Despite over two decades of robust economic growth, Kazakhstan’s export basket remains dominated by a limited number of commodities and trade partners. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has reinvigorated the need for Kazakhstan and the region to diversify trade, transit, and transport partners to enhance economic resilience. This chapter provides a brief overview of Kazakhstan’s export profile, and discusses how the war in Ukraine, by creating the urge to develop alternative trade routes, has further complicated the country’s diversification efforts. The chapter concludes by outlining three policy challenges for Kazakhstan to address if it is to diversify its trade profile and routes, which are discussed at length in the following chapters of this report: export promotion policies for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (Chapter 2), a one-stop shop for exporting SMEs (Chapter 3), and improved cross-border co-operation on the Caspian Sea (Chapter 4).
Diversifying Kazakhstan’s Exports
Abstract
After a severe recession in the 1990s, Kazakhstan has enjoyed a period of sustained economic growth supported by an ambitious reform agenda. Reforms targeted increased contribution of the private sector to economic development, diversification of employment, output and exports, and integration in regional and international value chains. However, growth remains highly dependent on primary commodity exports, particularly hydrocarbons and metals. Moreover, the country’s trend rate of growth has been gradually declining over the past two decades, which might be indicative of the fact that the boom in the commodity sector has not been matched by productivity growth in non-resource sectors (OECD, 2018[1]; ADBI, 2019[2]).
Source: (World Bank, 2024[3]).
Note: Data for 2023 is provisional and comes from (World Bank, 2024[4]). Estimate for 2024 is a projection from the same.
External trade is a major driver of growth and domestic output in Kazakhstan. Between independence in 1991 and 2022, trade on average represented 79.3% of the country’s GDP, and export of goods and services amounted on average to 42.6% of GDP (Figure 1.2). In 2022, these figures stood at 68% and 41.8% respectively, against an OECD average of 64% and 30.8% (World Bank, 2024[5]). Export revenues, especially from hydrocarbons and other minerals, are a central source of income for Kazakhstan, but have left the country’s growth rate largely dependent on global oil and gas prices (OECD, 2023[6]).
Export revenue (bn USD) and exports from non-resource sectors (% of total exports)
Kazakhstan’s export markets are relatively diversified in geographic terms, while, by contrast, the country’s import profile is geographically very concentrated (Figure 1.3). The country’s top five export destinations (China, Italy, Russia, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands) accounted for 48.8% of exports in 2022 and the top ten for 69.3%. Russia remains an important export destination, though it accounted for just 8.9% of exports in 2022, down from just under 20% at the turn of the century. On the import side, in 2022, Russia and China together accounted for 56.4% of Kazakhstan’s total imports: China provided 27.9% of imports and Russia 28.5%, while the country’s third-largest source of imports, Germany, provided only 5.0% in 2022, far behind the two leaders (Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2024[7]).
Note: The Observatory for Economic Complexity’s definition for Europe is used and excludes Russia. Central Asia includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
Source: OECD calculations (2024) based on OEC data (Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2024[7]).
Kazakhstan’s reforms have not yet resulted in a notable diversification of its export basket, which remains dominated by primary commodities. Between 2000 and 2022, Kazakhstan became Central Asia’s most diversified exporter in terms of the number of different export products (Figure 1.5), and the geographic diversification of its markets is comparable to that of some OECD countries. However, the country’s exports have remained highly concentrated around hydrocarbon products, especially mineral fuels, in volume terms (Figure 1.2). Among regional peers, only Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan have more concentrated export baskets than Kazakhstan, which also largely exceeds the concentration of comparable resource-rich OECD countries such as Australia and Canada (Figure 1.4 and Figure 1.5). In 2023, hydrocarbon products still accounted for over 53% of all exports and generated 15% of GDP (IMF, 2024[8]). Data from the Bureau of National Statistics suggest that the primary sector as a whole (hydrocarbons, metals and agricultural products) generated over 85% of total exports in 2023. This continuing reliance on exports of primary commodities reflects low levels of competitiveness in processing sectors and connectivity barriers that firms continue to face in international trade (OECD, 2023[9]).
