Exploring Norway's Fertility, Work, and Family Policy Trends

5. How perceptions, norms, and attitudes can affect family formation in Norway

Jonas Fluchtmann

Maja Gustafsson

Abstract

Since there is little evidence that family policy or observed economic outcomes offer clear explanations for the decline in birth rates in the 2010s, researchers have started to consider other factors that may have played a role. There is some evidence that perceptions about the current economic situation in households and in the world can have some impact on fertility choices. Equally, norms and attitudes have shifted from being pro-family to being more in favour of fulfilling personal potential on a wider scale and this can have had a role in dampening young adults’ desire to have children. The exact role of subjective factors such as perceptions, norms, and attitudes is notoriously hard to measure quantitatively. Nevertheless, recent country-specific and comparative studies have started mapping how subjective factors may have played a role in the fall in births in many OECD countries since the financial crisis. This chapter discusses the role that perceptions, norms, and attitudes may play in family formation and outlines some of the recent findings in this research.

5.1. Introduction and main findings

The falls in fertility rates across many OECD countries – including Norway – since the early 2010s have put yet again into question the prevailing demographic theory that strong economic indicators support high fertility rates. Falls in fertility cannot be clearly linked with key changes in family policy (Chapter 3), nor with increased labour market insecurity (Chapter 4).

Research has therefore started to look further afield for reasons behind the decline in fertility. Attempts to explain the fall in birth rates have taken different approaches, drawing on policy-oriented, economic and cultural explanations but no single theory to explain this trend has yet emerged (Dommermuth and Lappegård, 2017[1]; Dommermuth and Lappegård, 2016[2]; Duvander, Lappegard and Johansson, 2020[3]; Hellstrand et al., 2021[4]; Guetto, Bazzani and Vignoli, 2020[5]; Buh, 2021[6]; Comolli et al., 2020[7]). Investigations into whether compositional changes in the population of women, including changes in the shares of women in good health and with a migrant background have not been able to explain falls in fertility either (Box 5.1).

Box 5.1. Compositional changes cannot explain falls in fertility

Compositional changes in the group of women who are able to have children do not explain the falls in fertility since the early 2010s. Neither changes in health nor migration seem to have driven any significant portion of the decline (Hart and Kravdal, 2020[8]). There is little difference in fertility between those in good and bad health, as measured using indicators based on sickness absence and long-term dependency (Hart and Kravdal, 2020[8]). Both women who have been on sick leave or received long-term benefits and those who are not, have experienced a decline in births since 2009. However, the decline in fertility after 2009 has been strongest for women who have not been on sick leave or received long-term benefits, i.e. those who can be assumed to be the healthiest (Syse, Dommermuth and Hart, 2020[9]). With regards to immigration to Norway, numbers have been stable during the 2000s so changes in migration flows will have had no more than a minor impact (Statistisk sentralbyrå, 2022[10]). While the long-term trend is that fertility has fallen among migrants, the trend is neither recent or large enough to have much explanatory power in the fertility decline since 2010. The fertility rate of migrants coming to Norway has fallen slightly or remained stable compared to what it was a decade ago and the reason behind this seems to lie in falling fertility rate in origin countries rather than any form of integration once settled in Norway (Tønnessen, 2022[11]).

An emerging body of demographic research has instead focused on changes in perceptions, norms and life goals. This strand of research puts the emphasis not on actual insecurities and events, but instead on perceived insecurities, agency and resilience. It is argued that perceptions of insecurities, imagined futures and shared narratives are just as – or even more – important as actual insecurities when it comes to people’s fertility intentions (Vignoli et al., 2021[12]; Vignoli et al., 2021[12]; Beckert, 2014[13]; Gatta et al., 2021[14]; Hofmann and Hohmeyer, 2013[15]; Hart and Kravdal, 2020[8]; Comolli et al., 2020[7]). This strand of research posits that the decision to have a(nother) child does not only hinge on the actual state of the economy or personal finances, but more on people’s perception of how things are going. Young couples judge their prospects by taking account of a wider range of insecurities compared to what previous generations did. With the rise of social media and a shift towards more interconnectivity, the effects of global events – such as financial crises, economic downturns, violent conflicts, and wars – have become ever closer and more accessible. Even as actual economic outcomes are strong in Norway, people can perceive that their situation is insecure.

In addition to economic perceptions, societal attitudes regarding the costs and benefits of family formation are changing. In accordance with the theory of the second demographic transition – which predicts sub-replacement fertility and increased diversity of family constellations (Zaidi and Morgan, 2017[16]) – younger adults seem to attach an increased value to concepts such as individualism and self-realisation – i.e. according to Maslow (1943[17]), the highest form of psychological development, where individual potential is fully realised (Gatta et al., 2021[14]; Hellstrand, Nisén and Myrskylä, 2022[18]). This puts into question previously established norms around the importance of careers, optimal family size, ideal timing of birth, and gender roles in couples. Recent shifts in attitudes concerning risk and family life might thus be just as important – or even more important – as the underlying changes in living standards and economic unpredictability.

