Peter Jarrett
Cyrille Schwellnus
OECD Economic Surveys: Morocco 2024
Economic Assessment
OECD Economic Surveys
Abstract
Morocco has a young and growing population, but many jobs remain informal, youth unemployment is high and female labour market participation is low. Making better use of the working-age population would support growth and raise living standards. The government is undertaking a major reform to increase coverage of the social safety net and reduce informality, which will contribute to achieving a higher-quality labour market. The reform should be fully implemented, and further measures taken to make work in the formal economy more attractive, including by lowering social contributions for lower-paid formal workers, adjusting the strictness of labour market regulation, taking into account the impact of the minimum wage on formalisation, and strengthening tax and social contribution enforcement. The unusually large share of youth not in employment, education or training (NEET) partly reflects weak educational outcomes that could be improved by strengthening the school system, including avoiding excessive grade repetition and enhancing teaching methods as supported by on-going reforms. Participation of women in the formal labour market could be improved by extending childcare supports, raising financial inclusion, reducing discrimination more effectively and tackling gender stereotypes.
Morocco has a young and growing population, but labour market informality is widespread, youth unemployment is high, particularly for skilled young workers, and labour market participation of women is low. Making better use of Morocco’s people and skills would contribute to higher growth, lower poverty and better-quality jobs. Weaker labour market outcomes than in the average OECD country are not uncommon among other countries with similar income per capita in the region (Table 3.1). However, there is room to improve Moroccan labour-market institutions and address long-standing weaknesses in education and skills policies to achieve better outcomes, building on past and on-going reforms. This chapter analyses policies to reduce informality, boost youth employment and strengthen female labour market participation, focusing on reforms to the social protection system and labour market regulation; education and skills policies; and specific policies to achieve better labour market outcomes for women. OECD experience shows that flexibility-enhancing policies must be balanced by policies and institutions that protect workers, foster inclusiveness and allow workers and firms to make the most of ongoing structural changes (OECD, 2018[1]).
1. Simple average of Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia.
2. Share of informal workers in total dependent employment as measured by the share of workers unaffiliated with social security (last official estimate by the Haut-Commissariat au Plan for 2013-14).
Source: Haut-Commissariat au Plan, OECD, World Bank, ILO.
A number of policy reforms have been initiated by the authorities, including a major reform of social protection and reforms to the school system. Implementing a broad package of further measures across the policy areas covered in this chapter would be mutually reinforcing and help to support this approach. For instance, improving educational outcomes across the board would likely improve female labour market prospects, while reducing informality would likely improve worker skills by giving them access to formal training.
Section 3.1 gives an overview of the Moroccan labour market, focusing on informality, high youth unemployment, and low female labour market participation. Section 3.2. analyses policies to reduce labour market informality, including tax-and-benefit policies and labour market regulation. Section 3.3 discusses active labour market policies and education policies that could boost labour market participation of young people, while Section 3.4 proposes reforms that would help women obtain more and better jobs.
Demographic developments are favourable, but emigration is high
Morocco’s population is growing rapidly, at a rate of around 1% each year. While fertility for the average woman has fallen sharply since the 1970s and is now at 2.05 children, just below the birth rate of 2.1 required for population stability, rising life expectancy has been adding to the size of the population. Fertility remains higher for rural women (2.36) than those in urban settings (1.87). Overall life expectancy was 74 years in 2021, a hefty rise since the 71.7 years observed in 2004, although there remains a substantial gap between the best and worst regions (from 79.3 to 69.4 years). The working-age population continues to grow, although it is expected to stabilise during the 2040s before it begins to recede in the longer term (Figure 3.1).
Source: World Population Prospects 2022, United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division.
The population is relatively young. The total dependency ratio has recently reached a plateau of about 0.5 dependents per person of working age with around 0.4 children per person of working age. While youth dependency is fairly high but falling, old-age dependency is rising, albeit from a very low level: it will reach over 15% in 2030, up from below 7% in 2000, and may then exceed 50% before the end of the century. The current and projected 2030 old-age dependency ratios are only about half of unweighted average levels in OECD countries and will still be below them in the distant future. Morocco’s so-called “demographic dividend” of a low total dependency ratio is expected to begin to unwind from the mid-2030.
Morocco experiences substantial outward migration, although this has slowed in recent years. Net outward migration outflows relative to the existing population peaked at some -3.3 per thousand per year around 2005 but have fallen to -1.2 per thousand in recent years. However, this is still high compared to other MENA countries. About 3.3 million Moroccans resided abroad in 2020, over 80% in Europe (Haut-Commissariat au Plan (HCP), 2020[2]). This diaspora is large, surpassed only by Egypt’s 3.6 million among MENA countries. The country is also home to a small number of immigrants, mainly from Sub-Saharan Africa.
There are a number of drivers of outward migration, including earnings differences with more advanced economies, linguistic links to some European countries and well-established diaspora networks. A survey in 2018-19 by the Haut-Commissariat au Plan (HCP) found that 23% of adults were considering leaving the country (29% of men, 18% of women). The share was highest for those under the age of 30 and in rural surroundings. While only 12.4% of those with no educational qualifications self-identified as potential emigrants, 20.7% of those with tertiary education and 40.6% for those with a vocational qualification were considering emigrating. Almost three-quarters of all emigrants (a total of around 45 000 per year) depart for economic reasons, mainly related to leaving for a job or expecting a higher standard of living. A third of emigrants have tertiary education (compared to 13% across the whole adult population), especially those headed to North America, implying a loss of accumulated skills for Morocco through “brain-drain” effects. A significant number of departures are to undertake university education (57 000 in 2019). There is offsetting return migration, but on a small scale (OECD, 2024d) and typically after a long spell abroad. Only around half of returning migrants return to jobs in Morocco, while one in six retire. Returning migrants often bring skills and valuable experiences that could strengthen the Moroccan economy: more could be done to facilitate the official recognition of any skills they acquired abroad, sometimes in the form of qualifications that do not currently exist in Morocco. Enhanced financial incentives to return could be offered, particularly to the most highly qualified.
There are important regional social and labour-market differences in Morocco, partly reflecting a geographically spread-out population, transport challenges, and variations in the level of development between the cities and coastal areas as well as rural and mountainous regions. There has been a long-term trend to urbanisation, which reached 64.8% of the population in 2023, compared to 35.1% in 1971 (HCP, 2024c); that is expected to continue with only 30% of the population predicted to be living in rural settings by 2035. Across regions, labour-market outcomes vary considerably: in 2022, labour-force participation rates ranged from about 38% to 50% and unemployment rates from 7% to 20%.
As in other similar countries, rural residents face a number of challenges. Educational outcomes tend to be weaker in rural areas. When entering the labour market, there is a higher share of youth neither in employment, education or training (NEET) in rural areas (30.3% compared to less than 21.8% in urban areas in 2022). In rural areas, some children are made to undertake domestic work, as children 15 and under are not protected when working in traditional artisan and handicraft sectors. Rural workers are more likely to be informal and historically have been less likely to benefit from social protection, as in other developing countries (Kolev, La and Manfredi, 2023[3]). Nevertheless, participation rates are higher for rural adults than for urban dwellers because of the more frequent necessity for women to work to support the family, and unemployment rates are much lower (about 6%, compared to almost 16.8% in urban areas).
Labour-market informality is widespread
Labour market informality is widespread in the Moroccan economy, as in other countries at similar levels of income per capita. Morocco has officially focussed its measurement of informality on the share of job holders who are not affiliated with any social insurance schemes. National surveys undertaken in 2013-14 by the planning agency HCP published in 2018 suggested that based on this definition the informal share was around 67% of all workers and 36% of non-agricultural workers (El Rhaz and Bouzner, 2021; Figure 3.2). This was due to the high share of workers unaffiliated with social insurance in the agricultural sector, where workers in the past were not required to join the system. This social insurance-based measure of informality is likely to improve very significantly with the requirement from 2024 for people to declare themselves on the new social register to benefit from direct assistance and medical cover.