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, from 0 to 1
Note: The HHI is an index, traditionally used to assess the concentration of markets for competition regulators, with a value of 0.15 corresponding to low concentration, 0.15-0.25 a moderate concentration, and above 0.25 a high concentration. When measuring export diversification, a concentration of 0.10 still indicates a high concentration. The HHI being a non-linear indicator, a 0.1 change does not represent the same gap at different levels of concentration.
Source: OECD calculations (2024) based on OEC data (Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2024[10]).
Kazakhstan also shows an interesting case of relative de-concentration (rather than diversification) of exports. If between 2010 and 2019 the concentration of hydrocarbon products in its exports increased, the latter shifted towards an increased share of metals between 2019 and 2022, accounting for a lower concentration of the country’s export basket (Figure 1.2 and Figure 1.5). Nonetheless, if metals are included, the average share of primary commodities between 2010 and 2023 constitutes on average 87% of exports (Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2022[11]). (Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2024[7]).
HHI, normalised; number of exported products
Note: The concentration of exports is measured with a normalised Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) on exported products classified according to the HS 4-digit system. Diversity is measured as the number of exported products according to the HS 4-digit system. The circle marker represents 2010 data, while the square marker is used for 2022 data.
Source: OECD calculations (2024) based on OEC data (Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2024[10]).
Commodity reliance both reflects and intensifies the underdevelopment of the private sector, especially small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (OECD, 2021[12]). Larger firms usually predominate in mining and manufacturing due to capital intensity, high barriers to entry and exit, and economies of scale (OECD, 2017[13]; OECD, 2019[14]; OECD, 2022[15]). On the other hand, SMEs are more involved in services (as of January 2024, 74% of registered SMEs worked in services sector) with retail commerce, transportation and real estate being the most prominent types of activities (QazStat, 2024[16]). However, due to a lack of data, the share of SMEs, compared to other types of enterprises, in the services sector is not available. In the export sector, they mainly act as intermediaries in commodity trade. Between 2020 and 2022, SMEs accounted for around 25% of export revenues, somewhat above the 20% level recorded in 2016 but still well below their shares of GDP (36.5% in 2022) and employment (45.8% in 2022), and their exports were mainly concentrated in the oil and grain sectors (ADBI, 2019[2]; OECD, 2024[17]). Productivity and connectivity barriers therefore keep SMEs’ contribution to exports marginal, and below that of neighbouring countries, such as Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, where the SME share of exports averaged 36.7% and 25.8%, respectively, over 2015-2019 (State Committee on Statistics, 2021[18]; National Statistical Committee, 2021[19]; OECD, 2023[6]).
The nature of the country’s export basket and its geography translate into a low level of integration into global value chains (GVC). Kazakhstan’s reliance on commodity exports and higher relative trade costs is reflected in the country’s declining participation in GVCs over the last decade. While the country is substantially forward integrated into other countries’ exports as a supplier of primary and intermediate inputs, especially raw materials (hydrocarbons and metals), the country’s backward integration into GVCs is weak: between 2008 and 2020, the share of foreign value added in Kazakhstan’s exports has decreased from 18.3% to 14.6%, well below the OECD average of 26.7%. When GVC participation is measured through the domestic value added driven by foreign final demand, Kazakhstan’s participation is at 25.4% in 2020, below the OECD average of 29.8% (OECD, 2023[20]). In addition, Kazakhstan’s relative remoteness from major markets and trade routes (distance penalty) and its persisting connectivity challenges further reduce the global competitiveness of its non-extractive sectors and is likely one reason for the very small share of more sophisticated capital goods, such as machinery, in the country’s exports (around 3% in 2022) (Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2022[11]; OECD, 2023[6]; OECD, 2023[9]).
