Talent Abroad: A Review of Romanian Emigrants

Report

Talent Abroad

16 July 2019

Chapter 2. Recent trends in emigration from Romania

Abstract

This chapter analyses recent migration flows from Romania as well as the intentions to emigrate observed in the Romanian population. The total migration flow from Romania to OECD countries is compared to the flows from neighbouring countries, and its evolution is related to changes in flows to particular destination countries. Using international survey data, the chapter then presents results on intentions to emigrate from Romania, also for specific groups in the population and in comparison to neighbouring countries. Special attention is given to the link between emigration intentions and the labour market situation in Romania.

The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.

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Note by all the European Union Member States of the OECD and the European Union: The Republic of Cyprus is recognised by all members of the United Nations with the exception of Turkey. The information in this document relates to the area under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.

This chapter uses data on annual migration flows to present the trends in emigration from Romania in recent years. As these flows are the result of recent decisions to emigrate, they reflect trends in emigration behaviour. By contrast, the stocks discussed in the previous chapter accumulated through emigration flows over a long time and often resulted from a particular historical context. To better understand the drivers of recent emigration flows, the chapter further presents evidence on the demographic and socio-economic composition of flows between 2004 and 2016. A detailed discussion of survey evidence on the population’s intentions to emigrate from Romania offers insights into the potential for future migration flows, especially from certain demographic groups. While intentions to emigrate are most often not carried out, they are linked to observed emigration flows and allow for comparison of emigration intentions among specific groups in the population.

Free movement of Romanian citizens in the European Union

Migration flows from Romania to OECD countries since 2000 have occurred in the context of Romania’s process of accession to the European Union (EU) and its zone of free mobility. Of the 36 member countries of the OECD, 23 were also members of the European Union at the time of Romania’s accession in 2007 (the “EU‑25”). As a result, intra‑EU mobility plays a large role in structuring overall migration flows to the OECD.

The evolution of Romania’s relationship with the EU profoundly shaped emigration flows even prior to Romania’s EU accession. The 1993 signing of the Agreement for Romania’s Association to the European Union, which connected trade and cooperation accords with the EU to policy reforms in Romania, marked a turning point in Romania’s domestic conditions and led to increased emigration to Western Europe (Uccellini, 2010[1]).

Romania and the European Union opened formal negotiations for accession in 2000. In 2002, the EU lifted visa requirements for Romanian nationals entering the Schengen zone, allowing them to stay in EU countries for up to 90 days (Gabriel Anghel, 2008[2]). This new ease of movement led to an increase in emigration, but mostly of a temporary and circular variety due to the restriction on length of stay (Uccellini, 2010[1]).

Romania joined the EU in 2007, but its citizens did not immediately have access to full mobility within the EU. Free movement of workers is a fundamental principle of the European Union. Article 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union specifies that EU citizens are entitled to free movement for work: EU citizens can “look for a job in another EU country, work there without needing a work permit, reside there for that purpose, stay there even after employment has finished, and enjoy equal treatment with nationals in access to employment, working conditions and all other social and tax advantages” (European Commission, 2018[3]).

While Romania’s accession to the EU guaranteed eventual free movement of its workers, many EU countries imposed transitional arrangements to restrict Romanians from their labour markets. The seven‑year transitional period was divided into three phases (the so‑called “2+3+2” system). During the first two years, national law could regulate access to labour markets, and Member States could extend restrictions an additional three years upon notification to the European Commission. Member States could apply a final two‑year period of restrictions if they presented evidence of serious disturbances in their labour markets. A safeguard clause allowed countries to re-impose restrictions if labour market disturbances arose after the lifting of national measures (European Commission, 2011[4]). These restrictions on labour market access varied across countries, with some applying full work‑permit schemes and others creating simplified procedures such as not requiring work permits for employment in certain sectors or exempting certain jobs from labour‑market tests (European Commission, 2011[4]).

Ten EU Member States opened their labour markets to Romanian workers at the time of accession: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland and Sweden. Five EU Member States removed restrictions after the first period of transitional arrangements: Denmark, Greece, Spain, Hungary, and Portugal. Spain subsequently invoked the safeguard clause and re-imposed restrictions in 2011. Italy and Ireland removed restrictions after the second phase, and the remainder of EU‑25 countries (including Spain) allowed full access to their labour markets starting at the beginning of 2014 (European Commission, 2011[4]).

While Romanians did not immediately benefit from free movement of workers in all EU countries, they nonetheless had access to the territories of other EU countries. The transitional arrangements did not alter the fundamental right of EU citizens to move and reside freely within the EU as specified in Article 21 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the EU. In addition, the transitional arrangements did not apply to self‑employed workers although Germany and Austria applied restrictions on the cross‑border provision of services involving the temporary posting of workers (European Commission, 2011[4]).

Growing flows of emigrants from Romania to OECD countries

The OECD International Migration Database provides annual data on legal migration flows that include both permanent and temporary migrants (only permanent migrants in the case of the United States, see Box 1.2 in Chapter 1). While annual legal migration flows from Romania to OECD countries peaked at 560 000 in 2007, they nonetheless quintupled from about 88 000 in 2000 to 415 000 in 2016 (see Figure 2.1). Romanian emigrants represented 6% of entries to OECD countries in 2016, up from only 3% in 2000.

Figure 2.1. Migration flows of Romanian citizens to OECD countries, 2000‑16

EU accession in 2007 brought a peak in Romanian emigration…

The notable peak in Romanian emigration in 2007 coincided with Romania’s accession to the European Union and its zone of free mobility. After rising steadily by about 17% per year between 2000 and 2006, an increase imputable to the lifting of Schengen visa requirements for Romanians, Romanian emigration more than doubled from 2006 to 2007. While Romanian citizens had free access to the labour markets of only 10 of the EU‑25 Member States at that time, the transitional arrangements did not limit non‑employment free movement within the EU or self‑employment, and these provisions clearly played a role in the large increase in Romanian emigration (European Commission, 2011[4]).

