Closing the gender gap in working hours will require changes not only in government and organisations’ policies, but also in cultural norms around the role of women and men (and mothers and fathers) in the Netherlands. This section reviews relevant policy measures aimed at lessening gender inequalities in hours worked: encouraging fathers to take more parental leave and/or become the part-time worker in their household; more social supports before and after the school day and when children are very young; reforming marginal effective tax rates to encourage more full-time dual-earner households; effective access by both genders to flexitime and teleworking; promoting longer hours in teaching professions; and tackling norms and culture around caregiving.
Part-time and Partly Equal: Gender and Work in the Netherlands
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3. Reducing barriers to full-time work
3.1. Increase the take-up of early childhood education and care
Increasing access to good quality and affordable early childhood education and care (ECEC) is one way to increase women’s paid work hours. While a high share of children are enrolled in ECEC in the Netherlands, they are in care for very few hours, relative to peers in other European OECD countries. 55.9% of 0- to 2-year-olds in the Netherlands are in ECEC programmes, well above the OECD average of 33.2% (Figure 3.1).
Figure 3.1. ECEC enrolment rates are comparatively high in the Netherlands
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Note: For 0- to 2-year-olds: Data generally include children enrolled in early childhood education services (ISCED 2011 level 0) and other registered ECEC services (ECEC services outside the scope of ISCED 0, because they are not in adherence with all ISCED-2011), but exact definitions differ across countries. Data for the United States refer to 2011, for Switzerland and Malta to 2014, and for Japan and Argentina to 2015. For 3- to 5-year-olds: Data include children enrolled in early childhood education and care (ISCED 2011 level 0) and primary education (ISCED 2011 level 1). Data for South Africa refer to 2015. See OECD Family Database (http://www.oecd.org/els/family/database.htm) Indicator PF3.2 for more detail. Information on statistical data for Israel: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932315602.
Source: OECD Family Database, http://www.oecd.org/els/family/database.htm.
Infants and children under age three in the Netherlands spend 16 hours per week, on average, in ECEC. This is well below the over thirty hours per week that young children spend in care, on average, in Latvia, Portugal, Iceland, Norway, Slovenia, Denmark, France, Poland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Greece, Estonia, Italy and Sweden.
Figure 3.2. Average hours in ECEC are short in the Netherlands
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Note: Data for Switzerland and Malta refer to 2014, and for Iceland to 2015. With the exception of New Zealand, data are OECD estimates based on information from EU-SILC. Data refer to children using centre-based services (e.g. nurseries or day care centres and pre-schools, both public and private), organised family day care, and care services provided by (paid) professional childminders, regardless of whether or not the service is registered or ISCED-recognised. For New Zealand, data cover children using licensed centre-based (e.g. 'Education and Care' services, Playcentres, Kõhanga Reo, Kindergartens) and home-based services, only. All non-licensed care is excluded regardless of whether it is paid or unpaid. See OECD Family Database (http://www.oecd.org/els/family/database.htm) Indicator PF3.2 for more detail.
Source: OECD Family Database, http://www.oecd.org/els/family/database.htm.
Full-time childcare costs in the Netherlands are higher than in many other OECD countries (Figure 3.3), which likely depresses take-up. For a dual-earner household in the Netherlands making 100% and 67% of average wage, childcare costs for two children (aged two and three) equate to just over 20% of the national average wage. This is well above the OECD average (14.0%) for this type of household, and roughly four times higher than in countries like Germany (5.0%), Iceland (5.1%) and Sweden (5.2%). Childcare costs are somewhat progressive as households move up the income distribution, and families with lower incomes pay lower net costs. Still, for a typical single-parent household with two children (again aged two and three) in the Netherlands, childcare costs equate to 5.7% of the average work. About four out of ten parents say that childcare is too expensive (Roeters and Bucx, 2018[42]).
