This chapter analyses the non-labour market outcomes of migrants, examining whether and to what extent these differ from the outcomes of the native-born population. The analyses focus on self-reported health, political efficacy, interpersonal trust and volunteering. Previous analyses of data from the Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC) have shown that literacy and numeracy skills are positively associated with many aspects of individual well-being, like health, active participation in the political process, levels of interpersonal trust, and involvement in volunteer or associative activities. This chapter examines if the association between skills and these non-labour market outcomes differs between migrants and natives, and how this connection is intertwined with education, age, gender and other individual characteristics.
Skills on the Move
Chapter 6. Non-labour market outcomes among migrants
Abstract
The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.
The importance of non-labour market outcomes
While employment and wages are important for individual well-being, non-economic factors also contribute to well-being and to the smooth functioning of societies as a whole. These factors are becoming increasingly important in the policy discourse. The report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress (Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi, 2009[1]) is one example of the interest in developing broader measure of well-being, going beyond traditional measures of economic success, like wages (at the individual level) and GDP (at the country level). The OECD with its How’s Life initiative has been adopting the recommendations of the Commission and developed a new way to measure and benchmark countries’ performance using composite indicators reflecting well-being in a broad spectrum of economic and social dimensions.
The Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC) collects information on four non-labour market outcomes: self-assessed health (health); the level of trust adults have in others (trust); the sense of being able to influence the political process (political efficacy); and participation in associative, religious, political or charity activities (volunteering). This chapter identifies disparities in such outcomes across native-born and foreign-born adults and examines how differences across the two groups are shaped by the socio-economic status of respondents and, crucially, by their proficiency in information-processing skills.
Examining the broad well-being of migrants is useful in identifying alternative benchmarks of integration. Labour market integration is important for migrants because it enables them to acquire economic resources, gives them a sense of purpose and provides opportunities for social bonding. It is important for host communities because it ensures that migrants contribute to the economic and social well-being of the country. However, in order to understand how and why people develop a sense of the belonging to a community it is also important to consider migrants’ broader life experiences. Measures of non-labour market outcomes are increasingly being recognised as important benchmarks in the evaluation of policy initiatives (OECD, 2013[2]).
Previous research has shown that education is one of the factors that is most strongly associated with subjective well-being, together with health status, social connectedness, being in a stable relationship with a partner, and being employed (Dolan, Peasgood and White, 2008[3]; Winkelmann and Winkelmann, 1998[4]; Kahneman and Krueger, 2006[5]; Blanchflower and Oswald, 2011[6]; Helliwell, 2008[7]). So far, however, studies have failed to capture the inter-relationship between different explanatory factors and the mechanisms that lead adults, in general (and migrants, in particular), with more education to express greater well-being. The information available from PIAAC – on participation in education and attainment, employment status and wages and on proficiency in literacy and numeracy – can elucidate some of these mechanisms.
There is a large body of empirical literature documenting the relationship between economic and non-labour market outcomes. Previous work using PIAAC data has found that proficiency in information-processing skills is positively associated with trust, volunteering, political efficacy and self-assessed good health among the general population. These relationships hold even after accounting for socio-demographic characteristics, like education, parents’ educational attainment, age and gender. The mechanisms linking economic and non-labour market outcomes, and the individual determinants of non-labour market outcomes (and, ultimately, of well-being) have been much less investigated, partly because of a lack of data, and partly because of the inherent difficulty in determining causal relationships. Non-labour market outcomes can be seen as being of inherent value and an expression of well-being, or, in light of the vast literature on the relationship between social capital and economic growth, as mediating variables in studying the relationship between skills proficiency and economic outcomes.
This chapter aims to investigate whether migrants and natives differ in non-labour market outcomes and, if so, if this can be explained by differences in observable characteristics across the two groups. The chapter also aims to identify whether education and skills play similar roles among migrants and natives in determining non-labour market outcomes.
Health
Disparities in self-reported health
Poor health is a major burden for the affected person, but also for governments. Recent estimates suggest that health expenditures account for as much as 9% of GDP across OECD countries; and in the United States, they represent as much as 18% of GDP (OECD, 2014[8]). There is a large body of evidence highlighting considerable disparities in health across population subgroups, with socio-economically disadvantaged and low-educated people disproportionately more likely to be in ill health (Grossman, 2000[9]; Grossman, 2005[10]; Schütte et al., 2013[11]; van der Kooi et al., 2013[12]; OECD/EU, 2015[13]).
Health is an important outcome in itself, but it is also a key potential determinant of differences in labour market participation and performance, and in engagement in lifelong learning activities, across adults. Adults who are highly proficient in information-processing skills might be better able to manage their health and, as a result, might be in a better position to use their skills in the labour market.
