This chapter presents the context for integration policy in Norway. Starting with an outline of the economic and social conditions, with a special focus on the pandemics impact on integration, it proceeds to present a short profile of the immigrant population in Norway, their education and labour market outcomes as well as their settlement. It concludes with an overview of the development of integration policy and the main stakeholders.
Skills and Labour Market Integration of Immigrants and their Children in Norway
Working Together for Integration
2. Context of integration policy in Norway
Abstract
This report was largely completed before the Russian aggression against Ukraine. Norway swiftly adapted its integration framework to accommodate for the specific challenges arising from the inflow of refugees from Ukraine. These measures are discussed in a separate chapter (Chapter 6).
Social and labour market context of integration policy
Norway’s welfare model depends on high employment of all genders
The integration of immigrants and their children has to be seen in the context of some of the specificities of the Norwegian economy and labour market setting. In particular, Norway has one of the highest GDP per capita and the third-highest productivity levels OECD-wide (OECD, 2021[1]; OECD, 2021[2]). The employment rates are above the OECD average, and labour market participation of both men and women is high. In the first quarter of 2021, 74% of the population aged 15 to 64 was employed (OECD, 2021[2]). However, labour‑force participation has been declining over the last decade, particularly among native‑born men. What is more, while unemployment rates are below the OECD average, they never returned to the levels preceding the 2008 global economic crisis (OECD, 2019[3]).
A first look at the labour market outcomes of the foreign-born depicts outcomes close to the OECD average. Prior to the pandemic, in 2019, the foreign-born in Norway had an employment rate of 70% and a participation rate at 75% – which corresponds to the OECD average for immigrants in terms of absolute levels but relatively high gaps (7 and 4 percentage points, respectively) compared with the native‑born population. Likewise, the pre‑pandemic unemployment rate for the foreign-born was 7% – 1 percentage point below the OECD average for this group, but 2.5 times higher than among the native‑born in Norway.
There are large differences in employment rates between immigrants born in an EU country and those from a non-EU country (Figure 2.1). The employment rate of EU immigrants is higher than that of their native‑born peers for both genders in Norway, while the rates of non-EU immigrants are well below those of the native‑born. Indeed, the gap in employment rates between EU and non-EU-born is larger in Norway than in any other OECD country considered here; it is 18 percentage points among men and a full 21 percentage points among women.
Figure 2.1. Employment rate gaps between EU- and non-EU-born immigrants are large in Norway
Source: OECD Secretariat calculations based on EU LFS 2019.
Prior to the COVID‑19 pandemic, the employment rates of immigrants stood relatively stable over the past decade. The employment rate of immigrant men in Norway has been between the top‑3 and bottom‑3 performers of the comparison group, while the rate among women was in fact the highest until 2019 (Figure 2.2). While gaps to native‑born men were less than 5 percentage points at the end of the past decade, immigrant women lagged behind their native‑born peers by about 10 percentage points.
Figure 2.2. Employment rates of foreign-born are high, but gaps to native‑born women increased
Note: Top and bottom 3 performers among the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States.
Source: EU LFS.
The large employment rate gap between foreign- and native‑born women has to be seen in the context of Norway having one of the smallest gender gaps in employment OECD-wide. In 2021, 73% of women in Norway aged 15‑64 were employed, which is 14 percentage points above the OECD average. The gender gap in labour force participation has remained at 5 percentage points (a third of the OECD average) over the past decade (OECD, 2021[4]). Norway also has one of the lowest gender pay gaps across the OECD, including among low-educated workers (OECD, 2017[5]). Mothers are also more likely to be in work than elsewhere. Only in one in ten families is the father the sole bread-winner (OECD, 2017[6]). Norway has many policies promoting full-time employment of women, including widely accessible and subsidised childcare services, parental leave and other policies supporting a “dual earner-dual career” model (OECD and Nordic Council of Ministers, 2018[7]).
Another key feature of the country is its extensive social welfare system. In 2019, it recorded the second-highest amount of social expenditure per head in the OECD (OECD, 2021[8]). That same year, Norway spent around 25% of its GDP on public social policy programmes and benefits, placing the country in the upper quarter at position 9 out of 38 (OECD, 2021[8]). Twelve percent of the working-age population receive disability benefits, a share higher than in any OECD country. In addition, the share of public spending on incapacity benefits – due to sickness, disability and occupational injury – was, at 4.4% of the GDP, the second-highest OECD-wide; only surpassed by Denmark (OECD, 2019[9]). Norway’s welfare state is furthermore characterised by a high degree of wage compression, a large public sector and extensive active labour market policies (OECD, 2019[10]).
In 2019, overall expenditure per capita for public benefits was almost 20% higher among the native‑born than among the foreign-born. In 2020, overall levels were similar for both groups, due to an increase in unemployment benefits which was stronger among immigrants. In both years, there were notable differences by type of benefit. Incapacity and other health-related benefits were much higher for the native‑born, while unemployment and social assistance were higher among foreign-born (Figure 2.3). Accounting for age differences, the benefit expenditure per foreign-born was NOK 48 000 in 2019 and NOK 60 000 in 2020, whereas it was 54 000 for native‑born in 2019 and increased to NOK 61 000 for native‑born in 2020.
Figure 2.3. Levels of public expenditure on native‑ and foreign-born at working age are at similar levels but differ by benefit type
Note: Health-related benefits include sickness benefit, care benefit, training allowance, attendance allowance, work assessment allowance, disability benefit, and basic benefit. Family benefits included parental benefit, adoption benefit, lump-sum grant, child benefit, cash-for-care benefit, single parent benefit. Unemployment benefit also includes new benefits from 2020: Wage compensation and unemployment benefits for self-employed and freelancers. Social assistance also includes qualification benefits. Note that social assistance depends on household income and is meant to secure income for the whole household. Social assistance is included here for the person it is paid out to.
Source: NAV, May 2021.
The pandemic introduced a new context and additional challenges for integration
The COVID‑19 pandemic has disproportionally affected immigrant employment and living conditions in 2020 and 2021. On the 12th of March 2020, the Norwegian Government implemented several measures to limit the spread of the COVID‑19 virus, along with a number of changes to integration policy (Box 2.1). The containment measures led to a massive reduction in economic activity, and the number of registered jobseekers reached record levels. The sharpest increase in new job seekers was observed between the first and second quarter of 2020. In just four weeks, the share of jobseekers in the total labour force increased from 2.8% to 15.4%. The share of registered unemployed immigrants as a percentage of the labour force increased from 5.5% in February 2020 to close to 18% in March 2020. Immigrants from Central and Eastern EU countries and Asia experienced the largest increase. However, while immigrant unemployment tripled, the relative increase for the native‑born was much larger – their unemployment rate rose from less than 2% to 9% and their total number quintupled. Before the pandemic the unemployment rate was three times as high among immigrants, while in March 2020 it was around two times as high. (Statistics Norway, 2020[11]).
In the fourth quarter of 2020, immigrants accounted for 42% of all registered unemployed. This share was about the same as the years before the pandemic (Statistics Norway, 2021[12]). In international comparison, the developments in Norway are similar to other OECD countries, and the increase in unemployment over the whole year was stronger in neighbouring Finland and Sweden (Figure 2.4).
Figure 2.4. The unemployment rate of immigrants increased strongly during the first year of the pandemic
Source: OECD Secretariat calculations based on data from Eurostat, 2019 and 2020 [lfsa_urgacob].
In previous periods of economic downturn, the consequences of job loss have been much more long-lasting for immigrants than for the native‑born (Bratsberg, Raaum and Røed, 2018[13]). This also seems to have been the case, at least initially, during the pandemic. Among immigrants from low-income countries who were unemployed at the beginning of 2020, 76% of women and 70% of men had not returned to a job by the end of 2020. For natives, the share was 61% for women and 63% for men (Bratsberg, Raaum and Røed, 2021[14]).
Immigrants are overrepresented in sectors that have been the most affected by containment measures, such as the business service sector, catering and hotel services, and retail. Calculations by Statistics Norway show that 29% of immigrants were employed in these sectors; the corresponding share was 13% among the general population. The share was even higher for immigrants from Asia and Africa (Olsen, 2021[15]). Immigrants are also more often overrepresented among employees with temporary and part-time contracts. Earlier research on Norway has also found that immigrants are heavily overrepresented in firms with higher risks of business closure (Bratsberg, Raaum and Røed, 2018[13]).