An alternative measure of informality, workers without a contract, stood at 67.2% of all employees in 2000 before drifting down to 51.2% in 2022, but with a much larger share in rural, heavily agricultural, settings and for youth (HCP, 2024c). Other sources and methods give figures for the share of informal workers of anywhere from 41% to 80% (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2022[5]). One major source of discrepancy is whether the figure includes the agriculture sector or not, since that is where the majority of informal workers are to be found: 82% of women and 46% of men are estimated to be informal in agriculture (HCP, 2023a). Informality is also prevalent in construction and public works, as well as trade and repair services. Many informal workers in Morocco, as elsewhere, are employed by formal-sector businesses that pay income and value added taxes: across a broad sample of developing countries, excluding Morocco for which there are no data, the share is above 40% (Kolev, La and Manfredi, 2023[3]). By age group, as elsewhere in the MENA region, the informal share in Morocco follows a U-shaped pattern, with prevalence highest for younger and older workers (Ulyssea, 2020[6]; Lopez-Acevdeo et al., 2023[7]): in 2017, 94% of 15-24 year-old job holders were estimated to work in the informal sector (OCDE, 2021[8]). There is also a gender difference with almost 90% of informal non-agricultural workers being male, in contrast with outcomes elsewhere among developing countries (Ulyssea, 2020[6]). Most informal workers work independently, while about 88% of the others worked for employers with fewer than 10 staff in 2017 (Lopez-Acevdeo et al., 2023[7]), and many also work as unpaid family workers (domestic helpers).
Overall, while the extent of informality in Morocco is difficult to assess precisely, it appears that it is more prevalent than many other similar countries when the agriculture sector is included (Figure 3.2). This is confirmed by evidence that prevalence of informal workers is comparatively high in Morocco at all levels of schooling (Ulyssea, 2020[6]) and income (Lopez-Acevdeo et al., 2023[7]). International comparisons would be easier if Morocco were included in the OECD’s recently developed Key Indicators of Informality based on Individuals and their Households (KIIbIH) database, which is based on household surveys and provides harmonised and comparable indicators across 42 countries related to informal employment (Kolev, La and Manfredi, 2023[3]).
Note: The data are not fully comparable across countries. They apply to 2022 except for JOR (2021); HUN (2020); EGY and TUN (2019); and THA (2018).
1. The last official estimate by the Haut-Commissariat au Plan for 2013-14 based on the share of workers unaffiliated with social security.
2. The last official estimate by the Haut-Commissariat au Plan for 2013-14 based on the share of workers unaffiliated with social security excluding agriculture.
Source: ILO Labour Force Statistics; Haut-Commissariat au Plan.
Informal activity is estimated to be a much smaller share of GDP than its share in employment, with estimates ranging from around 11% according to the Haut-Commissariat au Plan to 30% according to the Central Bank. This lower share of informality in GDP than in employment reflects the fact that informal workers’ labour productivity is far lower than that of those in formal jobs because of lower average levels of human capital and their working in less capital-intensive activities.
Many informal workers are within the framework of the law because – if they fall below a certain income threshold – employers, own-account workers and family workers are not liable for any taxes or social contributions and have long been eligible, prior to current reforms, for medical coverage without being insured under the government’s RAMED scheme (Régime de l’Assistance Médicale). All salaried workers are legally required to make social contributions, but an estimated 65% did not do so in 2018. This compared with 54% in Tunisia. Many contribute only part of the year (Lopez-Acevdeo et al., 2023[7]). While informality could result from economic necessity for people with low skills and bargaining power, somewhat unusually in Morocco, it is pervasive even in the highest income deciles and among university graduates (Figure 3.3). While rates of informality tend to decline with rising income, a majority of informal workers are not in the bottom two income deciles, a higher share than in Tunisia or Egypt (Lopez-Acevedo et al., 2023[7]). No sectoral or occupational breakdown is available that would allow for a separate assessment of informality between the non-agricultural and agricultural sectors.
Note: Informal employment is defined as workers, salaried or non-salaried, not covered by contributory social insurance. Thus, some country variation may occur as specific categories of workers are excluded by law from contributory social insurance, implicitly allowing legal informal employment. Due to data limitations for Egypt, it was not possible to use deciles of per capita household expenditures—alternatively, wealth deciles were constructed based on a factor analysis approach using household ownership, durable assets and housing conditions.
Source: G. Lopez-Acevedo, M.Ranzani, N. Sinha and A. Elsheikhi (2023), Informality and Inclusive Growth in the Middle East and North Africa, Middle East and North Africa Development Report, World Bank, Washington, DC. doi:10.1596/978-1-4648-1988-9
The unemployment rate is high, particularly among young urban workers. With pervasive informality and casual work (petits boulots), the measurement of unemployment, even if survey-based, is somewhat blurred. Most jobless people lack access to loss-of-employment benefits, but some are able to work informally at least a little to support themselves. Survey-based unemployment in Morocco stood at 13% of the formal labour force on average in 2023 (up from 9.2% in 2019), including many highly-educated new entrants seeking their first job. Unemployment had been high by MENA standards in the mid-1990s before entering into a period of relative improvement. A rising number of working-age people are out of the labour force because they are not searching for work (sometimes termed “passively unemployed”), mostly women as is the case in similar countries (ILO, 2024[9]). There is also substantial regional heterogeneity, with unemployment rates ranging from 7-20% (11% to 49% for women).
Unemployment is especially prevalent for youth under 25 (35.8%), women (18.3%, compared to 11.5% for men) and those with higher educational attainment, notably university graduates, and for urban dwellers (Figure 3.4., Panel C). By contrast, the measured unemployment rate for those without any diploma was only 5%, which is likely to reflect “passive unemployment” or work in subsistence-level jobs in the informal sector. This compares to 19.6% for those with some diploma (primary, secondary or higher) and 25.9% for those with a higher level of attainment (including 28.1% for university graduates). This underlines the challenges for those with tertiary education to integrate into the labour market. Joblessness is especially high and rising among highly educated women under 35 (38.3%), possibly reflecting a slowdown in public-sector hiring, where many of these group look for work due to the stability of permanent work contracts, salaries and associated benefits, and the predictability and low level of working hours (Morikawa, 2015[10]; Bassou, 2023[11]).
Note: The figure refers to the first three quarters of 2023.
Source: Haut-Commissariat au Plan.
Unemployment spells are often long: the average was recently 32 months, with 66.4% of unemployed not having had a job for more than a year in 2023 (Figure 3.4., Panel D), down from a pandemic peak of 75% but still well above the pre-COVID share of 51%. Average unemployment duration is longer for those with more education and women, but the gender gap is shrinking. Layoffs have recently been the origin of around 27% of all unemployment, but the majority of the unemployed (51.2%) are young and have never worked before (over two-thirds for women).
In Morocco, the term “underemployment” is taken to mean either involuntarily working fewer hours than the standard 48 per week or being over-qualified for one’s job (mismatch) (Guermane and Bakrim, 2022[12]). Underemployment is common, especially among those with high-school diplomas and even among university graduates, who often have to take jobs far from their field of study: 9% of all employees were underemployed in 2022 (10.0% for men and 5.4% for women). Census data from 2014 suggest that 7.6% of workers were over-qualified and 46.7% under-qualified (HCP, n.d.[13]). Looking just at those with some sort of diploma, the gap was narrower, with 16.1% over-qualified and 31.1% under-qualified. Prior to the pandemic, the share of over-qualified workers reached 23% in ICT and 20% in finance and insurance, as many employers lacked the capacity to use the skills available. By contrast, in manufacturing, the share of production workers who were skilled in 2019 (67%) was lower than the average for all lower-middle-income countries (76%), according to the World Bank Enterprise Surveys.