Figure 6.1 shows the percentage of native-born and migrant adults in PIAAC-participating countries who reported being in excellent or in very good health. On average across participating countries, the share of adults who reported to be in excellent or very good health is similar across the two groups,. However, in Chile, England, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, Northern Ireland, Spain and Singapore, migrants were more likely than natives to report being in good health. By contrast, in France, Germany, Israel, the Netherlands and Sweden, they were less likely to report being in good health. In Chile, migrants were particularly more likely than natives to report being in excellent or in very good health (67% of natives but 81% of migrants reported excellent or very good health, a difference of 13 percentage points). Natives, on the other hand, were more likely to report being in excellent or very good health in Estonia (where 68% of natives but only 44% of migrants reported excellent or very good health, a difference of 25 percentage points), Israel (where 89% of natives but 75% of migrants reported excellent or very good health, a difference of 13 percentage points) and the Netherlands (where 83% of natives but 70% of migrants reported excellent or very good health, a difference of 13 percentage points).
Differences in the health status of migrants and natives could be due to differences in the background characteristics of the two populations, particularly their age and labour market status. Institutional factors, such as immigration policy and access to welfare institutions (as well as personal choice) can determine health differences between the two groups. Previous chapters in this report have indicated that migrants have poorer labour market outcomes than natives, and that their skills are underused in the labour market. Labour market penalties might lead to poorer health because migrants might have fewer economic and social resources that enable them to engage in the behaviours and to make the choices that maintain good health.
Moreover, to the extent that migrants have a lower social status than they would have had, given their background, had they not migrated, they might be more likely than natives to suffer from “status syndrome” (Marmot, 2005[14]). Status syndrome refers to the poorer health and higher mortality rates that are observed among people of lower social status compared with people of higher social status. The syndrome was first observed and described by Michael Marmot, who tracked the mortality rates and the incidence of certain health conditions among British civil servants in a Whitehall study.
Psychological factors, social support from extended family networks and welfare regimes might all contribute to differences in health across migrant populations. Differences in health status between migrants and natives might also be a “statistical artefact”, derived from the fact that, in some countries, migrants who are in poor health and who cannot work or have difficulty finding employment, might leave the host country, with the result that only migrants in good health remain. In other countries, generous welfare systems and a labour market that is less based on manual labour might attract people in poor physical health to enter and remain in the country. This selection effect might arise because legislation or personal preferences might lead migrants to return to their home country if and when they are unable to be economically active or suffer from poor health. In other host countries, comprehensive healthcare and welfare arrangements and good-quality care might eliminate this selection effect because migrants will have no reason to leave the country for health-related reasons.
Figure 6.1. Reported health by immigrant status
Note: Migrants are defined as those participants whose country of birth is different that the country at which they are doing the test. Statistically significant differences are marked in bold. Estimates based on a sample size less than 30 are not shown (Japan, Poland and Turkey).
Countries are ranked in descending order of the percentage of migrants who report being in excellent or very good health
Source: (OECD, 2015[15]) Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC) (2012, 2015), Table A6.1, www.oecd.org/skills/piaac/publicdataandanalysis
Table 6.A.1 indicates that in some countries, differences in the socio-demographic profile of migrants and natives lie behind the observed differences in the percentage of adults in the two groups who reported being in excellent or very good health. For example, when comparing natives and migrants of similar age, parents’ educational attainment and gender, and who speak the main language of the Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC), only migrants in New Zealand and Singapore were more likely to report being in excellent or very good health. In Austria, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Israel, the Netherlands and Sweden, migrants were less likely to report being in good health than natives, with gaps between the two groups as large as 6 percentage points in Estonia, Finland, Greece and the Netherlands.
The role of education and skills in promoting health
Changes in the nature of work, in infrastructures and healthcare have meant that non-communicable diseases that arise from people’s lifestyle choices play an increasingly important role in determining the health of individuals and disparities in health outcomes across people and communities. Prevention programmes that promote healthy lifestyles are increasingly important but present new challenges for health practitioners and policy makers. While the need for treatment in the presence of illness and disease is evident for patients, prevention programmes de facto require lifestyle changes among groups of healthy people who have to understand issues related to the risks, health benefits and psychological costs incurred at different points in time, often decades apart. As a result, and more than ever, education and proficiency in information-processing skills might be key to explaining differences in health outcomes. The expectation that individuals will become partners in the management of their health and bear responsibility for adopting healthy behaviours has increased in parallel with the growth in chronic conditions due to increases in life expectancy (Bauer et al., 2014[16]). In order to effectively manage chronic conditions individuals have to constantly communicate with health care providers and understand complex probabilistic concepts such as risk factors, learn to self-monitor parameters such as blood pressure, comply with long-term courses of drug regimens for multiple morbidities, navigate digital texts, interpret information on food and drug labels, and connect with support networks of friends and peer patients through social media. With rapidly evolving health-promoting technology products, individuals need to adapt to become perennial learners (Kakarmath et al., 2018[17]). As such, strong general literacy and numeracy proficiency have become pre-conditions for the development of health literacy (Berkman et al., 2011[18]).
