Development Co-operation Report 2020

4. Development co‑operation tested and responsive

Mags Gaynor
Development Co-operation Directorate, OECD

Anita King
Development Co-operation Directorate, OECD

Abstract

COVID-19 is an unprecedented test of the development co-operation community and system’s ability to react quickly, change gears when priorities shift, move and mobilise resources, and build and sustain a co‑ordinated global response. While a post-mortem may not be possible until the pandemic ends, this chapter examines how bilateral and multilateral actors have adapted so far. It showcases early evidence of innovative, flexible and effective policy and delivery responses and identifies bottlenecks to preparedness, as well as systemic strengths and weaknesses, notably systems for information sharing, planning and co‑ordination.

COVID-19 has put development co-operation to the test

• The international development response to COVID-19 has been most effective where it built on existing good practice, local knowledge and leadership, and where flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances was already built into systems and partnerships.

• Investments in risk management, crisis preparedness and addressing the interface of humanitarian, development and peacebuilding work have paid off, but development actors could have been more prepared - individually and collectively - for a global health shock.

• Many development agencies leveraged existing networks, and domestic and partner country structures to co-ordinate their efforts. However, co-ordinating a joined-up, coherent and transparent international response proved difficult.

• The critical role of strong national systems and leadership in crisis response came to the fore. Some systemic weaknesses revealed the need to step-up investments in country systems and capacity building.

• Local actors’, particularly civil society’s, contribution to sustainable development was reinforced during this crisis. Development agencies placed more trust in them and engaged politically in support of their work. However, local organisations on the front lines of the crisis struggle to access sufficient development finance.

• In the urgency to respond, other emergencies and crises risked being forgotten with efforts scaled back and appeals underfunded, leaving already vulnerable groups even more at risk.

• The pandemic provided an opportunity for repressive regimes to assume emergency powers with implications for governance and civic space. International development actors and DAC members’ ability and willingness to flex their combined diplomatic muscle in support of development objectives and human rights is crucial in such situations.

• The disproportionate impact of the socio-economic crisis on displaced and vulnerable groups, and on women and girls, is widely recognised. Translating this awareness into systematic actions to address their specific needs proved difficult. Women and girls should be placed at the centre of response plans to walk the talk on gender equality.

• A high share of official development assistance (ODA) for pandemic response was repurposed from existing programmes, posing challenges to long-term predictability and continuity in programming. Urgent questions emerged on the evidence base for effective allocations of existing ODA and on good practices for financing responses to global threats and challenges efficiently, equitably and inclusively.

• The pandemic and its secondary effects reveal the importance and challenge of applying lessons, evidence and evaluations during crises. Development agencies should be better prepared to conduct rapid learning, to access and share evidence to guide decision making, to support internal and cross-country learning, and to stay focused on development results for accountability and communication.

This chapter takes stock of how COVID-19 has challenged, tested and also brought out the best in development co‑operation. It does so in four parts. First, it briefly identifies how the COVID-19 pandemic spilled over from a rapidly evolving health crisis into a crisis for development. Second, it reflects on how individual governments and the development co-operation system as a whole co-ordinated their efforts. Third, it takes stock of how development actors have so far adapted and adjusted to new and heightened demands. A fourth section captures changes to development co-operation systems and approaches that are likely to outlast this pandemic, and considers what it might take to future-proof development co‑operation. Chapter 9 analyses preliminary estimates of international finance for the response and reflects on some of the difficult choices and trade-offs that governments had to make.

The COVID-19 pandemic defined development co-operation in 2020

The COVID-19 crisis has been unique in many ways – including in the uncertainties it created. First and foremost, very little was known about the virus itself and evidence on transmission shifted several times (Jones et al., 2020[1]; AUDA-NEPAD, 2020[2]). Additionally, it rapidly touched every nation in very concrete, yet different ways. Most OECD governments were faced with containing the virus at home before it hit developing countries. Indeed, Italy recalled the support it had received from other countries when it became the epicentre of COVID-19, to engage its citizens around a message of global solidarity when the time came to support developing countries in managing the impacts of the virus (AICS, 2020[3]).

As set out in the Overview and Part I, developing countries responded differently to COVID-19. Quickly spilling over from a health crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic put all economies and societies under severe strain. For low-income countries, it created the perfect storm. High levels of public debt and the need to massively increase public expenditure was coupled with an abrupt and unexpected loss of domestic revenue, further exacerbated by dramatic drops in remittances, private finance and foreign currency (Gurara, Fabrizio and Wiegand, 2020[4]; OECD, 2020[5]).

There are many lessons and new ways of working which could outlast the pandemic – if they are learnt and sustained.

COVID-19 also impacted development co-operation in different ways. The pandemic has shaken up working practices, partnerships and business models and put unprecedented strain on public finances. It has also prompted debates about the need to renew international governance and systems for providing global public goods as well as for global financial settlements, for example, International Monetary Fund (IMF) special drawing rights. Repatriation of international staff and travel restrictions in partner countries made it more difficult for development agencies to get the data and results information they needed to guide programming, manage risks and learn which responses were effective (OECD, 2020[6]). All of these challenges, combined with the critical need to invest in the fundamental enablers of resilience, provide new opportunities and ideas for strengthening the contribution of development co-operation to future preparedness for shocks. There are many lessons and new ways of working which could outlast the pandemic – if they are learnt and sustained.

As underlined in the joint statement of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in April, fighting the pandemic and addressing its impacts “demands a strong, co-ordinated, inclusive and coherent global response” (OECD, 2020[7]). At time of writing (November 2020) and against a backdrop of continuing uncertainty, it is too early to provide an in-depth assessment of how international development actors responded to COVID‑19. While DAC members mobilised resources with some success to respond robustly and collaboratively when the pandemic arrived, feedback from interviews and consultations with DAC members for this chapter and other evidence suggests that they could have been better prepared, individually and collectively, for a global health pandemic and crisis.