…but the economic crisis quickly reduced flows, followed by more gradual increases

This surge proved to be temporary, as legal migration flows from Romania fell by 40% to 330 000 in 2008. Flows continued their decline in 2009, falling by a further 21% to 260 000, only about 18% higher than pre‑accession levels. Migration flows from Romania to OECD countries then resumed their gradual upward trend, rising by nearly 60% between 2009 and 2016. Evidence points to the onset and persistence of the global economic crisis as the cause of the sharp decrease in Romanian emigration after 2007, although the impact was uneven across destination countries (Holland et al., 2011[5]). The economic crisis also underlay the resumption of Romanian emigration after 2009 as economic conditions in Romania were slower to improve than those in most destination countries (Holland et al., 2011[5]).

Despite the consistent and sometimes spectacular increases in Romanian emigration flows, there may be evidence of slowing emigration from Romania to OECD countries. Flows increased by only 13% between 2009 and 2013 in the wake of the economic crisis. While Romanian emigration increased sharply by 42% between 2013 and 2015, data for 2016 show no increase compared to 2015.

In 2016, Romania ranked second among all countries of origin in magnitude of immigration flows to OECD countries (Figure 2.2). Ahead of Romania in the 2016 ranking was China (538 000), while Syria (343 000), India (272 000) and Poland (263 000) occupied the third, fourth and fifth places, respectively. Romania rose quickly in the rankings of top origin countries between 2000 and 2016: from tenth in 2000, Romanian flows attained the first place in 2007 and have consistently ranked second since then behind flows from China.

With the exception of flows from Syria linked to the European refugee crisis, flows from Romania have grown at a higher rate than those from any of the other top ten origin countries between 2000 and 2016. While flows from Viet Nam, Poland and India all more than doubled, flows from Mexico and Italy increased by less than 10%. Flows from China increased by more than 90% during this period.

Figure 2.2. Migration flows from selected origin countries to OECD countries, 2000‑16

Flows from Romania dwarf those from neighbouring countries

Annual migration flows from Romania to OECD countries have been higher than flows from Bulgaria, Hungary, Moldova, Serbia and Ukraine since 2002 (Figure 2.3). While emigration from Ukraine was 18% higher than emigration from Romania in 2001, Romanian flows surpassed Ukrainian flows by 55% in 2002. Flows from Romania have exceeded flows from any of its neighbours since 2002, and the gap between Romanian flows and the next‑largest flow has risen from 96% in 2003 to 230% in 2016. Ukraine was the country of origin with the second‑largest flows to OECD countries between 2003 and 2010 and again in 2016, while flows from Bulgaria occupied the second place between 2011 and 2015. Flows from Romania accounted for half or more of flows from these six countries from 2004 to 2016.

The predominance of flows from Romania to OECD countries obscures the dynamism of migration flows from its neighbours, most of which have seen strong growth in emigration. Bulgaria joined the European Union at the same time as Romania, and its emigration flows to OECD countries have since followed a pattern similar to flows from Romania. Bulgarian emigration flows grew by over 360% between 2000 and 2016, almost as much in relative terms as Romanian flows (+380%). Flows from Bulgaria experienced spike in 2007 at the time of accession, followed by a drop‑off in 2008 and steady increases after 2009. While slightly lower than flows from Ukraine in 2016, flows from Bulgaria accounted for 15% of flows from these six countries.

Figure 2.3. Migration flows from Romania and neighbouring countries to OECD countries, 2000‑16

Emigration flows to OECD countries from Moldova, Hungary and Ukraine all more than doubled between 2000 and 2016. Moldovan flows experienced the highest growth in this group, increasing by almost 250% during this period to almost 16 000 in 2016. Despite this growth, Moldovan emigration flows actually contracted by 56% after peaking at almost 36 000 in 2010. Emigration from Hungary to other OECD countries rose by almost 250% over the period to reach 85 000 in 2016. More than 85% of this increase took place between 2010 and 2014, when emigration flows from Hungary doubled to a high of just under 100 000. Flows from Ukraine to OECD countries rose overall by 125% over the period but displayed high variability: flows of Ukrainian citizen doubled between 2000 and 2001 to 120 000, declined by 48% to just over 60 000 in 2012‑13 and finally doubled again between 2013 and 2016 to reach 128 000. The recent increase may be related to the Ukrainian crisis of 2013 and following years.

Serbia is the only one of Romania’s neighbours to experience a decrease in emigration between 2000 and 2016. Emigration flows to OECD countries from Serbia declined overall by 19%, from 55 000 in 2000 to 44 000 in 2016. Flows from Serbia were much higher in 2015, reaching 61 000, and during the 1990s, surpassing 150 000 in 1993 and 125 000 in 1999.

EU accession and the economic crisis shaped emigration patterns to specific OECD countries

Both Romania’s accession to the EU in 2007 and the global economic crisis starting in 2008 strongly shaped emigration flows to particular OECD countries. Leading up to the 2007 accession, migration flows shifted strongly to Italy and Spain and away from OECD destinations popular in 1990s (such as the United States, Canada and Hungary). Italy and Spain saw a surge in Romanian migration flows in the year following Romania’s EU accession, but then abruptly experiences sharp decreases in Romanian migration flows because of the global economic crisis. The economic downturn led to diversions of Romanian migration flows to Germany and later the United Kingdom. The labour‑market restrictions on Romanian workers that many EU‑25 countries imposed at the time of Romania’s EU accession seem to have done little to damper emigration flows from Romania, perhaps because Romanians were able to access other mobility pathways (European Commission, 2011[4]).