Several studies have investigated the relationship between education and health outcomes and behaviours, finding a positive association between the two. The education-health link is partly explained by the higher income that more educated people earn. But it is increasingly clear that this association also stems from a direct, causal impact of education and learning on health (Lleras-Muney, 2005[19]; Lundborg, 2008[20]; Oreopoulos, 2006[21]; Silles, 2009[22]). Educated people might be more efficient at maintaining good health and, as a result, enjoy better health with the same amount of resources, all else being equal. Education might prompt adults to make better health choices, such as adopting a healthier diet, exercising and avoiding tobacco. More education generally translates into greater access to better information and greater ability to act on such information. Education might also alter the perception of risk and, by doing so, might render adults more likely to invest in their health. In addition, since it is associated with the potential for high income throughout a lifetime, education is likely to shape what individuals are willing to do to insure themselves against the risk of being in poor health and the potential associated loss of income.
Health literacy has been linked to the use of emergency health services, hospitalisation, interpretation of health communication, appropriate taking of medications and mortality in the elderly (Berkman et al., 2011[18]). The expectation that individuals will become partners in the management of their own health and bear a major responsibility for adopting health promoting behaviours has increased in parallel with the growth in life expectancy and associated chronic health conditions (Bauer et al., 2014[16]). Treatment of a chronic condition often requires that individuals communicate with health care providers and understand complex probabilistic concepts such as risk factors, learn to self-monitor parameters such as blood pressure, comply meticulously with long-term courses of drug regimens for multiple morbidities, navigate digital texts, interpret information on food and drug labels, and connect with support networks of friends and peer patients through social media. With rapidly evolving health-promoting technology products, individuals need to adapt to become perennial learners. As such, strong general literacy and numeracy proficiency have become pre-conditions for the development of health literacy.
Previous analyses of PIAAC data have indicated that information-processing skills play a key role in explaining within-country variations in self-reported health (Borgonovi and Pokropek, 2016[23]). However, little is known about the extent to which differences in the proficiency in these skills explain variations in self-reported health across natives and migrants, or the degree to which migrants and natives are likely to report that they enjoy good health if they attain similar levels of proficiency in information-processing skills.
Table 6.A.1 shows the degree to which differences in educational attainment and literacy skills explain disparities between natives and migrants in the probability of reporting that they are in excellent or very good health. Results are in line with previous work suggesting that both educational attainment and literacy levels are strongly and positively associated with adults’ self-reported health status. All else being equal, adults with a tertiary degree are more likely to report being in excellent or very good health than those who do not have an upper secondary degree, and those who have greater proficiency in literacy are more likely to report being in excellent or very good health than those who are less proficient. However, differences in the educational attainment or literacy levels between migrants and natives do not explain the disparities between migrants and natives in self-reported health status.
Figure 6.2 indicates that in the majority of participating countries, the association between self-reported health and literacy are similar among migrants and natives; but in Ireland, Israel, New Zealand, Northern Ireland, Norway, and the United States, proficiency in literacy appears to be less associated with health status among migrants than among natives. For example, in Ireland, all else being equal, a difference of 50 points in literacy proficiency is associated with a difference of around 3 percentage points in the probability that a native adult will report being in excellent or very good health; but among migrants, there is no such advantage. In the United States, a difference of 50 points in literacy proficiency is associated with a difference of around 6 percentage points in the probability that a native adult will report being in excellent or very good health; but among migrants, this difference is only 3 percentage points. Similarly, in Canada, Lithuania, Northern Ireland and the United States, the relationship between earning a tertiary degree and reporting good-to-excellent is weaker among migrants and among natives (see Table 6.A.1).
Figure 6.2. Differences between natives and migrants in the relationship between literacy and health, by migrant background
Note: The returns to literacy is not statistically significant in Czech Republic, Greece and Italy and are therefore not presented on this chart. Migrants are defined as those participants whose country of birth is different that the country at which they are doing the test. Returns to literacy are based on a regression model and take account of differences associated with the following variables: age, gender, education, immigration background and parents' educational attainment (See model 4 in the source table). Statistically significant differences are maked in bold. Estimates based on a sample size less than 30 are not shown.
Countries are ranked in descending order of the returns to literacy for natives
Source: (OECD, 2015[15]) Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC) (2012, 2015), Table 6.A.1, www.oecd.org/skills/piaac/publicdataandanalysis
Generalised trust
Generalised trust is a feeling of goodwill towards anonymous others. It allows for smooth social and economic interactions in complex societies, where people engage frequently with others whom they do not know and from whom they differ in many ways. The wealth of research on generalised trust in sociology, political science, economics and public health reflects the importance of trust in unfamiliar others in increasingly complex societies (Nannestad, 2008[24]; Newton, 2007[25]) and the social and economic benefits of generalised trust. In these contexts, the absence of trust can have negative consequences for economic activity.
Interpersonal trust, especially generalised trust, is a strong predictor of economic prosperity (Fukuyama, 1995[26]; Knack and Keefer, 1997[27]; Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993[28]) and individual well-being (Helliwell and Wang, 2010[29]). The literature has identified a number of channels through which trust can affect economic performance (Algan and Cahuc, 2014[30]): trust is thought to be essential for the smooth functioning of financial markets; it is likely to play an important role in economic activities that involve a high degree of uncertainty (like investments in research and development, which are the sources of technological innovations) or in which contracts are difficult to enforce; and by promoting co-operation, trust can improve the organisation of firms and the quality of labour relations.
