How's Life? 2024

Well-being and Resilience in Times of Crisis

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How's Life?

5 November 2024

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2. How has well-being fared during recent crises?

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Abstract

The interrelated crises of the past four years have affected many dimensions of well-being. While employment outcomes have proven to be resilient and average household incomes have not deteriorated, progress in other aspects of people’s material conditions has slowed down post-2019. The impact of the cost-of-living crisis becomes particularly apparent when asking people themselves how they evaluate their financial circumstances. Meanwhile, life expectancy and student skills decreased across OECD countries in the context of the pandemic, and well-being dimensions such as subjective well-being and social connectedness exhibit signs of downward risks, should their current trajectory continue. There are also warning signs across some resources for future well-being, particularly natural and social capital.

The past four years, starting with the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 followed by the cost-of-living crisis in mid-2021, have brought about disruptive change to OECD economies. This chapter contrasts short-term developments in well-being since 2019 with medium-term trends since 2010 to understand how different aspects of well-being are being affected over time (see Box 2.1 for more details).1

In many cases, the latest available data show that average well-being outcomes today are significantly higher than around a decade ago (when the world was in the aftermath of another disruptive event, the 2008 global financial crisis) (see also Chapter 4). The series of recent shocks has nonetheless impacted many areas of well-being. While employment outcomes have bounced back and average household incomes have not deteriorated relative to 2019, progress in other aspects of people’s material conditions has slowed down since then. The impact of the cost-of-living crisis becomes particularly apparent when asking people themselves how they evaluate their financial circumstances. Meanwhile, life expectancy and student skills have decreased across OECD countries in the context of the pandemic, and well-being dimensions such as subjective well-being and social connectedness exhibit signs of downward risks, should their current trajectory continue. There are also warning signs across some areas of resources for future well-being, particularly natural and social capital.

Many aspects of economic capital have on average proven to be resilient to recent crises, although countries’ trajectories are diverging for some indicators, including the financial net worth of government. There are clear warning signs for natural capital, where much stronger action is needed to combat climate change. Across OECD countries, progress in recycling rates and the creation of protected areas has slowed down since 2019. The risks to biodiversity as measured by the Red List Index of threatened species have risen in the majority of OECD countries in both the medium- and short-term and almost 15% of the population for the OECD on average was exposed to extreme heat in 2023, up from 13% in 2010. Trends in social capital, including recently declining rates of trust in government and little progress on perceived public sector integrity, should also be closely monitored by policy makers.

Box 2.1. Analytical approach for contrasting medium- vs short-term developments in well-being

Copy link to Box 2.1. Analytical approach for contrasting medium- vs short-term developments in well-being

This chapter assesses trends in well-being in two ways:

Indicator-specific thresholds are used to classify change between two points in time as genuine improvement, deterioration, or no clear trend (see the Reader’s Guide for more details)
Annualised changes are examined for each indicator in different periods of time, to identify patterns in the historical context that can be considered “unusual” (within the constraints of data availability).

Time periods

To assess both medium-term and short-term trends in well-being, this chapter considers three points in time for each indicator: a first baseline year of ~2010 (to represent what well-being looked like just over a decade ago), a second baseline year of 2019 (before the COVID-19 pandemic), and the latest available year (the state of well-being today) (Figure 2.1).

2010 was chosen as the first baseline year to maximise country coverage for the time series. Given that 2010 came in aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, a time when many well-being outcomes had deteriorated in OECD countries, the analysis presented in this chapter was repeated with alternative baseline years before and after the financial crisis (2007, 2013). These robustness checks confirmed that overall, the patterns were similar, no matter the year considered.

Figure 2.1. Time periods considered for assessing changes in well-being
Copy link to Figure 2.1. Time periods considered for assessing changes in well-being

Time periods considered in this chapter, illustrated for the indicator of housing affordability

Using the example of life expectancy, Figure 2.2 illustrates how data is interpreted in this chapter using above methods. In the latest available year, 2022, a newborn could, on average across OECD countries, expect to live 80.7 years. This is more than one year higher than around a decade ago, an improvement according to the indicator-specific threshold for meaningful change (see Reader’s Guide). But average life expectancy today is lower than in 2019, just before the COVID-19. This trend is also visible when comparing annualised growth rates between 2010-19 (positive, at 0.21%), and 2019-the latest available year (negative, at -0.16%).

Figure 2.2. Example: Interpretation of changes over time for life expectancy
Copy link to Figure 2.2. Example: Interpretation of changes over time for life expectancy

Post-2019, many material conditions that had on average been improving over the past decade have now stagnated

Copy link to Post-2019, many material conditions that had on average been improving over the past decade have now stagnated

Several aspects of household’s material conditions across OECD countries have, on average, proven resilient to the shocks of the past four years, and did not deteriorate relative to 2019. This was partly due to governments taking a sequence of far-reaching actions aimed at containing the pandemic, buffering income shocks to households and businesses, and addressing inflation, which supported employment outcomes and average household incomes in particular. Despite this, progress relative to pre-pandemic levels has slowed down or reversed in several other aspects of material conditions. This is most visible when it comes to people’s own evaluations and feelings about their economic circumstances.

Work and job quality

From a purely quantitative perspective, labour markets in OECD countries have generally proven resilient to the recent series of economic shocks, including to inflationary pressures. After employment dropped in the first six months of 2020, many countries saw it reach historically high levels in 2023, alongside low levels of unemployment (OECD, 2024[2]). For instance, the average OECD employment rate (for people aged 25-64) stood at 78.4% in 2023, 1.6 percentage points higher than before the COVID-19 crisis (Figure 2.3). Quarterly employment rates also remained at record historical values by Q1 2024. Meanwhile, the OECD unemployment rate (which rose in the beginning of the pandemic but was already back to its pre-COVID-19 level in January 2022) reached a record low of 4.9% in December 2023 and remained at this value in the first half of 2024 (OECD, 2024[2]).

From a qualitative perspective, job quality trends have been mixed. On the one hand, labour market insecurity (which measures the expected monetary loss associated with becoming and staying unemployed as a share of previous earnings) improved in most OECD countries between 2015 and 2022 (Figure 2.3) (OECD, 2024[2]). The share of employees affected by long working hours across OECD countries had already been falling before COVID-19, by an average of 0.2 percentage points per year between 2010 and 2019. This average trend continued at a similar pace up until today, and contrary to initial fears that the availability of remote work in some sectors would lead to blurred boundaries between personal and working time the rise in long working hours in the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic was temporary (OECD, 2021[3]). In the latest available year, 2022, around 7% of employees across OECD countries regularly worked 50 hours or more a week (Figure 2.3).

