OECD initiative for safe international mobility during the COVID-19 pandemic (including blueprint)

 1.1. Context

On the occasion of the 60th Anniversary of the signing of the OECD Convention, 14 December 2020, Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez of Spain called on the OECD to work on an international framework to enable COVID‑19‑free international mobility.

At present, most people in OECD countries are not vaccinated, and the situation is even worse in developing countries. Several OECD countries are in the midst of a third wave of the pandemic, with intensive care units at full capacity, and thousands of deaths per day. The least-invasive non-pharmaceutical interventions are not controlling the spread of the virus, and many countries are moving to restrict daily activities. In this context, countries have adopted additional measures to restrict cross-border travel.

It is essential to reflect, however, not just on where we are in the pandemic, but where we will be and preparing for a scenario where greater international mobility may be possible. The vaccines are proving effective. Notwithstanding local supply issues, millions of people are being vaccinated each day. It is reasonable to look forward to a day where most people, in most OECD countries, will be vaccinated. COVID‑19 will still be circulating, but the risks of severe disease and death will be sharply reduced – at least, if no new variant of concern knocks the recovery off track. At some point, the policy objectives will shift to ‘living with COVID’ – with some enduring changes in lifestyles from those that have been forced on OECD populations in the past year, but moving, in so far as it is possible, to ending many restrictions, including some of those on international travel.

Many countries are openly planning for such a situation. The likelihood is that in the course of this year, many OECD countries will be including certificates of vaccination as part of their travel policies. Going on the announcements that have been made, no country will insist on vaccination as a condition of travel, but in the absence of such a certificate, they will ask for tests and, possibly, quarantine – much as is happening as at present. This is the nature of the announcements made by, for example, Iceland, Israel, and the European Union (EU) with its ‘Digital Green Certificate’ proposal.

The human and economic costs of constraining international mobility are significant. The halt in travel and tourism is having a knock-on impact on the wider economy, given the interlinked nature of the global economy. The OECD estimates, for example, that more than a third of the tourism value added generated in the domestic economy comes from indirect impacts.

 

Box 1. The economic costs of restricting international mobility

Restrictions on international travel have led to an unprecedented collapse in the number of international travellers with devastating implications for particular sectors:

• International tourism fell by around 80% in 2020. For the average OECD country, pre‑pandemic, the sector contributed 4.4% of GDP, 6.9% of employment, and 21.5% of service exports, but with much higher shares for some countries. Tourism is highly labour intensive and the World Travel and Tourism Council estimates that up to 174 million jobs are at risk globally.

• Industries providing international transport have experienced massive declines: international air passenger traffic, measured in industry-wide revenue passenger kilometres, has been 90% or more lower compared to the previous year since April 2020; the cruise industry experienced a loss of 25 million passengers in 2020 relative to pre‑pandemic expectations of 32 million passengers. In 2020, the drop in international rail passengers was about 90% for cross-border train services in Europe.

The halt in travel and tourism is having a major adverse macroeconomic impact, given the interlinked nature of these sectors. Those OECD countries with greatest exposure – including Greece, Iceland, Portugal, Mexico and Spain – are among those that have experienced the largest falls in GDP in 2020 (see Figure 1). Indeed, the pre‑crisis size of the travel and tourism sector explains differences in GDP growth better than exposure to any of the other sectors most vulnerable to the pandemic, or the average stringency of wider lockdown measures. Regression analysis further suggests that a 10 percentage points of GDP greater exposure to the travel and tourism sector increased the hit to GDP by nearly 3 percentage points in 2020, after controlling for other factors such as lockdown measures.

 

Figure 1. Countries with the greatest exposure to travel and tourism experienced the largest falls in GDP

Share of GDP generated by travel and tourism in 2019, %

Source: OECD Economic Outlook database and World Travel & Tourism Council database.

Note: This box summarises material in a forthcoming Secretariat note “The Economic Costs of Restricting International Mobility”, which provides further details, analysis and full references.

Hence, although the current situation is evolving, it may noy be propitious for loosening existing restrictions to international travel, it is reasonable to plan for a future when it is in order to be well prepared and to have all necessary systems operational. Travellers will be relying on a mixture of vaccines and tests. However, if there is no international framework for travel policies, the result will be a patchwork of national and regional rules, inconsistent with each other, involving different proofs of vaccination or test results to be presented when people cross borders at the country of origin and/or destination. This will be confusing and costly for travellers and transport and tourism companies, discouraging of travel and tourism due to the uncertainty, and complex to manage. It can also increase the incidence of use of fraudulent certificates thereby undermining the ability of authorities to mitigate public health risks.