While institutions, such as judicial systems, are crucial in sustaining trust, education and skills policies are also likely to play an important role. Higher information-processing skills can help people better understand the motives underlying others’ behaviours, and the negative consequences of lack of co-operation. Education and cognitive skills help build the socio-emotional skills needed to engage in fruitful social relationships (Borgonovi and Burns, 2015[31]). Indirectly, societies with larger shares of skilled individuals might function more efficiently, thus helping to sustain trust.
The Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC) allows for the creation of measures of interpersonal trust through responses to the statements: “Only few people can be trusted” and “If you are not careful, other people will take advantage of you”, to which respondents could report that they strongly disagreed, disagreed, neither agreed nor disagreed, agreed or strongly agreed. For the purpose of the analysis carried out in this section, adults who disagreed or strongly disagreed with these statements were classified as having high levels of trust.
In many countries, migration flows have increased the level of ethnic, social and religious diversity in local communities. Research on migration and generalised trust has attempted to identify the extent to which greater diversity is associated with less trust among native populations (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002[32]; Borgonovi, 2012[33]). However, monitoring the level of generalised trust expressed by migrant communities is also a good way to identify their well-being: whether they feel safe and welcome in their communities.
Figures 6.3 and 6.4 show the percentage of migrants and natives who reported that they disagree or strongly disagree that only few people can be trusted. In 12 OECD countries, natives were more likely than migrants to report that they strongly disagree or disagree that only few people can be trusted; in Denmark and the Netherlands the differences between the two groups are particularly large. For example, in Denmark, 46% of natives, but only 32% of migrants reported that they disagree or strongly disagree that only few people can be trusted, a difference of 14 percentage points. In the Netherlands, 33% of natives but only 22% of migrants reported the same, a difference of 11 percentage points. Similarly, in 9 OECD countries, natives were more likely than migrants to report that they strongly disagree or disagree that if you are not careful, other people will take advantage of you. In Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, differences between the two groups amount to at least 10 percentage points. Tables 6.A.2 and 6.A.3 suggest that differences in the profiles of migrants and natives by gender, age, language spoken at home and parents’ education do not explain differences in the levels of trust expressed by the two groups.
Figure 6.3. Percentage of adults who believe that most people can be trusted, by migrant background
Note: Migrants are defined as those participants whose country of birth is different that the country at which they are doing the test. Statistically significant differences are marked in bold. Estimates based on a sample size less than 30 are not shown (Japan, Poland and Turkey).
Countries are ranked in descending order of the percentage of migrants who report disagreeing or strong disagreeing that only few people can be trusted. Statistically significant differences are marked in bold.
Source: (OECD, 2015[15]) Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC) (2012, 2015), Table 6.A.2, www.oecd.org/skills/piaac/publicdataandanalysis
Figure 6.4. Percentage of adults who believe that others will not take advantage of them, by migrant background
Note: Migrants are defined as those participants whose country of birth is different that the country at which they are doing the test. Statistically significant differences are marked in bold. Estimates based on a sample size less than 30 are not shown (Japan, Poland and Turkey).
Countries are ranked in descending order of the percentage of migrants who report disagreeing or strong disagreeing that if you are not careful other people will take advantage of you. Statistically significant differences are marked in bold.
Source: (OECD, 2015[15]) Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC) (2012, 2015), Table 6.A.3, www.oecd.org/skills/piaac/publicdataandanalysis
The role of education and skills in promoting generalised trust
The literature has identified large differences between people in levels of generalised trust, and educational attainment is one of the factors that is strongly associated with people’s propensity to trust anonymous others (Borgonovi, 2012[33]; Putnam, 2000[34]; Paxton, 2007[35]; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002[32]; Brehm and Rahn, 1997[36]; Nannestad, 2008[24]; Merolla et al., 2013[37]);. Education could be a factor because of social sorting and cognitive processes (Nie, Junn and Stehlik-Barry, 1996[38]; Hooghe, Marien and de Vroome, 2012[39]). Better-educated adults are more likely to be active in the labour market and to command higher wages than adults with less education. As a result, better-educated adults have stronger safety nets to protect them from the negative consequences of misplacing trust. The cognitive mechanism recognises that, over time, only individuals who are not penalised for engaging in co-operative behaviours can afford to trust others. Being able to appreciate the trustworthiness of specific people in given situations is a prerequisite for people to be able to hold a general expectation about the trustworthiness of others in general (Yamagashi, 2001[40]; Sturgis, Read and Allum, 2010[41]).
Tables 6.A.2 and 6.A.3 confirm that, in the majority of PIAAC-participating countries, educational attainment and literacy proficiency are positively associated with the likelihood that individuals will trust others. For example, adults with a tertiary qualification are, on average across participating countries, 13% more likely to disagree or strongly disagree that there are only a few people that they can trust completely and, all else being equal, a difference of 50 score points in literacy proficiency is associated with a 3% greater likelihood that adults will disagree or strongly disagree that there are only a few people that can be trusted completely.