Official development assistance (ODA) continues to play an essential and unique role in supporting developing countries to face and cope with challenges: as concessional public finance focused on peoples’ welfare in developing countries, it goes where other (private) finance dares not, it has proven to be relatively stable and predictable (OECD, 2020[8]), it serves as a lever for policy reforms and policy coherence for development, and adds value when it builds systems and human capacity for sustainable development. Ultimately, the COVID-19 pandemic revealed a stark disparity between countries in terms of availability of finance, tools, institutional capacity and political will to mobilise support packages (Kharas and Dooley, 2020[9]). Faced with the same global shock, developing countries had drastically different capacities to respond and invest in recovery than advanced economies. Many depend on international private and public investment, including ODA, for an inclusive recovery. Yet that financing is falling very short (OECD, 2020[10]), and a funding crisis may be brewing on several fronts.

A rapidly evolving crisis

Early in the pandemic, statements by the DAC (OECD, 2020[7]) and other bodies recognised that COVID‑19 would have a distinct and devastating impact on vulnerable countries and populations, and on women and girls in particular. Avoiding a health crisis in these countries was urgent, but it was quickly apparent that the COVID‑19 pandemic had not changed developmental and basic human needs. Rather, it was amplifying and expanding existing levels and forms of human suffering and vulnerability.

Priorities quickly evolved and needs escalated as containment measures took a toll

Initially, the international response to COVID-19 focused on health concerns, seeking to minimise transmission and enhance capacity to provide care for infected people while protecting front-line workers. Public health and health sector initiatives quickly received wide-ranging support from development agencies: testing was ramped up using rapidly accredited local laboratories, drugs were approved, epidemiological models for various scenarios were developed. In light of stiff global competition from wealthier countries, OECD governments and multilateral organisations supported developing countries to procure protective equipment and other essential supplies. Public health information was an immediate priority to target misinformation and to encourage behaviours known to contain transmission (wearing masks, social distancing, minimising travel and large gatherings, etc.). Many of these public information campaigns built upon community-based approaches developed during the 2014‑16 Ebola outbreak. Humanitarian corridors were set up and humanitarian assistance programmes adapted or expanded to deliver essential services such as cash, food, water and sanitation and to protect populations, including from domestic and gender-based violence. The United Nations (UN) Global Humanitarian Response Plan, which aggregated appeals from seven UN agencies, expanded its funding call from USD 2 million in April to USD 9.5 million by September (See Figure 1 in Overview).

By the second half of the year, it was clear that measures to contain the virus were particularly impacting the most vulnerable people with risks of increased gender inequalities (OECD, 2020[11]) (OECD, 2020[12]). In tandem with containment efforts and humanitarian assistance, the focus of development agencies shifted to resuming or expanding public health and education programmes, providing longer term income support, investing in systems to monitor the wider effects of the virus, and protecting jobs and livelihoods. In spite of national and international efforts, by October, the World Bank estimated that 2020 would be the first year since 1990 that extreme poverty has increased (World Bank, 2020[13]).

Virus containment measures had troubling domino effects

In October, Freedom House estimated that governance had declined in 80 countries since the start of the pandemic (Repucci and Slipowitz, 2020[14]). A situation report compiled by the DAC Governance Network based on information from over 100 countries shows clearly the pandemic’s diverse impacts on governance practices, such as the increased concentration of power in central governments and the disruption of election cycles. The report also highlights that state capacity and public trust in leadership are critical in responding effectively to the pandemic.

Civil society actors have been playing essential roles in the COVID-19 response (CIVICUS, 2020[15]). In some settings, however, restrictions on individual freedoms and civic space resulting from surveillance measures, lockdowns, physical distancing measures, and new legislation and controls put in place to contain the pandemic have severely hampered the ability of civil society organisations (CSOs) to operate (CIVICUS, 2020[16]; ICNL, 2020[17]).On top of these new challenges, COVID‑19 hit in a context that was already characterised by increasing global fragility and growing inequality (OECD, 2020[18]). Systemic risks, like climate change and biodiversity loss, economic instability, and political unrest in many areas are heightening uncertainty about the future. For many people in situations of conflict, violence, displacement or abject poverty, COVID-19 has simply amplified existing needs.

In several cases, existing crises were forgotten in the immediacy and urgency of COVID-19. As international political leadership shifted attention to the pandemic, they deprioritised crises and issues that were important before the outbreak (OECD, 2020[19]). Wars are still being fought in Libya, the Syrian Arab Republic, Yemen and elsewhere; indeed, COVID-19 makes it all the more urgent to address these challenges and situations (OECD, 2020[19]).

Yet the pandemic is limiting the international community’s capacity to support peace efforts and some actors note that international responses to COVID-19 have not been sensitive to conflict situations. The combination of risk of infection and the banning of flights had the effect of scaling down some essential activities. For example, several peacekeeping missions entered into a force protection mode, limiting operational activities (OECD, 2020[19]; Security Council Report, 2020[20]). With UN special envoys unable to travel, diplomatic work was curtailed and mediation initiatives (e.g. in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) were cancelled. Efforts in global refugee settlements were put on hold (UNHCR, 2020[21]), leaving forcibly displaced people particularly vulnerable (OECD, 2020[22]).

Mixed co-ordination story

Identifying and tracking needs required new tools

In the pandemic’s early months, it was extremely difficult to identify and quantify needs. Knowledge about the virus was changing fast; testing was unreliable and not widely available.

A number of co-ordinated plans and appeals emerged from the multilateral system. In February, the World Health Organization (WHO) rapidly outlined the public health measures that the international community could support in its Strategic Preparedness and Response Plan. In March came the Global Humanitarian Response Plan, followed a month later by the UN socio-economic framework, which provided a wider lens on the impact of COVID-19 and a stronger, coherent narrative for the UN’s COVID‑19 response. By June, the UN INFORM Epidemic Risk Index had been adapted to help prioritise “countries at risk from health and humanitarian impacts of COVID-19 that could overwhelm current national response capacity” (UN, 2020[23]). An initial overview of lessons from the UN socio-economic response noted that different UN agencies use different approaches and tools to identify the most vulnerable, and that this may have hampered efforts to prioritise and target interventions (UNDP, 2020[24]). The rapid transition to virtual networks meant that Internet access increasingly determined who could be consulted, impacting organisations’ ability to access and gather information. Over time, global monitoring and reporting systems have improved. However, different monitoring systems continue to be used by UN agencies, and there is scope to build a more holistic picture of what is needed, what is being funded and what is being achieved.