Figure 3.3. Childcare costs in the Netherlands are higher than the OECD average for a dual-earner family
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Note: Data reflect the net cost (gross fees less childcare benefits/rebates and tax deductions, plus any resulting changes in other benefits received following the use of childcare and/or change in family income) of full-time care in a typical childcare centre for a two-parent two-child family, where both parents are in full-time employment and the children are aged two and three. Gross earnings for the two earners in the 'dual-earning two-child couple family' are set equal to 100%% of average earnings for the first earner and 67% of average earnings for the second earner. Those for the single earner in the 'single-parent two-child family' are set to 67% of average earnings. 'Full-time' care is defined as care for at least 40 hours per week. Where benefit rules are not determined on a national level but vary by region or municipality, results refer to a “typical” case (e.g. Michigan in the United States, the capital in some other countries). See the OECD Tax and Benefit Systems website (http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/benefits-and-wages.htm) for more detail on the methods and assumptions used and information on the policies modelled for each country. Information on statistical data for Israel: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932315602.
Source: OECD Tax and Benefit Models 2018, http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/benefits-and-wages.htm .
Although the Netherlands performs well on internationally comparative measures of childcare quality (LKK, 2018), there remains room for improvement in the quality of care and ensuring equal access. There is considerable sub-national variation in quality across care providers; the care system for children of working parents and the educational system for children in play groups and preschool classes are managed by different Ministries and private/public/non-profit actors; and there is no national curriculum for content for childcare centres (Schreyer and Oberhuemer, 2017[43]). ECEC programmes targeting educationally disadvantaged children have come under criticism in recent years for doing little to close the achievement gap between disadvantaged (often first- or second-generation migrant) children and children of highly educated (usually native Dutch) parents, and access to these programmes varies enormously across regions and municipalities (Driessen, 2017[44]).
Sweden offers a useful example of a country where childcare enrolment grew in tandem with female employment. The share of 0- to 6-year-olds in childcare grew from a meagre 3% in 1965 to a high of 77% in 2012. What is noteworthy is that the share of female workers in part-time roles nearly halved from 1987 (when 29.77% of female workers were in part-time jobs) to 2017 (when 17.5% were), as Swedish children are in childcare for relatively long hours (see Figure 3.2). On average, Swedish 0- to 2-year-olds spend 30 hours per week in childcare, compared to just 16 hours for Dutch children of the same age.
Figure 3.4. Childcare enrolment growth coincided with more women entering full-time jobs in Sweden
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Source: For women's employment rate and women's part-time employment rate: OECD Employment Database, http://www.oecd.org/employment/emp/onlineoecdemploymentdatabase.htm; for the childcare enrolment rate: data provided by the Swedish authorities for 1965‑2002, and NOSOSCO (various years), Social Protection in the Nordic Countries: Scope, Expenditure and Financing, http://nowbase.org/da, for 2003‑16.
Of course, having adequate and affordable formal childcare services may not be enough if people do not believe that childcare is good for children. Fewer than 30% of women and men believe that childcare is good for an infant under age one. The rate rises slightly as children age, but still, only 40% of women and 35% of Dutch men think that childcare is good for a one-year-old. There is fairly widespread acceptance of toddlers going to day-care, with over two-thirds of women and men supporting this, but support again drops when considering whether school-aged children should be in out-of-school hours care. At the same time, reviews of childcare quality are fairly positive when surveying Dutch people who actually have young children in childcare, relative to parents who do not use formal care (Roeters and Bucx, 2018[42]),
If norms around childrearing do not support formal care for very young children, and preferences remain for infants and young toddlers to stay at home, this does not necessarily imply that mothers need to stay home. This again brings to the fore the fundamental question of which parent should exit the labour market to provide care (in cases where the household has decided that having a parent home is the best for children). While women have some biological advantages in childcare when infants are very young – for instance, in breastfeeding – the persistent gendered division of care labour as a child ages is often a reflection of social norms (Section 3).
The Netherlands should evaluate the costs and benefits of expanding the provision of affordable, high-quality childcare, so that everyone who needs space has access to it – but also to help improve trust in formal childcare and relax norms about mothers staying home with children.
3.2. More support during and after the school day
The school day does not necessarily facilitate the combination of care and full-time work commitments. Furthermore, the shortage of teaching hours means that school hours can be somewhat unpredictable so that Dutch parents sometimes need to rearrange their paid work schedules in order to care for their children.
Efforts to grow the supply of teachers and incentivize longer work hours should be expanded and strengthened. This would help improve job quality among teachers – a largely female workforce – and have downstream effects for parents, as well, who might be better able to rely on schools to educate their children during the workweek.
School hours are an important determinant of whether (and how much) mothers work outside of the home. The total hours Dutch children spend annually in instruction in primary school may not be very different from neighbouring countries, but the Netherlands could do better in its provision of out-of-school hours (OSH) care.