Box 2.1. Immediate changes relation to integration policy to respond to COVID‑19
The COVID‑19 pandemic and the implemented control measures severely impacted the quality and scope of the available training and tests in the Introduction Programme. The economic shock following the lockdown measures meant that immigrants finishing the programme faced greater challenges in getting a job. To counteract the negative effects of the pandemic, the government implemented several measures:
Possibility of extension of the Introduction Programme by up to six months
Extension of the right to training in Norwegian and Social Studies by up to four months
Further career guidance for those in need
Additional funding to increase the use of online tools in Norwegian language training
Amendments to the Introduction Act, allowing municipalities to pay full benefits regardless of participants’ absence due to COVID‑19
Additional funds to NGOs for awareness-raising work on COVID‑19
Additional funds to strengthen job employment programmes such as “Jobbsjansen”, which is targeting immigrant women
A temporary amendment making it easier to study or do training while receiving unemployment benefits
A survey on the quality of life of the Norwegian population carried out just before and after the pandemic outbreak showed that immigrants experienced a greater increase in concern about their future than the rest of the population. This is possibly linked to the fact that they were more likely to lose their jobs than the rest of the population (Støren, Rønning and Gram, 2020[23]).1
Norway’s knowledge intense labour market requires high skills
The Norwegian labour market is knowledge‑intense and employment options for the low-skilled are limited. Only 3.5% of employment is in elementary occupations, defined as jobs with simple and routine tasks that require the use of hand-held tools and often some physical effort. This is the lowest share OECD-wide (Figure 2.5.). Only about half of these jobs are done by natives. Instead, the majority of the native‑born work in high-skilled jobs (52%), about two in five work in medium-skilled jobs (39%) and one in ten (10%) in low-skilled jobs. Among immigrants, 36% work in high-skilled, 44% in medium-skilled and 20% in low-skilled jobs (Statistics Norway, 2021[24]). Projections on future labour market demand indicate that employers demand for high-skilled workers will continue to increase whilst the demand for low-skilled workers will drop significantly (Walbækken et al., 2019[25]).
Figure 2.5. Few employment options exist in elementary occupations
Note: ISCO‑9 from the International standard classification of occupations.
Source: EU LFS 2019.
The high skill level of the Norwegian labour market corresponds with an adult population in Norway that is also relatively highly skilled in international comparison. Data from the 2013 OECD Survey of Adult Competencies (PIAAC) show that Norway belongs to the top performers in literacy, numeracy and problem-solving in technology-rich environments. Immigrants have significantly lower literacy scores than the native‑born, although scores are higher for those with more years of residence (OECD, 2014[26]).
Access to lifelong education and training are necessary to ensure that the Norwegian workforce can meet the demands of the labour market. Indeed, lifelong upskilling is a key principle of the Norwegian education policy. While adults’ access to lifelong learning and upskilling is high in Norway in international comparison, immigrants and low-skilled workers are underrepresented. The share of the foreign-born population attending adult education is 12 percentage points lower than among the native‑born. The difference between the two groups has even widened over the past years (OECD/European Union, 2018[27]).
Norway has a high standard of living, but many children of immigrants grow up in relative poverty
Norwegians enjoy one of the highest standards of living in the world. Norway ranks well in most indicators of well-being and among the top when it comes to self-reported well-being, environmental quality and work-life balance (OECD, 2020[28]). The country has one of the highest median incomes in the OECD and at the same time one of the largest shares living in the middle class (OECD, 2019[10]). Due to low income inequalities and high net replacement, particularly for low-income families, Norway’s Gini coefficient of 0.26 denotes the sixth-lowest income inequality after government taxes and transfers in the OECD (OECD, 2021[29]). At current levels of intergenerational mobility, it would take two to three generations for the offspring of a low-income family in Norway to approach the mean average income. The OECD average is four to five generations (OECD, 2018[30]). Looking at the improvements in inequality over time, Norway and the other Nordic countries have experienced a fall in these rankings since 2010.
However, children growing up in immigrant households in Norway are about three times more likely to be at risk of relative poverty than their peers growing up in native‑born households. In 2020, 26% of children in immigrant households were at risk of relative poverty, compared to 9% among their peers with parents who are both born in Norway (Figure 2.6). Moreover, the share of children growing up in households with relative poverty increased by 6 percentage points over the last decade among foreign-born households, while it remained at the same level for native‑born households. As a result, the gap between the two groups increased. A similar unfavourable development is only present in the Netherlands, and other (comparable) countries even recorded a positive development. Notably Finland was able to half its at-risk-of-poverty rate for children in immigrant households from 34% in 2010 to 17% in 2020.
Figure 2.6. One in four children in foreign-born households grows up at risk of relative poverty
Note: At-risk-of-poverty rate, cut-off point: 60% of median equivalised income after social transfers.
Source: OECD Secretariat calculations based on EU-SILC and ECHP surveys, 2021.
Among the children living in households with a persistently low income, more than half are children of immigrants – a share which has steadily increased over the past ten years. In 2019 almost every second immigrant child lived in a household with a persistently low income. Among those born in Norway but to immigrant parents the share is also high at 34%, compared to 6% for children who are native‑born to native‑born parents (Epland and Morten Normann, 2021[31]).
A short profile of the immigrant population
Origin and characteristics of Norway’s immigrant population
Over the past two decades, Norway’s foreign-born population has been growing at a compound annual rate of around 4%. While the foreign-born accounted for just 6.5% of Norway’s population in 2000, they accounted for close to 16% in 2020 (Figure 2.7). Only a handful of OECD countries had a similar increase in their immigrant population over this period. A further 3.5% of the Norwegian population are Norwegian-born to immigrant parents. The number of newly arrived immigrants peaked in 2011, largely driven by labour immigration from Eastern Europe. Inflows have gradually declined since then.
In 2021, one in four immigrants had lived in Norway up to four years, and half of the residing immigrant population had not been in Norway for longer than 10 years (Statistics Norway, 2021[32]). This points to the more recent character of migration to Norway, compared to the OECD total where about 70% of foreign-born in have been residing in the country for ten years or more.
Figure 2.7. Norway has seen a strong increase in its foreign-born population over the past 20 years
Source: OECD (2020[33]), OECD International Migration Outlook 2020, https://doi.org/10.1787/ec98f531-en; OECD (2021[34]), OECD International Migration Outlook 2021, https://doi.org/10.1787/29f23e9d-en.
The immigrant population is younger than the rest of the population. In 2021, 11% of the immigrants were over 60 years, compared with 37% among the native‑born population. There is a slight overweight of men among the immigrants (53% versus 47%), driven by the large numbers of Polish immigrants, where men constitute over 60% of all immigrants. Among immigrants from Thailand and Viet Nam, however, the majority are women.
In 2020, 9% of the foreign-born population was from another Nordic country, 35% from an EU country, 10% from the rest of Europe, 13% from Africa, 29% from Asia and the Middle East as well as 5% from other parts of the world (Statistics Norway, 2021[35]). Migrants from Poland are the largest foreign-born group in Norway. In 2021, they accounted for 13% of the foreign-born population, more than twice as many as the second-largest group, immigrants born in Lithuania. Other prominent countries of origin are Sweden, Syria, Iraq and Pakistan. Pakistan used to be the leading non-European origin country for decades but was surpassed by Somalia in 2014. The number of immigrants from Syria has grown sharply over the past decade, such that in 2021, they accounted for almost 4% of Norway’s foreign-born population, compared to just 0.4% in 2010 (Statistics Norway, 2021[32]).
The majority of recent immigrants to Norway have come for work. Among all first-time immigrants who have arrived in Norway between 2005 and 2020, 42% came for work, 33% for family reasons, 14% on humanitarian grounds and 10% for educational purposes. The vast majority of labour migrants have come from EU countries through the free mobility arrangements.
Indeed, free mobility has been the main category of entries to Norway over the past 15 years, accounting for 57% of new permanent arrivals in Norway over this period. This is a high share in international comparison (Figure 2.8).
Figure 2.8. Most immigrants to Norway over the past two decades have arrived via free mobility rights
Note: Numbers include changes of status from temporary to permanent.
Source: Standardised statistics by the OECD Secretariat. *OECD comparison group includes the following 14 countries: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States.
Following the EU enlargement to Eastern European countries in 2004 and 2007, numbers of EU/EFTA‑born immigrants, notably from Poland and the Baltic States, rose sharply, leading to a rapid change in the composition of Norway’s migrant population. Between 2004 and 2011, Norway attracted the same number of labour migrants from Central and Eastern Europe as Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Iceland combined (Friberg and Eldring, 2013[36]).
In 2019, 35% of all labour migrants came from Poland, 15% from Lithuania and 20% from other Eastern European countries. While the share of EU/EEA labour migrants has fallen since its peak in 2011/12, labour migration from countries outside EU/EEA has increased, especially from India and Viet Nam. Men constitute the overwhelming majority of labour migrants (70%).