OECD governments also developed tools to assess and track needs and to identify what others were doing. Initially, many of these tools were internal and specific to individual organisations. As described in Box 4.1, USAID developed analytical and qualitative tools to guide decision making as the crisis rapidly evolved. Sweden also relied on information from its embassies and complemented its Multidimensional Poverty Analysis tool with additional guidance in May 2020 to help staff to identify the medium- and longer term consequences of COVID-19. In March, the OECD States of Fragility Platform started tracking over 20 key indicators pertaining to the impact of, or response to, COVID-19 in fragile contexts for public use. Several newly developed tools capture elements of the international response, among them the WHO COVID-19 Partners Platform, a UN joint data portal, the COVID-19 Global Gender Response Tracker co‑ordinated jointly by the UNDP and UN Women, and the Global Innovation Exchange (Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2020[25]).1 Feedback from DAC members indicated that many of the challenges with pulling together programme and funding information in this context reflect data gaps in development co-operation that predate COVID-19.

Box 4.1. USAID: Identifying priorities and responding to needs as the pandemic evolved

On 7 February 2020, USAID made available USD 100 million from its Emergency Reserve Fund to support the health sector response of countries most in need. By July, the United States had pledged USD 1.5 billion for international support. Timelines to commit these funds were often as short as two weeks, requiring USAID’s COVID-19 Task Force and staff to rapidly assess needs and ensure funding was reaching the right places as the situation quickly evolved.

Initially, a modelling tool was used to identify the most affected or at-risk countries, using a set of qualitative and quantitative factors, such as current case numbers, the strength of health systems and levels of urbanisation. Where there was little official data, the model used proxy measures. USAID mission colleagues were ultimately responsible for defining how funding would be used in their respective countries. As the pandemic rapidly evolved, all missions were involved in defining priorities. Decisions were informed by evidence. For example, over the first few months of the pandemic, USAID‑funded humanitarian assistance focused primarily on health and water, sanitation, and hygiene initiatives. By June, partners were reporting dramatic increases in hunger and USAID pivoted to focus on food assistance in rural and urban areas.

As the scale and complexity of the crisis became clear, it became more challenging to get an overview of other countries’ efforts and to identify where USAID could add value. A funding tracker was maintained in USAID to keep abreast of pledges and programmes announced by other development actors. A number of complementary tools assessed the broader impacts of the pandemic, such as economies, democracy and gender-based violence.

From June to October 2020, USAID started looking to the future. An Over the Horizon Strategic Review was initiated to prepare the agency to meet the challenges and opportunities of a world altered by COVID-19. The review team was charged with assessing the current global landscape and potential future scenarios, and developing actionable recommendations to adapt USAID policies, programmes and operations accordingly. The review engaged approximately 20 USAID missions, spanning every region, and approximately 75 technical experts. Partner roundtables were held with stakeholders from around 75 different organisations including implementers, think tanks and academia. Through the exercise, USAID established three strategic objectives to focus assistance on addressing pressing challenges exacerbated by COVID-19, by: building more stable and resilient systems; responding to rising poverty, food insecurity and lost educational opportunities; and strengthening strained public and private health systems and health security. It also identified a set of focus countries in which to pursue these objectives and developed 32 specific recommendations for implementation.

Source: Interviews with senior members of the USAID COVID-19 Task Force; USAID (2020[26]), Over the Horizon Snapshot, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/USAID_Over_the_Horizon_Snapshot.pdf.

Joint statements indicated a sense of global and regional solidarity

The early months of the pandemic prompted many expressions of global and regional solidarity. In April, DAC members jointly committed to strive to protect ODA levels (OECD, 2020[7]); at the November High Level Meeting, members reaffirmed this commitment and reiterated the importance of ODA to address the immediate health and economic crises and support longer term sustainable development. In May, heads of the Arab Coordination Group institutions2 issued a joint communiqué announcing a co-ordinated initiative to mitigate, contain and recover from the negative impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic (Islamic Development Bank, 2020[27]) (See Chapter 9). Leaders of 58 countries issued a joint statement on the importance of protecting sexual and reproductive health and rights and promoting gender responsiveness in the COVID-19 crisis (French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, 2020[28]). While these examples of co-ordination reflect the potential of the development system to come together in recognition of shared needs and goals, joint statements have not proven sufficient for delivering prioritised and co-ordinated action in a joined-up way.

More deliberate and systematic processes for crisis response could increase co‑ordination

The escalating needs, differential impacts and limited resources available to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic made it essential to have effective co-ordination underpinned by comparable, comprehensive evidence and open data. The need for better co-ordination and more real‑time information sharing between development actors was flagged at global and regional levels, in partner countries, and across individual OECD government systems. Several new ad hoc co-ordination efforts provided opportunities to do so. These include the Development Ministers Contact Group on COVID-19 convened by Canada and the United Kingdom with membership comprising Australia, the EU, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and the United States, and exchanges between chief economists convened by Sweden, the United Kingdom, the OECD and the World Bank.

Resources were often allocated based on the presence of existing partners and where countries had the capacity to apply for them, rather than based on a division of labour between providers to avoid duplication and better matching of resources to needs.

Nevertheless, deliberate and systematic co-ordination of development co‑operation priorities, responses and synergies, notably among members of the DAC, did not emerge. A number of DAC members reported during interviews conducted for this chapter that they initially allocated their bilateral resources without a clear overview of priority needs and channels for support, or of other actors’ responses. As a result, resources were often allocated based on the presence of existing partners and where countries had the capacity to apply for them, rather than based on a division of labour between providers to avoid duplication and better matching of resources to needs. This raises a question as to whether a more deliberate strategy for crisis co-ordination would help international development actors to focus limited resources between and within countries when dealing with crises that have such a global impact.

