



Building Trust in Public Institutions

Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions in New Zealand



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Foreword

In New Zealand, the government's response to the COVID-19 crisis is considered effective as it protected people's lives with limited affectations to the society and the economy. A key factor for achieving these results was the focus on collective goals, grounded in the high-trust relationship that exists between New Zealanders and their public institutions. Still, high levels of trust should not be taken for granted. As new challenges emerge and old ones reappear, people in New Zealand expect the government to build on the lessons from the pandemic to improve service delivery and the resilience of public institutions.

As is the case for many other countries, the economic context in New Zealand is deteriorating, with increased levels of inflation that could undermine people's living conditions in the short term. In parallel, and despite a recent moderation housing prices have risen drastically in recent years, sparking a debate on intergenerational equality and whether future generations will be able to achieve a standard of living similar to today's. Global warming, moreover, increases the likelihood of environmental disasters intensified by New Zealand's natural exposure and high reliance on natural resources, raising the stakes on government's ability to effectively manage intergenerational and global challenges. At the same time, New Zealand continues to address its colonial legacy and strives to reconcile the rights and expectations of all population groups composing the country. Preserving public trust will be essential to maintain the legitimacy of public institutions, nurture social cohesion and effectively address these challenges.

This report draws on quantitative information collected through the 2021 OECD Trust survey implemented in New Zealand alongside 21 other OECD countries. In addition, it relies on the insights provided in more than 40 interviews with government officials, civil society representatives and academics in New Zealand as well as the input provided by the Steering Group created by the New Zealand administration to accompany this project. Following Korea in 2018, Finland in 2021 and Norway in 2022, this is the fourth OECD country study in the series "Building Trust in Public Institutions". It is the first study to benefit from a large set of comparative data collected through the OECD Trust Survey that allows New Zealand to be benchmarked against other small, advanced economies and other anglophone countries with a similar institutional or cultural background.

Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions in New Zealand emphasises the importance of making public services more responsive by ensuring that all public services use "learning loops" to address citizen feedback. It also recognizes the potential of further integrating long-term thinking into policy making with an emphasis on institutional memory and technical capacity. Finally, it stresses the need to develop a holistic approach to counter the spread of mis- and disinformation and to further strengthen the integrity system.

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Executive Summary

Trust in others and in public institutions in New Zealand is comparatively high. High levels of trust helped New Zealand's administration navigate the COVID-19 pandemic with minimum impact on society and the economy. Some of the reasons behind this effective response included a high reliance on expertise, an emphasis on shared goals coined by the slogan "a team of five million", and high confidence in the functioning of a politically neutral, effective, and trusted public service that worked in a co-ordinated manner. However, despite the positive outcomes achieved on many fronts, New Zealand is not exempt from challenges to its democracy. The Wellington protests -- an anti-vaccine demonstration fueled by misleading information that led to occupation of the Parliament surroundings and other key locations in the country in February 2022 -- highlighted the pervasive effects of mis- and disinformation, even when policies have delivered their intended outcomes.

According to the 2021 OECD Trust Survey, implemented as part of this study, trust in New Zealand is highest in the police (73%) and the courts (65%) and lowest in local government councilors (45%) and the media (35%). Just over half (56%) of New Zealanders reported trusting the public service, which is above the OECD average (50%), but only in the middle of the benchmarking group of small, advanced economies and other anglophone countries considered for this study.

The drivers of public trust also vary according to the institution and level of government considered, suggesting a need for different strategies to ensure that policies and reforms addressing trust are correctly targeted. The responsiveness of public services and the reliability of government in addressing future challenges are important drivers of trust in the public service. Levels of trust in local governments are most influenced by meaningful engagement opportunities and fairness of treatment. Similarly, trust in Parliament is predominantly influenced by meaningful engagement opportunities, but also by expectations of having a say in what the government does and the reliability of institutions in addressing future environmental challenges and maintaining the stability of business conditions.

In a context where complexity is the norm, governments are expected to respond rapidly and effectively to people's changing demands and expectations. New Zealand needs a competent and trusted public service to help ensure the well-being of the country and all its people. The public service act, enacted in 2020, emphasizes "a spirit of service to the community" as the fundamental characteristic of the public service, to be nurtured across all organisations. In the framework of the act, New Zealand Public Service Commission released the first briefing on the state of the public service in December 2022. The briefing states the vision for the public sector and discusses progress to promote stewardship and transform the public sector. This report is expected to contribute to these efforts. It recognizes that in some instances the perceived quality of public services is deteriorating, requiring complementary actions to improve satisfaction and preserve and strengthen public trust.

The main recommendations of this report revolve around six main areas: 1) Upgrading measures of trust to build a robust evidence base; 2) Strengthening responsiveness of services for people's well-being; 3) Enhancing preparedness and strengthening foresight in policy making; 4) Improving transparency and achieving meaningful engagement; 5) Reinforcing the integrity system; 6) Preserving and strengthening fairness. The main findings and recommendations are summarised below.

Main Findings	Main Recommendations
Upgrading measures of trust to build a robust evidence base	
<p>New Zealand collects measures of experience and satisfaction with the public service through the Kiwis Count survey.</p> <p>Results from the OECD Trust Survey shed light on the fact that complementary regular information is needed to understand how people perceive the competences and values of the public service and their relationship to levels of trust.</p>	<p>Questions included in the Kiwis Count Survey allow tracking the evolution of trust over time but can be complemented with measures that align with the OECD Survey on the Drivers of Trust.</p> <p>Regularly collect answers to questions on the drivers of trust that can provide guidance on where to invest to preserve and strengthen trust in public institutions. Measures on the expected responsiveness of services, the reliability of long-term policies, engagement opportunities and perceived integrity and fairness can allow monitoring the effects of different policies and actions over time, as well as their relationship to trust levels.</p>
<p>There are variations in trust levels by population groups. Māori, young people, people outside the large urban areas, the less educated and those with less income have consistently lower levels of trust in institutions.</p> <p>Indicative evidence suggests that there is important variation when looking jointly at socioeconomic characteristics within populations groups (e.g. ethnicity and education or income levels)</p>	<p>Expand sample sizes in survey-based research for having representativeness by combined socioeconomic characteristics. This would allow analysing systematically the differences within and across populations groups.</p> <p>Quantitative analysis can be complemented by qualitative evidence obtained for example through text analysis, focus groups or cognitive testing that can contribute to an understanding of why some groups or sub-groups are systematically distrustful.</p>
Strengthening the responsiveness of services for people's well-being	
<p>43% of New Zealanders believe that government will improve a service when people complain, while 38% are sceptical that the service would be improved.</p> <p>Findings show that responding to people's complaints on service provision is the most important driver of trust in the public service.</p>	<p>Ensure all public services use "learning loops" to address citizen feedback.</p> <p>Systems to gather and act on citizen feedback are central to public service responsiveness. It is crucial to ensure that these are present throughout frontline services.</p> <p>All agencies should analyse the experience of different sub-groups and communities, to identify the differing problems they face.</p>
<p>In line with many OECD countries, just over 40% of New Zealanders see the public sector as innovative. The adoption of innovative ideas is a significant driver of trust in local government in New Zealand.</p>	<p>Government could strengthen public sector innovation through cross-agency learning mechanisms.</p> <p>Digital services can make interactions with government institutions faster and easier, and promote the provision of seamless services. New Zealand has undertaken successful digital reforms in taxation. This should galvanise ongoing efforts on digital government.</p> <p>There is room to proactively ensure further transparency in how personal data is used.</p>

Main Findings	Main Recommendations
<p>New Zealand has a highly centralised government, with limited local government involvement in service delivery. Just 45% of the population reported trusting local government, the lowest of the benchmarking group of countries.</p>	<p>Ensure local government has appropriate competence and capacity that can aid responsiveness. Local government policy should actively consider the local government roles and competences needed to boost responsiveness. New Zealand could also consider putting in place institutional mechanisms to help citizens to seek redress for issues with local government.</p>
Enhancing preparedness and strengthening foresight in policy making	
<p>Preparedness to cope with future crises is a key driver of trust in the public service. While the response to COVID-19 in New Zealand was considered successful, it is important to strengthen institutional mechanisms for long-term policy foresight.</p>	<p>Integrate long-term thinking into policy making. The Long Terms Insight Briefs are a powerful tool, yet it is important to advance conversations on how they might affect/influence policy.</p> <p>Core public service agencies should focus on building institutional memory and the technical capacity for long-term thinking</p>
<p>New Zealand has a well-defined institutional framework for climate change policy. Yet only 35% of the population is confident that New Zealand will succeed in reducing greenhouse gas emissions.</p>	<p>To further improve trust, policy must bridge gaps in hitting emission targets. Adaptation will be important in shielding the public, and both central and local authorities must maintain capability to deliver adaptation.</p>
<p>62% of people survey respondents in New Zealand believe that it is likely that government institutions will be ready to protect people's lives if a serious new contagious disease spreads. New Zealand is however highly exposed in comparative terms to natural hazards.</p>	<p>Provide faster and more citizen-focused responses to disasters.</p> <p>Strengthen post-event accountability and lesson-learning functions in central government.</p> <p>Ensure transparency to citizens on how risk management decisions and recovery activities are undertaken.</p>
<p>Failures to effectively address widely recognised policy issues are a risk to levels of trust:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Levels of satisfaction with the education system are low (50% compared to 57.6% on average in OECD and the lowest of the benchmarking group) and there is declining attainment as measured by OECD PISA results • New Zealand has high and rising housing costs compared to OECD peers. • Child poverty in New Zealand is comparatively high and has pervasive implications as a replicator of inequalities over time 	<p>Identify what factors contributed to New Zealand's successful response to the COVID-19 crisis in terms of effectively harnessing a relatively small pool of public health expertise and reallocating resources to address key needs would help identifying transferable lessons for other pressing issues.</p>

Main Findings	Main Recommendations
Improving transparency and achieving meaningful engagement	
<p>Results from the Trust Survey find that over three-quarters of the New Zealand population expect information about administrative process to be easily available. However, there are limitations, as several regulatory exemptions and restrictions apply to sharing information.</p>	<p>Promote a culture of more proactive disclosure of information. Extend efforts to use plain language, set clear goals, target audiences and messages, and identify best channels to reach different publics.</p>
<p>Less than half of New Zealanders expect to be consulted on issues affecting their community and only 37% expect that the views expressed by people in public consultations will be adopted.</p>	<p>Ensure that opportunities for citizens' engagement are meaningful and broad - including instances for deliberation and participation, especially at the local level - so that people perceive a sincere invitation to inclusive policy making.</p>
<p>Having a say in what the government does is among the most important drivers of trust in the parliament.</p> <p>Despite high levels of voter turnout in national elections, New Zealanders present low levels of political engagement in other political activities, including voting in local elections, and there is widespread scepticism about people's ability to influence political issues. This trend is more acute for Māori and other minority groups.</p>	<p>Proactively reach out to those who feel left behind, preventing participation gaps from becoming structural political inequalities.</p> <p>Invest in improving political socialisation and outreach to specific segments of the population, such as the young, the less educated, the Māori or Pacifica communities.</p>
<p>Trust in the media was 35% in New Zealand in 2021, below the OECD average (38%) and on the lower end of the benchmarking group. The changing media ecosystem has played a curcial role in undermining institutional trust in other countries that have a similar cultural and institutional background to New Zealand.</p>	<p>Develop a holistic approach to counter the spread of mis- and disinformation. Promote diverse, independent and quality media; support media and digital literacy; consider transparency requirements and issues related to the business models of social media platforms and explore other efforts to strengthen the information ecosystem.</p>
Reinforcing the integrity system	
<p>New Zealand ranks one of the least corrupt countries in the world on international metrics such as the Corruption Perception Index by Transparency International.</p> <p>However, results from the OECD Trust survey show that less than half of New Zealanders believe courts would always act free from political influence (43.9%) or that public employees would refuse money offered to speed up access to public services (48%).</p>	<p>Reinforce the transition towards a more preventive integrity approach, invest more in training beyond awareness, and include integrity elements in risk management and internal control.</p> <p>Include these efforts in a comprehensive national integrity strategy, co-ordinated by the central government, but accompanied by integrity initiatives at the local level, aiming to bridge gaps and prevent legal loopholes.</p> <p>To improve perceptions of political integrity and protect public policies from undue influence, New Zealand could reopen discussions on developing lobbying regulations, as well as tighten political finance laws, define targets, and broaden the scope of transparency requirements and bans.</p>

Main Findings	Main Recommendations
Preserve and strengthen fairness	
<p>42% of New Zealanders consider that public employees would treat rich and poor people differently (38% on average in OECD countries). Perceptions of discrimination are higher for Māori, the unemployed, women and some of the younger cohorts.</p>	<p>Proactively seeking engagement with groups that may feel left behind, particularly at the local level and ensuring that there are specific spaces and channels to communicate with them can help enhance fairness perceptions and thereby strengthen trust.</p> <p>Deliberative processes, particularly at the local level and in regions farther away from main cities, could be an effective tool to strengthen trust and a sense of inclusion.</p>
<p>Important efforts have been made to ensure a diverse workforce. The representation of Māori in public employment, including management positions, matches their representation in the general population.</p> <p>There is a balanced representation of women in the administration including at the managerial level.</p> <p>New Zealand is the OECD top performer on gender equality at the political level.</p>	<p>There is room to improve the representation, at senior levels, of population groups such as people identifying as Pacifica or of Asian background and people from the Middle East, Latin America and Africa. Efforts to build a diverse public force should be maintained as a necessary condition to strengthen public trust.</p>

1

Trust and Public Governance in New Zealand

This chapter explores the theoretical and practical relevance of trust in public institutions by providing a critical review of the literature on institutional trust in New Zealand. It presents evidence on trust levels from the OECD Survey on the Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions and compares New Zealand to other small-advanced economies and to other anglophone countries. This chapter also discusses the role that high levels of public trust have played in addressing the COVID-19 pandemic and in designing the response to the crisis; this trust helped New Zealand both achieve high levels of compliance and minimise unintended socio-economic consequences. Finally, the chapter presents the OECD framework and measurement methodology underpinning this report: it introduces the concepts of competence and values as the main drivers of institutional trust as recognized in the OECD trust framework.

Governments exist to provide public goods and services that are important to peoples' well-being, which would not be provided without collective action. This includes the provision of public services such as public education, but also providing the rules that underpin functioning markets, reduce social and economic inequalities to levels that are consistent with civil society expectations, and ensure equality of opportunity and a fair treatment. Ultimately, achieving the outcomes that people expect, requires good public governance and well-functioning public institutions. Trust is a key foundation of well-functioning democracies; it facilitates the implementation of policies and contributes to successfully navigating social and economic crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic as well as to addressing long term challenges ahead such as global warming.

Public governance in New Zealand is functioning well. The New Zealand government's handling of the pandemic has been praised internationally as a successful example of a system that minimised unintended social and economic consequences. Some of the elements that contributed to this success were high reliance on expertise, strengthened emphasis on collective shared goals and a politically neutral, effective, and trusted public service that worked in a coordinated manner. According to the Kiwis Count survey, conducted by the Public Service Commission, trust in the public service brand reached record levels of about 70% in December 2020 amid the COVID-19 pandemic (Public Service Commission, 2022^[1]).

Still, domestically, New Zealand faces challenges ahead. As evidenced by the Wellington protests, even when policies are effective, mis- and disinformation can shake the foundations of the democratic system and undermine the legitimacy of institutions. In addition, perceptions on the deterioration of some services, deepening inequalities and a gloomy economic outlook threaten to weaken social cohesion. New Zealand also experiences an increased likelihood of environmental disasters from climate change, owing to the country's natural exposure and high reliance on natural resources. Finally, New Zealand also strives to address its colonial legacy. Preserving and strengthening institutional trust will be of essence to navigate through these challenges while preserving New Zealand's relative place as a lead OECD country in several public governance areas.

At the forefront of this transformation is the public service. The 2020 public service act lay down the framework for the work of the public service in years to come. It sets the foundations for a public service that is more adaptive, agile and collaborative that can more effectively meet the needs of New Zealanders. Through an emphasis on the spirit of service, the act places the trust relationship between people and institutions at the heart and as a key outcome of service provision.

Institutional trust is also recognised as a key element for achieving well-being as one of the broad objectives of the New Zealand administration. Some of the channels through which public institutions are expected to contribute to enhancing people's well-being are reflected in the public service standards of integrity and code of conduct (Public Service Commission, 2007^[2]), which directs public servants to "strive to make a difference to the wellbeing of New Zealand and all its people".

Improving people's wellbeing (including setting the environment for people to pursue their own wellbeing) is also the main objective of the core analytical tool of the New Zealand Treasury; the *Living Standards Framework* (Treasury, 2021^[3]). At a societal level high interpersonal trust is both an indicator of an effectively functioning society and contributes directly to peoples' wellbeing (OECD, 2017^[4]; Algan and Cahuc, 2010^[5]; Helliwell and Wang, 2010^[6]; OECD, 2017^[4]; OECD, 2011^[7]; The Treasury, 2021^[8]).

The academic literature recognises a strong link between interpersonal and institutional trust, although it is not conclusive about the causal direction. Some studies underline that interpersonal trust may function mostly as a predictor of political or institutional trust, and thus the level of social capital in a society explains institutional outcomes (Lipset and Schneider, 1983^[9]). For example, a study using data from Australia concludes that if people trust their family and friends, they will have higher trust in their local and national representatives and government (Job, 2005^[10]). Similarly, using data from the European Social Survey in Finland, researchers find that interpersonal trust has a strong impact on all levels of political trust (Bäck and Kestilä, 2009^[11]). Rothstein and Uslaner argue that there is a reciprocal relationship between

interpersonal trust and institutional trust (Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005^[12]). Interpersonal trust is high in places where people can be confident that institutions will function impartially and effectively in event of a conflict. At the same time, effective and impartial institutions depend ultimately on a society in which most people are trustworthy.

It is important not only that public institutions are effective, but also that they are seen to behave in a way that is fair and consistent with the values that they are supposed to embody and uphold. The intrinsic value of trustworthy institutions is reflected in the New Zealand Treasury's *Living Standards Framework* through the *engagement and voice* dimension of current wellbeing and in the Public Service Commission's work programme aimed at enhancing trust (States Services Commission, 2020^[13]).

Following South Korea (OECD/KDI, 2018^[14]), Finland (OECD, 2021^[15]) and Norway (OECD, 2022^[16]) this is the fourth OECD country study on the drivers of trust in public institutions. The report analyses the main drivers of people's trust in public institutions in New Zealand, focusing on public governance reforms and actions that can help regain and maintain high trust.

The report relies on the OECD framework on the drivers of trust in public institutions that lays out key public governance drivers of trust (reliability, responsiveness, openness, integrity and fairness of government), as well as cultural and political drivers, and government's capacity on global and intergenerational challenges (Brezzi et al., 2021^[17]). It is the first one to benefit from a large cross-country comparative evidence collected via the 2021 OECD Trust Survey (OECD, 2022^[18]). In particular, New Zealand is compared¹ to other small, advanced economies as well as other Anglophone countries with similar institutional and historic background.


This introductory chapter presents an overview of the theoretical and practical relevance of trust in public institutions by reviewing available sources of information on institutional trust in New Zealand and discussing the evolution of institutional trust over time. Before diving into the results of the OECD survey on the drivers of trust in public institutions, presented at length in chapters 2-4, this chapter discusses some of the underlying public management reasons explaining comparatively high levels of trust in New Zealand. Finally, it presents in detail the OECD framework on the drivers of trust in public institutions and measurement methodology constituting the basis of this report.

1.1. New Zealand is a high trust country

Levels of trust are high in New Zealand when compared to other OECD countries. While New Zealand's position in terms of measured trust varies depending on the measure used, it is consistently towards the upper end of the distribution of countries, a result that is consistent with the survey conducted for this study. Figure 1.1 shows the proportion of the population reporting confidence in the public service² for New Zealand and the benchmarking group of small advanced economies and anglophone countries many of which are also high trusting countries. In New Zealand, 55% of the population trust the public service, a proportion above the OECD average and in the middle of the reference group countries, after Ireland, Finland, Norway, and the United Kingdom but above Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden.


Figure 1.1. New Zealanders have fairly high confidence in the public service

Share of respondents who indicate confidence in the public service in New Zealand, selected countries and OECD average, 2021



Note: Figure presents responses to the question “On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust the (public service)?” The “trust” proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale; “neutral” is equal to a response of 5; “do not trust” is the aggregation of responses from 0-4; and “Don't know” was a separate answer choice. OECD(22) refers to the unweighted average across 22 OECD countries.


Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)

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Almost half of respondents in New Zealand trust parliament (47%), 8 percentage points higher than the average across OECD countries (Figure 1.2). Across OECD countries, parliaments and political parties are the least trusted public institutions. In terms of trust in parliament New Zealand fares comparatively well, only after Norway, Finland, Denmark and Ireland. Annex A presents complementary figures on comparative levels of trust for other institutions.


Figure 1.2. Trust in parliament is in the top half of high trusting countries

Share of respondents who indicate trust in parliament in New Zealand, selected countries and OECD average, 2021



Note: Figure presents responses to the question “On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust the parliament?” The “trust” proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale; “neutral” is equal to a response of 5; “do not trust” is the aggregation of responses from 0-4; and “Don’t know” was a separate answer choice. OECD(22) refers to the unweighted average across 22 OECD countries.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)

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Other sources of data on trust in public institutions find that New Zealand ranks consistently among the high trusting countries on trust in government, parliament and public service. For example, according to the Gallup World Poll, 63% of New Zealanders trusted the government in 2021, behind only Switzerland, Norway, Finland and Denmark among 28 OECD countries (Gallup World Poll, 2021_[19])³. Box 1.1 presents some historical and institutional factors that contribute to the comparatively high levels of trust in New Zealand.

Box 1.1. Institutional and historical factors explaining high levels of trust in institutions in New Zealand

New Zealand is a stable parliamentary democracy with a history of broad and inclusive political participation including early granting of voting rights to women and Māori. The New Zealand parliament is unicameral, meaning that a party that can command a majority in parliament has few checks on its ability to pass legislation. The need for the ruling party to show that they command the confidence of Parliament to form a government means that the ruling party, almost by definition, has a clear legislative majority. With no upper house, no written constitution, and a head of state – the governor general – who is bound by convention to follow the advice of their ministers there are very few checks and balances on the power of the executive outside of unwritten norms and values. This makes trust in – and the trustworthiness of – institutions fundamental to the effective functioning of the New Zealand state in a way that is potentially quite different to many other OECD countries (including the UK with which New Zealand shares many other institutional features). On the one hand, trust that institutions will work as intended is the main constraint on potential executive power given the absence of other limits. On the other hand, a strong executive potentially allows government to follow through on electoral commitments reinforcing the general public's trust in the political process.

Over time New Zealand has advanced in recognising the Te Tiriti o Waitangi/the Treaty of Waitangi as the founding document for New Zealand with impacts across the political system. Signed in 1840 by the British Crown and more than 500 Māori chiefs, the treaty established the authority of the British Crown over New Zealand and granted Māori all the “rights and protections” of British subjects but also confirmed te tino rangatiratanga – usually translated as chiefly authority – of the signatory chiefs. The Treaty of Waitangi has regained greater legal stature since 1975. The Waitangi Tribunal, created in 1975, functions as a permanent commission of inquiry to consider claims by Māori that the Crown has violated the principals of the Treaty. Since 1985 it has had the ability to consider historical claims and its reports have had wide-reaching implications. Also, since the mid-1980s the principles of the Treaty have been referenced in several dozen Acts of Parliament. This has required government agencies to consider the Treaty in their actions and has allowed challenges in court where the principles have been ignored (Orange, 2022^[20]).

New Zealand has a politically neutral civil service that is recruited and promoted on merit, and accountable to the executive through cabinet ministers and to Parliament through select committees. The high levels of institutional trust in New Zealand have been grounded in an effective and honest public service. This is reflected not only in internal measures of institutional trust, but also in assessments of the honesty of New Zealand institutions by external stakeholders. The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) measures the degree to which a country's institutions are seen as corrupt by non-nationals. New Zealand displays exceptionally low levels of perceived corruption. Between 2012 and 2021 New Zealand ranked as the least corrupt country in the world in all years except 2014 and 2018, often sharing the place with one or more of the Nordic countries (Transparency International, 2022^[21]).


1.1.1. Levels of trust in New Zealand are comparatively high

Trust in government in New Zealand has remained high and stable over the past 15 years, while it decreased in other countries with similar cultural characteristics, particularly in the period prior to the COVID-19 pandemic (Figure 1.3). The figure shows, for example, that trust in government in Australia and the United States decreased from the start of the period and remained low up to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Trust in Ireland decreased severely after the 2007/2008 global financial crises. In contrast, levels of trust in New Zealand remained high and have slightly increased over the 2006-2021 period.

Figure 1.3. Confidence in the national government remained high and stable over time

Share of respondents who indicate confidence in the national government, 2006-2021



Note: Figure presents the share of respondents answering “yes” (the other response categories being “no”, and “don’t know”) to the survey question: “In this country, do you have confidence in... national government? The Gallup World Poll uses a representative sample of about 1 000 citizens in most countries.


Source: Gallup World Poll

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In most countries the main source for trust in government before the 2000s is the World Values Survey (WVS) with increasing country coverage since then. The WVS captures trust in parliament, the police and trust in others. In New Zealand, the results show a positive trend for trust in all institutions, with a significant increase for trust in parliament between 1998 and 2004. This reflects a particularly low level of confidence in Parliament during the first term of government following the introduction of a Mixed Member Proportional Representation System (MMP), a period where the parliament was coming to terms with the new system and the composition of parties supporting the government changed between elections. The increase in institutional trust from 2000 to 2019 shown in Figure 1.4 is confirmed by other sources such as the Kantar Public Sector Reputation Index 2021 (Colmar Brunton, 2021_[22]), which shows similar trends. Trends over time are also consistent with other surveys such as the New Zealand General Social Survey (NZGSS) showing gradual rises in measures of institutional trust up until the start of the COVID-19 pandemic and broadly stable levels of interpersonal trust. Additional surveys such as the survey from the Institute of Governance and Policy Studies⁴ (IGPS) find similar patterns (Chapple and Prickett, 2019_[23]; Chapple and Prickett, 2022_[24]). Although questions are not strictly comparable a similar pattern is found in the Kiwis Count survey (Public Service Commission, 2022_[11]) (Box 1.2).

Figure 1.4. Trust levels have increased over time in New Zealand up to the pandemic

Percentage of the population reporting to trust the police, parliament and other people



Source: World Values Survey, 1998-2020; NZGSS 2014-2018

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
Box 1.2. The Kiwis Count Survey

Kiwis Count is a survey of New Zealand residents commissioned by the Public Service Commission and carried out by a private sector research firm. The survey is intended to measure trust in the public service based on people's experience. The survey collects 1000 responses each quarter for a total annual sample of 4000 responses. During 2021, the sample was boosted to 6000 respondents. Results of the survey are published on the Public Service Commission's website and the survey microdata is available on an anonymised basis to researchers.

Kiwis Count collects information on users' trust in the public service based on their experience in a range of different circumstances and across different organisations, reasons for the level of trust reported for a subset of the respondent's most recent interactions with the public service, and two measures of institutional trust: a measure of trust in Public Service overall, as well as trust in the private sector. The trust measures included in Kiwis Count are a measure of "experienced trust" based on the respondent's most recent interactions with the public service. This question is only asked to people who report interacting with the public service in the recent past. The second question asks all respondents about overall trust in the public service and is reported as "trust in the Public Service brand". New Zealand has fairly high confidence in the Public Service. Figure 1.5 shows how these two measures along with a third question on trust in the private sector have evolved over time since 2012. Trust in the Public Service reached a maximum of about 70% in December 2020 probably reflecting a "rally round the flag"

phenomenon where people gather behind their institutions in time of crises such as war, a natural disaster, or a pandemic.

Figure 1.5. Kiwis Count: trust in the public sector brand spiked during 2020



Source: Public Service Commission, <https://www.publicservice.govt.nz/our-work/kiwis-count/>

1.2. Trust and the response to COVID


The COVID-19 pandemic has impacted countries across the world and seen government intervention in society to control the disease on a scale with no recent comparisons. Government responses, however, have varied significantly in effectiveness. The best-performing government have succeeded in limiting both the health and economic impacts of COVID-19 while less successful responses have been associated with high death tolls and a sharp economic downturn. Because the effectiveness of many public health interventions – such as lockdowns or vaccination – is grounded in public confidence in the advice provided by health authorities, levels of institutional trust have been an important factor in the different levels of effectiveness in responding to COVID-19 seen in different countries. Similarly, more effective public responses to the pandemic might be expected to result in higher levels of trust in government.

1.2.1. New Zealand response to COVID was highly effective

New Zealand had one of the most effective responses to the COVID-19 pandemic of any nation. Although New Zealand's distance from other countries, small size, and island status undoubtedly contributed to making COVID-19 relatively easier to manage in New Zealand than for many other countries, a rapid, coherent, and strong response to the pandemic underpinned by broad public support was a major contributor to the effective control of the spread of COVID-19.

Differences between countries in deaths due to COVID-19 may be affected at the margin by differences in how countries classify the cause of death. An alternative measure of the mortality impact of COVID-19 is to look at excess deaths compared to previous years. Contrary to expectations in a pandemic, both New Zealand and Australia saw the mortality rate fall during COVID-19 (Figure 1.6). This is almost certainly due to the fact that public health measures targeting COVID-19 were also highly effective at limiting the spread of other respiratory infections – such as influenza – that account for a significant portion of mortality at older age groups.

Figure 1.6. New Zealand's excess mortality decreased during the COVID-19 pandemic




Note: Figure shows the cumulative p-score⁵ for excess mortality 2020-2022 in New Zealand and a subset of OECD countries.
Source: (Karlinsky and Kobak, 2021^[25])

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New Zealand was comparatively unusual in its response to COVID-19 in that it pursued a strategy of elimination rather than suppression or mitigation for most of the 2020-2021 period. In other words, rather than trying to limit the spread of the disease to a level that the health system could manage without collapse, New Zealand aimed to reduce COVID-19 cases in the community to zero. This involved introducing some of the most stringent public health measures in the world when the disease first appeared in New Zealand in March 2020 and again when the Delta variant of COVID-19 appeared in August 2021 (Figure 1.7). Only when the proportion of fully immunised (two vaccinations) adults reached 90% in late 2021 and the much more contagious Omicron variant entered the country did New Zealand move to a suppression and mitigation strategy.

Figure 1.7 charts the severity of COVID-19 responses for selected countries over the 2020 to 2022 period⁶. Compared to Sweden, which adopted a much lighter-touch policy response, or even Australia – which was closer to New Zealand in its approach – it is evident that New Zealand's initially strong approach to COVID-19 allowed the country to rapidly return to a much lighter level of intervention than most other countries once community transmission of COVID-19 had been eliminated in the country. In fact, New Zealand's elimination strategy was sufficiently successful that for most New Zealanders life went on largely as normal for between June 2020 and August 2021.

Figure 1.7. From end of 2020 on New Zealand's COVID-19 policies were less restrictive than in other countries



Note: Figure shows the severity of COVID-19 policies in 2020-2022 in New Zealand and selected OECD countries, on a scale of 0-100. The Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker compares information on policy measures related to closure and containment, health economic policy for more than 180 countries.

Source: (Hale et al., 2021^[26])

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When New Zealand's elimination strategy was first introduced many commentators were concerned that too much weight was being placed on public health goals at the expense of the economy (Hickey, 2020^[27]). Contrary to these concerns, New Zealand's overall economic performance during the period of the COVID-19 pandemic has been exceptionally strong with New Zealand experiencing a shorter period of economic contraction than other comparable countries (OECD, 2022^[28]). This relatively strong economic performance is consistent with evidence that relatively stringent public health measures are unlikely to have large negative economic impacts compared to the alternative scenario (Sheridan et al., 2020^[29]). In New Zealand's case the relatively strong economic performance is likely to be grounded in the fact that the more stringent public health measures associated with New Zealand's elimination strategy were short in duration and allowed the economy to function closer to normality than was the case in countries pursuing a mitigation or suppression strategy.


In addition, New Zealand implemented a simple and effective communication strategy that proved highly effective. It gave a prominent role to expertise, delivered concise and clear messages very frequently and was built in an inclusive manner, around a narrative of common societal goals and the construction of community. In turn, public institutions delivered a coordinated and potent answer that contributed to reassuring people and their building trust towards institutions.

1.2.2. An effective response to COVID-19 has reinforced trust in government

New Zealand's effective response to COVID-19 is associated with an increase in levels of trust in government institutions. Figure 1.8. shows the difference between trust levels over the 2020-2021 period in New Zealand and a 2018 baseline. Importantly, this increase in trust was larger for those institutions associated with the COVID-19 response (e.g. the Health system) and smaller for institutions with a weaker public health role (the Police) and private institutions (the media). This suggests that the trust increases are associated with the effectiveness of the public health response rather than a more general "all in it together" effect.

Figure 1.8. Positive changes in levels of institutional trust associated with the COVID-19 response

Percentage point change in 2020 and 2021




Note: Figure shows the percentage point change in trust in public institutions in New Zealand in 2020-2022 compared to 2018 baseline.
Source: Statistics New Zealand, Wellbeing Statistics (NZGSS 2014-2018, HLFS 2020-2021)

StatLink  <https://stat.link/iso9wk>

Auckland is New Zealand's largest city and is the entry/exit point for the majority of travellers. As a result of these factors Aucklanders' experience of the pandemic was very different to that of other New Zealanders. All major New Zealand COVID-19 outbreaks hit Auckland first and Auckland spent a much longer period under stringent lockdown than was the case for the rest of the country.


Despite this experience there is no evidence how COVID-19 affected levels of trust in Auckland differently from the rest of New Zealand during the period from mid-2020 to mid-2021 (Figure 1.9). While average levels of institutional trust tend to be marginally higher in Auckland than in the rest of the country, there is no evidence that trends in trust over this time differed significantly between Auckland and the rest of the country. It is, however, important to caveat this with the fact that the trust series ends before the long Delta-related lockdown in Auckland from August to December 2021.

Figure 1.9. Levels of trust in Auckland were similar to the rest of the country during COVID-19



Note: Figure shows the institutional trust, Auckland vs New Zealand total.

Source: Statistics New Zealand, Wellbeing Statistics (HLFS 2020-2021)

StatLink  <https://stat.link/k7d9ie>

1.2.3. As the crisis has lengthened strains have begun to show

Although levels of trust appear to have increased in New Zealand with the response to COVID-19, as the pandemic has dragged on, strains have begun to show that could influence levels of trust in the medium to long run. This is particularly the case for the sectors of the New Zealand economy that are more dependent on international connections. Two parts of the New Zealand economy were particularly impacted by COVID-19. The first of these was the tourism and hospitality sector which was affected both by domestic restrictions on travel and social gatherings as well as by the loss of international tourism. The impact on the tourism sector was particularly acute given that tourism is New Zealand's largest export industry. According to Statistics New Zealand substantial net falls in employment were seen in accommodation and food services as well as transport, postal, and warehousing (Statistics New Zealand, 2022^[30]). Both these sectors are strongly linked to tourism (as is arts and recreation which is a smaller sector and suffered a smaller absolute fall). Similarly, if less obviously, the large fall in education and training reflects the fact that New Zealand has a large export education sector dependent on the arrival of foreign students.