Figure 2.4. Since 2019, annual real wages rose in around one-third of OECD countries but declined in almost one-fifth
Copy link to Figure 2.4. Since 2019, annual real wages rose in around one-third of OECD countries but declined in almost one-fifth

Average annual real gross wages per full-time employee, USD at 2022 PPPs

On the other hand, real wages across OECD countries grew at a less sustained pace in recent years. Between 2010 and 2019, OECD average annual real wages were growing by an annualised 1.1%. After 2019, this rate dropped to an annualised 0.3% and wages declined (i.e. fell by at least USD 1 100) in seven OECD countries (Figure 2.4, Panels A and B). In 2022, full-time employees in the OECD earned on average USD 47 600 annually (Figure 2.4, panel A). More recent quarterly data show that, while annual wage growth turned positive in a number of countries as inflation has moderated, by Q3 2023 real wages were still below their Q4 2019 level in 20 out of 35 OECD countries (OECD, 2024[2]). In addition, while earnings quality (which accounts for both the average level of earnings and their distribution across workers) was generally better across the OECD in 2021 than in 2015, it worsened between 2021 and 2022 in a context of inflation hikes and slow wage adjustment in 14 of 17 countries with available data (OECD, 2024[2]).

Income and wealth

During the 2010-19 period, growth in mean household net adjusted disposable incomes for the OECD as a whole was generally sluggish at an annualised 1.2% (Figure 2.5). During the COVID-19 and cost-of-living crises, government interventions have helped to minimise job losses and sustain average incomes (OECD, 2020[4]; 2022[5]; 2022[6]; 2022[7]; OECD, 2021[3]). Thus, mean household net adjusted disposable incomes in real terms in 2022 was not significantly lower than pre-COVID levels in any OECD country, and households had on average USD 35 200 per capita available after paying taxes and accounting for transfers (Figure 2.5). More recent quarterly data up to the first quarter of 2024 on gross disposable household income is available for a smaller selection of OECD countries.2 This more granular evolution of household income for the OECD average shows a sharp increase as governments expanded support to households during the early years of recent crisis, up to a peak in the first quarter of 2021, followed by relative decline and subsequent recovery starting in the third quarter of 2022 (Figure 2.6).

Figure 2.6. During recent crises, household income varied year-on-year, but remained above pre-pandemic levels
Copy link to Figure 2.6. During recent crises, household income varied year-on-year, but remained above pre-pandemic levels

Real household gross disposable income per capita, index (2010Q1=100), OECD Total

Relative income poverty has proven hard to tackle over the past decade though in many countries, concerted government efforts helped to stop it from rising post-2019. Between 2010 and 2019, the share of people across OECD countries with household disposable income below 50% of the national median fell at an average annual rate of only 0.02 percentage points (Figure 2.5). Over the 2019-22 period, the average pace of poverty reduction was then slightly more sustained (at an annualised rate of 0.1 percentage points). For the majority of OECD countries, relative income poverty over this short-term period remained stable (in 18 out of 34 countries with available data) or improved (in 11 countries it cumulatively fell by more than 0.6 percentage points) (OECD, n.d.[8]). In 2022, just under 12% of people across OECD countries lived in relative income poverty (Figure 2.5).

Meanwhile, progress on the reduction of income inequality, measured by the ratio of household disposable income of the richest 20% (of the income distribution) relative to that of the poorest 20%, has stalled. For the OECD as a whole, the income quintile ratio fell at an (already slow) average annual rate of 0.03 between 2010 and 2019. However, between 2019 and 2022 the fall slowed to half of this prior rate, and income inequality did not significantly change for the majority of OECD countries (Figure 2.7, Panels A and B). In 2022, the top 20% of the income distribution received on average 5.6 times more income than the bottom 20% (Figure 2.7, Panel A).

Figure 2.7. Progress in reducing income inequality since 2010 stalled post-2019
Copy link to Figure 2.7. Progress in reducing income inequality since 2010 stalled post-2019

Ratio of the average (equivalised) household disposable income of the top 20% of the income distribution to the average income of the bottom 20% (S80/S20 or income quintile share ratio)

Housing

Low-income households are particularly vulnerable when a high share of their income is devoted to housing costs, since this limits spending on other essential goods and services, such as food, health care and education. Across OECD countries, in 2022 almost one in five households in the bottom 40% of the income distribution spent more than 40% of their disposable income on housing (i.e. rent and mortgage costs) (Figure 2.9, Panel A). The OECD average for this “housing cost overburden” slightly improved between 2010 and 2019 (at an annualised reduction rate of 0.06 percentage points) but reversed between 2019 and 2022 (during which the housing cost overburden rose by 0.4 percentage points per year on average). This reversal was driven by a deterioration in one-third of the OECD countries with available data, whilst just under half stagnated (Figure 2.9, Panel B).

When it comes to other housing outcomes for the OECD as a whole, the average share of income that households have left after housing costs has remained stable (just under 80%) in both the medium- and short-term, whereas the share of households living in overcrowded conditions continued to improve, from 16% in 2010 to 12% in 2022 (Figure 2.8).

Figure 2.9. Almost 20% of lower-income households were overburdened by housing costs in 2022, and the situation worsened in a third of OECD countries since 2019
Copy link to Figure 2.9. Almost 20% of lower-income households were overburdened by housing costs in 2022, and the situation worsened in a third of OECD countries since 2019

Percentage of households in the bottom 40% of the income distribution spending over 40% of their disposable income on housing costs

Subjective evaluations of people’s economic circumstances

Figure 2.10. At a glance: Perceptions of financial circumstances over time
Copy link to Figure 2.10. At a glance: Perceptions of financial circumstances over time

Selected indicators of people’s perceptions of their financial circumstances, OECD average, 2010-23 or latest available year

So far, material conditions have been described by conventional indicators of income inequality and poverty, highlighting some areas in which progress has slowed down and others in which it was more resilient. However, these conventional indicators often fail to capture economic insecurity and stress related to material hardship – this is why they can be usefully complemented by perception-based data that capture how people assess and feel about their own circumstances. These data show that the impact of the cost-of-living crisis may be more widespread than suggested by more conventional measures (Figure 2.10).

