This chapter offers a long-term vision for fiscal control in Colombia. It focuses on how such a vision could help ensuring the co-ordination and continuity of preventive and concomitant control in Colombia. In particular, co-ordination mechanisms as well as planning and policy tools such as the National Development Plan (NDP), the National Moralisation Commission (CNM), the Regional Moralisation Commissions (CRM) and others can contribute to the strengthening and continuity of preventive and concomitant control.
Preventive and Concomitant Control at Colombia's Supreme Audit Institution
New Strategies for Modern Challenges
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OECD Public Governance Reviews
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4. Towards a fiscal management public policy in Colombia
Abstract
Ensure the co-ordination and continuity of preventive control in Colombia through a fiscal management public policy
Ensuring the co-ordination and continuity of preventive control in Colombia through a public fiscal management policy is essential. In particular, it is necessary to ensure that any public policy reform is influenced by technical aspects and the needs of modern and efficient fiscal management and control. A fiscal management public policy must be aligned with current international practices, including by migrating to a fiscal management capable of giving constructive recommendations to the public administration or making effective and efficient use of data analytics.
A reform could be sought to allow progress towards a fiscal management aligned with international practices, which contributes to the development of improvement processes in Colombia’s public management. This reform could include aspects related to the continuity of internal processes, for example by including a policy vision that exceeds the 4-year period currently assigned to an administration. In essence, the preventive and concomitant control of the CGR should be part of a State policy that allows a long-term vision of its aims and objectives.
As such, the CGR can benefit from existing co-ordination spaces, which may help to leverage trust within public administration entities. Among them, Law of 2020 of 2016 created the Colombian "National Integrity System" to promote the concurrence of all State entities, the private sector and citizens around the promotion of integrity in the Colombian public service. This system includes a co-ordinating committee which includes the National Moralisation Commission (Comisión Nacional de Moralización, CNM) and the Regional Moralisation Commissions (Comisiones Regionales de Moralización, CRM) and entrusts the Administrative Department of the Public Service (DAFP) with its operation. Taking into account the need to use existing co-ordination spaces that strengthen the management of fiscal control, as well as the importance of promoting cultural change around preventive and concomitant control, the CGR may consider using its interaction with these bodies to promote its tools for corruption risk management.
Promote the inclusion of a long-term vision of fiscal control in Colombia in the next National Development Plan, including issues related to preventive and concomitant control as well as tools to strengthen the institutional image of the CGR among citizens
According to the CGR, the instruments currently used by the CGR aimed at the long-term vision of fiscal control are those of institutional planning, such as the entity's action plan and the applicable legal framework. However, several previous studies recommended to have a unification and standardisation of surveillance and control in Colombia through a public policy that guides long-term objectives (Inter-American Development Bank, 2019[1]).
The previous purposes were specified in the National Development Plan (PND) 2018-2022, which establishes the need for hierarchical and functional restructuring of some dependencies of the CGR. Thus, the PND 2018-2022 establishes that for the purposes of the surveillance of national and territorial fiscal management:
“The Presidency of the Republic will lead the process of restructuring the model of national and territorial fiscal control, in co-ordination with all the competent entities, to guarantee professionalisation in the preventive and warning functions that allow the co-ordination and timely restitution of damages to public assets. This model must take into account the financial and managerial/administrative autonomy of territorial fiscal control, the selection by merit of the territorial comptrollers, the change of periods that foresee the interference of local actors, the adoption of anti-clientelistic measures and the possibility of investing in technology and institutional modernisation.” (Departamento Nacional de Planeacion, 2018[2])
To this end, the purpose of the government's policy for the period 2018-2022 corresponds, on the one hand, to restructuring the surveillance model developed by both the CGR and the Territorial Comptrollers' Offices, so that it is carried out from the perspective of the prevention of fiscal damage, with the professionalisation and specialisation of these entities. On the other hand, the purposes of the policy requires providing financial and administrative autonomy to fiscal control agencies, modifying the election periods of territorial comptrollers and the possibility for these bodies to strengthen investments in technological improvement. The PND 2018-2022 allowed the President of the Republic to hierarchically and functionally restructure the CGR, including the creation of several new Delegates and the creation of the DIARI.