The relatively high incidence of unemployment, particularly of young, educated people, is common to countries in the region and reflects a number of challenges (Figure 3.5). The new cohorts looking to join the labour market each year, currently around 400 000 per year, creates a major pressure to generate a sufficient number of new jobs: annual net job creation has reached 300 000 only twice since 2000 and has averaged only 110 000. The elasticity of employment with respect to GDP has fallen as employment creation has been in higher productivity activities (Banque Mondiale et Haut-Commissariat au Plan, 2021). At the same time, there is a significant shift in employment with losses in the agriculture sector and gains in industrial and services activities. The government hopes to create 400 000 new jobs by 2026 (Gouvernment du Maroc, 2024[14]), and the demand for qualified workers is increasing, as suggested by the increase in the share of workers with secondary or tertiary degrees from 41% in 2017 to 50% in 2023. Perceived mismatch between the skills of people leaving education and demand for their skills in 2013 was one of the highest among 10 comparator countries, according to World Bank surveys (OECD, 2017, Vol. 2). Young people in Morocco face a particularly difficult school-to-work transition. It often takes them years to properly settle into a stable job. Feelings of unfairness result from the perceived role of connections in most new hires (Pereira da Silva, 2018[15]), and this may contribute to the large number of young people who wish to emigrate (Arab Barometer, 2022[16]).
Note: Youth unemployment refers to the share of the labour force ages 15-24 without work but available for and seeking employment.
Source: World Bank WDI – ILO estimates.
There is a relatively large share of young people who are not in education, employment or training (NEET), although there has been a gradual improvement. This represents a significant loss of potential for the economy and can have permanent impacts on accumulation of skills and life-time prospects (“scarring”). According to the Haut-Commissariat au Plan, there are nearly 1½ million Moroccans aged 15-24 in this situation, accounting for one-quarter of that age bracket (down from over 30% in 2012). The overall NEET rate is much higher than the OECD average (less than 13%), but broadly in line with MENA norms (OECD, 2022a). Women represent nearly three-quarters of this group. Some 31% of women in this age group are NEETs (down from almost 50% in 2012), many of whom are married and have a secondary diploma, (Figure 3.6). NEET rates are much higher for rural youth (30.3%) than urban (21.8%). However, in recent years, the NEET rate has been shrinking gradually overall and more rapidly for women. Young people without a job tend to stay in that situation, with many of those who were NEET in 2010 still not in employment in 2018 (Alfani et al., 2020[17]). According to Alfani et al. (2020[17]), the probability of being NEET rises with age within the youth category, falls with education, is higher for those residing in medium-sized towns than cities or rural areas and is higher for married than unmarried women but lower for married men.
Note: The NEET rate is the number of young people 15 to 24 not in education, employment or training as a share of the total youth population.
Source: ILOSTAT- ILO Modelled Estimates (ILOEST), https://ilostat.ilo.org/
Female labour market participation is low
Female participation in Morocco’s labour market is relatively low (Figure 3.7). This represents a missed opportunity in terms of mobilising their skills and integrating them into the labour market, as well as reducing household incomes. This low rate continues despite progress in the educational levels of women at all levels, including the fact they now make up more than half of the undergraduate student body and in all major disciplines except engineering. The government's 2023-2026 equality plan includes measures to empower women, protect them from violence, promote their rights and combat discrimination and stereotypes. The Ministry of Solidarity, Social Integration and the Family (MSISF) has launched the ‘GISSR Attamkine wa Arriyada’ (Empowerment and Leadership) programme, which has signed up 84,000 women and is supporting them in their empowerment process.
Fewer than one in five women of working age were working in 2023 or are looking for employment, nearly 50 percentage points behind the corresponding male rate. This gender gap is typical of MENA countries, compared to a global average of the gap of around 26 percentage points and 12 percentage points for the OECD average with Jordan having even lower rates, reflecting a mixture of economic and other factors. Even among the most active age group (25-29-year-olds), female participation is only 31.5%, compared to 95% for men. There are currently about 11 million women of working age who are inactive. Regional variation is significant, with the female participation rate varying from 12% to 27%, a range much larger than for its male counterpart, which is less than nine percentage points.
Morocco’s female participation rate has declined over time since 2005, despite rising educational attainment and declining fertility. As these factors typically raise female participation, this has been termed the “MENA paradox” (Assaad, et al., 2018[19]). This may reflect a U-shaped trajectory over time (Goldin, 1994[20]), as women in rural areas stop working in informal and agricultural jobs as household income increases, offsetting the positive effect of higher educational attainment, despite the high unemployment faced by well educated women. In international comparisons, however, Morocco’s experience with declining female participation is unusual; indeed, most comparators have seen stable rates and Türkiye’s has risen noticeably.
Closing the gender gap can play a key role in boosting growth as it has in OECD countries over past decades (Hsieh et al., 2019[21]). Some quantitative evidence suggests that the associated loss in terms of GDP per capita is as much as 46% (IMF, 2022[22]; Bargain, 2021[23]). If female participation could be boosted to 45% in the coming decade as envisaged by the New Development Model (Kingdom of Morocco, 2021[24]), that would add 1.7-2.4% per year to average per capita GDP growth until 2035 (Bouba and Azeroual, 2022[25]). Low levels of female labour force participation are not only detrimental to growth but may indicate missing household welfare and unjustified gender inequality (Pimkina and de la Flo, 2020[26]).
Those women who do work tend to be concentrated in informal jobs that lack social protection, with many working as unpaid family workers or in very low-wage jobs in agriculture (Bossenbroek and Ftouchi, 2021[27]). However, many of the most educated women work in the public sector. The latest data suggest that the overall monthly pay gap in favour of men is as much as 21%, though – with their higher average level of attainment – it is now 10% in favour of women for those 18-29 (HCP, 2024[28]).
Labour force participation rate, by age group and diploma
Note: The labour force participation rate is calculated as the labour force divided by the total working-age population. The working-age population refers to people aged 15 to 64.
Source: ILO Labour Force Survey and data provided by the authorities.
Tackling widespread informality requires a comprehensive set of policies, building on past initiatives and on-going reforms. Informality is determined by a range of factors including how the tax-and-benefit system shapes workers’ decision to work in the formal sector through taxes and social security contributions and the associated benefits, such as health insurance, unemployment insurance and pension coverage. High marginal tax rates and social contribution rates, especially on people with low earnings, and weak enforcement of tax and social security requirements can discourage formal participation. Similarly, tight labour market regulation in the form of strict employment protection legislation in the formal sector and high minimum wages can discourage formal sector participation by workers and businesses. Effective formalisation strategies need to take a comprehensive approach rather than focusing on a single factor (Box 3.1).
Similar to many emerging market economies, Morocco is characterised by pervasive informality. While informal work is an important source of livelihood for many households and allows firms to respond to adverse economic shocks, informal firms are characterised by lower productivity and workers in the informal sector earn lower wages. Widespread informality also has negative implications for revenue mobilisation, aggregate growth, and competitive dynamics in the formal sector.
The effectiveness of formalisation policies depends on the particular circumstances of informal firms and workers in each country. An integrated national formalisation strategy should involve multiple policy levers and should broadly aim to maximise the benefits of formality and increase the costs of informality.
Strategies used to reduce informality in other countries have included:
Decreasing the cost of entering the formal sector: Firms and workers may wish to enter the formal sector but are discouraged from doing so from high entry costs. This may be a result of complicated and costly registration processes or excess labour regulations. Reducing entry costs on both the firm side and the formal labour market can yield meaningful formalisation gains (Ulyssea, 2010[29]; Benhassine et al., 2018[30]; Ohnsorge and Yu, 2022[31]).