For instance, in 2023, almost one in five people across 18 OECD countries said it was difficult or very difficult to make ends meet (Figure 2.11, Panel A). This finding came despite the remarkable progress over the past decade in the share of people reporting financial difficulties, which fell in almost all countries with available data since the aftermath of the global financial crisis and which decreased for the OECD as a whole by an average of 1.2 percentage points a year between 2010 and 2019. However, between 2019 and 2023, the share of people with difficulty making ends meet, for the OECD on average, rose by an annualised 0.03 percentage points, and significantly worsened in five out of 20 countries with available data (Figure 2.11, Panel B).3

Figure 2.11. There have been strong medium-term reductions in the share of people with financial difficulties, but progress since then stalled
Copy link to Figure 2.11. There have been strong medium-term reductions in the share of people with financial difficulties, but progress since then stalled

Percentage of individuals who have difficulty or great difficulty in making ends meet

Feeling that one’s home is not warm enough is a well-being deprivation in itself, but it can also point to potential energy poverty due to financial difficulties or rising energy prices (OECD, 2022[9]). In 2023, on average just under 9% of people in 17 European OECD countries said they could not keep their house adequately warm (Figure 2.12, Panel A). This share had decreased over the past decade (by an annualised 0.3 percentage points between 2010-19) but increased by an average of 0.4 percentage points a year between 2019-23. Indeed, over this short-term period, energy poverty outcomes either stagnated or worsened in the majority of countries with available data (Figure 2.12, Panel B).

Figure 2.12. The share of people with difficulty to keep their dwelling warm increased in eight out of 18 European OECD countries between 2019 and 2023
Copy link to Figure 2.12. The share of people with difficulty to keep their dwelling warm increased in eight out of 18 European OECD countries between 2019 and 2023

Percentage of the population who have difficulty to keep their dwelling warm

In 2022, 8% of 15-year-old students in OECD countries reported that, within the previous 30 days, there was at least one day a week when they had not eaten because there was not enough money to buy food (Figure 2.13). Food insecurity negatively impacts students’ not only physical health, but also their school performance, educational opportunities and overall quality of life (OECD, 2023[10]). While there is no data available to assess trends over time in the food security of high school students, national data suggests that food insecurity for households with children might have risen more generally in recent years – for instance, in the United States in 2022, 17% of households with children were unable to acquire enough food to meet the needs of all their members because they had insufficient money or other resources, almost 5 percentage points more than in 2021 (USDA, 2022[11]).

Figure 2.13. 8% of students in OECD countries experienced food insecurity in 2022
Copy link to Figure 2.13. 8% of students in OECD countries experienced food insecurity in 2022

Percentage of 15-year-old students reporting not having eaten during at least one day a week within the previous 30 days because there was not enough money to buy food

There are warning signs across many non-material aspects of well-being since 2019

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Well-being in the here and now is also about people’s quality of life and their relationships. Several outcomes across the dimensions of knowledge and skills, health, subjective well-being and social connectedness exhibit signs of downward risks, should their current trajectory continue. These risks should be closely monitored and appropriately addressed by policy makers.

Knowledge and skills

By 2022, more young people than ever had attained upper secondary education across OECD countries. At 86%, the average share of young adults (aged 25 to 34) with at least an upper secondary education in the OECD was the highest since records started. It progressed at a steady pace since 2010 (when it stood at around 81%) and growth was not slowed down by the immediate effects of the COVID-19 pandemic (Figure 2.14).

However, the pandemic and its associated restrictions on learning environments in schools adversely impacted the actual skills students have been acquiring. The OECD PISA triennial survey of 15-year-old students tests achievements in three core subjects (reading, mathematics and science), with the latest survey having taken place in 2022. While students’ performance, particularly in reading and science had been on a negative trajectory for a decade, well before the pandemic, the OECD average score had never changed between consecutive assessments by more than five points in reading or four points in mathematics (OECD, 2023[10]). Compared to 2018, 2022 PISA science scores remained broadly stable in many OECD countries, but average reading and mathematics scores dropped by a record 10 and 15 score points, respectively (Figure 2.15). This deterioration corresponds to half a school year’s worth of learning in reading and three-quarters of a year in mathematics (OECD, 2023[10]). Students were affected right across the spectrum of performance, meaning that the average gap between the highest-scoring students (those in the 10% with the highest scores) and the weakest students (those in the 10% with the lowest scores) increased only modestly (OECD, 2023[10]). Furthermore, for the OECD on average, the share of students with low scores in all three PISA subjects increased markedly, from 13% in 2018 to 16% in 2022 (Figure 2.14).

The share of young adults not in employment, education or training (NEET) had been on a downward trend in the majority of OECD countries between 2010 and 2019 and fell by an average of 0.3 percentage points a year for the OECD as a whole over this period (Figure 2.16, Panel A). However, countries’ experiences have diverged since then: between 2019 and 2022, the NEET rate significantly decreased in more than one-third of countries with available data while increasing in one-fifth (Figure 2.16, Panel B). Overall, this led to the average OECD NEET rate rising by an annualised 0.05 percentage points in the short-term. In 2022, 11% of young adults were NEET across OECD countries (Figure 2.16, Panel A).

Figure 2.15. PISA performance in maths and reading worsened significantly between 2018 and 2022
Copy link to Figure 2.15. PISA performance in maths and reading worsened significantly between 2018 and 2022

PISA mean scores, 15-year-old students

Figure 2.16. After a decade-long decline, the share of youth not in employment, education or training has risen in one-fifth of countries
Copy link to Figure 2.16. After a decade-long decline, the share of youth not in employment, education or training has risen in one-fifth of countries

Percentage of youth (aged 15-24) not in employment, education or training (NEET)

Health

Gains in life expectancy had already been slowing down over the past decade (average annualised growth for the OECD average was only 0.2% between 2010 and 2019), but the COVID-19 pandemic (and in some countries, other factors such as increased opioid use) had a major negative impact due to the exceptionally high number of excess deaths (OECD, 2023[12]). Compared to pre-pandemic levels in 2019, almost half of OECD countries had lost at least half a year of life expectancy by 2022, turning the OECD’s average annualised growth rate into a negative -0.2% over this period (Figure 2.18, Panel B). In 2022, a newborn in the average OECD country could expect to live 80.7 years (Figure 2.18, Panel A). Similarly, average premature mortality (i.e. potential years of life lost due to a range of medical conditions or fatal accidents) across OECD countries, which had fallen by an annualised rate of -2% between 2010-19, rose by an annualised 10% between 2019-21. In 2021, around 5 100 potential years of life were lost per 100 000 inhabitants for the OECD as a whole (Figure 2.17).