The exact role of subjective factors such as perceptions, norms and attitudes are notoriously hard to measure quantitatively. This is especially true for cross-country quantitative analysis – such as the one undertaken in this report – since perceptions are enormously context-dependent. Nonetheless, some recent country specific and comparative studies have started mapping how subjective factors can have played a role in the fall in births in many OECD countries since the financial crisis. This chapter explains some of the recent trends seen in this research.

5.1.1. Main findings

The family policy environment and the state of the economy are not the sole predictors of the intentions for fertility decisions. The perceptions and norms of young couples regarding the importance of family formation, as well as expectations of economic security, are important.

The perceptions of the uncertainties people face seem to have worsened more than the actual level of uncertainties. Compared to before the financial crisis of 2008‑09, the perception of labour market insecurities has become more important in explaining fertility rates, even though such insecurities in themselves have not increased substantially. There is also evidence that in part this is related to the increased pace at which information is shared through (social) media, and the financial crisis being the first economic crisis that was reported live in detail and speed across the world.

Changes in norms around the value of family life have worked in tandem with other changes in attitudes. While young people in Norway see starting a family as a natural step, the matter of choosing good timing has gained importance over the long term, not least due to the increasing practice of intensive parenting for both partners. While women historically have had to consider life changes due to the responsibility that is placed on them through children, this is a newer phenomenon for men. It is perhaps unsurprising that young adults feel the need to take some time to navigate these new practices and norms before finding a balance between work, life, and partnerships that they are happy with.

It is hard to predict whether fertility will increase or decrease as couples find their footing in terms of life goal priorities and their roles in couples. Going forward, Norway can continuously evaluate developments in this area.

5.2. Growing evidence for a “subjective turn” in fertility decisions

Although actual economic circumstances are strong in Norway, this does not necessarily mean that individuals feel that they are. Perceived insecurity within families, volatility of macro‑indicators and the spread of international news can have a major impact on people’s intentions to have children. This “subjective turn” in couples’ decision-making around family formation is a relatively new area of research and more quantitative and qualitative investigations are required to map its potential impact.

5.2.1. Perception of own situation can be more important than actual outcomes

The perception, and anticipation, of insecurity at the level of the family or individual situation can be important in influencing fertility decisions (Vignoli et al., 2021[12]). Research from Finland shows that perceived uncertain life situations – including dimensions such as the perceived financial situation, own or spouse’s unfinished studies, housing size and perceived challenges to combine work and childcare – are the strongest factors behind a decision to postpone having a(nother) child (Savelieva, Jokela and Rotkirch, 2022[19]). The study also showed that women with higher levels of education were more likely to state factors directly related to life situations as reasons for postponement, compared with women with lower educational attainment. Another study took advantage of an unemployment benefit reform in Germany (“Hartz 4”) to construct a natural experiment. The reform was highly debated and meant that individuals faced higher demands to prove job search efforts and reduced income security in case of unemployment. In the study period, the share of women reporting economic worries increased considerably and Hofmann and Hohmeyer (2013[15]) found that among women who were very worried about their economic situation had relatively low fertility, while there was no significant difference in fertility between women who were somewhat worried and those who were not worried at all.

It is intuitive that the effects of labour market and other insecurities are not the same for everyone but can differ based on contextual factors such as country, region, socio‑economic background, gender, education level, risk tolerance and social support networks (Alderotti, Vignoli and Matysiak, 2019[20]). Gatta et al. (2021[14]) found that the perception of one’s ability to handle a future job loss or economic mishap is more powerful as a predictor of fertility than actual economic stability of that person. For instance, research covering 22 countries using European Social Survey data found that insecure work situations become more relevant for fertility decisions if coupled with low overall subjective well-being. When well-being is high, aspects of insecure job situations make little difference. The relevance of the combined insecure job situation and low subjective well-being was stronger for men than for women, and especially relevant for people over the age of 28 (Vignoli, Mencarini and Alderotti, 2020[21]).

There is evidence to suggest that men and women in Norway have changed the way they consider their own economic situation after the financial crisis 2008‑09. In fact, people seem to ascribe greater value to being in a stable job during the 2010s than before. Dommermuth and Lappegård (2017[1]) found that being in work has become more important to women since 2010. It has also become more important to have more work experience before having a first child, and this is especially so for women aged 26‑32 compared to younger women. This suggests that women value having a stronger foothold in the labour market more today than 10 years ago. Research from Finland supports these findings and also found stronger negative relationships between insecure jobs and negative fertility intentions after the financial crisis than before it (Vignoli, Mencarini and Alderotti, 2020[21]). Similarly, in a factor analysis of declared reasons for not having children from Finland, respondents were concerned with traditional factors of uncertainty, including weak financial positions, insufficent support from society, too small living spaces (Rotkirch, 2020[22]), despite strong observed outcomes in these areas.