Efforts to co-ordinate were evident by regional actors and institutions

Several important co-ordination initiatives for the overall COVID-19 response built on existing regional structures. The Team Europe approach was facilitated by more regular inter-ministerial meetings and enhanced internal European Commission (EC) co-ordination, as outlined by Commissioner Urpilainen in her “In My View” piece. Team Europe has demonstrated the potential of the EU to pool efforts and resources and advocate collectively for a shared agenda (Box 4.2). In Southeast Asia, members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) held video conferences with their Chinese, Japanese and Korean counterparts to exchange information and identify needs for technical support and medical supplies (Kalinina, 2020[29]). In the Pacific, Australia and New Zealand worked with the Pacific Islands Forum to deliver essential humanitarian support and services (Box 4.3).

Box 4.2. Team Europe: From emergency response to driver of EU development effectiveness

By Niels Keijzer, German Development Institute/Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)

The European Commission moved swiftly to mobilise a new “Team Europe” response to the reverberating impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. It was announced on 8 April as “the Global EU response to COVID-19”; soon after lockdowns were imposed across Europe and on the same day that European Union (EU) development ministers convened their first virtual meeting.

This initial EU response focused on a mutually beneficial, quick reaction to meet developing countries’ immediate needs. In part because the EU was nearing the end of its seven-year budget cycle, much of the Team Europe proposal and accompanying press releases focused on reallocating development co‑operation funds over the remaining months of 2020. These were complemented by bilateral contributions from member states, the European Investment Bank, and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

A follow-up EU ministerial meeting held on 8 June adopted a political statement that signalled an ambition for Team Europe to expand beyond a response to direct needs and economic consequences caused by the pandemic. It suggested Team Europe should also inform the EU’s medium- and long‑term development co-operation planning. Through a series of highly visible joint projects, the Team Europe concept is driving debates on what “working better together” could mean in practice, including co-operation within international fora and action on debt relief. Team Europe may provide a welcome new dynamic to the EU’s collective effectiveness in the field of development policy and promote new understandings of the complementarity between the EU and its member states.

Box 4.3. Regional co-ordination in the Pacific: The Pacific Humanitarian Pathway on COVID-19

Remote geographies, limited resources, vulnerable health systems, and reliance on international trade and transport make Pacific Island countries particularly vulnerable to the COVID-19 pandemic. By April, when most Pacific governments had declared a state of emergency, the Pacific Islands Forum invoked the Biketawa Declaration, a framework agreed in 2000 for co-ordinating responses to regional crises. Out of this came the Pacific Humanitarian Pathway on COVID‑19, a co-ordination platform to facilitate the movement of essential medical and humanitarian assistance across the region with clear backing at the political level.

Australia and New Zealand prioritise the Pacific in their international development co‑operation programmes. In their responses to the pandemic in the Pacific, both countries actively supported regional ownership by using and strengthening existing co-ordination structures. Australia complemented the Pathway by maintaining an essential services and humanitarian corridor, mobilising its defence and customs agencies and official development assistance (ODA) resources to deliver personnel and critical infrastructure, including the delivery of GenEx testing kits. By July, Australia had committed more than AUD 205 million (Australian dollars) (USD 147 million) to COVID-19 response in the Pacific and has since allocated additional funding to ensure Pacific countries achieve full COVID‑19 immunisation coverage once vaccines are available. New Zealand supported Pacific partners with an initial NZD 50 million (New Zealand dollar) (USD 33 million) package to help prepare health systems and address wider health, economic, governance and social challenges. Where it was not possible to get advisors on the ground, New Zealand stepped up general budget support.

While the Pathway focused on responding to the immediate health and humanitarian needs, Pacific Island countries are likely facing long-lasting challenges as remittances and tourism have declined drastically and international trade continues to be disrupted. Nevertheless, the Pathway is a strong test case for regional leadership and ownership and a success to build on – not least when it comes to ensuring equitable distribution of vaccines and treatments when these are available.

Source: Information provided by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

A range of whole-of-government, nationally focused co-ordinated efforts

Efforts to strengthen communication and co-ordination of development co-operation nationally also emerged. In particular, OECD governments became more aware of the impacts of their domestic policies such as health and migration on developing countries. The COVID-19 crisis accelerated a rethinking of health services in New Zealand that had initially been prompted by a 2019 measles outbreak, with health services in the Pacific now seen in a regional context rather than as either a domestic or international issue. Australia extended the validity of migrant worker visas recognising that these workers are important both for the remittances they send home to Pacific Island countries and for Australia’s agricultural sector. In Sweden, building on existing structures for cross-ministerial collaboration and decision making, more frequent exchanges across ministries provided an opportunity to sensitise health officials to the effects of COVID‑19 in developing countries. Increased awareness across EU governments of developing countries’ concerns also helped promote an EU position that stresses global and fair access to vaccines.

Within OECD countries, there were efforts to co-ordinate across society, particularly with civil society partners to jointly identify priorities and build coherent and co-ordinated responses to COVID-19. Examples include virtual town halls in Canada featuring the Minister for International Development (Ontario Council for International Cooperation, 2020[30]); a dialogue convened with a consortium of French CSOs working abroad to inform the strategy and priorities for the French government; and in Italy, an inter-institutional and multi-stakeholder task force comprising representatives of line ministries, CSOs, and private sector and other stakeholders to inform the Italian government’s strategy. These dialogues should help to draw a range of evidence, perspectives and considerations into decision-making processes.

In developing countries, country leadership has been key to effective co-ordination, as seen in Mozambique (Box 4.4) as well as Ghana, where USAID helped the presidential co-ordinator to develop Ghana’s approach. In many cases, existing mechanisms such as UN country teams or humanitarian response platforms became national partnership platforms or command centres by expanding to include government authorities, international finance institutions, and private sector and bilateral donors. In sharp contrast, where national leadership was weak or absent, or national responses infringed on individual rights, development co-operation actors found it very challenging to act outside of existing sector co‑ordination groups, thus limiting opportunities for a more coherent response.