The Netherlands is slightly below the OECD average in the share of 6- to 11-year-olds who use centre-based out-of-school-hours care services for at least one hour during a usual week, before or after school. 25.3% of 6- to 11-year-olds in the Netherlands use at least one hour of OSH care per week, compared to over 50% of similarly aged children in Denmark, Sweden, Slovenia, and Luxembourg. As noted above, public attitudes towards OSH are not very positive, though they are higher among parents who actually use these services. Better supply and take-up of OSH care would likely help parents work longer hours.
Figure 3.5. Participation rates in centre-based out-of-school-hours care services are on par with other countries
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Note: Data for the United States refer to 2011, for Iceland, Switzerland and Malta to 2014, and for Australia to 2017. Data generally reflect the proportion of children who use centre-based out-of-school-hours care services for at least one hour during a usual week, cover the use of services offered before and/or after school hours only, and do not cover 'school-going' children who use centre-based care services only during school holidays or only on days when schools are closed. Exact definitions differ across countries. Data for Australia refer to children aged 6 to 12 and the age groups 6 to 8 and 9 to 12, for Japan to children aged 7 to 11 and the age groups 7 to 8 and 9 to 11, and for the United States to children aged 5 to 11 and the age groups 5 to 8 and 9 to 11. See OECD Family Database (http://www.oecd.org/els/family/database.htm) Indicator PF4.3 for more detail.
Source: OECD Family Database, http://www.oecd.org/els/family/database.htm.
3.3. Marginal effective tax rates may discourage women from shifting to full-time jobs
Another factor driving decisions to work (and how much) is tax rates. In a comparative perspective, the tax/benefit system in the Netherlands encourages second earners to enter employment (Figure 3.6). Take, for example, a two-parent Dutch household with two children, with one parent working full-time on average earnings, and the second out of work. When entering full-time work with average earnings, the second parent would lose 26% of their new earnings through taxation, social contributions, and changes in family benefits (the ‘effective tax rate’ on entering employment) (Figure 3.6). This a lower share than in most OECD countries, and almost six percentage points below the OECD average. Effective tax rates are even lower for second earners entering work on lower wages. For instance, a second earner in the Netherlands entering employment on 67% of average earnings faces an effective tax rate of just 13% – the third lowest in the OECD, and less than half the OECD average for this family type (Figure 3.6).
Figure 3.6. The tax system in the Netherlands encourages second earners to enter employment
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Note: Model estimates for a two-parent, two-child, dual-earning family. The first partner is assumed to work full-time with gross earnings at the national average. The second partner is assumed to be moving from out of work (on Guaranteed Minimum Income (GMI) benefits) to full-time employment, with gross earnings at the stated level. The effective tax rate refers to the share of additional earnings gained from the second earner moving into full-time employment that are lost through changes in family taxation/social contributions and/or adjustments to family benefit entitlements. Data for Chile refer to 2016, and for Canada, Korea and Turkey to 2017. See the OECD Benefits and Wages website (http://www.oecd.org/social/benefits-and-wages/) for more detail on the methods and assumptions used and information on the policies modelled for each country. Information on statistical data for Israel: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932315602.
Source: OECD Tax-Benefit Models 2018, http://www.oecd.org/social/benefits-and-wages/
At the same time, however, the Dutch system provides only weak incentives for second earners to move from part-time to full-time work. Indeed, while overall income increases as a function of hours worked, the shift from part-time to full-time work comes with a steep effective tax rate that may discourage some workers from making the transition (Figure 3.7). This might deter women from transitioning from part-time to full-time jobs when, for example, children enter primary or secondary school.
Take a similar example to above – a two-parent, two-child family in the Netherlands, with the first parent working full-time on average earnings, and the second working part-time on average earnings (reduced pro-rata). The second earner in that Dutch household would lose just over half (52%) of the extra earnings they make from shifting from part-time to full-time work (Figure 3.7, Panel A), and with childcare costs the burden would be even higher. This is an enormous penalty for (typically women) switching to full-time work – the third-highest such tax liability in the OECD, after Belgium and Italy. A 38% penalty for lower earners (67% of average earnings) switching from part-time to full-time work is not as severe, but it is still one of the highest rates in the OECD (Figure 3.7, Panel A).