5.2.2. A perception of macro-level insecurities prevails despite good performance

Historically, economic downturns tend to negatively affect births, and this trend can be observed, for instance, during the 1900s recessions in Norway and elsewhere (Comolli et al., 2020[7]). Recessions and economic instability tend to particularly affect first births among younger adults since they have the biological advantage to postpone childbearing until the economic and labour-market outlook has improved (Andersson, 2000[23]). In this sense, the timing of the fall in fertility rates – and the concentration among young women – suggests a link with the financial crisis in 2008‑09.

However, the low birth rates through the 2010s have been more persistent than any actual economic consequences of the crisis in Norway. The TFR fell substantially in Norway even though the Norwegian economy was relatively shielded from the crisis (a trend also seen in other countries not deeply affected by the 2008‑09 crisis), with only a shallow recession and a subsequent quick recovery (OECD, 2010[24]; Comolli et al., 2020[7]). Norway also performed well on macro-level indicators of economic health in the years immediately following the 2008‑09 financial crisis, including recovery in GDP, employment, and real wages (OECD, 2014[25]). Unemployment rose only a little compared to countries like Iceland and Finland during the crisis (Comolli et al., 2020[7]), and economic growth was spurred on by high and increasing oil prices between 2000 and 2014 (Nordbø and Stensland, 2015[26]).

There is a perception that insecurities are still present

The actual impact of the financial crisis on the Norwegian economy may have been comparatively light and short-lived, but the perception of macro-level volatility and unpredictability has prevailed throughout the 2010s. For instance, in 2018 when economic growth peaked (Figure 5.1. ), just 68% described the economic situation over the previous six months in Norway as “very good” or “good” (Ipsos, 2019[27]). Despite its strong performance in terms of labour markets and social security, respondents were most likely to name “unemployment” and “poverty and inequality” as the more concerning problems in Norway in 2018, with 33% of respondents reporting these categories (Ipsos, 2022[28]). These worries are reflected in the consumer confidence index by the industry organisation Finans Norge, which had a pre‑financial crisis peak in Q1 2007 and since then has been volatile and low, reaching a low point in Q1 of 2016 (Figure 5.2).

Figure 5.1. Norway’s GDP growth has fluctuated more than in other Nordic countries since 2009

Note: Nordic average excluding Norway refers to the simple average across Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Sweden.

Source: Aggregate National Accounts, SNA 2008 (or SNA 1993): Gross domestic product.

The observed oil price fluctuations could have contributed to a feeling of insecurity that did not completely reflect the strong economic outcomes that Norway exhibited. Even though the brent crude price fell steeply between 2012 and 2016 (almost halving in 2015 alone), and then again in 2018, economic growth – albeit more volatile than in the other Nordic countries – was overall strong and less volatile than might have been expected (Knudsen, 2016[29]) (Figure 5.1). Throughout the 2010s, Norway remained one of the richest countries in terms of GDP per capita across the OECD. As such, actual macroeconomic fallouts from the 2008‑09 crisis cannot explain the sudden and persistent fall in births that occurred from 2010 and onwards.

Figure 5.2. There has been a lack of confidence among Norwegian consumers during the 2010s

Notes: Axis line presents the average value over the period. The index is calculated as the difference between the percentage of optimistic and pessimistic responses for each of five questions about respondent confidence in the household economic situation and the country, and whether it is a good time to make major purchases for the household, subsequently divided by five. The index is seasonally adjusted and indexed to the local peak in Q1 1997. The x-axis is set at the average during the observed period.

Source: Consumer Confidence Index 2020, Finans Norge.

The value people placed on the broad economic situation grew over this time: while the employment rate in their community (municipality) barely had any impact on birth rates before 2010, it became a significant factor with a negative effect on birthrates after 2010 (Dommermuth and Lappegård, 2017[1]). Abrupt changes, including oil price and GDP volatility in the economic outlook (Figure 5.1) can contribute to negative and lasting impressions of instability. Few think that the situation is improving: close to a quarter of 30‑39 year‑olds (23%) reported thinking that the economic situation will be a little or a lot worse in Norway in a year’s time while just 46% thought the situation would be a little or a lot better (Ipsos, 2022[28]).