The second impact of COVID-19 restrictions was on those parts of the New Zealand economy heavily dependent on migrant labour. This includes large parts of New Zealand's primary sector with a particular impact in the horticulture and wine industries. One noticeable feature of the economic impact of COVID-19 is that it was asymmetrical between the major urban centres and provincial regions. Both tourism and primary industries were negatively impacted by COVID-19 and are important in provincial New Zealand. In contrast, the major urban centres are much more dependent on industries that saw employment growth during the pandemic such as health care, public administration, and professional, technical, and scientific services. This may explain why the anti-mandate protests of February and March 2022 were dominated by people from outside the major urban areas (Box 1.3).

Box 1.3. The anti-mandate protests

Despite generally widespread support for the country's response to COVID-19, New Zealand experienced divisive protests centred on the government's COVID-19 response in February and March 2022. The protesters were a diverse group including young, old, men, women, Māori, non-Māori, gang members, church groups and a range of other individuals and groups. However, an informal poll carried out at the protest site on 19-20 February identified that two thirds of the protesters were from outside of a major urban area, with 41% originating from smaller provincial cities (Farrar, 2022^[31]). While the initial focus of the protest was mainly centred on the removal of the vaccine mandates, the prominence of various conspiracy theories and more general anti-government sentiments increased over time. Journalists reported antisemitism was rife within the protest as were a wide range of conspiracy theories (Chumko, 2022^[32]).

Despite the significant disruption caused by the protest to both parliament and Wellingtonians more generally, Police initially took a light-handed approach to the situation. This was motivated by concern that any attempt to remove the protesters would escalate into violence and that there were a significant number of children present. As the protest dragged on the composition of the protesters changed with an increasingly angry hard core of protesters remaining. It was this group that the Police eventually moved forcefully off Parliament grounds on 2 March 2022.

Despite their prominence in the media, the numbers involved in the protests were never large. Estimates suggest approximately 3000 people were involved in the protest around parliament at its peak, with lower numbers as the protests dragged on. Although the protests attracted some public support initially, this fell off over time as the anti-social aspects of the protests became more prominent and it became clear that the protesters held views well outside the New Zealand mainstream.

1.3. The OECD approach to building trust to reinforce democracy

While trust has been acknowledged as important for a long time (Arrow, 1972^[33]), it has not traditionally been part of the portfolio of official statistics produced by most developed countries nor has there been extensive empirical analysis of the drivers of trust. Nonetheless, given the importance of trust, advancing its measurement is essential.

In the last decade the OECD has increasingly recognised the importance of trust to economic outcomes and to wellbeing more broadly. This is reflected both in the work programme on the drivers of institutional trust of which this study is a part (Brezzi et al., 2021^[17]; OECD, 2017^[34]; OECD/KDI, 2018^[14]; OECD, 2021^[35]; OECD, 2022^[16]), and in work to develop *OECD Guidelines on Measuring Trust* (OECD, 2017^[4]) to support national statistical offices and other data providers improving the underlying evidence base while putting forward concrete measurement instruments.

The OECD Guidelines on Measuring Trust define trust as:

A person's belief that another person or institution will act consistently with their expectations of positive behaviour

This definition is built around two important elements. First, trust is concerned with beliefs or expectations. Trust matters because these expectations condition how people behave in response to interactions with other people and institutions. Second, trust focuses on expectations of positive behaviour. Fundamentally trust concerns the ability of person to act with a reasonable expectation that those people and institutions that they interact with can be relied on to behave in a competent fair and honest manner.

While the measurement of trust is grounded in the broad definition given above, different questions capture different measurement concepts. In particular, it is important to be clear about who is being trusted and the difference between trust and the drivers of trust. The OECD identifies five broad categories of trust based on analysis of the World Values Survey (OECD, 2017^[36]). These include generalised interpersonal trust, trust in people known to the respondent, trust in non-governmental institutions, trust in political institutions, and trust in law and order institutions.

This study focuses predominantly on institutional trust or people's expectations of positive behaviour by public institutions, which could also be called their trustworthiness. Nevertheless, even when limited to people's trust in public institutions the scope of this study remains very broad as it encompasses both a political and an administrative dimension. 'Political trust' refers to an assessment of elected leaders (i.e. the parliament), while 'administrative trust' refers to the institutions that form the core of public administration. These institutions include those entities that are in charge of policy design and service delivery, such as the public service. A key challenge for addressing institutional trust is that these dimensions (i.e. institutional and political trust) could be influenced by similar factors (OECD/KDI, 2018^[14]). This report builds on the understanding that institutional performance can influence institutional trust. It is built around the framework for understanding and measuring the drivers of institutional trust (Table 1.1) and presents primary evidence through a population survey implemented for such purpose on the drivers of institutional trust in New Zealand (See Section 2.1).

1.3.1. The OECD framework on the drivers of trust in public institutions

The OECD has developed a framework on the determinants of public trust that encompasses two broad categories: competences and values (OECD, 2017^[36]). Since the outbreak of the pandemic, the Framework has been reviewed through a consultative process including academics, practitioners and civil society entitled "Building a New Paradigm for Public Trust," which engaged over 800 policy makers, civil servants, researchers, data providers and representatives from the private and non-profit sectors across six webinars between 2020 and 2021 (Brezzi et al., 2021^[17]).

The framework finds consistency in the literature regarding specific attributes that matter for trust and may be amenable to policy action, in relation to two broad components, competences and values.

- Trust as competence: Competence is a necessary condition for trust – an actor with good intentions but without the ability to deliver on expectations cannot be trusted. The provision of public goods and services (from security and crisis management to public health and education) is one of the principal activities exercised by government. However, citizens depend on the ability of governments to actually deliver the services they need, at the quality level they expect.
- Trust as values: When it comes to influencing trust, the process of policy making and its guiding motivations are just as important as actual results. Citizens expect not only effective policies to improve socio-economic conditions, but also irreproachable behaviour.

In turn within these two broad categories, the framework identifies five main drivers of trust in government institutions. Within **competence** they capture the degree to which institutions are **responsive** and **reliable** in delivering policies and services, and act in line with the **values** of **openness**, **integrity** and **fairness**. The revision of the Framework intended to guide public efforts to recover trust in government during and after the crisis, with a particular focus on building back more inclusively, e.g. by taking into account socioeconomic, political and cultural differences, and by generating buy-in to address challenging, long-term, intergenerational issues like climate change. These drivers interact to influence people's trust in public institutions and are compounded by countries' economic, social, and institutional situations. Table 1.1 presents the updated OECD framework on the drivers of trust in public institutions.

According to this competence-values approach, citizens assess government from the perspective of how service delivery responds to people's needs and expectations, but also with respect to the efficacy and

fairness of the policy-making process and its outcomes. Furthermore, the framework provides guidance on measuring trust, on its monitoring over time, and on analysing the factors that may drive it in the future. In turn, following the revision of the framework it now includes explicitly as determinants of public trust political attitudes and participation, satisfaction with public services and the evaluation of government action on long-term global challenges (Brezzi et al., 2021^[17]).

The next chapter presents the OECD Trust Survey and the different factors that influence trust in public institutions in New Zealand. As trust is a multidimensional construct that alongside the performance of public institutions depends on a number of individual economic, cultural and socioeconomic determinants to a certain extent these are all covered in the coming chapter even if not directly measured by the survey. Still, this case study of trust in public institutions places specific emphasis on the public governance drivers and potential actions that New Zealand administration could take to influence them.

Table 1.1. OECD framework of the Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions, 2022

Levels of trust in different public institutions		
Trust in national government, local government, civil service, parliament, police, political parties, courts, legal systems and intergovernmental organisations		
Public Governance Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions		
Competencies	Responsiveness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide efficient, quality, affordable, timely and citizen-centred public services that are co-ordinated across levels of government and satisfy users. • Develop an innovative and efficient civil service that responds to user needs.
	Reliability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Anticipate needs and assess evolving challenges. • Minimise uncertainty in the economic, social and political environment. • Effectively commit to future-oriented policies and co-operate with stakeholders on global challenges.
Values	Openness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide open and accessible information so the public better understands what government is doing. • Consult, listen, and respond to stakeholders, including through citizen participation and engagement opportunities that lead to tangible results. • Ensure there are equal opportunities to be part of and participate in the institutions of representative democracy.
	Integrity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Align public institutions with ethical values, principles, and norms to safeguard the public interest. • Take decisions and use public resources ethically, promoting the public interest over private interests while combating corruption. • Ensure accountability mechanisms between public institutions at all levels of governance. • Promote a neutral civil service whose values and standards of conduct uphold and prioritise the public interest.
	Fairness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improve living conditions for all. • Provide consistent treatment of businesses and people regardless of their background and identity (e.g. gender, socio-economic status, racial/ethnic origin).
Cultural, Economic and Political Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Individual and group identities, traits, and preferences, including socio-economic status; interpersonal socialisation and networks. • Distrust of and disengagement from the system. 		
Perception of government action on intergenerational and global challenges		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Perceptions of government commitment to and effectiveness in addressing long-term challenges. 		

Source: Brezzi, González, Nguyen and Prats (2021)

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Notes

¹ New Zealand is systematically compared to Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

² Trust in the Public Service is considered as the reference measure as trust in government was not included in the New Zealand Survey to comply with restrictions set by the Political Neutrality Principle governing the public service and to avoid confusion as the term “national government” could be associated with one of the two major parties in New Zealand “national party” the wording of this question will be revisited for further waves of the survey

³ It should be noted that responses for the OECD Trust Survey are on a Likert-scale from 0 (no trust at all) to 10 (complete trust) while the World Gallup Poll questions are on a binary scale (trust/do not trust). For this reason the proportion of respondents who trust an institution according to the OECD Trust survey (responses between 6-10) may be lower than from the World Gallup Poll (Nguyen, Frei, González and Brezzi, 2022).

⁴ The main exception is that the IGPS shows a fall in trust in parliament over the COVID period.

⁵ The cumulative p-score is calculated as -1 . It captures the percentage difference in actual deaths during the COVID-19 pandemic compared to what would have been expected over the same period had prior patterns of mortality persisted.

⁶ The measure of stringency of COVID-19 responses included here is based off the OxCGRT project Containment and Health Index, a composite measure of thirteen of the response metrics. This index builds on the Stringency Index, is calculated on the basis of the following thirteen metrics: school closures; workplace closures; cancellation of public events; restrictions on public gatherings; closures of public transport; stay-at-home requirements; public information campaigns; restrictions on internal movements; international travel controls; testing policy; extent of contact tracing; face coverings; and vaccine policy.

2 Institutional trust and its drivers in New Zealand

This chapter describes trust levels by gender, education, ethnicity, migrant background, and geographical location. It also presents multivariate analysis of the drivers of trust in New Zealand in the public service, the local government and the parliament. It finds that the responsiveness of services is the most important driver of trust in the public service. In turn, openness and reliability are key drivers of trust in local government councillors. Political efficacy and reliability are key drivers of trust in the parliament. The chapter also addresses additional characteristics that help to understand levels of trust in New Zealand, such as high cultural diversity and dependence on natural resources.

This chapter presents data from the Survey on the Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions (OECD Trust Survey) implemented in New Zealand. In addition, where possible, it compares institutional trust and its drivers in New Zealand with trust levels in comparable OECD countries given their size, level of economic and social development and high baseline levels of institutional trust or with strong historical ties to New Zealand. Accordingly, New Zealand is benchmarked to other small advanced economies such as Finland, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden and to other Anglophone countries that include Australia, Ireland, Canada and the United Kingdom. While this chapter relies predominantly on data compiled through the OECD Trust Survey it also makes use of secondary source when discussing factors underpinning high levels of trust in public institutions in New Zealand.

2.1. The OECD Survey on the Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions (OECD Trust survey)

The OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions is a new measurement tool supporting OECD governments in reinforcing democratic processes, improving governance outcomes, It is the first cross-national investigation dedicated specifically to identifying the drivers of trust in government, across levels of government and across public institutions. Box 2.1 presents briefly some key characteristics of the OECD Trust Survey including its coverage and implementation method.

The Trust Survey in its current form has been revised and expanded based on methodological suggestions and empirical lessons reflected in the OECD Guidelines on Measuring Trust (OECD, 2017^[1]), the TrustLab project (Murtin et al., 2018^[2]), the consultative process “Building a New Paradigm for Public Trust” that took place through six workshops between 2020-2021, the updated conceptual Framework on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions (Trust Framework) (Brezzi et al., 2021^[3]), in-depth case studies conducted in South Korea, Finland and Norway (OECD/KDI, 2018^[4]; OECD, 2021^[5]; OECD, 2022^[6]) and discussions held at the OECD Public Governance Committee in 2021 (GOV/PGC/RD(2021)) and at the OECD Committee for Statistics and Statistical Policy in 2020 (SDD/CSSP(2020)).

Box 2.1. Description of the OECD Trust Survey

The OECD Trust Survey, carried out by the OECD Directorate for Public Governance, has significant country coverage (usually 2000 respondents per country) across twenty-two countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Ireland, Iceland, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The large samples facilitate subgroup analysis and help ensure the reliability of the results.

These surveys were conducted online by YouGov, by national statistical offices (in the cases of Finland, Ireland, Mexico, and the United Kingdom), by national research institutes (Iceland) or by survey research firms (New Zealand and Norway). The YouGov online surveys use a non-probability sampling approach with quotas to ensure that samples are nationally representative by age, gender, large region and education. The majority of the surveys conducted by YouGov took place in November and December 2021; the other surveys went into the field within a year of (before or after) that date. Mexico conducted face-to-face interviews focused on urban areas.

The survey process and implementation has been guided by an Advisory Group comprised of public officials from OECD member countries, representatives of National Statistical Offices and international experts. The OECD intends to continue to improve and conduct the survey on a regular basis in the

coming years to help governments improve the way they govern, monitor results over time, and better respond to public feedback.

For a detailed discussion of the survey method and implementation, please find an extensive methodological background paper at <https://oe.cd/trust>.

Source: Adapted from Building Trust to Reinforce Democracy

The OECD Trust Survey was implemented in New Zealand between February 8th and February 24th 2022. This collection period coincides with the Wellington protests, which may introduce some bias into responses. The survey was carried out by Research New Zealand and achieved an effective sample of 2211 respondents. Box 2.2 presents some additional characteristics of the survey.

Box 2.2. Key characteristics of the survey implemented in New Zealand

In order to ensure comparability across countries and guarantee standard quality criteria for all countries that participated to the OECD trust survey the following criteria have been observed for the survey implemented in New Zealand.

- Survey respondents were defined as resident New Zealanders aged 18 years and over.
- The survey was implemented by Research New Zealand online and was sourced from an online active panel of over 300,000 active members. An active member is someone who has completed at least one survey in the last three months.
- The survey is representative of the New Zealand population by age, gender, ethnicity and regions. The achieved sample has been RIM weighted according to these criteria. The weighting parameters were sourced from Statistics New Zealand's most recent (2018) Census of Populations and Dwellings.
- The total sample of 2,211 includes 388 Māori respondents who were oversampled in order to achieve sufficient numbers for analysis purposes.
- Results based on the total weighted sample of 2,211 are subject to a maximum margin of error of $\pm 2.1\%$ at the 95% (confidence level) and a design effect (deff) of 1.03. The sub-sample of 388 Māori is subject to a maximum margin of error of $\pm 5.1\%$.

Source: Technical report provided by Research New Zealand about the implementation of the OECD Trust Survey.

In alignment with the principle of political neutrality some questions from the OECD core questionnaire were removed from the survey implemented in New Zealand. Notably, trust in the national government was not included because of the potential confusions with the political party "The New Zealand National Party", shortened "National". Further waves of the survey will consider ways of reformulating this question to fit the New Zealand context.

The survey implemented in New Zealand includes the following general question on institutional trust "On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust each of the following institutions?" accompanied by the following list of institutions (Table 2.1).

Table 2.1. List of institutions measured through the OECD Trust Survey in New Zealand

Dimension	Institution
Political/administrative institutions	Local government councilors
	Parliament
	Public Service (non-elected employees in central government)
	Local authority/council employees
Law and order institutions	Police
	Courts and legal system
Non-governmental institutions	Media
	International organizations (United Nations, OECD, World Bank, etc)

Source: OECD Trust survey implemented in New Zealand.

The measurement approach on the drivers of institutional trust moves away from standard perception questions (e.g. how much confidence do you have in your national government) and instead focuses on specific situations linked to people interactions with public institutions. Typical behavioural questions, as used in psychology or sociology, investigate the subjective reaction expected from individuals when faced with a specific situation. However, the situational questions are not stereotypical behavioural questions: they do not focus on the individual behaviour but rather on the expected conduct from a third party, in this case a public institution, a civil servant or a political figure. Consequently, the questions provide, instead, a measurement on the trustworthiness of public institutions. Unlike attitudes (passive response) and behaviours (active response), trustworthiness is based on expectations of positive behaviour in alignment with the working definition of trust presented in chapter 1. The battery of situational questions for measuring the determinants of public trust in New Zealand in alignment with the OECD trust framework is presented in Table 2.2.

Table 2.2. Survey questions on each of the framework dimensions in New Zealand

Policy Dimension		Questions
Competence	Responsiveness	<i>If many people complained about a government service that is working badly, how unlikely or likely do you think it is that it would be improved?</i>
		<i>If there is an innovative idea that could improve a public service, how unlikely or likely do you think it is that it would be adopted?</i>
	Reliability	<i>If a new serious contagious disease spreads, how unlikely or likely do you think it is that government institutions will be ready to act to protect people's lives?</i>
		<i>How unlikely or likely do you think it is that the business conditions the government can influence (e.g. laws and regulations businesses need to comply with) will be stable and predictable?</i>
Values	Openness	<i>If a decision affecting your community is to be made by the local government, how unlikely or likely do you think it is that you would have an opportunity to voice your views?</i>
		<i>If you need information about an administrative procedure (for example obtaining a passport, applying for a benefit, etc.), how unlikely or likely do you think it is that the information would be easily available?</i>
		<i>If you need information about an administrative procedure (for example obtaining a passport, applying for a benefit, etc.), how unlikely or likely do you think it is that the information would be easily available?</i>
	Integrity	<i>If a court is about to make a decision that could negatively impact the government's image, how unlikely or likely do you think it is that the court would make the decision free from political influence?</i>
		<i>If a government employee was offered money by a citizen or a firm for speeding up access to a public service, how unlikely or likely do you think it is that they would refuse it?</i>
	Fairness	<i>If a government employee has contact with the public in the area where you live, how unlikely or likely is it that they would treat both rich and poor people equally?</i>
<i>If a government employee interacts with the public in your area, how unlikely or likely do you think it is that they would treat all people equally regardless of their gender, sexual identity, ethnicity or country of origin?</i>		
<i>If you or a member of your family apply for a government benefit or service (e.g. unemployment benefits or other forms of income support), how unlikely or likely do you think it is that your application would be treated fairly?</i>		

Source: OECD Trust survey implemented in New Zealand

The survey implemented in New Zealand also includes questions on the drivers of trust that were specifically included for this study. These questions were included to, on the one hand to explore additional factors influencing trust in New Zealand (e.g. how the government has treated people in a community or experience with agencies) and on the other hand to further validate the internal coherence of the OECD trust framework for New Zealand. Table 2.3 presents the additional questions included the survey implemented in New Zealand. Annex B presents a detailed description of the differences between the survey implemented in New Zealand and the core OECD questionnaire.

Table 2.3. Additional questions on the drivers of trust included in the survey implemented in New Zealand

Additional questions included in the survey in New Zealand
<p>How much do each of the following influence your trust in the institutions of government?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How the government has treated people in my community • Experiences I've had with government agencies • Experiences my family and/or friends had with government agencies • Things I've seen in the media • The motivations of the people working in government • The integrity of the people working in government (e.g. political neutrality, corruption) • Not having enough information about what government institutions are doing to be able to trust them
<p>Do you agree with the following statements?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Government institutions are competent to do their job. • Government institutions act according to the best interest of society.
<p>How much confidence do you have in government institutions to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide good public services • Consider the interests of the future generations • Protect citizens • Use power ethically • Use public resources ethically • Listen to citizens • Improve socio economic conditions for all people

Source: OECD Trust survey Implemented in New Zealand


The next chapter presents the different factors that influence trust in public institutions in New Zealand. As trust is a multidimensional construct that alongside the performance of public institutions depends on a number of individual economic, cultural and socioeconomic determinants (Ananyev and Guriev, 2018^[7]; Algan, 2018^[8]) these are all addressed in the coming chapter. However, this case study of trust in public institutions places specific emphasis on the drivers related to public governance rather than the individual factors. These drivers are areas where public administrations could take action to influence trust in public institutions. Nonetheless, the analysis controls for individual characteristics and when relevant refers to them.

2.2. Trust varies across institutions in New Zealand

According to the OECD Trust Survey, there is a large variation on trust levels in public institutions in New Zealand (Figure 2.1). Similar to other OECD countries, respondents in New Zealand have highest trust in law and order institutions. Around 7 in 10 respondents trust the police (73%), followed by trust in the courts and legal system (65%), 6 percentage points and 8 percentage points respectively above the OECD average. The news media is the least trusted institution (35%), slightly below the OECD average (39%). Low levels of trust in the news media are consistent with findings from other sources that explain this trend by the fact that media in New Zealand is seen as increasingly opinionated, biased, and politicised (Myllylahti and Treadwell, 2021^[9]; Myllylahti and Treadwell, 2022^[10]).

Figure 2.1. Trust in the police and courts and legal system are the highest among respondents in New Zealand

Share of respondents in New Zealand who indicate trust (on a 0-10 scale), 2021



Note: Figure presents responses to the question “On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust [institution]?” The “trust” proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the response scale; “neutral” is equal to a response of 5; “do not trust” is the aggregation of responses from 0-4; and “Don't know” was a separate answer choice.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)


StatLink  <https://stat.link/pkrteq>

With the caveat that no question about the central government was asked in this survey wave in New Zealand, survey results show that New Zealand scores above the OECD average regarding trust in political and administrative institutions. Trust in the parliament (47%) is eight percentage points above the OECD average (39%). Over half say that they trust the public service (55%), which is higher than the OECD average (50%) but below levels in comparable OECD countries such as Norway (61%), Finland (66%) and Ireland (68%) (Figure 2.2).

Trust in local government councillors¹ is on the lower end in comparison to other institutions in New Zealand (45%). Lower trust in local politicians could be linked to fewer competencies and responsibilities of local levels of government in New Zealand as also evidenced by diminishing levels of participation in local politics and a decrease in voter turnout at the local elections (local authority election voter turnout in 2019 was 42%)².

Figure 2.2. Trust in public service is higher than in the local government and parliament in New Zealand

Share of respondents who indicate trust in various government institutions in New Zealand, selected countries and OECD average, (responses 6-10 on a 10-point scale), 2021




Note: Figure presents the share of response values 6-10 in three separate questions: "On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust the [parliament / local government / civil service (public service in New Zealand)]?" The "trust" proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale; "neutral" is equal to a response of 5; "Do not trust" is the aggregation of responses from 1-4; and "Don't know" was a separate answer choice. Finland's scale ranges from 1-10. OECD(22) refers to the unweighted average across respondents in 22 OECD countries.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)

StatLink  <https://stat.link/vlc03s>

Figure 2.3. The highest confidence in government institutions is to protect citizens

Share of respondents in New Zealand with confidence in government institutions to address various issues, 2021



Note: Figure presents responses to the question "How much confidence do you have in government institutions to: [...]:". Shown here is the proportion of respondents that answer "confident" based on the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale 0-10, where 0 is "No confidence at all" and 10 "full confidence".

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)


StatLink  <https://stat.link/x2o6pw>

In the survey conducted in New Zealand a question to qualify reasons underlying their trust in public institutions was asked to respondents. Three fifths of the New Zealand population are confident that their institutions will protect them while 56% think they will provide good public services. Half of New Zealanders expect power and resources to be used ethically while 44% of New Zealanders expect institutions to listen to them (See Figure 2.3). Overall, public institutions are evaluated better on their competences than on their values. This is consistent with some recurrent concerns raised by interviewees for this case study who indicated raising inequalities and lack of openness and meaningful engagement as potential aspects undermining trust in public institutions.

Another specific set of questions included in the survey implemented in New Zealand covers additional reasons that could influence trust in public institutions (Figure 2.4). New Zealanders recognize experience with public agencies, expressed in different forms, as the most relevant element to their trust in government agencies. Over 60% of respondents consider that their experience and those of family and friends with government agencies influences their confidence. The experience of their community and the way in which it has been treated. Reasons related to the media and missing information about the tasks of government institutions are considered as less important to build confidence levels yet some variations exist by population groups (See Box 2.3).

Figure 2.4. Experience with government agencies is the most important reason to influence trust in institutions

Share of respondents in New Zealand who report reasons that influence trust, 2021



Note: Figure presents responses to the question "How much do each of the following influence your trust in the institutions of government?". Shown here is the proportion of respondents that answer "completely" based on the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale 0-10, where 0 is "Not at all" and 10 "Completely".

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)

StatLink  <https://stat.link/4gywbd>

Box 2.3. The role of experience in trust building in New Zealand


Several questions about people's perception on a series of factors influencing trust were included for the first time in an OECD Trust Survey in New Zealand. The questions were formulated in the following way: "How much do each of the following influence your trust in the institutions of government?" (on a 0-10 response scale ranging from 0-not at all to 10-completely):

1. How the government has treated people in my community
2. Experiences I've had with government agencies
3. Experiences my family and/or friends had with government agencies
4. Things I've seen in the media
5. The motivations of the people working in government
6. The integrity of the people working in government (e.g. political neutrality, corruption)
7. Not having enough information about what government institutions are doing to be able to trust them

People report that experience by others shape institutional trust. There are however important differences across population groups. Experiences from family and/or friends when interacting with institutions stand as the most important features shaping trust for the highly educated. Accordingly, 70% of people with a university degree report this to be a key factor influencing trust compared to just 30% in the case of people with only secondary education. In turn, at 67% people own's experience is the most reported feature influencing trust in the case of respondents who are 50 or over compared to 59% in the case of those between 18 and 30. Conversely, 42% of younger respondents say that the lack of information about government institutions is influencing their trust level compared to just 32% in the case of older respondents (Figure 2.5).


Figure 2.5. Important reasons to influence trust, by age, education and ethnicity

Share of respondents who report different reasons that influence their trust levels by age, education and ethnicity, 2021



Note: Figure presents the difference between 1- younger (18-29) and older (50+) respondents (left figure); 2- lower educated and higher educated respondents (middle figure); 3- European and Māori respondents (right figure) of responses to the question "How much do each of the following reasons influence your trust in the institutions of government?". Shown here is the proportion of respondents that answer "completely" based on the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale 0-10. * means that differences in proportions are statistically significant at the 90% significance level; ** means that differences are statistically significant at the 95% level; *** means that differences are statistically significant at the 99% level.


Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)

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The survey also incorporates a question on interpersonal trust reflecting in the link, recognized in the literature, between interpersonal and institutional trust (Lipset and Schneider, 1983^[11]; Job, 2005^[12]; Bäck and Kestilä, 2009^[13]). On average across countries, people tend to have high trust in other people (Figure 2.6). 65% of New Zealanders consider that most people can be trusted which is close to the OECD average but on the low end of the benchmarking group only above Australia (63%) and Sweden (61%). Countries with high trust in other people are the Netherlands (83%), Norway (78%) and Ireland (78%).

Figure 2.6. Trust in others in New Zealand is close to the OECD average

Share of respondents in New Zealand who indicate trust (on a 0-10 scale), 2021



Note: Figure presents responses to the question in general how much do you trust most people? "On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust". The "trust" proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the response scale; "neutral" is equal to a response of 5; "do not trust" is the aggregation of responses from 0-4; and "Don't know" was a separate answer choice. Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)

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2.3. People of Asian background, older cohorts, and the more educated report higher trust levels


In general, and like in other surveyed OECD countries, women, younger people, as well as those with lower education and income levels tend to have lower trust in others and in public institutions (Figure 2.7 and Table 2.4). This trend is consistent with results for interpersonal trust where the youngest cohort display significantly lower levels of trust than other age groups (Figure 2.7). As discussed in chapter one, interpersonal and institutional trust tend to be correlated and mutually reinforcing (OECD, 2022^[14]).

Regarding geographic and ethnic disparities, the Māori and Pacifica populations are the least trusting as well as respondents living outside urban areas such as Wellington and Auckland. This finding is consistent with trends in other countries, where people who live geographically further away from political institutions or economic centres often feel excluded from the political system and may have more limited access to high quality services, and as a result tend to have lower trust (OECD, 2022^[15];

Mitsch, Lee and Ralph Morrow, 2021^[16]; Wood, Daley and Chivers, n.d.^[17]). In the case of New Zealand, while 61% and 57% of the population in Wellington and Auckland trust the public service, trust is down to 53% and 47% in more remote areas of the North and South islands, a trend also observed for other institutions such as the parliament and local government institutions (See Table 2.4).

Figure 2.7. There are differences in interpersonal trust across population groups in New Zealand

Share of respondents in New Zealand that trust most people by subgroup, 2021



Note: Figure presents the responses to the question “On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, in general how much do you trust most people?” The “trust” proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale. “NZL mean” presents the weighted average across all respondents in New Zealand. Top 25% and bottom 25% refers to the income distribution based on household's total gross annual income of 2021, before tax and deductions, but including benefits/allowances. High education is defined as the ISCED 2011 education levels 5-8, i.e. university-level degrees such as Bachelors, Masters or PhD, and low education refers to less than a completed upper secondary degree. * means that differences in proportions are statistically significant at the 90% significance level; ** means that differences are statistically significant at the 95% level; *** means that differences are statistically significant at the 99% level. Reference group in light blue.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)

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Respondents who identified as Māori have lower levels of trust, whereas respondents who identified as Asian have the highest trust in public institutions. For example, only 42% of Māori reported trusting the public service compared to 56% of European and 66% of Asians. As will be discussed in subsequent sections when controlling for different socioeconomic characteristics being Māori is the only one that stands as significant when it comes to trust in the public service.

Still, Māori are inherently diverse thus generalizations could be misleading. However, the fact that some Māori could feel that historically the crown has breached their trust through the different versions of the Waitangi treaty and the delay in its application as well as their marginalization from political decision-making might explain lower average trust levels for Māori. A recent report published by the office of the Auditor General on Māori perspectives of public accountability based on a series of interviews with Māori concludes that Māori perceive trust as relational, reciprocal, that *Tikanga*³ (Māori values) builds trust and confidence and that the power imbalance thwarts trust (Office of the Auditor General, 2022^[18]).

In turn, trust in the media (the least trusted institution) is also low among respondents identifying as Māori, just over a quarter of Māori reported trusting the media compared to a third in the case of people identifying as New Zealand European (See Table 2.4). Some Māori populations are more likely to trust

information provided by their Iwi and people in their community as exemplified by the COVID-19 vaccination campaign and the role played by iwi in convincing Māori to get vaccinated as opposed to general vaccination campaigns. Information provided through institutional channels may not be necessarily attuned with cultural practices of some Māori groups.

Nonetheless, despite having overall comparatively lower levels of trust, significant institutional efforts to incorporate Māori's viewpoint into decision-making and to involve them in governance processes leading to policy development and implementation, were acknowledged by different institutional and non-institutional stakeholders interviewed for this case study, including those representing Māori communities. The necessity of investing in building long-term trust relations with Māori was recognized as a crucial step for raising trust levels between Māori and the government and is the approach being taken by many government institutions.


Māori are themselves a diverse group. Box 2.4 below displays trust in the public service by ethnicity considering people's education and income levels as well. While these statistics are not significant as the sample was not designed for such purpose they are indicative of the variations in trust levels when combining different characteristics that go beyond just ethnicity. A study conducted by the Public Sector Commission and that uses data from the Kiwis Count finds that after controlling for socioeconomic variables, the size and significance of ethnicity in trust in the public sector brand or trust based in recent experience diminishes (Papadopoulous and Vance, 2019^[19]).

Box 2.4. Trust in the public service by a combination of subgroups

Figure 2.8 shows the variation in trust levels by ethnicity when combined with respondents' income and education. People who identified as European, Māori and Pacifica, who are in the highest quartile of the income distribution, have substantively higher levels of trust. Differences in trust by education and income among the Asian population and people from another ethnicity are minimal. The trust gap in the public service between people with lower and higher education is the largest among Māori. These differences shed light on the diversity within population groups and call for nuanced analyses with larger survey samples that would allow analysing these differences systematically across and within various population groups.


Figure 2.8. Trust in the Public Service is lower among people with lower income and lower education

Share of respondents who indicate trust in the Public Service in New Zealand (responses 6-10 on a 10-point scale), 2021



Note: Figure presents responses to the question “On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust the Public Service?” The “trust” proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the response scale; “neutral” is equal to a response of 5; “do not trust” is the aggregation of responses from 0-4; and “Don't know” was a separate answer choice. The trust levels are disaggregated by ethnicity and income levels and ethnicity and education levels. The left figure shows respondents belonging to the bottom and top 25% of the income distribution based on household's total gross annual income of 2021, before tax and deductions, but including benefits/allowances. The right figure shows respondents with “high education” referring to ISCED 2011 education levels 5-8, i.e. university-level degrees such as Bachelors, Masters or PhD, while “low education” refers to less than a completed upper secondary degree. No significance levels are reported because the sampling of the survey was not designed for testing differences across small subgroups of the population.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)

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The consistently highest levels of institutional trust among respondents of Asian background could be explained by some socioeconomic characteristics. 88% of the respondents identifying as Asian have a university education and institutional trust is consistently higher among people with a university education (See Table 2.4). In addition, people of Asian background often represent collectivistic values emphasizing higher consideration for authority (Confucian values) and the need to fit in with others to avoid conflict in society in particular when they have lived abroad (Hempton and Komives, 2008^[20]) (Zhang et al., 2018^[21]). The combination of these factors might help explain respondents with Asian background rather positive assessment of public institutions and the confidence they place in them.

Table 2.4. Share of trust levels and standard errors in New Zealand, by ethnicity and region

	Local Government Councilors	Parliament	Police	Public Service	Local authority/ council employees	Media	Courts and Legal System	International Organization
Share								
Ethnicity								
European	43%	45%	76%	56%	51%	33%	67%	51%
Māori	34%***	36%***	52%***	42%***	38%***	26%**	45%***	32%***
Pacifica	37%	43%	61%***	44%**	38%***	26%	49%***	46%
Asian	64%***	69%***	81%**	66%***	68%***	57%***	78%***	72%***
Other	47%	40%	71%	52%	51%	37%	68%	48%
Region								
Auckland	51%	54%	75%	57%	56%	42%	69%	56%
Wellington	45%	53%	74%	61%	54%	36%	65%	55%
Canterbury	45%	46%*	72%	53%*	51%	35%	63%	54%
Waikato	50%	54%	78%	64%	56%	35%	71%	52%
Rest of North Island	37%**	37%***	69%	47%***	43%**	28%**	59%	42%***
Rest of South Island	37%*	40%***	69%	53%	46%*	32%	63%	45%**

Note: Figure presents the share of response values 6-10 to the question: "On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust the [institution]?" * means that differences in proportions are statistically significant at the 90% significance level; ** means that differences are statistically significant at the 95% level; *** means that differences are statistically significant at the 99% level. Significant higher shares than the reference group are highlighted in blue and significant lower shares than the reference group are highlighted in red. In bold are the reference group (European and Wellington respectively).


Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)

The largest gap in trust by socioeconomic categories is on justice-related institutions. Law and order institutions are the most trusted institutions in New Zealand. However, there are important variations across population groups. For example, 52% of Māori and 61% of Pacific trust the police compared to 76% of people of European background, even though substantial efforts have been made towards building a police force that represents the diversity of the society and to strengthen efforts to work *via* partnerships with individuals, communities, businesses, and other public agencies. Still, Māori are overly represented in jail with over 50% of inmates being of Māori ethnicity and Māori are also more likely to be victims of crimes (Ministry of Justice, 2022^[22]). These factors may contribute to explain comparatively low levels of trust by Māori in law-and-order institutions.

Consistent with findings from other OECD member countries, the police (80%) and the courts (72%) are most trusted by older cohorts as compared to younger or middle-aged respondents (OECD, 2022^[15]). The trust gap in courts and legal system between people with low and high levels of education is also large at 20 percentage points (See Figure 2.9 Panel A) and 16 percentage points between younger and older respondents (See Figure 2.9 Panel B). Men have 13 percentage points higher trust in courts and legal system, which is the largest gender gap across all institutions (See Figure 2.9 Panel C).


Figure 2.9. People with high level of education, older respondents and male report higher trust in public institutions

Panel A: Share of respondents in New Zealand that trust the following institutions by highest level of education, 2021




Note: Figure presents responses to the question “On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust [institution]?” Shown here is the proportion of respondents that “trust” the [the institution] (i.e. response values 6-10), grouped by highest level of education. “Higher” education refers to ISCED 2011 levels 5-8, which refers to university-level degrees such as Bachelors, Masters or PhD, while “Medium” education refers to levels 3-4, or upper and post-secondary, non-tertiary education and “Low education” refers to less than a completed upper secondary degree. All differences are statistically significant on a 99% level.

Panel B: Share of respondents in New Zealand that trust the following institutions by age group, 2021



Note: Figure presents responses to the question “On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust [institution]?” Shown here is the proportion of respondents that “trust” based on the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale, grouped by age group. Stars show statistically significant differences between subgroups. * means that differences in proportions between the young and the older population group are statistically significant at the 90% significance level; ** means that differences are statistically significant at the 95% level; *** means that differences are statistically significant at the 99% level.

Panel C: Share of respondents in New Zealand that trust the following institutions by gender, 2021



Note: Figure presents responses to the question “On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust [institution]?” Shown here is the proportion of respondents that “trust” based on the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale, grouped by gender. All differences are statistically significant on a 99% level.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)

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
In addition to personal characteristics, perceptions of one’s own situation could also influence trust in public institutions. People who feel financially insecure, i.e. reporting concerns about their household’s finances and overall social and economic well-being, have 16 percentage points lower trust in local authority/council

employees and the parliament (just below the OECD average of 17 percentage points for the parliament) compared to people with no financial concerns. For all institutions considered, the gap is higher than 10 percentage points (See Figure 2.10 Panel A).

Perceptions of socioeconomic vulnerabilities are consistent with self-reported income, a more objective measure of socioeconomic status. Respondents belonging to the bottom 25% of the income distribution in New Zealand have lower trust levels for all institutions. The income gap is large and consistent across institutions reaching up to 20 percentage points for trust in courts and legal system and 16 percentage points in the case of the police (See Figure 2.10 Panel B).


Figure 2.10. Trust in institutions is lower among people with perceived socioeconomic vulnerabilities and low self-reported income

Panel A Share of respondents in New Zealand that trust the following institutions by financial concerns, 2021




Note: Figure presents responses to the question “On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust [institution]?” Shown here is the proportion of respondents that “trust” based on the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale, grouped by respondents with and without financial concerns (“Thinking about the next year or two, how concerned are you about your household’s finances and overall social and economic well-being?”). All differences are statistically significant on a 99% level.

Panel B Share of respondents in New Zealand that trust the following institutions by self-reported income, 2021



Note: Figure presents responses to the question “On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust [institution]?” Shown here is the proportion of respondents that “trust” the [the institution] (i.e. response values 6-10), grouped by income group. The income refers to the household's total gross annual income of 2021, before tax and deductions, but including benefits/allowances and respondents are grouped in bottom 25% and top 25%. All differences are statistically significant on a 99% level.


Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)

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31% of the New Zealand respondents indicated that they have worked in the public sector. Figure 2.11 shows that people who have worked in the public sector have on average higher trust in the public service. The level of trust is especially higher for those that have worked in the public sector⁴ (comprising the public service, local government, and other public sector). There is however variation within the public sector. For those who have worked in a public sector department trust is significantly higher than for those who haven't, yet the opposite is true for those who reported working in other type government agency. Only direct experience has an effect on trust as work by a friend or family member does not have any effect on trust in the public service.


Figure 2.11. People that have worked in the public sector have higher trust in the Public Service

Share of respondents in New Zealand that trust the Public Service by subgroup, 2021



Note: Figure presents the distributions of responses to the question "On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust the Public Service (non-elected employees in central government)?" The "likely" proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale. "NZL mean" presents the weighted average across all respondents in New Zealand. "Public employment" is based on responses to the question "Have you ever worked in the public sector?", followed by the question: "Have you ever worked in... [A public service department or departmental agency/Local government/Other public sector organisation]" and "Do you have any family members or friends who work or have worked in the public sector?". * means that differences in proportions are statistically significant at the 90% significance level; ** means that differences are statistically significant at the 95% level; *** means that differences are statistically significant at the 99% level. Reference group in light blue.


Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)

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There are also variations in trust levels by migrant status (Figure 2.12). Migrants without New Zealand citizenship have higher trust levels in the public service (67%) than people who have citizenship (51%). Similar results are observed for migrants (people born in another country and who moved to New Zealand at a certain point). 65% of people born abroad express trust in the public service compared to 52% of those born in New Zealand. This likely reflects the fact that New Zealand's migration criteria weight education very strongly and, as a result, migrants have higher average levels of education (and therefore trust) than the New Zealand born population. These results are also consistent with those found in other advanced small-developed economies such as Norway and Finland where the same pattern is observed for people with a migrant background (OECD, 2022^[6]; OECD, 2021^[5]).


Figure 2.12. Trust in Public Service is higher among migrants and those that have lived outside of New Zealand

Share of respondents in New Zealand that trust the Public Service by subgroup, 2021



Note: Figure presents the distributions of responses to the question "On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust the Public Service (non-elected employees in central government)?" The "likely" proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale. "NZL mean" presents the weighted average across all respondents in New Zealand. "Lived outside" is based on the responses to the questions "Have you spent time living outside of New Zealand as an adult?". "Migrant" is based on responses to the question "Were you born in New Zealand?". Reference group in light blue.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)

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2.4. New Zealand has higher trust than other countries with similar levels of cultural diversity and higher cultural diversity than other countries with similar levels of trust

It is often argued that the high trust model of government characteristic of the Nordic and other northern European countries can be partly attributed to relatively high levels of social and ethnic homogeneity (OECD, 2022^[6]; OECD, 2021^[5]). It is certainly well established that social and ethnic homogeneity are associated with higher interpersonal trust (Zmerli and Van der Meer, 2017^[23]) and that high levels of interpersonal trust contribute to high levels of institutional trust (Rothstein and Ulaner, 2005^[24]). In this sense, New Zealand represents something of a paradox.

Figure 2.13 compares levels of interpersonal trust and levels of cultural diversity measured by the Greenburg Index of cultural diversity (Goren, 2013^[25]). Compared to other countries with similar levels of trust, New Zealand has a high level of cultural diversity. However, compared to other countries with similar levels of cultural diversity New Zealand has high levels of trust. This suggests that high trust in New Zealand is not driven by cultural homogeneity (and might suggest that the importance of cultural homogeneity to high trust is lower than is sometimes suggested). Similarly, other countries with similar political traditions – such as the United Kingdom or Canada in Figure 2.13 - have lower levels of trust than


New Zealand suggesting that New Zealand's constitutional model is unlikely to be a key driver of high trust here.

Two factors may help explain New Zealand's relative position of high trust and high cultural diversity. First, New Zealand has high levels of migration and according to the 2018 census over a quarter of the population is foreign born. Since the 1990s this migrant population has increasingly come from non-anglophone countries. This migrant population largely has higher levels of trust than the New Zealand average (Smith, 2020^[26]).

A second important factor in New Zealand's ability to sustain high levels of trust in a culturally heterogeneous society is that levels of trust are path-dependent. (Rothstein and Ulaner, 2005^[24]) note that high levels of interpersonal trust are often grounded in effective and trustworthy institutions. Similarly, it is these high levels of interpersonal trust that support institutional quality. In effect, historical high or low levels of institutional trust are potentially self-sustaining leading to virtuous/vicious circles at the national level. New Zealand, with a long history of effective and trustworthy institutions may be in a high trust equilibrium. In these circumstances events that undermine public trust in institutions are of particular concern as they risk pushing New Zealand away from this equilibrium.

Few high-profile cases had occurred over the past years including key agencies⁵ where malfunctioning of public institutions received significant media attention. In all cases there were credible and strong arguments made in the media or review/inquiry reports regarding the managerial culture of the organisations in question (Easton, 2019^[27]; Newsroom, 2020^[28]). These focused on the impact of senior leadership culture on organisational competence. The second issue is that all three failures were publicly connected to trust in the relevant institutions and their ability to effectively perform their functions. While in all cases accountability mechanisms worked well, including through direct responsibility being taken by chief executives, and corrective measures were implemented, they shed light about the role that the media could play in shaping trust patterns and the importance of learning lessons in terms of strengthening a managerial culture that relies in technical knowledge and institutional memory.

Figure 2.13. Cultural diversity and interpersonal trust are negatively associated, 2013



Source: World Values Survey 2009-2014, Goren, E. (2013)

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
2.5. High levels of trust underpin New Zealand economy

As previously discussed, perceived economic insecurity and income levels influence institutional trust. Preserving high levels of institutional trust is key to the functioning of the New Zealand economy. Trust is essential to a country's economic performance. In 1972 Kenneth Arrow famously argued that “virtually every commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust, certainly any transaction conducted over a period of time. It can plausibly be argued that much of the economic backwardness in the world can be explained by a lack of mutual confidence” (p.357) (Arrow, 1972^[29]). Although Arrow's argument was made before the availability of good cross-country data on trust, the emergence of such data from the early 1990s onwards has contributed to extensive empirical research on the relationship between trust and economic outcomes that largely vindicates the initial insight.

A recent systematic review of the literature on the relationship between trust and economic outcomes (Smith, 2020^[26]) identifies 16 papers examining the relationship between institutional trust and the rate of economic growth. All 16 papers show a positive cross-country relationship between the rate of economic growth and institutional trust and for all but one this relationship is statistically significant at conventional levels. Looking at the relationship between trust and the level of income rather than the rate of economic growth, (Auty and Furlonge, 2019^[30]; Algan and Cahuc, 2010^[31]) provide convincing evidence that changing levels of institutional trust over the 20th century explain changes in levels of income and that this relationship is causal. There are also a number of studies looking at the relationship between trust and productivity (Hazeldine, 2022^[32]; Coyle and Lu, 2020^[33]; Smith, 2020^[26]; Knack and Keefer, 1997^[34]; Bjornskov and Meon, 2015^[35]), which suggest that institutional trust is associated with higher multifactor productivity at the country level. In fact, it is likely that trust is a key element of multifactor productivity at the country level (Legge and Smith, 2022^[36]).

2.6. Although institutional trust levels are high, New Zealand is only a medium-productivity country

Trust is important to economic outcomes, but much of its impact is not reflected in the measures of produced capital and human capital (labour) that underpin the system of national accounts and traditional measures of inputs and outputs. As a result of this, the impact of trust on the economy is largely reflected in measured multifactor productivity (Coyle and Lu, 2020^[33]; Legge and Smith, 2022^[36]; Smith, 2020^[26]). Although New Zealand has high levels of institutional trust, multifactor productivity is only moderate (Figure 2.14). This implies that New Zealand faces a significant downside risk from falling trust. Levels of trust in New Zealand society are high by global terms and have limited scope to increase. However, there are many countries with lower levels of trust – including a number of countries with similar cultural backgrounds and histories (e.g. Australia, the United States). Moreover, large falls in trust are possible over relatively short periods of time as has been seen in the United States since 1990 (McGrath, 2017^[37]).

Figure 2.14. Multifactor productivity is moderate in New Zealand

Source: Multifactor productivity by country, 2019, OECD


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2.7. Dependence on natural resource rents places pressure on New Zealand's high-trust model

One source of risk to New Zealand's high trust economic model lies in its dependence on natural resource rents. Under a previous heading it was discussed the degree to which New Zealand's total wealth stock is dominated by natural capital. This dominance is reflected in the makeup of New Zealand's exports. Figure 2.15 shows the make-up of New Zealand's merchandise exports (i.e. exports other than services) in 2021. Of total merchandise exports, 61.8% are primary products and 58.2% are agricultural products (the difference being aluminium and crude oil exports). However, countries with high levels of trust and high dependence on natural capital are rare (Norway being the other obvious example).

The abundance of natural resources can result in a resources curse to a large extent because the ability to extract income from economic rents from natural capital reduces the need to build effective institutions. Although New Zealand is not affected by the resource curse in its traditional form, there is reason to believe that the high level of dependence on natural capital places pressure on institutional trust.

Figure 2.15. Of total merchandise exports in New Zealand, a large majority are primary products and agricultural products



Note: Commodities exported by as a percentage of total merchandise exports, 2021

Source: Overseas Merchandise trade statistics, June 2021, Statistics New Zealand

StatLink  <https://stat.link/rctevu>

In New Zealand natural resource allocation and management decisions are decided under the ambit of the Resource Management Act 1991 (the RMA). The RMA decentralises much decision making about natural capital and places this in the hands of local government (both at the regional level through regional councils and at the more local level through territorial authorities)⁶. When introduced the intent of the RMA was to decentralise resource management decisions and delegate these to the level where the effects of the decisions would be most strongly felt. However, more recently there has been concern that the RMA has been working ineffectively in managing natural resources.

The RMA has been criticised from a range of different perspectives with concerns around its complexity, its lack of direction, and particularly weak support for monitoring and enforcement on the part of the local bodies tasked with implementing it in practice (Fischer, 2022_[38]). One issue that is of particular concern from the perspective of institutional trust is that the organisations tasked with monitoring and enforcing environmental outcomes under the RMA are also tasked with regional economic development. In some cases, the issue goes beyond policy responsibility for economic development with local bodies actually owning assets with significant environmental impacts to be monitored under the RMA (Fischer, 2022_[38]).

Concerns around conflicts of interest in resource management decisions under the RMA have created a perception among some groups that decision-making around natural capital has been captured – at least partly – by vested interests (Brown, Peart and Wright, 2016_[39]). Issues with water quality and allocation of water rights to dairy interests have had a high media profile in the last decade (Gudsell, 2017_[40]; Corlett, 2020_[41]) both due to concerns around over-allocation of water rights in dryland areas and water quality issues associated with nitrate pollution.


This is partly supported by official enquiries. For example, while prosecution decisions should be made on technical and legal grounds, elected officials such as local councillors may be directly involved in the decision-making process (Office of the Auditor General, 2011^[42]). Similar issues also exist with respect to other aspects of natural capital such as the quota system that underpins fisheries management (Heron, 2016^[43]). More recently the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment has highlighted the significant gaps that exist in the data available to monitor natural capital (Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, 2019^[44]).

While New Zealand's management of its natural resource stocks has not yet led to an observable impact on institutional trust, concerns about the lack of effective monitoring and enforcement and a perception of undue influence from vested interests are of concern. Significant reforms around resource management are currently underway. This includes repealing the RMA and replacing it with three acts: a climate change adaptation act, a strategic planning act, and a natural and built environment act. As these reforms are enacted they present a significant opportunity to shore up the infrastructure around institutional trust in New Zealand, particularly with regard to natural resource management.

2.8. Increases in trust have occurred under the context of stable levels of income inequality but raising housing prices are a risk

As shown by OECD data and in Chapter One levels of institutional trust in New Zealand are high and have remained stable or even increased over time. Income inequality in New Zealand rose rapidly between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s and it has subsequently remained relatively stable. Figure 2.14 below shows the ratio between the 90th percentile and the 10th percentile of incomes in New Zealand – a summary measure of income inequality – over the period from 1982 to 2019. Following the economic reforms of the late 1980s and early 1990s income inequality has been relatively stable whether measured by the 90/10 ratio as in Figure 2.16 or by other measures of income inequality such as the Gini coefficient (Perry, 2019^[45]). Overall, the general rise in trust measures in New Zealand in the 2004 to 2020 period likely reflects the impact of factors unrelated to income inequality or economic performance more generally.

Figure 2.16. Income Inequality in New Zealand has been increasing



Note: Income Inequality in New Zealand: the P90:P10 ratio, 1982 to 2018, total population.


Source: Perry 2019.

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Figure 2.17 below shows the house prices to income ratios in New Zealand compared to other OECD countries from 2000 to 2022. The increase in New Zealand has been the highest amongst countries displayed. As a result of highly expansionary monetary policy, the suspension of the loan-to-value ratio (LVR) household debt increased to 169% of disposable income and house prices to levels that the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) judges to be unsustainable (OECD, 2022^[46]).

Figure 2.16 shows that there is a higher level of income inequality after housing costs have been deducted from income than before. In addition, there is evidence that income inequality after housing costs increased over the period since 2000, with the 90/10 ratio of after housing cost income higher following the 2008 global financial crisis when compared to the period before it (Figure 2.17). Throughout the interviews carried out for this study spiking housing prices were mentioned as a potential reason that could affect trust by deepening current and intergenerational inequalities (See Chapter 3).

Figure 2.17. House prices-to-income ratios have increased more than in other countries over the last year



Note: The price to income ratio is the nominal house price index divided by the nominal disposable income per head and can be considered as a measure of affordability.

Source: OECD Economic Outlook database.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/qic0rs>

2.9. The drivers of trust in public institutions in New Zealand

The OECD Trust Survey implemented for this case study makes it possible for the first time in New Zealand to carry out a comprehensive analysis of the determinants of trust. As presented at the beginning of this chapter the survey includes questions on trust levels of institutions Table 2.1 and 12 questions on the perception of trustworthiness of public institutions in New Zealand according to the five dimensions of the OECD Framework on the determinants of public trust presented in Table 2.2 (i.e. responsiveness,

reliability, openness, integrity, fairness). The survey in New Zealand included a question about people's confidence in government institutions to perform different tasks associated with the dimensions of the OECD framework. Figure 2.3 shows that while slightly more than 60% of the population are confident that public institutions will protect them, just 44% expect to be listened to. All in all, components pertaining to competences (i.e. responsiveness and reliability) are better assessed than those associated with values (i.e. integrity, openness and fairness).

Respondents were asked how likely or unlikely certain events or conditions were in the case of public institutions in New Zealand. The analysis links overall levels of trust with the drivers of trust for three institutions: the public service; local government as represented by local government councillors; and the parliament. The logistic regressions use as dependent variables people who trust or do not trust (the three institutions) and as explanatory variables questions on the determinants of trust as well as controls for socioeconomic characteristics (See Box 2.5).

Box 2.5. Specification of the model on the drivers of trust in public institutions implemented in New Zealand

The empirical analysis of the drivers of trust is based on logistic regressions. Institutional trust is separately measured using three different variables: trust in the public service, trust in parliament and trust in local government councillors. The survey question is phrased as follows: "On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust each of the following?". The dependent variable is recoded as a dummy. It takes value 0 for responses 0-4 on the original 11-points scale, and value 1 for responses 6-10. Response 5, "Don't know" and people who didn't answer are excluded. Stepwise regressions are used as a data reduction method that allows identifying variables that will feed into the final logistic regression.

Based on the OECD framework, trust is expected to be mainly driven by respondents' perceptions of responsiveness, reliability, openness, integrity, and fairness of government and public institutions. These five dimensions are operationalized utilizing 12 variables, originally measured on a 0-10 scale that were then standardized. In addition to these, the main set of predictors includes 5 variables measuring respectively: internal and external efficacy (both on an 11-points scale), satisfaction with administrative services (same scale), and confidence in one's country's ability to respond to tackle environmental challenges.

All models include the following control variables: socio-demographics (age, gender, education, interpersonal trust, perception of economic insecurity and ethnicity) they are all estimated using survey weights. Missing data are excluded using listwise deletion.

2.9.1. Trust in the public service

Figure 2.18 shows the main drivers of trust in the public service in New Zealand. Responsiveness, as the extent to which public institutions will address people's concerns about services, has the highest potential impact on trust in the public service. According to the survey, 42.7% of respondents expect that if a service is working badly and people complain about it, it will be improved. Moving from the typical New Zealander to one with slightly higher confidence (one standard deviation increase) could lead to an increase in trust in the public service by 6.3 percentage points (see Figure 2.18).


The driver with the second highest explanatory power for trust in the public service is government preparedness to protect people's lives in a future pandemic. Trust in the public service could increase by almost 5 percentage points if moving from the typical respondent to one with a slightly higher perception of government preparedness. As discussed in Chapter One, New Zealand's response to the pandemic has

been praised internationally and led to one of the lowest mortality rates around the globe. Not surprisingly – bearing in mind the COVID-19 experience – 61.8% of respondents in New Zealand consider the government to be prepared to cope with a future pandemic. Still, New Zealand remains confronted with a wide variety of risks including those deriving from climate change that call for strengthened reliability and effective disaster management plans (See Chapter 3).

Satisfaction with administrative services is the factor with the third highest explanatory power for trust in the public service in New Zealand. At a comparatively high level of 68% satisfaction with administrative services, it remains an important lever to preserve and strengthen trust in the public service. Shifting from the typical respondent on this variable to one with slightly higher confidence could lead to an increase in trust of 4.7 percentage points in trust in the public service.


While elements of competence remain the strongest predictors of trust in the public service some indicators associated with government values have additional explanatory power. Less than half (48.4%) of the New Zealand population expects that public servants will refuse a bribe to speed up access to an administrative service. Improvements on this variable from the typical respondent to one with a higher perception that bribes are refused will result in an increase in trust of about 3.9 percentage points. Elements of openness, related to the incorporation of public feedback received in public consultations, is also statistically significant, and improvements in this dimension could lead to positive changes in trust of about 3.4 percentage points (See Figure 2.18).

Figure 2.18 Service responsiveness has the highest explanatory power for trust in the public service



Note: The figure shows the most robust determinants of self-reported trust in public service in a logistic estimation that controls for individual characteristics and self-reported levels of interpersonal trust. All variables depicted are statistically significant at 99%, except responsiveness which is statistically significant at 95%. Only questions derived from the OECD Trust Framework are depicted on the x-axis, while individual characteristics such as age, gender, education, which also may be statistically significant, are not shown.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)

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
2.9.2. Trust in the parliament

The second institution for which the analysis on the drivers of trust was carried out is the New Zealand Parliament. Figure 2.19 shows factors that turned out significant for levels of trust in the national

parliament. The factors with the highest relative weight relate to whether or not people think their voices will be heard. People's expectations that their opinions expressed in public consultations has the highest potential impact on trust in the national parliament. Political efficacy, or the extent to which people think they have a say in what the government does, also has a relatively high potential impact on trust in the parliament. Improving external political efficacy from the typical respondent to one with a slightly higher level on this variable could lead to improvements in trust of about 4.5 percentage points, keeping all other things equal.


The second group of variables with a relatively high explanatory power on trust in parliament are related to reliability. Increasing people's confidence on public institutions' ability to deliver on climate change targets could increase trust levels by about 5 percentage points, keeping everything else equal. Another dimension of reliability with the potential of increasing public trust substantially refers to the stability of business conditions. Improvements on this component could result in a potential increase in trust of about 5 percentage points. Other components of reliability such as the extent to which institutions are prepared to fight future crises or satisfaction with administrative services are also significant. Yet, the starting point, i.e. the current level of these components, is much higher, 61.8% and 67.9% respectively (See Figure 2.19).

Figure 2.19. Political efficacy and reliability are key determinants of trust in the parliament



Note: The figure shows the most robust determinants of self-reported trust in parliament in a logistic estimation that controls for individual characteristics and self-reported levels of interpersonal trust. All variables depicted are statistically significant at 99%. Integrity is statistically significant at 95%. Only questions derived from the OECD Trust Framework are depicted on the x-axis, while individual characteristics such as age, gender, education, which also may be statistically significant, are not shown.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)


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2.9.3. Trust in local government councillors

Figure 2.20 presents significant factors explaining trust in local government councillors. Elements of openness, such as having the opportunity to voice concerns on local issues and expecting that opinions expressed in public consultations will be considered, are significant. The latter is the factor with the highest relative impact, moving from the average respondent to one with a slightly higher score on this question could improve trust in local government councillors by 6.6 percentage points. Improvements in the expectations of fair treatment of people from different income levels has the potential to influence trust in

local government councillors by 5.4 percentage points, the second highest relative contribution for trust in local government councillors.

Figure 2.20. Openness and fairness are also key determinants of trust in the local government councillors



Note: The figure shows the most robust determinants of self-reported trust in local government councillors in a logistic estimation that controls for individual characteristics and self-reported levels of interpersonal trust. All variables depicted are statistically significant at 99%. Responsiveness is statistically significant at 95%. Only questions derived from the OECD Trust Framework are depicted on the x-axis, while individual characteristics such as age, gender, education, which also may be statistically significant, are not shown.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)

StatLink  <https://stat.link/ntfua>

2.9.4. Comparative analysis on the drivers of trust in public institutions in New Zealand

Table 2.5 shows the determinants of trust in the public service, parliament and local government councillors and highlights these determinants that are significant across the three studied institutions. The positive sign within brackets indicates the institution for which the coefficient is largest when compared to the other two institutions. Improving service responsiveness and satisfaction with administrative services have a higher relative effect for trust in the public service. Preparedness to fight a future pandemic has a slightly larger coefficient for trust in local government councillors, although differences are not very large. Aspects related to openness, specifically expectations about people's voices being heard, are significant for the three institutions analysed and has a relatively higher effect for trust in the public service.

Several control variables are included in the regressions and only interpersonal trust is consistently significant across all institutions. Feelings of economic insecurity expressed by financial concerns have also a significant effect on trust in the parliament. This is not surprising as the parliament can directly influence people's lives through policies and choices and is sought after for responses on societal and economic issues. While there is diversity within groups, ethnicity and specifically being Māori has a weakly significant effect in trust in the public service in turn being Asian weakly influences trust in the parliament. Qualitative survey responses signal aspects related to economic insecurity and vulnerabilities as an additional lever of trust in public institutions (See Box 2.4).

Table 2.5. Comparison of the drivers of trust in public institutions in New Zealand

	Trust in the public service	Trust in the parliament	Trust in local government councillors
Personal characteristics			
Age			
Gender			
Education			
Financial concerns			
Interpersonal trust			
Ethnicity (Māori)			
Ethnicity (Asian)			
Drivers of trust in public institutions			
Courts independence (integrity)			
Refusing bribes (integrity)			
Improving services (responsiveness)	(+)		
Adopting innovative ideas (responsiveness)			
Preparedness to fight a new disease (reliability)			(+)
Stability of regulatory conditions (reliability)			
Confidence reduce emissions (reliability)			
Voicing views local issues (openness)			
Opinions in public consultations considered (openness)			(+)
Equal treatment income (fairness)			
Satisfaction administrative services (reliability)	(+)		
Political efficacy (having a say)			

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)

This chapter presented the results of the survey on the drivers of trust in public institutions in New Zealand and discussed additional factors that can influence trust in years to come. Based on these and other quantitative results as well as the analysis of the interviews carried out with over 50 representatives from public institutions, civil society, ethnic communities and academia in New Zealand, the following chapter will discuss the type of actions that can be undertaken to preserve and strengthen trust in public institutions in New Zealand.

Box 2.6. Drivers of Trust: Open-Ended Survey Responses in New Zealand

The OECD Trust Survey included an open-ended survey question asking about influences in people's trust in public institutions: *"Please feel free to share any additional thoughts on what influences your trust in government and public institutions."* The answer to the open-ended survey question was voluntary and respondents could elaborate in a text box on their ideas and perceptions of influencing factors in trust. The open-ended survey question was added to the survey questionnaire in 17 out of 22 OECD countries that participated in the OECD Trust Survey to build on quantitative measurements of drivers of trust in public institutions and to add qualitative evidence about trust in the government and public institutions. 23% of respondents in New Zealand answered the open-ended survey question with valuable survey responses, slightly fewer respondents compared to the other OECD average (29% of respondents across surveyed OECD countries answered the open-ended survey question).

The open-ended survey answers were grouped in topics based on respondents' use of similar words in the survey response. In a cross-country comparison, the housing crisis and increasing crime were issues that were more frequently mentioned in New Zealand, whereas corruption was much less frequently named to influence trust than in other surveyed countries. Systemic inequalities and the preferential treatment of ethnic minorities were specific concerns of respondents in New Zealand. Regarding international issues, many people expressed concerns with New Zealand's role in international collaboration and climate change and were sceptical that a small country like New Zealand could contribute to both in a sufficient manner, which respondents from other smaller sized countries mentioned as well.

OPEN QUESTION:

Please feel free to share any additional thoughts on **what influences your trust** in government and public institutions.

Note: All references to institutions in this survey mean the institutions over time, for example for government it is any government over time regardless of which political parties are in power.

Crises that New Zealand is facing: Housing crisis, crime, migration, climate change, pandemic

Worries about corruption in the political system; politicians' ethics and morals

Taxation and worries about government's excessive spending

Systemic inequalities; preferential treatment of ethnic minorities (Maori)

Distinction between **levels of government:** national government and local government councillors

Transparency, misinformation, open communication, role of the media, scientific evidence and facts

Lack of government responsiveness: Politicians own agenda, election promises not kept, open consultations and protests not considered

Dissatisfaction with policy outcomes: pandemic restrictions, public service performance, lacking quality healthcare system

Unfair inequalities, such as living costs

Trustworthy: Lack of cooperation between political parties and politicians competence

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)

2.10. Opportunities to upgrade measures of trust to build a robust evidence base

- The Kiwis Count Survey is one of the primary ways by which the PSC monitors levels of confidence in public sector agencies (See Box 1.1). The survey is a commendable effort to measure customer satisfaction with services on a regular basis and report on trust in government. Nonetheless, questions on trust included in the Kiwis Count are based on the respondent's trust in the public service brand or on most recent personal interaction with a Public Service agency. This inevitably excludes many of the most important drivers of trust. It is recommended that the Public Service Commission revises the Kiwis Count Survey to improve the relevance and comparability of the data that it collects. Key priorities in the revisions should be preserving valuable time series, improving comparability of data collected, improving the relevance and usefulness of the data collected, and minimising respondent burden. Measures of the expected responsiveness of services, the reliability of long-term policies, engagement opportunities and perceived integrity and fairness can allow monitoring the effects of different policies and actions over time as well as their relationship to trust levels. Accordingly, questions included in the Kiwis Count Survey can be complemented with measures that align with the OECD Survey on the Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions. In turn, building a time series on questions on the drivers will allow monitoring the effects of different policies and actions over time.

- There are recurrent trust gaps between several societal groups: Māori, younger people, people outside the large urban areas, the less educated and those with lower income have consistently lower levels of trust in institutions. Indicative evidence suggests that there is important variation when looking jointly at socioeconomic characteristics within populations groups (e.g. ethnicity and education or income levels). Having samples that are sufficiently large to combine different socioeconomic characteristics (e.g. ethnicity and education level) may contribute to give visibility to wells of distrust and better target actions to engage with them.

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Notes

¹ Local government councillors are elected representatives responsible for representing their communities in local councils for three years terms.

² <https://www.dia.govt.nz/Services-Local-Elections-Local-Authority-Election-Statistics-2019>.

³ Tikanga could be translated as Māori values. Māori expressed that if Tikanga are used to guide engagement and build relationships, trust and confidence would improve. At the heart of tikanga are concepts such as tika (true, right, fair, just), pono (honest, genuine, sincere), aroha (empathy, compassion, care), mana, whanaungatanga, kotahitanga and manaakitanga - principles that were highlighted by the participants as necessary in building trust

⁴ The breakdown of people reporting that they have worked in the public sector is as follows: 59% reported that they have worked in the public sector. 14% have worked in the local government and 35% reported working in other public sector.

⁵ Specifically, these agencies refer to the Treasury and a leakage of sensitive budgetary information in May 2019. Oranga Tamariki and a 2019 case involving Oranga Tamariki attempting to uplift a week-old baby from its mother that made national headlines. Finally, The 2018 Census managed by Statistics New Zealand failed to achieve target response rates and was a year late in providing the first outputs.

⁶ New Zealand has two levels of local government: regional councils and territorial authorities. Regional councils cover the country's 17 regions and have responsibility for environmental management and economic development, while the 67 territorial authorities are comprised of 13 city councils, 53 district councils, and the Chatham Islands council.

3

Competence and trust in New Zealand

This chapter builds on the empirical analysis carried out for this case study, deepening the analysis of competence, an important dimension that drives institutional trust. “Competence” encompasses responsiveness, or government’s ability to deliver services at the level of quality that people expect, and reliability, or the effective management of social, economic, and political uncertainty, all while incorporating evolving needs and addressing future challenges. It discusses several avenues that will contribute to preserving and strengthening levels of institutional trust in New Zealand, such as improving public service delivery and responsiveness by ensuring that all frontline services have effective and regularly used feedback loops on citizen experience. It also recognizes the importance of enhancing digital government and innovation. The chapter also emphasises the importance of providing faster and more citizen-focused responses to disasters as well as to strengthen institutional mechanisms for long-term policy foresight.

Perceptions of the competence of government institutions are a key driver of overall trust in government. Competence can be thought of as government's ability to deliver as per expectations (Nooteboom, 2007^[1]). The OECD Framework on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions identifies government competence as a key element in determining public trust (Table 1.1) (Brezzi et al., 2021^[2]). There are two key drivers of competence. The first is responsiveness. This is the ability of government to provide efficient, quality, affordable, timely and citizen-centred public services that are co-ordinated across levels of government and which satisfy users; and government's ability to operate an innovative and efficient civil service that responds to user needs. The second driver is reliability. OECD defines this as the ability of government to anticipate needs and assess evolving challenges; minimise uncertainty in the economic, social and political environment; and effectively commit to future-oriented policies and co-operate with stakeholders on global challenges.