Marginal effective tax rates are comprised of a variety of components, such as income taxes, social security contributions, and benefits. In the Netherlands, the large penalty for a second earner (at average wage) moving into full-time work is driven mostly by an increase in the income tax burden (Figure 3.7, Panel B). For this worker profile, 40% of additional earnings gained from switching to full-time work are lost through income tax (Figure 3.7, Panel B), mostly on account of an increase in personal income tax on the second earner (38% of additional earnings), but also because of household net loss in tax credits (2%). Social contributions exert a smaller overall effect (Figure 3.7, Panel B). The second earner themselves actually pays substantially more in social contributions when switching to full-time work (24% of additional earnings) but, due to a re-allocation of tax credits, this is partially offset by a reduction in social contributions paid by the first earner (-12%).
Figure 3.7. Second earners in the Netherlands face high tax penalties switching from part-time to full-time work
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Note: Model estimates for a two-parent, two-child, dual-earning family. The first partner is assumed to work full-time with gross earnings at the national average. The second partner is assumed to be moving from part-time (67% of full-time) to full-time employment, with gross earnings at the stated level. The effective tax rate refers to the share of additional earnings gained from the second earner moving to full-time employment that are lost through changes in family taxation/social contributions and/or adjustments to family benefit entitlements. Data for Chile refer to 2016. See the OECD Benefits and Wages website (http://www.oecd.org/social/benefits-and-wages/) for more detail on the methods and assumptions used and information on the policies modelled for each country. Information on statistical data for Israel: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932315602.
Source: OECD Tax-Benefit Models 2018, http://www.oecd.org/social/benefits-and-wages/
3.4. Flexitime and teleworking: A substitute for part-time work?
Flexible workplace practices have been found to help promote work-life balance. While workplace flexibility often brings to mind part-time work, it also includes measures such as flexitime (starting and finishing work at different times of the day), spreading hours worked across weeks or months, and teleworking (OECD, 2017[1]). Such measures enable workers to organise paid work hours with childcare obligations, reduce commute times, and remain closer to dependent family members if caregiving is needed, although flexible workplace practices also have the potential to increase stress and total working hours (OECD, 2017[1]).
Many OECD countries, including the Netherlands, have expanded legislation ensuring workers’ “right to request” part-time or flexible work arrangements. In Australia, Hungary, Portugal, Slovenia, and Turkey, the right to request was introduced or extended for parents with young children. Some, like Portugal, explicitly regulate that parents working part-time or with flexitime shall not be penalised in terms of assessment and career development.
The Netherlands (along with the United Kingdom) went further than most countries by widening the right to request to all workers (OECD, 2017[1]). This is an important expansion: extending the right to request confers bargaining power and lessens the risk of discrimination against certain groups of workers when they have greater legal entitlements, e.g. parents (ibid). The Netherlands also protects the right to return to full-time work.
In the United Kingdom, where the right to request flexitime and teleworking was introduced and expanded quickly between 2003 and 2014, mothers have been found to be less likely to reduce work hours after childbirth when they have access to flexitime and teleworking (Chung and van der Horst, 2018[28]). By “adapting work boundaries to fit around family demands,” mothers are able to substitute telework and flexiwork for a reduction in work hours (ibid).
Figure 3.8. More than half of Dutch workers report having control over their work hours
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Note: Employees with “some or total control over their working time” are those who report they can choose between several fixed working schedules, can adapt their working hours within certain limits, or can determine their working hours entirely by themselves.
Source: OECD calculations based on the 6th European Working Conditions Survey (2015), www.eurofound.europa.eu/surveys
A study in the Netherlands finds that telework among Dutch workers is associated with moderate increase in actual hours worked, but not in contracted hours of preferred hours, and that flexi-time is not associated with an increase in hours worked. This research also finds that men were much more likely than women to have flexi-time or regularly telework in the Netherlands. However, this research does not make causal claims about the effects of flexitime and telework on labour supply and aside from the aforementioned study of the United Kingdom, little research has been conducted in other countries on the causal effects of flexitime and teleworking on decisions to work part-time versus full-time. This is an empirical question that merits further analysis in the Netherlands and elsewhere: does the availability and take-up of flexible work arrangements encourage part-time workers to increase their labour supply?