The observed oil price fluctuations could have contributed to a feeling of insecurity that did not completely reflect the strong economic outcomes that Norway exhibited. Even though the brent crude price fell steeply between 2012 and 2016 (almost halving in 2015 alone), and then again in 2018, economic growth – albeit more volatile than in the other Nordic countries – was overall strong and less volatile than might have been expected (Knudsen, 2016[29]) (Figure 5.1). Throughout the 2010s, Norway remained one of the richest countries in terms of GDP per capita across the OECD. As such, actual macroeconomic fallouts from the 2008‑09 crisis cannot explain the sudden and persistent fall in births that occurred from 2010 and onwards.

The value people placed on the broad economic situation grew over this time: while the employment rate in their community (municipality) barely had any impact on birth rates before 2010, it became a significant factor with a negative effect on birthrates after 2010 (Dommermuth and Lappegård, 2017[1]). Abrupt changes, including oil price and GDP volatility in the economic outlook (Figure 5.1) can contribute to negative and lasting impressions of instability. Few think that the situation is improving: close to a quarter of 30‑39 year‑olds (23%) reported thinking that the economic situation will be a little or a lot worse in Norway in a year’s time while just 46% thought the situation would be a little or a lot better (Ipsos, 2022[28]).

Importing a feeling of insecurity from abroad

Norway could have inadvertently imported some of the uncertain sentiments that abounded in Europe and elsewhere despite the relatively strong economy at home. Media news reporting filters, evaluates and simplifies complex information, and this is becoming a key factor in an increasingly globalised world. The perception of economic strength or weakness is strongly rooted in the public narratives conveyed through the media (Vignoli et al., 2020[30]; Vignoli et al., 2021[12]). Evidence from Sweden shows that different dimensions of perceived global uncertainties can matter as much as – or even more than – actual economic uncertainties for couples’ family formation intentions (Guetto, Bazzani and Vignoli, 2020[5]).

Trends of rapid globalisation and online reporting and the role of social media in news dissemination have sped up the way news and narratives are shared. Sensationalist reporting, aimed to capture the attention of an online audience, encourages the sharing of pessimistic and dramatic images of a stagnant, underperforming continent. Broad-based negative narratives during the 2010s go beyond the financial crisis and include xenophobic responses to the refugee crisis in 2015, Euroscepticism and the rise of populism, all of which contribute to spreading a feeling of uncertainty and unpredictability (Kreyenfeld, Andersson and Pailhé, 2012[31]; Joris, Puustinen and d’Haenens, 2018[32]; Comolli et al., 2020[7]; Vignoli et al., 2020[30]). A contributing factor of the role of media on perception could be the “echo chamber” effect of social media, where ones’ own beliefs and narratives are reconfirmed rather than challenged, even if they are factually wrong (Cinelli et al., 2021[33]). The negative impact of media reporting can be seen in the Reuters Institute Digital News Report. The proportion of respondents who say that they actively avoid the news has increased in recent years, and two of the most common reasons are that they bring down one’s mood and that they wear one out (Newman, 2022[34]).

5.3. Changing costs-and-benefits equation of having children

When young people value achieving life goals – such as self-realisation, travelling and studying – which in some ways compete with traditional life goals of settling down and starting a family, the psychosocial costs and benefits of having children can become more important in young people’s minds. This suggests that an evaluation of changes in perceptions, values and norms can be useful to better understand why fertility has fallen. While the quantitative analysis in this report cannot identify a clear role of attitudes and norms, this section outlines some of the emerging literature on this topic. More qualitative and quantitative analysis of the roles of attitudes and norms is needed to gain a deeper understanding of the roles these subjective factors can play in family formation decisions.

5.3.1. Family versus self-realisation

Most births are intentional (although unintentional births still happen) and more couples intend to have – and do have – fewer children. As such, the cost-benefit calculation of having children is different today than in the past. While this calculation is constantly evolving, there is a long tradition in demographic research of trying to understand which advantages and disadvantages men and women consider when they make decisions about family formation, and often these centre around financial costs and health aspects (Langdridge, Sheeran and Connolly, 2005[35]; Park, 2005[36]; Mynarska and Rytel, 2022[37]; Cools and Strøm, 2020[38]; Lebano and Jamieson, 2020[39]).

The social norm in Norway is to have children at some point in life (Archetti, 2020[40]), and family is at the top of many people’s mind when it comes to what brings well-being. Just over 12% of men and nearly 24% of women responding to a recent survey feel pressure from society in general to have a(nother) child (Cools and Strøm, 2020[38]). When asked what gives people meaning in life, the top choice in the 2021 Global Attitudes Survey was family and children, with 38% of respondents giving this response (Silver et al., 2021[41]). Many feel that raising children is a rewarding experience that benefits them throughout their lives. Indeed, when considering both parents and non-parents aged 25‑44, a large majority (88%) of in Norway say that an important or very important reason to them personally for having children (regardless of whether they currently are parents or not) is that a child brings lifelong happiness (not including respondents who choose the option “don’t know” or choose not to respond). These figures are broadly similar across gender and age groups (GGS, 2020[42]).