In 2019, family migrants accounted for 23% of the immigrants residing in Norway. Family immigration is composed of those who already have a family in Norway (family reunification) and those who want to establish a family in Norway (family formation). The latter category represents a third of all family immigration and has historically been a person coming to form a family with a Norwegian-born person. Yet, as the Norwegian population is becoming more diverse, more and more persons are also coming to join previous immigrants, with a majority joining someone born in Pakistan. For those coming to Norway to establish a family with a Norwegian-born, most are from Thailand. The origin of those reuniting with a family member reflects previous refugee and labour migration flows, with many coming from Poland and Somalia and, more recently, from Syria. In recent years, fewer immigrants joined their families in Norway. While men account for the bulk of labour migrants, the overwhelming majority of those coming to join a family member are women (74%). Every fourth person in the family migration category has come to join a refugee.
Norway is also a longstanding destination for humanitarian migrants – a group that faces particular integration challenges due to their forced migration. 43% of the resident non-EU migrants who arrived as adults have come on humanitarian grounds (including family migration to humanitarian migrants). In total, more than 170 000 refugees are currently living in Norway. The main origin countries are Somalia, Syria, Iraq, Eritrea, Afghanistan and Iran. Norway experienced its first large inflow of asylum seekers only in the late 1980s. Throughout the years, Norway has experienced large fluctuation in numbers of asylum seekers with peaks in 1987, 1992, 2002, 2009 and 2015. In addition to those crossing the Norwegian border to apply for asylum, Norway has since 1950 accepted a pre‑determined number of refugees as part of an annual resettlement quota. In 2019, for the first time since 1999, the number of resettled refugees exceeded the number of granted asylums in Norway. The latter varied for a long time between 1 000 and 1 500 people, but since 2015, the number has been between 2000 and 3 000 persons annually.
Following the arrival of large humanitarian flows in 2015/2016 to Europe, the number of applications from asylum increased. The peak was reached in 2016, with humanitarian inflows accounting for 36% of all residence permits. However, over the 2015‑20 period, cumulated applications of refugees per inhabitant remain below the EU average; an annual average of 146 applications for international protection per 100 000 citizens compared to 186 for the EU average (Eurostat, 2021[37]). While men make up the majority of refugees residing in Norway, 64% of the family migrants to refugees are women.
Norway’s population holds increasingly positive views on migrants, but less so on integration policy and regards employment and language skills as key parameters for integration success (Box 2.2).
Box 2.2. Norwegian society views immigration as increasingly positive but is less optimistic about integration policy
Statistics Norway annual survey on the population’s attitudes towards immigration and immigrants shows that attitudes have become increasingly positive over the years. When asked if immigrants make a useful contribution to Norwegian working life, almost 8 out of 10 answered that they fully or fairly agree. Another question measuring populations’ attitudes is whether immigrants are seen as a source of insecurity in Norwegian society. When the survey started in 2002, the share that disagreed with this statement was 41%. In 2020, the share that disagreed had risen to 63%.
In the Integration Barometer of 2020, participants were asked if Norway should take in more immigrants. The opinions diverged; 30% want Norway to take in more while 40% want Norway to accept fewer. One in two respondents thinks that the integration of immigrants works poorly, and only one in five thinks it works well. The Barometer further showed that language proficiency and employment are the most important factors for a migrant to be regarded as well integrated. Few agree that immigrants should give up their culture and values, but around half of the respondents answered that the values within Islam are incompatible with basic values in Norwegian society.
Education and labour market integration of immigrants
Norway’s immigrants have thus come from a diverse range of countries and categories, with different employment and education backgrounds, consequently bringing a wide range of different integration needs. For example, 56% of the refugees from Africa do not have any education beyond lower-secondary education (ISCED 0‑2), compared with 12% of European labour immigrants. The distribution by level of education shows that immigrants have, on average, lower formal education levels than the native‑born if they come from a non-EU country but higher average levels than the native‑born if they come from the EU 27 (Figure 2.9). However, this is true for many European countries. In fact, the difference between natives and non-EU immigrants is less pronounced in Norway than in many other countries, and the actual shares of low- and high-educated immigrants are well below and above the EU average, respectively. In terms of education levels, the composition of the Norwegian immigrant population is thus not unfavourable in international comparison.
Figure 2.9. Non-EU immigrants are lower educated and EU immigrants are higher educated than the native‑born
Note: Countries are ordered by the share of non-EU foreign-born.
Source: OECD Secretariat calculations based on data from Eurostat, 2021.
Many refugees and their family have at most completed lower-secondary education. This is the case for about one in two humanitarian migrants in Norway. However, also one in five within this group is tertiary educated. Immigrants arriving as family to a non-refugee partner and those coming for work have overall higher education levels, which are overall similar to the native‑born population. Migrants coming for education purposes are an outlier because over 80% are tertiary educated (Table 2.1).
Table 2.1. Refugees and their families have low education levels
Education level (ISCED) based on place of birth and migration category, percentages, aged 15‑66, 2019
Note: For about 19% of the immigrant population, the education level is unspecified. The largest share is found among labour migrants (30%). Data excludes those coded as currently in full-time education.
Source: Calculated based on data from SSB (2021[24]).
Compared with other OECD countries with large and longstanding migrant populations, the labour force participation rate of migrant men in Norway has been somewhere in the middle of the group over the past decade (Figure 2.10). The participation rate of women, on the other hand, has been consistently one of the highest although it has declined slightly in recent years. In contrast, while there is little difference in participation of foreign and native‑born men, one observes a clear gap – widening in recent years – between foreign- and native‑born women. A similar pattern emerges when looking at employment rates in Norway.
Figure 2.10. Gap in participation rate between foreign-born and native‑born women is high
Note: Top and bottom 3 performers among the following 14 countries: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.
Source: OECD Secretariat calculations based on national and European labour force surveys, 2021.
Unsurprisingly, labour migrants have a high employment rate. In fact, at 78% in 2019, their employment rate has been higher than that of the native‑born population, which was 75%. At 52% and 48% in 2019, refugees and family migrants to refugees who arrived as adults have the lowest employment rates across immigrant groups. Among refugees and their families, women have particular poor labour market outcomes. Refugee women have an employment rate of 42%, 15 percentage points lower than refugee men. The largest gender gap, however, exists among migrants who arrived as family to refugees. In this group, women have an employment rate of 44%, a full 20 percentage points below men.
Figure 2.11. Employment rates increase with time in Norway but differ by admission class
Source: OECD Secretariat calculations based on data from SSB, 2021.
After three to four years in Norway, most immigrants are and stay in employment (Figure 2.11). At the same time, especially refugees and their family members have not caught up to the other admission classes even after ten years in Norway. While their employment outcomes improve with time in Norway, the progress is slow. Among refugees who have been in the country longer than 10 years, only 55% are employed. Family migrants to refugees have even lower employment rates as refugees themselves, related to the fact that most of them are women. Again, the proportion of those in employment increases with time in Norway, and among those with 10 years or more in the country, around 57% are employed. Low employment levels among refugees and their family are partly explained by lower educational attainment. In fact, higher education narrows the employment gap between immigrant groups, suggesting that refugees in particular benefit from higher education levels.
Research indicates that the labour market attachment of some immigrant groups is high and increasing at the beginning, but decreases strongly after only about seven years in the country. Bratsberg and colleagues find that employment rates of immigrants from low-income countries drop after 5 to 10 years in Norway, and social insurance dependency rates relative to native‑born increase, regardless of gender and admission categories (Bratsberg, Raaum and Røed, 2017[38]). Notably, most immigrants in Norway arrived within the last decade, and their long-term labour market integration is a key policy priority in this respect.
The settlement of immigrants in Norway
Figure 2.12. Immigrants are settled more evenly in 2020 than a decade ago
Note: Shares are calculated by county, based on the county structure of January 2020.
Source: OECD Secretariat calculations based on data from SSB, 2021.
As depicted in Figure 2.12, immigrants reside all over Norway, but most are concentrated in Oslo, where almost one in four is foreign-born (24%). As mentioned, Norway has seen a sharp increase in its foreign-born population. In just one decade, the foreign-born share increased by 5 percentage points, up from 10.5% in 2010. This increase has been relatively homogenous across the country. In seven of the 11 counties, the share increased by about 5 percentage points. Likewise, a recent SSB report compared data from 2012 to 2020 on a municipality-level and shows about the same numbers of municipalities above and below the national average of foreign-born in both years (Gulbrandsen et al., 2021[39]).