Figure 2.4 shows the flows from Romania to the main destination countries that Chapter 1 identified as the ten OECD countries that host the largest numbers of Romanian emigrants. Many of the same countries have received the largest flows of Romanian citizens in recent years, with some notable exceptions. Hungary and Canada attracted the fourth‑ and sixth‑largest flows of Romanians in 2000, respectively, but fell to the 11^th and 16^th places in 2016. Flows of Romanians to the United States were the fifth largest in 2000 but only the tenth largest in 2016. While Israel hosts a large number of Romanian emigrants, flows of Romanian citizens only ranked 14^th in 2000 and fell to 31^st in 2016, reflecting the fact that most emigration from Romania to Israel took place between the 1950s and the 1970s (see Box 1.3 in Chapter 1). Despite not appearing in the top ten countries for numbers of Romanian emigrants in 2015/16. Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark all ranked in the top ten countries of destination for emigration flows from Romania in 2016.

A spike in flows to Spain and Italy following accession to the European Union…

The most salient development in the flows of Romania to the main destination countries is the dramatic rise and subsequent fall of emigration to Spain and Italy in the years surrounding Romania’s accession to the European Union (see the left panel of Figure 2.4). Between 2000 and 2007, emigration from Romania to Spain rose by over 1 000%, from 17 500 to almost 200 000. Flows to Spain increased regularly during this time, rising by an average annual rate of 35%.

A number of factors related to Romania’s process of accession to the EU shaped emigration to Spain. The lifting of Schengen visa requirements for Romanians in 2002 and agreements between Romania and Spain for the latter to hire Romanian workers led to increases in flows to Spain prior to 2007 (Holland et al., 2011[5]). While Spain imposed restrictions on Romanian workers as part of the transitional arrangements allowed under Romania’s EU accession, the already‑established Romanian community created conditions for the spike observed in 2007. Not only did the existing population of Romanians in Spain make it easier for additional Romanian citizens to emigrate there after EU accession via network effects, but some of the observed spike may also be related to the regularisation of Romanians already resident in Spain in 2007 (Holland et al., 2011[5]). Research has also pointed to linguistic and cultural affinities for the predominance of Romanian emigration to Spain in the early 2000s (Martínez, 2011[6]) and to the preference of employers for Romanian workers (Holland et al., 2011[5]).

While overall Romanian emigration to Italy increased 14 fold between 2000 and 2007, rising from 19 000 to 270 000, flows were more erratic than those to Spain prior to Romania’s EU accession. Emigration to Italy decreased by 15% from 19 000 in 2000 to 16 500 in 2002 but almost quintupled in 2003 to 79 000. Flows then followed a declining trend for three years, sinking by 50% to 40 000 in 2006, their lowest level since 2002. Emigration to Italy rebounded sharply in 2007, however, rising by 580% to reach their historic high of more than a quarter of a million.

Figure 2.4. Migration flows of Romanian citizens to the main destination countries, 2000‑16

In 2007, flows to Italy were 37% higher than flows to Spain. Flows to Italy and Spain together in 2007 accounted for almost 85% of total flows of Romanian citizens to OECD countries, with flows to Italy alone making up almost half the total (49%). In contrast, flows of Romanians to Spain accounted for more than half of total flows to OECD countries in 2005 (51%) and 2006 (57%) while flows to Italy accounted for 20% or less.

While Italy applied transitional arrangements at the time of Romania’s accession to the EU, the specific restrictions may have encouraged the spectacular increase in Romanian emigration in 2007. Italy did not require work permits for Romanians to work in agriculture, hotel and tourism, domestic work and care services, construction, engineering, managerial and highly skilled work or seasonal work (Holland et al., 2011[7]). Many of these sectors attracted Romanian workers and may partly explain the popularity of Italy as a destination in 2007 and following years. As in the case of Spain, linguistic and cultural affinities may have also driven some emigration to Italy (Uccellini, 2010[1]).

…followed by a sharp decline with the onset of the global economic crisis in 2008…

Just as striking as the magnitude of the increase in flows of Romanians to Italy and Spain in 2007 was the rapidity of the decline in these flows in the following years (Figure 2.4). Emigration to Spain decreased by 70% in 2008 to 61 000, or about the same level as in 2003. A further 30% reduction in flows to Spain in 2009 brought the total to under 45 000. After rebounding somewhat in 2010 and 2011 to over 50 000, flows to Spain plummeted by 46% between 2011 and 2013 to 23 000. Emigration to Spain was stable between 2014 and 2016 at an average of 29 000 per year. This total, 85% lower than the 2007 peak, accounted for about 7% of Romanian emigration to OECD countries in 2014‑16.

The global economic crisis of 2008 drove the sharp decrease in Romanian emigration to Spain after 2007 (Figure 2.4 ). The economic crisis in Spain was deeper and more persistent than in other countries. While it affected both native‑born and foreign‑born workers, unemployment rose rapidly especially for workers who were already disadvantaged, such as immigrants and unskilled or temporary workers (Holland et al., 2011[5]). The unemployment rate for the native‑born in Spain increased from 8.8% in 2007 to 18.6% in 2009, while it increased for foreign‑born from 11% in 2007 to 20% in 2008 and 30% in 2009 (Holland et al., 2011[5]). Romanian emigrants were among the groups that suffered the largest increases in unemployment, with large losses occurring in in 2008 because of concentration in construction sector (Holland et al., 2011[5]). Data from DIOC show that the unemployment rate of Romanian emigrants in Spain increased from 11% in 2005/06 to 42% in 2010/11 (see Chapter 4 for further analysis of the labour‑market outcomes of Romanian emigrants). Research suggests that these increases in unemployment had a significant negative effect on flows from Romania to Spain: net population flows from Romania and Bulgaria to the EU-25 were 50% to 65% lower in 2008 and 2009 than the counterfactual flows in the absence of such a pronounced downturn, with large reductions to Spain in particular (Holland et al., 2011[7]).