At the same time, it is becoming increasingly acceptable not to have children and researchers in Finland observe the rise of a new “childfree ideal” (Rotkirch, 2020[22]); research from the US also finds increasing numbers of young adults who do not want to have any children (Guzzo, 2022[43]). Reasons for delaying or choosing not to have children include not wanting to give up the current lifestyle (Alakärppä et al., 2022[44]; Rotkirch, 2020[22]). Life goals other than family and children have gained importance in recent years (Ellingsæter, 2017[45]; Hart and Kravdal, 2020[8]). This means that people tend to postpone or even renounce having children in order to pursue other life goals that they value, including career advancement and self-realisation activities (Savelieva, Jokela and Rotkirch, 2022[19]; Rotkirch, 2020[22]). As documented by Rotkirch (2020[22]), having children – rather than not having children – is described as a “sacrifice” by many young people today.

The decision whether or not to have a(nother) child is also linked to concerns about negative mental and physical health outcomes. While not detracting from the rewarding experience that many people derive from having children, it is important to recognise that having children can come with additional pressures in terms of mental and physical health. Experienced and perceived health-related issues with giving birth or caring for children can be important too (Hayford et al., 2016[46]). For instance, Figure 5.3 shows that the physical difficulties of pregnancy and giving birth is one of the reasons most often referred to as an important reason to not have a(nother) child.

Figure 5.3. Daunting responsibility is most commonly reported as an important reason to not have (more) children

Note: GGS data were obtained from the Generations and Gender Programme Data Archive and collected through the Survey on Family and Work by Statistics Norway, with contributions from Lars Dommermuth and Trude Lappegård. More information about model survey instruments can be found at: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (2005). Generations & Gender Programme: Survey Instruments. New York and Geneva: United Nations. Data do not include respondents choosing the options “Don’t know” or choose not to answer. Respondents include parents and non-parents.

Source: GGS 2020 Generations and Gender Survey2020 Norway Wave 1.

There are some differences between how men and women approach the idea of having children. Research from Germany finds that women exhibit some of the stronger feelings of disadvantage around having children and retain a sort of “veto” power against having a child. By comparison, they observe stronger feelings of advantage around having children for men (Stein, Willen and Pavetic, 2014[47]). Fears and worries around parenthood have also been shown to be stronger for women than men – perhaps in part because they typically bear a greater responsibility for children in a family, and in part due to non-financial costs that mainly impact women (Mynarska and Rytel, 2022[37]).

Health issues around pregnancy, delivery and childcare are also disproportionately likely to affect women. In Norway, it has been shown that important burdens associated with having children include sleep deprivation, pregnancy and delivery, and worries about the potentially adverse consequences for older siblings have also been listed as reasons for not having another child (Cools and Strøm, 2020[38]). One study reviewing 36 international studies finds that as many as 25% of mothers giving birth to a healthy baby at-term are expected to suffer from childbirth PTSD at a clinical level due to a very stressful birth experience (Dekel, Stuebe and Dishy, 2017[48]). Mental health also tends to worsen, especially due to increased time pressures when caring for children, and these symptoms last over time. For fathers, the first child has little negative impact on mental health, but the second child is more important (Ruppanner, Perales and Baxter, 2019[49]).

Although poor mental or physical health in relation with pregnancies and childbirth has not increased significantly in recent years (Tesli et al., 2016[50]), it can play a part in couples’ decision to form families. If people have started talking more about health-related issues, or been increasingly able to gather information, it is possible that they become more hesitant toward having children. Health-related issues might also become more important if there is a greater hesitancy around having children overall. For instance, those who are concerned about negative aspects of childbirth and childrearing are more likely to remain childless. Evidence from Poland suggests that perceived negative aspects such as time commitment and energy requirements can indeed be important factors weighing against the decision to have children (Mynarska and Rytel, 2022[37]).

The Second Demographic Transition theory has emerged as a central theory to explain changes in family formation over the course of the 2000s and 2010s (Sobotka, 2008[51]). It holds that as societies reach a certain level of economic advancement, non-materialist values such as self-fulfilment become more important to people. It predicts that the family ideal weakens as a result of a greater focus on individual autonomy, choice and self-realisation. In this sense, having children and investing time and resources in raising them according to the high standards required by society (see below) can be seen as competing with alternative life goals. The focus on self-realisation also means that there is a greater emphasis placed on the quality of relationships, which in turn can lead to a postponement of partnership and a greater likelihood of leaving a partnership that is no longer satisfactory (Hellstrand, Nisén and Myrskylä, 2022[18]; Lesthaeghe, 2014[52]; Sobotka, 2008[51]).