As in other OECD countries, immigrants are more likely to settle in urban centres than rural areas, but the concentration is less pronounced in Norway than elsewhere (Figure 2.13). Using Norway’s national centrality index as classification, in 2020, 57% of immigrants lived in most and second most central municipalities (Sentralitetsklasser 1 and 2, interval 870‑1000), against 43% of the native‑born population. In turn, only one in ten foreign-born lived in the second-least and least central municipalities (Sentralitetsklasser 5 and 6, interval 295‑669) against 15% of the native‑born. The rest live in central areas (Sentralitetsklasser 3 and 4).
Figure 2.13. Immigrants in Norway are comparatively equally settled across the country
Note: The share is with respect to the degree of urbanisation; 25% of 15‑64 year‑olds in Norwegian cities are foreign-born, and 18% outside of cities are foreign-born. For European countries, the share of foreign-born is shown according to categories of degree of urbanisation: cities and other areas (towns and suburbs and rural areas) based on a joint European Commission / OECD classification. Local Administrative Units (LAU) are classified as cities, towns and suburbs or rural areas based on a combination of criteria of geographical contiguity and minimum population threshold applied to 1 km2 population grid cells. Cities are LAUs where at least 50% of the population lives in urban centres. For Canada, the share of foreign-born is shown for Census Metropolitan Areas (CMAs) and for the rest of the country. Data for Canada refer to 2016. For the United States, the share of foreign-born is shown for Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) and for the rest of the country.
Source: OECD (2021[34]), OECD International Migration Outlook 2021, https://doi.org/10.1787/29f23e9d-en.
Descendants of immigrants in Norway
In OECD-comparison, Norway has one of the highest shares of children either foreign-born or native‑born to two immigrant parents (Figure 2.14). Their share doubled from 2006 to 2018. A comparable strong increase is only observed in Italy and countries with overall much smaller numbers of children of immigrants like Finland and Slovenia.
In 2021, over one in three children in Norway (34%) under 15 had at least one parent born abroad. The increase of youth with migrant parents has been strongest among children of two foreign-born parents. While the group compose 3.4% of the entire population, they make up 14% of all under 15 years old and 20% of all 0‑4 year‑olds. Against this backdrop, Statistics Norway estimates that by 2060 the share of native‑born to immigrants is expected to account for 8% of the entire population (SSB, 2018[40]).
Figure 2.14. The share of young people with two migrant parents doubled in just 12 years
Note: Selected OECD countries.
Source: Secretariat estimations based on EU-LFS, Eurostat, Census and Admin data.
Immigration drives the growth in the youth population in Norway. In 2021, one in two Norwegian-born to immigrant parents was under the age of 10, and almost 70% of Norwegian-born to immigrant parents are under 15 years of age (Statistics Norway, 2021[41]). The age composition of this group is therefore very different from the rest of the Norwegian population. A third of the descendants of immigrants have parents born in Asia – mainly from Pakistan. After Pakistan, the second largest group are native‑born to parents from Somalia and Poland, followed by Iraq and Viet Nam. Due to their young age vis-à-vis the overall population, the majority of the Norwegian-born children of immigrants are still in the education system or have just recently entered the Norwegian labour market.
The evolution of integration policy
From the “principle of choice” to a focus on labour market integration
Considering the relatively small numbers of migrants coming to Norway until the mid‑1980s, integration policy developed early. Already in 1970, 150 hours of training in Norwegian were introduced as a municipal responsibility with voluntary participation.
A White Paper from 1980 (On immigrants in Norway) presented integration as a short-term but two‑way process with equal opportunities and freedom of choice as guiding principles. Immigrants were given a choice to which degree they wanted to become integrated into the Norwegian society and were encouraged to maintain their language, religion and culture. The government at the time considered that integration would be easier if immigrants were able to maintain their mother tongue. Immigrant children were therefore offered mother tongue training at school, and in 1980, 46% of immigrant children enrolled in compulsory schooling received such training. At the same time, labour immigrants, refugees and their family members were offered 240 hours of free Norwegian language training (Kulbrandstad Iversen, 2017[42]).
In the 1980s, the principle of mainstreaming was introduced, which meant that the needs of immigrants should be considered within the general social and employment policy. Foreign nationals with three years of residence received voting rights in local elections in 1983. Mother tongue training and Norwegian as a second language were introduced as regular school subjects, and municipalities had to offer training in mother tongue if teachers were available. Immigrant organisations could receive state funding (Kulbrandstad Iversen, 2017[42]; Bay A-H, Finseraas H and Hagelund A, 2010[43]). In 1988, a new White Paper on integration policy emphasised that immigrants have the same rights and obligations as the native‑born population (Kulbrandstad Iversen, 2017[42]).
Until the 1980s, most migrants came from other Nordic countries, based on the common Nordic labour market, which was established in 1954. There was also some limited “guest worker” type of migration in which Norwegian companies recruited workers from for example Yugoslavia. Labour migrants also came from Pakistan, Morocco, Türkiye and India, individually i.e. through informal networks and found a job after arrival.
Starting in 1985, the number of asylum seekers increased, and a growing gap in employment rates between immigrants and native‑born called for new policy measures. In a new “white paper on immigration policy and multicultural Norway” from 1997, the labour market is described as the most important arena for integration and focus laid on measures to facilitate long-term integration and increase immigrants’ possibility to support themselves in the new country (Kommunal- og arbeidsdepartementet, 1997[44]). A national test in Norwegian was introduced, and the previous policy of promoting mother-tongue education was replaced by a new emphasis on measures to promote competence in Norwegian (Kulbrandstad Iversen, 2017[42]).
Since its inception, municipalities have always been a key player in providing integration policy in Norway. Yet, the scope and quality of their interventions and programmes varied across the country in the early years (Brochman G and Hagelund A, 2012[45]). The white paper from 1997 stressed differences in quality as difficulties in the co‑ordination of integration efforts. In reaction, it suggested a more structured and informed integration process.
The establishment of a formal introduction programme
At the turn of the millennium, increased immigration and a rising employment gap between immigrants and natives put pressure to make further changes in the integration policy. To establish a uniform framework for refugees and other vulnerable groups, the Storting passed an Introduction Act in June 2003.
The 2003 Act marked a turning point because it established for the first time a full-time, mandatory integration programme to strengthen the integration of newly arrived refugees and their families to participate in the workforce, in social life and to gain economic independence. Following the examples of its Scandinavian neighbours of Sweden and Denmark, which had introduced similar measures earlier, the programme provides since its inception individually adapted support, including language training and social studies as well as labour market training programmes, for refugees and their families. At its introduction and until recent changes implemented in January 2021, it generally lasted for two years, with a possibility to extend by one additional year. Participants are entitled to a monthly introduction benefit that is not means-tested and above the social assistance level (see Chapter 3 for an in-depth discussion); the Introduction Programme is seen as the “first job” of newly arriving refugees.
The Introduction Act imposed a duty on newly settled immigrants to participate in the programme in their assigned municipality while establishing participation as an individual right. The fact that the programme was made mandatory was partly driven by the differences in integration outcomes between immigrant men and women and the rationale that a mandatory programme would guarantee the participation of women (Djuve, 2011[46]).
Language training has been a key pillar of the Introduction Programme since its inception, through a duty and right to participate in a minimum of initially 250 hours of Norwegian language training and 50 hours of social studies. Immigrant groups not eligible for the Introduction Programme have to pay for their language training. In 2012, the mandatory language courses for those in the Introduction Programme were extended to 600 hours. To ensure the quality of the training, mandatory tests for those with a duty and right to Norwegian and social studies was also imposed in 2012. Starting 2005, all non-EU/EEA immigrants who wished to obtain a permanent residence permit had to complete 250 hours of Norwegian and 50 hours of social studies.
Increasing focus on mandatory measures
As an immediate response to the increase of asylum seekers in 2015/16, a bipartisan asylum agreement was concluded in November 2015 with proposals to tighten immigrant and integration policy (Arbeiderpartiet et al., 2015[47]). It included, among other measures, a tightening of the requirements for family reunification through the introduction of an age requirement for marriage migration (24 years old for both parties), an “attachment requirement” allowing authorities to reject reunification if the family can be reunited in another safe third country, and a shortened grace period for when refugees are exempted from the income requirement for family migration (Gustafsson Grønningsaeter and Brekke, 2017[48]). In parallel, since 2016, passing language and civic tests at a certain level has become a prerequisite to applying for permanent residence and naturalisation. In 2017, an income requirement for permanent residence was introduced. In 2020 new changes were made again to the residence permit requirement, this time for the first time creating different requirements for different immigrant groups. The change extended the required duration of residence from 3 to 5 years for humanitarian migrants and their family members. For all other immigrant groups, the requirement of 3 years of residence to obtain a permanent residence permit was unchanged.