Kazakhstan’s trade performance has proven surprisingly resilient despite sanctions on Russia, though significant downside risks remain
Close ties with Russia leave Central Asia vulnerable to political and supply risks, especially secondary sanctions, despite government assurances to comply with Western sanctions. Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries have emerged in 2023 in better shape than initially anticipated following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine (OECD, 2023[6]). However, they remain exposed to trade, freight transit and investment risks due to close political and economic integration with Russia (ITF-OECD, 2019[23]; OECD, 2022[24]). The evidence suggests that, faced with sanctions, Russian enterprises have sought to overcome import barriers, including for technological goods, by diverting flows to Russia through Central Asia and the South Caucasus (World Bank, 2023[25]; EBRD, 2023[26]; German Council on Foreign Relations, 2023[27]).
As Russian firms move away from established supply lines, Central Asian economies are increasing trade with Russia by exporting their products and providing transportation and re-exporting services (EBRD, 2023[28]) (EBRD, 2023[29]). For instance, in the first five months of 2023, Kazakhstan’s exports to Russia showed a 45.1% year-on-year increase. Over this same period, Kazakhstan’s imports from the European Union (EU) and United Kingdom (UK) increased by 82.8%, and imports from non-EU/non-EAEU countries by 72.6%, especially for sanctioned or dual-use goods, suggesting a substantial uptick in re-exports (Bureau of National Statistics, 2023[30]). However, in parallel, Kazakhstan has introduced a ban on exports of more than 100 dual-use items in October 2023 to ensure conformity with the international sanction regime (KazTag, 2023[31]).
Russia has remained an important trade partner for Kazakhstan. Though sanctions are raising the cost of trade for the region, Russia remains an important transit country for Kazakhstan and its Central Asian neighbours, with over 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports transiting through Russia in 2022, despite efforts to find alternative routes (Reuters, 2023[32]). Moreover, Kazakhstan’s bilateral trade with Russia benefits from the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), a common customs area with unified technical standards and standardised gauge width for rail traffic, while Russia’s war in Ukraine has exacerbated Central Asia’s distance from global value chains and major trade routes.
Regional connectivity discussions have gained renewed political momentum in Kazakhstan and across Central Asia
Sanctions against Russia have reinvigorated discussion of potential alternative land routes between China and the EU, transiting through Central Asia. Until February 2022, most overland freight transport from China to Europe passed through what is known as the Northern Corridor, transiting predominantly through Russia and Belarus, with rail offshoots running through Kazakhstan and Mongolia (Figure 1.7). Until the war, this route was the most well-established and frequently used trade, transit, and logistics infrastructure linking Asia and Europe, also benefitting to Kazakhstan with more than 80% of Eurasian rail freight transiting through its territory (ITF-OECD, 2019[23]).
Kazakhstan also benefitted from a renewed interest, due to its key location on an alternative trade route: the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), also known as the Middle Corridor. This multimodal route connects Asia to Europe by traversing Kazakhstan and crossing the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan, Georgia and onwards to Europe through the Black Sea and Türkiye. Given sufficient investment and smoother procedures to reduce transport costs, the route could become an attractive complementary trade route linking Kazakhstan to Europe, one of its main trading partners, and also boosting regional trade. However, the route’s current transport and logistical capacity is limited due to insufficient infrastructure, a weaker operational and trade facilitation environment, and inadequate regional, national, and supra-national stakeholder co-ordination (OECD, 2023[9]).
Source: (OECD, 2023[9]).
The TITR offers Kazakhstan an opportunity to leverage its strategic regional position. Bordering China and Russia, Kazakhstan is located at the crossroad of major trade routes, such as the Northern Corridor and the North-South corridor to Iran, and it represents an entry point to the Central Asia - Caucasus regional market. If so far more than 80% of Eurasian rail freight transits through Kazakhstan, developing the TITR could further develop freight through Kazakhstan’s access to the Caspian Sea (ITF-OECD, 2019[23]; OECD, 2023[9]).. In 2022 alone, Kazakhstan’s Caspian Sea cargo transportation volumes increased 6.5-fold compared to 2021 to 891 thousand tons, while overall container shipments along the TITR increased by 33% reaching 33.6 thousand TEUs in 2022 (Port Aktau, 2023[33]; Adilet, 2022[34]; Port Aktau, 2023[35]). During the first seven months of 2022, Kazakh exports through the Caspian also increased 9-fold year-on-year, although businesses reported operational difficulties and congestion in ports (Astana Times, 2022[36]; OECD, 2023[9]).