The OECD initiative is intended to help to address these issues and encourage greater consistency in policies on international travel. It does not seek to replace other international initiatives, but rather to support and complement them, by either accelerating them or helping to enable their adoption by a broader range of countries.

 1.2. Process

As a first step in the intiative, the OECD Secretariat prepared four background documents, on the economic consequences of restrictions on travel; testing protocols; data exchange and privacy; and possible forms any agreement might take. A series of bi- and plurilateral meetings and consultations with countries, international organisations and other stakeholders, discussed the issues raised in these papers. In order to advance the discussion as rapidly as possible, a draft ‘blueprint’ was prepared. This explicitly drew directly on existing frameworks wherever possible, avoiding duplication with and building on work already undertaken in other fora, particularly by International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the EU.

The draft was also submitted to the following Committees on 5 February 2021 and other bodies for information and comment:

• Digital Economy Policy

• Health Committee

• Regulatory Policy Committee

• Tourism Committee

• Trade Committee

• Transport Management Board (ITF)

• Transport Research Committee (ITF)

• Working Party on Migration.

In addition to consultation through Committees, Delegations were encouraged to designate a national contact point responsible for co‑ordinating positions at the national level and engaging on a whole‑of-government basis with the OECD. The responses provided by countries were included in DELSA/HEA(2021)2/REV2 (Blueprint framework for safer international travel during COVID‑19 pandemic: comments from committees).

Various meetings were held to discuss the responses to the draft Blueprint, including with national contact points, and international organisations active in this area (ECAC- European Civil Aviation Conference, ICAO- International Civil Aviation Organization, IMO- International Maritime Organisation, UNWTO- the World Tourism Organisation, WHO- World Health Organization, WTO- World Trade Organization), and stakeholders (ACI- Airport Council International, CLIA- Cruise Lines International Association, ETOA- European Tourism Association, IATA- International Air Transport Association, IBMATA- International Border Management and Technologies Association, ICC- International Chamber of Commerce, WEF- World Economic Forum and WTTC- World Travel and Tourism Council). Companies such as Boeing and Airbus have also shared with us their technical modelling related to the pandemic. Bilateral consultations were also held with many countries, international organisations, and other stakeholders. Particularly intensive collaboration has taken place with ICAO, with the OECD participating in the CART discussions and relevant working groups, and the WHO.

A revised version of the Blueprint was shared with all the OECD bodies listed above on 1 April 2021 [see DELSA/HEA(2021)1/REV1 – Blueprint framework for safer international travel during COVID‑19 pandemic: comments from committees] and subsequently also to the WP1 of the EPC for information. Comments received from countries were synthesised and key outstanding issues were discussed at meetings with business stakeholders (16 April 2021), the relevant International Organisations (19 April 2021) and National Contact Points (20 April 2021). At this last meeting of the national contact points, delegates agreed that the document was ready to be transmitted for consideration at the Ministerial Council Meeting. The document was discussed at the Executive Committee on 29 April and by Council on 6 May, and transmitted to the Ministerial Council Meeting.

 1.3. Developments

The pandemic moves swiftly and there have been a number of developments in both the epidemiological situation and in the national and international responses which have required adjustments in some aspects of the Blueprint.

Vaccination has taken place rapidly in some OECD countries – notably Israel, where over half of the adult population have already received at least one shot of vaccine, and Chile, the United Kingdom, and the United States, all of which are very close to reaching this mark. Many other OECD countries are estimated to be only two or three months away from reaching a similar milestone. It is clear that the vaccines are effective in preventing deaths and severe disease; increasingly, the evidence is also that they prevent mild forms of the disease and are likely to be effective in reducing community transmission, even though levels of protection may vary from one vaccine to another and the evidence base is still being developed. Vaccination changes both the underlying risks that arise from travel, but also the perception of risks and preferences of national populations. This has been reflected in the revised blueprint.

New variants of concern. At the time when the initial blueprint was drafted, countries were deciding how to adapt travel protocols to reflect new variants of concern (NVoC). New variants may be of concern if they have more severe effects on health; are more transmissible; or more resistant to vaccines or treatment than other variants. In all these cases, NVoCs change the balance of risks in travel across borders.