Reducing the ongoing cost of formality: Reducing the costs of formal sector participation, especially for firms and workers on the margins of formality, may be an attractive option to induce formalisation. This can include a lower corporate income tax for SMEs as research has shown that reducing the tax burden for small-scale entrepreneurs has a large effect on formalisation rates (de Mel, McKenzie and Woodruff, 2013[32]; Rocha, Ulyssea and Rachter, 2018[33]). Additionally, high mandatory social security contributions, especially for lower-wage workers, are cited as a major impediment for the expansion of formal employment (Arnold et al., 2024[34]). For instance, the cost of hiring workers at the minimum wage, including all social security-related contributions, amounts to 36% of GDP per worker in Latin America, compared to 22% of GDP per worker in OECD countries, contributing to heightened rates of informality in the region characterised by low enforcement (Ripani et al., 2023[35]; Arnold et al., 2024[34]).The lowering of the tax burden for firms and workers on the margins of formality can provide greater economic incentives for formalisation.
Enhancing the benefits of formality: This can include initiatives aimed to expand market access opportunities for formal firms through procurement opportunities (Box 3.3). From the worker's perspective, a more comprehensive health insurance coverage scheme meant for formal sector workers can be an important incentive for formal sector participation as was the case in Colombia (Camacho et al., 2014)
Increase the cost of informality: Greater enforcement of existing laws and regulation is also an important policy instrument for formalisation. Research has indicated that the deployment of additional municipal inspectors boosted firm registration rates by up to 27 percentage points in Brazil (de Andrade, Bruhn and McKenzie, 2014[36]). Enhanced enforcement should aim to ensure that no violations of existing legislation are committed, and that workers and firms pay their taxes (OECD, 2024[37]). Additional enforcement measures should focus on the extensive margin by emphasising firm formalisation, as placing too much of a focus on workers may worsen unemployment and poverty.
Digitalisation: The digitalisation of procedures to operate in the formal sector can boost formalisation by lowering compliance costs and strengthening deterrence mechanisms. The introduction of electronic VAT invoicing in Peru was found to have raised reported firm sales and value-added by over 5% in one year (Bellon et al., 2022[38]). Similarly, the rollout of computerised VAT invoices in China also strengthened incentives to register and correctly report sales, resulting in more than 10 percentage point improvement in government revenue collection after 5 years (Fan et al., 2018[39]).
Information provision: Firms and employees operating in the informal sector may not be fully aware of the benefits of formalisation (or the consequences of continued operations in the informal sector). When rolled out in conjunction with other interventions, informational campaigns to highlight the benefits of formalisation (or the costs of operating informally) have shown promise in boosting rates of formalisation (Ulyssea, 2020[6]; Jessen and Kluve, 2021[40]).
Reforms to the tax-benefit system
Large-scale ongoing reforms, combined with past measures, could have a significant impact on incentives to declare formal employment in Morocco through the extension of social insurance coverage and administrative improvements, and targeted tax changes. First, the authorities have created a new single unified social registry (RSU) to cover the entire population, which replaced the previous incomplete and fraud-prone system (CNSS, 2023). The relevant agency was established late in 2023, and 17 million people have registered. Most people enrolling in the system will have to pay at least some social security contributions, but vulnerable people will be exempted (Box 3.2). People enrolling in the system will get full access to the public health insurance scheme. Second, since 2021, the self-employed with annual turnover below either MAD 2 million (around USD 200 000) in industry, commerce and the crafts or MAD 0.5 million in other services have the option of a simple Unified Professional Contribution (CPU) to replace the personal income tax, the business tax, the municipal services tax and social charges in return for medical cover. This adds to the creation in 2015 of the status of auto-entrepreneur, whereby a self-employed individual is exempt from VAT and a presumptive tax of only 1% of turnover is charged if turnover is below MAD 200 000 in the services sectors (0.5% of turnover is charged if turnover is below MAD 500 000 in other sectors), and social charges of MAD 100-1 200 per month (USD 10-120) are levied (depending on turnover), but the person gains access to medical insurance. This programme has been a growing success: the number of auto-entrepreneurs has risen from 86 000 in 2018 to 406 000 in 2022, although there are significant revenue costs and the scheme is estimated to have a potential to enrol around 4 million people (Gannat and Betcherman, 2021[41]). A risk is that many who are already covered will declare lower incomes to get under the thresholds and qualify for its advantages, and also that these thresholds could at some point discourage business growth and vertical integration (Lopez-Acevdeo et al., 2023[7]).
The social reform implemented from the end of 2023 introduces a system of targeted social payments, together with extension of health coverage, for people who join the single unified social registry (RSU). This aims to improve social protection in a targeted way, partially replace the previous system of subsidies, narrow regional income inequalities and ensure dignity for all Moroccans, as well as to support people moving into work.
3.4 million have been determined eligible to access the new direct social payments, covering nearly 12 million people (of which 4.9 million children and 1.2 million seniors) (Gouvernment du Maroc, 2024[14]). Official projections are for expenditure on this programme to reach MAD 29 billion (1¾ per cent of GDP) annually by 2026.
The reform is expected to boost spending in the non-contributory component to 3.45% of GDP from 1.35%. Contributory social insurance in Morocco was 6.6% of GDP in 2019 (Lopez-Acevdeo et al., 2023[7]), compared to 11.7% in Tunisia and 10.9% in Egypt.
Eligibility is based on a score derived from a wide range of indicators based on family circumstances and consumption. All applicants for social benefits can use an online tool to calculate a score based on 70 socio-economic indicators (not including income), and only those below a programme-specific threshold are eligible for assistance. Having a large number of indicators, including consumption-based indicators, such as electricity consumption, and asset-based indicators, such as home ownership, rather than a simple income-based threshold is intended to limit the risk of fraud. Given the large proportion of informal work, income can easily be under-declared, while consumption and asset-based indicators may be more easily verifiable.
There are several different kinds of targeted direct payments under this programme, sometimes loosely referred to as “family allowances”. The first payment is a one-off payment for the birth of a child. A second is for families with children under 21, with a reduced amount if they are not in school. These programmes account for the bulk of overall spending. Handicapped children get a supplement. Third, all but affluent families with no children get an allowance. Fourth, there is a specific payment for widows with children under 21.
The social reform is expected to improve incentives to formalise by requiring registration in the system and conditioning health coverage on making a minimum social contribution for those above a certain threshold. The authorities aim for the extension of the social assistance programme and registration to allow targeting of activation measures towards parts of the population where inactivity is high or formal labour market participation is low. While some social assistance recipients do not have work capacity and providing benefits may have income effects that reduce incentives to earn more, the increased engagement with the authorities through registration and scoring provides a channel to target activation measures and supports to specific groups that need support. Expanding activation measures to a large population, sometimes with more complex needs, may require a substantial increase in the scale and resources of labour market programmes.
The social reform should be flanked by complementary reforms to strengthen formalisation. Despite the social reform, there is a risk that workers remain in the informal economy either in terms of employment or the declaration of their full earnings, while making contributions and being covered by social insurance. In addition, the score that determines eligibility for the cash benefit penalises households that are covered by social security, which could induce a large marginal loss for a household from formalisation. This feature of the scoring formula should be removed. There is evidence from other countries that targeting informal workers for expansion of social protection can have large adverse effects on incentives to formalise among beneficiaries (Garganta and Gasparini, 2015[1]).
At the same time, Morocco has been making its tax system simpler and more progressive (Bank Al-Maghrib, 2021), which should improve incentives to formalise. Specifically, it has implemented an initial 10% personal tax rate since 2010 that kicks in at almost 100% of average per capita GDP, compared with Tunisia’s initial rate of 26% and Egypt’s 2.5% that both apply from lower income thresholds (OECD, 2024a). The top rate is 38% and the labour tax wedge – the gap between gross wages (before income taxes and social security contributions) and take-home pay – for single earners without children is 25%, compared to the OECD average of 35% (OECD Taxing Wages 2023) (OECD, 2019). To reduce the administrative burden and improve incentives for firms to formalise, the 2024 budget implemented a new system of calculating VAT liabilities (autoliquidation) and two new VAT-withholding mechanisms, which are intended to improve tax transparency, tackle fake invoicing, broaden the tax net in digital services and encourage formalisation.