5.3.2. Pressures of parenting

Greater hesitation around whether and more careful consideration of when children should arrive mean that people’s perception of what they need to have achieved, and what conditions need to be fulfilled, before having children becomes increasingly important (Ciganda, Lorenti and Dommermuth, 2021[53]; ESHRE Capri Workshop Group, 2018[54]; Bearak et al., 2020[55]; Hart and Kravdal, 2020[8]). Thinking about balancing the costs and benefits of having children – both financial and non-financial – becomes more poignant when norms around good parenting become increasingly demanding. Parents tend to put in a lot of time in childcare in Norway, ascribing to a normative framework of intensive parenting rather than letting them grow up without much intervention. In fact, between 2000 and 2010, the time men and women spend on family care increased from 39 minutes to 54 minutes for men and 1 hour and 12 minutes to 1 hour and 19 minutes for women (SSB, 2022[56]). In Norway, the norm of intensive parenting is held among parents across education levels, while in other countries this tends to be common among parents with higher education only (Ellingsæter, Kitterød and Hansen, 2022[57]).

Norway is not alone in exhibiting strong normative requirements of parents to invest considerable time and effort in their children. Parents in Korea face a strong culture of “helicopter parenting” or “over-parenting”, that require parents – and particularly mothers – to micromanage their children’s days in order to maximise their chances in an increasingly competitive education environment. This “helicopter parenting” culture was found to inhibit parents’ emotional and financial abilities to have children, as well as children’s ability to develop autonomy, independence, and happiness (OECD, 2019[58]).

A fear of not being able to live up to the ideal of intensive parenting is an important reason for postponing or avoiding family formation. Qualitative evidence from Europe finds that one important reason why some women in their early thirties choose to postpone having children is that they do not find themselves able to live up to the ideal of motherhood and intensive parenting (Lebano and Jamieson, 2020[39]; Rotkirch, 2020[22]). Similar effects are also seen in the United States where the economic investment required can be larger than in many European countries which offer more extensive public supports (Guzzo, 2022[43]). Indeed, the difficult responsibility of having and raising children is most frequently reported as an important reason for not having children (with 64% of 25‑44 year‑olds respondents reporting this (parents and non-parents, excluding those choosing not to respond or answering “don’t know”), out of the reasons evaluated in the 2020 Generations and Gender Survey in Norway (GGS, 2020[42]). Reporting that the difficulty of responsibility is an important reason is most common among 25‑29 year‑olds (68%), followed by 30‑34 year‑olds (65%) (Figure 5.3).

Intensive parenting norms suggesting that children deserve extensive emotional, time and financial investment by both their fathers and mothers are widespread in Norway (Ellingsæter and Kitterød, forthcoming[59]; Ellingsæter, Kitterød and Hansen, 2022[57]). The shared responsibility between men and women is reflected in the fact that the policy focus in Norway has moved on from creating a woman-friendly welfare state toward building a father-friendly welfare state that centres on enabling fathers to be co-carers in the household on par with mothers (Ellingsæter, 2017[45]). This follows a normative change; a good father is no longer simply a breadwinner, but he also needs to have emotional attachment and spend time with his children. With the expansion of earmarked parental leave policies for fathers (see Chapter 3), Cool and Strøm (2014[60]) found that fathers in Norway experience a small (relative to mothers) fatherhood wage penalty, especially fathers who work full-time in the private sector. Evidence from the GGS survey suggests that couples are still getting used to changing norms of gendered responsibilities in the household: while only 29% of women aged 25 to 44 state that children being a burden on time and energy is an important reason not to have children, 41% of men age 25 to 44 report that this is an important reason (Figure 5.4).

Figure 5.4. More men than women are concerned that children are a burden to time and energy

Note: GGS data were obtained from the Generations and Gender Programme Data Archive and collected through the Survey on Family and Work by Statistics Norway, with contributions from Lars Dommermuth and Trude Lappegård. More information about model survey instruments can be found at: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (2005). Generations & Gender Programme: Survey Instruments. New York and Geneva: United Nations. Data do not include respondents choosing the options “Don’t know” or choose not to answer. Respondents include parents and non-parents.

Source: GGS 2020 Generations and Gender Survey2020 Norway Wave 1.

People are concerned even though children in Norway are comparably well off

People feel the pressure of parenthood despite the current high levels of child well-being observed in Norway relative to many other OECD countries. A relatively low proportion of Norwegian children lived in households at risk of poverty (7.9%) in 2019 (Figure 5.5). While the proportion increased from 5.9% between 2012 and 2019, Norway remains at the lower end of the scale across the OECD and child poverty is still lower than its neighbour Sweden (8.9%). It is slightly higher than its neighbours Finland (3.5%) and Denmark (4.9%). Similarly, children in Norway are among the least likely to be space poor in their home. Just 7% of children lived in overcrowded accommodation in Norway in 2020, compared to 26% across European countries (EU 27) and 23% in Sweden, 12% in Denmark and 9% in Finland (Figure 5.6).