International developments. Since the initial version of the blueprint:

• ICAO has issued the third Report of its Council Aviation Recovery Task Force (CART) accompanied by the third edition of the Take‑off Guidance Document and second edition of the ICAO Manual on Testing and Cross-Border Management Measures.1 This set of documents provide governments with strategic recommendations and guidelines for the recovery of international civil aviation as well as up-to-date technical guidance for the establishment of a multi-layer risk management strategy. In addition, the ICAO Manual provides guidance on the implementation of Public Health Corridors (PHCs), which enable governments to mutually recognise their respective public health risk management frameworks and establish a bilateral or multilateral temporary arrangement within which air travel can be resumed. Information exchanged in a PHC may also include requirements and specifications for documentation regarding proof of testing for the purposes of international travel. The ICAO process has also delivered recommendations on the information that is to be included in the documentation providing proof of testing for the purpose of international travel.

• Furthermore, on 17 March, the EU published its legislative proposal “establishing a common framework for a Digital Green Certificate covering vaccination, testing and recovery. This will put in place an EU level approach to issuing, verifying and accepting such certificates, to help holders to exercise their right to free movement within the EU, as well as making it easier to wind down COVID‑19 restrictions put in place in compliance with EU law”.2 The proposal is open to global initiatives and takes into account ongoing efforts of specialised agencies of the United Nations such as the WHO and the ICAO, to establish specifications and guidance for using digital technologies for documenting vaccination status.

• The WHO has recently issued its “Interim guidance for developing a Smart Vaccination Certificate” (19 March 2021). The “approach is focused on establishing key specifications, standards and a trust framework for a digital vaccination certificate to facilitate implementation of effective and interoperable digital solutions that support COVID‑19 vaccine delivery and monitoring, with intended applicability to other vaccines.” This is not, at present, intended to be used for travel purposes,3 but rather for informing vaccination rollout and policies. However, in principle, it could also be used by authorities wishing to take into account vaccination status in their travel policies (noting that WHO recommendations are revised every three months or earlier in light of new scientific evidence).

The ICAO CART guidance was approved on 12 March 2021 and communicated to States for implementation. The initiatives of the European commission (EC) and WHO are currently in progress and subject to further approval. All these initiatives converge on the objectives of more efficient use of information in the efforts to contain the pandemic, they do however target and cater to specific objectives and audiences in mind. While the ICAO initiative relates to the use of testing certificates for international air travel across a wide membership (193 countries), the EC initiative applies to intra-EU travel only and is framed in the context of helping EU citizens “facilitate the exercise of free‑movement”. In turn, the WHO initiative is not designed for travel and provides “interim guidance”. This implies, among other things, that each initiative proposes somewhat different information sets and verification mechanisms, including in the context of who is able to issue certificates and how these might be validated, as indicated in Box 2.

Country policies. Countries have continued to face the challenge of providing an appropriate degree of security against importation of COVID‑19 cases through international travel, and while considering the impact of mobility restrictions on specific economic sectors and the economy as a whole. Since the initial draft of the blueprint, several countries have faced a new wave of infections, often linked to the spread of more transmissible NVoCs. In some cases, this has led to new or reintroduced restrictions on all international travel, except for certain narrowly defined purposes. Furthermore, modelling of the effectiveness of pre‑departure testing has led some countries to conclude that there was a need to tighten their travel policies. A number of countries have introduced periods of strict quarantine in state‑monitored hotels for several days on arrival prior to being allowed to move about in the destination country. International travel currently remains heavily restricted.

 1.4. The OECD initiative

In the light of these developments, and with a view to ensuring maximum complementarity and synergy with the most recent testing and vaccination certificate initiatives, the OECD initiative proposes:

• To set up a temporary cross-sectoral forum for knowledge sharing about safe international travel, and

• A blueprint for safe international travel, to be implemented on a voluntary basis, to promote greater certainty, safety and security in travel as re‑opening takes place and consistent (and complementary) with the most recent certificate initiatives.

 A blueprint for safer international travel during the COVID‑19 pandemic

1. 1.

   Applicability

• The travel protocols described in this document are applicable to international travel by air, rail, coach and ship. Private modes of transportation are excluded in this document, but countries may decide to extend the arrangement to include them.

• Application of the travel protocols is a joint responsibility of national authorities and carriers who transport travellers across borders, and travellers themselves.

1. 2.