Figure 2.18. COVID-19, combined with other causes of mortality, led to a decline in life expectancy in almost half of OECD countries
Copy link to Figure 2.18. COVID-19, combined with other causes of mortality, led to a decline in life expectancy in almost half of OECD countries

Life expectancy at birth, years

Mental health plays a central role in people’s lives and is intrinsically tied to many other aspects of people’s wider well-being (OECD, 2023[13]). Fatalities from suicide, acute alcohol abuse and drug overdose, so-called “deaths of despair”, represent an important measure of severe mental illness and addiction among the population (OECD, 2020[14]). Deaths of despair have fallen between 2010 and 2019 in most OECD countries (and the OECD average fell by an annualised 1.2% over this period), but progress has stalled since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2021, on average 23.6 people per 100 000 in OECD countries died from such causes, a rate identical to 2019 levels (Figure 2.19, Panels A and B).

When it comes to common mental health symptoms, harmonised international data are available only for European OECD countries in 2019, before the COVID-19 pandemic (Figure 2.17). Previous OECD work relying on national estimates and unofficial surveys has documented that the share of the population reporting symptoms of anxiety and depression increased in all countries with available data at the start of the pandemic, and as much as doubled in some (OECD, 2023[12]). Indeed, more than a quarter of the population were at risk of anxiety and depression in 2020 and 2021 (OECD, 2021[3]). These (non-harmonised) national estimates and unofficial surveys point to some recovery in population mental health by 2022; however, the prevalence of depression remained elevated relative to pre-pandemic levels (OECD, 2023[12]).

Figure 2.19. Progress in reducing deaths of despair stalled during the COVID-19 pandemic
Copy link to Figure 2.19. Progress in reducing deaths of despair stalled during the COVID-19 pandemic

Combined deaths from suicide, acute alcohol and drug use abuse, per 100 000 population (age-standardised)

Subjective well-being

Average life satisfaction in the OECD, on a scale from 0 (not at all satisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied), improved between 2013 and 2018 (by an average annual 0.04 points). However, progress has stalled since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic: in 2023, life satisfaction across OECD countries stood at 7.4, similar to its 2018 level (Figure 2.21, Panel A). Indeed, between 2019 and 2023, life satisfaction either remained stable or deteriorated in most countries with available data (Figure 2.21, Panel B). Meanwhile, outcomes improved for those with very low satisfaction with life in both the medium- and short-term: the average share of people with a life satisfaction score of 4 or below on a 0-10 scale stood at 8% in 2013, falling to around 6% in 2018 and an eventual 5% in 2022 (Figure 2.20).

Figure 2.21. Since 2018, life satisfaction remained stable in 12 OECD countries, deteriorated in 11 and improved in six
Copy link to Figure 2.21. Since 2018, life satisfaction remained stable in 12 OECD countries, deteriorated in 11 and improved in six

Mean values for life satisfaction, reported on a scale from 0 “not at all satisfied” to 10 “completely satisfied”

Almost 30% of people in OECD countries reported experiencing a lot of physical pain in 2022-23 (Figure 2.22, Panel A). Physical pain had already been on the rise in the decade prior to COVID-19 and had increased by an average annual 0.2 percentage points between 2008-10 and 2017-19. This trend then further accelerated, with the prevalence of pain rising by an annualised 0.4 percentage points between 2017-19 and 2022-23. Indeed, the share of people experiencing a lot of pain increased by at least 3 percentage points in two-fifths of OECD countries relative to their 2017-19 pre-pandemic levels (Figure 2.22, Panel B).

Figure 2.22. The prevalence of physical pain already rose in the decade prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, a trend that has further accelerated since then
Copy link to Figure 2.22. The prevalence of physical pain already rose in the decade prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, a trend that has further accelerated since then

Percentage of the population who reported experiencing physical pain a lot the previous day

In 2022-23, on average one in eight people across OECD countries reported more negative feelings (anger, sadness, worry) than positive feelings (enjoyment, laughing or smiling a lot, well-rested) on the previous day – also known as “negative affect balance” (Figure 2.20). This edition of How’s Life? assesses how individual emotions within this aggregate measure have developed. On the one hand, the share of people reporting positive emotions of being well-rested and feeling enjoyment has remained stable for the majority of OECD countries both in the medium- and short-term, while feelings of anger have been consistently decreasing (OECD, n.d.[1]). On the other hand, concerning trends in the cases of worry, sadness, and laughter warrant closer monitoring (Figure 2.20).

In 2022-23, 36% of the OECD population reported experiencing a lot of worry the previous day (Figure 2.23, Panel A). Feelings of worry have been on a negative trajectory over the past decade: between 2008-10 and 2017-19, the share of the population experiencing a lot of worry increased by an annualised 0.2 percentage points for the OECD average. This average trend continued between 2017-19 and 2022-23 (Figure 2.17). At the national level, outcomes predominantly stagnated (in 21 out of 38 OECD countries) or deteriorated (in 12 countries) over the last four years (Figure 2.23, Panel B).

The share of people feeling sad has also increased across OECD countries, particularly in the short-term. While the OECD average for the prevalence of sadness rose only by an annualised 0.06 percentage points between 2008-10 and 2017-19, this rate increased five-fold to 0.3 percentage points between 2017-19 and 2022-23. At the national level, outcomes predominantly stagnated (in 24 out of 38 OECD countries) or deteriorated (in 10 countries) over the past four years (Figure 2.24, Panel B). In 2022-23, 21% of people across OECD countries said they felt a lot of sadness the previous day (Figure 2.24, Panel A). Feelings of laughter followed a similar trajectory, with average outcomes across OECD countries on a slight downward trajectory over the medium-term, a trend that accelerated during the COVID-19 pandemic (Figure 2.20).