Participation in the TITR is expected to produce positive spill-over effects on Kazakhstan’s economy. Improved logistics services could reduce Kazakhstan’s overall transit dependence on Russia and boost its trade capacity, with an expected increase by 70 million tonnes (mt) of its exports by 2030 compared to 2021 (World Bank, 2023[37]). In turn, a better capacity to export will bring new opportunities to promote industries producing more sophisticated processed goods and contribute to the diversification of the country’s trade basket (OECD, 2023[6]). If Kazakhstan’s distance penalty to major markets, such as Europe, cannot be fully eliminated, participation in the TITR can nonetheless improve regional transport connectivity, reduce trade costs, and increase trade volumes.
However, if the TITR can bring a substantive increase in regional trade, at the international level, it will remain an alternative trade route. The TITR’s geography requires more multi-modal switches between road, rail, and maritime transport, as well as more border crossings, than the Northern Corridor. Even if the route could in the long run be shortened, it suffers from a lack of attractiveness for the private sector. In addition, with its current capacity, the TITR can only absorb around 5% of the 100 million tonnes that were carried through the Northern Route (ITF, 2022[38]), and this share is not expected to grow beyond 11% by 2030 (World Bank, 2023[37]). However, at the regional level, the development of the route could better integrate economies of Central Asia and the Caucasus, and contribute to the further development of local growth poles (OECD, 2023[9]). In particular, if the development of the route leads to an improved integration of the region’s economies into GVCs.
Realising the potential of the TITR as a regional trade route will require substantial investment in transport infrastructure and better “soft” trade facilitation arrangements. If transit through the Caspian littoral countries has more than doubled since February 2022, the lack of adequate road, rail, and maritime infrastructure as well as trade facilitation agreements along the route has led to severe port and border point congestion (The Jamestown Foundation, 2023[39]). Developing the TITR as a viable route will require national and regional reforms in relation to regional integration, infrastructure, trade facilitation, and supranational co-ordination (OECD, 2023[9]).
Kazakhstan has developed an institutional and policy framework for export promotion, but dedicated export promotion support for SMEs remains modest
Over recent years, Kazakhstan has developed an array of institutions responsible for formulating and implementing trade and export promotion strategies, and it has begun providing firms with the capacity-building and financial support measures needed to export. Under the supervision of the Ministry of Trade and Integration (MTI), QazTrade is the main implementing body, along with private-sector representatives such as the Chamber of International Commerce (CIC) which is part of the National Chamber of Entrepreneurs of Kazakhstan (Atameken). However, the support on offer lacks a dedicated SME-focus, while the absence of complex monitoring and evaluation processes prevents a more effective allocation of government resources. Finally, sparse trade representation channels abroad, as well as of a clear branding of Kazakh products, further reduces the reach of the country’s exports.
Developing dedicated SME export promotion policies and SME-specific advisory and financial support services, as well as expanding Kazakhstan’s branding and trade representation network abroad would better support SME exports. Addressing the lack of an integrated SME component in Kazakhstan’s export promotion strategy design, implementation, and evaluation would help promote export diversification and SME development. This would require the government to: (i) clarify and expand the institutional export promotion framework for SMEs; (ii) expand capacity-building and financial instruments for exporting SMEs; and (iii) expand the export promotion network abroad and provide a clear branding strategy in target markets in co-operation with the private sector.
Kazakhstan has developed several online portals to enhance export promotion reach and effectiveness for SMEs, but access to information remains scattered
Kazakhstan has developed several online trade and export support portals, such as the Single Window for Export-Import Operations, the Kazakhstan Trade Portal, the Trade Facilitation Information Portal, as well as the ASTANA-1 customs border portal and the Keden online customs clearance system, providing firms with e-permits, information, references, and documents related to exports (Atameken, 2019[40]). However, this has resulted in an overlap of tools and a dilution of available support to exporting firms, especially SMEs. Access to information remains scattered and difficult for many SMEs within the institutional internationalisation ecosystem.
