# OECD Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook: Country Fact Sheet 2024



# Chile

#### **Contextual factors**

| State structure | Executive power | Legislative system | Legal system |
|-----------------|-----------------|--------------------|--------------|
| Unitary         | Presidential    | Bicameral          | Civil law    |


#### Strategy and institutions on anti-corruption and public integrity

In December 2023, Chile adopted the <u>National Strategy on Public Integrity 2023-2033</u>, approved by the Secretary General of the Presidency. The strategy is based on five thematic pillars: 1) civil service, 2) public resources, 3) transparency, 4) politics, and 5) private sector. Each pillar includes specific strategic objectives aiming to foster a culture of integrity. This is Chile's first strategic framework for anti-corruption and public integrity.

As a general rule, two authorities have a supervisory function for lobbying activity issues in central government, namely the <u>General Comptroller of the Republic of Chile</u> and <u>the Council for Transparency</u>, which oversee the Lobbying platform, where registered users can access data on lobbying activities. However, some institutions may fall under the oversight of other authorities with regards to lobbying activities, such as the Parliamentary Ethics and Transparency Committees, the Central Bank, the Prosecutor's Office and the General Comptroller of the Republic. The Council for Transparency is also the independent body responsible for open data policy. Chile established an entity supervising political finance (<u>Electoral Service</u>), as well as a central government body for internal control and audit <u>(Government Internal Audit Council)</u>.

### **Overview**


Figure 1. Overview



| Greatest strengths                | Areas to improve                   |  |
|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|--|
| Political finance - regulation    | Political finance - implementation |  |
| Conflict of interest - regulation | Transparency of public information |  |
| Lobbying - regulation             | Post-employment integrity          |  |

# **Anti-corruption strategy**

Figure 2. Anti-corruption strategy




The National Strategy on Public Integrity 2023-2033 is a top performer among OECD countries' strategic framework on anti-corruption and public integrity. It is the first strategy adopted at the central government level in Chile with 210 measures to fight corruption and strengthen public integrity. The strategy includes a situation analysis comprising an identification of existing public integrity risks, outcome level indicators for the public integrity objectives, and target values for all outcome-level indicators. Moreover, the strategy refers to several international legal instruments relating to public integrity.

The strategy also uses data from the OECD Public Integrity Indicators and several surveys and other analytical documents. Being a new strategy, there is no data on the implementation of strategic objectives nor on monitoring and evaluation practices.

# Corruption risk management and audit

Figure 3. Corruption risk management and audit




As measured against OECD standards on risk management, which includes internal control and internal audit, Chile fulfils 76% of criteria for regulations and 49% for practice, compared to the OECD average of 67% and 33%, respectively.

Chile's regulatory framework specifies the operational arrangements for internal audit. According to Resolution 10/2021 of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, public entities and services are required to establish and maintain internal audit units. The central harmonisation unit within the Government Internal Audit Council trains internal auditors and promotes best practice on internal control and audit across the public sector. The harmonisation unit also conducted government-wide reviews of internal control and audit. However, audit charters and procedure manuals are not consistently adopted by heads of institutions. In Chile, 92% of public organisations were audited and 46% of internal audit recommendations were implemented by organisations.

# Lobbying

Figure 4. Lobbying




As measured against OECD standards on lobbying, Chile fulfils 50% of criteria for regulations and 89% for practice, compared to the OECD average of 38% and 35%, respectively.

The country's regulatory framework defines lobbying activities, including which actors are considered as lobbyists and imposes sanctions for breaches of standards. However, it does not include cooling off periods for public officials and lobbyists. Chile is nonetheless a top performer in terms of practice. In 2023, the Presidential Advisory Commission for Integrity and Transparency launched a Code of Conduct for the interactions between public officials and lobbyists. However, the Code is not mandatory. A lobbying register is available online, and it provides information on the type of and expenses for lobbying activities, as well as the pieces of legislation and regulation targeted.

#### **Conflict of interest**

Figure 5. Conflict of interest




As measured against OECD standards on conflict of interest, Chile fulfils 89% of criteria for regulations and 67% for practice, compared to the OECD average of 76% and 40%, respectively.

Chile's comprehensive regulatory framework defines and describes how to manage conflict-of-interest situations for various levels of government. It includes interest declarations upon employment from members of government, parliament and highest bodies of the judiciary as well as for public employees in a high-risk positions and top-tier civil servants of the executive branch. In practice, these declarations are submitted by elected officials and senior civil servants, but not for members of the judiciary. Verification of interest declaration is conducted according to a risk-based methodology.

#### **Political finance**

Figure 6. Political finance




As measured against OECD standards on political finance, Chile fulfils 90% of criteria for regulations and 57% for practice, compared to the OECD average of 73% and 58%, respectively.

The country's framework includes personal liability for breaches of electoral candidates and proportionate sanctions of breaches. The Constitutional Organic Law on Transparency, Limits and Control of Electoral Expenditure established an independent body monitoring political finance, the Electoral Service of Chile. Regulations include bans for anonymous donations, contributions from foreign states or enterprises as well as state-owned enterprises. However, only donation below a certain threshold can be qualified as "reserved", which means that only the Electoral Service knows the identity of the donor and not the general public. The law also establishes a ceiling on campaign expenses, comprehensive reporting requirements, and mandatory public disclosure of party finances. However, in practice, not all political parties have submitted annual accounts as well as those related to elections, within the timelines defined by national legislation.

# **Transparency of public information**

Figure 7. Transparency of public information



As measured against OECD standards on public information, which includes access to information and open data, Chile fulfils 78% of criteria for regulations and 65% of criteria for practice, compared to the OECD average of 67% and 62%, respectively.

The Council for Transparency oversees access to information in Chile. It carries out inspections of compliance and can sanction non-compliance. Proactively disclosed datasets include asset and interest declarations of elected officials, members of the judiciary and senior civil servants, as well as the salary of individual civil servants in all ministries. However, central company and land registries are not publicly available, and there are no published agendas and recorded minutes of government sessions.