Romanian flows to Italy mirrored those to Spain after 2007, but did not decline as far or as fast (Figure 2.4). About 175 000 Romanian citizens emigrated to Italy in 2008, a decrease from the 2007 peak of 35%. In the context of a sharp decline in overall flows from Romania to OECD countries in 2008 (see Figure 2.1), flows to Italy accounted for more than half (52%) of the total. Flows further declined by 39% in 2009 to 106 000 and 13% in 2010 to 92 000. After several years of relative stability, flows to Italy declined again by almost 30% between 2012 and 2013 and have averaged about 50 000 per year since 2014. Flows to Italy accounted for about a third of all Romanian flows to OECD countries between 2009 and 2012, a share that has since declined to 11% in 2016.

The economic crisis in Italy likely played a role in these declines but the impacts, especially on unemployment, were not as pronounced as those in Spain. Unemployment among EU‑28 migrants increased between 2008 and 2009, likely due to concentration of Romanian and Bulgarian emigrants in the construction and manufacturing sectors where the recession was concentrated. DIOC data indicate that the unemployment rate of Romanian emigrants increased form 8% in 2005/06 to 14% in 2010/11 (see Chapter 4 for additional details). Italy responded to the crisis by reducing recruitments of foreign‑born low‑ and medium‑skilled workers (Holland et al., 2011[5]), which may have contributed to the reduction of Romanian emigration flows.

…and recent increases in flows to Germany and the United Kingdom

While increasing and subsequently declining flows to Italy and Spain drove the overall trend in Romanian emigration to OECD countries between 2006 and 2009, increasing flows to Germany and the United Kingdom between 2010 and 2016 offset further decreases in flows to the Southern European countries.

The sharp rise in emigration flows to Germany made it the main destination country in recent years (see the left panel of Figure 2.4). After remaining relatively flat between 2000 and 2006, Romanian emigration to Germany1 increased by 84% in 2007 to almost 43 000. Despite this large relative increase, flows to Germany accounted for less than 8% of total flows to OECD countries in 2007.

While flows to Italy and Spain declined sharply after 2007, emigration to Germany continued to increase after 2007 by an average of about 20% per year to reach over 220 000 in 2016. The largest increase occurred between 2013 and 2014, when Romanian flows to Germany rose from 140 000 to just under 200 000, a jump of 42%. Other large increases occurred between 2009 and 2010 (+32% to 75 000) and between 2010 and 2011 (+29% to just under 100 000). Romanian emigration to Germany accounted for more than half of total flows to OECD countries from 2014 to 2016.

Romanian’s accession to the EU explains part of the sharp increase in flows to Germany. While Germany restricted the free movement of Romanian workers between 2007 and 2014, the right to freedom of settlement allowed under EU membership enabled Romanians to move to Germany as small‑business owners or as self‑employed workers. Germany extended opportunities for seasonal work, contract work and the posting of workers and labour‑market access to Romanians with a university degree (Bertoli, Brücker and Fernández-Huertas Moraga, 2013[8]). Thus, despite Germany’s imposition of transitional arrangements, other mobility paths linked to EU membership facilitated the increases of emigration flows of Romanians to Germany.

The economic crisis may also explain some of the increases in flows of Romanians to Germany. Research shows that adverse economic conditions in Spain and Italy during the crisis may have diverted Romanian flows from these countries to Germany (Bertoli, Brücker and Fernández-Huertas Moraga, 2013[8]). Bertoli et al. argue that the increase in observed migration flows between Romania and Germany between 2007 and 2011 cannot be explained by either relatively stable economic conditions in Romania or an unchanged institutional framework regulation EU mobility. They point instead to deteriorating economic conditions in other EU destinations, especially in Spain and Italy: Spanish and Italian unemployment rates explain 59% of the variation in the Romanian in the diverted flows to Germany from 2007. In the case of Spain, this effect would account for 37 466 additional Romanian migrants to Germany per year (Bertoli, Brücker and Fernández-Huertas Moraga, 2013[8]).

Thanks to an upsurge in flows between 2012 and 2016, the United Kingdom has become the second destination for Romanian emigrants (Figure 2.4). While data are not available for prior years, about 10 000 Romanians emigrated to the United Kingdom in 2009, accounting for less than 4% of total flows to OECD countries. Flows to the United Kingdom actually declined by 40% between 2009 and 2012 to a low of 6 000 before tripling to 19 000 in 2013. A sharp upswing occurred again in 2014, with flows almost doubling to 37 000, and in 2015, with emigration increasing by 51% to reach 56 000. The level in 2016 was slightly lower than in 2015. Overall, Romanian emigration to the United Kingdom increased almost five fold between 2009 and 2016. The lifting of work restrictions on Romanian citizens in the United Kingdom in 2014 likely contributed to this upsurge.

Emigration flows to the other main countries of residence of Romanian emigrants, with the exception of flows to France, declined between 2000 and 2016 (see the right panel of Figure 2.4), reflecting the long-term decline of migration flows towards destinations that were popular in the immediate aftermath of the fall of the totalitarian regime (Sandu, 2005[9]). Flows to North American destinations, which were prevalent in the 1990s (Andrén and Roman, 2016[10]), fell sharply during this period: emigration to the United States shrank by about half, from almost 7 000 in 2000 to 3 600 in 2016 while flows to Canada plummeted by 70% from 4 400 to 1 400. Emigration to Hungary, another common destination in the 1990s (Andrén and Roman, 2016[10]), fell by 65% from 8 900 to 3 000. Flows to these three countries accounted for almost a quarter of total flows to OECD countries in 2000, but less than 2% in 2016. Migration flows to Israel were already extremely low in 2000, when only 270 Romanians emigrated there, but Israel registered only a handful of arrivals in 2016 after a decline of 94% after 2000. These low flows reflect the fact that most emigration from Romania to Israel occurred decades ago (see Box 1.3 in Chapter 1). Romanian flows to France rose six fold, from 1 200 in 2000 to 8 500 in 2016 (although flows were markedly higher in 2015).