There were also changes to the NIP participant’s access to other welfare benefits. In 2016 single parents saw their benefit levels decline as the single parent benefit was merged with the introductory benefit, and in 2017, the right to cash support for parents with children who did not attend kindergarten was limited to parents who had lived in Norway for longer than five years (Djuve and Kavli, 2019[49]). A further limitation to social benefits of humanitarian migrants was proposed in July 2016, delaying their access to old-age pensions and other disability and social security benefits. With slight changes some of the provisions came into force on 1st of January 2021. This includes the removal of preferential treatment regarding pensions rules for refugees compared to other migrant groups. Convention refugees had, for example, been exempted from waiting periods and had been compensated for short residency times in their pension entitlements (Hagelund, 2020[50]). The required waiting time for immigrants to be eligible for social security benefits such disability pensions, old-age pensions and rehabilitation benefits was also raised from three to five years.
The 2020 Integration Act – a renewed focus on formal education and targeted training
The 2003 Introduction Programme had several shortcomings. Already in 2009, a first OECD review of Norway’s integration system (Liebig, 2009[51]) recommended, among other measures, a more “outcome‑focused language training according to migrants’ abilities and needs” and to “incite municipalities to make more effective use of the possibility to allow faster tracks for new arrivals who are closer to the labour-market”. Indeed, while formally the introduction framework was already tailor-made and flexible, in practice there was little differentiation in its implementation to account for different starting points and needs of new arrivals.
Since 1 January 2021, a new Integration Act has been in force, providing for the most significant changes in Norway’s integration policy in nearly two decades. It reforms responsibilities for integration, early qualification measures, career guidance, skills mapping and Norwegian Language Training and Social Studies, alongside further changes of the Introduction Programme. An important change is the introduction of an individualised integration plan that is agreed upon by the participant and the settling municipality. The overall objective is to provide more refugees with formal education for sustainable – rather than immediate – labour market integration.
The new framework enhances flexibility in the measures proposed and in programme duration, to account for diversity in participants’ background, age and ambitions. The focus is no longer the number of hours or years of participation but rather the formal competencies achieved. For those with upper secondary education the programme may last between three to six months, with a six-month extensions. For participants who have the goal of completing upper secondary education, the NIP can be extended up to four years to complete schooling. The programme ends when the final goal or duration is reached. Approved leave is now added to the duration of the programme.
With the new framework, the previous requirement of having completed at least 600 hours of language training was replaced by a requirement to achieve a minimum level in Norwegian, referred to as participants’ “Norwegian Goal”. The indicative minimum level depends on the individuals’ formal education level. This “Norwegian Goal” can vary between A2 and B2 in the four language skills (oral, listening, writing and reading) under the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages (CEFR).
Table 2.2. Target groups and measures of the 2020 Integration Act
Source: Adjusted from (Hernes, Staver and Tønnessen, 2020[52]).
What is more, municipalities are expected, together with other actors, to enable participants who do not achieve their educational goals in due time to participate in other upskilling programmes. Participants in the Introduction Programme below the age of 25 who do not have upper secondary education have the main goal of completing this educational qualification.
To support this goal, counties (the responsible governance level for upper secondary education in Norway) are now additional stakeholders in the Introduction Programme. Under the new regulation, the county is responsible for providing Norwegian language training and social studies for those in full-time upper secondary education. The county is also responsible for organising career guidance, a new mandatory element at the beginning of the Introduction Programme, to better guide the individualised plans.
Another important objective of the new Act is to reduce disparities in integration offers and outcomes across Norway. To this end, the new integration entails a number of standardised elements and provides for digital resources for the Introduction Programme.
The policy changes to the Introduction Act have to be seen in the context of several other major recent reforms (Box 2.3). These include a large regional reform and the subsequent transfer of important integration competencies to counties. In addition, Norway is implementing a major reform of primary and secondary education, which includes changes to Norwegian for foreign-language speakers.
Box 2.3. Recent reforms related to integration policy
Over the past few years, Norway has been undergoing several parallel reforms which are closely interconnected and relevant for integration policy.
Through the Regional Reform, in force since 2020, counties play a greater role in the integration process. The purpose of the Regional Reform was to create larger and more functional counties with greater capacity and competence to strengthen local democracy and development. The reform merged 19 counties into 11 and reduced the number of municipalities from 428 to 356. Counties are now in charge for allocating of newly settled refugees across municipalities and matching refugees’ skills to local needs. They are also responsible for organising the skill mapping and career guidance of immigrants. Counties now have greater responsibility and more resources for providing support to immigrants with weak school results from primary and lower secondary education to better prepare them for upper secondary school.
Since January 2020, the Norwegian Nationality Act has allowed for dual citizenship.
For those married or living with a Norwegian citizen, the minimum number of years of residence required to obtain permanent residence permit have been raised from three to five years. The same extension applies to persons with a residence permit based on strong human consideration and their family members. Changes have also been made to the required level of oral skills in Norwegian to obtain citizenship, from level A2 to B1.There will be exceptions from the requirement, for example for immigrants who, due to personal circumstances over which the person in question has no control or health reasons, are not able to reach level B1 in oral Norwegian. These amendments have not yet taken effect.
An ongoing Skills Reform aims to raise overall skills levels in Norway and ensure regular training for upskilling. The reform includes measures for adults with poor basic skills and little formal education. The reform also facilitates hiring people outside the labour market and makes formal education and vocational training more accessible to immigrants. Long-term unemployed and immigrants lacking upper secondary education will be given priority in employment training.
In August 2020, the core curriculum for primary and secondary education was modified. The new curriculum aims to provide more time for in-depth learning. New subjects have also been introduced in the core curriculum on health and life skills, democracy and citizenship, and sustainable development.
A proposed Reform of Upper Secondary Education, which is currently under discussion, aims to reduce early drop-outs and create a more specialised and flexible education system. One proposal is to remove the time limit to finish upper secondary school. This would improve the chances for students with weaker academic results, especially recent arrivals, to complete their upper secondary education. The government also seek to introduce a right to an apprenticeship with measures to ensure that all students enrolled in vocational education receive a certificate after completion. The shortage of apprenticeships is one of the greatest impediments for students getting their trade certificate and students with migrant parents are further less likely to obtain apprenticeships than other students.
Key actors in integration policy
Multiple ministries and agencies shape integration policy
Integration is mainstreamed in Norwegian policy making. Hence, all authorities have a responsibility to support the goals of the integration policy and to adapt their services to the population, including the needs of immigrants and their children. Over the past decades, the responsibility for the national integration policy has changed frequently (Figure 2.15). Since October 2021, the overreaching responsibility for migrants’ integration lies with the Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion. The ministry also has the responsibility for labour market, welfare and social policies. For matters relating to policies and laws regulating entry and residency of foreigners, the responsibility lies with the Ministry of Justice and Public Security and the Directorate of Immigration (UDI).
Figure 2.15. The responsibility for integration policy has changed several times
Source: Forvaltningsdatabasen (n.d.[56]), https://www.nsd.no/polsys/data/forvaltning/enhet/9080/endringshistorie.
In 2020/21, the budget line for integration policy (at the time in the Ministry of Education and Research), amounted to NOK 9.1 billion, i.e. about 900 million Euros. The bulk of this sum are grants to the municipalities, to compensate for expenditure related to the settlement of migrants and for Norwegian language training and social studies. There is also a small budget line for the Directorate for Integration and Diversity (IMDi) (Kunnskapsdepartementet, 2020[57]) which has an important role in implementing integration policy. The Directorate has always been under the auspices of the ministry in charge of integration policy and is therefore currently under the Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion. IMDi was established as a separate administrative entity on 1 January 2006, in part to signal the growing attention paid to the issue of integration. One of the Directorate’s key responsibilities is the organisation of the placement of refugees in municipalities. The Directorate also serves as a national advisory body and centre for knowledge, research and expertise on integration to the municipalities, authorities and the general public (Box 2.4). With the Regional Reform that went into force on 1 January 2020, several of IMDi’s integration tasks, notably regarding supervision of the municipalities’ integration work, have been transferred to counties (see below).