Box 4.4. Mozambique: Effective co-ordination under strong national leadership

For Mozambique, one of the world’s poorest countries, COVID-19 constituted an economic and public health emergency requiring urgent support and action. In response, and to protect investments in developing Mozambique’s health service over many years, an International Community COVID-19 Task Force worked with the government to build a national COVID-19 response. The response was led by the Mozambican Prime Minister. Working with the European Union and the private sector, the task force co-ordinated efforts by key stakeholders in Maputo and all main funders of Mozambique’s health system, including: the African Development Bank; the International Monetary Fund (IMF); the United Nations; the World Bank; the EU Delegation; and the embassies of Canada, Ireland, Korea, the Netherlands, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States. As a result, USD 13 million in international funds were repurposed and made available to the Ministry of Health on the day it launched Mozambique’s initial COVID-19 plan. The group, chaired by Ireland, also helped frame the government’s national response plan, ensuring appropriate actions were prioritised and funds directed to where they were most critically needed and most impactful.

By August 2020, key achievements included increasing capacity for COVID-19 testing and modelling on different epidemiological scenarios; mobilising faster procurement and delivery of personal protective equipment and other essential equipment; the roll-out of an innovative social cash transfer programme to the poorest communities involving mobile money; development of a COVID-19 resource tracking tool to enable real-time information flows, decisions, funding and prioritised actions; and on line support to develop safe operating procedures for COVID-19 patient care and health workers. The collaboration contributed to reducing the negative impacts of COVID-19 in Mozambique and has maximised opportunities for recovery.

Source: Irish Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

Investments in preparedness proved important but insufficient

Over the past 20 years, shocks and complex crises have prompted incremental improvements in development co-operation systems and humanitarian assistance. The establishment and operation of refugee camps in Rwanda in the 1990s led to a strong focus on protection issues and introduced the concept of minimum quality standards, which helped professionalise humanitarian assistance. The Indian Ocean tsunami (2004) triggered a humanitarian reform and co-ordination agenda. Earthquakes in Pakistan (2004) and Haiti (2010) and Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines (2013) highlighted the power of local response and the importance of working with national governments (Alexander, 2020[31]). The interlinked financial and food crises of 2008-09 placed new emphasis on demonstrating results from development co‑operation and using ODA to leverage other forms of support for developing countries. In the public health sphere, previous outbreaks of zoonotic diseases3 demonstrated the need for effective international co-ordination, multi-sectoral responses, global health surveillance systems, and building community trust and engagement.

Specific to health sector preparedness, several OECD governments had made long-term investments to help low-income and lower middle-income countries prepare for preventing, detecting and responding to health threats, for instance through programmes that strengthen health security and preparedness such as the United Kingdom’s Tackling Deadly Diseases in Africa Programme, which began in 2017, and investments in strengthening health systems. The global health system was nonetheless unprepared for a pandemic despite the fact that scientists have been sounding warnings of a coronavirus pandemic for almost 20 years (The Lancet COVID-19 Commission, 2020[32]).

As for the preparedness of development actors, DAC members recognise that they could have been better prepared for a crisis of the magnitude and scale created by COVID-19. Their ability to respond quickly and coherently while taking risks in a rapidly changing context was largely built on existing structures, showing the value of discussions over the past decade on disaster risk reduction and how systems can integrate humanitarian and development efforts. But while many members had a combination of risk registers, business continuity plans, crisis response plans, contingency budgets and rapid funding instruments in place, none had run through probable crisis scenarios to test their systems. Only a few countries – the United Kingdom in particular – mentioned having surge capacity to mobilise additional staff to support countries to manage crisis situations. Very few had tested their capacity to manage several crises at once. Exercises such as USAID’s Over the Horizon review (see Box 4.1) and foresight processes such as those led by the OECD (OECD, forthcoming[33]) may prove helpful in systematically considering what preparedness means for the international development system and individual organisations under different scenarios (See also Box 7.4 in Chapter 7).

Taking stock of the response so far

The pandemic’s impacts are still evolving, as are the responses from the development community. While it is impossible to give a comprehensive assessment of efforts to date, development co‑operation actors themselves have adapted and adjusted to new demands, often working in newly flexible and innovative ways. As time goes on, it will be important to assess how different approaches have fared in terms of enabling co-ordination, helping to align limited resources to needs, and providing timely resources to local, front-line organisations. Six specific insights can be identified from the research conducted for this chapter.

1. Multilateral institutions were in a position to act quickly and at scale

Multilateral institutions played a critical role. In the current strained context for multilateralism, the significance of this should not be overlooked, with continued tensions between some of the world’s leading trade and economic powers (OECD, 2020[34]; 2020[35]). These, along with policies that undermine norm‑setting institutions and other isolationist and arbitrary actions (e.g. calls to defund the WHO and blocking of new special drawing rights), represent very real threats to the effective functioning of the multilateral system. Nevertheless, the manner in which multilateral institutions, backed by member states, facilitated the global and regional response – demonstrating agility and reach – provides some reassurance. Global leadership and collective efforts, such as collaboration around equity of access to vaccines and treatments, may strengthen the system as a whole and boost its capacity and preparedness for future crises (Box 4.5).

The crisis magnified the unique capacity of multilateral development banks and financial institutions to allocate funding at scale (OECD, 2020[36]). The International Finance Corporation and other lenders have, for example, supported countries and private companies to preserve jobs, often bringing a strong focus on women’s empowerment. The analysis, access and networks of multilateral institutions – coupled with their ability to work with and through partner governments – supported quick responses within existing governance structures and across many programmes and sectors. While the shock of COVID-19 has placed pressure on the IMF and other institutions’ resources, and tested their ability to provide a global social safety net for the poorest countries in the case of a simultaneous global shock, their role has so far proven essential in the crisis. There is nonetheless room for improvement. As time goes on, there is increasing criticism of the speed at which multilateral organisations are disbursing funds to developing countries and the extent to which they are focusing on poverty and vulnerability outside of humanitarian action (Duggan et al., 2020[37]; Igoe, 2020[38]). A planned analytical study of the multilateral system’s response to COVID-19 to be conducted by the Multilateral Organisation Performance Network (MOPAN) in 2021 will allow a fuller assessment of the multilateral response to COVID-19.

Multilateral institutions also continued to deliver on their core mandates and activities, such as global surveillance, peace-keeping efforts and humanitarian assistance, and provided airlifts for the delivery of critical supplies and personnel in the absence of commercial airline flights. Similarly, multilateral actors and institutions are critical to ongoing efforts to develop and distribute vaccines and treatments, with the World Health Organization playing a key convening role and setting standards at the international level.