In the majority of countries, the association between educational attainment and literacy proficiency is the same among migrants and natives, but in some it is weaker among migrants. For example, in Canada, Denmark, Lithuania, New Zealand and the United States, the difference in the extent to which tertiary-educated migrants and migrants who have less than an upper secondary degree disagreed or strongly disagreed that there are only a few people you can trust completely is considerably smaller than the difference observed between natives who have a tertiary degree and those who have an upper secondary degree. Similarly, in Australia, Austria, Denmark, New Zealand and the United States, the difference in the extent to which tertiary-educated migrants and migrants who have less than an upper secondary degree disagreed or strongly disagreed that if you are not careful, other people will take advantage of you is considerably smaller than the difference observed between natives who have a tertiary degree and those who have an upper secondary degree.
In many countries, differences in self-reported trust associated with literacy skills are smaller among migrants than among natives. For example, in Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Germany, New Zealand and the United States, among OECD countries, and in Singapore, adults’ reports on the extent to which they disagree or strongly disagree that there are only a few people that can be trusted completely are less associated with literacy among migrants than among natives (Table 6.A.2). Similarly, in Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Israel, the Netherlands, New Zealand and the United States, adults’ reports on the extent to which they disagree or strongly disagree that if they are not careful other people will take advantage of them are less associated with literacy among migrants than among natives (Table 6.A.3).
Political efficacy
Political efficacy helps sustain and develop successful democratic systems (Almond and Verba, 1963[42]; Macpherson, 1977[43]; Pateman, 1970[44]). It is defined as “the feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact on the political process, i.e. that it is worthwhile to perform one’s civic duties” (Campbell, Gurin and Miller, 1954[45]). Political efficacy has two components that highlight different aspects of the relationship between individuals and the public sphere: internal political efficacy, which refers to feelings of personal competence “to understand and to participate effectively in politics” (Craig, Niemi and Silver, 1990[46]), and external political efficacy, which refers to people’s belief “in the responsiveness of political bodies and actors to citizens’ demands” (Balch, 1974[47]; Converse, 1972[48]).
Countries differ widely in how migrants come to acquire political rights and duties, in the range of opportunities they have to engage in the political sphere, and in the extent to which migrant communities are a primary concern for politicians at the national, regional or local level. Because political participation and representation are closely tied to citizenship and to the degree to which people feel that they belong to a community and a social system, migrants might express less political efficacy than natives. It is more difficult for migrants to acquire political rights; and developing feelings of belonging and of identification with their host country requires that migrants internalise their host community’s social mores and that their community recognises their contributions.
PIAAC respondents were presented with the following statement aimed at measuring their level of external political efficacy: “People like me do not have a say in what the government does” to which respondents could answer on a five-point Likert scale ranging from “strongly agree”, “agree”, “neither agree nor disagree”, “disagree” to “strongly disagree”. Lower values indicate less external political efficacy. The external political efficacy question has a long tradition in studies of political efficacy, dating back to the first National Election Studies in the United States in the 1950s (Lane, 1959[49]). Given the strong link between migrant background and political rights and representation, the question might lead foreign-born adults to consider their background as particularly salient when answering this question.
Figure 6.5 shows that in as many as 12 OECD countries native-born adults were more likely than foreign-born adults to report that they disagree or strongly disagree that people like them do not have any say about what the government does. In Finland the difference is particularly wide: 47% of native born but only 24% of foreign-born adults so reported, a difference of 24 percentage points. In Denmark, 52% of natives but only 35% of foreign-born adults reported that they disagree or strongly disagree that people like them do not have any say about what the government does, a difference of over 17 percentage points. Among OECD countries, differences between the two groups are wider than 10 percentage points in Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. Interestingly, in Flanders (Belgium) and New Zealand, foreign-born adults were more likely than their native-born counterparts to report high levels of political efficacy. Results presented in Table A6.4 suggest that length of stay in the country is not a significant factor shaping differences in political efficacy among migrant groups.
Figure 6.5. Percentage of adults who reported high levels of political efficacy, by migrant background
Note: Migrants are defined as those participants whose country of birth is different that the country at which they are doing the test. Statistically significant differences are marked in bold. Estimates based on a sample size less than 30 are not shown.
Countries are ranked in descending order of the percentage of migrants who report disagreeing or strong disagreeing that people like them don't have any say about what government does. Statistically significant differences are marked in bold.
Source: (OECD, 2015[15]) Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC) (2012, 2015), Table A6.4, www.oecd.org/skills/piaac/publicdataandanalysis
Cultural and social reproduction theorists consider levels of political efficacy to be determined primarily by the experiences and interactions children have with important reference figures and by their experiences as they grow up. They stress the importance of socialisation processes in shaping political outcomes and civic participation (Prior, 2010[50]). During childhood, people internalise what society expects of them, but also the extent to which societal norms, and political institutions and actors will allow them to lead the lives they want and strive to achieve (Johnson and Dawes, 2016[51]; Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993[28]; Stolle and Hooghe, 2004[52]; Uslaner, 2002[53]). To the extent that foreign-born adults might have lived under authoritarian regimes and have come to view political institutions as not responsive to local communities, they might find it difficult to develop the level of trust in institutions that will allow them to play an active and engaged role in their communities.