Figure 2.23. Relative to 2017-19, feelings of worry either stagnated or increased in the majority of OECD countries
Copy link to Figure 2.23. Relative to 2017-19, feelings of worry either stagnated or increased in the majority of OECD countries

Percentage of the population who reported experiencing worry a lot the previous day

Figure 2.24. The prevalence of sadness picked up pace during the COVID-19 pandemic
Copy link to Figure 2.24. The prevalence of sadness picked up pace during the COVID-19 pandemic

Percentage of the population who reported experiencing sadness a lot the previous day

Social connections

The time people spend together, the activities they engage in with one another, and the quality and diversity of their relationships play a large role in determining overall health, happiness and well-being.4 It is difficult to assess medium-term trends in objective indicators of social connectedness since data relying on time use surveys are not regularly collected (Figure 2.25). However, there is tentative evidence of declines in subjective social connectedness outcomes, particularly in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Around 2018, people across OECD countries spent on average six hours a week interacting with friends and family (OECD, n.d.[1]). In three countries with available time series (Canada, Japan and the United States), the average weekly time spent in social interactions declined by 40 minutes between 2009-11 and 2015-22. This trend mirrors national time use data on other objective measures of social exposure: for instance, in the United States, the average time spent alone increased from 35.6 hours/week in 2003 to 38.6 hours/week in 2019 and continued to rise to 41.6 hours/week in 2020 (Kannan and Veazie, 2023[15]).

In 2022-23, 9 out of 10 people across OECD countries reported having friends or family to rely on in times of need. Perceptions of social support on average remained stable in the decade prior to COVID-19, but since then slightly declined (Figure 2.25). Between 2017-19 and 2022-23, the share of people reporting they have friends or family to rely on decreased by an average of 0.2 percentage points per year (Figure 2.25). Indeed, while there were no clear changes in perceived social support in the majority of OECD countries over this period, it deteriorated by at least 3 percentage points in six countries and improved by the same magnitude in only one (OECD, n.d.[1]).5 Patterns are similar for satisfaction with personal relationships, which stood at 8 on a scale from 0 (not at all satisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied) for the OECD average in 2022. While the OECD average satisfaction with relationships did not clearly change in the medium- or short-term, all meaningful changes at the national level (in seven countries in which changes between 2018-22 exceeded 0.2 points) were deteriorations (Figure 2.25), (OECD, n.d.[1]).

Figure 2.26. Feelings of loneliness range from below 4% to close to 14% in OECD countries with available data
Copy link to Figure 2.26. Feelings of loneliness range from below 4% to close to 14% in OECD countries with available data

Percentage of people feeling lonely most or all of the time in the past four weeks

While the social isolation of the elderly had already been a growing concern before 2020, social distancing and containment measures during the COVID-19 pandemic led to spikes in reported loneliness for all age groups, including youth (OECD, 2021[3]). High-quality information on loneliness collected by national statistical offices is increasingly available, and estimates show that prevalence of loneliness ranged from below 4% to close to 14% in OECD countries with available data in 2023 (Figure 2.26, Panel A).6 Relative to 2018, the share of people feeling lonely across OECD countries slightly increased, by an average of 0.06 percentage points per year (Figure 2.26, Panel B).

There are warning signs for the resilience of future well-being, particularly for natural and social capital

Copy link to There are warning signs for the resilience of future well-being, particularly for natural and social capital

This section assesses medium- and short-term trends across the natural, economic and social systems that are needed to maintain today’s well-being for future generations.7 Many areas of economic capital have on average proven to be resilient to recent crises, although countries’ trajectories are diverging for indicators such as the financial net worth of government. There are clear warning signs for natural capital, where much stronger action is needed to combat climate change. Across OECD countries, progress in recycling rates and in the creation of protected areas has slowed down since 2019. Risks to biodiversity as measured by the Red List Index of threatened species have increased in the majority of OECD countries in both the medium- and short-term and almost 15% of the population across OECD countries was exposed to extreme heat in 2023, up from 13% in 2010. Negative trends in social capital, including recently declining rates of trust in government and little progress on perceived public sector integrity, should also be closely monitored by policy makers.

Natural capital

In 2021, OECD greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions stood at 10.9 tonnes per capita on average (Figure 2.27). Average GHG emissions per capita were on a downward trajectory in the decade before the COVID-19 pandemic and decreased by an annualised 1.3% between 2010 and 2019 (Figure 2.27). This pace accelerated to an annualised 2.2% reduction between 2019 and 2021, partly driven by restrictions on human activities particularly in the first year of the pandemic (OECD, 2023[16]). However, it is clear that countries’ efforts are insufficient to date, and climate change is increasingly impacting people’s lives (OECD, 2023[16]).

Renewables, although increasing, still play a relatively minor role in energy mixes. Across OECD countries, only 12% of the total primary energy supply came from renewable sources in 2021 (Figure 2.27). The OECD average share of renewables in the energy mix increased by an average of 0.3 percentage points per year between 2010 and 2019. It continued at a similar annualised pace between 2019 and 2021 in the context of rising energy prices (Figure 2.27).

Protected areas covered 16% of total land area and 22% of marine exclusive economic zones on average across OECD countries in 2022 (Figure 2.27).8 Twenty-six OECD countries have now met the Aichi 2020 target to protect at least 17% of their land area and 20 countries have met the Aichi 2020 target to protect at least 10% of coastal and marine areas (OECD, 2023[16]). However, only nine and seven OECD countries, respectively, are currently meeting the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework Target 3 to protect 30% of both terrestrial and marine areas by 2030 (OECD, 2023[16]). Between 2010 and 2019, OECD countries expanded their protected areas: the average share of land designated as terrestrial protected area and the average share of exclusive economic zones classified as marine protected area increased by an annualised 0.3 and 1.3 percentage points, respectively. However, progress has slowed down since then, with both types of protected areas only expanding by an average annual 0.2 percentage points between 2019 and 2022 (Figure 2.27).

Figure 2.28. Progress in recycling municipal waste has slowed after 2019
Copy link to Figure 2.28. Progress in recycling municipal waste has slowed after 2019

Municipal waste recycled or composted, as a share of treated waste

Progress in recovering materials from waste has also slowed down in recent years. In 2022, on average 42% of municipal treated waste was recycled or composted across OECD countries (Figure 2.28, Panel A). This share had been growing over the past decade, with the recycling rate for the OECD average increasing by an annualised 1.1 percentage points between 2010 and 2019. However, between 2019 and 2022, it grew by only 0.2 percentage points a year. While it either remained stable or improved in the more than two-thirds of OECD countries with available data over this period, it also deteriorated in seven (Figure 2.28, Panel B).