Formalisation incentives could be further boosted by cutting payroll taxes and ensuring an appropriate level of the minimum wage (Angel-Urdinola et al., 2016). The Tahfiz programme reduces the barriers to new hires in the formal economy by exempting new businesses created after 2015 from employer social security contributions for up to 10 new hires up to a monthly wage ceiling of MAD 10 000 for 24 months. The new hires are exempted from personal income taxes. This improves incentives for new hires but does not permanently reduce the costs for employing low-wage workers in the formal sector. The support is generous in the extent of these exemptions as it applies to wages many times higher than even the minimum wage in the formal sector. Cutting payroll taxes across new and old businesses but targeting those cuts to only those earning low wages would strengthen formalisation incentives. This was found by some studies to have been effective in Colombia in the years following its payroll tax cut in 2012 (OECD, 2019b).
Formalisation could be further encouraged by a tighter enforcement of tax and social security contribution requirements to reduce under-reporting of income. The government should strengthen enforcement of labour regulations by further increasing the number of job inspectors, their pay, and the size of the fines they may impose. Any firms found to be employing informal workers could be barred from eligibility for future public-sector contracts (OECD, 2023a), and any in the liberal professions found to be informal could be banned from practising them. Electronic wage reporting (at least for businesses with dependent employees) could be required as in Chile, allowing for the crosschecking of this information with the social security regime to prevent firms over-reporting their payroll for corporate income tax purposes and under-reporting it for social security contribution purposes. Additional measures to increase formalisation of firms and enforce their obligations could help (see Chapter 2).
Reforms to labour market regulation and enforcement
The Moroccan labour code requires complex written contracts and thus a significant share of jobs is handled through short-duration oral contracts or without any formal labour contract at all (Table 3.2). Even though official data show a steady shift to written contracts, except among the least educated, the authorities should consider introducing a simple standard written contract that could be used by default to raise the prevalence of formal contracts.
Source: OECD calculations based on data provided by the authorities.
Reforms of strict labour market regulations, notably dealing with minimum wages and employment protection, could help to ease the transition to stable formal employment. Morocco’s relatively high minimum wage (the SMIG), which is set through social dialogue, may act as a deterrent to formal work. The SMIG rose steeply between 2010 and 2012 but has fallen back somewhat in real terms since (Figure 3.8., Panel A). It is currently set at MAD 16.29 per hour (around USD 1.65) in the private sector (MAD 3 111.39 per month) and MAD 3 500 per month in the public sector and applies to all non-farm work. By international standards, it is rather generous relative to the level of income in the economy at almost 30% of GDP per worker (Panel B). The SMIG is scheduled to be raised by 5% in January 2025 and another 5% in January 2026. Even in the formal sector, where it is supposed to apply, compliance appears imperfect as 45.6% of all employees reported wages to the social security agency (CNSS) that were less than the SMIG in 2019. OECD experience shows that full compliance can be hard to achieve (OECD, 2022c).
Note: Panel A: In 2010 prices. Panel B: Data for the latest year (2021 or 2022).
1. Annual minimum wage obtained by multiplying the monthly statutory gross minimum wages, in US dollars converted using 2017 purchasing power parities (PPP, USD), by 12.
Source: World Bank WDI; ILOSTAT, Wages and Working Time Statistics Database.
The relatively high level of the SMIG tends to discourage formal-sector employment by pricing people out of the market (Angel-Urdinola, Barry and Guennouni, 2016[43]), especially the lower skilled, women and youth. While minimum wages are helpful to protect vulnerable workers, the social assistance system provides a less-distortionary approach to supporting the incomes of lower-income households. An HCP survey reported that 26% of firms (43% of large firms) surveyed in 2019 cited labour costs as a barrier to hiring (Haut-Commissariat au Plan (HCP), 2019[44]). The SMIG should be set taking into account the impact on formalisation incentives. To ensure an appropriate level of the minimum wage, it might be helpful to set up an independent commission that periodically reviews the level of the minimum wage, accounting for social and economic factors, such as the rate of productivity growth, as in France or the United Kingdom. To avoid negative impacts on formalisation, the authorities could envisage excluding some low-productivity sectors, applying a lower sector-specific minimum wage in some cases, as is already the case in agriculture or for domestic workers. Another option is to allow a special low rate for youth, whose productivity is lower and whose hiring is most at risk from a high SMIG level.
While employment protection laws are necessary to support the creation of high-quality jobs and protect workers from insecurity and unfavourable treatment, excessive regulations can be counterproductive by leading to jobs being created outside the formal sector or not at all (OECD, 2018). When applied to permanent contracts, it largely comprises of firing restrictions, whereas when it applies to temporary contracts, it is mainly hiring restrictions that are involved. While Morocco is not covered by the OECD indicator of the strictness of employment protection legislation (EPL), the OECD’s Multidimensional Review of Morocco (2017) included some estimates for 2013. They showed EPL to be significantly tighter in Morocco than in comparator countries and the average OECD country, both for permanent contracts (individual and collective dismissals) and temporary and agency contracts. It is unclear whether much has changed in the intervening decade, but this is consistent with other sources. Hiring and firing restrictions may also be hampering the labour reallocation process from agriculture and other low-productivity sectors to the higher-technology, more formalised sectors that have a foothold in Morocco, notably automotive and aeronautical manufacturing (Kuddo, 2018; Chauffour and Diaz-Sanchez, 2017). According to the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys (2023), 19.9% of surveyed firms considered labour market regulations as a major constraint, compared to an average of 12.1% in the MENA region and 10% in all surveyed countries. The 2019 HCP business survey found that 40% of surveyed companies (47% of industrial firms) view labour market regulation as a hindrance to their business development (HCP, 2019).
A number of labour market regulations are particularly burdensome for businesses. Unlike in the majority of other similar countries (Hatayama, 2021), fixed-term contracts are not permitted for permanent tasks, nor can they exceed 12 months in duration, though they can be renewed once. Easing these restrictions in a balanced way would allow for a larger role for temporary workers. Dismissals are difficult, as employers must consult with employee representatives even for single-person layoffs and, if applicable, union officials, and provide all necessary information regarding the reasons for the dismissal(s) and request third-party approval from regional authorities, which constitutes a significant barrier to business restructuring. Collective dismissals require an approved redundancy plan, which can be burdensome for mid-sized employers, who risk being stuck with excessive levels of staffing. Probationary periods cannot exceed 1.5 months (45 days) for white-(blue-) collar workers on permanent contracts (Gannat and Richardson, 2021), whereas many other countries have no such limits. Morocco had no such ceilings until less than a decade ago. Moreover, there are strict rules on overtime and night premia.
At first glance, the financial costs of dismissal are relatively low, allowing firms to adjust their workforces. Dismissal costs start at only 4.2% of monthly pay and rise with seniority to 15.2% after 35 years, whereas the corresponding figures with no seniority are 8% in Egypt and 5%-6.25% in Tunisia (Lopez-Acevedo et al., 2023). This is well-below OECD norms. However, average damages in the case of unfair dismissal are 1.5 months’ pay per year of seniority with a ceiling of 36 months’ pay. Workers often mistakenly see severance pay and damages as their rightful job-loss compensation and employers often respond with court action to avoid payment (Lopez-Acevedo et al., 2021a, p. 24). The tripartite agreement between the government and the social partners of 29 April 2024 foresees the continuation of negotiations on the reform of the labour code, aiming to strike a balance between the ease of doing business and protecting workers.