People’s worries are not simply about the short-term economic climate, but they also worry about the prospects of their children’s generation. When people worry about the prospects of future generations, they will be less inclined to have (more) children. In 2020, 58% of 25‑44 year‑old respondents report feeling very worried or somewhat worried about future generations’ prospects, with slightly more women (60%) than men (56%) reporting so (figures exclude those who choose not to respond and those responding “don’t know” (Figure 5.7).

Figure 5.5. Children are less likely to live in households at risk of poverty in Norway than in many of its neighbouring countries

Notes: Data refer to poverty rates after transfers and taxes. The methodology is using the new income definition after 2012.Instead of 2021, data refer to 2020 for Korea, Latvia, Mexico, New Zealand, and Sweden; to 2019 for Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States; to 2018 for Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Poland, Türkiye; 2017 for Chile and Iceland. Instead of 2012, data refer to 2011 for Chile and 2013 for Estonia, Sweden, the United states. Data for 2012 is missing for Belgium, Japan, and Luxembourg.

Source: OECD Income Distribution Database.

Figure 5.6. Children in Norway are among the least space‑poor in the Europe

Note: Instead of 2020 data refer to 2018 for Iceland and the United Kingdom. Instead of 2009, data refer to 2010 for EU – 27.

Source: Overcrowding rate by age group [TESSI171], EU-SILC Survey, Eurostat. https://www.oecd.org/housing/data/affordable-housing-database/housing-conditions.htm

Figure 5.7. Many respondents report feeling worried about future generations

Note: GGS data were obtained from the Generations and Gender Programme Data Archive and collected through the Survey on Family and Work by Statistics Norway, with contributions from Lars Dommermuth and Trude Lappegård. More information about model survey instruments can be found at: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (2005). Generations & Gender Programme: Survey Instruments. New York and Geneva: United Nations. Data do not include respondents choosing the options “Don’t know” or choose not to answer.

Source: GGS 2020 Generations and Gender Survey2020 Norway Wave 1.

5.3.3. Potentially competing with gender equality priorities

There is an ongoing debate about the potential link between gender equality and fertility. The responsibility of taking care of children is daunting for many people of childbearing age, and this puts additional pressures on the roles and responsibilities of prospective fathers and mothers. As men and women are increasingly acting as parents on an equal basis, the decision to have children increasingly hinges on both parties feeling ready to take on this responsibility. Research suggests that actual and perceived fairness are important parts of the puzzle when trying to understand fertility decisions among young couples (Neyer, Lappegård and Vignoli, 2013[61]; Kolk, 2019[62]; Lappegård, 2020[63]), and Norwegians tend to support gender equal norms and partnerships (Kitterød and Teigen, 2021[64]). However, increasing gender equality could also be seen as one of the sources of falling fertility, in part due to changing gender roles in couples and new patterns of negotiations and decision making (Vignoli et al., 2020[65]).

Norway is known to be one of the countries with the highest equality between men and women in the OECD and worldwide – reaching top levels across a range of gender equality measures in education, employment and governance (OECD, 2022[66]; 2018[67]; 2017[68]). Indicators of gender-equal norms that are measured and compared cross-country include the belief that men and women make equally good political leaders and business executives, and that they have equal rights to jobs when work is scarce (Figure 5.8). In Norway, 8% of people believe that men make better political leaders than women do, compared with the much higher figure of 21% across the OECD. While this is one of the lowest proportions in the OECD, it is still higher than that in New Zealand, Iceland, and Sweden. A slightly higher proportion of people in Norway believe that men make better business executives than women (11%). While still lower than the OECD average (18%), the figure in Norway is higher than that in countries such as New Zealand and Iceland.

Figure 5.8. Norwegians believe men and women are equally capable of running the country

Note: Data refer to 2020 for Canada, 2019 for Japan and New Zealand, 2018 for Australia, Chile, Mexico, Korea and Türkiye, as well as 2017 for all European countries and the United States.

Source: European Values Study and World Values Survey (EVS/WVS, 2021[69])

Men are increasingly central to parenting in Norway

The norm that all men and women are equal and should have equal rights and opportunities is widespread across population sub-groups in Norway. Support for gender equality has been growing steadily over time. Although more women support gender equal ideals, egalitarian values are growing increasingly widespread among men as well. Similarly, while support for gender equality still tends to be more widespread among younger and higher-educated groups, differences between these populations are increasingly being wiped out (Kitterød and Teigen, 2021[64]). One sign that gender equality has come a long way in Norway is that the debate is not solely about how to elevate women’s voices, but there is also an active debate around including male voices in areas they are not typically prevalent. For instance, the organisation Reform centre lobbies for men’s inclusion in gender equality debates (Box 5.2).