The OECD average Red List Index (which considers the combined extinction risk for birds, mammals, amphibians, cycads and corals) stood at 0.886 in 2024 (on a scale of 1 to 0, where 1 means that all species fall into the least concern category and 0 means all species are extinct) (Figure 2.29, Panel A). The risks to biodiversity have continued to increase across OECD countries in both the medium- and short-term, with similar rates of annualised decline (of around 0.1%) in the Red List Index between 2010-19 and 2019-24. Thirty-three out of 38 OECD countries recorded a heightened risk of species extinction of species in this latter period (Figure 2.29, Panel B).

Figure 2.29. The Red List Index has continued to decline in almost all OECD countries in recent years
Copy link to Figure 2.29. The Red List Index has continued to decline in almost all OECD countries in recent years

Red List Index, where 0 = all species having gone extinct and 1.0 = all species qualifying as “Least Concern"

In 2023, one in seven people across OECD countries was exposed to extreme heat, defined as days with a maximum temperature over 35°C for at least two weeks a year (Figure 2.30, Panel A). Although temperature measurements are variable over time, this is significantly higher than in 2010, when one in eight people experienced extreme heat for the OECD average. In the short-term, compared to 2019, exposure to extreme heat significantly increased in seven OECD countries and only decreased in one. Almost all increases occurred in countries in which exposure to extreme temperature was already above the OECD average (Figure 2.30, Panel B).

Figure 2.30. 15% of people across OECD countries are exposed to extreme temperatures
Copy link to Figure 2.30. 15% of people across OECD countries are exposed to extreme temperatures

Percentage of population exposed to at least two weeks of hot days a year

In 2022, average annual water use represented just over 25% of OECD countries’ internal water resources (Figure 2.27). Water use is placing resources under stress in several countries: in nine out of 22 OECD countries with available data, water stress is considered at least “medium-high” (i.e. annual gross water abstraction rates above 20% of internal resources), implying that both supply and demand need to be managed and conflicts among competing users need to be resolved (OECD, 2024[17]). Between 2010 and 2019, average OECD water use from internal water resources decreased by an annualised 0.4 percentage points. However, this trend reversed in recent years, with water use increasing by on average 0.3 percentage points a year between 2019 and 2022 (Figure 2.27).9 Water use as a share of total renewable resources (including inflows from neighbouring countries) followed a similar pattern (OECD, n.d.[1]).

Economic capital

In 2022, the OECD average stock value of produced fixed assets per capita (including buildings, machinery and infrastructure) was close to USD 150 000 (Figure 2.31). It had already increased at an annualised rate of 1.6% between 2010-19, which then further accelerated to 2.6% between 2019-22. Indeed, since 2019, the average value of produced fixed assets increased by at least USD 7 700 per capita in two-third of OECD countries and remained stable in the remaining third (OECD, n.d.[1]).

As for intellectual property assets, between 2010 and 2019, the OECD average stock of these increased by an annualised 6.5%, but only by an annualised 1.2% since then (Figure 2.31).10 The indicator showed no clear changes in two-thirds of OECD countries between 2019 and 2022 (OECD, n.d.[1]). In 2022, the OECD average stock of intellectual property assets was worth USD 9 800 per capita (Figure 2.31). Similarly, the average OECD investment in research and development (R&D) as share of a GDP rose at an annualised rate of 0.2 percentage points between 2010 and 2019, but fell by an average 0.1 percentage point annually in the following three years (Figure 2.32, Panel A).11 Since 2019, investment in R&D has remained stable in more than half of OECD countries with available data, while increasing in eight, including some of the countries with the highest levels of R&D investment to begin with (Figure 2.32, Panel B). In 2022, OECD countries were on average investing 3.1% of their GDP in R&D (Figure 2.32, Panel A).

Figure 2.32. Since 2019, R&D investment increased in some of the OECD countries in which investment was already high
Copy link to Figure 2.32. Since 2019, R&D investment increased in some of the OECD countries in which investment was already high

R&D investment, percentage of GDP

In 2022, across OECD countries, government financial liabilities exceeded financial assets to the tune of 20 percentage points of GDP (Figure 2.33, Panel A). The OECD average financial net worth of general government decreased by a cumulative 1.6 percentage points between 2010 and 2019 but reverted to a cumulative increase of 2.6 percentage points since then. This positive average trend masks diverging trajectories between OECD countries, with financial net worth of government improving in 19 countries and deteriorating in 14 between 2019 and 2022 (Figure 2.33, Panel B).

Figure 2.33. Trends in financial net worth of government diverged between countries
Copy link to Figure 2.33. Trends in financial net worth of government diverged between countries

Financial net worth of the general government sector, percentage of GDP

The OECD leverage ratio of monetary financial institutions (i.e the ratio between their financial assets and their equities) was 18.6 in 2022 (Figure 2.31). Compared to 2019, this ratio widened, potentially heightening the financial system’s exposure to risk and cyclical downturns. While the ratio fell by an average of 0.2 points a year between 2010 and 2019, this trend reversed, with an annualised increase of almost 1 point since then (Figure 2.31). Between 2019 and 2022, the leverage ratio of monetary financial institutions increased by at least 3 points in close to half of OECD countries and showed no clear change in the others (OECD, n.d.[1]).

Average household debt across OECD countries was falling in the decade before the COVID-19 pandemic at an annualised pace of 0.4 percentage points. Between 2019 and 2022, this trend accelerated to average annual reductions of 0.8 percentage points, driven by household debt decreasing by at least 3 percentage points in one-quarter of OECD countries and remaining broadly unchanged in three-fourths (OECD, n.d.[1]). In 2022, the OECD average household debt stood at 120% of household net disposable income (Figure 2.31), and levels of household debt exceeded income in more than half of OECD countries (OECD, n.d.[1]).

Social capital

Average trust in other people in 2023, across 18 OECD countries with available data, essentially remained at its values of 2013 and 2018 (Figure 2.35, Panels A and B). In 2023, the OECD average for the mean interpersonal trust score was 6.1, on a scale from 0 (you do not trust anyone) to 10 (most people can be trusted). Meanwhile, just under 15% of people across OECD countries had very low trust in others (i.e. they reported a score of 4 or below on a 0-10 scale) (Figure 2.34). Outcomes for those at the lower end of the trust distribution improved over the past decade and particularly so in the short-term: the OECD average share of people with very low trust in others decreased between 2013 and 2018, by on average 0.3 percentage points a year. It then continued to fall at double this pace between 2018 and 2022 (Figure 2.34).

Figure 2.35. Since 2018, trust in others has not changed in the majority of OECD countries with available data
Copy link to Figure 2.35. Since 2018, trust in others has not changed in the majority of OECD countries with available data

Mean values for interpersonal trust, on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 10 (complete trust)

The OECD average for levels of trust in government fluctuated over the past decade, with lower scores in the early 2010s and a peak in trust at the onset of the COVID-19 crisis following a “rallying around the flag effect”. However, this started to decline again in 2022-23, though most recent estimates remain slightly above those observed just before the pandemic (Figure 2.34). In 2022-23, 48% of people across OECD countries said they trusted their national government (Figure 2.36, Panel A). Trends over the past four years have been diverging across countries, with trust in government rising in one-third of OECD countries and falling in another third between 2017-19 and 2022-23 (Figure 2.36, Panel B). The OECD has also started to collect additonal in-depth information on different aspects of trust in institutions via the OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions (Box 2.2).

Figure 2.36. Compared to pre-pandemic levels, trust in government has improved in one-third of OECD countries but declined in another third
Copy link to Figure 2.36. Compared to pre-pandemic levels, trust in government has improved in one-third of OECD countries but declined in another third

Percentage of the population responding “yes” to a question about confidence in the national government

Box 2.2. The OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions

Copy link to Box 2.2. The OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions

The OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions examines how people’s expectations of and experiences with public institutions influence their trust in government and other public institutions. The survey, developed over the course of a decade, was first implemented in 20 OECD countries in 2021 and in 30 OECD countries in 2023 (OECD, 2024[18]). Going forward, it will be carried out every two years.

The current How’s Life? edition uses the Trust Survey as a source only for the indicator on “Having a say in government”, and not yet for trust in the national government. Measured levels of trust differ between the currently used source of the Gallup World Poll (which at the time of publication had longer time series available) and the Trust Survey, due to differences in survey timing and the response scale, but overall patterns are similar (OECD, 2024[19]).

According to the OECD Trust Survey, in late 2023, a higher share of people (44%) across OECD countries had low or no trust in the national government than high or moderately high trust (39%), but with significant variations across countries and population groups (Figure 2.37).

Figure 2.37. Trust in government according to the 2023 OECD Trust Survey
Copy link to Figure 2.37. Trust in government according to the 2023 OECD Trust Survey

Share of population who indicate different levels of trust in their national government, 2023

The OECD average for the extent to which governments have sound stakeholder engagement rules and practices when developing laws, on a scale from 0 (no engagement) to 4 (maximum engagement) was 2.1 in 2017 (Figure 2.34). Stakeholder engagement slightly improved between 2014-17, during which the OECD average rose by an annualised 0.07 scale points, but progress slowed down at less than half of this prior rate between 2017-21 (Figure 2.34). Country trends diverged during this latter period, with one-third of OECD countries experiencing improvement in government stakeholder engagement and another third deterioration (OECD, n.d.[1]). Relative to 2017, countries improved their stakeholder engagement practices with respect to subordinate regulations (which were fewer to begin with) to a greater extent than to primary laws (where improvements were mainly driven by an increase in virtual consultations and a greater variety of documents shared when consulting stakeholders (OECD, 2021[20]). Most OECD countries have overall room for improvement, as only a few systematically consult at earlier stages of policy development (OECD, 2021[20]).

In recent years, there has been little progress in tackling perceptions of public sector corruption across OECD countries. According to the assessments of experts and businesspeople in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, the OECD average level of perceived corruption in the public sector in 2023 was 66, on a scale from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (the total absence of corruption) (Figure 2.38, Panel A). This average value is similar to estimates in 2010 and in 2019. Over the 2019-23 period, no OECD country managed to significantly improve perceived public sector integrity (Figure 2.38, Panel B).

Figure 2.38. No OECD country has significantly improved perceived public sector integrity since 2019
Copy link to Figure 2.38. No OECD country has significantly improved perceived public sector integrity since 2019

Corruption Perception Index, 0 (highly corrupt) – 100 (very clean) scale

References

[22] Gallup World Poll (2023), The Global State of Social Connections, https://www.gallup.com/analytics/509675/state-of-social-connections.aspx (accessed on 14 May 2024).

[15] Kannan, V. and P. Veazie (2023), “US trends in social isolation, social engagement, and companionship ⎯ nationally and by age, sex, race/ethnicity, family income, and work hours, 2003–2020”, SSM - Population Health, Vol. 21, p. 101331, https://doi.org/10.1016/J.SSMPH.2022.101331.

[24] Mahoney, J. et al. (2024), “Measuring social connectedness in OECD countries: A scoping review”, OECD Papers on Well-being and Inequalities, No. 28, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/f758bd20-en.

[21] Montornès, J. and M. Khder (2021), The impact of multinationals’ transfers on Irish GDP, Banque de France, https://www.banque-france.fr/en/publications-and-statistics/publications/impact-multinationals-transfers-irish-gdp (accessed on 30 April 2024).

[17] OECD (2024), Environment at a Glance Indicators, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/ac4b8b89-en.

[2] OECD (2024), OECD Employment Outlook 2024: The Net-Zero Transition and the Labour Market, OECD Publishing, https://doi.org/10.1787/ac8b3538-en.

[18] OECD (2024), OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions – 2024 Results: Building Trust in a Complex Policy Environment, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9a20554b-en.

[19] OECD (2024), OECD Trust Survey Design and Technical Documentation: Annex to the OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions - 2024 Result, https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/support-materials/2024/07/oecd-survey-on-drivers-of-trust-in-public-institutions-2024-results_eeb36452/2023%20Trust%20Survey%20-%20Technical%20annex.pdf (accessed on 7 August 2024).

[16] OECD (2023), Environment at a Glance Indicators, OECD Publishing, https://doi.org/10.1787/ac4b8b89-en.

[12] OECD (2023), Health at a Glance 2023: OECD Indicators, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/7a7afb35-en.

[13] OECD (2023), How to Make Societies Thrive? Coordinating Approaches to Promote Well-being and Mental Health, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/fc6b9844-en.

[23] OECD (2023), OECD Employment Outlook 2023: Artificial Intelligence and the Labour Market, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/08785bba-en.

[10] OECD (2023), PISA 2022 Results (Volume I): The State of Learning and Equity in Education, PISA, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/53f23881-en.

[7] OECD (2022), Income support for working-age individuals and their families, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/a89a2ccf-en.

[9] OECD (2022), OECD Economic Outlook, Volume 2022 Issue 2, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/f6da2159-en.

[5] OECD (2022), OECD Employment Outlook 2022: Building Back More Inclusive Labour Markets, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/1bb305a6-en.

[6] OECD (2022), Tax Policy Reforms 2022: OECD and Selected Partner Economies, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/067c593d-en.

[3] OECD (2021), COVID-19 and Well-being: Life in the Pandemic, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/1e1ecb53-en.

[20] OECD (2021), OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2021, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/38b0fdb1-en.

[14] OECD (2020), How’s Life? 2020 - Measuring Well-being, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9870c393-en.

[4] OECD (2020), “Supporting livelihoods during the COVID-19 crisis: Closing the gaps in safety nets”, OECD Policy Responses to Coronavirus (COVID-19), OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/17cbb92d-en.

[1] OECD (n.d.), How’s Life? Well-being Database, http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/fu (accessed on 3 May 2024).

[8] OECD (n.d.), OECD Household Dashboard, http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/hk (accessed on 11 May 2024).

[11] USDA (2022), Food Security Status of U.S. Households in 2022, https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/food-nutrition-assistance/food-security-in-the-u-s/key-statistics-graphics/#children (accessed on 19 June 2024).

Notes

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← 1. Understanding the impact of these events on all aspects of people’s lives in real time was often not possible with the (high-quality, large-sample) data sources governments and international organisations such as the OECD typically use for their policy analysis. Indeed, in many cases, especially when it comes to information on non-economic outcomes, data are often collected infrequently and/or published with a considerable time lag (in addition to the challenges of data collection during a pandemic). This does not mean it was impossible to uncover insights about the impact of these crises – in fact, some national statistical offices and many academics in the OECD area responded with significant innovations in high-frequency data collection especially during the COVID-19 pandemic, including household “pulse” surveys and new Internet-based surveys (OECD, 2021[3]). The OECD also stepped up its forecasting techniques and where possible (mostly for analyses on macroeconomic and labour market outcomes) relied on quarterly estimates (OECD, 2021[3]; 2023[23]; 2024[2]). Although much more needs to be done to increase the frequency and timeliness of data collection, several of the high-quality annual sources on social, economic and environmental well-being outcomes that the How’s Life? series of reports relies on have now become available for 2022 and 2023, and in some cases even up to 2024.

← 2. I.e. excluding social transfers in kind (such as health or education provided for free or at reduced prices by governments and non-profit institutions serving households) and not deducting the amount needed to replace the capital assets of households (i.e. dwellings and equipment of unincorporated enterprises).

← 3. The OECD average trends are partly driven by Türkiye, in which the share of people with difficulty making ends meet rose markedly in a context of hyperinflation. If this outlier is excluded, the OECD average for this indicator experiences a slow-down in progress rather than a short-term trend reversal, with average annual reduction rates of 1 percentage point between 2010-19 and of 0.2 percentage points between 2019-23.

← 4. There is ample evidence illustrating the harmful causal impacts of social isolation and loneliness on other well-being dimensions, including health, labour market, economic and educational outcomes and civic engagement (Mahoney et al., 2024[24]). Several OECD countries and international organisations have begun to recognise social connections as a policy priority, with various dedicated strategies to promote connectedness having been launched in the past five years amidst a growing sense that that loneliness and isolation are on the rise (Mahoney et al., 2024[24]). A separate working paper under the umbrella of the How’s Life? series will be released in 2025 to examine trends and inequalities in social connectedness in depth, complementing the high-level findings in this section.

← 5. Social support between 2017-19 and 2022-23 deteriorated in Austria, France, Italy, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States and improved in Greece (OECD, n.d.[1]).

← 6. These estimates are lower than some of the unofficial data on loneliness that have recently been published by the Gallup Word Poll, which estimates 2023 prevalence rates in OECD countries at around 20% (Gallup World Poll, 2023[22]). Upcoming OECD work will explore whether and to what extent survey design affects prevalence estimates.

← 7. Health outcomes and skills, which are both important for well-being today and in the future by contributing to human capital, have already been addressed in the previous sections.

← 8. It is still difficult to evaluate biodiversity outcomes and actual protection levels, as they depend on the designation of the geographic area and on its effective management. Indeed, protected areas have been changing over time, including the addition of new areas, the revision of boundaries, and the destruction of some sites due to pressures from economic development or natural processes. Additionally, there are large variations in the management objectives of terrestrial protected areas across OECD countries, which can be partly explained by differences in geography and ecology and in the pre-existing patterns of human settlement in the territory (OECD, 2023[16]).

← 9. The OECD average trends are partly driven by Israel, in which water use as share of internal water resources increased by 12 percentage points between 2019-22. If this outlier is excluded, the OECD average for this indicator experiences a slow-down in progress rather than a short-term trend reversal, with annualised reduction rates of 0.4 percentage points between 2010-19 and of 0.03 percentage points between 2019-22.

← 10. The OECD average trends are partly driven by Ireland due to the relocation of preexisting intangible assets by multinationals to their Irish subsidiaries in Q2 2019 and Q4 2019, (Montornès and Khder, 2021[21]). If this outlier is excluded, the OECD average for this indicator grows at an annualised rate of 2.4% between 2010-19, and by a slightly lower annualised 2.1% between 2019-22.

← 11. The OECD average trends are partly driven by Ireland due to the relocation of preexisting intangible assets by multinationals to their Irish subsidiaries in Q2 2019 and Q4 2019, (Montornès and Khder, 2021[21]). If this outlier is excluded, the OECD average for this indicator grows at an annualised rate of 0.02 percentage points between 2010-19, and by a slightly higher 0.03 percentage points between 2019-22.

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