51% of survey respondents in New Zealand consider government institutions to be competent to do their job (Figure 3.1). Respondents were asked to indicate how much they agreed with the statement "Government institutions are competent to do their job", on a scale from 0 (fully disagree) to 10 (fully agree). 51% of survey respondents gave a score of 6 out of 10 or higher, indicating that they agreed government institutions were competent. However, 32% gave a score of 4 or lower, indicating that they do not believe government institutions are competent. While a minority, this is a significant proportion of the population. 15% expressed a neutral opinion, and just under 3% did not know. This question was included specifically in the survey in New Zealand as an overall measure of perceptions of the competence of government institutions. Comparative data for other countries is not available.


Women, Māori and those with lower incomes and less formal education are less likely to consider government to be competent (Figure 3.2). There are substantial differences across society in New Zealand in how government competence is viewed. The most dispersed opinions are found when comparing across ethnic groups. Māori (41%) and Pacifica (41%) are unlikely to consider government is competent, while those of Asian backgrounds (69%) have the most positive ranking of government competence of any group in society. People of European background have average levels of belief in government competence (49%). This is consistent with differences identified in chapter two, which finds that Māori have lower average trust levels while Asians have higher average trust levels.

Income level is strongly related with perceptions of competence. 73% of those in the top 25% of income levels considered government institutions to be competent, compared to 62% of those on middle income levels, and 54% of those with low incomes. Education is also a significant division. Only 39% of those with lower education levels (primary only) consider government to be competent, the lowest of any group in the survey, compared to 57% among those with higher education levels (tertiary upward). Women (48%) also rank competence lower than men (55%). Age is the only demographic variable which does not have a strong relationship with perceptions of the competence of government institutions. 47% of people aged 18-24, and 48% of those aged 25-19, consider government institutions to be competent, compared to 50% of middle-aged people (aged 30-49) and 53% of older people (aged 50+).

Figure 3.1. 51% of New Zealanders consider government institutions to be competent

Share of respondents in New Zealand, 2021

■ Agree ■ Neutral ■ Disagree ■ Don't know




Note: Figure presents the agreement with the question "Government institutions are competent to do their job." The "agree" proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale; "neutral" is equal to a response of 5; "disagree" is the aggregation of responses from 0-4; and "Don't know" was a separate answer choice.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)

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Figure 3.2. Women, Māori and Pacifica, those with lower incomes and those with less formal education are less likely to consider government institutions to be competent

Share of respondents in New Zealand, 2021



Note: Figure presents the agreement with the question "Government institutions are competent to do their job." The figure shows the "agreement" proportion, which is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the 0-10 response scale. "NZL mean" presents the weighted average across all respondents in New Zealand. Top 25% and bottom 25% refers to the income distribution based on household's total gross annual income of 2021, before tax and deductions, but including benefits/allowances. High education is defined as the ISCED 2011 education levels 5-8, i.e. university-level degrees such as Bachelors, Masters or PhD, and low education refers to less than a completed upper secondary degree. * means that differences in proportions are statistically significant at the 90% significance level; ** means that differences are statistically significant at the 95% level; *** means that differences are statistically significant at the 99% level. Reference group in light blue.


Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)

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People living in more urban areas tend to have a somewhat more positive view of government competence (Figure 3.3). A majority of people living in Wellington (53%), Auckland (55%) and Waikato (56%) agreed that government institutions are competent to do their job. By contrast, only 45% of people living in other areas of the North Island held this view. On the South Island, 50% of people living in the Canterbury region agreed that government institutions are competent to do their job, compared to 47% of people living elsewhere on the South Island. Regional differences are likely to reflect the combined effects of many different factors. These will likely include demographic differences, differences in income levels, and other differences between regions. Notably, more densely populated and urbanised regions will typically allow public services to be closer and more easily available for residents.

Figure 3.3. People in urban areas are more likely to consider government institutions to be competent

Share of respondents in New Zealand, 2021



Note: Figure presents the agreement with the question "Government institutions are competent to do their job." The figure shows the "agreement" proportion, which is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the 0-10 response scale. "NZL mean" presents the weighted average across all respondents in New Zealand. * means that differences in proportions are statistically significant at the 90% significance level; ** means that differences are statistically significant at the 95% level; *** means that differences are statistically significant at the 99% level. Reference group in light blue.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)

StatLink  <https://stat.link/luqts4>

There is some evidence that concentrations of very low confidence exist among people with more than one of these characteristics. The OECD Trust Survey is designed to be nationally representative for New Zealand including by gender, geography, ethnicity, education and income. However, it did not interview enough people to allow for statistically robust analysis of detailed sub-groups of the population. Nonetheless, the data provides interesting indicative information suggesting that concentrations of low confidence may be present among people who have 2 or more of the characteristics noted above. As shown in Table 3.1, very low proportions of young Māori (31%) and Māori women (34%) who answered the survey perceived government institutions as competent. Moreover, there remains a risk that people who are systematically distrustful of government are less likely to be reached by a survey of this sort. Those who are systematically distrustful are less likely to share personal details and appear on the list of candidates to take the survey. Even if they are reached, they may be more likely to refuse to complete the survey. As such, it is possible that this data may underrepresent the concentrations which exist.

Table 3.1. Where characteristics overlap, there may be concentrations of negative perceptions of government competence

Share of respondents considering institutions to be competent by subgroup, 2022

		Young (18-29)	Female	Bottom 25% Income	Māori	Pacifica
Age	Very young (18-24)		46%	38%	38%	34%
	Young (25-29)		45%	37%	16%	22%
	Middle (30-49)		46%	49%	44%	45%
	Old (50+)		52%	47%	46%	51%
Gender	Female	46%		44%	34%	48%
	Male	51%		50%	55%	52%
Income	Bottom 25%	38%	41%		47%	37%
	Middle 50%	47%	46%		41%	31%
	Top 25%	59%	60%		54%	53%
Ethnicity	European	59%	48%	44%		
	Māori	51%	34%	38%		
	Pacifica	48%	38%	39%		
	Asian	62%	70%	69%		
	Other	29%	44%	50%		

Note: Figure presents the agreement with the question "Government institutions are competent to do their job." The figure shows the "agreement" proportion, which is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the 0-10 response scale. Green indicates >50% positive responses for a subgroup, yellow 35-49% and orange <35%. Top 25% and bottom 25% refers to the income distribution based on household's total gross annual income of 2021, before tax and deductions, but including benefits/allowances. High education is defined as the ISCED 2011 education levels 5-8, i.e. university-level degrees such as Bachelors, Masters or PhD, and low education refers to less than a completed upper secondary degree. No significance levels are reported because the sampling of the survey was not designed for testing differences across small subgroups of the population.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)

This chapter first examines government responsiveness, with a focus on public service delivery, and then government reliability, covering government's ability to protect citizens from economic, environmental and public safety risks. New Zealand exhibits good practice in a range of areas, and delivered a highly effective response to the COVID-19 crisis (Chapter 1). However, these successes must be set alongside major delivery issues in various sectors e.g. housing, water quality, education, child poverty (see Chapter 4). Improving trust requires minimising these in future.

3.1. Responsiveness

The first pillar of government competence within the OECD Trust Framework is Responsiveness. This refers to two aspects of government operation. First is the ability of government to provide efficient, quality, affordable, timely and citizen-centred public services that are co-ordinated across levels of government and satisfy users. Second is the ability to operate an innovative and efficient civil service that responds to user needs. Aspects of responsiveness, in particular satisfaction with public services, are key drivers of trust in the public service (Figure 2.18). To a lesser extent, responsiveness is an important driver of trust in local councillors and in parliament. The OECD trust survey implemented in New Zealand captures elements of responsiveness through the following three questions.

- How dissatisfied or satisfied are you with the education system/health system/administrative services in New Zealand?

- If many people complained about a government service that is working badly, how unlikely or likely do you think it is that it would be improved?
- If there is an innovative idea that could improve a public service, how unlikely or likely do you think it is that it would be adopted?


3.1.1. Public Service Delivery

57% of survey respondents have confidence in New Zealand’s government to deliver good quality public services (Figure 3.4). Respondents were asked to rate their level of confidence a score on a scale from 0 (no confidence at all) to 10 (full confidence). A majority, 57%, provided a response of 6 or higher, indicating overall confidence in government institutions.

Māori and Pacifica, women and people with less education or lower income have less confidence in government to deliver good quality public services (Figure 3.5). Compared to the national average of 57%, Māori (-13 percentage point, or pp) and Pacifica (-16pp) expressed much less confidence in the capacity of institutions to deliver good public services than those of European background. Only a minority of Māori and Pacifica expressed confidence. In contrast, those from Asian backgrounds (+13pp) were much more confident than Europeans. Respondents with high income (+13pp) were more confident than those with low income. Those with high education levels (+15pp) expressed much more confidence in public services than those with low or middle education levels. Men (+ 7pp) expressed significantly more confidence than women. Older people (+8pp) were significantly more confident than the youngest cohort (+ 7pp). There were no significant differences in confidence between very young, young and middle aged people.

Figure 3.4. Most respondents have confidence in government institutions to deliver good quality public services

Share of respondents in New Zealand, 2021



Note Figure presents responses to the question “How much confidence do you have in government institutions to: Provide good public services” The “Confidence” proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale; “Neutral” is equal to a response of 5; “No confidence” is the aggregation of responses from 0-4; and “Don’t know” was a separate answer choice.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)



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Figure 3.5. Māori and Pacifica, women and people with less education or lower income have less confidence in government to deliver good quality public services

Share of respondents in New Zealand, 2021



Note: Figure presents responses to the question “How much confidence do you have in government institutions to: Provide good public services” The figure shows the “Confidence” proportion, which is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale. “NZL mean” presents the weighted average across all respondents in New Zealand. Top 25% and bottom 25% refers to the income distribution based on household’s total gross annual income of 2021, before tax and deductions, but including benefits/allowances. High education is defined as the ISCED 2011 education levels 5-8, i.e. university-level degrees such as Bachelors, Masters or PhD, and low education refers to less than a completed upper secondary degree. * means that differences in proportions are statistically significant at the 90% significance level; ** means that differences are statistically significant at the 95% level; *** means that differences are statistically significant at the 99% level. Reference group in light blue.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)

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Improving responsiveness of public services is the area with the highest potential for impacting trust in the public service in New Zealand (Figure 2.18). As such, it is reviewed in depth here, from three different perspectives: identifying services with lower satisfaction; identifying how to improve responsiveness across all services; and level of government at which services are delivered.

Improving delivery in services with lower satisfaction


Among services examined, respondents were least satisfied with education. Satisfaction with healthcare was also lower than in other small advanced economies and anglophone countries. Survey respondents were asked to indicate how satisfied or dissatisfied they were with the education, healthcare and administrative services in New Zealand as a whole, on a scale from 0 (not at all satisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied) (Figure 3.6). The lowest scoring public service was public education, where 50% of New Zealand residents reported being satisfied with New Zealand’s education system (a score of 6 or higher). Satisfaction with the education system was somewhat below the average across the 22 other OECD countries which took part in the survey (58%). It is also below the small advanced economies and other anglophone countries used as key comparators for New Zealand.

54% of respondents in New Zealand were satisfied with the healthcare system. While this is a majority of the population, it is substantially lower than the average of 64% across all other OECD countries which took part in the survey. Finally, a large majority of respondents (68%) were most satisfied with administrative services. This is above 63% observed on average in OECD countries. This is the only service which a majority of respondents in all sub-groups reported they were satisfied with.

Figure 3.6. Most respondents are satisfied with public services in New Zealand, but satisfaction with the education and healthcare systems is lower than in many comparable countries

Panel A: Satisfaction with education system


Share of respondents in New Zealand, selected countries and OECD average, 2021



Note: Figure presents the within-country distributions of responses to the question "On a scale of 0 to 10, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the education system in your country as a whole?" The "likely" proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale; "neutral" is equal to a response of 5; "unlikely" is the aggregation of responses from 0-4; and "Don't know" was a separate answer choice. "OECD" presents the unweighted average across countries. In Finland, only respondents with experience in the education system were asked about their level of satisfaction; in Norway respondents were asked specifically about satisfaction with upper secondary education/schools and primary schools. For more detailed information please find the survey method document at <http://oe.cd/trust>.

Panel B: Satisfaction with healthcare system


Share of respondents in New Zealand, selected countries and OECD average, 2021



Note: Figure presents the within-country distribution of responses to the question "On a scale of 0 to 10 [where 0 is "not at all satisfied" and 10 is "completely satisfied"], how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the healthcare system in [country] as a whole?" The "satisfied" proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale; "neutral" is equal to a response of 5; "unlikely" is the aggregation of responses from 0-4; and "Don't know" was a separate answer choice. In Norway the question referred to satisfaction with primary care doctors, public healthcare centres, nursing homes, and health & care services in the home. "OECD" presents the unweighted average across countries. For more detailed information please find the survey method document at <http://oe.cd/trust>.


Panel C: Satisfaction with administrative services

Share of respondents in New Zealand, selected countries and OECD average, 2021



Note: Figure presents the within-country distribution of responses to the question "On a scale of 0 to 10 [where 0 is "not at all satisfied" and 10 is "completely satisfied"], how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the quality of administrative services?" The "satisfied" proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale; "neutral" is equal to a response of 5; "unlikely" is the aggregation of responses from 0-4; and "Don't know" was a separate answer choice. "OECD" presents the unweighted average across countries. For more detailed information please find the survey method document at <http://oe.cd/trust>.


Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)

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Among public services, improvements to the education system appear likely to have the biggest impact on trust. Education was the service with which the public were least satisfied in OECD's survey. Low citizen satisfaction with education services is matched by declining performance of the education system over the past 15-20 years. Scores of New Zealand school students aged 15-16 have fallen in reading, mathematics and science over this period. In mathematics, declines have been sharpest on average for Māori and Pacifica groups, increasing disparity in learning levels (Figure 3.7)


The New Zealand Government's recent review of the school system recognises a lack of trust in the system. A recent review notes that a key reason for New Zealand's poor equity and achievement outcomes is that, since the Tomorrow's Schools reforms in 1989, schools have predominantly operated as autonomous, self-managing entities, loosely connected to each other, and with a distant relationship with the centre. This autonomy has left schools to operate largely on their own and without sufficient support. The report notes that schools and parents expressed a lack of trust, including that the necessary support will be available when it's needed. Schools and parents expressed frustration at the lack of consistent and accessible support from government agencies, and that some of this is caused by a relative lack of Ministry of Education staff at the front line, and the need for stronger, more focused relationships with schools, and greater clarity about the respective roles in the sector (New Zealand Ministry of Education, 2019^[3]).

Figure 3.7. New Zealand's average PISA score have declined, and Māori and Pasifika students score far below national averages



Note: Reproduction of analysis from OECD Economic Survey of New Zealand 2022. In each test subject, there is theoretically no minimum or maximum score in PISA; rather, the results are scaled to fit approximately normal distributions, with means for OECD countries around 500 score points and standard deviations around 100 score points. About two-thirds of students across OECD countries score between 400 and 600 points. Less than 2% of students, on average across OECD countries, reach scores above 700 points, and at most a handful of students in the PISA sample for any country reach scores above 800 points (OECD, n.d.^[41]).

Source: [OECD PISA Database](#); (Yashiro, Carey and Purwin, 2022^[5])

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Reforms to the education sector should actively seek to improve accessibility and quality of education in New Zealand. OECD research shows that around 80% of the variation in satisfaction levels across countries is related to standards for accessibility, responsiveness and quality in service delivery (Baredes, 2022^[6]). Table 3.2 presents a “citizen scorecard” for New Zealand, showing how it ranks among OECD nations for the accessibility, responsiveness and quality of education and healthcare services. For each indicator, the table shows New Zealand’s rank among OECD countries, and arrows show whether New Zealand’s absolute performance has improved or worsened in recent years. Metrics coloured in grey indicate New Zealand does not perform substantially differently to the average across OECD countries (i.e. is within one standard deviation of the mean of OECD countries). Metrics coloured green indicate NZ performs substantially above the OECD average (i.e. more than one standard deviation above the mean).

In terms of quality of service delivery, New Zealand scores 22nd in the OECD in the proportion of variation in reading performance which is explained by socio-economic background (Table 3.2). This means that children from households which are economically, socially or culturally disadvantaged¹ in New Zealand find it more difficult to perform well in school than in many other OECD countries. In terms of accessibility of education, New Zealand ranks 28th across all OECD countries on private expenditure on education. Private sources accounted for 16% of total expenditure in pre-primary institutions, similar to the OECD average of 17%. However, at tertiary level, 47% of expenditure comes from private sources in New Zealand, compared to 30% on average across OECD countries (OECD, 2021^[7]).

Table 3.2. Citizen Scorecard for public services in New Zealand

Rank among OECD countries, change in absolute performance

	Accessibility		Responsiveness		Quality	
Healthcare	Health care coverage	1	Doctor often or always explains things in a way that is easy to understand	1	Diabetes hospitalisation	22
		→		↑		
	Out-of-pocket expenditure as % total health spending	9	Got same or next-day appointment with doctor last time needed care	4	30-day mortality following stroke hospitalisation	18
→		↓		↑		
	Unmet care needs during COVID-19	n.a.	Median waiting times for cataract surgery	10	5-year breast cancer survival rate (all stages)	8
				↓		
Education	Private expenditure on education (primary to tertiary)	28	NEET aged 15-29 years	19	PISA mean reading score	8
		→		↑		→
	Enrolment rate at age 4 (in early childhood and primary education)	18	Index of shortage of educational material	12	Share of students below level 2 proficiency in reading	12
↓		↑		→		
	First-time tertiary enrolment rates under 25	14	School staff help students with homework	6	% variation in reading performance explained by socio-economic background	22
		↓		↑		

Note: This table presents data already published of OECD Government at a Glance 2021. For more detailed notes on sources and methods, see Chapter 14 of this publication, here: <https://www.oecd.org/gov/government-at-a-glance-22214399.htm>

Source: (OECD, 2021^[8])

While Māori and Pacifica are intrinsically diverse special attention is due to how Māori and Pacifica experience the education system. These groups express, on average, lower satisfaction with public services in general, and the education system in particular. Satisfaction scores for the education system among Māori and Pacifica (39% and 37% respectively) are among the lowest score of any group for any service. Recent government research into the experiences of Māori in the education systems noted “the lack of appropriate and meaningful ways to connect in mainstream English-medium schools, compounded by implicitly or explicitly negative expectations of teachers and peers”, as well as direct experiences of racism (Children's Commissioner, 2018^[9]). The results of OECD's survey suggest that improving the experience of Māori with the education system is an important issue in building long-term trust between Māori citizens and government institutions.

Improving Responsiveness of Public Services


Ensuring services are responsive and citizen-centric requires governments to improve service delivery based on feedback on individual needs, experiences and complaints. Different groups in society need different public services. They interact with public institutions and in different ways. For example, young people have more interaction with the education system, people with lower incomes have more interaction with the social protection system. Different groups can have systematically different experiences, and systematically different problems, when using public services. To improve trust, governments must understand and respond to the needs of different groups of citizens.

Only 43% of respondents felt that if many people complained about a government service that is working badly, it would be improved (Figure 3.8). A large minority of respondents (38%) felt that public institutions in New Zealand are unlikely to respond to complaints and concerns. Perceptions of the responsiveness of New Zealand's government are slightly higher than the average across other OECD countries (40%). However, there is room to improve, as shown by the gap to small advanced economies and English-

speaking comparator countries, such as the Netherlands (50%) and Canada (48%). The leader across all OECD countries on this metric, not shown in the graph, is Korea (58%).

Figure 3.8. Only 43% of people feel that government will improve a service when people complain

Share of respondents in New Zealand, selected countries and OECD average, 2021




Note: Note: Figure presents the within-country distributions of responses to the question "If many people complained about a public service that is working badly, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that it would be improved?". The "likely" proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale; "neutral" is equal to a response of 5; "unlikely" is the aggregation of responses from 1-4; and "Don't know" was a separate answer choice. OECD(22) refers to the unweighted average across 22 OECD countries.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)

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Women, young people, Pacifica and Māori groups, and people with financial concerns or fewer years of education are on average less satisfied with public services than others (Figure 3.9). The groups which reported less satisfaction with public services are very similar to those which regarded government as being less competent (Table 3.1). First, men are substantially more satisfied than women in their experiences with public services. This applies across all services, and in particular to healthcare, where only 48% of women were satisfied with services, compared to 61% of men. Second, people with more years in education tend to be much more satisfied with public services than others. This is particularly true with the education system and with administrative services. Third, in some cases, younger people (18-30) are less satisfied than older generations. A similar proportion of younger and older people are satisfied with healthcare. However, there is a very large differential in satisfaction with education, with only 40% of 18-24 year olds satisfied, compared to more than 50% in older age groups. Younger people are also much less satisfied with administrative services than older people. Fourth, people in the bottom 25% of households by income were much less satisfied with all services than others. Finally, people living in or near New Zealand's main cities appear to be more satisfied with public services. People living on the South Island are generally less satisfied with public services than those living on the North Island.

Figure 3.9. Māori, Pacifica, Women, young people and those with financial concerns or less years of education are less satisfied with public services.



Note: Figure presents responses to the question “On a scale of 0 to 10 [where 0 is “not at all satisfied” and 10 is “completely satisfied”], how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with....?” The “satisfied” proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale. Top 25% and bottom 25% refers to the income distribution based on household’s total gross annual income of 2021, before tax and deductions, but including benefits/allowances. High education is defined as the ISCED 2011 education levels 5-8, i.e. university-level degrees such as Bachelors, Masters or PhD, and low education refers to less than a completed upper secondary degree. * means that differences in proportions are statistically significant at the 90% significance level; ** means that differences are statistically significant at the 95% level; *** means that differences are statistically significant at the 99% level. Reference group in light blue. For more detailed information please find the survey method document at <http://oe.cd/trust>.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)

StatLink  <https://stat.link/k8nfhw>

OECD’s review noted examples of government institutions in New Zealand following good practice in operating feedback mechanisms for New Zealanders using their services. At national level, the quarterly Kiwi’s Count survey provides a regular national snapshot of trust and satisfaction with public services (Te Kawa Mataaho | Public Service Commission, 2022_[10]). Further surveys operate at sector level. A notable example is the Ministry of Social Development (MSD) oversees provision of a range of public benefits. It is the second largest public agency in New Zealand, and serves around a quarter of the population. MSD operates large scale surveys of users, providing a formal route for feedback on service quality and offer suggestions on improvements. In 2019/20, MSD collected over 70,000 survey responses and more than 150,000 comments (New Zealand Ministry of Social Development, 2020_[11]). In other cases, government

institutions have collaborated with researchers to examine service delivery, and proactively identify how better to design services for particular groups in the population (Lips, Barlow and Woods, 2016^[12]).

Regular feedback mechanisms combined with sub-group analysis have proven to be an effective tool in improving public service responsiveness in many OECD countries. Box 3.1 offers examples of various mechanisms which OECD and other countries are using to ensure citizens views are systematically addressed in service delivery. Australia's TAPS survey is similar to Kiwis Count, but operates at a larger scale, allowing more insight into sub-groups. France operates a continuous service improvement program, with an online platform for public feedback. Singapore operates a cross-government system for tracking satisfaction and feedback on digital services, and provides performance information to help identify improvements. Korea's public, which has the most positive perception of government responsiveness among OECD countries, can use a petitions system to request changes in delivery or government policy.

Box 3.1. Feedback Loops and Service Improvement

Survey of Trust in Australian Public Services (TAPS, formerly the Citizen Experience Survey)

Australia's Citizen Experience Survey is a regular, national survey measuring public satisfaction, trust and experiences with Australian public services. TAPS offers a whole-of-Australian Public Service (APS) and cross-sectional view of service experience, complementing existing work undertaken by APS agencies. Data is collected on satisfaction with various life events, as well as overall trust levels. The 2022 survey collected 1,000 responses each month, totaling 12,000 over the year. The large sample allows detailed analysis by gender, age and region. The survey is led by the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, allowing a direct feedback loop to senior policymakers. Survey results support the APS to continually improve Australian public services.

France *Services Publics+* Program

Services Publics+ is France's continuous improvement program for public services. It focuses on making service delivery closer, simpler and more efficient for citizens. Inputs on the operation of public services are gathered: Government measures of the complexity faced by users; the public can also directly submit testimony of their experiences with public services via a web portal. This information from users forms the basis of a continuous improvement cycle. Government agencies identify and prioritize actions that lead to concrete improvements in services. Local operational teams in charge of different services are empowered to make changes. Performance against targets is published online.

Singapore Whole of Government Analytics Application (WOGAA)

Singapore's WOGAA system monitors the performance of government websites and digital services in real-time. The system presents key information such as website traffic, and also collates user feedback, and recommendations to improve site performance. It also benchmarks against whole-of-government (WOG) averages in a single dashboard. Data is presented in real time. This allows public officers to conveniently access the information they need so to make effective data-driven decisions and proactively improve their services.

Korea E-petition systems

Korea's E-people system is an online petition and discussion portal. It allows citizens to submit civil petitions or proposals to the government. These are automatically re-directed to the corresponding government agencies, which have a limited time to respond, and are also required to share their procedures for reaching a decision. The results are shared online.

Korea established the People's petition system in August 2017. Through this portal people can freely propose ideas and suggestions on 17 categories, spanning from reform of the political system, international relations, defence and economics, climate change and the labour market. If more than 200,000 citizens sign a petition within 30 days of being posted, high-level government officials (e.g. ministers or presidential secretaries) are required to provide an answer.

Source: <https://www.apsreform.gov.au/resources/reports/taps-2022>
<https://www.developer.tech.gov.sg/products/categories/analytics/wogaa/overview.html>
<https://www.plus.transformation.gouv.fr/>
<https://www.epeople.go.kr/jsp/user/on/eng/intro01.jsp>

The examples in Box 3.1 differ in the form of information they gather. However, each institutes a different systemic approach to service improvement. Governments gather regular and representative data on the experiences of service users, supplemented where possible with qualitative feedback from users. In each example, government institutes a regular and formalised feedback loop to senior managers with the authority to direct changes in delivery. Each has governance mechanisms in place to ensure recommendations for service delivery are followed up. Finally, and importantly, each allows for public reporting of issues identified and how they have been resolved. This is important both for transparency, and for helping the public to update their judgements on the responsiveness of government institutions.

Public agencies delivering frontline services in New Zealand should ensure they are comfortable that they have effective feedback loops in place. This would involve having systematic and regularly used systems for gathering and analysing user feedback. In particular, public agencies should ensure that the information they collect is suitable for accurately identifying problems faced by different subgroups of users.


Work to improve responsiveness should include specific focus on identifying the issues being faced by social groups which on average express lower satisfaction: Māori and Pacifica, women, young people and those with fewer years of education or lower income. The OECD survey presented in this report consistently shows that improving public service provision for these groups is critical to improving national levels of trust in government. Data in this study points to a need for particular attention to some Māori and Pacific groups interactions with the education system, and provision of administrative services to young people.

Scale of delivery vs Local responsiveness

Delivering responsive public services implies tailoring delivery to the needs of individuals, regions or communities. OECD noted that “more engagement and partnering with communities to develop services they want and that work for them” is an important expectation for New Zealand’s public services over the next three years (Te Kawa Mataaho | Public Service Commission, 2022^[13]). In New Zealand, this must be done in a context in which public services are largely delivered through central government agencies. Overall, 89% of public expenditure in New Zealand is delivered through central government, the second highest level in the OECD, after Ireland (Figure 3.10). Local government provides cultural and recreational facilities and is responsible for local regulatory services. It also plays a role in public investment, including managing water services. However, local government has a smaller policy role than in most OECD countries. It is not responsible for health, social protection or education. OECD has previously noted that local government councils are often perceived as technical bodies for providing key infrastructure to citizens (Vammalle and Bambalaite, 2021^[14]).

Figure 3.10. New Zealand delivers almost all public spending through central government

Distribution of general government expenditures across levels of government, 2019 and 2020



Note: Data for Chile and Colombia are not available. Data for Türkiye are not included in the OECD average due to missing time series. Flows between levels of government are excluded (apart from Australia, Korea, Türkiye, Costa Rica and Indonesia). For Japan data for sub-sectors of general government refer to fiscal years and are for 2018 rather than 2019. Local government is included in state government for Australia and the United States. Australia does not operate government social insurance schemes. Social security funds are included in central government in Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Source: (OECD, 2021^[8])

StatLink  <https://stat.link/em2buw>

New Zealand's demography often creates a dynamic towards national or regional-level public agencies managing front-line service delivery. The country has a relatively small and dispersed population. Centralised management can generate efficiencies of scale in infrastructure provision, access to funding and technical expertise. In some services, devolved responsibility has contributed to delivery failures. A clear example is the water sector. Most New Zealanders receive water services from their local councils, who own and operate the infrastructure. In 2016, an outbreak of gastroenteritis affecting up to 5,500 people was traced to contaminated drinking water. A review found that local councils faced issues in accessing the finance and specialised personnel required to maintain and upgrade water infrastructure (New Zealand Government, 2019^[15]). To address these issues, the central government proposes to aggregate all water services delivery into four water regional services entities (New Zealand Government, 2022^[16]). The education sector, cited above, may also be an example. Insufficient access to central support and technical expertise are cited by New Zealand's government as having contributed to under-performance in schools.

Similar dynamics are also seen in Norway and Finland, which have the most similar population size and density to New Zealand among OECD countries. In Finland, local government accounts for 28% of public expenditure, and management of the health system is decentralised. Finland plans to reduce 195 local health organisations to 22 local boards in 2023, and also to set up a single national rescue service. (Government of Finland, 2022^[17]). Norway manages most public expenditure and services via central government, similar to New Zealand. It has recently created a more centralised police force. However, while structural reform of the police has improved technical capability, it has not improved local presence, and public satisfaction has fallen (Box 3.2).

Box 3.2. Scale and responsiveness in service delivery: Police Reform in Norway

Reform of the police service was adopted in 2015 following the report of an independent commission that was established in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 2011. The main aims were to create a more centralised and robust police force, with greater focus on efficiency, emergency preparedness and resilience as well as a more visible and local police presence. The reform resulted in larger police districts, fewer police stations and less local presence, which led to less frequent contact between people and police officers. The reform has been successful in creating more robust professional environments that can handle more complex cases. However, the goal of enhancing the local presence has not been reached. Data from the different waves of Norway's Citizens survey shows the percentage of the population satisfied with police services decreased from 70% in 2015, when the reform was adopted, to 62% in 2019. The reform sheds light on the tension between reaction capacity and governance legitimacy by maintaining direct contact with people (Christensen, Lægreid and Rykkja, 2017^[18]).

Source: (OECD, 2022^[19])

As illustrated by the case of Norway, the effects of centralisation / decentralisation of services have an ambiguous effect on trust. Decentralisation can help governments to tailor service delivery to local needs, and also expand citizen participation by bringing government closer to citizens. However, decentralisation may result in a loss of economies of scale and in fragmentation of public policies. Determining optimal subnational unit size is therefore of utmost importance. This is a context-specific task, and varies by country, region and policy area (OECD, 2019^[20]). Noting New Zealand's relatively centralised structure, there are three fronts for advancing service responsiveness.

First is to support greater cross-operation *across* central government agencies which deliver services. This is helpful wherever improved delivery requires 2 or more central government agencies to interact. Work on this front is already well advanced and is central in New Zealand's public sector reform agenda. New Zealand has made reforms to enable greater collaboration across government agencies and greater data sharing (see section 3.1.2 below), and reports that these have already supported better tailoring public services to local needs (Te Kawa Mataaho | Public Service Commission, 2022^[13]).

Second is to take considered decisions on the internal delegation of decision making *within* central government agencies which deliver services. This means agencies working consciously to strike an appropriate balance between granting autonomy on practical delivery issues to the relevant front line officials, while maintaining overall quality of delivery through central quality controls, delivery standards, performance monitoring and technical support. Issues of managerial culture, staff turnover, and building institutional memory are also important in maintaining operational capability.

OECD did note examples of conscious decisions on devolving decision-making both in discussions with officials and in action. One example is the major health system reform of July 2022, which aims for a system which is "nationally planned, regionally delivered and locally tailored". 20 independent district health boards have been replaced with a single national health agency. The national health agency will manage overall planning and delivery for the health system, hospitals and specialist care. It will contain four regional boards which will plan primary and community health services. Local health networks will advise on local needs and support implementation (New Zealand Government, 2022^[21]).

Third is to ensure appropriate capability and funding for services delivered by local governments. This would appear to be the area in which New Zealand faces greatest challenges. An ongoing review of local government has indicted that they face issues including financial pressure, varying capacity levels, overlapping responsibilities with central government, and an "unfunded mandate" to enforce regulation or

deliver services mandated by central government. Underlying this is “...a culture of mistrust between central and local government. At governance, management and staffing levels there is little cross-pollination between central and local government, and much mutual misunderstanding about respective roles” (Review into the Future of Local Government, 2021^[22]). The OECD’s Guidelines for Effective Decentralisation outline how best to promote local democracy, efficient public service delivery and regional development via decentralised bodies (OECD, 2019^[20]). Important guidelines for New Zealand include:

- The way responsibilities are shared should be explicit, mutually understood and clear for all actors. This is critical for accountability, monitoring and effectiveness of investment and service delivery policies.
- Access to finance should be consistent with functional responsibilities. Division of financing responsibilities should ensure there are no unfunded or underfunded assignments or mandates.
- Subnational governments need own-source revenues beyond grants and shared tax revenues.
- Central government should assess capacity challenges in the different regions on a regular basis. Special public agencies accessible to multiple jurisdictions should be encouraged in areas of needed expertise.
- Higher level governments need to monitor subnational performance in critical service areas based upon a minimum set of standardised indicators and provide timely feedback, as well as benchmark inter-local performance in service delivery.

3.1.2. Innovation and Effectiveness in the Public Service

This section examines New Zealand’s government’s ability to operate an innovative and efficient civil service that responds to citizen needs. Much of the operation of the civil service is an upstream process and is often not visible to citizens. Nonetheless, it has strong effects on the capability of government to deliver. The section will examine a core set of competencies: innovation capacity, digital government, and policy coherence.

Public Service structure and principles

OECD noted as part of its review that the structure of New Zealand’s public service has recently been revised with a view to creating the capacities required to improve and sustain public trust. The Public Service Act 2020 (New Zealand Government, 2020^[23]) made a number of reforms intended to “help the Public Service join up services around New Zealanders’ needs and secure public trust and confidence, so it remains well placed to serve New Zealand in the future” (Te Kawa Mataaho | Public Service Commission, 2022^[13]) (Te Kawa Mataaho Public Service Commission, 2020^[24])

The act makes reforms in five key areas. First, the act aims to create a “unified” public service, elucidating a core set of public service values and principles, and applying to all public servants in government ministries and range of other “crown agencies”. (New Zealand Government, 2020^[25]). The principles are that public servants should be impartial, accountable, trustworthy, respectful and responsive. These public service principles are closely aligned with the pillars of OECD’s trust framework. Second, the act aims to strengthen the Māori-Crown relationship, including by developing and maintaining public service capacity to engage with Māori, and continuing to mandate an employment policy which support Māori. Third, the act sets standards for supporting diversity, pay equality, and inter-agency movement of public servants.