It is also important, at the organisational level, to ensure that women and men are not treated differently when they request flexible work arrangements. While male workers who reduce hours or take long leaves to care for their family often face stigma and barriers in the workplace (Coltrane et al., 2013[45]) (Vandello et al., 2013[46]), there is evidence from the United States that women are penalised even more than men when both remain in the workforce but request flexible work. In a randomised experiment looking at the gendered effects of requesting telework, almost 70% of male employees who requested flexible schedules to accommodate child care requests were rated as “likely” or “very likely” to have the request granted. When female employees made the same request, that number dropped to around 57%. Participants were also much more likely to evaluate the men as more likable and committed than the women (Munsch, 2016[47]).
3.5. More childcare and chores for men
Changes to social policies can only go so far if attitudes and norms do not change in tandem. Improving access to childcare and modifying the tax-benefit system will have little effect if Dutch parents continue a “traditional” division of paid and unpaid labour.
Arguably the most important next step for improving gender equality in the Netherlands is getting men to do a greater share of childcare, eldercare, cooking, and chores, so that women have greater flexibility to engage in paid work. At the moment, women are still doing most of the unpaid work at home (Section 1) – about one-third as much as Dutch men, on average, and more than their female counterparts in northern Europe. However, some have argued that the normalisation of part-time work in the Netherlands is helping to change norms around the priority of the family for both women and men (Wielers and Raven, 2013[12]).
Dutch women and men say that they want more egalitarian outcomes, but they also acknowledge that reality does not match ideals (Section 1). Nearly 60% of Dutch parents with a child younger than age 18 report that they would like an equal distribution of childcare between parents, but under 40% say that this actually happens (Portegijs et al., 2018[10]). 40.4% of Dutch parents with a child younger than 18 years think that care work and paid work should be distributed equally within a household
Despite these expressed desires for equality, there remain fairly strong beliefs that women are better suited for childrearing. Nearly one-fifth of Dutch parents – 17.2% – believe that a man should do more paid work and a woman should do more care work. Almost no one believes that a woman should do more paid work and a man should do more unpaid caregiving. And among parents who seek an equal division of childcare, only one in five report that they have achieved it at home (Portegijs et al., 2018[10]).
These attitudes toward gender roles have become more egalitarian over time, but they remain quite entrenched. About 40% of men think that a woman is better suited to raise small children. This is progress from the rate of over 60% of men who held this belief in the early 1980s, but it is still a rather large share. It is not only men holding these beliefs: about a quarter of Dutch women, too, feel that women are better suited than men to raise small children (Portegijs et al., 2018[10]).
These expressed beliefs help explain why women report working part-time in order to care for family, yet say they are not dissatisfied with access to childcare (Section 2).
Public perceptions around the (un)desirability of formal care for young children and perceptions around who can best care for children at home are strongly reinforcing the gendered division of labour found in the Netherlands. Simply put, many Dutch people do not think children should be in formal childcare (or at least, not for many hours). When children then stay home, many Dutch people think mothers are best suited to care for them.
Given these beliefs, gender inequalities in paid and unpaid work have been slow to dissipate. There is room for improvement in policies and in changes in attitudes at home.
3.5.1. Paternity leave and parental leave for fathers
Paternity leave is a key policy measure for getting fathers more invested in caring for children from their earliest days as a parent. Governments recognise that getting fathers to participate in unpaid care work is a keystone of gender equality outside of the home. In a 2017 OECD survey of countries, when asked how best to increase men’s unpaid care work at home, the most common answers were changing boys’ and men’s attitudes towards caregiving and ensuring that men do not experience discrimination when they take leave from work to care for dependents (OECD, 2017[11]).
Figure 3.9. Country priority rankings: Getting men to spend more time on care activities
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Note: 35 countries responded. Each country could select up to three strategies.
Source: OECD Employment, Labour and Social Affairs Committee (ELSAC), Questionnaire on Progress in Implementing the 2013 Gender Recommendation. Published in (OECD, 2017[1]).
Many countries are trying to encourage a more equal division of paid and unpaid work across men and women through fathers’ leave programmes, which incentivise fathers to leave work to care for young children immediately after or for a longer period after birth (OECD, 2017[1]). In addition to helping child development and fathers’ well-being, fathers’ participation in parental leave may promote gender equality through several different channels. Fathers’ leave-taking can help change the within-household distribution of unpaid work, as both mothers and fathers are involved in parenting tasks soon after birth – an important period for establishing caregiving habits. Fathers’ leave-taking may also strengthen women’s labour market participation (both entry and hours) by enabling mothers to return to work earlier and lessening the risk of statistical discrimination against women overall.