Further enhancing the effectiveness and reach of Kazakhstan’s online trade and export support tools requires developing a unified cross-government approach and enhancing public-private co-operation to address informational barriers and encourage regional exports. Unifying the export promotion support ecosystem around a single supervising authority, which could then develop incrementally a one-stop shop (OSS), would allow the government to enhance the reach of existing support tools. The gradual implementation of a national online OSS, supplemented by regional physical points of contact, would contribute to the effectiveness of Kazakhstan’s internationalisation ecosystem. Doing so would require the government to: (i) develop a unified cross-government approach to online trade and export promotion tools; and (ii) integrate relevant public and private stakeholders at regional and national levels into OSS design and implementation.
Deeper regional integration will help Kazakhstan and its neighbours exploit the economic opportunities offered by new economic corridors
Kazakhstan has developed trade and transit policies to capitalise on the country’s advantageous position in major transregional trade routes. It has developed cross-border co-operation hubs (CBC) with its most immediate neighbours. The “Caspian Knot” hub, covering Kazakhstan’s two Caspian Sea ports and including a special economic zone (SEZ), has received particular attention in the context of the development of the TITR. However, the Caspian Knot has not yet reached its full potential due to gaps in infrastructure and trade facilitation arrangements, limited private-sector involvement, and the lack of arrangements for monitoring and evaluation.
Improved regional co-ordination, private-sector involvement in infrastructure development, and evaluation mechanisms are needed to develop the potential of Kazakhstan’s Caspian Sea ports. Diversifying trade and transit across new corridors will require sufficient private and public-sector involvement for Kazakhstan to develop its domestic trade and transit infrastructure and intensify regional integration. The CBC hubs, and in particular Kazakhstan’s Caspian ports of Aktau and Kuryk, are an integral part of this ambition. Further developing their potential will require developing (i) co-operation mechanisms on the domestic and transnational levels to develop Caspian port infrastructure and improve trade facilitation; (ii) an institutional framework and practices to increase private sector participation in the development of the Caspian Knot; and (iii) a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation system for CBC hubs and SEZs and integrate their outcomes into the policy cycle.
This report aims to support Kazakhstan’s efforts to diversify its trade profile and routes, with a focus on SME internationalisation and regional integration
At the request of the government, this report focuses on practical aspects of export diversification. Based on recent OECD work and interviews with public and private stakeholders (see Methodology), the report analyses Kazakhstan’s efforts to develop export promotion policies for SMEs (Chapter 2), to create a one-stop shop for exporting SMEs (Chapter 3), and to improve the cross-border co-operation hub on the Caspian Sea (Chapter 4). Chapters 2 to 4 of this report analyse the current institutional and policy arrangements, outline key challenges, and provide targeted policy recommendations (Table 1.1).
Source: OECD Analysis (2024).
Findings from this report are drawn from data collected between November 2022 and June 2023 (see Methodology). This report summarises the OECD assessment of both the legal and institutional framework and the practical aspects of export diversification in Kazakhstan as of 2023. A number of changes to the legal, institutional, and practical framework for export promotion have been made since then. These have been closely followed, but they are not assessed here, because their practical effects are expected to take time to materialise. For instance:
The Ministry of Industry and Infrastructure Development (MIID) was split into the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Industry and Construction in September 2023. It remains unclear how the export promotion mandate of the former ministry has been reallocated (Chapter 2). The report therefore continues to refer generically to the MIID (“then-MIID”);
The MTI has recently appointed sales and trade representatives in priority foreign target markets, but it is too early to assess their track record in helping promote Kazakhstan’s products abroad and connect the country’s exporters to clients in foreign markets (Chapter 2).
While the new law on export credit agencies (Chapter 2Box 2.5) entered into force in March 2024, the new prerogatives it grants to KazakhExport have not yet been fully implemented, and the effect on firms will only be felt at a later stage.
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