Through its Directorate of Labour and Welfare, the Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion also oversees the Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration (NAV). NAV is the Norwegian public employment and welfare agency, responsible for implementing labour market and social policies. Since 2006, it has operated as a one‑stop service for employment and welfare administration. NAV runs a local office in each municipality that administers social services while the respective municipality remains responsible for assessing individuals’ needs regarding social benefits. NAV serves 2.8 million users annually and administers approximately one‑third of the state budget through its administration of unemployment benefits, work assessment allowance, sickness benefit, pensions, child benefits and cash-for-care benefits (NAV, 2021[58]). NAV offers integration support as part of its mainstream services for ordinary job seekers but may also provide additional targeted assistance to immigrants in co‑ordination with the municipalities. Immigrants from non-EU/EFTA member countries are given priority for access to active labour market programmes, similar to those given to members of other potentially disadvantaged groups such as long-term unemployed and youth (Norwegian Ministries, 2020[59]). Non-humanitarian immigrants and immigrants who completed or stopped their Introduction Programme turn to NAV in case they need support to re‑enter the labour market or apply for social benefits. This includes settled immigrants and recently arrived non-refugees, such as labour or family migrants. NAV is also responsible for humanitarian migrants who decline the Introduction Programme and those who finished or dropped out of their NIP and have been in the municipality for more than five years. NAV had specialised offices for immigrants (NAV Intro) in areas of high immigrant concentration. These were unique in international comparison (Liebig, 2009[51]). However, with a view of mainstreaming immigrant labour market integration and other services, these were abolished in 2015.
The second key national stakeholder is the Ministry of Education and Research, especially the recently-established Directorate for Higher Education and Skills and the Norwegian Agency for Quality Assurance in Education (NOKUT). The latter is, among other tasks, responsible for recognising foreign educational qualifications at all levels – apart from regulated professions. The Directorate for Higher Education and Skills was established in July 2021 due to a merger of six state bodies. The new Directorate includes the former Directorate for Lifelong Learning, previously known as Skills Norway (Kompetanse Norge). Skills Norway was in charge of developing and overseeing of Norwegian language training and social studies. It also supports county authorities in the provision of career guidance.
The Ministry of Justice and Public Security is responsible for the government’s refugee and immigration policy. It oversees the Immigration Act and the operation of asylum centres and deportations, as well as the Directorate of Immigration (UDI) and the Immigration Appeals Board (UNE). UDI’s main task is to process applications under the Immigration Act and the operation of reception centres while UNE deals with the complaints against decisions taken by the UDI. UDI was established in 1987 with the overall responsibility for the settlement of refugees, this responsibility was later transferred to the Directorate of Integration and Diversity (IMDi) in 2006. UDI is further responsible for the first reception of adults and unaccompanied minors above 15 years. Unaccompanied minors below 15 are placed in special care centres run by the Norwegian Directorate for Children, Youth and Family Affairs.
Anti-discrimination and equality policies are under the remit of the Ministry of Culture and Equality. In 2018 the government established an Anti-Discrimination Tribunal, a complaints body that enforces the anti-discrimination legislation. Other actors working against discrimination is the Equality and Anti-Discrimination Ombud. The Ombud represents the interest of those discriminated against and gives guidance to employers on their duties set out in the law.
As in other OECD countries, the many stakeholders involved in integration work at the national, regional and local levels have made the Norwegian integration system complex (Figure 2.16).
Box 2.4. Research and data sources on integration in Norway
There is an impressive and longstanding array of data and research on integration in the country. What is more, systematic research and regular policy evaluations have long been key components in developing integration policy. Both IMDi and Statistics Norway (SSB) produce research results in the field of integration on a regular basis, in addition to an impressive number of research institutions.
One of the reasons for the high quality of data and research on integration in Norway is its system of linked administrative registers, which allows following the integration process of immigrants and their children over time. Every resident in Norway has a Personal Identification Number (PIN), through which the person’s education, employment and participation in the labour market are registered in the Central Population Register (CPR) database. Most variables on immigrants have been available since 1990.
The CPR allows to follow arrival cohorts over time and identify changes in their education and labour market affiliation. Notably, for immigrants who arrived as refugees and participated in the Introduction Programme, a specific dataset exists; the National Introduction Programme (NIR) database. At the same time, for other groups such as migrants coming due to free mobility rights, the available data is less well developed, as many do not register their education level, for example.
SSB also conducted four special surveys on the living conditions of immigrants in 1983, 1996, 2005/2006 and 2016, filling information gaps on social integration such as housing, attitudes and membership in associations. The most recent survey covered 4 500 immigrants who have been living in Norway for more than two years and who have come from the following countries: Türkiye, Poland, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Viet Nam, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Eritrea. These groups account for about a third of the total foreign-born population.
An important gap in the current data system is language programme data. (Former) Skills Norway collects basic data on tests taken in language training and social studies such as the number of registrations and passed tests by municipality, time and test level/type. However, it does not include individual identifiers or participant metadata such as age, origin and education.
While these data allow for country-specific analyses, they are not necessarily international comparative due to different underlying definitions and (lack of) comparably well-developed data in other countries. Examples are definitions of family reunification or lack of data in many countries on detailed admission categories. For international comparisons, the European labour force and household surveys (i.e. EU‑LFS and EU-SILC) have been used accordingly.
Figure 2.16. Many actors are involved in the integration process at all levels
Source: OECD Secretariat.
The integration of new arrivals is largely decentralised
Municipalities organise and provide the Introduction Programme, including courses in Norwegian and Social Studies, and housing for newly arrived immigrants. Municipalities are also responsible for training in Norwegian and Social Studies for asylum seekers as well as for mapping their skills before settlement, for those receiving international protection. Municipalities are also responsible for primary and lower secondary education, while counties are responsible for upper secondary education. Since the content of the Introduction Programme aims to be tailor-made to each participant, the 356 municipalities have considerable autonomy regarding its implementation and content (Hernes et al., 2019[60]).
The Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Authorities (KS) represents the interest of the municipalities, the counties and the local public enterprises on the national level. Together with the IMDi and the counties, KS assesses how many refugees each municipality can be asked to accept. Refugees are expected to be settled in areas where they can find work and be offered the necessary education and skills training. The inclusion of counties in the settlement process is new and was introduced with the Regional Reform that went into force on 1 January 2020.
Counties’ new responsibilities for migrants’ integration have to be seen in the context of a larger regional reform (Box 2.3). With the Regional Reform, the 11 counties have received a greater responsibility for the regional integration and skills policy, and counties’ new responsibilities were further clarified with the 2020 Integration Act. These reforms provided counties with co‑ordination and advisory responsibility in integration and skills policy. As a result, counties took over supervising the municipalities’ integration efforts that were previously carried out by IMDi, subsequently leading to the closing of IMDi’s regional activities.
Since 2021, counties are expected to monitor municipalities’ integration activities and develop regional plans for the qualification of immigrants. This includes responsibility for allocating and following up on grant schemes aimed at getting immigrants into jobs or education as well as providing career guidance and training in Norwegian and social studies for immigrants in upper secondary education.
There is a strong role of social partners in Norway, but immigrants are not always well covered
The Norwegian labour market model is characterised by social dialogue and tripartite co‑operation. Social partners, therefore, play a crucial role in its functioning. Norway has no nation-wide statutory minimum wage, but instead wages are negotiated by social partners. Working conditions are regulated partly through collective agreements and partly by statutory law. Over the last decade, trade union affiliation in Norway remained both relatively stable and comparatively high, at around 50% in 2019. The country consistently ranks in the upper quintile of OECD countries when it comes to union membership. Nevertheless, in 2020 the rate remains somewhat below that in other Nordic countries (60% in Finland, 66% in Sweden and 68% in Denmark).
While overall about 51% of employees in Norway were union members, this share was only 41% among immigrant workers, according to the 2016 Survey on Living Conditions of Immigrants (Vrålstad and Stabell Wiggen, 2017[61]). The degree of organisation varies by nationality, education and duration of stay. Non-EU immigrants are more likely to be organised than immigrants from Eastern and Central Europe, whereas the degree of organisation among immigrants with more than 15 years of residence is almost equal to that of natives. Looking at different occupation levels, one finds that there is a gap among union coverage for the high-skilled but not for the low-skilled. What is more, research has put forward additional explanations for the lower organisational rate among immigrants such as type of employment, varying trade union traditions, and lack of information (Nergaard, Barth and Dale-Olsen, 2015[62]; Hagen and Jensen, 2016[63]; Cools, Finseraas and Rasmussen, 2020[64]; Kjellberg, 2021[65]). Over the last decade, collective agreements have been introduced in industries where many labour migrants work, such as the cleaning sector. The measures have been closely developed and implemented with the social partners (Alsos, Nergaard and Trygstad, 2019[66]).
Social partners are obliged to promote equality and prevent discrimination on the grounds of ethnicity, religion and belief. The Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise (NHO) and the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) have, since 2008, incorporated a supplementary agreement on diversity and integration into their main agreement (Bergsli, 2020[67]).