Since two parties need to be ready to invest financially, socially, and emotionally in intensive parenting when a child comes along it may be difficult to get the timing right (Jensen, 2016[70]). New norms of self-realisation, gender equality, combined with intensive parenting, suggests that both parents, at the same time, need to be in a good social, emotional, and financial position in their lives and careers. The commitment to think about timing and involvement is a newer phenomenon for prospective fathers than prospective mothers. In fact, it has been suggested that increased demands on time and emotional commitment from fathers has been one of the key factors in delaying or avoiding having children (Jensen, 2013[71]; Frances Goldscheider, 2015[72]). This fits with recent survey evidence in Norway that shows that male partners tend to be the ones who argue against having a(nother) child (Cools and Strøm, 2020[38]). Qualitative work finds that male childless respondents also emphasise that they want to be sure of the relationship, have financial aspects in place, and be in a position that allows them to “be there”. These new, high ideals about what is expected from parents (and fathers in particular), and beliefs that starting a family will change their lives completely makes participants hesitant toward having children (Cools and Strøm, 2020[38]).

Box 5.2. A changing role for men in gender equality debates

Starting as a crisis and counselling hotline for men in 2002, the Norwegian Reform – resource centre for men has developed into a politically independent foundation and a central player in including men in the strives towards more gender equality. The main aims of Reform are to ensure that men are included in the work towards a more gender-equal society and to shed light onto the struggles men face themselves by including male perspectives in the Norwegian debate on gender equality.

Reform also assists men in a difficult life situations by running a range of support services – such as a crisis hotline and specialised psychotherapy for men – and actively disseminates knowledge about the challenges and needs of Norwegian men and boys through publications, seminars and workshops as well as maintaining a strong presence in traditional and social media. The foundation promotes active fatherhood, violence prevention, better physical and mental health, and more equal norms around masculinity. It also works in close co‑operation with different government agencies by reviewing government policy proposals from a male perspective on gender equality.

Source: Reform - resource centre for men, https://reform.no/.

A qualitative study in Norway finds some differences by social class in men’s attitudes to having children. Middle‑class men tend to experience pressure from their social networks to have stable relationships and children, and express worries that everything must be in place. Working-class men, by contrast, are more likely to be single, or in casual relationships, where children are not a focal point. Working-class men also tend to have a more relaxed attitude than middle‑class men to planning for a child and express that child are simply something that happen at some point (Jensen, 2016[70]). A postponement in first births reflect the fact that young adults are taking some time to find new ways of navigating life goals, careers, self-realisation, partnerships, and gender equality.

Monitor and evaluate the effects of increased gender mainstreaming

Norway has a comprehensive gender and family policy environment that actively encourages equality between men and women at home, at work, and in public life. Existing evidence suggests that there is public support for this: Norwegians are supportive of egalitarian sharing of household responsibilities and sympathetic to government intervention to increase gender equality (Jakobsson and Kotsadam, 2010[73]). Together with its Nordic neighbours, it aims to mainstream gender equality across the full range of public policies. This has been an official policy goal of Norway since the adoption of the first Gender Equality Act in 1978, which aimed “to promote equality and in particular the position of women” by mandating “all public authorities shall facilitate for gender equality in all areas of responsibility”. In practice, such gender mainstreaming efforts are not always successful. Progressive norms should be reflected in future policy, comprehensive gender budgeting and assessment of policy consequences for gender equality (Holst and Teigen, 2021[74]).

As discussed in previous chapters, family and labour market policy in Norway have been designed with the explicit purpose of encouraging men and women to engage in equal measure in the labour market and household. This will have the effect to reduce the financial and personal costs for women to have children since they are not expected to give up their job and wage to care for children, and they are not explicitly allowing families to encourage full-time employment of both partners in a family. By extension, such policies can also contribute to a more even gender balance of household and of care work (Neyer, Lappegård and Vignoli, 2013[61]).

Supporting progressive gender norms through gender mainstreaming and budgeting will be a policy aim in its own right in Norway, and it is possible that this entails secondary pressures on fertility rates. While men and women will enjoy more evenly distributed rights and opportunities, it is possible that changing norms make family and work life more complicated to navigate for young couples. It might also be the case that young adult will establish a new set of norms and gender roles that involve mothers and fathers more equally in the home. It is conceivable that after a period of adjustment, young adults will choose to have children and fertility might increase. Norway would do well to consider monitoring any links between gender equality and fertility as couples take some time to negotiate new norms.

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