The policy-feedback literature has hypothesised that policies shape citizenship. Some research has examined the extent to which different types of welfare programmes, and their design, can shape people’s sense of agency, and level of civic and political engagement (Bruch, Ferree and Soss, 2016[54]; Kumlin, 2004[55]; Kumlin and Rothstein, 2005[56]). Cultural and social reproduction theories suggest that the acquisition of external political efficacy crucially depends on the experiences people have as they become adults and on the level of their parents’ political efficacy. The experientialist approach views external political efficacy as the result of positive interactions and experiences with institutions, including the government.
Political efficacy can be built and destroyed over time as individuals change, and political institutions act in ways that do (or do not) foster the well-being of the communities they serve, lack transparency or are not open to citizens’ involvement (Hardin, 2002[57]). More specifically, when communities provide few opportunities to consult with migrants, even though the migrants might not be citizens or have passive political rights, and when there are large differences in social and economic outcomes between native and migrant populations, migrants might perceive political institutions and actors as distant and unresponsive. Both the policy-feedback literature and experientialist theories suggest that the gap between migrants and natives in external political efficacy might vary greatly across countries, depending on the opportunities afforded to migrants to influence government action, and on the structure of the immigration and welfare policies that affect them.
The role of education and skills in promoting political efficacy
Educational attainment is one of the factors that is most strongly associated with political participation and involvement. Within countries and at any given time, adults who have more qualifications and who have attended school for longer are more likely to be politically active (Borgonovi, d'Hombres and Hoskins, 2010[58]; Lipset, 1959[59]; Putnam, 2001[60]; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980[61]). The role of education in promoting political efficacy could stem from knowledge about political institutions, an understanding of economic and social affairs, and also from the greater information-processing skills that better-educated adults have developed. In fact, feelings of efficacy depend on people’s ability to make use of the information in their environment to hold political institutions accountable for respecting the mandate given to them by the electorate. While voting is a key form of political participation, people have other means to ensure that they play an active role in making local, regional and national governments respond to their needs, protect their rights and promote their well-being.
Table 6.A.4 indicates that, in most PIAAC-participating countries, educational attainment and literacy proficiency are strongly and positively associated with external political efficacy. On average across participating countries, tertiary-educated graduates were 16% more likely than adults without an upper secondary degree to report disagreeing or strongly disagreeing that people like them do not have any say about what the government does. In Austria, Chile, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway and the United States, the difference between tertiary-educated adults and adults without an upper secondary degree is at least 20 percentage points. Similarly, a difference of 50 score points in literacy proficiency is associated with a higher likelihood that adults will report disagreeing or strongly disagreeing that people like them do not have any say about what the government does. Among OECD countries, the change in political efficacy that is associated with literacy is particularly steep in Australia, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Greece, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and the United States.
Figure 6.6 and Table 6.A.4 suggest that in a few countries educational attainment and literacy proficiency moderate disparities in political efficacy related to migrant background. For example, in Canada, England (UK), Estonia, and Germany, literacy proficiency is less strongly associated with political efficacy among migrants than among natives. In Denmark, Flanders (Belgium), Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and the United States, educational attainment is less strongly associated with political efficacy among migrants than among natives. In the majority of countries, estimated differences between the two groups suggest a weaker relationship among migrants, although small sample sizes lead to imprecise estimates and therefore it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis of similarity in effects across the two groups at conventional levels (p<5%).
These results could indicate that while access to and ability to use information are key to explaining disparities in political efficacy among native-born adults, other factors might be at play for migrants. For example, structural impediments to political participation and involvement, and feeling that their voices, needs and concerns are of secondary importance to politicians might better explain why migrants report less political efficacy. Most research on the effects of migration flows on political participation and involvement focuses on the impact that a large population of migrants has on the political views, perceptions and feelings of efficacy among natives. But if political systems are to represent the interests and needs of local communities and promote social cohesion in among diverse populations, then they must ensure that foreign-born individuals feel that institutions are responsive to their needs and that their voices are heard and respected.
Figure 6.6. Differences in the effect of literacy proficiency on political efficacy, by migrant background
Note: The returns to literacy are not statistically significant in France and are therefore not presented on this chart. Migrants are defined as those participants whose country of birth is different that the country at which they are doing the test. Returns to literacy are based on a regression model and take account of differences associated with the following variables: age, gender, education, immigration background and parents' educational attainment (See model 4 in the source table). Statistically significant differences are marked in bold. Estimates based on a sample size less than 30 are not shown.
Countries are ranked in descending order of the returns to literacy for natives. Statistically significant differences are marked in bold.
Source: (OECD, 2015[15]) Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC) (2012, 2015), Table A6.4, www.oecd.org/skills/piaac/publicdataandanalysis
Volunteering
Volunteering is the donation of time, and sometimes expertise, by an individual to benefit a group or a cause (Wilson, 2000[62]). Although it shares several common features with other helping behaviours, volunteering is proactive and organised rather than reactive and spontaneous. Volunteering directly benefits those who engage in the activity: people who volunteer enjoy higher levels of mental and physical well-being than those who do not volunteer (Li and Ferraro, 2005[63]; Post, 2005[64]; Whiteley, 2014[65]). In addition, volunteering indicates social integration and community spirit.