OECD also noted that the reform aims to create a public service in which agencies are highly aligned in their goals, while having high autonomy to collaborate and find effective ways of achieving them (Hughes and Scott, 2021^[26]). Mechanisms for improving collaboration across central government agencies are well elaborated. The Public Service Act seeks to improve planning for development of senior leaders, as well as creating powers for senior public service leaders to tackle “system wide” issues affecting management and delivery across public sector entities. Finally, the act creates new administrative structures which allow

public agencies to more easily collaborate to deliver on priorities which cut across institutional boundaries or responsibilities (Te Kawa Mataaho Public Service Commission, 2020^[27]).

Enhancing digital government and innovation


43% of survey respondents in New Zealand feel that if there is an innovative idea that could improve a public service, the government is likely to adopt it. This is above the OECD average (38%), and compares well with countries in the benchmark group such as Canada (48%) and Netherlands (50%).

Innovation in the public sector, understood in a broad sense, is important for maintaining public trust in government over time. Existing structures, processes and interventions are not always the most appropriate or effective means for the public sector to deliver on government priorities and citizen expectations. In the public sector, the level of innovation that will happen by default is unlikely to be sufficient or sustained without confronting the systemic biases for maintaining and replicating the status quo. The latter is a by-product of the need for government and its operations to be stable and dependable. Public sector organisations therefore need to be able to innovate, consistently and reliably, so new approaches can be deployed when and where needed. To reliably and consistently innovate, public sector organisations need to take a deliberate approach to innovation management, one which builds on previous efforts (OECD, 2019^[28]).

New Zealand performs somewhat above the OECD average in implementation of digital government reforms. The most recent OECD Digital Government Index ranked New Zealand 11th out of 29 OECD countries covered. New Zealand outperformed the OECD average overall, and in areas including; openness in fostering the use of technologies and data to communicate and engage in policy making and service design with different actors; and equipping public servants to design policies and deliver digital services. New Zealand slightly lagged the OECD average in the extent to which it delivered data and digital services to the public without waiting for formal requests (OECD, 2020^[29]).

Figure 3.11. 43% believe the government will adopt innovative ideas to improve public services

Share of respondents in New Zealand, selected countries and OECD average, 2021



Note: Figure presents the within-country distributions of responses to the question “If there is an innovative idea that could improve a public service, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that it would be adopted by the responsible public agency/office?” The “likely” proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale; “neutral” is equal to a response of 5; “unlikely” is the aggregation of responses from 1-4; and “Don’t know” was a separate answer choice. The scale ranges from 0-10. The question is phrased slightly differently in Norway. OECD(22) refers to the unweighted average across 22 OECD countries.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)

StatLink  <https://stat.link/glv9x>

A potential impediment to use of digital technologies by the government has been the absence of data companies based in New Zealand. This has been interpreted as a barrier because data stored, processed or transmitted by cloud services could be subject to legislation and regulation in the countries where data are stored (this also raises potential questions around sovereignty over data relating to Māori). Decisions by several major digital companies to establish datacentres in New Zealand is likely to remove any data sovereignty issue, enabling the government to use cloud computing more intensively and adopt other data-intensive digital technologies (OECD, 2022^[30]).

New Zealand has demonstrated the capacity for public sector innovation and service transformation in recent years. The leading example is the Inland Revenue Department (IRD), which has recently completed a multi-year modernisation program, aimed at improving digital delivery and customer service. IRD reports that usage volumes on its digital portal have tripled, with 99% of individual tax payments now made online. 99.5% of COVID support applications have also been made online. The workforce of the Department has been reduced by 28%, cutting running costs (Inland Revenue Department, 2022^[31]). The external auditor has provided a positive appraisal of this program though noting benefits will need to be monitored until 2023/24 before it can be determined whether benefits outweigh costs (New Zealand Controller and Auditor-General, 2020^[32]). OECD has also previously profiled New Zealand’s “Better Rules” initiative. This project sought to transform laws and regulations into sets of machine-readable code, with the aim of developing routines which could help to remove ambiguity and misjudgement in the application of regulations and legislation. (OECD, 2019^[33]).

To improve trust, New Zealand will need to ensure active promotion of innovation in government and support networking. OECD’s typology of organisations for innovation in the public sector identifies 5 types of agencies: 1) Promoting innovation across government; 2) Promoting service improvement in functional areas; 3) Develop and test innovative solutions; 4) Funding innovation; and 5) Developing capacity for innovation and networking (OECD, 2017^[34]). New Zealand has some support in place to fund public sector

innovation, including the GovTech Accelerator (Creative HQ, n.d.^[35]) and the recently closed Digital Government Partnership Innovation Fund (New Zealand Government, n.d.^[36])

There may be scope to improve in promoting innovation across government and developing innovative solutions. New Zealand has lacked a dedicated cross-agency centre for developing and testing innovative solutions, and supporting networking across government, since the closure of the Service Innovation Lab in 2020 (Service Innovation Lab, 2020^[37]). The Digital Public Service branch of the Department of Internal Affairs has taken over the role of providing services to government agencies in delivering integrated digital services (New Zealand Government, 2020^[38]). This partially replicates functions, and as a relatively small government by workforce, New Zealand may have somewhat lower internal barriers to networking and cross-agency collaboration than others. A more systematic consideration of how agencies can be incentivised to develop and test innovative solutions, and develop capacity for innovation and networking, may improve innovation standards.

Transparency in the use of citizens' data

Appropriate and effective use of citizen's data is an increasingly important aspect of government reliability. In an increasingly digital world, citizens submit a range of personal data to government through their interactions with public services and activities to comply with laws and regulations. Data on individual citizens can be used to increase trust in public institutions, by improving service delivery and evaluate the effectiveness of policies. However, public institutions must also safeguard against violations of privacy or other inappropriate uses, which could damage trust. Most versions of the OECD trust survey contained the question "If you share your personal data with a [public agency/office], how likely or unlikely do you think it is that it would be exclusively used for legitimate purposes?" This question was not contained in the survey questionnaire used in New Zealand. Hence it is not possible to gauge public attitudes on issues of data privacy. However, surveys conducted by New Zealand's Privacy Commissioner have found that 61% of New Zealanders are concerned about government agencies sharing their personal information without permission. Only 26% feel they have a good idea of how their personal information is used by government (New Zealand Privacy Commissioner, 2020^[39]).

New Zealand performs above the OECD average on openness of government data. The most recent OECD Open, Useful, Reusable Data Index (OURData) ranked New Zealand scored 12th out of 32 OECD countries on data openness. The OURData index benchmarks the design and implementation of open data policies in central government. New Zealand slightly outperformed the OECD average on data availability and data accessibility, and demonstrated strong improvement in the support from the government to increase data literacy skills among public servants (Perez, Emilsson and Ubaldi, 2019^[40]).

New Zealand collects a range of data from citizens, which is held digitally and in some cases combined. New Zealand operates a range of digital government services, each of which may collect data about users of the service. Data from various sources is combined within the Integrated Data Infrastructure (IDI). This is a large research database maintained by Statistics New Zealand. It integrates anonymised individual-level data on health, education, justice, benefits, housing, socio-economic issues and other topics. The IDI is used to improve citizen welfare, by assessing and evaluating the effects of government policies. It is used both by government agencies and academic researchers. To manage privacy concerns, data held in the IDI is de-identified i.e. names, birthdates and other information which identifies individuals is removed. Access to the data is governed by the "Five Safes" rules (Tauranga Aotearoa Stats New Zealand, 2022^[41]). This review noted these multiple appropriate safeguards, and also the transparent online documentation of government regulations governing data use. The IDI allows for the rapid evaluation of the outcomes and costs associated with government service provision for different people and services from existing data sources. In principle, it could be used to support more detailed analysis of how interactions with government services shape trust and satisfaction than is possible with survey vehicles like Kiwis count.

New Zealand is modernising laws, regulations and infrastructure to enable greater usage of administrative data about individuals and businesses, including greater sharing across government agencies. The aim is of greater re-use of digital data is to support better service delivery for citizens. The new Data and Statistics Bill aims to “continue to provide appropriate safeguards and protections to ensure public trust and confidence in the collection and use of data for official statistics and research” (Tatauranga Aotearoa Statistics New Zealand, 2021^[42]). The bill has generated vigorous public debate around the appropriate governance and limits of data sharing in government (Daalder, 2021^[43]). (Te Mana Matapono Matatapu | Privacy Commissioner, 2022^[44]) (New Zealand Council for Civil Liberties, 2022^[45]). A new Digital Identity Services Trust Framework bill has also been tabled in parliament (New Zealand Parliament, 2021^[46]). From a civil service perspective, New Zealand’s digital identity trust framework sets out a regulatory framework establishing rules for providing digital identity services (New Zealand Government, n.d.^[47]). The 2021 Government Data Strategy and Roadmap provides an overarching plan for New Zealand’s government data system. It aims to enable data held by public agencies to be integrated and shared for public benefit. The roadmap acknowledges that the data system relies on a high trust environment. It specifies a activities “designed to build and maintain trust and confidence in the data” (New Zealand Government, 2021^[48]).

New Zealand could potentially improve trust by allowing citizens greater visibility as to what data government holds about them, and how it is used. At present, citizens can request a record of the data held about them by individual agencies using the Privacy Commissioner’s “[About Me](#)” tool (New Zealand Privacy Commissioner, n.d.^[49]). However, requests must be made to each individual agency separately. Moreover, government is not able to provide information about how data held by different agencies is linked. As such, citizens may find it difficult to access or understand the full range of data government holds about them, or their community, and how it is used. Other OECD countries provide substantially more transparency to the public on how their personal data is used. Box 3.3 highlights Estonia, which allows citizens to have quick and easy access to key data which government holds about them, and the purposes it has been used for. However, the trade-off for enabling this transparency is that individuals must hold a unique electronic ID, used for all interactions with public services.

Box 3.3. Estonia’s Citizen Data Tracker

Estonia operates sophisticated e-government systems. All citizens over the age of 15 are required to hold a unique electronic identification (eID) number and card. The eID is used to access all online public services, and also for wide range of privately provided online services. The system allows rapid and integrated access to a range of services (E-Estonia, 2019^[50]). To help maintain trust in public institutions in this highly digital environment, the government has established an online “[Data Tracker](#)” tool. This tool allows citizens to check exactly how their personal data in several key databases has been used and shared within government. In particular, the Tracker covers use of personal data on a number of sensitive topics, including tax, health and social security records. Usage of data which cannot be checked via the “Data Tracker” can be followed up through a query to the relevant institution. From the government’s perspective, the Data Tracker “...empowers citizens to **participate in the building of a digital society** based on a core, necessary ingredient for life in communities – **trust**” (E-Estonia, 2019^[51]).

Opportunities to strengthen the responsiveness of services for people's well-being

This section summarizes key results and presents potential policy avenues to improve responsiveness and strengthen public trust.

- 43% of New Zealanders believe that government will improve a service when people complain, while 38% are sceptical that the service would be improved. Findings show that responding to people's complaints on service provision is the most important driver of trust in the public service. There is room for improving delivery and responsiveness of public services by ensuring that all frontline services have effective and regularly used feedback loops on citizen experience. Ensure all agencies are routinely analysing the experience of different population groups and communities. Among public services, improvements to the education system appear likely to have the biggest impact on trust.
- New Zealand has a highly centralised government, with limited local government involvement in service delivery. Just 45% of the population reported trusting local government, the lowest of the benchmarking group of countries. Local government policy should actively consider the local government roles and competences needed to boost responsiveness. New Zealand could also consider putting in place institutional mechanisms to help citizens to seek redress for issues with local government.
- In line with many OECD countries, just over 40% of New Zealanders see the public sector as innovative. Enhancing digital government and innovation – Build on successful digital reforms in taxation to improve delivery elsewhere. Strengthen public sector innovation through greater focus on cross-agency learning and collaboration mechanisms.
- Transparency in use of citizens' data - Allow citizens greater visibility as to what data government holds about them, and how it is used.


3.2. Reliability

The second component of government competence within the OECD trust framework is Reliability. This refers to a number of interrelated aspects of government functioning. First is the ability to anticipate needs and assess evolving challenges. Second is the ability to minimise uncertainty in the economic, social and political environment. Third is the capability to effectively commit to future-oriented policies. Fourth, and relatedly, is the ability to co-operate with stakeholders on global challenges. This section examines in more detail how New Zealanders experience the reliability of public institutions.

Most New Zealanders (60%) have confidence in government institutions to protect citizens. This high level of confidence is shared across many groups in society. The groups with less confidence include people aged 18-29, people with fewer years of formal education, and especially Māori and Pacifica (each 49%) (Figure 3.12)

Figure 3.12. Most New Zealanders have confidence in government institutions to protect citizens

Share of respondents in New Zealand, 2021




Note: Figure presents responses to the question “How much confidence do you have in government institutions to protect citizens?” The “Confidence” proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale; “Neutral” is equal to a response of 5; “No confidence” is the aggregation of responses from 0-4; and “Don't know” was a separate answer choice.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)

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Figure 3.13. But young people, those with less education and Māori and Pacifica have less confidence

Share of respondents in New Zealand, 2021




Note: Figure presents responses to the question “How much confidence do you have in government institutions to protect citizens?” The figure shows the “Confidence” proportion, which is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale. “NZL mean” presents the weighted average across all respondents in New Zealand. Top 25% and bottom 25% refers to the income distribution based on household’s total gross annual income of 2021, before tax and deductions, but including benefits/allowances. High education is defined as the ISCED 2011 education levels 5-8, i.e. university-level degrees such as Bachelors, Masters or PhD, and low education refers to less than a completed upper secondary degree. * means that differences in proportions are statistically significant at the 90% significance level; ** means that differences are statistically significant at the 95% level; *** means that differences are statistically significant at the 99% level. Reference group in light blue.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)

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Figure 3.14. Most New Zealanders have confidence in government institutions to consider the interests of future generations

Share of respondents in New Zealand, 2021




Note: Figure presents responses to the “How much confidence do you have in government institutions to consider the interests of future generations?” The “Confidence” proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale; “Neutral” is equal to a response of 5; “No confidence” is the aggregation of responses from 0-4; and “Don't know” was a separate answer choice.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)

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Figure 3.15. But young people, those with less education and Māori and Pacifica have less confidence

Share of respondents in New Zealand, 2021



Note: Figure presents responses to the question “How much confidence do you have in government institutions to consider the interests of future generations?”. The figure shows the “Confidence” proportion, which is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale. “NZL mean” presents the weighted average across all respondents in New Zealand. Top 25% and bottom 25% refers to the income distribution based on household's total gross annual income of 2021, before tax and deductions, but including benefits/allowances. High education is defined as the ISCED 2011 education levels 5-8, i.e. university-level degrees such as Bachelors, Masters or PhD, and low education refers to less than a completed upper secondary degree. * means that differences in proportions are statistically significant at the 90% significance level; ** means that differences are statistically significant at the 95% level; *** means that differences are statistically significant at the 99% level. Reference group in light blue.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)

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Similarly, a majority of New Zealanders (52%) also have confidence in government institutions to consider the interests of future generations. 32% did not have confidence. The groups with less confidence include people aged 18-29, people with fewer years of formal education, and especially Māori (40%) and Pacifica (37%) (Figure 3.15). This question is important with regard to confidence in government to tackle environmental and other long-term challenges to wellbeing. Directly comparable-OECD data on this question is not available as this is the first time the question has been included in the OECD trust survey. However, evidence from 4 OECD countries shows that people are less willing to support environmental policy, even when they believe it is necessary, when they do not trust government will be effective in delivering it (Fairbrother, Johansson Sevä and Kulin, 2019^[52]).

This section looks in more depth at opportunities for actions to improve citizen perceptions of the reliability of government institutions in New Zealand. To do this, it is ordered into four sub-sections, each examining a key functional area in which government helps to prevent risks and protect citizens. a) First, and most fundamentally, it examines government's ability to protect citizens safety and deliver in a resilient fashion in the face of disasters. Second it looks at issues related to ensuring a stable economy, in which everyone benefits from rising average living standards over time. Third, this chapter examines New Zealand's social protection system. This is the means by which government ensures that New Zealanders are supported when they experience shocks (unemployment, recessions, etc) and supports those who have less advantages or opportunities. Finally, the chapter examines environmental protection and climate change action. These are the key long-term challenges which governments today must grasp in order to secure the wellbeing of citizens in the future. These four areas are not a complete list of issues a potentially relevant to reliability, rather they are chosen to focus on key actionable topics.

Further elements of reliability are captured through other questions in the OECD trust survey:


- If a new serious contagious disease spreads, how unlikely or likely do you think it is that government institutions will be ready to act to protect people's lives?
- How unlikely or likely do you think it is that the business conditions the government can influence (e.g. laws and regulations businesses need to comply with) will be stable and predictable?
- How confident are you that New Zealand will succeed in reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the next 10 years?

3.2.1. Disaster Risk Protection

The most fundamental aspect of reliability is the State's ability to protect lives and livelihoods of citizens in the face of natural hazards and threats created by human activity. 62% of people in New Zealand believes that it is likely that government institutions will be ready to protect people's lives if a serious new contagious disease spreads (Figure 3.16). This is the highest score for any of the 22 countries included in the survey, and well above the average of 49%. As shown in Figure 2.3 above, New Zealand's residents have higher confidence in their public institutions' ability to protect them than in any other government function. However, these positive findings should be read with some caution. Data was collected in early February 2022, shortly before the first large scale COVID infections in New Zealand. The positive results are likely influenced by New Zealand's effective response to the COVID-19 pandemic (Chapter 1).

Figure 3.16. Most New Zealanders are confident in their government’s readiness to protect people from new contagious diseases

Share of respondents in New Zealand, selected countries and OECD average, 2021



Note: Figure presents responses to the question “If a new serious contagious disease spreads, how unlikely or likely do you think it is that government institutions will be ready to act to protect people’s lives?” The “likely” proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale; “neutral” is equal to a response of 5; “unlikely” is the aggregation of responses from 0-4; and “Don’t know” was a separate answer choice. OECD(22) refers to the unweighted average across 22 OECD countries.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)

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New Zealand is relatively highly exposed to natural hazards. OECD has previously estimated that New Zealand had the highest economic damages from natural disasters (as a percentage of GDP) across 37 OECD countries from 1995-2015 (OECD, 2018^[53]). A significant contributor was the 2010 Canterbury earthquake, which caused severe damage and large loss of life, and costs of roughly 20% of GDP. Around 22% of the population is exposed to significant earthquake risk (OECD/The World Bank, 2019^[54]). Volcanoes can also present risks, with 22 people killed in the White Island eruption in 2019. The tragic Christchurch mosque shootings in 2019 demonstrated that New Zealand is not immune to major threats to national security.

As such, maintaining confidence in public institutions ability to protect citizens is important for safeguarding trust. Preparedness to fight infectious disease is one of the most important drivers of trust in the public service in New Zealand (Chapter 2). It is also a moderately important driver of trust in parliament and local government councillors. Comparing New Zealand’s structures to the OECD’s Recommendation on Governance of Critical Risks (OECD, 2014^[55]) recommendation provides some insights on potential improvements in managing risks to public safety and security.

New Zealand has a comprehensive, all-hazards and transboundary approach to identifying and managing national risks. There is no single national strategy on management of critical risks. However a “National Risk Approach” is in place to help systematically identify and assess critical risks (New Zealand Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2021^[56]). Nationally significant hazards and threats are recorded on the classified National Risk Register. A number of sector level strategies focus on specific risks. Among these, notably, the Influenza Pandemic Plan 2017 provides planning for how to implement responses, such as border controls and movement restrictions, which were later used in response to COVID-19 (New Zealand Ministry of Health, 2017^[57]). An institutionalised system provides governance of

critical risks. A Cabinet-level committee oversees national security. This is supported by two key Chief Executive-level boards, made up of various public institutions, which provides oversight and cross-government co-ordination of risk planning and response. In turn, it is supported by multiple thematic working groups (New Zealand Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2020^[58]). The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet's National Security Group provides leadership across New Zealand's national security community and supports coordination and collaboration on nationally significant risks and issues, and events or emergencies of national significance. A dedicated National Emergency Management Agency leads and supports on emergency response and recovery, and supports risk reduction and readiness.

A potential opportunity for improving trust is to examine how to provide faster and more citizen-focused responses to disasters. New Zealand does not operate a public agency with institutionalised capacity for disaster recovery and reconstruction. Instead, government has set up bespoke systems to manage long-term support disaster recovery. The Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) was the most notable. While CERA led the response, complex relationships among government agencies created uncertainty in responsibilities, and also attracted negative public scrutiny (Small, 2017^[59]). Recovery efforts were also slowed by CERA's need to set up management systems in parallel to delivering activities (New Zealand Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2017^[60]). Similar themes are visible in the response to the Christchurch shootings. Affected citizens reported un-coordinated and inflexible responses among different government agencies involved in the response, with effects on their perceptions of government (Royal Commission of Inquiry into the terrorist attack on Christchurch masjidain on 15 March 2019, 2022^[61]). To allow faster and more co-ordinated responses to future disasters, government may wish to examine standardised emergency management structures. One action already identified is to establish agreements with government departments to provide core services (finance, HR, etc) for future recovery agencies (New Zealand Controller and Auditor-General, 2017^[62]).

Trust levels may be supported by strengthening accountability and lesson-learning. In New Zealand, these functions are performed by specially appointed Royal Commissions. Commissions are appointed from outside government, giving them the advantage of independence. Findings are made public, and implementation of their recommendations is tracked. Commissions are a useful and regularly-used approach. However, no central government agency has institutional responsibility for lesson learning and accountability after crises. This creates two potential gaps. First, from a learning perspective, the extent to which lessons are systematically learned and retained in government agencies may be limited. Second, from an accountability perspective, Commissions do not typically review issues such as failure to prepare or failures to act by government agencies, and they also do not have powers such as referring complaints or setting sanctions. Complementing Commissions with stronger central government learning and accountability mechanisms may support trust.

Public institutions can also support trust by ensuring transparency to citizens on how risk management decisions and recovery activities are undertaken. In the case of risks materialising, many OECD countries provide detailed, online public reporting on how recovery funds have been spent, and what activities are being undertaken. This is an important mechanism for engagement with citizens. More pro-actively, increasing transparency may involve encouraging greater societal discussion and visibility about key local and national risks. A local aspect in risk planning should be encouraged. Local government can play an effective role in communicating about disaster risks to the public, as well as strengthening local-level preparation and resilience.

Box 3.4 below, drawn from OECD's report "Assessing Global Progress in the Governance of Critical Risks" (OECD, 2018^[53]) and online Toolkit for Risk Governance, provides examples of how OECD countries are addressing the issues highlighted above.

Box 3.4. Selected good practices in Disaster Risk Management

Crisis management co-ordination: USA

The National Incident Command System (ICS) consists of a standardised emergency management structure that allows federal, state, tribal and local governments, NGOs, and the private sector to respond to the demands of a crisis situation, regardless of jurisdictional and political boundaries. Aimed at fostering interoperability and interagency co-operation, the ICS provides schemes for 14 management characteristics related to incident command, operations, communication, planning, logistics, finance and administration, and intelligence and investigation. Management objectives and action planning are centralised in a single unit of command to prevent diverging orders and promote accountability to a unified command and reporting institution. This allows agencies to respond to emergencies in a cost-effective and co-ordinated way that supports mutual objectives and strategies. At the same time, the ICS is flexible enough to be implemented for all kinds of incidents, small or large (OECD, n.d.^[63])

Supporting institutional learning: Japan

The International Research Institute of Disaster Science (IRIDeS) of the Tohoku University identified lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake. Its report proposes 37 recommendations ranging from such topics as evacuation processes, tsunami early warning systems, building back better after a disaster, structural mitigation measures and territorial planning in tsunami-prone areas. This post-crisis research is the first major outcome of IRIDeS which was established after the earthquake in the tsunami affected areas. IRIDeS has become a world reference for disaster management research, with a secure ten-year budget from the national government (OECD, 2014^[64])

Transparent reporting of recovery measures: Italy

Launched in Italy after the 2009 L'Aquila earthquake that struck the Italian region of Abruzzo, the Open Data Ricostruzione portal was established to increase transparency and efficiency in the use of public resources in the reconstruction phase. The portal collected, systematised and made available all information relating to the investments made during the reconstruction processes. It is in an easily accessible tool for various stakeholders, including citizens and researchers. The portal provides information on the allocation and use of funds as well as the progress in implementing public works programmes, including technical and administrative details on the procedures (OECD, 2018^[53]).

Communication and local preparedness: France

France introduced the Document d'information communal sur les risques majeurs (DICRIM) in 1990. Every community subject to a Risk Prevention Plan must draw up an information document about the self-protection measures to take in the event a major hazard or threat occurs. The mayor and the municipal council are responsible for the DICRIM. The document is tailored to the locally prevailing hazards and includes information on: natural and technological risks; measures taken by the municipality to reduce risk exposure; safety measures to be followed in the event of an emergency; critical infrastructure. The DICRIM informs citizens about the nature of the hazards and threats, their potential consequences, and the measures they can take to protect themselves or reduce their exposure and potential damages. Some DICRIM also encourage inter-municipal hazard analysis (Gouvernement de France, n.d.^[65])


3.2.2. Protecting Wellbeing and Economic Stability

Perceptions about the stability of the business environment can have important long-term investment and growth implications. Predictable government regulations, and maintenance of macroeconomic stability, support households and business to make long-term investments with a greater level of surety about future operating conditions and potential future income.

48% of survey respondents in New Zealand thought it was likely that government could supply stable and predictable business conditions, while 25% thought it was unlikely (Figure 3.17). This figure was substantively above the OECD average (32%) and compares well to the highest performing small advanced economy (Netherlands, 53%). Nonetheless, as per the analysis in Chapter 2, improvements on this factor could have a significant effect on trust, especially in parliament.

Figure 3.17. Around half of New Zealanders believe government institutions can support stable business conditions

Share of respondents in New Zealand, selected countries and OECD average, 2021



Note: Figure presents responses to the question “How unlikely or likely do you think it is that the business conditions the government can influence (e.g. laws and regulations businesses need to comply with) will be stable and predictable?” The “likely” proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale; “neutral” is equal to a response of 5; “unlikely” is the aggregation of responses from 0-4; and “Don't know” was a separate answer choice. OECD(22) refers to the unweighted average across 22 OECD countries.


Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)

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A wide range of issues can affect economic stability, and a full review of business conditions and regulations in New Zealand is beyond the scope of this review. OECD's views on economic policy in New Zealand are set out in the most recent OECD Economic Survey (OECD, 2021^[66]). However, from a trust perspective, housing prices are potentially affecting New Zealanders perceptions of reliability (Section 2.8). Between 2005 and 2019, New Zealand saw one of the sharpest increases in real housing prices in OECD countries (Figure 3.18). House price increases accelerated in 2020 and 2021, as relaxed monetary policy was used to stimulate the economy as part of the COVID response. Measures included boosting liquidity in the banking sector, temporary removal of loan-to-value-ratio (LVR) restrictions on mortgages and low interest rates. Prices reached a peak in late 2021, having risen at around 25% year-on-year (OECD, 2022^[30]). However, in 2022, house prices appear to have fallen sharply, as COVID measures have been removed and interest rates raised to combat rising inflation.

The issues in the housing market have created financial pressures on renters and first-time buyers. These are disproportionately young people and those on lower incomes, both of whom have lower trust than other groups (See Figure 2.17). In 2019, housing in New Zealand was already among the least affordable in any OECD country. New Zealand had one of the highest ratios of house prices to income (OECD, 2021^[67]). Among the lowest income quintile, 56% of households renting accommodation, and 43% of those with a mortgage, were spending more than 40% of their disposable income on housing costs (Figure 3.19). This was the highest proportion of any OECD country for which data is available. As COVID responses were put in place, first-time buyers have increasingly taken on large mortgages in relation to their income levels (Figure 3.20). Now that higher interest rates have been put in place, there is an increased risk of home losses among this group. Recommendations on housing policy are outside the scope of this report, but action to increase housing affordability and reduce variability in prices could contribute to improving public perceptions of government reliability.

Figure 3.18. House prices have grown rapidly, creating financial pressures on households



Note: House price indices (2015=100) measure the change over time of all residential properties (flats, detached houses, terraced houses, etc.) purchased by households. It includes both new and existing dwellings when available, independently of their final use and their previous owners. Only market prices are considered and include the price of the land on which residential buildings are located. 2005 data were not available in several countries; when it is the case data for the nearest available year were used: Latvia and Lithuania (2006), Luxembourg (2007), the Czech Republic (2008), Poland (2010) and Hungary (2007). 2019 data were not available in several countries; as such, data for 2018 were used: Chile, Colombia and New Zealand. Real house price data for Costa Rica were not available.

Source: (OECD, 2021^[68])



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Figure 3.19. Many households on lower incomes were overburdened by housing costs

Share of population in the bottom quintile of the income distribution spending more than 40% of disposable income on mortgage and rent




Note: Overburden is defined as the share of population in the bottom quintile of the income distribution spending more than 40% of disposable income on mortgage and rent. In Chile, Mexico, Korea and the United States gross income instead of disposable income is used due to data limitations. No data on mortgage principal repayments are available for Denmark due to data limitations. Results only include categories with enough observations.

Source: (OECD, 2021_[68])

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Figure 3.20. First-time buyers have increasingly taken on high-risk mortgages

Shows Debt to Income and Loan to Value in New Zealand



Note: Shows high-risk shares of new mortgage lending by buyer type. DTI is Debt to Income, LVR is Loan to Value.

Source: Figure 1.20 from OECD Economic Survey (OECD, 2022_[30]), based on (Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 2021_[69])

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3.2.3. Environmental Protection


Cross-nationally, people's confidence that their country will reduce greenhouse gas emissions has a significant and positive relationship with trust in national government (Figure 3.21). In other words, effective policies to fight climate change may improve trust in government. This can support a positive feedback loop, as high trust can also improve the effectiveness of environmental policy. Evidence from many OECD countries shows that trust in government is a significant factor in citizens' willingness to support climate policies (Hammar and Jagers, 2006^[70]) (Harring and Jagers, 2013^[71]) (Rhodes, Axsen and Jaccard, 2017^[72]). While many people believe that mitigating climate change will make future people's lives better, they may still not support these policies if they have little confidence that policies will be effective, or implemented for long enough, to mitigate climate change (Fairbrother et al., 2021^[73]).

54% of New Zealanders are not confident that the country will reduce emissions (Figure 3.22). Only 35% are confident. This figure is almost identical to the average across OECD countries (OECD, 2022^[74]). New Zealand has a relatively high level of trust in government, and this is usually associated with higher confidence in the ability of the government to reduce emissions. As such, this data raises questions as to why New Zealanders' are more sceptical of government on climate change than on other issues.

New Zealand has a robust set of targets, institutions and policy tools on climate change and environmental protection. From a trust perspective, these provide assurance that existing policies are credible and effective (OECD, 2022^[30]). New Zealand's primary tool for reducing greenhouse gas emissions is an Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), which sets a minimum price for emissions. Just over half of New Zealand's greenhouse gas emissions are covered by the ETS (New Zealand Ministry for the Environment, n.d.^[75]). In 2019, the Climate Change Response (Zero Carbon) Amendment Act set a new domestic greenhouse gas emissions reduction target, reducing net emissions of all greenhouse gases (except biogenic methane) to zero by 2050 (New Zealand Ministry for the Environment, 2021^[76]). It also established the Climate Change Commission to provide independent, evidence-based advice to government on climate issues. The Commission monitors and review progress towards the country's goals for reducing emissions and adapting to a changing climate. The legislation requires it to set emissions budgets within set timeframes. The independent Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment has broad powers to investigate environmental concerns. The Commissioner provides independent reports and advice on environmental issues, and works to review the agencies and processes set up by the Government to manage the country's resources. They also investigate the effectiveness of environmental planning and management by public authorities and advise them on remedial action.

Nonetheless, New Zealand is not on track to meet its objectives for climate change mitigation. Strengthening climate change mitigation policy could therefore improve trust on average (noting that those working in carbon intensive industries may suffer negative effects). OECD's most recent economic survey assessed that New Zealand is not on track to meet either its 2030 abatement commitment or its 2050 net zero carbon emissions target. It is estimated that inflation-adjusted carbon prices under the NZ Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) will need to rise from NZD 68 per tonne of CO₂-e in early December 2021 to NZD 140 by 2030 and NZD 250 by 2050 for New Zealand to meet its abatement objectives from domestic sources. New measures will also be needed to complement carbon pricing, and address emissions sources not corrected by carbon pricing alone (OECD, 2022^[30]). Moreover, New Zealand's domestic targets are not sufficient to meet its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) under the Paris Agreement. New Zealand will need to invest in significant amounts of emission abatements elsewhere to meet its NDC (New Zealand Climate Change Commission, 2022^[77]). The government has published an Emissions Reduction Plan outlining policies and actions to help bridge the gap between the current emissions trajectory and the one required to meet the 2050 targets. Among others, actions include: increasing access to electric vehicles and public transport; supporting businesses to improve energy efficiency; accelerating the delivery of agricultural emissions reduction tools; and establishing native forests at scale to develop long-term carbon sinks and improve biodiversity (New Zealand Government, 2022^[78]).

Figure 3.21. Countries that are seen as more competent in the fight against climate change also benefit from higher levels of trust in government




Note: This scatterplot presents the share of “trust” responses to the question “On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust each of the following? The national government”, equal to the values of responses 6-10 on the response scale, on the y-axis. The x-axis presents the share of “confident” responses to the question “How confident are you that [country] will succeed in reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the next 10 years?”. The “confident” response is the aggregation of responses “somewhat confident” and “completely confident”. “OECD” presents the unweighted average of responses across countries. Finland is excluded as the results on confidence were not available, and Mexico is excluded due to lack of data on both questions. New Zealand here shows trust in civil service as respondents were not asked about trust in the national government (note that trust in civil service on average tends to be higher than trust in national government). For more detailed information please find the survey method document at <http://oe.cd/trust>.
 Source: (OECD, 2022^[74])

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Figure 3.22. A majority of respondents are not confident that New Zealand will succeed in reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the next 10 years

Share of respondents in New Zealand, selected countries and OECD average, 2021



Note: Figure presents the within-country distributions of responses to the question “How confident are you that New Zealand will succeed in reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the next 10 years?”. The “confidence” proportion is the aggregation of responses 1 (“not at all”) and 2 (“a little”). “No confidence” is the aggregation of responses 3 (“somewhat”) and 4 (“completely”). “Don't know” was a separate answer choice and no neutral option was included in the survey answers. OECD(22) refers to the unweighted average across 22 OECD countries.
 Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)

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Improving trust may also require more effective climate change adaptation measures, with a focus on increasing capacities in local government. Many of New Zealand’s communities are exposed to the effects of climate change. A high-profile case at the time of writing is Nelson, a low-lying coastal city of 50,000 residents, located at a river mouth on the South Island. Nelson is at increasing risk of coastal and river flooding as a result of climate change. In July 2022, the Nelson City Council undertook a public consultation on priorities in designing its adaptation responses. The consultation was accompanied by a set of high-definition projections of areas of the city potentially at risk from once-a-century flooding events over the next 100 years (Nelson City Council, 2022^[79]). Four days after the close of the consultation, in August 2022, a once-a-century flooding event occurred (New Zealand Herald, 2022^[80]). Nelson received roughly 2 months of rainfall over 3 days, resulting in more than 400 homes being evacuated, 350 landslides and a two week state of emergency (Deutsche Welle, 2022^[81]). Scientific commentators noted that climate change was “more than likely playing a role” in precipitating the floods (Gabel, 2022^[82]).