As such, several legal and institutional changes have led to the need for a public policy related to fiscal management. The reform established 3 966 new control subjects of the territorial order, upon which the CGR will have the power to carry out a preventive or concomitant control at its discretion. In practice, this reform entails moving from a universe of 1 711 control subjects to a new potential scenario of 5 677 subjects and represents a drastic change in the CGR's scope of action. Although the institution has wide territorial deployment, since in addition of 31 Departmental Management Offices, it had never exercised control over territorial entities (DNP, 2021[3]).
These conditions generate the need to establish a public policy that allows the development of the full potential of the CGR, including by providing feedback to the public administration and that answers to the challenges established by this novel reform. In addition to this challenge, the 2019 reform established that the CGR must direct and implement the National System of Fiscal Control, with the support of the General Auditor of the Republic and that this must achieve the unification and standardisation of the surveillance and control of fiscal management in the country.
This policy could contain the unified vision of preventive and concomitant control, as well as tools for the strengthening and institutionalisation of other functions of the CGR. International examples, such as Mexico, show the advantages of having a national control system as a complement to the national anti-corruption public policy (Box 4.1).
Box 4.1. National Fiscal System (SNF) in Mexico
In May 2015, the Mexican Congress approved a set of governance reforms to improve the accountability, integrity and transparency of the public sector. These measures, which in some cases implied reforms to the country's Constitution, drew a new map of national institutions to promote the creation of the National Anti-Corruption System and the National Transparency System.
Part of the reforms focused on expanding the mandate of the Audit Office of the Federation (Auditoría Superior de la Federación, ASF) and providing it with additional tools to carry out its work, for example, the ability to carry out real-time audits, conduct investigations and report more frequently to Congress. The effectiveness of the National Audit System and the recent reforms also depend on other participants, such as the Ministry of the Public Function (Secretaria de Función Pública, SFP) - the federal entity responsible for internal control - as well as sub-national government audit bodies, where legal frameworks, capacities, resources and needs are different.
The operational bases for the operation of the National Audit System also establish a set of inter-institutional co-ordination mechanisms between the bodies responsible for audits in the different levels of government. The aim is to maximise the coverage and impact of the audit throughout the country, based on a strategic vision, the application of similar professional standards, the creation of capacities and the effective exchange of information, without duplications or omissions.
Source: (OECD, 2017[4])
Issues such as institutional continuity may require a reduction of auditor turnover and promulgating specialisation among auditors, including General, Sectorial and Territorial Delegate Comptrollers and senior managers. To this end, the possibility of extending the management period of the Comptroller General of the Republic may even be considered, to avoid administrative and personnel changes every 4 years. In matters of legislative reform, a legislative proposal that aims to allow the CGR to issue recommendations to public entities could be considered, clarifying the difference between constructive recommendations and co-administration and alongside this, empowering Departmental managers in all fiscal control cycles, with special emphasis on the role they play in preventive and concomitant control.
Furthermore, a long-term vision should include an analysis of the opportunities and challenges related to the role of the Comptroller towards external actors. To this end, the CGR could think of designing a public policy that goes beyond the 4 years of the PND and that guides the actions of the entire sector. In particular, this policy, which could be designed as a 10-year Plan for Fiscal Management, would have the potential to promote trust, accountability and improved information to citizens regarding the role of the CGR as guarantor of public finances.
With regard to preventive and concomitant control, several academics and members of civil society expressed the need to know more in detail about this long-term vision of the CGR, as well as procedural aspects of the mechanism, including its functioning, advantages and disadvantages, as well as the need to generate technical criteria that allow social control over it. The CGR could then make methodological aspects and the results of this very new control, much more visible.
To this end, the CGR could consider implementing actions within this policy aimed at making the internal structure associated with preventive and concomitant control more visible, as well as displaying its more technical aspects, such as, for example, its contributions to risk management within public entities or its role in data governance in Colombia. For this purpose, it is also essential to launch the General Public Warning System (SIGAP), administered by the Planning Office of the CGR that has not yet been completed; and seek progress in the bank of positive results tied to this system, as well as the bank of good fiscal management practices.