Romanian emigration increased between 2000 and 2016 to a number of OECD countries outside of the established top ten countries of residence. Flows increased sharply during this period to Belgium (15 fold, to over 10 000 in 2016), the Netherlands (eight fold, to over 5 000) and Denmark (almost 30 fold, to 4 300). These three countries all experienced spikes in flows following Romania’s accession in 2007, with mostly continued gradual increases between 2007 and 2016. Most other European OECD countries saw increased in flows of Romanian citizens over this period, while non‑European countries such as Australia and New Zealand saw decreases.

Net migration patterns differ by country, with negative net migration to Spain

For a number of OECD countries, data are available on both the arrivals and the departures of Romanian citizens. In these cases – which include some of the main destination countries – it is possible to determine net migration flows of Romanian citizens by subtracting the arrivals from the departures. Net flows of Romanians are positive whenever more Romanian citizens emigrate to a particular OECD country than leave there; in the reverse case, net flows are negative.

After relatively high net migration flows from Romania to Spain between 2002 and 2007, the direction of the net flow reversed starting in 2008 (see Figure 2.5). Between 2002 and 2007, inflows of Romanians increased while outflows remained small both in absolute terms and compared to the magnitude of inflows. In 2007, for example, there were almost 200 000 arrivals against only 8 100 departures, for a net inflow of almost 190 000. Inflows decreased by 70% in 2008 but outflows rose by almost 300% to 32 000, leading to a net inflow of only 28 000. Negative net migration to Spain occurred in 2010, when outflows of Romanian citizens surpassed inflows. While 2011 and 2012 saw a return to positive net migration to Spain with decreases in outflows, negative net migration returned in 2013 and has prevailed since. The largest negative net flow (‑48 000) occurred in 2013, when almost 71 000 Romanian citizens left Spain against only 23 000 arrivals. Since 2009 almost 55 000 Romanians on average have left Spain per year compared to an annual average of only 19 000 arrivals. This increasingly negative net migration has led to the decline in the number of Romanian emigrants living in Spain described in Chapter 1.

Net flows of Romanian citizens to Italy followed a pattern similar to those to Spain but, thanks to lower levels of departures, did not become negative by 2015 despite a downward trend (see Figure 2.5). Net flows to Italy were generally lower than net flows to Spain between 2002 and 2006. In 2007, however, net flows to Italy rapidly surpassed net flows to Spain with fewer than 4 000 departures for a net inflow of 268 000. While net flows to Italy subsequently fell substantially below their 2007 level, the driver of this decline was decreasing inflows instead of increasing outflows as in the case of Spain: outflows of Romanian citizens from Italy only increased to about 10 000 per year between 2008 and 2015 while inflows plummeted to under 50 000 by 2015.

Unlike net flows to Spain and Italy, net flows to Germany and the United Kingdom increased after 2007 (Figure 2.5). Despite gradual increases in inflows to Germany between 2002 and 2006, net migration was low due to relatively high outflows of Romanian citizens. The spike in inflows to Germany in 2007 was accompanied by only a small increase in outflows, leading to an overall increase in net flows. Net flows to Germany followed an increasingly positive trend between 2008 and 2015. Despite this upward trend, departures of Romanians from Germany increased fivefold after 2007 to reach almost 130 000 in 2015, more than the departures from Italy and Spain combined in that year. The geographic proximity of Germany and the prevalence of seasonal and/or temporary work there may create a pattern of temporary circular migration, which is evident in the high level of outmigration among Romanians in Germany (Holland et al., 2011[7]). The relatively high growth of inflows has offset the growth in outflows to produce the positive trend, as both grew by an average annual rate of 20%.

In contrast to Germany, net flows to the United Kingdom have increased as departures of Romanians have grown more slowly than arrivals. While inflows increased six fold between 2011 and 2015 to 56 000, departures declined by 25% between 2011 and 2014 before increasing to 5 000 in 2015. The lower level of departures may be related to the relative recency of emigration flows to the United Kingdom.

Figure 2.5. Net migration flows of Romanian citizens to main destination countries, 2002‑16

Flows include a high share of women, an increasing proportion of highly educated, and a declining share of those who were previously unemployed

The gender composition of Romanian emigration flows from 2000 to 2016 varied across OECD destination countries, with flows to Italy having especially high shares of women and those to Germany being predominantly male. Figure 2.6 displays the share of women in the migration flows of Romanians to Germany, Italy and Spain. Emigration to Italy has consisted mainly of women: flows included a majority of women in almost every year, with the share of women dipping below 50% only in 2000 and 2004. The proportion of women among Romanians emigrating to Italy followed a positive trend between 2007 and 2016, rising from 54% to 63%. In Spain, women have predominated in flows since the start of the global economic crisis: men outnumbered women until 2007, while the share of women was higher between 2008 and 2013. The share of women in flows to Spain hovered around 50% between 2014 and 2016. In contrast to the Southern European destination countries, where Romanian women have generally been more numerous in emigration flows, men have accounted for most of the flows to Germany. The highest share of Romanian women emigrating to Germany was 47% in 2001, and this proportion has steadily decreased to arrive at 34% in 2016. The differing labour‑market opportunities in these three destinations may play a role in the diverging gender compositions of their Romanian emigration flows (see Chapter 4 for further analyses of the labour‑market outcomes of Romanian emigrants).

