	EDLB	EAUB	EAUB	EAUB	EDLB	ED	ED	EDLB	ED	ED	ED
Kyrgyzstan	EA	EAUB	EAUB	EAUB	EA	EAUB	EA	EA	EAUB	EA	EA
Lao People's Democratic Republic	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA
Lebanon	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EAUB	EAUB	EAUB
Lesotho	ED	EDUB	EDUB	ED	ED	ED	ED	EDLB	ED	ED	EDUB
Liberia	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED

Recipient	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Libya	CA	CA	EA	EDLB	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA
Madagascar	CA	CA	CA	EA	EA	EAUB	EAUB	EAUB	EAUB	EAUB	EAUB
Malawi	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EAUB	EDLB
Malaysia	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Maldives	ED	ED	EDLB	EAUB	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EDLB	ED
Mali	ED	ED	EA	EA	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EAUB	EAUB
Mauritania	EAUB	EAUB	EAUB	EAUB	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Mauritius	LD	LD	LD	LD	LDLB	LDLB	LDLB	EDUB	EDUB	EDUB	EDUB
Mexico	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
Moldova	ED	EDUB	EDUB	ED	ED	ED	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	ED	ED
Mongolia	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
Montenegro	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EAUB	EAUB	EAUB	EAUB	EA	EA	EAUB	EAUB
Morocco	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA
Mozambique	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Myanmar	CA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Namibia	EDUB	EDUB	EDUB	EDUB	EDUB	EDUB	EDUB	ED	ED	EDUB	EDUB
Nepal	EDLB	EDLB	EA	EA	EDUB	EDUB	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
Nicaragua	EAUB	EAUB	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Niger	CA	EDLB	EDUB	EDUB	EDUB	EDUB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB
Nigeria	EA	EAUB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	ED	ED	ED	ED	EDLB	EDLB
North Macedonia	EDLB	EDLB	EAUB	EAUB	EAUB	EAUB	EAUB	ED	ED	ED	ED
Pakistan	EAUB	EAUB	EAUB	EAUB	EAUB	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Panama	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
Papua New Guinea	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Paraguay	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
Peru	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
Philippines	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EAUB	EAUB	EA
Rwanda	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Sao Tome and Principe	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
Senegal	EDUB	EDUB	EDUB	EDUB	EDUB	EDUB	EDUB	EDUB	EDUB	EDUB	EDUB
Serbia	EDUB	EDUB	EDUB	EAUB	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Sierra Leone	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	ED	ED	EDLB
Solomon Islands	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
Somalia	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA
South Africa	LDLB	LDLB	LDLB	EDUB	EDUB	EDUB	EDUB	EDUB	EDUB	EDUB	EDUB
South Sudan		CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA
Sri Lanka	EA	EA	EA	EAUB	EAUB	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
Sudan	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	CA	CA
Suriname	ED	ED	ED	EDUB	EDUB	EDUB	EDUB	EDUB	EDUB	ED	ED
Syrian Arab Republic	EALB	EALB	EALB	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA
Tajikistan	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Tanzania	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EAUB	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Thailand	EA	EAUB	EDLB	EA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA

76 | OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE BY REGIME CONTEXT (2010-2019)

Recipient	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Timor-Leste	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED
Togo	EA	EA	EA	EAUB	EAUB	EAUB	EAUB	EAUB	EAUB	EA	EA
Tunisia	EA	EA	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	EDUB	ED	ED	ED
Türkiye	ED	EDLB	EDLB	EAUB	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Turkmenistan	EALB	EALB	EALB	EALB	EALB	EALB	EALB	EALB	EALB	EALB	EALB
Uganda	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Ukraine	EDLB	EAUB	EAUB	EAUB	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EAUB	EDLB
Uzbekistan	EALB	EALB	EALB	EALB	CAUB	CA	CA	CA	CA	CAUB	CAUB
Vanuatu	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	ED	EDUB
Venezuela	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Viet Nam	CA	EALB	EALB	EALB	EALB	EALB	CAUB	CAUB	CAUB	CAUB	CAUB
West Bank	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Yemen	EA	EA	EALB	EALB	EALB	EALB	CA	CA	CA	CA	CA
Zambia	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EDLB	EAUB	EAUB	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
Zimbabwe	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA

Annex C. List of Development Assistance Committee members

Australia	Japan
Austria	Korea
Belgium	Luxembourg
Canada	Netherlands
Czech Republic	New Zealand
Denmark	Norway
European Union	Poland
Finland	Portugal
France	Slovak Republic
Germany	Slovenia
Greece	Spain
Hungary	Sweden
Iceland	Switzerland
Ireland	United Kingdom
Italy	United States

Annex D. Decomposition analysis

An analytical scenario referred to as “constant” was created to better understand whether allocation changed due to the reclassification of regimes or due to changes in official development assistance (ODA) to individual recipients. The “constant” scenario was created by taking the regime allocation in 2010 and making it the same for the subsequent years until 2019. This scenario was then compared to the way ODA is actually allocated across regimes with ODA overall, development ODA and humanitarian ODA. This is useful as the constant scenario allows us to better understand whether donors changed their allocation for existing regimes, using 2010 as a baseline scenario, or whether the changes observed are mostly due to regime classification.²¹


Table D.1. ODA allocation change from 2010 to 2019

Regime category	ODA official/ODA <i>constant</i>	ODA humanitarian official/ODA <i>constant humanitarian</i>	ODA development official/ODA <i>constant development</i>
Closed autocracy	178%/50%	1 681%/197%	49%/39%
Electoral autocracy	41%/41%	36%/175%	42%/20%
Electoral democracy	-18%/18%	143%/357%	-22%/10%
All ODA	33%	193%	17%

A quick analysis of the trajectories of the “official” and “constant” flows of ODA towards closed autocracies shows a different overall trend starting to accentuate from 2015 onwards with the growth of the “official” category outpacing that of the “constant” category (Figure D.1). This was due mostly to humanitarian ODA, as the development graph shows a limited divergence between the two categories. In particular, the acceleration of this divergence is due first and foremost to the acceleration of humanitarian ODA to Syria (closed autocracy from 2013) from 2015 (USD 4 021 million), with the trend accelerating in subsequent years, and to the inclusion of Yemen as a closed autocracy in 2016 (with increasing humanitarian ODA flows from 2016 to 2019 during the continuation of the civil war).

²¹ To ensure that only regimes existing in 2010 were used, South Sudan was removed from the analysis, which explains why the trajectory of the “official” category differs from other parts of the report.

Figure D.1. Bilateral ODA flows to closed autocracies from all official donors for total ODA, development ODA and humanitarian ODA comparing an “official” and “constant” scenario, 2010-19




In the case of development ODA, more went to closed autocracies in the “constant” scenario than in the “official” scenario until 2016. This was principally due to the fact that Viet Nam was classified as an electoral autocracy from 2011 to 2015. It can also be attributed to the reclassification of Madagascar as an electoral autocracy from 2013, of Niger from 2011 and of Myanmar from 2011.

In conclusion, a few observations can be made about the nature of ODA towards closed autocracies:

- The level of overall ODA towards closed autocracies keeping regimes “constant” (+50%) evolved more rapidly than that of overall ODA (33%). At the same time, “official” ODA (+178%) evolved much more rapidly than “constant” ODA (+50%), meaning that the difference was due to changes in regimes that became closed autocracies or changed from closed autocracies to other regime types.
- The level of both “constant” (+39%) and “official” (+49%) development ODA was higher than the average progress of all ODA (+17%), suggesting that regardless of regime changes, a larger portion of ODA was allocated to regimes that were classified as closed autocracies in 2010.
- The level of humanitarian ODA holding regimes “constant” (+197%) from 2010 is similar to the average level of change of humanitarian ODA (+193%). The level of change in “official” ODA for humanitarian ODA (+1 681%) can therefore be attributed to the reclassification of regimes as closed autocracies after 2010.

The trajectory of “overall” and “constant” ODA to electoral autocracies was very similar, with some minor differences between 2018 and 2019 (Figure D.2).