While multilateral institutions responded to the pandemic in line with their own goals, many also collaborated in new, and potentially more effective, ways. Where lending was not possible – for example in the Islamic Republic of Iran and Yemen – the UN and World Bank worked in innovative partnerships to provide grants delivered via multi-donor trust funds.4 The pandemic has also advanced UN reform: UN resident co-ordinators report that co-ordination improved among UN agencies in countries including Moldova, Myanmar and Zambia. UN country teams in Nigeria and Togo have also set up COVID‑19 multi‑donor trust funds to encourage joint agency action (UNDP, 2020[24]; UN, 2020[39]).

Box 4.5. The critical next challenge: Ensuring equitable access to vaccines and treatments

Given the scale and immediacy of need, ensuring the equitable distribution of vaccines and treatments for COVID-19 to all countries is an urgent, global challenge. Achieving this objective requires global solidarity and international co-operation by all relevant actors to raise resources and sustain investment over several years.

Distribution and access to vaccines are not new to the development agenda

Development co-operation actors are well placed to support the vaccine effort. The Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations and Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, established two decades ago, have been working with pharmaceutical companies to lower prices and ensure that the poorest countries have access to vaccines and treatments. OECD governments, including those of Norway and the United Kingdom, showed leadership and support for this work well before the current pandemic. Some have scaled-up their efforts in light of COVID-19. The European Commission, France, Germany and Norway are pushing actively for universal access to COVID-19 vaccines and treatments as part of their response.

Developing economies also play a role in the research and manufacture of effective treatments and vaccines. A consortium launched in July by the African Union Commission aims to bring together global vaccine developers, funders and African organisations to conduct clinical trials. With the production of generic drugs already happening in developing economies, they have called for provisions of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, or TRIPS, to be applied to COVID‑19-related intellectual property so that they can produce COVID-19 pharmaceuticals to ensure access for all countries (WTO, 2020[40]). The transfer of knowledge and know-how will be an important complement to these provisions.

COVAX is a completely new form of partnership for innovation, procurement and global solidarity

The Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator, which was launched in April 2020, and the ACT‑Acceleration Facilitation Council co-chaired by the President of South Africa and the Prime Minister of Norway are galvanising international support for equitable access to COVID-19 tests, treatments and vaccines. The Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations, Gavi and the World Health Organization co‑ordinate COVAX – the vaccines pillar of the ACT-Accelerator – which should expedite vaccine development and manufacture and ensure fair and equitable access to vaccines (See also In My View by Berkley). COVAX uses the collective buying power of high-income countries to bring a vaccine to the market quicker and at a lower price than would otherwise be the case. Over 180 countries and economies have joined COVAX, including 92 low- and middle-income economies that are eligible for support. The Advanced Market Commitment, the needs-based instrument of COVAX financed largely through official development assistance (ODA), works to support developing countries that cannot afford to self-finance their access to vaccines. As of September 2020, nine candidate vaccines were part of the COVAX initiative, with a further nine under evaluation, giving COVAX the largest and most diverse COVID-19 vaccine portfolio in the world (Berkley, 2020[41]).

Putting ACT-A on a sustainable financing path remains a significant challenge. As of November 2020, USD 4.6 billion was urgently needed by the ACT-Accelerator, with a further USD 23.9 billion needed to finance activities through 2021 (WHO, 2020[42]). ODA clearly has an important role to play in ensuring equitable distribution and access to vaccines in developing countries (OECD, 2020[43]).

2. OECD governments play an essential complementary role

Bilateral engagement by OECD governments, particularly when backed by a strong and stable presence in countries, plays an important diplomatic role supporting political dialogue, particularly on issues of public financial management, governance, and civil society space and human rights, while also delivering programmes that are responsive to local contexts and needs. Local knowledge and insights on COVID-19 also helped OECD governments to pivot and adapt their own programmes and to inform and shape multilateral responses through the executive boards.

Reflections from previous crises in Haiti, Liberia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sierra Leone and Timor Leste have repeatedly highlighted that the most relevant and sustainable programmes come from local responders and support for local solutions. In recognition of this, embassies and country offices channelled significant resources to local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in developing countries. Belgium, Ireland and Sweden encouraged their existing local partners and networks to identify and address niche areas where they had capacities and expertise, while USAID drew on its vast local network (Box 4.1). Australia and Denmark focused on helping local businesses, particularly those run by women.

In supporting local and national responses in developing countries, several OECD governments including Korea (Box 4.6) drew on their own experience with the pandemic by offering online training by their own health specialists for local pharmacists, lab scientists, doctors, nurses and community health workers.

Box 4.6. Taking collaboration digital: How Korea shares expertise and knowledge

Knowledge sharing is central to Korea’s vision of development co-operation. After the pandemic hit Korea in February, the government took a deliberate policy decision to share its experience, knowledge and resources with developing countries. A structured, cross-government approach to knowledge sharing included nine webinars on how Korea managed COVID-19; online and mobile information campaigns; a helpdesk function; and remote training. These actions reinforced Korea’s previous work on pandemic preparedness and global health surveillance.

Several factors enabled timely, relevant knowledge sharing and technical assistance: Korea had solid relationships with health officials and policy makers in developing countries; existing partnerships with hospitals, laboratories, research centres and community health workers; technical assistance programmes that could be ramped up and adapted; and good technology and experience with working on line.

Source: Information provided by the Korean Delegation to the OECD. For webinar recordings in English, see Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2020[44]).

3. Flexibility to adapt programmes and work within the new reality has been key

Feedback from Sweden and Ireland’s country offices in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone and Tanzania confirms that COVID-19 did not create fundamentally new problems; rather it highlighted and exacerbated existing risks, imbalances and needs. Thus, it was critical to continue and adapt existing programmes where possible and only reallocate funds if certain criteria were met.

Governments and partners have been flexible and creative in finding ways to continue existing programmes. Partners have adapted and innovated to allow for physical distancing or to reach communities and households that could no longer access essential services. Technical assistance and training were provided to developing country governments and partners through video messaging, online helpdesks and by phone. Programmes also followed people as they moved, or adapted to needs. Rural food security programmes, for instance, adapted as food insecurity intensified in urban areas. However, significant challenges remain to sustain activities in the most fragile contexts, many of which are affected by violence, armed conflict, floods, typhoons and other scourges, and among communities with poor digital access (OECD, 2020[18]).