The risk of episodes of this sort is likely to increase as climate change intensifies. This episode highlights, first, that the effectiveness of climate change adaptation has the potential to be an important driver of trust levels in the short-to-medium term in New Zealand. It also highlights the critical importance of local government capacity in planning and implementing adaptation activities. Local government, specifically regional councils, are responsible for most environmental management in New Zealand. As noted above, local government in New Zealand has a truncated range of responsibilities, and in many cases suffers from lack of access to financing and expertise. It is important that reviews of local government functions consider their ability to deliver effective local adaptation activity.

3.2.4. Maintaining a long-term view

To improve trust, it is important that New Zealand maintains a clear long-term view of risks and opportunities. New Zealand has an unusually short electoral cycle, with parliamentary elections every three years. This means the window within which public officials must develop, implement and evaluate new policies is often shorter than in other OECD members. This creates a risk of short-term thinking and may make it harder to identify and tackle long-term problems. The Public Service Act 2020 combats any such risks by making it a legal requirement that each government department must present a Long Terms Insight Briefing every three years. This must contain “information about medium and long-term trends, risks and opportunities that affect or may affect New Zealand... and policy options for responding to these matters” (New Zealand Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2021^[83]).

New Zealand’s public institutions may be able to improve trust by continuing to institutionalise long-term policy foresight. The need to institute long-range thinking faces many governments, and is a core aspect of reliability. New Zealand’s Long Term Insights Briefings are a welcome tool and they could benefit in building existing institutional memory and technical capacity. As a new tool, it is important to ensure these are incorporated into policy-making, and improved over time. OECD members have adopted a range of approaches to institutionalise long-term thinking, including cross-agency foresight work (Finland) and institutionalised centres of excellence (Canada). Box 3.2 presents these. New Zealand may benefit from reviewing mechanisms elsewhere in the OECD.

Box 3.5. Policy foresight & Long-term thinking

Government Report on the Future, Finland

Finland undertakes a cross-government “Report on the Future” once every electoral cycle. Past editions have covered the transformation of work (Finland Prime Minister’s Office, 2018^[84]), sustainable growth and wellbeing (Finland Prime Minister’s Office, 2013^[85]) and long-term climate and energy policy (Finland Prime Minister’s Office, 2009^[86]).

The production of each report is a multi-year process. It is designed to enable co-ordinated horizon-scanning and policy discussion across government, as well as enabling foresight by elected officials. Work is co-ordinated by the Prime Minister's office, and features input from a range of other government ministries, as well as external experts. Reports are developed in two parts. First, joint horizon scanning and foresight activities take place across government agencies, to develop a picture of possible future developments and/or scenarios. Second, potential solutions are developed and presented. These two sections are developed in sequence, with each section taking approximately 15 months to complete. Content is "built openly and in a network-like manner", through cross-government workshops, events, discussions and expert meetings, with the final output representing a joint outlook. When each section is completed, it is submitted to parliament for debate.

Policy Horizons Canada

Policy Horizons Canada is a Canadian federal government agency which conducts foresight activities. The agency provides an institutional home for foresight activities within government. It reports through the Minister for Employment and is overseen by a Steering Committee composed of public servants from a wide range of agencies, and also academic institutions. PHC provides publicly available analysis on the potential consequences, challenges and opportunities arising from a range of trends. This includes analysis of economic issues (digitalisation, new technology), social issues, and topics related to governance and the future of democracy. The agency has also conducted a range of activities to increase skills in foresight within the public service. These have included training programs on foresight analysis for public servants, and behavioural insights briefs to help build foresight capacity.

Opportunities to enhance preparedness and strengthen foresight in policy making

This section summarizes key results and presents potential policy avenues to improve reliability and strengthen public trust.

- 62% of people survey respondents in New Zealand believe that it is likely that government institutions will be ready to protect people's lives if a serious new contagious disease spreads. New Zealand is however highly exposed in comparative terms to natural hazards. It is key to Provide faster and more citizen-focused responses to disasters. Strengthen post-event accountability and lesson-learning functions in central government. Ensure transparency to citizens on how risk management decisions and recovery activities are undertaken.
- Protecting Wellbeing and Economic Stability. Failures to address widely recognized are a risk to levels of trust. – Take action to increase housing affordability and reduce variability in prices. Identify factors that contributed in managing previous crisis (e.g. COVID) in terms of effectively harnessing a relatively small pool of public health expertise and reallocating resources to address key needs, this would help identifying transferable lessons for other pressing issues.
- New Zealand has a well-defined institutional framework for climate change policy. Yet only 35% of the population is confident that New Zealand will succeed in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Policy could work towards bridging the gaps in emissions targets. Institutional mechanisms for adaptation could be further prioritised, including ensuring there is appropriate capability for adaptation.
- Preparedness to cope with future crises is a key driver of trust in the public service. Strengthen New Zealand's newly developed institutional mechanisms for long-term policy foresight by learning from foresight exercises carried out elsewhere in the OECD. It is important to advance conversations on how the briefs may influence policies.

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Note

¹ In PISA, a student's socio-economic status is estimated by the PISA index of economic, social and cultural status (ESCS), a composite measure that combines into a single score the financial, social, cultural and human-capital resources available to students

4 Values and trust in New Zealand

Building on the empirical analysis, this chapter focuses on opportunities to improve core values that inform government actions and thereby influence levels of institutional trust. These include government's openness, integrity, and fairness. It stresses the importance of going beyond the traditional understanding of transparency towards a new and broader communicational sense, which requires planning how public information is going to be communicated and anticipating people's needs to better arm them against mis- and disinformation. It also entails strengthening a preventive integrity approach, investing more in training beyond awareness-raising, and including integrity elements in risk management and internal control. Finally, as a way to strengthen fairness it recognizes the importance of engaging with groups that may feel left behind, particularly at the local level and in more remote regions and ensuring that there are specific spaces and channels to communicate with them.

4.1. Openness

4.1.1. Openness as a core principle that underpins public service and governance

Open government refers to a culture of governance that promotes the principles of transparency, integrity, accountability and stakeholder participation in support of democracy and inclusive growth (OECD, 2017^[11]). Cross-nationally, promoting and investing in transparency and openness initiatives is found to be associated with higher levels of public trust (OECD, 2022^[2]; Bouckaert, 2012^[3]; Beshi and Kaur, 2020^[4]). Yet, the relationship between openness and trust is complex: cultural values play a significant role in how people perceive and evaluate openness policies and their impact (Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2013^[5]). Most importantly, the effect of openness on public trust is mediated by additional elements, making openness a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for positively influencing trust. For instance, greater transparency will not necessarily lead to increased trust if it exposes controversial information or corruption cases (OECD, 2017^[6]; Bauhr and Grimes, 2014^[7]). Furthermore, evidence shows that information on and perceptions of government performance may affect the impact of openness initiatives (Alessandro et al., 2021^[8]), and that people need to feel trusted by the government in order to trust it, believing that an invitation to participate is genuine and that they are empowered to influence political systems (Schmidhuber, Ingrams and Hilgers, 2020^[9]).

Building on the OECD Recommendation of the Council on Open Government (OECD, 2017^[11]), the OECD Framework on the Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions measures three key aspects of openness. First, it addresses government's mandate to inform, including letting people know and understand what the government does and improving transparency.¹ Second, it assesses consultation, which entails a two-way relationship in which stakeholders provide feedback to the government and vice-versa. Third, it looks at the government's capacity to engage citizens and other stakeholders, to include their perspectives and insights and promote co-operation in policy design and implementation. The OECD Trust Survey includes the following three questions gauging these elements in New Zealand:


- If you need information about an administrative procedure (for example obtaining a passport, applying for a benefit, etc.), how unlikely or likely do you think it is that the information would be easily available?
- If a decision affecting your community is to be made by the local government, how unlikely or likely do you think it is that you would have an opportunity to voice your views?
- If you participate in a public consultation on reforming a major policy area (e.g. taxation, healthcare, environmental protection), how unlikely or likely do you think it is that the government would adopt the opinions expressed in the public consultation?

Results from the 2021 OECD Trust Survey show that New Zealanders' perceptions of openness are quite positive on transparency of information, but less encouraging on how they see their voice in public decision making (Figure 4.1). Around 8 in 10 (77%) respondents believe that information about administrative procedures is easily accessible (12 percentage points above the average across OECD countries). However, slightly less than half New Zealanders perceive they have enough opportunities to voice their views (48%) and a minority believe that institutions would listen to these views (37%). Although these levels appear as low, New Zealand fares above OECD averages in the three indicators..


Across OECD countries, there is a widespread scepticism about opportunities for engagement and participation, as Figure 4.1C shows. In New Zealand, in line with OECD countries, positive perceptions that the government would adopt inputs provided in public consultations is found to be a key determinant of trust in the public service and the local government (Figure 2.18 and 2.20). Additionally, having the opportunity to voice one's views has a statistically significant, albeit smaller, effect on trust in local government.

Figure 4.1. New Zealanders are satisfied with transparency of information, but a minority is confident in opportunities to voice and engage


PANEL A: Share of respondents who indicate different levels of perception of the ease of finding information about administrative procedures in New Zealand, selected countries and OECD average (on a 0-10 scale), 2021



PANEL B: Share of respondents who indicate different levels of perceived likelihood that they would have the opportunity to voice their view if a local government decision affects their community in New Zealand, selected countries and OECD average (on a 0-10 scale), 2021




PANEL C: Share of respondents who indicate different levels of perceived likelihood that a government would adopt opinions expressed in a public consultation in New Zealand, selected countries and OECD average (on a 0-10 scale), 2021



Note: Figure presents the distributions of responses to the question “If you need information about an administrative procedure (for example obtaining a passport, applying for benefits, etc.), how likely or unlikely do you think it is that the information would be easily available?” (Panel A); “If a decision affecting your community is to be made by the local government, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that you would have an opportunity to voice your views?” (Panel B); “If you participate in a public consultation on reforming a major policy area (e.g. taxation, healthcare, environmental protection), how likely or unlikely do you think it is that the government would adopt the opinions expressed in the public consultation?” (Panel C). OECD(22) refers to the unweighted average across 22 OECD countries.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)

StatLink  <https://stat.link/qoelnb>

4.1.2. Public institutions in New Zealand have a long-standing culture of transparency

Transparency is a cornerstone of New Zealand’s public administration. The Official Information Act (OIA) was first adopted three decades ago (1982), formalising the principle of freedom of information in a pioneering legal framework. The Act’s liberal disclosure approach creates the rights to a process for accessing public information, which goes beyond just listing relevant sources and documents that could be accessed (Liddell, 1997^[10]; Snell, 2006^[11]). New Zealand has also been member of the Open Government Partnership since 2013 - two years after its creation - and is currently designing its fourth national action plan in order to deepen participation, transparency and accountability. The country promotes the principle of *openness by default* and is one of the top 9 country leaders in digital government, mainly regarding data availability and accessibility (OECD, 2020^[12]). New Zealand has also advanced in the proactive disclosure of government information. In 2019 a new policy was established to proactively release of all² Cabinet and Cabinet committee papers.

Recent experts’ assessments consider New Zealand’s regulations as strongly transparent with predictable enforcement,³ reflecting the impact of latest initiatives, such as the creation of a single user-friendly website that brings together all national laws and facilitates access to legal information for the public, or easy online access to parliamentary hearings. Indeed, strengthening and designing innovative transparency initiatives has been an important part of New Zealand’s successful strategy to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic (Box 4.1).

Beyond multiple openness initiatives and policies, New Zealand promotes broad open government literacy – understood as the combination of awareness, knowledge and skills that public officials and stakeholders

need to engage successfully in open government strategies and initiatives –, which is essential to a real culture of openness. According to the OECD Open Government Survey, the country not only provides clear guidelines on open government data and stakeholder participation, but also provides training to civil servants to embody open government principles (OECD, 2021^[13]).

Box 4.1. COVID-19 and openness

As in many OECD countries, the pandemic led to physical restrictions in public life: people were unable to meet representatives, attend public hearings, etc., and commitments or initiatives related to face-to-face engagement with public institutions were halted during the lockdown. However, New Zealand developed remarkable initiatives to promote openness and to strengthen transparency and engagement through digital means during the COVID-19 pandemic.

At the outbreak of the pandemic, an Epidemic Response Committee was established to deliberate on the government’s management of the COVID-19 epidemic. This was the first select committee in New Zealand to have its proceedings broadcast live on Parliament TV. The broadcast aimed to provide maximum public visibility for the Committee’s work while the House was unable to meet because of COVID-19 restrictions. Furthermore, meetings of the Committee were live-streamed to the New Zealand Parliament Facebook page around three times a week, reaching an audience of around 1000 people on average. Similar committee broadcasting was undertaken for ministerial appearances and COVID-related hearings during 2021 lockdowns.

The government also set the policy to proactively publish cabinet documents every 15 days, and the Prime Minister’s and the Director General of Health broadcast daily press conferences to update New Zealand’s “team of 5 million” on the progress in tackling the virus.


In addition, Karaehe Kaewa (wandering classroom) was developed. This initiative includes online education visits to the Parliament and allowing civic education to be offered to schools outside of the capital. Finally, the government organised a Super Saturday Vaxathon, a day-long TV livestream promoting vaccination, showing vaccination centres and people being vaccinated, with the goal of achieving 100,000 vaccine doses.

Source: Office of the Clerk of the House of Representatives; <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IL5r8Gv-tQ4>

However, as per the last report of the Global Right to Information Rating (RTI), New Zealand’s legal framework on access to public information has some limitations. Access to government information may be undermined by multiple exemptions and restrictions to disclose information included in other regulations. In addition, the scope of the Act falls short of covering Parliament and some judiciary bodies, such as the Controller or Auditor General. Additional challenges can appear regarding access to government information at the local level, as lack of clear details or insufficient training to staff and counsellors may lead to misinterpretation of the Act. For instance, although the public is allowed to access local authorities’ meetings, there are exceptions if the topics to be addressed require a closed meeting, but these exemptions are not clearly specified in the regulations. This has resulted in a high number of complaints being presented to the ombudsman regarding access to public information at the local level. According to the OECD survey, 54.7% of respondents consider that they know how the government works Figure 4.2.

Figure 4.2. A majority of New Zealanders report knowing how the government works

Share of respondents in New Zealand, 2021



Note: Figure presents responses to the question “How much do you know about how central government in New Zealand works?” The “less knowledge” proportion is the aggregation of responses from 0-4 on the scale; “neutral” is equal to a response of 5; “more knowledge” is the aggregation of responses from 6-10, where 0 =nothing at all and 10 =a great deal.


Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)

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Furthermore, although perceptions of transparency are overtly positive in the country, there are some population groups that find it harder than others to access public information. The proportion of respondents of the OECD Trust Survey who believe information on administrative procedures is easily accessible is lower among the less educated, the young, the Māori and respondents from Pacific communities, as well as for those who reported having financial concerns (Figure 4.3). These groups have shown a similar perception of inaccessibility when asked about their knowledge of the functioning of the government,⁴ which may signal that there is a need to make the functioning of government more accessible to them (Box 4.2).


Figure 4.3. Younger people, those with lower education and income are less likely to believe that information is easily available

Share of respondents in New Zealand, 2021



Note: Figure presents the distributions of responses to the question “If you need information about an administrative procedure (for example obtaining a passport, applying for benefits, etc.), how likely or unlikely do you think it is that the information would be easily available?” The “likely” proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale. “NZL mean” presents the weighted average across all respondents in New Zealand. Top 25% and bottom 25% refers to the income distribution based on household’s total gross annual income of 2021, before tax and deductions, but including benefits/allowances. High education is defined as the ISCED 2011 education levels 5-8, i.e. university-level degrees such as Bachelors, Masters or PhD, and low education refers to less than a completed upper secondary degree. * means that differences in proportions are statistically significant at the 90% significance level; ** means that differences are statistically significant at the 95% level; *** means that differences are statistically significant at the 99% level. Reference group in light blue.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)

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Indeed, neither providing information (active transparency) nor granting the right to information to citizens through access to information laws (passive transparency) may be enough to ensure a broader culture of transparency and openness. The “*right to know*” needs to be complemented by coherent communication strategies that aim to better inform people and shield them from mis- and disinformation. These strategies should set clear goals, target audiences and messages, and identify the best channels for reaching diverse groups of people. Those population groups and individuals who feel left behind or excluded from wider society need to be a particular focus. For instance, the “[Unstoppable Summer: A COVID-19 Public Service Announcement](#)”, a short musical video featuring the Director General of Health and shown before broad audience events, is a good example of how best to target youth. Other OECD countries’ initiatives designed to target specific population groups may be also relevant for increasing transparency in a communicational sense (Box 4.2). These communication elements are especially relevant in a context where personal beliefs and emotions play a key role in shaping public opinion beyond objective facts, and social media facilitate widespread distribution of these messages (Schnell, 2022^[14]). The adoption by the New Zealand Government of a Plain Language Act in October 2022 is a step in the right direction to improve the accessibility of key documents for the public and could be an important element in strengthening trust between public agencies and groups that may feel they have been left behind.

Box 4.2. OECD countries' initiatives to reach broader audiences

In order to better communicate and broaden their understanding of transparency, OECD countries have designed various initiatives to reach broader population groups.

In 2010, the US enacted the Plain Writing Act to enhance citizen access to government information and services by establishing that government documents issued to the public must be written clearly. The Act is accompanied by guidelines on its implementation that are extended to the public administration.


Costa Rica's Handbook on Communication (2018-2022) includes detailed guidelines on communicating with vulnerable groups and on sensitive topics (including migration, gender-based violence, LGBTQ+ rights, and people with disabilities).

The Government of Canada's Policy on Communications and Federal Identity (2016) establishes as one of its four objectives that communication should be projected equally in both official languages to make the government visible and recognizable to the public in Canada and abroad.

Source: (OECD, 2021^[15])

Only 35% of the population reported trusting the news media, making it the least trusted institution in the country (See Figure 2.1). Figure 4.4 shows that New Zealand fares below the OECD average (38.7%) and on the low end of the benchmarking group, just above Australia, the United Kingdom and Denmark. Promoting a healthy information ecosystem via a proactive and holistic "communicational" approach that promotes diverse, independent and quality media, supports media and digital literacy and considers transparency requirements and issues related to the business models of social media platforms would help prevent and counter mis- and disinformation (OECD, 2021^[15]). This is of particular relevance considering the protests held in February- March 2022. A recent study found that during the protests, mis- and disinformation producers attracted more video views than all of the country's mainstream media pages combined for the first time (Hannah, Hattotuwa and Taylor, 2022^[16]).

Figure 4.4. About one-third of New Zealanders trust the news media



Note: Figure presents responses to the question "On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust the news media?" The "trust" proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale; "neutral" is equal to a response of 5; "do not trust" is the aggregation of responses from 0-4; and "Don't know" was a separate answer choice. OECD(22) refers to the unweighted average across 22 OECD countries.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)

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The OECD Principles of Good Practice for Public Communication Responses to Mis- and Disinformation can help promote a whole-of-society response to the challenges presented by the spread of misleading and harmful content. The ten principles include practical examples and reiterate the importance of governments' communicating transparently, honestly, and impartially, and of conceiving of the public communication function as a means for two-way engagement with citizens. Ultimately, the principles provide practical guidance and present a range of good practices on government interventions aimed to counter mis- and disinformation, address underlying causes of distrust, and promote openness, transparency and inclusion. These principles could also help guide reforms to the media and social media to discourage the spread of mis- and disinformation. In addition to the principles, country experience with ongoing initiatives may support the whole communication strategy (Box 4.3).

Box 4.3. RESIST initiative in the UK

The Government Communication Service of the United Kingdom launched in 2019 a counter disinformation toolkit to support public officials in preventing and tackling the spread of disinformation as well as in disseminating reliable and truthful information. The RESIST toolkit is divided into five independent components that helps to:


- **R**ecognise disinformation
- use media monitoring for **E**arly warning
- develop **S**ituational insight
- carry out **I**mpact analysis
- deliver **S**trategic communication
- **T**rack outcomes

In addition to the toolkit, the UK Cabinet Office partnered with the University of Cambridge to create a game called Go Viral! (<https://www.goviralgame.com/en>). The game was designed to help the public understand and discern the most common COVID-19 misinformation tactics used by online actors, so they can better protect themselves against them. As per initial results, there have been over 207 000 digital 'inoculations' to health misinformation delivered through the Go Viral! Game, and the intervention was found to raise players' ability to resist misinformation by up to 21%.

Source: UK Government Communication Service; UK's presentation during OECD Public Governance Committee, October 2021.


4.1.3. New Zealanders are electorally active, but many feel sceptical about their political voice

Although voting is not compulsory, levels of voter turnout in New Zealand are among the highest in the world. These levels have decreased steeply in recent decades, although in 2020 turnout levels were the highest since 1999 (New Zealand Electoral Commission, 2020^[17]). According to the OECD Trust Survey, 85.1% of respondents reported voting in the 2020 Parliamentary election elections, similar to percentages found in other high-trusting countries, such as Norway, Denmark or Sweden, and above the average across OECD countries surveyed (79%). However, New Zealanders present low levels of political engagement in other political activities - including voting in local elections (Figure 4.5) - and there is a widespread scepticism about people's ability to influence political issues via routes other than voting.

Figure 4.5. Political participation in New Zealand

Note: Figure presents the share of respondents that mentioned having participated in the following form of political participation during the last 12 months.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)


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The application of the treaty of Waitangi as the foundational document of New Zealand has resulted in a multicultural society. Accordingly, institutional arrangements have been designed and improved across time to promote and enhance inclusiveness and make every New Zealander feel politically represented. Already in 1867, a Māori electoral roll was adopted, establishing parliamentary seats for Māori representatives. In turn, the 1993 electoral reform moved from a majoritarian to a mixed-member proportional system increasing the representativeness of ethnicities and ensuring that different voices and groups can be reflected and included in policy making (Karp and Banducci, 1999^[18]). Indeed, according to New Zealand's Electoral Commission, the gap between non-Māori and Māori enrolment rates was the smallest, 3.1 percentage points in 2020, and voter turnout for those on the Māori roll has been steadily increasing, from 57.6% in 2002 to 69.1% in 2020.

While Māori leaders have been present in political life for a long time, the first Māori party was formed in the 90s, and entered Parliament only in the 2000s; generally and for Māori political parties are one of the less trusted government institutions in the country (Nguyen, Prickett and Chapple, 2020^[19]). In addition, other ethnic groups such as Pacifica population do not have the same level of organization and political participation (Nguyen, Prickett and Chapple, 2020^[19]). According to the OECD Trust Survey, only around four in ten New Zealanders report feel they have a say in what the government does. The less educated and those reporting financial concerns feel more vulnerable and powerless (Figure 4.6). These results are of crucial relevance, as people's perceptions that they can influence public decisions affecting their lives is the main determinant of trust in parliament in New Zealand (Figure 2.20). Moreover, recent studies using European Social Survey data found that initiatives that open up political processes to people, provide meaningful opportunities for political participation, and make them feel empowered to participate in politics and influence what the government does, may result in higher levels of public trust and political participation (Schmidhuber, Ingrams and Hilgers, 2020^[9]; Prats and Meunier, 2021^[20]).

Figure 4.6. The most vulnerable feel that they do not have a say in what government does

Share of respondents in New Zealand, 2021



Note: Figure presents the responses to the question "How much would you say the political system in [country] allows people like you to have a say in what the government does?" The "likely" proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale. "NZL mean" presents the weighted average across all respondents in New Zealand. Top 25% and bottom 25% refers to the income distribution based on household's total gross annual income of 2021, before tax and deductions, but including benefits/allowances. High education is defined as the ISCED 2011 education levels 5-8, i.e. university-level degrees such as Bachelors, Masters or PhD, and low education refers to less than a completed upper secondary degree. * means that differences in proportions are statistically significant at the 90% significance level; ** means that differences are statistically significant at the 95% level; *** means that differences are statistically significant at the 99% level. Reference group in light blue.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)


StatLink  <https://stat.link/schz50>

The civil society landscape in New Zealand is small. There are around one thousand groups listed in the National Residents Associations Database, but only 16.5% of New Zealanders reported participating at least once a week in sports or recreational activities and 30.2% reported volunteering through an organisation (Statistics New Zealand, 2021^[21]). In interviews carried out for this study, it was also emphasized that funding was a key challenge for civil society organisations and that there was no organisation that could support civil society organisations in applying for funds, status, etc. Both of these elements may be related to feeling unheard and perceived difficulties in participating in politics (OECD, 2022).

In addition, the OECD Trust Survey shows that some population groups feel more unheard than others (Figure 4.7). Across population groups, Māori are those who have the strongest feeling of not being involved: only 36.7% of Māori believe they would have the opportunity to voice their views in decisions affecting their community. In addition, and although it is not representative, there are clear participation gaps (12 percentage points) between those who are young and reported financial concerns compared to older respondents and those who do not feel economically vulnerable. These differences can have a crucial impact on the political system. Feelings of being unheard and participation gaps were found to affect electoral behaviour (Satherley et al., 2020^[22]). New Zealand's voter trends and polarisation patterns show that there are no strong divisions among voters in relation to demographic backgrounds.

Figure 4.7. The most vulnerable respondents are those more sceptical about opportunities to voice their views

Share of respondents in New Zealand, 2021



Note: Figure presents the responses to the question "If a decision affecting your community is to be made by the local government, how unlikely or likely do you think it is that you would have an opportunity to voice your views?" The "likely" proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale. "NZL mean" presents the weighted average across all respondents in New Zealand. Top 25% and bottom 25% refers to the income distribution based on household's total gross annual income of 2021, before tax and deductions, but including benefits/allowances. High education is defined as the ISCED 2011 education levels 5-8, i.e. university-level degrees such as Bachelors, Masters or PhD, and low education refers to less than a completed upper secondary degree. * means that differences in proportions are statistically significant at the 90% significance level; ** means that differences are statistically significant at the 95% level; *** means that differences are statistically significant at the 99% level. Reference group in light blue.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)

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Beyond perceptions, New Zealand's government is strongly committed to engaging people in policy making. According to New Zealand's Cabinet Guide and Cabinet Manual, engaging and consulting with citizens is strongly recommended, and, in a number of acts, public consultation is a legislative requirement (e.g: the Local Government Act, the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act, etc). Furthermore, long-term insights briefings on key topics relevant for the future are a rather new foresight tool and public participation in policy development and is amongst the country's main commitments in its national Open Government plan. New Zealanders can provide their feedback and make submissions to a bill, and they can also give local and central government inputs on plans through consultation listings before decisions are made. In addition, there are multiple recent initiatives to engage people and groups at the community level in both policy and service design (such as the programme to Regenerate Christchurch or the development of the Māori Strategy), which are supported by the Policy Community Engagement Tool developed and launched in December 2021 under the supervision of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (Box 4.4). The recently released brief on the State of the Public Service stresses the development of active citizenship as a key focus of the New Zealand public service (Public Sector Commission, 2022^[23]).

Box 4.4. New Zealand's Policy Community Engagement Tool

The Policy Community Engagement Tool (the Tool) was first released and piloted in May 2021. It provides good practice guidance on community engagement for policy makers and agencies as they respond to the recommendations of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Terrorist Attack on Christchurch Masjidain.

The Tool advises public officials involved in the engagement activity on the steps, processes and resources that will enable them to undertake good community engagement, including a detailed checkbox guide (with critical questions, see Figure below) to ensure all key elements are considered. It encompasses all the necessary activities involved when carrying out engagement in five steps:

- Step 1 – Designing the engagement
- Step 2 – Planning the engagement
- Step 3 – Managing the delivery of engagement
- Step 4 – Analysing and sharing the results of engagement
- Step 5 – Reviewing and evaluating the engagement

Step 1 – Designing the engagement			
Step activity	Critical questions	Evidence of success	Notes on your response to critical questions and record of progress
1.1 Begin designing your engagement to determine the most appropriate level of participation and influence on the IAP2 Spectrum	<input type="checkbox"/> Have we reviewed and applied the Policy Project's Community Engagement Design Tool to help gather and analyse the information needed to shape the detailed engagement design? (this will identify the most appropriate level on the IAP2 Spectrum for the project) <input type="checkbox"/> Have we specifically considered the following design elements: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> history and context that has led to this point? <input type="checkbox"/> scope and focus for the policy issue or opportunity – are any matters out of scope, or aspects of solutions non-negotiable? <input type="checkbox"/> people and stakeholder groups interested in and affected by the policy issue or opportunity, and possible solutions that we'll need to engage with? (see Guide to Inclusive Community Engagement) <input type="checkbox"/> high-level purpose of our engagement, and what would be the ideal outcomes from engagement? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The context for and scope of the policy project is understood and can be communicated to stakeholders. • Affected and interested people who are potential participants have been identified, and a stakeholder map with a range of relevant and diverse stakeholders has been prepared. • The purpose of engagement within the policy project has been clearly identified. • The level of participation and the degree of influence on policy decisions has been identified, with input from stakeholders. • A minimum level of involve or collaborate was considered for each relevant stage of the project and adopted if appropriate. 	Record here: who the target groups for engagement within the community are; and the level(s) of participation and degree of influence on decision making on the IAP2 Spectrum for the relevant groups, as indicated through the design process.


According to New Zealand's self-assessment on the Open Government National Action Plan, this guidance is broadly used and has significantly increased web traffic and downloads by public officials during 2021.

Source: <https://dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2022-01/policy-community-engagement-tool-jan22.pdf>

Nevertheless, responsibility for public consultation lies with individual agencies are the ones responsible for public consultations as they liaise with stakeholders, communicate, keep records, etc. This fragmentation may hinder the systematic compilation of records and monitoring (providing summaries, registering who are the ones consulted and how often, etc), or the existence of a consistent approach to notifying stakeholders of upcoming opportunities to contribute (OECD, 2021^[24]). Additionally, challenges and limits may arise related to actual implementation. For instance, during interviews carried out for this study, stakeholders mentioned *timeliness* as a challenge to meaningful engagement. Many reported that the first stage of engagement often takes place too late to influence policy outcomes. This, in turn, might undermine trust among those that interact with the government (OECD, 2021^[24]).

Figure 4.8. Less than half are confident that government institutions listen to citizens

Share of respondents in New Zealand, 2021



Note: Figure presents responses to the question “How much confidence do you have in government institutions to: Listen to citizens” The “confidence” proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale; “neutral” is equal to a response of 5; “No confidence” is the aggregation of responses from 0-4; and “Don't know” was a separate answer choice.


Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)

StatLink  <https://stat.link/mrxedk>

Other results support these points. Evidence from New Zealand’s *Survey on Community Engagement in Policy making* (2021) administered by policy advisors, community representatives and engagement specialists shows that timeframes for engagement are too short. Furthermore, according to the OECD Trust Survey, only a minority of New Zealanders (44%) are confident that government institutions listen to people (Figure 4.8). Even fewer respondents (37%) believe that if they participate in a public consultation the government would adopt the opinions expressed. Less educated New Zealanders are the most skeptical about the government being open and making policies including their concerns: fewer than 1 in 3 (28%) of those who completed lower secondary education believe the government would adopt opinions expressed in a public consultation (Figure 4.9).

Figure 4.9. New Zealanders with higher education, top 25% income and Asian population groups are more likely to believe that the government adopts opinions from public consultations

Share of respondents in New Zealand, 2021



Note: Figure presents the responses to the question "If you participate in a public consultation on reforming a major policy area (e.g. taxation, healthcare, environmental protection), how unlikely or likely do you think it is that the government would adopt the opinions expressed in the public consultation?" The "likely" proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale. "NZL mean" presents the weighted average across all respondents in New Zealand. Top 25% and bottom 25% refers to the income distribution based on household's total gross annual income of 2021, before tax and deductions, but including benefits/allowances. High education is defined as the ISCED 2011 education levels 5-8, i.e. university-level degrees such as Bachelors, Masters or PhD, and low education refers to less than a completed upper secondary degree. * means that differences in proportions are statistically significant at the 90% significance level; ** means that differences are statistically significant at the 95% level; *** means that differences are statistically significant at the 99% level. Reference group in light blue.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)

StatLink  <https://stat.link/s8c0q4>

Other than providing inputs to government, citizens are not able to initiate legislation, and there are only very few instances of participatory or deliberative democracy. Public institutions promote top-down engagement opportunities, but people are not encouraged to participate on their own initiative. In fact, there are tools that facilitate access to members of parliament and for starting petitions. New Zealanders can also initiate (non-binding) referendums, and although this tool has barely been used since the Initiated Referendum Act (1993) and has many limitations (Morris, 2004^[25]), it was found to have a positive impact on public trust (Qvortrup, 2008^[26]; Morris, 2007^[27]). In this regard, experiences from other OECD countries may suggest that more structured democratic innovations can be a good way to strengthen people's political voice and reinforce trust, at least at the local level, where turnout levels are decreasing steadily, and there are no political parties (Box 4.5).

Box 4.5. Deliberative democracy Initiatives across OECD countries at the local level

Citizens' Panel- Toronto Planning Review Panel (2015-2017)

The Toronto Planning Review Panel was a deliberative body, embedded into the city's planning division, that enabled ongoing citizen input on the issues of planning and transportation. Its members served two-year terms, after which a new cohort was randomly selected to be representative of the Greater Toronto Area. A group of 28 randomly selected residents from all parts of the greater Toronto area met

for 11 full-day meetings from 2015-2017. Prior to deliberation, participants met for four days of learning and training. A similar panel was appointed for the 2017-2019.

Planning Cell: A cable car for the citizens of Wuppertal, Germany (2016)

Forty-eight randomly selected citizens were brought together to discuss the possibility of building a cable car in their town. Citizens met for four full days and engaged in learning and deliberation. They listed arguments for and against the cable car and concluded by recommending the local government to conduct a thorough cost-benefit analysis and funding options before making a decision.

Citizens' Council on mobility in Vorarlberg, Austria (2018-2019)

The state government of Vorarlberg brought together 30 randomly selected citizens for one and a half days to develop principles and priorities in the field of mobility and transport for the state of Vorarlberg for the next ten to fifteen years. Following the Citizens' Council, a Citizens' Café took place, where the broader public could learn about the recommendations produced and discuss them with politicians and public administration.

Source: (OECD, 2020^[28])

In this regard, addressing participation gaps and reaching out to people left behind may require a mix of solutions, and to this end, it is important to consider the specific context, as well as political socialisation, historic and cultural elements. For instance, during interviews it was mentioned that although Europeans consider the democratic ideal as “one person, one vote”, for Māori the idea behind democracy is that policies are collective.