Participation in volunteer activities is a strong indicator of the extent to which people are part of formal social networks and activities (Putnam, 2001[60]). Volunteering can be a way for migrants to form strong connections both with other migrants and with the wider community. As such, volunteering can be a way for migrants to mediate some of the adverse consequences that are typically linked with relocation, such as loss of social and cultural capital. Volunteering can also be an effective way for migrants to upgrade and practice language skills without having to sustain some of the costs that are typically associated with participation in language courses – essentially exchanging work for the possibility of practicing the language of the host country (Dudley, 2007[66]).
Volunteering can also be a way for migrants to improve their employment opportunities and improve their likelihood of integrating into the labour market because it can act as a proxy for work experience (Aycan and Berry, 1996[67]; Couton, 2002[68]; Dudley, 2007[66]). Employers can regard volunteering as a productive activity that gives them relevant information on the job-relevant skills and attitudes of migrants who lack work experience in their host country and whose education qualifications might be a poor indicator of human capital. As a result, participation in volunteer activities can help improve migrants’ psychological well-being (because of the positive social network effect) and can result in better jobs or higher wages (Dicken and Blomberg, 1988[69]; Hackl, Halla and Pruckner, 2007[70]; Prouteau and Wolff, 2006[71]). Those migrants who volunteer in religious organisations, social welfare organisations or for groups that support migrants might also benefit psychologically from knowing that these organisations can assist them, too.
At the same time, migrants might volunteer less because they have fewer bonds in the host community, and many migrants, either out of necessity or choice, devote all of their efforts and energy to being productive members of the labour force. In addition, while the perception of discrimination against and local attitudes towards migrants might encourage migrants to volunteer for organisations that support migrant communities, they might also discourage migrants from volunteering for broader causes, which might help them forge strong links with the local community.
Few studies examine patterns of volunteering among migrant populations and whether they differ from those of native-born populations. Studies generally find that migrants are less likely to volunteer than natives but that, when they do volunteer, they tend to contribute a similar amount of time. Migrants appear to be more involved in volunteering for religious organisations and for community groups that provide programmes and services for migrants (Dechief, 2005[72]). This finding is consistent with the notion that migrants attempt to build an informal social welfare system that will insulate them from adversity.
Figure 6.7. Percentage of adults who reported that they had volunteered, by migrant background
Note: Migrants are defined as those participants whose country of birth is different that the country at which they are doing the test. Statistically significant differences are marked in bold. Estimates based on a sample size less than 30 are not shown.
Countries are ranked in descending order of the percentage of migrants who report participating in voluntary work for charity or non-profit organisations at least once a month. Statistically significant differences are marked in bold.
Source: (OECD, 2015[15]) Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC) (2012, 2015), Table A6.5, www.oecd.org/skills/piaac/publicdataandanalysis
The Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC) asked respondents the following question: “In the last 12 months, how often, if at all, did you do voluntary work, including unpaid work for a charity, political party, trade union or other non-profit organisation?” Respondents could answer: “never”, “less than once a month”, “less than once a week but at least once a month”, “at least once a week but not every day”, or “every day”.
On average across participating countries, native adults were more likely to report having participated in voluntary work, including unpaid work for a charity, political party, trade union or other non-profit organisation in the year before they participated in PIAAC. Some 36% of native adults, but 27% of migrant adults reported that they had volunteered in the previous year, a difference of eight percentage points. Differences between the two groups are particularly pronounced in Germany, where 38% of natives but only around 18% of migrants reported volunteering, and in Austria, where 38% of natives but only 20% of migrants so reported. Gaps between the two groups are observed in 20 of the 25 OECD countries with available data. Among OECD countries, no such difference is observed in Chile the Czech Republic, England (UK), Greece and New Zealand.
Differences in the socio-demographic profile of natives and migrants are unrelated to both the observed differences in volunteering rates and the propensity to volunteer. In Norway and the United States, volunteering is most prevalent among natives; as many as 60% of natives (compared with 42% of migrants) in Norway and 58% of natives (compared with 45%) of migrants) in the United States reported having volunteered at least once in the year prior to the PIAAC survey. In Spain, only around 19% of natives reported having volunteered –a share 8 percentage points larger than the share of migrants who so reported.
The role of education and skills in promoting volunteering
In all countries, higher proficiency in literacy is associated with a greater likelihood of engaging in voluntary work for non-profit organisations (e.g. political, charity or religious organisations). Participation in this kind of activity is likely to be a good proxy for altruism and civic engagement, whose link with skills has been attributed to civic education. Like trust, altruism can also be beneficial for economic performance, in that it may foster co-operation (Bowles and Polania-Reyes, 2012[73]). Literacy proficiency is not equally associated with the probability that native-born and foreign-born individuals will engage in volunteering activities. In some countries, including Australia, Chile, England (UK), Flanders (Belgium), Germany, Lithuania, New Zealand, Slovenia and the United States the increase in the probability of volunteering associated with higher literacy proficiency is lower among migrants than natives (see Table 6.A.5). In the remaining countries the opposite is true. Table 6.A.5 does not reveal differences across migrants and natives in how the probability of volunteering differs depending on educational attainment.