Many OECD governments also adapted existing partnerships. Funding was either disbursed earlier than planned, or with more flexible rules on salary and overhead costs. Some governments began using a more flexible and trust-based approach to working with CSOs and facilitating the reorientation of their programmes to COVID-19 work, while also maintaining long-term development programming where feasible. Norway, for example, has eased its administrative procedures for CSO partners through a set of COVID-19 temporary exemptions (Norad, 2020[45]).

4. Innovative partnerships led to new initiatives

On the whole, development co-operation actors relied more heavily on their known and trusted partners, in part as due diligence and monitoring needed to be conducted remotely, and there was less scope to enter into innovative new partnerships. Nevertheless, new initiatives have emerged. For example, an expanded United Kingdom-Unilever partnership (Unilever, 2020[46]) is bringing together NGOs, UN agencies, and the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine to promote hand-washing and disinfection in over 30 countries in Africa, Asia, the Middle East and South America. Another public-private partnership involving the Institut Pasteur de Dakar is developing a COVID-19 testing kit based on an existing kit for dengue fever that costs no more than USD 1 (OECD, forthcoming[47]). The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the Wellcome Trust, and the MasterCard Impact Fund established the COVID‑19 Therapeutic Accelerator initiative in March 2020, part of the therapeutics pillar of the ACT-Accelerator (see Box 4.5) (Therapeutics Accelerator, 2020[48]). Development actors can go further in harnessing innovation that goes beyond technological solutions by tapping into local innovation, and investing in radically new approaches to development challenges (OECD, forthcoming[47]).

Innovative partnerships also emerged to support oversight, monitoring and learning, responding to an increased demand from ministers and senior managers for rapid feedback and reflection to shape decisions. As attention shifts to more real-time data collection, reflection and analysis in response to a crisis, it will be important to retain a focus on longer term change and to evaluate the response (Box 4.7).

Box 4.7. The COVID-19 Global Evaluation Coalition: Learning and sharing lessons for more effective response and recovery

As development partners adapt and respond to the COVID-19 pandemic, there is growing interest in understanding what is and is not working to support response and recovery efforts. The COVID-19 Global Evaluation Coalition – a partnership of over 42 bilateral and multilateral organisations with the OECD serving as secretariat launched in June 2020 – supports collective learning with both rapid evidence summaries and evaluations. To meet its key objective to provide credible evidence to inform international development co-operation, the coalition supports and communicates individual members’ evaluations and joint analysis of the effectiveness and results of COVID-19-related response and recovery efforts.

Beyond answering questions about the effectiveness and impacts of individual efforts, this collaborative approach will help show how well partners co-ordinated their efforts to avoid duplication, how well they responded to country priorities, and to what degree COVID-19 actions were coherent with other international commitments such as those on climate and refugees. The coalition aims to maximise collaboration and learning while reducing duplication of effort in evaluating different elements of the COVID-19 pandemic response.

To the extent possible, the coalition provides real-time evaluation evidence on the pandemic response. A series entitled Lessons from Evaluation provides timely summaries of evaluation evidence, drawing on the collective evidence base of coalition members to inform the response to the COVID-19 pandemic. In addition, ex post evaluations look at longer term effects and will provide a critical resource for the international community as the world emerges from the pandemic.

Source: OECD (2020[49]), COVID-9 Global Evaluation Coalition, webpage, www.covid19-evaluation-coalition.org.

Other innovative examples include the EU-funded Global Monitor of COVID‑19’s Impact on Democracy and Human Rights, a one-stop platform with information, data, analysis and policy guidance on the implications of measures adopted by governments in 162 countries in the context of the pandemic (International IDEA, 2020[50]). The INCLUDE knowledge platform, funded by the Netherlands, enables research groups led by African researchers from 12 focus countries to investigate equity in COVID‑19 mitigation and policy responses over the period from July 2020 to April 2021 (Altaf, 2020[51]). And a new poverty tracker, developed by the Chronic Poverty Advisory Network (2020[52]) and recently expanded from two to six countries, is working to shed light on COVID‑19 impacts on vulnerable groups and to help identify the most effective responses for poor and marginalised people.

5. Agencies’ internal systems were stress-tested

The pandemic significantly impacted ways of working. As international staff left developing countries and lockdowns took hold, partnership, policy and advocacy interactions moved on line. Staff in development agencies were required to think on the go and adjust internal approaches and procedures, and a digital divide emerged within and between organisations depending on the degree to which organisations and individuals were well‑equipped and connected. Institutional centres of gravity also shifted. Some countries with strong country offices and decentralised structures found that tough and complex decisions needed to be taken in headquarters, with ministers closely involved. In light of regular DAC peer review findings that decentralised systems support programmes that respond to context and are better co-ordinated with other partners, it will be important to return decision making to country offices or embassies as soon as feasible. Others found it more effective for country managers, even if not physically in country, to take decisions appropriate to each context in the midst of the pandemic.

Funding oversight became more challenging. The principle of zero tolerance for corruption remained in place. Yet, most providers identified greater risk for corruption and fraud due to a combination of travel bans hampering on-site monitoring and due diligence and new, lighter procedures introduced to disburse funding quickly or to make funding more flexible. Reports of COVID-19 response funds being diverted for personal gain are already turning from a trickle to a flow (Ramaphosa, 2020[53]). It will remain both challenging and essential to strike the balance between ensuring that funds go where intended and remaining nimble and adaptive.

6. COVID-19 could lead to changes in development co-operation business models

Travel schedules, among other aspects of pre-pandemic development co-operation work, may not return to their previously frantic pace for some time and it will be important to consider the medium- to longer term impacts this has on partnerships and institutional structures. What would an effective and accountable delivery model look like when DAC members have fewer international staff in the field? If more funding is being channelled through multilateral organisations, should time and attention shift to influencing their work and strengthening the oversight function of multilateral boards?