A crucial starting point is to strengthen people's self-perception of their ability to understand and participate in political processes. There is no form of participation that is enhanced when individuals feel unable to understand politics. Feeling that one can make a difference can lead to more active, effective engagement in politics and other areas of social life (Prats and Meunier, 2021^[20]). The more people feel able to understand politics and have their voice heard, the more likely they are to pursue democratic endeavours (Gil de Zúñiga, Diehl and Ardévol-Abreu, 2017^[29]) and the more they trust public institutions and are satisfied with democracies. New Zealand recognises that the young can play an important role in counteracting the political disengagement trend, and has developed initiatives such as the Youth Parliament, parliamentarians travelling to schools over around the country or the “Kids Voting Program”. These initiatives could benefit from other, broader activities that extend beyond civic duties or enrolment to strengthen political interest, such as the mock elections run in Norway (Box 4.6). This would also address most New Zealanders' (83%) claim about the need to include learning about Parliament in the school curriculum.⁵

Box 4.6. Mock Elections and strengthening internal efficacy in Norway

Norwegians display the highest levels of internal political efficacy (i.e. people's own ability to participate in politics) across OECD countries. This can be linked to the fact that Norway is the only country in the world where there is a national framework (and a 70-year tradition) to conduct mock elections in schools.

The exercise includes debates and interaction with party members from youth organisations - every other year, which is held one week before local or parliamentary elections. This familiarises students with the political realm and trains them to be active democratic citizens, which helps perpetuate the democratic system. A study on the impact of political education at schools in Norway showed that mock elections had a positive effect on students' willingness to vote in parliamentary elections (Borge, 2016^[30]).

In addition, comprehensive, regular and representative population surveys, such as the Kiwis Count and the OECD Trust Survey, may facilitate citizen engagement and allow the government to obtain updated feedback on people's perceptions, experiences and evaluations of public governance and services, thus reinforcing vertical accountability beyond votes or electoral periods (OECD, 2022^[31]). This may complement ongoing targeted initiatives that are designed to address specific communities, such as engaging through intermediaries, setting up conversations without a framework, and community leaders' selecting priorities.

4.1.4. Opportunities to improve transparency and achieve meaningful engagement

This section summarizes key results and presents potential policy avenues to improve openness and strengthen public trust

- New Zealand has put in place multiple initiatives to promote openness as an important value of public governance. Indeed, promoting transparency and opening the government to the public has been the cornerstone of the country's successful strategy to tackle the pandemic. In particular, the daily briefings in which the Prime Minister and the Director General of Health directly addressed New Zealanders allowed them to establish trust with their audience through open and honest communication, inspire and motivate audiences, and establish a "duty of care" relationship through inclusive and empathetic communications (Beattie and Priestley, 2021^[32]). It is possible to capitalize on these lessons and improve openness and transparency in the regular functioning of the administration.
- Three-quarters of the population expect information to be easily available, and, indeed, New Zealand has put in place several law and initiatives to this end. Yet, whenever the information is not restricted, there are still challenges for some social groups to a, either because the information is presented in difficult-to-understand bureaucratic language, or because it is not proactively communicated. There is room to promote more proactive disclosure of information.
- In turn, the New Zealand government could go beyond the traditional understanding of transparency towards a new and broader communicational sense, which requires planning of how public information is going to be communicated and anticipating people's needs to better arm them against mis- and disinformation. These plans include extending efforts to use plain language, such as the recently introduced plain language bill; setting goals; targeting audiences and messages; and identifying best channels to reach different population groups
- The news media is the least trusted institution in New Zealand, with only 35% of the population trusting it. The country also fares at the low end of the benchmarking countries in this area. There is room to develop a holistic approach to counter the spread of mis- and disinformation. Ways to do this include promoting diverse, independent and quality media; supporting media and digital literacy; considering transparency requirements and issues related to the business models of social media platforms; and exploring other ways to strengthen the information ecosystem. Any initiatives in this area will need to directly tackle difficult issues such as existing financial incentives social and some conventional media companies to facilitate the spread of misinformation and the potential trade-offs implicit between halting the spread of misinformation and protecting fundamental values such as freedom of speech.
- New Zealand needs also to enhance political representation and proactively reach out to people who feel left behind, preventing participation gaps from becoming structural political inequalities. This will require the country to keep investing in and improving initiatives related to political socialisation and outreach to specific segments of the population, such as the young, the less educated, Māori or citizens from the Pacifica communities. These initiatives should be put in place on a regular basis, beyond specific policies or reforms. Furthermore, even though specific agencies are responsible, results from the exercises should be shared in broad national dialogues and

lessons from the communities' experiences should be made public in a co-ordinated manner, in order to promote institutional inclusion and nation-wide learning.

- Less than half of New Zealanders expect to be consulted on issues affecting their community and only 37% expect that the views expressed by people in public consultations will be adopted. New Zealand should ensure that opportunities for citizens' engagement are meaningful and broad - including instances for deliberation and participation, especially at the local level - so that people perceive a sincere invitation to inclusive policy making. This type of engagement goes beyond the more procedural mentality of consultations, by involving people during early stages of policy making, when problems and potential solutions are being identified, and responding to and using the inputs they provide in the development of regulations.

4.2. Integrity

Public integrity refers to the consistent alignment of, and adherence to, shared ethical values, principles and norms for upholding and prioritising the public interest over private interests in the public sector (OECD, 2017^[33]). Promoting public integrity and preventing corruption is crucial to building people's confidence in government and public institutions. Inversely, corruption implies abusing the trust that has been placed in a public duty. By definition, corruption erodes trust in public institutions. Indeed, research in European countries shows a strong correlation between perceptions of corruption and lower levels of trust (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015^[34]). A recent study of 173 European regions found that the absence of corruption – i.e. citizens expect their public officials to act ethically – was the strongest institutional determinant of citizens' trust in the public administration (Van de Walle and Migchelbrink, 2020^[35]).


The OECD Framework on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions considers integrity in relation to the government's mandate to use powers and public resources ethically, by upholding high standards of behaviour, committing to fight corruption, and promoting accountability. In the case of New Zealand, the survey includes two specific questions on perceptions of petty corruption, as well as political influence (and horizontal accountability among branches of government):

- If a government employee was offered money by a citizen or a firm for speeding up access to a public service, how unlikely or likely do you think it is that they would refuse it?
- If a court is about to make a decision that could negatively impact the government's image, how unlikely or likely do you think it is that the court would make the decision free from political influence?

4.2.1. New Zealand is perceived as society with low levels of corruption

According to major institutions and indexes, New Zealand is one of the least corrupt countries in the world and experts' assessments report that members of the executive or their agents would never, or hardly ever, grant favours in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements.⁶ Law enforcement is effective, institutions and regulations are transparent, and a comprehensive legal framework is in place to combat corruption and sanction corrupt practices (GAN Integrity, 2020^[36]). The country has historically ranked amongst those with the lowest levels of perceived corruption, equalling Denmark and Finland, and around one in two New Zealanders believe that institutions will use power and resources ethically (Figure 4.10).

Figure 4.10. About half of New Zealanders believe that power and resources will be used ethically



Note: Figure presents responses to the question “How much confidence do you have in public institutions to use power ethically” The “confidence” proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale; “neutral” is equal to a response of 5; “No confidence” is the aggregation of responses from 0-4; and “Don't know” was a separate answer choice.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)


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In practice, there are very few corruption cases, and as per regular surveys carried out by the Serious Fraud Office (SFO), they do not seem to have influenced trust. The percentage of people who agree or strongly agree to trust the SFO has increased steadily since 2012, and New Zealand's biggest bribery scandal - the Auckland's Road Maintenance Case, in which six people were charged in relation to alleged corruption - has not affected this figure; on the contrary, it is seen as an exemplary, fairly handled case.

Despite this, results from the OECD Trust Survey show that less than half of survey respondents report believing that courts would act free from political influence (43.9%) (Figure 4.11) and over a quarter the population believe that public employees would accept money offered to speed up access to public services (27%) (Figure 4.12). Although this result still leaves New Zealand below the OECD average-and near the bottom of the OECD for whether a public servant would accept a bribe, it nevertheless contrasts with other sources that provide better assessments about the absence of corruption. This might reflect scepticism about public integrity not picked up elsewhere, but is also difficult to rule out some degree of survey specific bias. Because variables of the integrity dimension, were found to have a statistically significant effect of people's trust in the public service and parliament (Figure 2.18 and 2.19) developing better understanding of this result should be of importance to the New Zealand public service.

Figure 4.11. Less than half of the population expect courts to take decisions free from undue influence

Share of respondents in New Zealand, selected countries and OECD average, 2021




Note: Figure presents the within-country distributions of responses to the question "If a court is about to make a decision that could negatively impact on the government's image, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that the court would make the decision free from political influence?" The "likely" proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale; "neutral" is equal to a response of 5; "unlikely" is the aggregation of responses from 0-4; and "Don't know" was a separate answer choice. Finland and Norway are excluded from the figure as the data was not available. OECD(22) refers to the unweighted average across 22 OECD countries.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)

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Figure 4.12. A third of New Zealanders believe that a public employee would refuse a bribe

Share of respondents in New Zealand, selected countries and OECD average, 2021



Note: Figure presents the within-country distributions of responses to the question "If a public employee were offered money by a citizen or a firm for speeding up access to a public service, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that they would refuse it?". The "Likely accepts a bribe" proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale; "neutral" is equal to a response of 5; "Likely refuses a bribe" is the aggregation of responses from 0-4; and "Don't know" was a separate answer choice. "OECD" presents the unweighted average across countries. Finland's scale ranges from 1-10 and the unlikely / neutral / likely groupings are 1-4 / 5-6 / 7-10. In Norway and Finland, the question was asked in a slightly different way. In Norway, "If a member of the Storting were to be offered a bribe or other benefit in return for exercising their influence on a parliamentary matter, how likely are they to accept it?" and in Finland, "If a parliamentarian were offered a bribe to influence the awarding of a public procurement contract, do you think that he/she would refuse the bribe?". OECD(22) refers to the unweighted average across 22 OECD countries.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)

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These findings could be linked to an uneven distribution of perceptions of risk of undue influence and corruption at the central and local level (further addressed in next section), rather than to broader evaluations of the public service. Indeed, most respondents (61%) of the OECD Trust Survey also reported that the integrity of people working in government strongly influenced their trust in public institutions (Figure 2.4). This may be because New Zealand has a long-established merit-based civil service, and the recent Public Service Act (2020) includes merit-based appointments amongst its five key principles of the public service. Indeed, public employees are recruited based on advertised positions and skills and must adhere in their daily work to core values and standards that guide the public service. This is a fundamental component of any public sector integrity system (Charron, Dahlström and Lapuente, 2016^[37]; Charron et al., 2017^[38]), as a culture of integrity cannot be achieved without a skilled and motivated civil service, committed to the public's interests, and delivering value for money for citizens.

Cynical perceptions on public integrity can be also related to a corruption-focused narrative guiding most of New Zealand's initiatives on the issue. Perhaps because of its high levels of trust as well as low levels of corruption, most of country's efforts have been concentrated on tackling and sanctioning undue behaviour, instead of investing in prevention, such as specific training or risk management of integrity issues. This approach, which has been possible because of a strong culture of ethics and a trust-based public service, is currently turning towards initiatives to preserve and strengthen integrity.

According to OECD's Recommendation on Public Integrity, providing training to build capacities and equip public officials to manage integrity issues that may appear in their daily work is crucial to reinforce a culture of integrity. In this regard, relevant training experiences from OECD countries - in terms of timing, target, frequency, etc. - could be useful to take into account in New Zealand (Box 4.7).

Box 4.7. Integrity training experiences in OECD countries

Austrian's Advance training course on Corruption related issues

The Federal Bureau of Anticorruption (BAK) in Austria put in place advanced training courses on all corruption-related topics, exploring the psychological background of the corruption phenomenon and addressing the possibilities of general and individual corruption prevention. The courses make references to the whole legal framework and are intended to be accompanied by a course book with a theoretical but also very practical approach, including generally applicable teaching content as well as specific innovations in research on corruption.

Explicit attention has been paid to enabling readers to concretely apply the content to themselves and their organisational units: readers can answer specific guiding questions and evaluate them using a scoring system. Based on the score obtained, the book offers ready-made solutions for preventing and combating corruption. Furthermore, the BAK course book contains case studies on corruption with practical solutions to prevent the (real) cases described, aiming to reinforce readers' own room for manoeuvre.

Ethics training in Flanders, Belgium

The Flemish Agency for Government Employees provides public officials with practical training that is not focused on the traditional communication of dispositions and guidelines, but instead presents dilemmas officials may face in their daily activities. Public officials are given practical situations in which they confront an ethical choice and where it is not clear how they might resolve the situation with integrity. The facilitator encourages discussion among the participants about how the situation could be resolved in order to explore the different choices. The debate over the possible courses of action, rather than the solution, is the most important element, as it helps participants to identify different opposing

values. Based on objectives and targets of specific groups or entities, the dilemmas presented could cover the themes of conflicts of interest, ethics, loyalty or leadership, among others

Source: Annual Report 2020, Federal Bureau of Anticorruption, Ministry of Interior, https://www.bak.gv.at/en/Downloads/files/Annual_Reports/BAK_Jahresbericht_2020_ENG_converted.pdf; (OECD, 2019^[39])

Additionally, including integrity aspects in risk management could be relevant to support New Zealand's changes. Internal control and risk management policies reduce the vulnerability of public sector organisations to fraud and corruption, while ensuring that governments are operating optimally to deliver programmes that benefit citizens (OECD, 2020^[40]). Efforts to audit and monitor different agencies could be strengthened by embedding integrity objectives into existing internal control and risk management policies and practices, informing risk definition with updated evidence (e.g. by regular surveys), and by identifying high-risks areas, as many OECD countries do (Box 4.8).

Box 4.8. Estonia's approach to integrity risks and control

The Estonian government's 2013-2020 Anti-Corruption Strategy recognised shortcomings in specific domains related to corruption prevention and risk mitigation, and recommended actions to remedy these challenges, stipulating that the ministry responsible for the specific area in question (e.g. health or the environment) should also be responsible for implementing subject-specific corruption prevention measures.

To target high-risk areas, the government of Estonia established domain-specific anti-corruption networks. Each ministry has a corruption prevention co-ordinator who is meant to manage the implementation of the anti-corruption policy in the relevant ministry and its area of government. The co-ordinators form the anti-corruption network – the network convenes annually around four to five times. The network also includes representatives from police, civil society, parliament, the state audit office and other stakeholders who are invited, depending on the topic chosen. There is also a network of healthcare authorities to discuss developments in their respective areas, as well as issues to resolve.

Source: (OECD, 2020^[40])


4.2.2. There are concerns regarding personal networks and unbalanced influence of some interests over the public good

Beyond corrupt practices that are criminalised and sanctioned, such as active and passive bribery, there are other, more subtle activities that are not necessarily illegal but may steer public decision making away from the public interest. These may include using personal connections to influence policy, or providing decision makers with biased or manipulated data, for example.

According to a report prepared by the Institute of Governance and Policy Studies at Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand may suffer from 'cosy-ism', defined as a high degree of overly cosy relationships between members of a small society (Rashbrooke, 2017^[41]). This implies that close relationships built by educational, cultural and political socialisation may influence (and bias) political decisions and appointments, translating economic or educational disparities into unequal opportunities and power over politics. Indeed, evidence from the OECD Trust Survey shows that only 29% of respondents reporting the lowest levels of education believe courts would make decisions free from political influence, and the percentage increases to 52% among those with highest levels of education (Figure 4.13).

Figure 4.13. Vulnerable groups perceive integrity of political courts negatively

Share of respondents in New Zealand, 2021




Note: Figure presents the responses to the question "If a court is about to make a decision that could negatively impact on the government's image, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that the court would make the decision free from political influence?" The "likely" proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale. "NZL mean" presents the weighted average across all respondents in New Zealand. Top 25% and bottom 25% refers to the income distribution based on household's total gross annual income of 2021, before tax and deductions, but including benefits/allowances. High education is defined as the ISCED 2011 education levels 5-8, i.e. university-level degrees such as Bachelors, Masters or PhD, and low education refers to less than a completed upper secondary degree. * means that differences in proportions are statistically significant at the 90% significance level; ** means that differences are statistically significant at the 95% level; *** means that differences are statistically significant at the 99% level. Reference group in light blue.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)

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Figure 4.14. Respondents with relationships in the public sector have positive views on integrity

Share of respondents in New Zealand, 2021



Note: Figure presents the responses to the question "If a public employee were offered money by a citizen or a firm for speeding up access to a public service, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that they would refuse it?" The "likely" proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale. "NZL mean" presents the weighted average across all respondents in New Zealand. Top 25% and bottom 25% refers to the income distribution based on household's total gross annual income of 2021, before tax and deductions, but including benefits/allowances. High education is defined as the ISCED 2011 education levels 5-8, i.e. university-level degrees such as Bachelors, Masters or PhD, and low education refers to less than a completed upper secondary degree. * means that differences in proportions are statistically significant at the 90% significance level; ** means that differences are statistically significant at the 95% level; *** means that differences are statistically significant at the 99% level. Reference group in light blue.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)

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In addition, 37% of respondents from the OECD Trust Survey have family members or friends who work or have worked in the public sector. Not surprisingly, those who reported to have a closer connection with the public sector are also those who present better integrity perceptions (Figure 4.14). Although half of New Zealanders are confident that institutions would use power or resources ethically, one in three (34%) reported cynical expectations about government institutions acting in the best interest of all.

Taking into consideration the above, New Zealand could pursue some initiatives to ensure policies are made in the public interest, and to preserve the integrity of interaction and stakeholder engagement during policy making, accompanied with proper communication of these initiatives. These include requiring disclosure of stakeholders' names and the activities they carry out if they intend to influence policies or requiring parliamentarians to make their agendas transparent and open to the public. Furthermore, New Zealand could reopen discussions on developing lobbying regulations, currently inexistent. Such dialogue should be open to the broader society and consider different concerns, challenges and interests, following the example of discussions carried out by Ireland when designing its lobbying regulations (Box 4.9).

Box 4.9. Ireland regulations on Lobbying

The Irish regulations on lobbying were developed informed by a wide consultation process that gathered opinions on its design, structure and implementation, based on OECD Recommendation on Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying.

2015 Regulation of Lobbying Act is simple and comprehensive: any individual, company or NGO that seeks to directly or indirectly influence officials on a policy issue must list themselves on a public register and disclose any lobbying activity. The rules cover any meeting with high-level public officials, as well as letters, emails or tweets intended to influence policy.

According to regulation a lobbyist is anyone who employs more than 10 individuals, works for an advocacy body, is a professional paid by a client to communicate on someone else's behalf or is communicating about land development is required to register themselves and the lobbying activities they carry out.

In addition to the law, on 28th November 2018, the Standards in Public Office Commission launched its Code of Conduct for persons carrying on lobbying activities. It has come into effect on 1st January 2019, and will be reviewed every three years.

Source: Regulation of Lobbying Act and website <https://www.lobbying.ie/>

In addition, in interviews conducted for this study, it was highlighted that concerns about personal networks and policy outcomes were higher with respect to institutions at the local level. Subnational units and institutions are not necessarily affected by central government integrity policies and initiatives; moreover, officials may not be sufficiently trained to identify and prevent undue practices. In this regard, it could be relevant to consider establishing a Public Service Commissioner for the local level, responsible for ensuring coherence with national integrity efforts and policies, as well as for dealing with integrity issues at the local level. A good example that could be a relevant starting point is the experience of the French integrity advisors (Box 4.10).

Box 4.10. Integrity advisors in France

According to French regulations (Law on Ethics and the Rights and Obligations of Civil Servants, 2016) every public official has the right to access to integrity advice, and every public organisation is required to appoint an ethics officer (*référént déontologue*). These ethics officers have the mission to advise civil servants on questions they may have regarding their integrity obligations in the course of their duties. This requirement has also spread to other levels of government, with an increasing trend of ethics officer appointments in regions and major French cities.

The *référént déontologue* of the territorial civil service management centre of the Rhône and Lyon métropole published its first activity report in May 2019 highlighting trends in advice and guidance provided to public officials. Guidance recalls for instance in which cases a secondary activity can be pursued and how to proceed in such cases, and reasons why a future private function may impact the functioning of the former organisation and services if the functions are close to the ones that were performed by the public official. A selection of anonymised cases is annexed to the report. It is worth noting that this ethics officer also acts as a whistleblowing focal point for the same jurisdiction.

Source: (OECD, 2020^[40])

Perceptions of vested interests influencing politics also extend to political finance (Transparency International NZL, 2019^[42]). Democracy and politics need money to survive. However, if funding is not regulated, it can unbalance political competition and generate or exacerbate inequalities. According to a survey carried out by the Institute for Governance and Policy Studies, only one out of four New Zealanders trust the way in which political parties are funded (Chapple and Anderson, 2021^[43]), and there are some rules regarding reporting and monitoring that need to be better defined. In New Zealand, there is no ban on donations from foreign interests or from companies with ongoing contracts with the government. In turn, not all donors are required to report on their donations to political campaigns (IDEA, 2022^[44]). Unregulated political finance presents clear risks related to funding sources and its legal status, as well as loopholes in regulations could leave room to privilege private interests biasing political competition. In this regard, experiences aiming to make political finance more transparent and easy to monitor can be relevant to consider and implement in the country (Box 4.11). (Transparency International NZL, 2019^[42]) (IDEA, 2022^[44])

Box 4.11. Transparency and accessible information on political finance in the United States

The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) obliges political committees to submit financial reports to the Federal Election Commission (FEC), which in turn makes them publicly available in person at the FEC offices in Washington, DC or online. The FEC has developed detailed standard forms to be used, requiring, among other things, precise information concerning contributions, donors, disbursements and receivers. All contributions to federal candidates are aggregated based on an election cycle, which begins on the first day following the date of the previous general election and ends on the election day, whereas contributions to political parties and other political committees are aggregated on a calendar year basis.

The intensity of the reporting may differ. For example, a national party committee is obliged to file monthly reports in both election and non-election years; a principal campaign committee of a congressional candidate must file a financial report 12 days before and another report 30 days after the election in addition to quarterly reports every year. The FECA prescribes that the financial reports are to be made public within 48 hours; however, in most cases, the FEC manages to make reports available online within 24 hours.

Source: Federal Election Commission, www.fec.gov/

4.2.3. Opportunities to reinforce the integrity system

This section summarizes key results and presents potential policy avenues to improve integrity and strengthen public trust.

- Public service and public officials in New Zealand are generally perceived as being honest and devoted to the public interest. They work on a trust basis and follow high standards of behaviour that are historically and culturally rooted. However, there is room to improve and better preserve integrity as a guiding principle and foundation of the public administration. New Zealand could also continue to take a more preventive integrity approach, investing more in training beyond awareness-raising, and including integrity elements in risk management and internal control. These efforts could be part of a comprehensive national integrity strategy, co-ordinated at the central government, but accompanied by integrity initiatives at the local level, aiming to bridge gaps and avoid legal loopholes.
- In addition, to improve perceptions of political integrity and shield public policies from undue influence, New Zealand could reopen discussion on developing lobbying regulations, as well as tighten political finance laws by defining clearer targets and broadening the scope of transparency requirements and bans. There is also a need to examine how potential conflicts of interest are managed at the local government level where personal links may influence resource management decisions. While these links are inevitable in a small country, approaches to managing them more transparently could enhance perceived integrity.

4.3. Fairness

While no individual value can summarise an entire society, it is commonly noted that the notion of “fairness” plays a similar role in New Zealand society to that played by “freedom” in the United States or the trio of “liberté, égalité, fraternité” in France (Fischer, 2012^[45]; Levine, 2022^[46]). This is reflected both in popular culture and in civil society. In popular culture, the phrase “fair enough” is a common response in conversation. New Zealand’s second-longest running television show is “Fair Go” (first aired, 1977) which focuses on investigative journalism and consumer affairs. At the more formal level, the 1985 Royal Commission on the Electoral System listed fairness as the first of 10 criteria for evaluating electoral systems, while the Inland Revenue Department (responsible for tax) uses the phrase “it’s our job to be fair”.

Perhaps influenced by the focus on fairness, and perhaps also reflecting how New Zealand’s national narrative has evolved, many of the main historical milestones celebrated in New Zealand can be linked to the idea of fairness. The Treaty of Waitangi – New Zealand’s founding document signed in 1840 – can be seen in terms of fair treatment by the British Crown establishing that Māori have the rights and privileges of British subjects (article 3) and equal protection of Māori property rights (article 2), although differences in English and Māori versions and their interpretation may have blurred that sense of fairness. In turn, New Zealand celebrates its status as the first self-governing country in the world to grant women the vote in 1893, a milestone in political fairness.

Achieving fairness remains a crucial issue, as disposable income inequality in New Zealand is higher than the OECD average despite market income inequality being around the OECD average, owing to below-average redistribution through taxes and transfers (OECD, 2022^[47]). Progressing towards an even fairer society requires redressing structural trends affecting vulnerable groups, in particular as the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic in these groups are still not fully visible.

The OECD framework on the drivers of trust defines fairness as having two components: improving living conditions for all and providing consistent treatment to people and business regardless of their background and identity. To capture aspects of fairness, the survey implemented in New Zealand included three questions on the fairness dimension:


- If you or a member of your family apply for a government benefit or service (e.g. unemployment benefits or other forms of income support), how unlikely or likely do you think it is that your application would be treated fairly?
- If a government employee interacts with the public in your area, how unlikely or likely do you think it is that they would treat all people equally regardless of their gender, sexual identity, ethnicity, or country of origin?
- If a government employee has contact with the public in the area where you live, how unlikely or likely is it that they would treat both rich and poor people equally?

4.3.1. Despite high levels of institutional trust, New Zealanders have mixed views on the fairness of institutions

Compared to similar OECD countries, perceptions of the likelihood of fair treatment from public institutions in New Zealand is around the OECD average. Figure 4.15 shows that the proportion of people believing that it is likely that someone applying for a government service or benefit would be treated fairly is below that for Ireland, the Netherlands, Canada, or Great Britain, although higher than for Denmark, Norway, Australia, or Sweden. At first glance, this might suggest that fairness should be an area of at least some concern for New Zealand government institutions. However, some care should be applied when interpreting the data. In particular, of the four countries in the chart with levels of institutional trust similar to or better than New Zealand, three report lower levels of perceived fairness (Denmark, Norway, Sweden). One interpretation of this otherwise counter-intuitive result is that countries with higher expectations of fairness from government institutions both judge institutional performance more harshly, but also generally have more trustworthy institutions as a result.

Figure 4.15. A majority expects to be treated fairly

Share of respondents who indicate different levels of perceived likelihood that application for government services or benefits would be treated fairly in New Zealand, selected countries and OECD average (on a 0-10 scale), 2021



Note: Figure presents the within-country distributions of responses to the question “If you or a member of your family would apply for a government benefit or service (e.g. unemployment benefits or other forms of income support), how likely or unlikely do you think it is that your application would be treated fairly?”. The “likely” proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale; “neutral” is equal to a response of 5; “unlikely” is the aggregation of responses from 0-4; and “Don't know” was a separate answer choice. In Norway, the question was formulated in a slightly different way. Finland is excluded from the figure as the data were not available. OECD(22) refers to the unweighted average across 22 OECD countries.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)



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Figure 4.16 looks at how the perceived likelihood that someone applying for a government service or benefit would be treated unfairly varies across different demographic groups. While there is some variation in perceived fairness across age groups (with younger age groups being less likely to expect fair behaviour) and income (with low and middle income groups being less likely to expect fair behaviour) the largest differences in expectations of fairness are among different ethnic groups. People identifying as Māori or Pacific are much less likely to indicate that they believe an application for government benefits or services would be treated fairly. Interestingly perceptions of fairness are lower among the Pacific population (43%) than for Māori (49%). At the other extreme, Asian New Zealanders are more likely than other population groups to hold expectations of fair treatment (69%).

Figure 4.16. Perceived likelihood that application for government services or benefits would be treated fairly is lower among the young, women, Māori and Pacific communities

Share of respondents in New Zealand, 2021



Note: Figure presents the distributions of responses to the question “If you or a member of your family would apply for a government benefit or service (e.g. unemployment benefits or other forms of income support), how likely or unlikely do you think it is that your application would be treated fairly?” The “likely” proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale. “NZL mean” presents the weighted average across all respondents in New Zealand. Top 25% and bottom 25% refers to the income distribution based on household’s total gross annual income of 2021, before tax and deductions, but including benefits/allowances. High education is defined as the ISCED 2011 education levels 5-8, i.e. university-level degrees such as Bachelors, Masters or PhD, and low education refers to less than a completed upper secondary degree. * means that differences in proportions are statistically significant at the 90% significance level; ** means that differences are statistically significant at the 95% level; *** means that differences are statistically significant at the 99% level. Reference group in light blue.


Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)

StatLink  <https://stat.link/uyszfn>


Information on people’s experience of discrimination has been collected in New Zealand since 2008 as part of Statistics New Zealand’s wider collection of well-being measures. This information can be triangulated against the information from the OECD Trust Survey presented above to help understand perceived fairness. Generally, the picture of experienced discrimination in Figure 4.17 below is consistent with the patterns in Figure 4.16. Experience of discrimination decreases with age after the mid-30s and is higher for women than for men. Māori and Pacific people are more likely to have experienced discrimination than New Zealand Europeans. The main difference between the two data sources is that Asian New Zealanders are more likely to report having experienced discrimination than New Zealand Europeans but also are more likely to report an expectation of fair treatment. This might reflect different experiences across different ethnic groups as to the source of experienced discrimination as the survey question captures discrimination across a wide range of contexts, including both government agencies and wider social interactions.

Figure 4.17. Experience of discrimination is higher among women, people aged 25-34 and unemployed people

Proportion of the population reporting having experienced discrimination in the past 12 months by population sub-groups, 2021




Source: Statistics New Zealand

StatLink  <https://stat.link/dy4rqc>

One theme that emerges from both Figure 4.16 and Figure 4.17 is the important role of socio-economic factors in experiences of discrimination and in perceptions of fairness. Low- and middle-income New Zealanders are less likely to expect fair treatment in applying for government services or benefits, while unemployed New Zealanders are much more likely to have experienced discrimination (29.4%) than full time employees (18.1%) or people not in the labour force (14.5%) (Figure 4.19), which show the proportion of people who expect that a public employee would treat people equally regardless of their gender orientation, ethnicity, or income. In contrast to general expectations of fair treatment presented in Figure 4.15, where New Zealand sits in the middle of comparable countries, New Zealand performs near the bottom of the same group for expectations of equal treatment for socioeconomic characteristics or income (although still near the middle of the OECD overall). Although Great Britain, Norway, and Australia rank lower than New Zealand when it comes to treatment based on income, the gap between New Zealand and these countries is small, while the gap between New Zealand and the top-performing countries – Denmark and the Netherlands – is large (more than 10 percentage points). A similar pattern is observed for perceived unequal treatment based on other characteristics such as gender orientation or ethnicity.

Figure 4.18. Half of the respondents believe in equal treatment of public employees

Share of respondents who indicate different levels of perceived likelihood that a public employee would treat people of different gender, ethnicity or sexual orientation equally in New Zealand, selected countries and OECD average (on a 0-10 scale), 2021




Note: Figure presents the within-country distributions of responses to the question “If a government employee interacts with the public in your area, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that they would treat all people equally regardless of their gender, sexual identity, ethnicity or country of origin? “. The “likely” proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale; “neutral” is equal to a response of 5; “unlikely” is the aggregation of responses from 0-4; and “Don't know” was a separate answer choice. In Norway, the question was formulated in a slightly different way. OECD(22) refers to the unweighted average across 22 OECD countries.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)

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Figure 4.19. Even fewer people believe in equal treatment regardless of socioeconomic status

Share of respondents who indicate different levels of perceived likelihood that a public employee would treat both rich and poor people equally in New Zealand, selected countries and OECD average (on a 0-10 scale), 2021



Note: Figure presents the within-country distributions of responses to the question “If a public employee has contact with the public in the area where you live, how likely or unlikely is it that they would treat both rich and poor people equally?”. The “likely” proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale; “neutral” is equal to a response of 5; “unlikely” is the aggregation of responses from 0-4; and “Don't know” was a separate answer choice. “OECD” presents the unweighted average across countries. In Norway, the question was formulated in a slightly different way. Finland is excluded from the figure as the data were not available. OECD(22) refers to the unweighted average across 22 OECD countries.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)

StatLink <https://stat.link/cz0gm4>

Although fairness is of fundamental importance to New Zealanders, according to the econometric analysis presented in Chapter 2, fairness has a smaller relative effect as driver of differences in trust within the New Zealand population when compared to other issues such as openness, responsiveness, and reliability. Questions relating to fairness had little impact on trust in the public service or Parliament. In fact, local government was the only institution for which fairness showed up as an important driver of trust (Figure 2.20). Improvements in whether people expect public employees to treat rich and poor people equally could result in improvements in trust of up to 5.5 percentage points. The ongoing process for reviewing the roles of local government could consider mechanisms for ensuring consistent treatment of different population groups, including through proactive engagement with those who may feel excluded.


The relative lack of impact of fairness on trust in the public service and Parliament may be due to a number of different causes. Given the proportion of New Zealanders reporting experience of discrimination, it is unlikely to be due to a lack of experience of unfairness. Instead, two alternative hypotheses present themselves. First, it may be that, in addition to those asked in the survey, there are ways in which unfairness is experienced in New Zealand. Alternatively, it might simply be that there is more variation in other aspects of institutional performance in New Zealand – openness, responsiveness, reliability, service quality – and that peoples’ experiences in these areas dominate the impact of fairness on levels of institutional trust.

4.3.2. The public service has significantly improved in terms of diversity but this may not be addressing important drivers of trust

Absence of discrimination in the provision of services is essential to build trust towards institutions in a diverse society. Having diverse groups of people in public life, including the young and elderly, those living farther away from the capital or other large city, women, and citizens with a migrant background, will lead to more responsive policy making, and increased perceptions of fairness (Nolan-Flecha, 2019^[48]) (OECD, 2020^[49]). A key focus for the public service in addressing this has been to improve the diversity of the public service generally and staff in senior positions. Figure 4.20 shows that, while representation for Māori in the public service is very close to the proportion of Māori in the working age population across both the public service as a whole and among managers, this is not the case for other population groups. The Pacific and Middle East and Latin America (MELA) groups are proportionately represented in the public service as a whole (more than proportionately in the case of the Pacific group) but are under-represented at management levels. Asian New Zealanders, by way of contrast, are under-represented in both groups.

Figure 4.20. Representation of ethnic groups in the public service varies

Percentage of total population compared to percentage of public service staff and public service managers by ethnic group, 2021



Source: Statistics New Zealand population projections (2022) and Public Service Commission workforce data (2021)

StatLink  <https://stat.link/49tfcj>

In fact, the picture presented in Figure 4.20 above probably underestimates the success of the Public Service in pursuing ethnic diversity goals but may overstate fairness gains more generally. Over the previous two decades, New Zealand's Asian and Middle East and Latin America populations have been growing rapidly, creating a moving target for the public service to pursue. For example, between 2013 and 2018, the proportion of New Zealanders of Asian ethnicity increased from 12.2% of the population to 15.7%. Over the period from 2016 to 2020, the proportion of people in the public service of Asian ethnicity increased from 8.9% to 11.6%.