   General recommendations

• The following recommendations for travellers, aligned with guidance by the World Health Organization (WHO) and the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) apply, including for vaccinated travellers:4

  1. i.

     do not travel when sick, including confirmed, probable and suspected (contact) cases;

  2. ii.

     adhere to hand and respiratory hygiene practices;

  3. iii.

     wear a surgical facemask or a filtering facepiece respirator properly covering mouth and nose (with exceptions as appropriate);

  4. iv.

     practice physical distancing to the extent possible to lower the risk of disease spread; and

  5. v.

     adhere to instructions provided by port or carrier personnel.

1. 3.

   Principles

• The following principles underpin the system:

  1. i.

     Relative risk-based approach: The protocol should aim to reduce the impact of the risk to a residual level that is considered acceptable by national authorities and in line with the World Health Organization (WHO).5

  2. ii.

     Consideration of the epidemiological situation: Restrictions on international travel should be commensurate with the epidemiological situation in the country of origin and destination.

  3. iii.

     Equal treatment of travellers: All travellers are to be treated equally and fairly, taking into consideration the previous point on the epidemiological situation. Safe travel is to be facilitated by presentation of proof of vaccination or recovery (where national policy allows this) or through tests demonstrating that the traveller is not infectious.

  4. iv.

     Appropriate use of quarantine: The blueprint aims to achieve an appropriate use of quarantine. For the situations of lower epidemiological risk, testing, genomic sequencing of positive cases, and adequate data collection for contact-tracing can provide relevant information about the prevalence of the disease among travellers and of the appearance of new variants of concern. Quarantine would be an instrument applicable to cases of higher epidemiological risk, with an option to end isolation earlier based on the results of diagnostic tests. Where an individual has been vaccinated, and national policy is to reflect vaccination status in its travel policies, quarantine might not be necessary.

  5. v.

     Reliance on national verification regimes: Countries participating in the system will accept vaccine certificates, recovery certificates, and test results that have been approved by the national authorities of other participating countries, as appropriate, subnational jurisdictions, taking into account ongoing discussions on international systems at the WHO, ICAO and the EU.

  6. vi.

     Simplicity and reliance on existing systems: The complexity of processes and amount of information collected and transferred across borders should be minimised. The system should be based on collecting strictly necessary data only (data minimisation and privacy by design), and on drawing as much as possible on existing tools and systems for sharing information in compliance with applicable data protection rules.

  7. vii.

     Interoperability, security and privacy protection by design: The system should be interoperable and based on a common nomenclature and format for information transfers (to be agreed). The system should also abide by the principle of “privacy by design”, in which the contents, collection mode, purpose for collection, and length of storage for any or all data being collected will be made clear to the data subject at the outset.

  8. viii.

     Recognition of other international agreements: where countries are part of a supranational grouping, such as the EU, nothing in the blueprint should be considering as superseding agreements made in that body concerning travel within the countries party to that grouping. In particular, it is acknowledged that Member States of the EU are committed to free movement of people, and that Council Recommendation (EU) 2021/119 of 1 February 2021 amending Recommendation (EU) 2020/147 will apply within the Union.

  9. ix.

     Priority of national legislation: The blueprint provides policy guidance and is not a legal document.

 Part 1. Measures for safer travel

1. 4.

   Epidemiological criteria

• Participating countries will:

  1. i.

     Use common epidemiological criteria for COVID‑19 case notification rate, testing rate, and test positivity rate, as reported to the WHO under the International Health Regulations and reflecting WHO definitions and published in the WHO Coronavirus (COVID‑19) Dashboard.6 Countries may also use the data published by the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), as appropriate. Cut-off dates are left to the discretion of organisations collecting and publishing the data (WHO or ECDC).

  2. ii.

     Take the following epidemiological criteria into account:

     1. (1)

        Notification rate: total number of newly notified COVID‑19 cases per 100 000 population in the previous 14 days at national, or as appropriate, sub-national level;

     2. (2)

        Test positivity rate: the percentage of positive tests among all tests for COVID‑19 infection carried out during the previous week;

     3. (3)

        Testing rate: the number of tests for COVID‑19 infection per 100 000 population carried out during the last week.

  3. iii.

     Define green, orange, red, and dark red categories of risk according to the severity of community spread of the SARS‑CoV‑2 virus in each country or region, calculated every two weeks, as indicated below:

     1. a)

        Green, if the notification rate is less than 25 and the test positivity rate is less than 4%;

     2. b)

        Orange, if the notification rate is less than 50 but the test positivity rate is 4% or more, or, if the notification rate ranges from 25 to 150 but the test positivity rate is less than 4%;

     3. c)

        Red, if the notification rate is 50 or more and the test positivity rate is 4% or more, or if the notification rate is more than 150;

     4. d)

        Dark red, if the notification rate is 500, or if there is high prevalence of new variants of concern;

     5. e)

        Grey, if not sufficient information is available or if the testing rate is 300 or less.