Figure 2.6. Share of women in migration flows of Romanian citizens to selected destination countries, 2000‑16

The information collected on migration flows typically covers at best some basic demographic variables, as is the case with the results from the International Migration Database presented above. It is therefore rarely possible to analyse the composition of migration flows with respect to key socio‑economic variables such as education or labour force status before migration. In contrast, survey data from can provide some first results by approximating inflows from Romania as citizens of a new‑EU‑member‑state country who resided in Romania the year before they are observed in a destination country. The EU Labour Force Survey (see Box 1.2 in Chapter 1 for a detailed description of this data source) can identify samples of new arrivals from Romania in multiple years based on a question on the country of residence one year earlier. The data record emigrants’ basic socio‑demographic characteristics – such as sex, age, marital status and whether or not they were accompanied by children – as well as their labour market status one year earlier and their education. The EU LFS data included samples of new arrivals from Romania between 2004 and 2016, ranging in size from 22 000 in 2004 to 53 000 in 2015.

Figure 2.7 shows the composition of the new arrivals from Romania over the period 2004 to 2016. Most characteristics were generally stable over the course of the period, with few statistically significant time trends. On average, the majority (53%) of new arrivals from Romania between 2004 and 2016 were women. Almost two-thirds (62%) were under 30 years old. More than a third (37%) were not married at the time of arrival, and 78% lived in a household with no children. While 71% of recent Romanian emigrants over the period did not hold a job in the year prior to migration, the data also show a statistically significantly negative time trend for being unemployed prior to departure.

Despite the general lack of significant time trends over the full 13-year period, the composition of newly arrived Romanian emigrants varied from year to year (Figure 2.7). The share of women peaked in 2007 at 63%, suggesting that women played a major role in the high emigration flows of that year. In the context of the high share of Romanian women arriving in 2007, it is worth noting that the proportion of newly arrived Romanian emigrants who were married also peaked in 2007, and the share without children in the household was at its lowest point. Taken together, these data points suggest that Romanian women, who in large part drove the surge in arrivals from Romania in 2007, may have been migrating with their families or at least with their children.

In contrast to what may have been a family‑centric pattern in 2007, the composition of newly arrived Romanian emigrants in 2013 points to a different pattern (Figure 2.7). While women again made up almost two‑thirds of the new arrivals, the share married plummeted 15%, its lowest level over the period, and the share without children in the household reached its high of 88%. The proportion without employment prior to migration was also at its lowest level in 2013 (51%), while the share of new arrivals with a medium or high level of education (69%) was close to its 2011 peak of 72%.

Figure 2.7. Composition of migration flows from Romania to main European destination countries, with linear trends, 2004‑16

Emigration prospects among the population living in Romania

Intentions to emigrate are high in Romania, especially among young people

To what extent will recent trends in recent migratory flows from Romania continue or change in the future? To answer this question, one can use data on Romania’s emigration potential, estimated from self-reported emigration intentions expressed in the Gallup World Poll (see Box 1.2 of Chapter 1). This data source can be used to analyse the emigration intentions of the Romanian population. The Gallup World Poll also includes demographic variables, indicators of education level and a number of employment variables for those surveyed, allowing us to study the relationships between these characteristics and emigration intentions.

Figure 2.8. Emigration intentions in Romania and neighbouring countries, 2009‑18

Self‑reported emigration intentions are common among the Romanian population. When asked if they would like to move abroad permanently if they had the opportunity, 26% of respondents between 2009 and 2018 responded in the affirmative (see Figure 2.8). This percentage is one of the highest recorded in the neighbourhood of Romania; only Moldova shows a higher percentage (35%). The average for neighbouring countries was 25%, reflecting the relatively high emigration intentions in this region.

However, these intentions do not always materialise. Of those who expressed a wish to emigrate, only a small proportion said they plan to emigrate in the next 12 months (see Figure 2.8). A discrepancy thus appears between self‑declared intentions and their eventual realisation in the short term, which is why the results based on self‑reported intentions should be considered with caution (see Box 2.1). In the case of Romania, the contrast between people who say they intend to emigrate and those who consider emigrating in the next 12 months is noteworthy: only a third (34%) of people intending to emigrate have concrete plans to leave the country within a year. The average is 38% for Romania’s neighbouring countries. In Ukraine and Bulgaria, however, the share of people with a concrete project (16%) is significantly lower than in Romania, while the share is 62% in Hungary and Moldova.

Among women in East European countries, the share of those intending to emigrate tends to be somewhat similar to that of men (according to data from the Gallup World Poll). In Romania, 26% of women surveyed said they intended to emigrate, the same percentage as the Romanian population overall. Similar trends are observed among women in neighbouring countries, for example in Moldova and in Serbia. The ranking of countries according to women’s emigration intentions is similar to the ranking of overall intentions in Figure 2.8; the percentage of Romanian women intending to emigrate is second among its neighbours, after Moldova.

The percentage of young Romanians (aged 15‑24) intending to emigrate is among the highest of any country of the region (Figure 2.9). In Romania, close to half (48%) of young people say they intend to emigrate, a percentage higher than that recorded in the total population. These very high emigration intentions are likely related to youth employment prospects. Marginean (2014[11]) points out that the youth unemployment rate in Romania, although broadly similar to the European average, is particularly concerning, as the number of youths entering the Romanian labour market is decreasing because of demographic reasons. This degradation of economic conditions for young persons is associated with a decline in participation in higher education. Overall, emigration seems to be one of the main solutions that young people choose to overcome the economic difficulties they face in Romania.

The next section explores the economic situation in Romania as one of several factors underlying the country’s high emigration intentions.