The number of labour-market inspectors is too low to deter informality effectively. Compared to an ILO benchmark for transition countries of one inspector for every 20 000 employees, Morocco until recently had only around half that number (Gannat and Betcherman, 20214; Kuddo and Moosa, 2019), far fewer than in Algeria and about a quarter the density seen in Jordan and Tunisia. Promisingly, their numbers have risen quite sharply in the past couple of years. Nevertheless, inspectors in Morocco are also responsible for supervising negotiations between employers and employees in the event of individual or collective labour disputes rather than just ensuring compliance with labour regulations and they resolve about 70% of all such conflicts. Creating a specialised public mediation service could ease the burden on the inspectorate. The government is increasingly able to cross-reference multiple computer databases in order to catch out fraud. In any case, it would be a wise move to work towards requiring all salary payments to be made via electronic transfer or at least not allowing any cash payments to be deductible for tax purposes to prevent employers from taking the informal option.
Taking a comprehensive approach to tackling informality by reforming the tax and benefits system, reviewing labour market regulations, and strengthening enforcement can have large positive effects on formalisation, as suggested by the experiences of Brazil and Chile (Box 3.3). Building on existing policies and on-going reforms would help to reduce informality more effectively in Morocco.
Brazil: Recent experiences show that using a combination of policy instruments can have a positive effect on inducing formalisation. Brazil introduced an integrated tax and social security contribution system for small and medium enterprises in 1996, SIMPLES, consolidating several separate federal tax and social security contributions into one single payment. The system reduced both the complexity of operating in the formal sector and reduced the tax burden for eligible firms, resulting in the formalisation of nearly half a million enterprises and over two million jobs (OECD, 2017b; OECD, 2013).
Revisions to the SIMPLES programme in 2007 (now known as Super SIMPLES) further reduced bureaucracy and the tax burden by incorporating state and municipal taxes, and social contributions into the system and exempting micro-enterprises from selected federal taxes (ILO, 2014). During this period, Brazil also rolled out complementary policies aimed at heightening enforcement through reforms in the labour inspection process in 1995. The reforms developed financial incentives to inspectors as the system awarded performance-linked bonuses granted in accordance with initial enforcement goals (Abras et al., 2018[14]). In addition, the development of common standards, enhanced monitoring of inspection quality, and increased options for labour inspections to resolve disputes have led to a 44% improvement in inducing formalisation following an inspection (Abras et al., 2018[14]). As a result of these initiatives, labour informality dropped substantially during subsequent periods from over 53% of total employment in 2002 to 36% by 2014 (Kerstenetzky and Machado, 2018[4]).
Chile: A major government-wide effort to induce formal sector participation through reforms to enhance the flexibility of the labour market was launched in the 1980s and the increased use of digital tools was accelerated beginning in the early 2000s. PreviRed, an online portal for declaring and paying for social security contributions was created, gradually bringing together all public and private schemes over time. Today, the platform contains more than 70 schemes including pensions, health, unemployment insurance, among other schemes, significantly simplifying the compliance procedures of operating in the formal sector.
Chile also began the steps towards integrating all forms of public procurement tenders into one single online portal: Mercado Publico. By 2017, more than 850 public institutions ranging from the central government to local hospitals manage tenders and make purchases in the system with formal registration a requirement for participating suppliers. The portal, with high rates of SME participation at 90%, indicates that enhancing market access opportunities for entrepreneurs can be a significant incentive for formal sector participation by raising the economic benefits to entry.
In 2013, Chile launched the Enterprise in a Day platform enabling entrepreneurs to establish, transform, and dissolve companies online. Procedures that previously took around three months have been reduced to five days and the cost of the start-up process fallen by more than 90% following the creation of the platform. Other concurrent policies that have positively contributed to formalisation include 1) the creation of a specialised legal status governing home enterprises with exemptions from selected licensing requirements (2002) and 2) a simplified tax regime for MSEs integrating and consolidating all forms of capital and labour taxation into one single levy (2014). Labour informality rates experienced a meaningful and sustained decline following these initiatives from over 40% in 2010 to 28% by 2018 (ILO, 2019).
High youth unemployment and a large share of youth neither in employment, education or training (NEET) in Morocco reflects difficulties of many young people in the transition from school to work. In the short term, the most direct policy to ease the school-to-work transition would be to strengthen active labour market policies and target them specifically to young people. In the medium term, reducing youth unemployment requires improving the school system to ensure that young people are equipped with labour market-relevant skills.
Active labour market policies need to be improved
The government has long made efforts to confront the problem of youth unemployment and ameliorate the lives of Morocco’s young people. Its approach to tackle the NEET problem has been to implement a year-long military service programme for around 200 000 19–25-year-olds, with an optional second year for up to 100 000 young people. An alternative social service option might be a useful addition, but this programme needs to be rigorously evaluated to ensure that it is maintained only if long-term labour-market outcomes are improved.
The government operates numerous active labour market policies, some of them focused on youth. However, the approach has been somewhat fragmented, with an excessive number of overlapping measures (Box 3.4). Some consolidation of the large number of measures, based on an in-depth systematic assessment of their effectiveness, would be helpful. To make the matching process of job offers and seekers more efficient it would be wise to seek to ensure that more of the jobless are registered with ANAPEC. One way to do this would be to automatically register those who obtain health-insurance coverage under the recent social reform and who are able to work. Furthermore, jobseekers should be required to take any jobs for which they are qualified in order to shorten excessively long spells.
The public employment agency, ANAPEC, established in 2000 but reorganised in 2022, had a budget of only MAD 240 million (USD 24.4 million) in 2022. Relatively few hires occur through its efforts, as most job search is undertaken through direct contact with employers and networking (Table 3.3).
ANAPEC recently developed a digital strategy to increase the quality of its services. It is responsible for managing a number of active labour market programmes, including the Tahfiz programme that exempts new businesses created after 2015 from the employer part of social security contributions and the payroll training tax for new hires, and employees from personal income taxes up to a wage ceiling of MAD 10 000 per month. ANAPEC also manages the government’s recently launched multi-pronged initiative Ana Moukawil to support 100 000 of the smallest firms and auto-entrepreneurs, many of whom are informal, with a budget of MAD 670 million over the next three years.
Key youth-focused programmes include the Idmaj programme that subsidises traineeships of up to two years’ duration with private-sector employers for those with at least a baccalauréat; beneficiaries pay no personal income tax, and employers pay no social charges nor any training tax but must agree to recruit 60% of their trainees at the end of their contracts, which seems to have been a binding constraint. In 2021, there were 117 000 of them. The Taehil programme has provided training for youths struggling on their insertion path by helping them to acquire professional qualifications or to reskill, especially where this is aligned with the expressed needs of expanding sectors like automotive and aeronautical manufacturing. Over 2017-2021, it had 115 000 beneficiaries. The Forsa and Awrach programmes aim to foster youth entrepreneurial activity but have fewer than expected beneficiaries.
L'Office de la formation professionnelle et de promotion du travail (OFPPT), which has a much larger budget than ANAPEC of some MAD 5 billion that is largely financed by the payroll training tax, is the public agency that oversees all vocational education and training, including initial vocational training. Bringing together more closely the OFPPT with ANAPEC could help to improve outcomes by enhancing coordination and eliminating duplication of efforts. In many OECD countries public training measures are handled by a single agency.
Source: OECD calculations based on data provided by the authorities.
Little has been done to quantitatively assess the value for money provided by most of the existing labour market programmes, although the Tahfiz has been evaluated, despite the potential costs and inefficiencies found in some programmes in other countries. There is a need for evaluation and consolidation of existing active labour market programmes. An exception is the Idmaj job-subsidy programme (Chatri et al., 2021): it was found to have significantly reduced the probability of unemployment only for women and those under the age of 24 (Chatri et al., 2021). But it also lowered wages and may have lengthened working hours and reduced social insurance coverage for those aged 25-34. No information was published about effects on income (as opposed to wages) nor on cost efficiency. The evaluation recommended shortening the contracts’ maximum duration, providing complementary employability training, and fixing differentiated salary ceilings that serve as the basis for tax and social-charge exemptions to counter the observed employer bias to low wages.