  4. iv.

     To the extent possible, provide sufficient warning of a possible change in risk level. A warning system to indicate that the limits for a change in risk level are being approached, calculated every two weeks, as indicated below:

     1. a)

        Orange warning, if the notification rate ranges from 18.75 to 25;

     2. b)

        Red warning, if the notification rate ranges from 37.50 to 50 and the test positivity rate ranges from 3% to 4%, or, if the notification rate ranges from 112.50 to 150 but the test positivity rate is below 3%;

     3. c)

        Dark red warning, if the notification rate ranges from 375 to 500.

  5. v.

     Coordinate with ongoing efforts (including the EU Early Warning and Response System) to identify criteria for taking into account the prevalence and risk associated with SARS‑CoV‑2 variants of concern, for which there is evidence of an increase in transmissibility, increase in virulance or change in clinical disease presentation, or decrease in effectiveness of public health and social measures or available diagnostics, vaccines, therapeutics.7

1. 5.

   Travel requirements

• Participating countries will:

  1. i.

     In line with national regulations, travellers who produce proof of vaccination, or who produce proof of recovery from a prior COVID‑19 infection may be exempt from testing requirements, unless for surveillance purposes, and/or quarantine requirements in the context of travel.8 Proof of vaccination is defined as having received the full number of specified doses for each vaccine. Recognised vaccines for proof include the ones recommended by the WHO for Emergency Use Listing (EUL), or the ones approved by a Stringent Regulatory Authority according to WHO’s interim definition.9

  2. ii.

     For the passengers who are unable to provide a valid proof of vaccination or recovery, adopt a travel protocol that may include tests and quarantine requirements commensurate with the level of risk of COVID‑19 infection, according to the colour-coded categories of epidemiological risk defined above. Where the use of RT-PCR is appropriate, countries will accept results of tests that have been approved by origin countries. When the use on antigen tests is appropriate, countries will rely on the results of antigen tests approved by origin countries that provide for a minimum of 80% sensitivity and high specificity (minimum >= 97% and ideally > 99% for rapid antigen tests) COVID‑19 diagnostics.10 11 12

  3. iii.

     Request all travellers to complete a passenger locator form prior to travel, preferably in digital format.

  4. iv.

     General public health measures should be maintained at all times, including the use of facemasks, distancing, and hand washing.

1. 6.

   Travel protocols

• Subject to their own considerations of risk associated with importation of cases of COVID‑19, local rates of vaccination, and other elements of national context, participating countries will adopt one of the travel protocols described below, and subsequently shown in Table 1.

• The following protocols may be modified by countries to indicate that travellers in transit are not subject to additional requirements and travellers who return within 48 hours of arrival are exempt from further testing requirements before the return trip.

• The protocols may also be modified to cover travel and provide exemptions of quarantine requirements for essential functions. Essential function should be defined by countries. WHO suggests the following: emergencies and humanitarian actions, travel of essential personnel, repatriations, and cargo transport for essential supplies such as food, medicines, and fuel.

  1. i.

     Travel protocol A. When the potential health impact associated with the importation of cases is estimated by participating country to be high, considering their own assessments of health system capacity, immunisation rates, global and regional trends of viral circulation, and other criteria, the following requirements and conditions will apply:

 Part 2. Information and security

1. 7.

   Information requirements for travel

• Participating countries agree on the following:

  1. 1. i.

        If countries choose to enable travel through the use of vaccination certificates or certificates of recovery, these should be based on a common set of information elements and agreed measures for security, facilitation, machine reading and interoperability in line with ICAO CART recommendations. Existing international initiatives (EU Digital Green Certificates and WHO Smart Vaccination Certificate) are considering what these should be.13 Although these initiatives are still under discussion in their respective organisations, they include the following information:

        1. (1)

           Personal Information of Subject:

           1. 1. a)

                 Full Name (Surname, Given Name)

              2. b)

                 Date of Birth (YYYYMMDD)

              3. c)

                 (optional but recommended) ID Document Type

              4. d)

                 (optional but recommended) ID Document Number

           2. (2a)