Despite relatively rapid changes in the ethnic composition of the public service at all levels, there is less evidence that the public service is effective at creating a wider sense of fairness among groups that report facing discrimination. For example, despite Māori having good representation within the public service – including at managerial levels – perceived average discrimination remains high among Māori and levels of institutional trust tend to be lower than for other population groups. In contrast, despite a larger gap in representation, Asian New Zealanders report lower levels of discrimination than Māori and have higher levels of institutional trust. The causes of this are various but are likely to be linked both to higher levels of socio-economic disadvantage among Māori and the persistent effect of historic grievances. Efforts to build and strengthen a diverse and representative public service should be maintained and are likely to be a necessary condition for high levels of institutional trust. Further improvements in this area, however, are unlikely to be sufficient in themselves to significantly increase trust.

In terms of gender representation, New Zealand has made remarkable progress both at the political and administrative levels. The share of women in managerial positions in the public service increased from 39.% in 2011 to 53.5% in 2021 (Public Service Commission, 2021). In addition, in 2022, slightly more than half (50.4%) of parliamentarians in New Zealand are women, consolidating New Zealand as the OECD leading country in this indicator (IPU, 2022).


4.3.3. Tackling child poverty would be crucial for maintaining high levels of trust in New Zealand

The second component of the fairness definition in the OECD framework on the drivers of trust refers to improving living conditions for all. 45% of New Zealanders are confident that government institutions will improve socio-economic conditions for all (Figure 4.21). Only 25% indicated they did not have confidence. This question was not asked in other OECD countries, so comparative data is not available.

A striking issue where New Zealand fares comparatively high and with the potential of replicating inequalities over time is child poverty.

Figure 4.21. Around half of New Zealanders are confident that government institutions will improve socio-economic conditions for all

Share of respondents in New Zealand, 2021



Note: Figure presents responses to the question “How much confidence do you have in government institutions to: Improve socio economic conditions for all” The “confidence” proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale; “neutral” is equal to a response of 5; “No confidence” is the aggregation of responses from 0-4; and “Don't know” was a separate answer choice.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)


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A continued focus on tackling child poverty will be crucial to achieve fairness and strengthen trust, especially among Māori and Pacifica groups. Income inequality in New Zealand, after accounting for both taxes and benefits, is slightly above the OECD average (Figure 4.22, panel A). The relative poverty rate, measured as the proportion of people with less than 50% of median income, is also similar to the OECD average (Figure 4.22, panel B). However, child poverty remains high by OECD standards. Prior to the pandemic, the child poverty rate (16.9%) was substantively higher than the OECD average (13.0%). Moreover, it was concentrated in Māori (19.6%) and Pacific (21.2%) communities (Figure 4.22, panel C). As already noted above, Māori and Pacific have lower levels of trust in public institutions than other groups in New Zealand. Addressing child poverty is one of the multiple avenues that can be pursued to help improve trust among these groups.

It should be noted that reducing child poverty is a key welfare target in New Zealand, and that data suggests it has been declining. The most recent figures, from June 2021, indicate that 2 of 3 of the three key

government measures of the number of children in poverty declined during the COVID pandemic (Figure 4.22). However, caution must be used in interpreting these figures, due to their timing. They may not necessarily fully account for the full economic impact of the pandemic. They may also be affected by COVID responses active at the time, and do not take into account benefit increases in the 2021 budget.

Figure 4.22. Income inequality is above the OECD average and child poverty is high



Source: (OECD, 2022^[47]), see figure 1.27

4.3.4. Opportunities to preserve and strengthen fairness

This section summarizes key results and presents potential policy avenues to improve fairness and strengthen public trust.

- Fairness is a core value of New Zealand society. 42% of New Zealanders expect that public employees would treat rich and poor people differently (38% on average in OECD countries). Perceptions of discrimination are higher for Māori, the unemployed, women and some of the younger cohorts. Proactively seeking engagement with these groups, particularly at the local level, and ensuring that there are specific spaces and channels to communicate with them can help enhance fairness perceptions and, in turn, strengthen trust. Deliberative processes, particularly at the local level and in regions farther away from main cities, could be an effective engagement tool.

- Important efforts have been made to ensure a diverse workforce. Māori representation in public employment is close to proportionate across the total public sector (16.4% of public servants as opposed to 16.7% of the population) and lags only a little in terms of staff in management positions (15.8% in 2021 compared to 14.8% in 2017). The Pacific population is well represented in the total public sector (10.2% of public servants as opposed to 8.3% of the population) but is under-represented at the level of management (6.5%). The Asian and MELA population groups are currently under-represented in the public service but the proportion of public servants in these groups has been growing strongly over the last decade relative to other groups.
- There is a balanced representation of women in the administration, including at the managerial level, and New Zealand is the top OECD performer on gender equality at the political level. There is room to improve the representation, at senior levels, of population groups such as people identifying as Pacific or of Asian background and people from the Middle East. Efforts to build a diverse public workforce should be maintained as a necessary condition to strengthen public trust and a wider range of population groups beyond ethnic identification and gender should be considered

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Notes

¹ Transparency refers to stakeholder access to, and use of, public information and data concerning the entire public decision-making process, including policies, initiatives, salaries, meeting agendas and minutes, budget allocations and spending, etc. Information and data disclosed should serve a purpose and meet citizens' needs.

² Excluding appointments and honours papers. Cabinet and committee papers are to be released and published online, with the approval of the relevant portfolio minister, no later than 30 business days after final Cabinet decisions have been made unless there is good reason not to publish all or part of the material, or to delay the release. The normal assessments for releasing official information, and a due diligence process to consider potential liability that might arise from publication, must occur prior to proactive release.

³ Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem Project), *Transparent Laws with Predictable Enforcement*, 2021.

⁴ Only one in three New Zealanders reported to have little knowledge about how central government works, but this proportion is bigger among the young, the less educated, Māori and people from Pacific communities.

⁵ New Zealand's Survey on Parliamentary Engagement (December 2021).

⁶ As part of the Varieties of Democracy Project, experts are asked *How routinely do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government, and cabinet ministers), or their agents, grant favours in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements?* Responses may rate between 0 (It is routine and expected) to 4 (1: It never, or hardly ever, happens).


Annex A. Complementary figures on comparative levels of trust

Trust in Public Institutions in New Zealand

This Annex shows the level of trust in public institutions in New Zealand in comparison to Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden for all public institutions not referenced in the report.

Figure A.1. Trust in the local government

Share of respondents who indicate trust in the local government in New Zealand, selected countries and OECD average, 2021



Note: Figure presents responses to the question “On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust the local government?”. In New Zealand, the question was formulated as local government councillors. The “trust” proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale; “neutral” is equal to a response of 5; “do not trust” is the aggregation of responses from 0-4; and “Don’t know” was a separate answer choice. OECD(22) refers to the unweighted average across 22 OECD countries.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)



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Figure A.2. Trust in the police

Share of respondents who indicate trust in the police in New Zealand, selected countries and OECD average, 2021




Note: Figure presents responses to the question “On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust the police?” The “trust” proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale; “neutral” is equal to a response of 5; “do not trust” is the aggregation of responses from 0-4; and “Don't know” was a separate answer choice. OECD(22) refers to the unweighted average across 22 OECD countries.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)

StatLink  <https://stat.link/fj2d1v>

Figure A.3. Trust in courts and legal system

Share of respondents who indicate trust in the courts and legal system in New Zealand, selected countries and OECD average, 2021




Note: Figure presents responses to the question “On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust the courts and legal system?” The “trust” proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale; “neutral” is equal to a response of 5; “do not trust” is the aggregation of responses from 0-4; and “Don't know” was a separate answer choice. OECD(22) refers to the unweighted average across 22 OECD countries.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)

StatLink  <https://stat.link/myc6ne>


Figure A.4. Trust in international organizations

Share of respondents who indicate trust in international organizations in New Zealand, selected countries and OECD average, 2021



Note: Figure presents responses to the question "On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust the international organizations?" The "trust" proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale; "neutral" is equal to a response of 5; "do not trust" is the aggregation of responses from 0-4; and "Don't know" was a separate answer choice. OECD(22) refers to the unweighted average across 22 OECD countries.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)

StatLink  <https://stat.link/leuf5w>

Annex B. Comparison OECD Trust Survey and New Zealand Survey

Differences between the OECD Trust Survey and Survey Questionnaire implemented in New Zealand

This Annex provides an overview on the survey questions adapted from the OECD Trust Survey and it specifies survey questions added specifically for New Zealand. Data in New Zealand was collected between the 8th and 24th of February 2022.

For more detailed information and comparison with the OECD Trust Survey please find the survey method document at <http://oe.cd/trust>.

Category	Survey Question - OECD TRUST SURVEY 2021	New Zealand vs. OECD Trust Survey
Trust levels	To start with, a general question about trust. On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, in general how much do you trust most people?	same
Trust levels	On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust each of the following? The national government	missing
Trust levels	On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust each of the following? The local government	same
Trust levels	On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust each of the following? The [parliament/congress]	same
Trust levels	On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust each of the following? The political parties	missing
Trust levels	On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust each of the following? The police	same
Trust levels	On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust each of the following? The civil service (non-elected government employees at central or local levels of government)	same
Trust levels	On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust each of the following? The news media	same
Trust levels	On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust each of the following? The courts and legal system	same
Trust levels	On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust each of the following? International organisations	same
Integrity	If a high-level politician was offered the prospect of a well-paid job in the private sector in exchange for a political favour, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that they would refuse it?	missing
Integrity	If a court is about to make a decision that could negatively impact on the government's image, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that the court would make the decision free from political influence?	same

Integrity	If a public employee were offered money by a citizen or a firm for speeding up access to a public service, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that they would refuse it?	same
Responsiveness	If many people complained about a public service that is working badly, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that it would be improved?	same
Responsiveness	If there is an innovative idea that could improve a public service, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that it would be adopted by the responsible [public agency/office]?	same
Responsiveness	If over half of the people clearly express a view against a national policy, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that would be changed?	same
Reliability	If a new serious contagious disease spreads, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that government institutions will be prepared to protect people's life?	same
Reliability	If you share your personal data with a [public agency/office], how likely or unlikely do you think it is that it would be exclusively used for legitimate purposes?	same
Reliability	How likely or unlikely do you think it is that the business conditions that the government can influence (e.g. laws and regulations businesses need to comply with) will be stable and predictable?	same
Openness	If a decision affecting your community is to be made by the local government, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that you would have an opportunity to voice your views?	same
Openness	If you need information about an administrative procedure (for example obtaining a passport, applying for benefits, etc.), how likely or unlikely do you think it is that the information would be easily available?	same
Openness	If you participate in a public consultation on reforming a major policy area (e.g. taxation, healthcare, environmental protection), how likely or unlikely do you think it is that the government would adopt the opinions expressed in the public consultation?	same
Fairness	If a public employee has contact with the public in the area where you live, how likely or unlikely is it that they would treat both rich and poor people equally?	same
Fairness	If a government employee interacts with the public in your area, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that they would treat all people equally regardless of their gender, sexual identity, ethnicity or country of origin?	same
Fairness	If you or a member of your family would apply for a government benefit or service (e.g. unemployment benefits or other forms of income support), how likely or unlikely do you think it is that your application would be treated fairly?	same
Satisfaction with services	On a scale of 0 to 10, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the <u>education system</u> in \$COUNTRY as a whole?	same
Satisfaction with services	On a scale of 0 to 10, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the <u>healthcare system</u> in \$COUNTRY as a whole?	same
Satisfaction with services	On a scale of 0 to 10, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the <u>quality of administrative services</u> (e.g. applying for an ID or a certificate of birth, death, marriage or divorce)	same
Satisfaction with services	In the last 2 years, have you or any children you have been enrolled in an educational institution in \$COUNTRY?	same
Satisfaction with services	In the last 12 months, have you or somebody in your household had a direct experience with the healthcare system in \$COUNTRY?	same
Political participation	How confident are you in your own ability to participate in politics?	missing

Political participation	How much would you say the political system in \$COUNTRY allows people like you to have a say in what the government does?	same
Political participation	Over the last 12 months, have you done any of the following activities? Please tick all that apply. Voted in last local or municipal election (if there were any)	same
Political participation	Over the last 12 months, have you done any of the following activities? Please tick all that apply. Contacted a politician, government or local government official	same
Political participation	Over the last 12 months, have you done any of the following activities? Please tick all that apply. Attended a meeting of a trade union, political party or political action group	missing
Political participation	Over the last 12 months, have you done any of the following activities? Please tick all that apply. Participated in a Citizen Assembly, Citizen Dialogue or Citizen Jury	missing
Political participation	Over the last 12 months, have you done any of the following activities? Please tick all that apply. Provided input or feedback on government policy, law or document	missing
Political participation	Over the last 12 months, have you done any of the following activities? Please tick all that apply. Worn or displayed a campaign badge or sticker	missing
Political participation	Over the last 12 months, have you done any of the following activities? Please tick all that apply. Taken part in a public demonstration	same
Political participation	Over the last 12 months, have you done any of the following activities? Please tick all that apply. Signed a petition, including an e-mail or online petition	same
Political participation	Over the last 12 months, have you done any of the following activities? Please tick all that apply. Posted or forwarded political content on social media	missing
Political participation	Over the last 12 months, have you done any of the following activities? Please tick all that apply. Boycotted certain products for political reasons	missing
Political participation	Over the last 12 months, have you done any of the following activities? Please tick all that apply. None of these	same
Political participation	Over the last 12 months, have you done any of the following activities? Please tick all that apply. Prefer not to answer	same
Political participation	Did you vote in the last national election?	same
Political participation	Is the party you voted for in the last national election (or would have voted for if you didn't vote) currently part of the government?	missing
Political participation	On the following issues, do you think the government should be prioritising them more, about the same, or less? Providing equal opportunities for all in \$COUNTRY	missing
Political participation	On the following issues, do you think the government should be prioritising them more, about the same, or less? Helping workers in \$COUNTRY to adapt to automation and new technologies	missing
Political participation	On the following issues, do you think the government should be prioritising them more, about the same, or less? Reducing \$COUNTRY's contribution to climate change	missing
Future policies	On the following issues, do you think the government should be prioritising them more, about the same, or less? Reducing public debt in \$COUNTRY	missing
Future policies	On the following issues, do you think the government should be prioritising them more, about the same, or less? Creating the conditions for businesses to thrive in \$COUNTRY	missing

Future policies	How confident are you that \$COUNTRY will succeed in reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the next 10 years?	same
Future policies	Which of the following issues do you think are best addressed by working with other countries than by \$COUNTRY alone? Please choose your top three issues for global cooperation. Tackling climate change	same
Future policies	Which of the following issues do you think are best addressed by working with other countries than by \$COUNTRY alone? Please choose your top three issues for global cooperation. Taxing large multinational companies regardless of where they are headquartered	same
Future policies	Which of the following issues do you think are best addressed by working with other countries than by \$COUNTRY alone? Please choose your top three issues for global cooperation. Protecting personal data and privacy online	same
Future policies	Which of the following issues do you think are best addressed by working with other countries than by \$COUNTRY alone? Please choose your top three issues for global cooperation. Preparing for the next pandemic	same
Future policies	Which of the following issues do you think are best addressed by working with other countries than by \$COUNTRY alone? Please choose your top three issues for global cooperation. Managing migration	same
Future policies	Which of the following issues do you think are best addressed by working with other countries than by \$COUNTRY alone? Please choose your top three issues for global cooperation. Protecting refugees	same
Future policies	Which of the following issues do you think are best addressed by working with other countries than by \$COUNTRY alone? Please choose your top three issues for global cooperation. Reducing inequality and discrimination	same
Future policies	Which of the following issues do you think are best addressed by working with other countries than by \$COUNTRY alone? Please choose your top three issues for global cooperation. Tackling fake news and misinformation	same
Future policies	Which of the following issues do you think are best addressed by working with other countries than by \$COUNTRY alone? Please choose your top three issues for global cooperation. Fighting international crime and terrorism	same
Future policies	Which of the following issues do you think are best addressed by working with other countries than by \$COUNTRY alone? Please choose your top three issues for global cooperation. None of these	same
Future policies	Which of the following issues do you think are best addressed by working with other countries than by \$COUNTRY alone? Please choose your top three issues for global cooperation. Don't know	same
Future policies	Which of the following areas do you think the government in \$COUNTRY should prioritise in order to better tackle global challenges (such as climate change, sharing of data, and migration, etc.)? Please choose your top two priorities. Engaging with multinational companies	same
Future policies	Which of the following areas do you think the government in \$COUNTRY should prioritise in order to better tackle global challenges (such as climate change, sharing of data, and migration, etc.)? Please choose your top two priorities. Joining forces with other governments internationally	same

Future policies	Which of the following areas do you think the government in \$COUNTRY should prioritise in order to better tackle global challenges (such as climate change, sharing of data, and migration, etc.)? Please choose your top two priorities. Strengthening \$COUNTRY's role in international institutions	same
Future policies	Which of the following areas do you think the government in \$COUNTRY should prioritise in order to better tackle global challenges (such as climate change, sharing of data, and migration, etc.)? Please choose your top two priorities. Engaging with citizens on global issues	same
Future policies	Which of the following areas do you think the government in \$COUNTRY should prioritise in order to better tackle global challenges (such as climate change, sharing of data, and migration, etc.)? Please choose your top two priorities. Strengthening coordination across government offices in \$COUNTRY	same
Future policies	Which of the following areas do you think the government in \$COUNTRY should prioritise in order to better tackle global challenges (such as climate change, sharing of data, and migration, etc.)? Please choose your top two priorities. Investing in the training and skills of government employees	same
Future policies	Which of the following areas do you think the government in \$COUNTRY should prioritise in order to better tackle global challenges (such as climate change, sharing of data, and migration, etc.)? Please choose your top two priorities. None of these	same
Future policies	Which of the following areas do you think the government in \$COUNTRY should prioritise in order to better tackle global challenges (such as climate change, sharing of data, and migration, etc.)? Please choose your top two priorities. Don't know	same
Future policies	How much do you disagree or agree that existing international agreements between countries (e.g. on migration, climate change, protection of personal data) are sufficient to solve long-term issues facing humanity?	similar
Future policies	Please feel free to share any additional thoughts on what influences your trust towards government and public institutions.	same
Future policies	Are you a citizen of [country]?	same
Future policies	Were you born in New Zealand?	similar
Background	Have you spent time living outside of New Zealand as an adult?	Unique to NZL
Background	In general, thinking about the next year or two, how concerned are you about your household's finances and overall social and economic well-being?	same
Background	If you imagine status in society as a ladder, some groups could be described as being closer to the top and others closer to the bottom. Thinking about yourself, where would you place yourself in this scale?	same
Background	From which of the following sources do you get information about politics and current affairs at least once per week? TV	same
Background	From which of the following sources do you get information about politics and current affairs at least once per week? Radio	same
Background	From which of the following sources do you get information about politics and current affairs at least once per week? Newspapers /magazines (incl. online)	same
Background	From which of the following sources do you get information about politics and current affairs at least once per week? Online social media	same

Background	From which of the following sources do you get information about politics and current affairs at least once per week? Other online sources	same
Background	From which of the following sources do you get information about politics and current affairs at least once per week? Family and friends	same
Background	From which of the following sources do you get information about politics and current affairs at least once per week? Place of work or study	same
Background	From which of the following sources do you get information about politics and current affairs at least once per week? None of these	same
Background	From which of the following sources do you get information about politics and current affairs at least once per week? Prefer not to say	same
Background	Which region do you live in?	same
Background	What is your gender?	same
Background	Which year were you born?	same
Background	What is your highest level of education?	same
Background	Please tell us the total gross annual income of your household in 2021.	similar
Background	Including yourself, how many people usually live in your household?	similar
Background	Which ethnic group or groups do you belong to?	Unique to NZL
Background	Have you ever worked in the public sector?	Unique to NZL
Background	Do you have any family members or friends who work or have worked in the public sector?	Unique to NZL
Background	How much do you know about how central government in New Zealand works?	Unique to NZL

Annex C. Detailed results of the econometric analyses

To test the relationship between trust in public institutions, its main drivers and the impact of other contextual variables, the study carried out an analysis based on logistic regressions. In all regressions, independent variables are normalised, meaning that the coefficients reported represent the change in the dependent variable as a result of one standard deviation increase in the explanatory variable. Results from logistic regressions are presented as average marginal effects for trust in the civil service, the parliament and the local government (local government councillors)

The policy and contextual drivers of trust in the local government, the civil service, the Parliament and the local civil service are presented respectively in Table A C.1, Table A C.2, and Table A C.3. The four instances are regressed using the three broad categories presented in the conceptual framework: 1) sociodemographic characteristics and interpersonal drivers; 2) policy drivers (i.e. competences and values); and 3) sustainability and perception of government actions in key societal trends. Each of the individual categories is first regressed on the dependent variable, first including the full set of variables, and in the following using a selection determined by a stepwise regression (except for the first category). In the final columns, all three categories are grouped together, and the significant variables are retained (using the same methodology). The full models have the higher explanatory power and are those retained for subsequent policy analysis (see Chapters 2-4).

Table A C.1. Trust in the Public Service

Variables	Interpersonal drivers	Policy drivers (competences and values)		Sustainability and key social trends		Full model	
	All	All	Selection	All	Selection	All	Selection
Age 30-49 (ref. 18-29)	0.45 (0.03)	1.86 (0.03)	2.67 (0.03)	-0.10 (0.03)	-0.42 (0.03)	2.16 (0.03)	2.40 (0.03)
Middle educ. (ref. low)	1.55 (0.04)	-3.02 (0.04)	-2.43 (0.04)	-0.83 (0.05)	-0.30 (0.04)	-2.21 (0.05)	0.66 (0.04)
Female (ref. male)	3.23 (0.02)	3.28 (0.02)	2.68 (0.02)	2.99 (0.02)	2.62 (0.02)	2.54 (0.02)	1.51 (0.02)
Maori (ref. European)	-5.98* (0.03)	-3.49 (0.03)	-4.78 (0.03)	-5.35 (0.03)	-6.09* (0.03)	-4.92 (0.03)	-6.89* (0.03)
Age 50+ (ref. 18-29)	-2.61 (0.03)	-0.23 (0.03)	-0.52 (0.03)	-2.83 (0.03)	-2.27 (0.03)	-0.31 (0.03)	0.31 (0.03)
High educ. (ref. low)	2.26 (0.04)	-3.13 (0.04)	-2.86 (0.04)	-1.00 (0.05)	0.02 (0.04)	-1.84 (0.04)	-0.84 (0.04)
Oth. gen. (ref. male)	3.96 (0.17)	4.41 (0.21)	4.26 (0.17)	-5.33 (0.23)	-3.76 (0.24)	2.74 (0.20)	3.19 (0.16)
Pacific (ref. European)	0.97 (0.05)	-1.01 (0.05)	-0.33 (0.05)	-0.75 (0.05)	2.24 (0.05)	-3.64 (0.05)	-0.56 (0.05)
Asian (ref. European)	6.44* (0.05)	1.70 (0.05)	2.15 (0.05)	1.65 (0.05)	2.48 (0.05)	0.28 (0.05)	0.32 (0.05)

	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Oth. ethn. (ref. European)	1.61	0.22	-1.36	-4.91	-2.43	-2.56	-2.43
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Financial concerns	-5.72*	-0.89	-1.58	-5.57*	-5.39*	-2.05	-4.39
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Trust levels: Interpersonal trust	18.50***	9.40***	9.87***	12.14***	12.01***	8.90***	10.17***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Reliability: Stable business conditions		2.25				2.64	
		(0.01)				(0.01)	
Openness: Voice view on community decision		1.32				1.56	
		(0.01)				(0.01)	
Openness: Info on admin procedure		2.02				0.88	
		(0.01)				(0.01)	
Openness: Account for public consultation views		2.62	2.99*			3.29*	3.36*
		(0.02)	(0.01)			(0.02)	(0.01)
Fairness: Treat rich and poor equally		2.02				1.95	
		(0.01)				(0.01)	
Fairness: Fair treatment of application		2.99*	4.41***			1.80	
		(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.01)	
Integrity: Political pressure on courts		2.78*	3.36**			2.49*	
		(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.01)	
Integrity: Bribing of public employees		3.11**	3.87***			3.02**	3.89***
		(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.01)	(0.01)
Responsiveness: Improving public services		4.56**	5.64***			4.44**	6.28***
		(0.02)	(0.01)			(0.02)	(0.01)
Responsiveness: Adopting innovative ideas		-0.86				-0.96	
		(0.02)				(0.02)	
Reliability: Prepared for infectious disease		2.67*	3.54**			3.20*	4.91***
		(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.01)	(0.01)
Satisfaction: Administrative services				6.71***	7.23***	3.39*	4.73***
				(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Participation: Confidence in own ability				0.57		-0.95	
				(0.01)		(0.01)	
Participation: Having a say				7.11***	8.45***	-2.30	
				(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	
Climate: confidence in reduced emissions				2.54*		0.26	
				(0.01)		(0.01)	
Observations	1574	1310	1372	1346	1435	1181	1354

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A C.2. Trust in the Parliament

Variables	Interpersonal drivers	Policy drivers (competences and values)		Sustainability and key social trends		Full model	
	All	All	Selection	All	Selection	All	Selection
Age 30-49 (ref. 18-29)	-1.06 (0.03)	1.20 (0.03)	1.07 (0.03)	-1.23 (0.03)	-1.14 (0.03)	1.70 (0.03)	1.46 (0.03)
Middle educ. (ref. low)	0.12 (0.04)	-0.64 (0.04)	1.12 (0.03)	-0.72 (0.05)	-1.47 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	0.95 (0.04)
Female (ref. male)	4.33 (0.02)	1.51 (0.02)	2.17 (0.02)	3.25 (0.02)	3.82 (0.02)	0.69 (0.02)	2.09 (0.02)
Maori (ref. European)	-5.60 (0.03)	-0.35 (0.03)	-3.29 (0.03)	-3.21 (0.03)	-3.25 (0.03)	-0.62 (0.03)	-2.26 (0.03)
Age 50+ (ref. 18-29)	-1.65 (0.03)	0.68 (0.03)	1.32 (0.03)	-1.56 (0.03)	-1.76 (0.03)	1.12 (0.03)	0.12 (0.03)
High educ. (ref. low)	1.15 (0.04)	-1.78 (0.03)	-0.56 (0.03)	-1.73 (0.04)	-2.94 (0.04)	-0.68 (0.04)	-1.25 (0.04)
Oth.gend. (ref. male)	7.01 (0.14)	-6.44 (0.15)	-6.13 (0.15)	-4.50 (0.20)	-4.08 (0.20)	-10.01 (0.13)	-10.44 (0.14)
Pacific (ref. European)	5.01 (0.06)	3.28 (0.05)	1.59 (0.05)	0.79 (0.05)	1.00 (0.05)	2.09 (0.05)	2.19 (0.04)
Asian (ref. European)	20.85*** (0.03)	10.30** (0.03)	8.78** (0.03)	8.12* (0.03)	8.57** (0.03)	6.62* (0.03)	7.80* (0.03)
Oth. ethn. (ref. European)	3.58 (0.06)	1.83 (0.05)	-1.13 (0.05)	-3.40 (0.06)	-2.61 (0.06)	-0.33 (0.06)	-1.58 (0.06)
Financial concerns	-12.10*** (0.03)	-6.53** (0.02)	-6.74*** (0.02)	-8.65*** (0.02)	-8.62*** (0.02)	-7.12*** (0.02)	-6.97*** (0.02)
Trust levels: Interpersonal trust	18.77*** (0.01)	7.35*** (0.01)	8.52*** (0.01)	11.02*** (0.01)	10.80*** (0.01)	7.61*** (0.01)	7.91*** (0.01)
Reliability: Stable business conditions		6.42*** (0.01)	6.57*** (0.01)			5.52*** (0.02)	4.99*** (0.01)
Openness: Voice view on community decision		0.95 (0.01)				-0.36 (0.01)	
Openness: Info on admin procedure		0.36 (0.01)				-1.22 (0.01)	
Openness: Account for public consultation views		6.66*** (0.01)	7.37*** (0.01)			5.25*** (0.01)	5.40*** (0.01)
Fairness: Treat rich and poor equally		3.86** (0.01)	3.79** (0.01)			2.48 (0.01)	
Fairness: Fair treatment of application		1.23 (0.01)				0.08 (0.01)	
Integrity: Political pressure on courts		2.60* (0.01)				2.98** (0.01)	3.37** (0.01)
Integrity: Bribing of public employees		0.00				0.32	

Responsiveness: Improving public services		(0.01) 4.39**	4.79***			(0.01) 3.69*	3.87**
Responsiveness: Adopting innovative ideas		(0.02) -0.58	(0.01)			(0.02) -1.69	(0.01)
Reliability: Prepared for infectious disease		(0.02) 6.29***	7.50***			(0.02) 4.98***	4.31***
Satisfaction: Administrative services				5.78***	5.48***	3.83**	2.87*
Participation: Confidence in own ability				(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Participation: Having a say				-1.79		-2.24	
Climate: confidence in reduced emissions				(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
				14.37***	14.23***	4.43**	4.49***
				(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
				8.23***	8.21***	5.12***	4.95***
				(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Observations	1682	1380	1497	1419	1419	1232	1289

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A C.3. Trust in Local Government Councillors

Variables	Interpersonal drivers	Policy drivers (competences and values)		Sustainability and key social trends		Full model	
	All	All	Selection	All	Selection	All	Selection
Age 30-49 (ref. 18-29)	-4.35 (0.03)	0.61 (0.03)	-1.12 (0.03)	-0.63 (0.03)	-1.21 (0.03)	3.44 (0.03)	-1.12 (0.03)
Middle educ. (ref. low)	-0.39 (0.04)	-3.55 (0.04)	-0.62 (0.04)	0.19 (0.05)	-2.66 (0.04)	-0.43 (0.05)	-0.62 (0.04)
Female (ref. male)	2.52 (0.02)	1.20 (0.02)	1.81 (0.02)	3.63 (0.02)	4.44 (0.02)	0.93 (0.03)	1.81 (0.02)
Maori (ref. European)	-3.91 (0.03)	-0.39 (0.03)	-1.87 (0.03)	-2.61 (0.03)	-4.37 (0.03)	-0.77 (0.03)	-1.87 (0.03)
Age 50+ (ref. 18-29)	-9.59** (0.03)	-3.34 (0.03)	-4.15 (0.03)	-6.20 (0.03)	-6.12* (0.03)	-1.97 (0.03)	-4.15 (0.03)
High educ. (ref. low)	-1.84 (0.04)	-6.96 (0.04)	-4.53 (0.04)	-2.11 (0.05)	-5.35 (0.04)	-3.46 (0.04)	-4.53 (0.04)
Oth. gen. (ref. male)	-13.61 (0.14)	-17.69 (0.15)	-18.89 (0.16)	-25.93 (0.17)	-22.43 (0.14)	-17.60 (0.18)	-18.89 (0.16)
Pacific (ref. European)	2.45 (0.08)	1.51 (0.07)	0.54 (0.07)	1.21 (0.08)	0.76 (0.07)	1.28 (0.07)	0.54 (0.07)
Asian (ref. European)	15.40*** (0.03)	6.78* (0.03)	6.33* (0.03)	6.34 (0.03)	7.21* (0.03)	4.00 (0.03)	6.33* (0.03)
Oth. ethn. (ref. European)	9.70 (0.05)	-0.11 (0.05)	2.62 (0.05)	3.71 (0.05)	2.81 (0.05)	-1.18 (0.05)	2.62 (0.05)
Financial concerns	-7.67** (0.03)	-3.57 (0.02)	-3.37 (0.02)	-3.66 (0.03)	-3.92 (0.02)	-2.65 (0.02)	-3.37 (0.02)
Trust levels: Interpersonal trust	22.31***	12.96***	13.40***	16.56***	17.12***	13.25***	13.40***


	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Reliability: Stable business conditions		2.01				1.55	
		(0.02)				(0.02)	
Openness: Voice view on community decision		4.68***	4.80***			4.97***	4.80***
		(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.01)	(0.01)
Openness: Info on admin procedure		-1.80				-2.69	
		(0.01)				(0.02)	
Openness: Account for public consultation views		5.77***	6.60***			5.42**	6.60***
		(0.02)	(0.01)			(0.02)	(0.01)
Fairness: Treat rich and poor equally		4.70***	5.44***			4.88**	5.44***
		(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.01)	(0.01)
Fairness: Fair treatment of application		2.48				3.65*	
		(0.02)				(0.02)	
Integrity: Political pressure on courts		-1.58				-1.76	
		(0.01)				(0.01)	
Integrity: Bribing of public employees		1.40				1.23	
		(0.01)				(0.01)	
Responsiveness: Improving public services		1.45				1.78	
		(0.02)				(0.02)	
Responsiveness: Adopting innovative ideas		3.08	3.88**			2.81	3.88**
		(0.02)	(0.01)			(0.02)	(0.01)
Reliability: Prepared for infectious disease		4.09**	5.25***			4.14**	5.25***
		(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.02)	(0.01)
Satisfaction: Administrative services				3.11*		0.10	
				(0.02)		(0.02)	
Participation: Confidence in own ability				-0.65		-1.06	
				(0.02)		(0.02)	
Participation: Having a say				9.93***	11.00***	-1.74	
				(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	
Climate: confidence in reduced emissions				6.81***	6.72***	3.20*	
				(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	
Observations	1621	1341	1486	1370	1472	1203	1486

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Annex D. Additional question implemented in New Zealand Survey

Government institutions act according to the best interest of society



Note: Figure presents the responses to the question "Do you agree with the following statement? Government institutions act according to the best interest of society." The "likely" proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale. "NZL mean" presents the weighted average across all respondents in New Zealand. Top 25% and bottom 25% refers to the income distribution based on household's total gross annual income of 2021, before tax and deductions, but including benefits/allowances. High education is defined as the ISCED 2011 education levels 5-8, i.e. university-level degrees such as Bachelors, Masters or PhD, and low education refers to less than a completed upper secondary degree. * means that differences in proportions are statistically significant at the 90% significance level; ** means that differences are statistically significant at the 95% level; *** means that differences are statistically significant at the 99% level. Reference group in light blue.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>)

StatLink  <https://stat.link/3iylom>

Building Trust in Public Institutions

Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions in New Zealand

In New Zealand, the government's response to the COVID-19 crisis is considered effective as it protected people's lives with limited disruption to society and the economy. A key factor in achieving these results was a focus on collective goals, grounded in the high-trust relationship that exists between New Zealanders and their public institutions. Still, high levels of trust should not be taken for granted. As new challenges emerge and old ones reappear, people in New Zealand expect the government to build on the lessons from the pandemic to improve service delivery and the resilience of public institutions. This report provides recommendations for further strengthening trust, including making public services more responsive, integrating long-term thinking into policy making, countering the spread of mis- and disinformation and reinforcing New Zealand's integrity system.



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