Reforms to enhance the quality of education are underway
The outcomes of Morocco’s education and school system have been relatively weak by international standards, but outcomes have been improving over the past decade and reforms are underway to enhance the quality of education. School is compulsory from age six until age 15 but, while significant progress has been made, dropout rates remain significant. Primary school enrolment on a net basis is now close to 100%, a substantial improvement compared to a decade ago. At the secondary level, 7-10% of children are estimated to drop out of school, an improvement from 12-14% in 2015, but still a significant concern (Figure 3.9). Dropping out of school is linked to pressure to work and difficulties in the education system, including excessive grade repetition and poor secondary school quality, especially in rural areas (Maghnouj et al, 2018). Girls may be required to help with household tasks and face refusal by a family member. Basic problems of costs and transport difficulties, including in remote and mountainous areas, also play a role.
Source: Ministère de l’Education Nationale, du Préscolaire et des Sports.
Young people still end their studies at an early age, although this has improved significantly. Around-two thirds of young people complete lower-secondary education, similar to but somewhat below some other MENA countries and well below OECD norms (Figure 3.10). Only around half of young people achieve a high-school diploma, up from 38% in 2010. There is still a large gender gap, with only 30% of girls compared with almost 45% of boys reaching that standard. The share of four- and five- year-olds in pre-school has reached nearly 80% in 2023, compared to only about 50% in 2018.
Share of the relevant age group who have completed lower-secondary education in 2022 or latest year
Note: The rate can exceed 100% due to several reasons, for instance "the numerator may include late entrants and overage children who have repeated one or more grades of lower secondary education as well as children who entered school early, while the denominator is the number of children at the entrance age for the last grade of lower secondary education".
Source: World Bank.
Educational challenges are increased by Morocco’s complex linguistic heritage (World Education News and Reviews, 2022). The Arab population faces the need to learn both Modern Standard Arabic, as well as the spoken Darija. A sizeable other group speak Amazigh at home, which is now an official language and is being introduced progressively into primary education with a budgetary allocation of around EUR 1 billion over the coming three years (Gouvernment du Maroc, 2024)). Much of the higher education system functions in French and science is commonly taught in French even below the tertiary level. English is now being taught from the first year of public lower-secondary school, two years earlier than previously, while it is taught already in primary school in many private institutions.
Educational outcomes as measured by test scores are weak relative to other countries that participated in the international 2022 PISA evaluation. The results indicate that the 15-year-old Moroccan participants were either the very lowest among all participants (in reading) or above only those from the Philippines (science) or the Philippines and Jordan (mathematics) (Figure 3.11). As in other countries, outcomes have deteriorated in all three subjects, in part reflecting disruptions to schooling from COVID‑19. However, the deterioration also reflects that more young Moroccans from marginalised populations sat the 2022 test than in 2018, with students from other groups doing about as well as in 2018 (OECD, 2023b).
Source: OECD, Program for International Student Assessment (PISA), 2022 Reading, Mathematics and Science Assessment.
Socio-economic status has a large and growing role in determining educational pathways, as in many other countries, constraining equality of opportunity and risking not making the most of the talents of those from less privileged backgrounds. A high-level socio-economic status (top two quintiles of the income distribution) plays a strong role in determining individual outcomes, including pre-primary enrolment rates; attainment and graduation rates, as well as PISA scores (Figure 3.12). The system is becoming increasingly dualistic, with private education gaining market share. From 2010 to 2021, the share of all schools that were private rose from 33% to 44%. This shift in market share may signal concerns about the public system, mainly by affluent families, but even low-income parents strive to send their children to private schools.
1. International quintiles refer to the distribution of students on the PISA index of economic, social and cultural status across all countries and economies.
Source: OECD, Program for International Student Assessment (PISA), 2022 Reading, Mathematics and Science Assessment.
The school system has suffered from a number of challenges. First, data from the 2018 PISA exercise showed that Morocco scored fairly weakly in teacher support for student learning in language-of-instruction lessons (55th out of 75) (OECD, 2019c). Learning outcomes showed uneven teaching quality and old-fashioned teaching methods. Second, teacher absenteeism remains a problem: a decade ago, it represented 7.5% of total teaching time (Maghnouj et al., 2018), and PISA 2018 referred to it as a big problem for 35% of all pupils. There are particular difficulties to find teachers to fill rural positions and to ensure that they attend class. Third, inadequate and decaying school infrastructure in both buildings and equipment has been a problem, notably in some outlying areas. Fourth, there has been a lack of accountability and an absence of clear responsibilities throughout the education system (Maghnouj, 2018), though some progress has been made in individual regional education and training authorities (AREFs) whose capacity varies. The central government has often passed useful reform legislation, but implementation has been lacking. Some more capable AREFs step up and adopt changes, but others do not, and information is poorly shared. Many micro measures have been piloted (often with foreign-aid funding), but they have not been well evaluated and the successful ones have not been scaled up.
The government has raised education spending as a share of GDP from 4.7% in 2017 to 5.8% in 2022, above most of its comparator countries and the OECD’s average of 4.3%. That will allow more investment in school infrastructure and an overhaul of recruitment, training, and payment of teachers. Resourcing no longer appears to be the main barrier to better outcomes, consistent with cross-country evidence suggesting that standardised test scores in Morocco are lower than in other countries with similar per pupil spending in primary education as a share of per capita GDP (OECD, 2017a).
Significant reforms are underway with the implementation of a roadmap to enhance school performance over 2022-26. This has focussed so far on the primary sector with the creation of 626 “pioneer schools” with 322 000 pupils that are applying new teaching methods and organisational principles (Box 3.5). Early results in both language and mathematics are promising (Gouvernement du Maroc, 2024). Follow-through in lower-secondary schools will start in the 2026-2027 year at the rate of 500 schools per year.
The authorities have put in place a roadmap for the reform of the education system over the period 2022-26 that focuses on strengthening the teaching of fundamental concepts, such as languages and basic mathematics; access to extra-curricular activities; and the reduction of school dropout rates.
These strategic objectives will be pursued by the gradual roll-out of a number of programmes that include the expansion of public early childhood education; a reform of teacher training and careers; a review of teaching methods, including the updating of school textbooks; as well as a certification scheme for schools that voluntarily participate in reform programmes and perform well on school evaluations.
A key element of the implementation of the roadmap is the establishment of “pioneer schools” that was launched for the primary sector in the school year 2023-24. 626 schools signed up voluntarily, amounting to about 9% of all primary schools, with the authorities’ stated objective of near universal coverage of primary schools by the school year 2026-27.
The “pioneer school” model is based on strengthened teacher training; the revision of teaching methods, notably through the adoption of the Teaching at the Right Level (TARL) teaching method that teaches fundamental concepts until they are mastered by students before moving on to the next concept; individual support for students in difficulty; the provision of digital teaching tools; as well as financial incentives for the teachers and schools to obtain a quality certification.
The “pioneer school” project will be independently evaluated at the end of the of the 2023-24 school year by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology-affiliated J-PAL research centre. The authorities will certify high-quality “pioneer schools” based on this evaluation. More evaluation will allow the adoption of proven pedagogical methods (Maghnouj et al., 2018) and quality certification of schools will strengthen accountability. Adoption of greater accountability, especially in schools in poor neighbourhoods has been shown to boost outcomes (Conseil Supérieur de l’Education, de la Formation et de la Recherche Scientifique, 2021).
Limiting grade repetition would help to lower dropout rates and should be replaced with a focus on providing more support to students who are struggling. Grade repetition has fallen over the past decade at upper-secondary levels to 13% but remains high at primary and lower-secondary levels (Elasraoui and El Omani, 2022). The government recognises that excessive grade repetition should be avoided at least in the early years of schooling, as scores in PNEA 2016 for those who have repeated were worse almost across the board (Conseil Supérieur de l’Education, de la Formation et de la Recherche Scientifique, 2017). It is much more prevalent than in other MENA countries –notably Egypt, where repetition is rarely used at all – according to the UNESCO Institute of Statistics. Grade repetition is experienced by 63.4% of children from the bottom income quartile, compared to 26.6% of those from the top quartile (Ministère de l’Education Nationale, du Préscolaire et des Sports, 2023). Replacing it by extra teaching support for those pupils who are falling behind, as foreseen in “pioneer schools”, would be a better solution with use of repetition limited to exceptional cases and requires resources to be allocated to this valuable work.