Figure D.2. Bilateral ODA flows to electoral autocracies from all official donors comparing an “official” and “constant” scenario, 2010-19



With regard to ODA for development, there is a divergence especially between 2018 and 2019 as a result of the reclassification of a number of recipients that became electoral autocracies in 2019, including: India (USD 5 797 million), Mali (USD 1 773 million after being an electoral autocracy temporarily in 2012-13), Malawi (USD 1 158 million), the Plurinational State of Bolivia (USD 831 million), Benin (USD 692 million) and Albania (USD 314 million). Other medium-sized recipients like the Philippines (USD 1 141 million in 2018) and Lebanon (USD 968 million) became electoral autocracies from 2018 onward.

With regard to ODA for humanitarian purposes, there is also a divergence from 2014 onward. This occurred mostly due to the reclassification of Syria as a closed autocracy from 2013 with an acceleration of humanitarian aid to Syria in 2015 (USD 4 021 million) and to the reclassification of Yemen as a closed autocracy in 2016.


In conclusion, a few observations can be made about the nature of ODA towards electoral autocracies:

- The level of overall ODA towards closed autocracies keeping regimes “constant” (+41%) evolved more rapidly than that of overall ODA (33%). At the same time, “official” ODA (+41%) evolved at the same pace as “constant” ODA (+41%), meaning that the difference is due to reclassifications to different regimes which cancelled each other out (e.g. India became an electoral autocracy while Syria became a closed autocracy).
- The level of both “constant” (+39%) and “official” (+49%) development ODA was higher than the average progress of all ODA (+17%), suggesting that regardless of regime changes, a larger portion of ODA was allocated to regimes that were classified as electoral autocracies in 2010.

- The change in humanitarian ODA for the “official” scenario (+36%) was lower than the average level of change of humanitarian ODA (+193%) and “constant” scenario (+175%). This is due to the fact that the electoral autocracies with the largest increases in humanitarian aid from 2010 to 2019 were reclassified as closed autocracies from 2010 to 2019.

The trajectory of “overall” and “constant” ODA to electoral democracies follows a similar trajectory until 2017, after which the divergence accentuates the most between 2018 and 2019 (Figure D.3).

Figure D.3. Bilateral ODA flows to electoral democracies from all official donors comparing an “official” and “constant” scenario, 2010-19



With regard to ODA for development, there is a similar divergence, especially between 2018 and 2019 as a result of the reclassification of a number of recipients that became electoral autocracies in 2019 (see above section on electoral autocracies for greater details).

With regard to ODA for humanitarian purposes, there is also a divergence from 2018, with “official” humanitarian ODA following a downward trend while “constant” ODA increased from 2018 to 2019. This occurred due to increased humanitarian ODA for Türkiye, which doubled from 2018 to 2019 (from USD 541 million to USD 1 086 million) and to a number of other recipients that were reclassified as electoral autocracies, including India, Lebanon, Malawi and Mali.

In conclusion, the following observations can be made about the nature of ODA towards electoral democracies:


- The level of overall ODA towards electoral democracies keeping regimes “official” (-18%) evolved less rapidly than that of overall ODA (33%) and “constant” (18%). This is due to a trend of democratic backsliding which accelerated from 2018 to 2019. Regardless of this trend, the fact that

“constant” ODA (18%) evolved at a slower rate than overall ODA (33%) indicates that additional ODA was, in fact, allocated to recipients that were autocracies in 2010.

- The level of both “constant” (+10%) and “official” (-22%) development ODA are lower than the average progress of all ODA for development (+17%). The difference between “constant” and “official” is due to regime reclassification, from democracy to autocracy, while the fact that both are lower than average evolution for ODA for development suggests that additional ODA was allocated mostly to autocracies.
- The level of humanitarian ODA holding regimes “constant” (+357%) from 2010 is higher than the average level of change of humanitarian ODA (+193%) and “official” ODA for humanitarian ODA (+143%). This means that additional ODA for humanitarian aid was allocated to regimes that became autocracies after 2010 but were previously electoral democracies.

Annex E. Closed autocracy decomposition

Figure E.1. Bilateral ODA flows to closed autocracies from all official donors divided by flows from all closed autocracies



Note: Syria and Yemen from 2010-19 are represented as separate from other closed autocracies