38. Beyond their direct effect on investment costs, the proposals would affect economies through several other channels. One important channel is that, by increasing tax revenues, the proposals would reduce, at least to some extent, the need for governments to rely on other (potentially more distortive) tax measures or cuts in government spending to restore public finances after the COVID-19 crisis. As such, the proposals would also support domestic resource mobilisation in developing economies.
39. The proposals would increase global tax revenues through their direct effect (discussed in the revenue section above) and they could further support tax revenues in the longer term by reducing the intensity of corporate tax competition between jurisdictions. This is because the introduction of a minimum tax rate would limit possibilities for governments to use very low statutory corporate tax rates or very generous preferential regimes to attract MNE activity and profit. Indeed, the introduction of a minimum tax rate would lift the floor on the effective corporate tax rate paid by MNEs to an agreed minimum level. The full implications of this on governments’ future tax rate and base setting behaviour are hard to anticipate with certainty and will depend on future circumstances. Nevertheless, in the context of the post-COVID-crisis constrained budgetary environment, this could have the effect of slowing or even halting some of the aggressive tax competition that has taken place over the past decades.
40. A potential downside of curtailing the ability of governments to offer very low tax rates is that it may, to some extent, reduce their ability to use tax incentives to pursue specific policy objectives, such as promoting innovative activities or economic development (e.g. via investment tax incentives or tax incentives for R&D). Under the Pillar One and Pillar Two design and parameters illustratively considered in this report, governments would retain a relatively wide margin to use the corporate tax system to pursue these goals, especially if Pillar Two includes a formulaic substance-based carve-out, as such a carve-out would make it easier to offer low rates to activities involving economic substance. In addition, as discussed further in Chapter 4, the efficiency of these preferential schemes is not always well-established. Finally, governments would continue to have a range of other policy tools at their disposal to support their policy objectives, meaning that they could likely adapt their mix of policy instruments if necessary without significantly undermining their ability to pursue these objectives. As a result, it seems unlikely that the reform would have detrimental effects on innovation or economic development via this channel.
41. Another important question is the potential impact of the proposals on compliance costs for MNEs and administration costs for governments. This impact is difficult to assess comprehensively at this stage, as it will depend on the exact design of the proposals and, in particular, on the extent to which the Inclusive Framework adopts simplification measures in the architecture of the proposals.
42. The new tax provisions under both pillars will increase tax filing requirements, which will have a cost for MNEs and governments (e.g. in terms of time spent and need to adapt existing procedures and IT systems). However, this cost will be moderated by the fact that smaller and less profitable MNEs would be out of the scope of the proposals, and the extent to which efficient design options, such as a centralised and simplified administration system, are to be included in the final design of the proposals. In addition, certain provisions of Pillar One (Amount B and the Tax certainty component) would reduce compliance and administrative costs by simplifying the tax treatment of certain business functions, and preventing tax disputes. It is also important to emphasise that, if a consensus-based solution cannot be secured, compliance costs for businesses would likely increase, as a proliferation of unilateral tax measures would likely give rise to a more fragmented and less consistent international tax system, as well as more frequent tax and trade disputes.
43. The economic impact of the proposals will also depend on who bears the economic ‘incidence’ of the additional taxes. In theory, the cost of additional taxes can ultimately fall on MNE shareholders (in the form of lower dividends), workers (in the form of lower wages) or consumers (in the form of higher prices). In practice, the incidence may be split between these three categories in proportions depending on the specific situation of each firm, as further discussed in Chapter 4.
44. Finally, the proposals may also affect competition dynamics among firms. By increasing taxes on large, profitable and profit-shifting MNEs, the proposals would likely contribute to a more even tax playing field between these MNEs and other MNEs (e.g. smaller MNEs that do not shift profits) as well as non-MNE firms. This could contribute to mitigating current trends towards greater market concentration, especially in digital markets, that risk undermining consumer welfare, investment and innovation. Indeed, preliminary evidence suggests that profit shifting MNEs use tax savings to crowd out other firms.