The rate of school dropouts needs to be reduced to raise average attainment. The Tayssir conditional cash transfer programme has a budget of MAD 4 billion (close to 0.3% of GDP) to subsidise families to keep two million students in school, and supplementary financial support is also provided to widows so their children can also stay in school. It was piloted in 2008 and then scaled up in 2013, reducing dropout rates from primary school by over a third, especially for girls. It also increased lower-secondary school enrolment for girls (Gazeaud and Ricard, 2021). The focus of the “pioneer schools” on the Teaching at the Right Level (TARL) method and individual support for students in difficulty (see Box 3.5) are positive steps, and the effect on dropout rates should be closely monitored. The expansion of the “pioneer school” model to lower-secondary schools from 2024-25 foresees a number of promising measures that should be fully implemented, including catch-up lessons of 4-8 weeks at the beginning of the school year to address gaps in knowledge and individual support for students in difficulty throughout the school year. A particular focus should be on girls, including by raising the awareness of the importance of education among students and families by reducing gender stereotyping in teaching materials. As a last resort for students that do drop out, the “second-chance school programmes” that aim to provide school dropouts with labour-market relevant skills, including soft skills, can complement prevention measures, but the focus should be on keeping young people in the school system or bringing them back once they have dropped out.
To improve teaching quality, salaries have been raised significantly and required qualifications and pedagogical training standards have been increased. Five years of post-secondary study and training will now be required. Demotivation among teachers is exemplified by the fact that teachers were significantly less satisfied with their jobs than the OECD average in PISA 2018 (Ministère de l’Education Nationale, du Préscolaire et des Sports, 2023) and that almost half of all teachers wanted to be transferred away from their current school (Conseil Supérieur de l’Education, de la Formation et de la Recherche Scientifique, 2021). In the context of lengthy strikes this school year (2023-2024), a settlement was reached with the five largest unions in late 2023. The new unified teacher status gives recent recruits the status of civil servants with all the associated benefits and a wage rise averaging MAD 1 500 net per month for starting teachers (around USD 150) and MAD 5 100 net for those at the end of their careers (around 30%), plus some improvement in working hours.
Incentives to raise teaching quality could be further strengthened by linking pay and performance. The unified teacher status adopted in late 2023 foresees expanding teacher evaluations based on measurable criteria, including participation in training measures and respect of professional rules. The next step should be to ensure that pay and career progression are to a larger extent based on merit rather than seniority. Placing a smaller weight on seniority in salary increases and a greater weight on teaching performance and the take-up of non-teaching tasks, as foreseen by the new unified teacher status, are positive steps that should be fully implemented. Providing stronger financial and career progression incentives for teachers who take up teaching positions in poor neighbourhoods or remote areas could help enhance the quality of education where it is most needed, while ensuring the career advancement of the most committed teachers.
The attractiveness of professional-track secondary education should be improved, as foreseen by the 2022-26 roadmap, including by building pathways between professional secondary degrees and access to tertiary education. A dearth of career guidance for students leads to mismatch between skills and demand. At upper-secondary level, only 15% of students in 2019-20 chose to enter vocational courses, while too many embark on university studies in areas with little private-sector labour market demand (notably humanities and law, economics and social science) (Lopez-Acevedo et al., 2021a). The government has now begun training specialised experts to strengthen career guidance, which begins at lower-secondary level. It should also provide intensified support for disadvantaged students, for example by facilitating connections between them and professionals in their desired fields (OECD, 2024e). The government is also raising the number of pathways between courses, so as to allow pupils to switch courses when they encounter obstacles or if their interests change. These measures could raise the relevance and attractiveness of professional-track secondary education, which would have the added benefit of keeping those students enrolled who may be most at risk of dropping out.
Relatively low female labour market participation reflects limited public support for childcare, as well as socio-cultural norms and discrimination. In 2016, an HCP survey found that over 60% of respondents thought priority in employment opportunities should be given to men and that working mothers could neglect the upbringing of their children (HCP, 2024b). According to a survey almost a decade ago, about half of Moroccan women said they were not allowed to work by their families, and many said they lacked adequate skills (Morikawa, 2015). While gender gaps in education attainment have shrunk in recent years (OECD, 2024f), far fewer women than men in the age bracket 15-24 are in education,(HCP, 2024b). The OECD Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI) suggests that the Moroccan labour market is more discriminatory overall than most other countries, notably than OECD countries, but better than most MENA comparators (OECD, 2024 forthcoming), and the situation has improved overall since 2019 (Table 3.4). However, Morocco performs worse on the economic dimension of the Index. Female full-time employees earn 16% less than corresponding men (HCP, 2023a).
Note: Measure is from 0 to 100. Higher values imply greater discrimination.
Source: OECD (2023), Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI) 2023 Global Report.
The government has recently launched the third programme for the promotion of gender economic inclusion and provides significant maternity leave and benefits. In Morocco, mothers working in the formal sector are accorded up to 14 weeks of paid leave, which is among the most generous in the MENA region (Hatayama, 2021), but in the private sector they receive only two-thirds of their salary, which is relatively low (OECD, 2017, Vol. 2). Mothers working informally are not eligible for such benefits. Evidence from Jordan, which recently implemented a maternity insurance scheme, is that such benefits do raise female labour force participation (ILO, 2021a), although the problem of finding replacement staff (at least for skilled workers) needs to be tackled. Women are also disproportionately responsible for elderly care, where few market-based options exist.
More support is needed to help women manage care responsibilities and work, as well as encouraging a more equal distribution of unpaid domestic work with men. Women have multiple claims on their time: according to UN Women, women and girls aged 15 and above spend 20.8% of their time on unpaid child and elderly care as well as other domestic work, compared to 3% spent by men; this ratio of seven is higher than the 5.9 MENA average (OECD, 2024 forthcoming). Measures to facilitate a better balance between women’s work options and family responsibilities would be welcome. According to the UN’s 2023 Gender Snapshot, on average Moroccan women work 2.8 hours per day more than men on home production (cooking and cleaning), despite the reduction in the burden of household chores over time due to labour-saving devices. Women would also benefit disproportionately from the ability to outsource domestic tasks. The availability of high-quality and affordable early childhood education and care (ECEC) is key. OECD evidence shows better childcare alleviates female participation disincentives and motherhood penalties (OECD, 2024b). Morocco has achieved significant progress in enrolling children above the age of 4 in pre-primary school. Extending public pre-primary education to children below the age of 4 would further improve female labour market participation incentives, as well as having positive effects on the development of children and promoting social inclusion.
Access to transport and financial inclusion of women need to be improved, particularly in remote rural areas. Innovative transport initiatives, such as dedicated, women-only transport options – which exist in Brazil, Egypt, India, Japan and Mexico – could be promoted by local and national authorities. Other promising initiatives include developing mobile apps that provide real-time information on transport schedules, routes, and safety features, as well as emergency response systems, as for instance emergency call buttons or apps within transport systems that allow women to quickly report incidents or harassment. More generally, gender perspectives should be integrated into all stages of transport policy development, planning and implementation. Improving financial inclusion could empower women who work to make their own consumption and saving decisions over their potential earnings. Possible measures include developing savings, insurance and investment products that cater to the specific needs of women and improving financial literacy, including by integrating financial education into the school curriculum to build financial skills from a young age. Discrimination against women could be better addressed by a more concerted attempt to remove discriminatory hiring practises through gender-blind processes and, more radically, by implementing positive discrimination in the form of management quotas in key sectors, as was done for boards of directors.
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