Conclusions and policy implications
The aim of this chapter was to present a picture of the broader well-being outcomes of migrants. International comparisons of migrants’ well-being present numerous challenges, as the size and characteristics of the migrant population can differ in important ways across countries (OECD, 2017[74]). This means that cross-country comparisons of migrants’ well-being outcomes need to be interpreted with caution and with an awareness of both the differences in the composition of migrant populations as well as the differences in the historical impact of migration policies across countries.
Results suggest that in some countries migrants report lower levels of health than natives. Migrants (especially undocumented migrants and asylum seekers) often face legal restrictions on entitlements to health care. Other barriers include user fees, language, lack of familiarity with rights, entitlements and the overall health system, underdeveloped health literacy, administrative obstacles, social exclusion, and direct and indirect discrimination. Health services should consider the specific challenges and needs of migrant populations to promote their health (OECD, 2017[74]). Furthermore, since stress is a major risk factor for a variety of diseases, migrants may be particularly exposed to a number of stressors, including pre-migration stressors such as refugee camp internment and catastrophic experiences, as well as post-migration stressors such as separation from family, unemployment, poverty, homesickness, acculturation stress, guilt, isolation, marginality and discrimination (Fenta, Hyman and Noh, 2004[75]; Prilleltensky, 2008[76]). Factors reducing the stress of adapting to a new country include strong social support networks within family and community, coping skills and knowledge of the new language and culture (Bhugra et al., 2011[77]; Hovey, 2000[78]; Hovey and King, 1997[79]; OECD, 2017[74]).
This chapter also identified that in some countries, migrants report lower levels of generalised trust, political efficacy and volunteering. Understanding migrants’ experiences of civic and political engagement is particularly important as they may often be excluded from certain forms of civic expression or from certain public services depending on their legal status (e.g. citizenship, type of residence permit) and their ability to navigate government bureaucracy and procedures. Developing ways to ensure that migrants are able to fully feel part of their communities, that there are ways for them to feel represented by national and local governments and that they are empowered to contribute their time and energy to promote the well-being of their communities is crucial to promote social cohesion.
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Annex 6.A. Tables
Annex Table 6.A.1. Differences in self-reported health, by migrant status and individual characteristics
Note: Marginal probabilities are multiplied by 100. Differences are based on a regression model and take account of differences associated with the following variables: age, gender, education, immigration background and parents' educational attainment. Only the score-point differences between two contrast categories are shown, which is useful for showing the relative significance of each socio-demographic variable vis-a-vis observed score-point differences. Estimates based on a sample size less than 30 are not shown.
Source: Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC) (2012, 2015)
Annex Table 6.A.2. Differences in the percentage of individuals who report disagreeing or strongly disagreeing that there are only a few people they can trust completely, by migrant status and individual characteristics
Note: Marginal probabilities are multiplied by 100. Differences are based on a regression model and take account of differences associated with the following variables: age, gender, education, immigration background and parents' educational attainment. Only the score-point differences between two contrast categories are shown, which is useful for showing the relative significance of each socio-demographic variable vis-a-vis observed score-point differences. Estimates based on a sample size less than 30 are not shown.
Source: Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC) (2012, 2015)
Annex Table 6.A.3. Differences in the percentage of individuals who report disagreeing or strongly disagreeing that if they are not careful other people will take advantage of them, by migrant status and individual characteristics
Note: Marginal probabilities are multiplied by 100. Differences are based on a regression model and take account of differences associated with the following variables: age, gender, education, immigration background and parents' educational attainment. Only the score-point differences between two contrast categories are shown, which is useful for showing the relative significance of each socio-demographic variable vis-a-vis observed score-point differences. Estimates based on a sample size less than 30 are not shown.
Source: Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC) (2012, 2015)
Annex Table 6.A.4. Differences in self-reported political efficacy, by migrant status and individual characteristics
Note: Marginal probabilities are multiplied by 100. Differences are based on a regression model and take account of differences associated with the following variables: age, gender, education, immigration background and parents' educational attainment. Only the score-point differences between two contrast categories are shown, which is useful for showing the relative significance of each socio-demographic variable vis-a-vis observed score-point differences. Estimates based on a sample size less than 30 are not shown.
Source: Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC) (2012, 2015)
Annex Table 6.A.5. Differences in self-reported volunteering, by migrant status and individual characteristics
Note: Marginal probabilities are multiplied by 100. Differences are based on a regression model and take account of differences associated with the following variables: age, gender, education, immigration background and parents' educational attainment. Only the score-point differences between two contrast categories are shown, which is useful for showing the relative significance of each socio-demographic variable vis-a-vis observed score-point differences. Estimates based on a sample size less than 30 are not shown.
Source: Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC) (2012, 2015)