Figure 2.9. Emigration intentions among 15‑24‑year‑olds in selected countries, 2009‑18

The employment situation in Romania is one of the main causes of the high level of emigration intentions

The Gallup World Poll asks people who say they intend to emigrate and those who do not questions on several aspects of their life satisfaction. One of the main factors that Romanians intending to emigrate underline is their economic and labour market situation.

Figure 2.10. Opinions of persons born in Romania, in Romania and abroad, 2009‑18

Results from the Gallup World Poll reflect the importance given to job prospects by people living in Romania who say they intend to emigrate. There are differences, albeit modest, in the responses given to employment‑related questions between those intending to emigrate and those without plans to go abroad (Figure 2.10). Among those intending to emigrate, few respondents are satisfied with their current job (11%), the availability of good quality jobs (7%) or their income (4%). The responses of Romanian emigrants to these same questions indicate a higher level of satisfaction with their economic situation. The share of Romanian emigrants living comfortably on present income is three times the share of those living in Romania. Larger gaps exist in satisfaction with jobs, with close to a third of Romanian emigrants satisfied with the availability of good jobs and close to two‑thirds reporting that their current job is ideal. These gaps in self‑reported economic situations can fuel the anticipation of a better life abroad for Romanians who have not yet left the country.

Figure 2.11 shows the share of respondents intending to emigrate among employed, unemployed and inactive people. As expected, the unemployed are the most likely to say that they intend to emigrate. People in employment seem to have this intention less often and the inactive even less often. However, as argued in Box 2.1, employed persons are more likely to emigrate, while the comparatively high intentions of the unemployed may face significant restrictions in practice. The share of employed persons in Romania intending to emigrate (29%) is relatively high compared to the percentages recorded in neighbouring countries, such as Serbia (24%), Bulgaria (23%) and Ukraine (19%). Thus even those Romanians with a job are more likely than employed persons in comparable countries to express an intention to emigrate.

Box 2.1. Reliability of self-reported emigration intentions

Survey data on self-reported emigration intentions face a challenge: intentions may not be very representative of actual emigration decisions. This discrepancy can arise from two sources. First, many of those who declare an intention to emigrate might never emigrate. Second, others who did not declare an intention to emigrate might do so if their situation changes.

In addition, some categories of people are more likely than others to fulfil their intentions to emigrate. Instead of the intention to emigrate, the opportunity to emigrate might be the strongest determinant of actual emigration. Such opportunities arise through employment opportunities or family networks abroad, for example, and some demographic groups are more likely to receive these offers or to have such networks. In OECD (2012[12]), it is observed that the discrepancy between emigration intentions and actual emigration tends to be smaller for the highly educated than for the average across educational groups. This indicates that people with a high level of education may have more opportunities to achieve their emigration intentions.

Similarly, since employers value work experience, people who already have a job are more likely to receive a job offer abroad than unemployed or inactive people. Although it is expected that reported emigration intentions will be high among the unemployed because of their frustration with the local labour market, actual emigration may be particularly low for this group because of its limited emigration possibilities.

Relating emigration intentions to individual characteristics and opinions given in a survey can reveal some indications of the reasons for emigration. However, it is rarely possible to compare these indications with the reasons that actually led to emigration, since emigrants leave the sample of the survey in the country of origin. The Gallup World Poll also does not allow determining how a person's characteristics or opinions influence subsequent emigration. The international scope of the survey does, however, allow comparisons of the characteristics and opinions of emigrants to those who report intentions to emigrate, and to those who report intentions to stay (see Figure 2.10).

This result confirms other comparative studies on emigration intentions in Europe. Using an online panel survey of 20 473 non‐student respondents aged 16‑35 from nine European Union countries, Williams et al. (2018[13]) also shed light on the emergence of Romania as an emigration nation. Romanian respondents showed the highest intentions to emigrate, both within one year (21%) and within five years (41%). Williams et al. point to the importance of economic factors to explain these high intentions to emigrate. More precisely, individuals who struggle “to secure their livelihood in their home country, those with no income, and no qualifications are most likely to have plans to migrate” (Williams et al., 2018, p. 15[13]). The authors emphasise the expected continuation of the rising trend of emigration to the more developed countries, given that Romania has only recently gained full access to the EU labour market.

Satisfaction with personal freedoms, family networks and educational attainment also underlie emigration intentions

The Gallup World Poll reveals a number of other non‑economic factors that may contribute to the high level of emigration intentions in Romania. The reported satisfaction with the freedom individuals have to live their lives seems to be one such factor. A large difference exists between those intending to emigrate and those who do not wish to do so concerning the satisfaction with this freedom. While about 64% of Romanians who do not show an intention to leave the country say they are satisfied with the freedom to lead their lives, this is the case only for 58% of those who would like to leave. This motive therefore seems at least as important as the question of employment. Overall, respondents in Romania who intend to emigrate tend to be less satisfied than both those who do not intend to emigrate and Romanian emigrants.

The presence of friends or family networks abroad, which is a fundamental criterion in the emigration decision, may also underlie high emigration intentions. As shown in Figure 2.10, the proportion of respondents indicating that they have such networks is higher among emigrants and people residing in Romania and intending to emigrate (respectively 63% and 58%) than among people not intending to emigrate (40%). Several channels can explain this link between the networks abroad and the intention to emigrate. The presence of such networks can indeed instil the idea of going abroad and favour the practical realisation of the project, whether via the availability of relevant information on employment opportunities abroad or on the legal channels of migration. Family networks can also provide material assistance the emigrant to finance the journey or the installation upon arrival. In addition, this network also constitutes a support for job search or psychological support (Massey et al., 1993[14]).

Emigration intentions vary widely with education level. Those with intermediate or higher education express a higher intention to emigrate than those with a low level of education (see Figure 2.11). Emigration intentions are likely to be related to job prospects in Romania: comparatively high emigration intentions of those with intermediate or high education may indicate that they face frustrating labour market difficulties, despite their qualifications. Although people with low levels of education are also likely to face such difficulties, their aspirations are likely lower and they are likely to face a stronger budget constraint that does not allow them to consider emigration as easily as people with a higher level of education.

Comparison of emigration intentions by educational level with the actual emigration rate of Romanians reveals that while people with higher levels of education express higher emigration intentions, they also have a higher propensity to fulfil their plans to leave the country. While the overall emigration rate of Romanians in 2015/16 was 14%, the same rate was 26% for people with a higher education diploma, an emigration probability ratio of more than 50%. At the same time, the differential in emigration intentions between the most educated and the general population was much lower at around 30%. This difference between intentions and actual migration reflects a selection of emigrants by level of education linked undoubtedly to migration policies in OECD countries that favour the most qualified, resulting in both more favourable financial conditions of graduates and better employment prospects in the countries of destination.

Figure 2.11. Romanian‑born persons who consider leaving Romania, by labour‑market situation and education, 2009‑15

Conclusion

Annual legal migration flows from Romania to OECD countries peaked at 560 000 in 2007, and quintupled overall from about 88 000 in 2000 to 415 000 in 2016. Romanian emigrants represented 6% of entries to OECD countries in 2016, up from only 3% in 2000. Both Romania’s accession to the European Union and the global economic crisis strongly shaped the timing of trends in Romanian emigration and the specific destination countries. After rising steadily by about 17% per year between 2000 and 2006, an increase imputable to the lifting of Schengen visa requirements for Romanians, Romanian emigration more than doubled from 2006 to 2007. Italy (270 000) and Spain (200 000) attracted most of the flows in 2007. Flows to these two countries sharply declined in 2008 with the onset of the economic crisis, leading to increased flows to Germany and the United Kingdom. Net migration to Spain has become negative in recent years, reflecting the increase in out‑migration of Romanians, while high numbers of departures in Germany may reflect a circular system. The characteristics of Romanian emigrants have been fairly stable over time: on average, the majority of new arrivals from Romania between 2004 and 2016 were women, almost two‑thirds (62%) were under 30 years old, more than a third (37%) were not married at the time of arrival, and 78% lived in a household with no children. While 71% of recent Romanian emigrants over the period did not hold a job in the year prior to migration, this share decreased over time. Emigration intentions in Romania are high in general and particularly elevated among young people. The issue of job opportunities is the main reason Romanians cite for wanting to leave their country.

References

[10] Andrén, D. and M. Roman (2016), “Should I stay or should I go? Romanian migrants during transition and enlargements”, in Labor Migration, EU Enlargement, and the Great Recession, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-45320-9_11.

[8] Bertoli, S., H. Brücker and J. Fernández-Huertas Moraga (2013), “The European Crisis and Migration to Germany: Expectations and the Diversion of Migration Flows”, IZA Discussion Papers, No. 7170, IZA, Bonn, ftp://ftp.iza.org/RePEc/Discussionpaper/dp7170.pdf (accessed on 21 November 2018).

[3] European Commission (2018), Free movement - EU nationals - Employment, Social Affairs & Inclusion - European Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=457 (accessed on 29 November 2018).

[4] European Commission (2011), Report from the Commission to the Council on the Functioning of the Transitional Arrangements on Free Movement of Workers from Bulgaria and Romania, European Commission, Brussels, https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=7204&langId=en.

[2] Gabriel Anghel, R. (2008), “Changing Statuses: Freedom of Movement, Locality and Transnationality of Irregular Romanian Migrants in Milan”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 34/5, pp. 787-802, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13691830802106069.

[7] Holland, D. et al. (2011), Labour mobility within the EU-The impact of enlargement and the functioning of the transitional arrangements FINAL REPORT, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, London, http://ec.europa.eu/progress.

[5] Holland, D. et al. (2011), Labour mobility within the EU-The impact of enlargement and the functioning of the transitional arrangements FINAL REPORT-COUNTRY CASE STUDIES, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, London, http://ec.europa.eu/progress.

[11] Marginean, S. (2014), “Youth Unemployment in Romania: Post-crisis Challenges”, Procedia Economics and Finance, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S2212-5671(14)00848-X.

[6] Martínez, R. (2011), “The Romanian Migrants in Spain. An Exceptional Migratory Flow”, International Review of Social Research, Vol. 1/1, pp. 31-59, http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/irsr-2011-0002.

[14] Massey, D. et al. (1993), “Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal”, Population and Development Review, Vol. 19/3, p. 431, http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2938462.

[15] OECD (2018), International Migration Outlook 2018, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/migr_outlook-2018-en.

[12] OECD (2012), Connecting with Emigrants: A Global Profile of Diasporas, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264177949-en.

[9] Sandu, D. (2005), “Dynamics of Romanian Emigration After 1989: From a Macro-to a Micro-Level Approach”, International Journal of Sociology, Vol. 35/3, pp. 36-56, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00207659.2005.11043153.

[1] Uccellini, C. (2010), “’Outsiders’ After Accession: The case of Romanian migrants”, Political Perspectives, Vol. 4/2, pp. 70-85.

[13] Williams, A. et al. (2018), The migration intentions of young adults in Europe: A comparative, multilevel analysis, http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/psp.2123.

Note

← 1. OECD International Migration Database (IMD) data on migration flows to Germany may not be strictly comparable with data on migration flows to other OECD countries. Inflows include foreigners who previously had no registered address in Germany and intend to stay at least one week in the country. In comparison, most other countries apply residence criteria established by EU Regulations (12 months’ time threshold). Figures for Germany may thus include short-term migration flows. Please see the Statistical Annex of OECD’s International Migration Outlook (2018[15]) for more information on IMD data sources.

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