The Netherlands has mandated parental leave for the duration of 26 times the number of hours worked per week. In theory, this arrangement allows dual-earner couples to take leave and provide personal care for a young child for one year. However, for most employees this leave is unpaid as only some employers, e.g. the government, continue (partial) wage payments during this period. Available data for the 2001‑13 period suggest that over this period the proportion of fathers who were eligible for parental leave (paid and/or unpaid) increased from 10 to 25% (CBS, 2014[48]), with men generally taking parental leave for one day per week for over a year.1
In many OECD countries, paid paternity leave and parental leave programmes give fathers the incentive to take up leave by setting aside reserved (or “bonus”) months of parental leave that the family receives only if the father commits to taking leave. This is an important step, given that parenting behaviours established at childbirth tend to persist as children age, with important implications for parents’ division of paid and unpaid work later in life. Parents’ behaviour, in turn, is one of the strongest predictors of an individual’s gendered behaviours and expectations, as adult children mimic (in attitudes and acts) how their parents shared paid and unpaid work (Cunningham, 2001; McGinn et al., 2015).
Since 2000, ten OECD countries have moved to provide fathers with strong financial incentives to take parental leave for at least two months. Nordic countries often reserve parts of the parental leave period for the exclusive use for each parent for a few months, and both Japan and Korea provide mothers and fathers with around one year of non‑transferable paid parental leave each. Other options include “bonus periods”, where a couple may qualify for some extra weeks of paid leave if both parents use a certain amount of shareable leave. This is the case in Germany, where two bonus months can be granted.
Until 1 January 2019, Dutch fathers were entitled to two days of leave for paternity leave at full pay around childbirth, but since then the entitlement has become five days of leave at full pay. As of 1 July 2020, employees will be entitled to an additional five weeks of paid leave paid at 70% of earnings (Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, 2018[49]). Leave reform will move the Netherlands close to the OECD average for father, but this period of paid leave for fathers is still shorter than for mothers. In future, fathers’ leave could be further developed and perhaps financed by equalising payment rates of leave for fathers and mother at 70% (it is now 100% for mothers up to a certain threshold). Leave can be taken on a part-time basis and such a support system would incentivize a more balanced sharing of care work during the early years.
The development of paid father leave is also an important step in building a “continuum of work and family supports” for parents with young children (OECD, 2016[50]). At present, there are gaps in policy supports for parents with young children in the Netherlands. By contrast, Danish and Swedish families with young children are supported by a continuous flow of policy support: paid parental leave for about 12‑18 months, followed by participation in quality ECEC services for 30 hours per week, followed by school and widely attended out-of-school hours services until children enter their teens.
Box 3.1. How does fathers-only leave affect the division of unpaid work?
Paternity leave and reserved-for-fathers parental leave programmes are relatively new in most countries (compared to maternity leave programmes), and take-up has historically been low (compared to mothers’ take-up), so it is still somewhat difficult to estimate precisely the effect of paternity or fathers’ parental leave on the downstream division of childcare and chores. Descriptive literature indicates that fathers’ leave-taking is associated with more hours spent by fathers on childcare, and that countries with more generous leave policies tend to see more men taking leave (see, for example, (Boll, Leppin and Reich, 2014[51]); (Huerta et al., 2013[52]); (Tanaka and Waldfogel, 2007[53])). Of course, there are serious limitations in using observational data to assess paid and unpaid work outcomes vis-à-vis cross-national variation in leave policies, as policies may be endogenous to pre-existing conditions in those countries. Generous paternity leave policies may be driven by pre-existing norms around gender equality, for example, rather than policies driving norms.
What, then, are the causal effects of paid leave programmes reserved for fathers on caregiving activities? Quasi-experimental approaches, like regression discontinuity or difference-in-difference designs, exploit variation in fathers’ “exposure” to access paternity or parental leave. Such studies contrast the outcomes for “treated” fathers with those of very comparable fathers who did not have access to the leave programme, either due to geographic or time variation.