              Additional information to be included in vaccination certificate (based on EU Digital Green Certificates and WHO Smart Vaccination Certificate):

              1. a)

                 Disease or agent targeted

              2. b)

                 Vaccine/prophylaxis

              3. c)

                 Vaccine medicinal product

              4. d)

                 Vaccine marketing authorisation holder or manufacturer

              5. e)

                 Number in a series of vaccinations/doses

              6. f)

                 Date of vaccination (indicating the date of the latest dose received

              7. g)

                 Country of vaccination

              8. h)

                 Certificate issuer

              9. i)

                 (optional fields) The WHO Smart Vaccination Certificates include all the above and: signature of health worker; health worker identification and due date of next dose

           3. (2b)

              Additional information to be included in the certificate of recovery (based on EU Digital Green Certificates):

              1. a)

                 Disease or agent individual has recovered from

              2. b)

                 Date of first positive test result

              3. c)

                 Country of test

              4. d)

                 Certificate issuer

     2. ii.

        A common set of information for testing certificates to be presented under a common nomenclature based on the ICAO “Recommended dataset on reporting COVID‑19 testing results” and in-line with other initiatives (EU Digital Green Certificates). The certificates will include the following minimum information:

        1. 1. (1)

              Personal Information of Test Subject:

              1. a)

                 Full Name (Surname, Given Name) (mandatory)

              2. b)

                 Date of Birth (YYYYMMDD) (mandatory)

              3. c)

                 ID Document Type (mandatory)

              4. d)

                 ID Document Number (mandatory)

           2. (2)

              Service Provider:

              1. a)

                 Name of testing facility or service provider (mandatory)

              2. b)

                 Country of test (mandatory)

              3. c)

                 Contact details of testing facility or service provider (mandatory)

           3. (3)

              Date and Time of Test and Report:

              1. a)

                 Date and time of specimen collection (mandatory)

              2. b)

                 Date and time of report issuance (mandatory)

           4. (4)

              Test Result:

              1. a)

                 Type of test conducted: molecular (PCR); molecular (other); antigen; antibody (mandatory)

              2. b)

                 Result of Test (normal/abnormal or positive/negative) (mandatory)

              3. c)

                 Sampling method (nasopharyngeal, oropharyngeal, saliva, blood, other (optional)

     3. iii.

        Provision of this information to the traveller in an ‘eye readable’ and printable format,14 as well as with an automatically generated and ‘machine readable’ QR or bar code codifying the information in a common order and format. If unable to create a QR or bar code, results will allow travellers to link their ID to the test.

     4. iv.

        Definitions on the type of providers that are authorised to issue results to travellers in the commonly agreed format.

     5. v.

        Inclusion of a unique and interoperable identifier or similar mechanism to enable verification of authenticity of certificates. This should rely on and be interoperable with existing initiatives including the ICAO Visible Digital Seal, the EU Digital Green Certificate and the WHO Smart Vaccination Certificate.

1. 8.

   Data protection and mechanisms for proof

   • Across all and any certificates, participating countries will:

     1. vi.

        Limit the amount of information requested from travellers to that agreed under the information requirements detailed above.

     2. vii.

        Avoid collecting and storing personal or sensitive data, giving preference to decentralised mechanisms of proof.

     3. viii.

        In the event that data is collected, countries will countries ensure that data is protected and secured in accordance with relevant domestic regulations.

     4. ix.

        Limit transfers of personal or personally identifiable data across international borders and, where needed, rely on existing mechanisms (e.g. informed consent) in full compliance with applicable data protection and transfer rules.

     5. x.

        Rely on existing mechanisms for relaying status information, favouring decentralised approaches that rely on QR/bar codes carried by travellers and which can be printed or integrated into existing private and public sector digital solutions.15

     6. xi.

        Rely on existing and interoperable mechanisms for verification of certificates, including those proposed under the ICAO Visible Digital Seal, the EU Digital Green Certificate and the WHO Smart Vaccination Certificate.

2. 9.

   Other

   • The proposed system applies to those countries which voluntarily agree to participate in the system; that is, it is an agreement between parties, not a universal system.

   • Additional requirements may be applied for travel involving countries that are not part of the agreement.

   • Participating countries may apply lists of travellers exempted to compliance with testing and quarantine requirements in accordance with national laws and regulations.

   • This system can be implemented unilaterally, bilaterally, plurilaterally or multilaterally, or through the ICAO Public Health Corridor mechanism.