Civil society plays an increasingly important role in integration, but its role still lags behind other OECD countries
In Norway, the overwhelming part of integration measures and support have traditionally been funded and provided by the state. This sets Norway – like its Scandinavian neighbours – apart in international comparison where provision (though not necessarily funding) of integration services is often made by non-governmental organisations (OECD, forthcoming[68]). While the state (at all levels of government) continues to be the most important actor for providing integration services, civil society actors are increasingly becoming an integral part of the integration system. In 2020, 48 organisations, mainly national, received grants for their integration work from IMDi (IMDi, 2021[69]). In addition, a total of 586 local projects received government grants through the municipalities in 2020.
The activities mainly include broader social integration. The new Integration Act does not regulate these activities, though IMDi has an online resource with advice and links to different services provided by the NGO sector, e.g. language cafes and other language training arenas, refugee guides, inclusion in local sports activities and more. Options for participation of the volunteer sector in the integration process are complex, as all integration projects driven by civil society organisations need to come about through bidding and a strict procurement process (Karlsdóttir et al., 2016[70]). In June 2021, the former Government launched a new strategy to strengthen the role of civil society in developing and implementing the integration policy for the period of 2021‑24. The strategy was accompanied by an increased economic support to NGOs working to improve integration. The strategy has 26 defined measures with three main goals: 1. More persons with immigrant parents participating in civil society, 2. Raise and support civil society’s effort on integration and 3. Better co‑operation and regulatory conditions. The strategy is in the process of being implemented by the current government.
Norway historically had an active approach to consult with immigrant organisations in policy development, but recently this has been less the case
Immigrant associations do not have a formal role in the political process at the national level, though immigrant organisations may be represented at the municipal and county administrative levels through immigrant councils. However, there is no data on how many municipalities and counties have such councils and their functioning varies widely (Kunnskapsdepartementet, 2021[71]). The councils use different names; some operate informally and are not part of the administrative structure, while others have a more formal function at the municipal and county offices. A few of the organisations are represented nationally by the Immigrants’ National Organisation (Innvandrernes landsorganisasjon).
Until 2014, a special independent advisory body called “The Contact Committee for Immigrant and the Authorities (KIM)” facilitated and promoted co‑operation and dialogue between non-governmental immigrant organisations and the authorities. Since 2014, this dialogue is arranged through an annual conference inviting local immigrant organisations to exchange experiences and ideas with the authorities.
Like in other OECD countries (OECD, 2020[72]), the pandemic has enhanced funding for the civil society and immigrant associations to provide information to relevant migrant groups on specific issues and concerns. In 2020, 2021 and 2022, a total of NOK 86.6 million was provided as grants to NGO’s for their COVID‑19 information efforts to immigrants.
References
[66] Alsos, K., K. Nergaard and S. Trygstad (2019), “Getting and staying together: 100 years of social dialogue and tripartism in Norway”.
[47] Arbeiderpartiet et al. (2015), Arbeiderpartiet, https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/7d82bd6cce8b466dacbb01d360846f79/asylavtale_stortinget_2015-11-19.pdf (accessed on 4 June 2021).
[43] Bay A-H, Finseraas H and Hagelund A (2010), “Civil Society and Political Integration Of Immigrants in Norway”, in Bengtsson, B., P. Strömblad and A. Bay (eds.), Diversity, Inclusion and Citizenship in Scandinavia, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle.
[67] Bergsli, A. (2020), Innvandring og integrering i arbeidslivet – en innføring, http://www.arbeidslivet.no/Arbeid1/Integrering/Integrering-i-arbeidslivet/ (accessed 31 May 2021). (accessed on 4 June 2021).
[14] Bratsberg, B., O. Raaum and K. Røed (2021), Integrating immigrants into the Nordic labour markets. The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, Nordregio, https://nordregio.org/new-report-covid-19-pandemic-affects-to-immigrants-integration-into-the-nordic-labour-markets/ (accessed on 30 November 2021).
[13] Bratsberg, B., O. Raaum and K. Røed (2018), “Job Loss and Immigrant Labour Market Performance”, Economica, Vol. 85/337, pp. 124-151, https://doi.org/10.1111/ECCA.12244.
[38] Bratsberg, B., O. Raaum and K. Røed (2017), Immigrant Labor Market Integration across Admission Classes, http://www.iza.org (accessed on 11 February 2021).
[45] Brochman G and Hagelund A (2012), “Comparison: A model with Three Exceptions?”, in Brochmann G and Hagelund A (eds.), Immigration Policy and the Scandinavian Welfare State 1945-2010, Palgrave Macmillan UK.
[64] Cools, S., H. Finseraas and M. Rasmussen (2020), “Organizing Immigrants: Organized Labor in the Age of Migration”, Review of Labour Economics and Industrial Relation.
[46] Djuve, A. (2011), Introduksjonsordningen for nyankomne innvandrere – Et integreringspolitiskt paradigmeskifte.
[49] Djuve, A. and H. Kavli (2019), “Refugee integration policy the Norwegian way-why good ideas fail and bad ideas prevail”, Transfer, Vol. 25/1, pp. 25-42, https://doi.org/10.1177/1024258918807135.
[31] Epland, J. and T. Morten Normann (2021), 115 000 barn i husholdninger med vedvarende lavinntekt - SSB, Statistiskt Sentralbyr[ - Barn i lavinntektshusholdninger, https://www.ssb.no/inntekt-og-forbruk/artikler-og-publikasjoner/115-000-barn-i-husholdninger-med-vedvarende-lavinntekt (accessed on 27 August 2021).
[22] Eurofound (2021), Right to combine unemployment benefit with training -, COVID-19 EU PolicyWatch, https://static.eurofound.europa.eu/covid19db/cases/NO-2020-17_949.html (accessed on 30 November 2021).
[37] Eurostat (2021), Asylum applicants by type of applicant, citizenship, age and sex - annual aggregated data (rounded), https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_asyappctza&lang=en (accessed on 17 September 2021).
[16] Expertgruppe (2020), Forslag til tiltak for å redusere Covid-19-smitte blant innvandrere, IMDi, https://www.imdi.no/globalassets/dokumenter/ekspertgruppe-rapport---forslag-til-tiltak-for-a-redusere-covid-19-smitte-blant-innvandrere.pdf (accessed on 4 June 2021).
[56] Forvaltningsdatabasen (n.d.), Integreringsavdelingen - Endringshistorie, NSD, https://www.nsd.no/polsys/data/forvaltning/enhet/9080/endringshistorie (accessed on 28 October 2021).
[36] Friberg, J. and L. Eldring (2013), Labour migrants from Central and Eastern Europe in the Nordic countries Patterns of migration, working conditions and recruitment practices, Nordic Council of Ministers 2013, http://norden.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:702572/FULLTEXT01.pdf (accessed on 6 September 2021).
[39] Gulbrandsen, F. et al. (2021), Innvandrere og norskfødte med innvandrerforeldres fordeling på kommunenivå, SSB, http://www.ssb.no/befolkning/artikler-og-publikasjoner/_attachment/446654?_ts=178440e5408 (accessed on 10 December 2021).
[48] Gustafsson Grønningsaeter, A. and J. Brekke (2017), “Family reunification regulation in Norway-A summary”, https://emn.ie/. (accessed on 15 September 2021).
[50] Hagelund, A. (2020), “After the refugee crisis: public discourse and policy change in Denmark, Norway and Sweden”, Comparative Migration Studies, Vol. 8/1, https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-019-0169-8.
[63] Hagen, I. and R. Jensen (2016), “Kan du representere meg? Rekruttering av tillitsvalgte blant innvandrere i Norge”, Søkelys på arbeidslivet, Vol. 32/03, https://doi.org/10.18261/issn.1504-7989-2016-03-02.
[60] Hernes, V. et al. (2019), Nordic Integration and Settlement Policies for Refugees: A Comparative Analysis of Labour Market Integration Outcomes, TemaNord, Nordic Council of Ministers, Copenhagen K, https://doi.org/10.6027/TN2019-529.
[52] Hernes, V., A. Staver and M. Tønnessen (2020), Indikatorer for ny integreringslov, NIBR-rapport 2020:19, NIBR, Oslo.
[69] IMDi (2021), Tilskudd til integreringsarbeid i regi av frivillige organisasjoner | IMDi, https://www.imdi.no/tilskudd/tilskudd-til-integreringsarbeid-i-regi-av-frivillige-organisasjoner/ (accessed on 20 September 2021).
[17] Indseth, T. et al. (2020), Covid-19 etter fødeland: Personer testet, bekreftet smittet og relaterte innleggelser og dødsfall, Norwegian Institute of Public Health.