At the time of writing this chapter, ten months into the pandemic, country programme managers in many cases have been able to do their jobs from headquarters, engaging with partners and governments remotely. But this was possible thanks to established relationships and networks. While projects and programmes could be monitored by drones, satellites, photos and mobile reports, it will not be possible to carry out virtual audits and due diligence processes. So, while some new ways of working adopted during the pandemic can be sustained, more fundamental changes to business processes may also be required.

Organisations need to find ways to adapt and deliver sustainable results that respond to short-term challenges of a complex global crisis while also continuing to pursue achievement of the 2030 Agenda. While international development agencies or ministries are still adapting and finding ways to recover their organisational effectiveness, this crisis also offers a unique opportunity for development co-operation managers to refine internal processes and practices, deepen ongoing reforms, promote adaptive approaches, realign priorities and incentives, and invest in improving capacities and systems, including in digitalisation. Development co-operation actors can build on some of the exceptions and innovations introduced during this crisis to make more diverse, flexible and sustainable resources available to civil society (particularly local CSOs), as both implementing partners and development actors in their own right.

The next section explores some of the potential legacies of the pandemic and offers avenues for action by DAC members.

Future-proofing development co-operation

The pandemic has revealed both strengths and weaknesses in the development co-operation system. Stronger international co-ordination is needed to deliver a more strategic response that effectively matches resources to actual need. This will require the bridging of tensions and gaps in international leadership and building coalitions across sectors and governments. The crisis also raises fundamental questions about future business models of development co-operation and the international development system. Finding better ways to tap into and leverage local capacities and expertise remains critical.

COVID-19 triggered positive change

One welcome legacy of COVID-19 is likely to be a quiet revolution in internal systems and procedures. Most development ministries and agencies reduced red tape, raised their risk tolerance, and improved their information technology and communications equipment. These changes were largely driven by need: travel bans, remote working and staff reassignments affected operations as international flight routes closed. In the initial months, assisting stranded citizens was a priority for many foreign ministries which lead also on international development. Over time, local staff found themselves with new roles and responsibilities. In some cases, helpful precedents have been set for empowering and delegating more authority to national staff. The crisis may have proved cathartic for delivering on long-held aspirations for greater localisation and trust in local partners, particularly CSOs. COVID‑19 inevitably obliged development actors to accept greater risk and to invest in rapid learning to inform decision making and to change course as more evidence came to light. These changes point to the potential for development actors to design partnerships and programmes that, from the outset, are meant to adapt to change.

Another positive legacy is the way in which the interlinkages between policies, and across development goals, became more explicit and real. Working across government brought increased sensitivity to policy coherence for global health and development. There is scope, now, to build on this experience to adopt systems thinking in the future, making good use of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to do so. The SDG framework is a way to visualise how the economic, environmental and social dimensions of development are interconnected, helping development actors and partner countries to prepare holistic responses to complex crises, such as that triggered by COVID-19.

Ongoing challenges call for more focused programmes and stronger global governance

COVID-19 has also shone a light on some systemic and co-ordination weaknesses.

For example, country-level responses largely failed to consider gender issues, despite awareness and understanding of the vital role of women in response to crisis situations, commitments and increased capacity for addressing gender inequalities, and the fact that women are faring worse than men in the COVID-19 crisis. Analysis using the UNDP/UN Women’s Gender Response Tracker shows that only 40% of 2 517 COVID-19 measures in 206 countries and territories were gender-sensitive (UNDP/UN Women, 2020[54]). In addition, senior managers and leaders within international development organisations have been quoted as saying things like, “gender can come later”, “we can’t afford gender now” or “everyone is affected, not just women”. This failing comes after high investment in raising awareness and commitments to gender equality and women’s empowerment. OECD governments can do more.5 They should engage ministries of finance and economy, as well as chief economists, in designing gender-responsive financial recovery plans. These plans should prioritise women’s economic and political empowerment and leadership and ensure that they support local women’s rights organisations and women’s groups and movements (OECD, 2020[12]).

The crisis has accentuated inequalities. While there are examples of effective humanitarian responses targeting vulnerable groups, evidence is lacking on the extent to which responses by development co-operation providers are pro-poor, tackle inequities, or include vulnerable and marginalised groups in key decision-making processes. According to DAC peer reviews, the track record of DAC members targeting poverty and groups most in need was mixed at best, even before COVID-19. There is also some concern that ODA commitments and disbursements related to COVID-19 will not focus on countries with high poverty rates (Dodd, Breed and Coppard, 2020[55]).

Looking ahead

As noted elsewhere in this report, a co-ordinated effort is needed to address structural issues that affect developing countries and ODA will have an important role to play in achieving this.

OECD governments have shown a capacity and willingness to adapt and flex their development co‑operation systems and partnerships through this crisis at a speed and scale that took many by surprise. The OECD DAC can play a key role in collectively sustaining the positive precedents identified in this chapter, while learning from and addressing the challenges and shortcomings. In keeping with its renewed commitment to build better partnerships, including with the private sector, triangular and South-South co‑operation partners, civil society, foundations, local governments and multilateral partners (OECD, 2020[56]), the DAC could further equip members with the evidence and information they need to design effective policy and financing responses in times of crisis while supporting mutual accountability for results. Through its norms and standards and learning among peers, the DAC could seek to gather evidence and information that would help its members, and other development actors outside of the DAC, to co-ordinate and future-proof their work.

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Notes

← 1.  For information on other tools and resources, see Global Partnership for Sustainable Development Data (2020[57]).

← 2.  This institution provides a platform for key Arab development funds and development banks to co-ordinate their development financing.

← 3.  These include the 2002-04 outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome, or SARS, in Asia, Europe, and North and South America; the 2012 outbreak of Middle East respiratory syndrome, or MERS; the 2014‑16 Ebola outbreak in West Africa; and larger outbreaks of Zika virus from 2015.

← 4.  For more information, see World Bank (2020[59]) and (2020[58]).

← 5.  In order to promote better, evidence-based policies, practices and strategic investments, many countries are developing new strategies to promote gender equality. The OECD DAC is developing guidance on gender equality and women’s empowerment in development co-operation and humanitarian assistance through the DAC Network on Gender Equality, which will address a range of challenges for women and girls who are disproportionately affected by the current crisis.