Most quasi-experimental studies find that the introduction of a leave programme reserved for fathers does increase leave take-up by fathers (see, for example, (Ekberg, Eriksson and Friebel, 2013[54]) on the case of Sweden; (Patnaik, 2018[55]) on Quebec; (Kluve and Tamm, 2009[56]) on Germany; (Farre and Gonzalez, 2018[57])on Spain; and (Cools, Fiva and Kirkebøen, 2015[58]) on Norway). Evidence from Norway suggests that there is a positive ripple effect on take-up over time, as fathers’ take-up of leave induces strong peer effects on other men, specifically their brothers and co-workers (Dahl, Løken and Mogstad, 2012[59]).
Furthermore, most quasi-experimental research using time use data suggests that fathers-only parental leave produces positive effects on fathers’ engagement in unpaid work. Looking at the 2007 introduction of two additional “daddy months” in Germany, Tamm (2018[60]) finds that fathers exposed to the leave programme spent more time on childcare than those who did not, particularly on weekends, and that these effects carried throughout the entire period studied – six years after childbirth. Fathers with access to the German “daddy months” were also more engaged in housework and errands (Tamm, 2018[60]). Kotsadam and Finseraas (2011[61]) find that the introduction of reserved leave for fathers in Norway led partners to be around 50% more likely to divide equally the task of doing laundry (but not other chores), and also reduced levels of partner conflict over the household division of labour (Kotsadam and Finseraas, 2011[61]). Farré and González (2018), looking at Spain, find that fathers who were eligible for paternity leave spent more time on childcare (by almost an hour per day) than fathers who were not eligible, and these effects persisted through the period studied - three years after birth (Farre and Gonzalez, 2018[57]) In Québec, fathers exposed to the “daddy quota” in Québec spent more time in housework in the three years following the introduction of the quota, relative to fathers who were ineligible (Patnaik, 2018[55]).
Some research on unpaid work outcomes of father-reserved leave has looked at parents’ division of sick days to care for children, rather than looking at time use data – actual (reported) hours spent in different activities. This research on sick days shows largely no positive effects of fathers-only parental leave. Ugreninov (2013[62]), for example, finds that the introduction of four reserved weeks of parental leave for fathers in Norway had no causal reduction on mothers’ probability of taking sick days to care for children. Ekberg et al (2013[54]), too, find that changes in the fathers’ allowance of parental leave in Sweden has had no effect on the probability that fathers (rather than mothers) will take sick days to care for children and mixed effects on mothers’ longer term employment outcomes. Of course, looking at sick days does not capture the daily, within-household division of care.
3.5.2. Ensuring that both mothers and fathers have equal opportunities to work full-time or part-time when children are very young
Public policies should support mothers and fathers who want to enter (or remain in) full-time work. However, when a household decides that one parent should work part-time, it is also important to ensure that both mothers and fathers have equal opportunity to do so. The default answer should not be the mother. Germany offers an interesting example of an effort to consolidate the equal sharing of parenting responsibilities. In 2015, Germany introduced the Parental Allowance Plus (ElterngeldPlus) and Partnership Bonus (Partnerschaftsbonus) measures, which provide financial incentives for both parents to work (relatively long) part-time hours (between 25‑30 hours per week) and share caregiving when children are very young. The financial support varies by family but typically comes in the form of a supplement to the parental leave or child allowance, taking into consideration the parents’ labour market income during this period. The stated goal of the programme is to give parents more time for family, support a partnership of family and vocation, promote shared parenting and ensure the livelihood of mothers (OECD, 2017[5]). Take-up by fathers has been slow but is improving (ibid).
3.5.3. Changing policies to change minds: Targeting gender stereotypes
Many OECD governments have also sought to change gender stereotypes through public awareness campaigns. Since 2013, at least six OECD countries – Australia, Austria, the Czech Republic, Korea, Portugal and Slovenia – have carried out national public awareness campaigns against gender stereotyping and norms, using a mixture of traditional and online media channels. Australia’s joint public-private campaign, the “Equilibrium Man Challenge”, was a novel online micro-documentary series that sought to raise awareness of the work-life balance by following a group of men who had taken up flexible work arrangements, often to care for family members.
More information is needed on the positive and negative impacts that media and social networks may have on social norms and gender stereotypes. This research, combined with more rigorous evaluations of targeted public information campaigns (Paluck, 2016[63]) could improve the effectiveness of future efforts to reduce gender stereotyping.
Note
← 1. The data series was discontinued by the Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek.