The Regulation of Lobbying and Influence in Chile

Executive summary

Since Chile’s first free parliamentary and presidential elections in 1989, the country’s democratic institutions have been stable and well-functioning. In particular, the introduction in 2014 of a law regulating lobbying (hereafter “the Lobbying Act”), following eleven years of parliamentary debate and proceedings, marked a significant advance in strengthening the transparency and integrity of decision-making processes in Chile. Among other measures, the Act and its associated regulations impose a duty on public authorities and public officials to disclose their meetings with lobbyists seeking to influence a public decision. As a result, Chile shows a strong regulatory framework for transparency in lobbying compared to other OECD countries.

A decade into the implementation of the Lobbying Act and as part of Chile's broader efforts to advance in the implementation of the newly adopted National Public Integrity Strategy, the Chilean government is carrying forward efforts to update the Lobbying Act to ensure it remains fit for purpose and covers the full spectrum of today’s lobbying practices and risks.

Strengthening the legal framework for transparency in lobbying

The current Lobbying Act provides broad definitions of “lobbying”, in line with good practice. Nevertheless, several potential loopholes remain that weaken the legislation and create confusion over the scope of the law.

• Chile could clarify and expand the current list of “passive subjects” – public officials that are the target of lobbying activities – specified in Articles 3 and 4 of the Act. In the last ten years of implementation, certain public authorities have added by resolution specific categories of public officials to this list, which has created differentiated transparency regimes and registration requirements across public authorities. To ensure clarity and consistency, categories of public officials that have been consistently established by resolution as passive subjects could be included directly in the scope of the Act. Similarly, the list of public decisions targeted by lobbying activities could be expanded to include appointments of key government positions. Additionally, the Lobbying Act could adapt the disclosure of lobbying activities targeting certain public decisions according to the institutional level they concern.

• Chile could use a broader definition of actors and activities aimed at influencing government decision-making processes by using a single concept of “interest representative” in the Lobbying Act. This concept could include indirect forms of influence. Further, the Lobbying Act could clarify exemptions from lobbying disclosure requirements and include provisions on the participation of lobbyists in certain government advisory and expert groups.

Enabling effective transparency on lobbying through efficient disclosure systems and online transparency portals

The current disclosure system for lobbying activities in Chile is comprehensive and provides a strong level of transparency. It puts the primary responsibility of disclosure on public officials, even if lobbyists are still required to register through several platforms to request meetings with public officials. However, this approach does not cover all lobbying and influencing activities, creates an imbalance in transparency obligations and adds to the burden of compliance by lobbyists since there is no centralised registration and transparency platform.

• Chile could provide comprehensive and pertinent information on who is lobbying, on what issues and how. This could be ensured by complementing the existing Public Agenda Registers with a Register of Lobbyists in which registration could be a pre-requisite to conducting lobbying activities and requesting meetings, and in which lobbyists would face additional disclosure requirements on all lobbying activities they conduct.

• While remaining separate, the two proposed registers – for lobbyists and for public officials – could be hosted on a single central registration and disclosure portal to facilitate registration and enable greater public scrutiny through cross-checking of information.

• To enhance the quality of the disclosed information, the proposed centralised lobbying registration and disclosure portal could serve as a one-stop-shop for lobbyists and public officials on how to register and disclose information.

Strengthening the integrity framework adapted to the risks of lobbying and influence activities for both public officials and lobbyists

In Chile, both public officials and lobbyists are subject to various integrity standards and transparency requirements specified in the Lobbying Act and the Code of Good Practice for Lobbyists. However, public officials often face lobbying-related ethical dilemmas, particularly in the age of social media and information overload. Similarly, lobbyists face increased expectations regarding their demonstration of and commitment to integrity.

• Chile could strengthen the lobbying integrity framework by clarifying public officials’ expected behaviour when dealing with lobbying, adequately managing the revolving-door phenomenon and developing additional capacity-building and awareness-raising activities for public officials.

• Chile could also assist businesses and civil society organisations in reinforcing their frameworks for transparency and integrity in policymaking. This could include a centralised and mandatory Code of Conduct for lobbyists with sanctions applicable for non-compliance. Additionally, Chile could add a provision in the Lobbying Act requiring legal entities to disclose sources of funding, both public and private.

Establishing mechanisms for effective implementation, compliance and review of the lobbying framework

The institutional framework for lobbying in Chile lacks a centralised and independent body to administer registers, enhance transparency and conduct investigations, which poses a significant challenge to the implementation of the lobbying framework. Additionally, the current sanctions regime lacks effectiveness and primarily targets public authorities and civil servants, with no effective provision for penalising lobbyists who violate lobbying rules.

• To assign clear responsibilities for implementation and enforcement, Chile could entrust an independent body with broader responsibilities for enforcing the Lobbying Act, verifying information disclosed and investigating potential breaches. Furthermore, Chile could introduce an anonymous reporting mechanism for those who suspect violations of the law.

• The Lobbying Act could include a gradual system of financial and non-financial sanctions for both those who are lobbied and those who lobby, applied at the entity level, and include provisions that enable oversight entity(ies) to apply measures to incentivise compliance.

• Chile could enable an effective review of the lobbying framework by including a periodic review mechanism in the Lobbying Act to address new developments in lobbying. Further, Chile could promote stakeholder participation in the discussion, implementation and subsequent revisions of lobbying-related regulations and standards of conduct.