[73] Indseth, T. et al. (2021), Covid-19 blant personer født utenfor Norge, justert for yrke, trangboddhet, medisinsk risikogruppe, utdanning og inntekt rt for yrke, Folkehelseinstituttet.
[70] Karlsdóttir, A. et al. (2016), “Learning to live in a new country – everyday social integration – Civil society and integration – Nordic rural perspective”, Nordic Council of Ministers.
[65] Kjellberg, A. (2021), “Den svenska modellen 2020: pandemi och nytt huvudavtal”, Arena Idé.
[44] Kommunal- og arbeidsdepartementet (1997), “Om innvandirng og det flerkulturelle Norge (White paper 1997, On immigration policy and multicultural Norway)”, Kommunal-og arbeidsdepartementet, Oslo.
[53] Kommunal- og moderniseringsdepartementet (2018), Oppgaver til nye regioner (Meld. St. 6 (2018–2019).
[42] Kulbrandstad Iversen, L. (2017), “Integration and language education in Norwegian immigration policy documents 1980–2016”, Apples –Journal of Applied Language Studies, Vol. 11/3, pp. 101-120.
[20] Kunnskapsdepartementet (2021), 40 millioner til innvandrerinfo, Press release.
[55] Kunnskapsdepartementet (2021), Fullføringsreformen – med åpne dører til verden og fremtiden (Meld. St. 21 (2020–2021))..
[71] Kunnskapsdepartementet (2021), Hverdagsintegrering – strategi for å styrke sivilsamfunnets rolle på integreringsfeltet 2021-2024.
[19] Kunnskapsdepartementet (2020), 456 millioner til flyktninger og nyankomne innvandrere, Press Release.
[54] Kunnskapsdepartementet (2020), Kompetansereformen – Lære hele livet (Meld. St. 14 (2019–2020)).
[21] Kunnskapsdepartementet (2020), “LOV-2020-12-18-154 Midlertidig lov om tilpasninger i integreringsloven for å avhjelpe konsekvenser av utbrudd av covid-19”.
[18] Kunnskapsdepartementet (2020), Prop. 78 L (2020–2021). Endringer i midlertidig lov om tilpasninger i introduksjonsloven for å avhjelpe konsekvenser av utbrudd av covid-19 (integreringspakke II).
[57] Kunnskapsdepartementet (2020), Proposisjon til Stortinget (forslag til stortingsvedtak) (Prop. 1 S (2020 –2021)).
[51] Liebig, T. (2009), “Jobs for Immigrants: Labour Market Integration in Norway”, OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers, No. 94, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/221336486778.
[58] NAV (2021), What is Nav?, NAV, http://www.nav.no/en/home/about-nav/what-is-nav (accessed on 4 June 2021).
[62] Nergaard, K., E. Barth and H. Dale-Olsen (2015), Lavere organisasjonsgrad, et spørsmål om nykommere?”.
[59] Norwegian Ministries (2020), “Immigration and Integration 2018-2019, Report for Norway to the OECD”, http://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/6a652e6b53594e42ba9aeedacc73a68f/immigration-and-integration-2018-2019-report-for-norway.pdf (accessed on 4 June 2021).
[29] OECD (2021), Income inequality (Indicator), https://data.oecd.org/inequality/income-inequality.htm#indicator-chart (accessed on 26 August 2021).
[2] OECD (2021), Employment rate (indicator), OECD Data, https://data.oecd.org/emp/employment-rate.htm (accessed on 26 August 2021).
[74] OECD (2021), GDP per capita and productivity levels, OECD Productivity Statistics (database), https://stats.oecd.org/BrandedView.aspx?oecd_bv_id=pdtvy-data-en&doi=data-00686-en# (accessed on 26 August 2021).
[4] OECD (2021), Gender Equality - Key chart on Employment, OECD, https://www.oecd.org/gender/data/employment/ (accessed on 26 August 2021).
[1] OECD (2021), Gross domestic product (GDP) (indicator), https://doi.org/10.1787/dc2f7aec-en.
[34] OECD (2021), International Migration Outlook 2021, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/29f23e9d-en.
[8] OECD (2021), Social spending (indicator), OECD Data, https://doi.org/10.1787/7497563b-en (accessed on 26 August 2021).
[72] OECD (2020), “How best to communicate on migration and integration in the context of COVID 19”, OECD Policy Responses to Coronavirus (COVID-19), OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/813bddfb-en.
[28] OECD (2020), How’s Life? 2020: Measuring Well-being, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9870c393-en.
[33] OECD (2020), International Migration Outlook 2020, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/ec98f531-en.
[3] OECD (2019), OECD Economic Surveys, https://doi.org/10.1787/888934071346.
[9] OECD (2019), OECD Economic Surveys: Norway 2019, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/c217a266-en.
[10] OECD (2019), Society at a Glance 2019: OECD Social Indicators, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/soc_glance-2019-en.
[30] OECD (2018), A Broken Social Elevator? How to Promote Social Mobility, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264301085-en.
[6] OECD (2017), Gender Equality - How do partners in couple families share paid work?, https://www.oecd.org/gender/data/how-do-partners-in-couple-families-share-paid-work.htm (accessed on 26 August 2021).
[5] OECD (2017), The Pursuit of Gender Equality: An Uphill Battle, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264281318-en.
[26] OECD (2014), OECD Skills Strategy Diagnostic Report - Norway 2014, OECD, Paris, https://www.oecd.org/skills/nationalskillsstrategies/Diagnostic-report-Norway.pdf (accessed on 30 August 2021).
[68] OECD (forthcoming), Making Integration Work: Introduction Measures for New Arrivals.
[7] OECD and Nordic Council of Ministers (2018), “Is the Last Mile the longest - Economic Gains from Gender Equality”, http://oe.cd/last-mile-gender-nordic (accessed on 26 August 2021).
[27] OECD/European Union (2018), Settling In 2018: Indicators of Immigrant Integration, OECD Publishing, Paris/European Union, Brussels, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264307216-en.
[15] Olsen, B. (2021), Immigrants most affected by the corona measures - SSB, https://www.ssb.no/arbeid-og-lonn/artikler-og-publikasjoner/innvandrere-mest-rammet-av-koronatiltakene (accessed on 17 August 2021).
[40] SSB (2018), Befolkningsframskrivingene 2018 - SSB, https://www.ssb.no/befolkning/artikler-og-publikasjoner/befolkningsframskrivingene-2018 (accessed on 11 October 2021).
[35] Statistics Norway (2021), 05184: Immigrants, by sex and country background 1970 - 2021. Statbank Norway, https://www.ssb.no/en/statbank/table/05184/ (accessed on 31 August 2021).
[32] Statistics Norway (2021), 09817: Immigrants and Norwegian-born to immigrant parents, by immigration category, contents and year. Statbank Norway, https://www.ssb.no/en/statbank/table/09817/tableViewLayout1/ (accessed on 31 August 2021).
[41] Statistics Norway (2021), 13055: Immigrants and Norwegian-born to immigrant parents, by sex, age and country background (world region) 1970 - 2021. Statbank Norway, https://www.ssb.no/en/statbank/table/13055/ (accessed on 31 August 2021).
[12] Statistics Norway (2021), Registered unemployed among immigrants (discontinued in Statistics Norway) - SSB, https://www.ssb.no/en/innvarbl (accessed on 17 August 2021).
[24] Statistics Norway (2021), Tables shared with the OECD on immigrants and their labour market outcomes 2008 to 2020.
[11] Statistics Norway (2020), Ledigheten blant innvandrere på nærmere 18 prosent i mars, http://www.ssb.no/arbeid-og-lonn/artikler-og-publikasjoner/ledigheten-blant-innvandrere-pa-naermere-18-prosent-i-mars.
[23] Støren, K., E. Rønning and K. Gram (2020), Livskvalitet i Norge 2020.
[61] Vrålstad, S. and K. Stabell Wiggen (2017), “Levekår blant innvandrere i Norge 2016”, 03, Statistisk centralbyrå, Oslo.
[25] Walbækken, M. et al. (2019), Automation/Robotisation-Demography-Immigration Possibilities for low-skilled immigrants in the Norwegian labour market of tomorrow, Economics Norway Report no. 7-2019.
Note
← 1. Immigrants in Norway have also been over-represented among COVID‑19 cases. Relative to their share in the population, almost five times as many immigrants recorded an infection as Norwegians with native‑born parents. This held even after controlling for socio‑economic conditions such as education, income, housing conditions, and occupation. Weaker Norwegian language and social segregation may have contributed to increasing the vulnerability of some immigrant groups but not others. Many immigrants are employed in jobs where physical distancing is difficult (Indseth et al., 2021[73]).