Make use of the National Moralisation Commission and the Regional Moralisation Commissions as spaces for co-ordination with the public administration and in relation to fiscal management in Colombia
In Colombia, the National Moralisation Commission (CNM) is a high-level mechanism that works for co-ordination between relevant actors to prevent and combat corruption. The CNM currently has 13 members; among them the President of the Republic; the Prosecutor General; the Attorney General and the Comptroller General. The Transparency Secretariat of the Vice Presidency of the Republic is the technical secretary of the CNM. The CNM must ensure the exchange of information and data between the aforementioned organisations, establish indicators to evaluate transparency in public administration and adopt an annual strategy to promote ethical conduct in the public administration. The CNM issues reports and publishes the minutes of the meetings (OECD, 2017[5]).
The OECD Public Integrity Review of Colombia had already emphasised the advantages of aligning and strengthening regulatory and integrity policies in Colombia through the National Moralisation Commission. The report pointed out that ensuring close co-ordination between the application of the law and integrity breaches prevention is key (OECD, 2017[5]).
As highlighted in this report, the need to demystify the work of the CGR and in particular its relationship with the public administration is imperative. To this end, the CNM has served as a communication channel on positive aspects and advantages of preventive and concomitant control, as well as a space for discussion on the doubts and objections of the executive branch. Indeed, the CNM has been a propitious setting to show the results of preventive and concomitant fiscal control, giving tools and information to the other members. An example of this have been the sessions held in 2021, where the CGR participated in the CNM, proposing the use of preventive and concomitant control to follow-up on resources used within the COVID-19 pandemic, in particular the purchase of vaccines and resources of the FOME (Emergency Mitigation Fund). At this meeting, the joint strategy with the Inspector General's Office (Procuraduría General de la Nacion, PGN) was presented. Moreover, issues related to concomitant and preventive control were discussed, such as the identification of critical projects or unfinished works and “white elephants”. As such, “Controlapp” was presented as a tool for citizen control and reporting. This app allows to follow-up on projects intervened by preventive and concomitant control, such as the Túnel de la Línea, the Ruta del Soland the Orito-Putumayo Sewerage System, among others. This practice is a good example for the constructive use of the CNM as a platform for dialogue and the CGR should aim to continue in this direction.
On the territorial level, the CNM provides guidelines to be implemented by the Regional Moralisation Commissions (CRM) across the regions. In fact, the risks of corruption on the territorial level, compared to the national level, are often different and could be higher for various reasons (OECD, 2021[6]):
First, a significant proportion of public resources are executed at territorial levels and sub-national governments have the responsibility for the provision of a large part of public services (such as water and sanitation, waste management, licenses and permits, education, health care etc.), which come along with risks to integrity (OECD, 2018[7]).
Second, the territory of Colombia is often characterised by a greater weakness of external control. Territorial comptrollers' offices sometimes fail to escape the political logic of the regions and run a risk of being captured (OECD, 2021[6]). Regional political dynamics are evident in the elections of the territorial comptrollers, undermining the independence of these control bodies (Corredor and Cortés, 2018[8]). Several discussions have proposed to implement another election model that allows to uncouple these positions from political influences and to promote their professionalisation.
Third, it was observed that at the sub-national level there are still gaps related to the qualification and capacity of the technical personnel of the territorial control bodies. Taking into consideration that this new preventive and concomitant control is based on the technical capacity of the teams, these deficiencies imply a risk for its success.
In the territory, the CRM are co-ordinating bodies for the fight against corruption and include regional representatives of the Inspector General (Procuraduria General de la Nación), the Prosecutor General (Fiscalia General de la Nación), the Comptroller General (CGR) and the Council of the Judiciary (Consejo Seccional de la Judicatura) as well as the Departmental, Municipal and District Comptrollers (Contraloría Departamental, Municipal y Distrital). The CRM are in charge of investigating, preventing and sanctioning corruption in the regions. In addition, other entities can be invited to the CRM when deemed necessary. Together with the CNM, they are part of the Co-ordination Committee of the National Integrity System created by Law 2016 of 2020.
The OECD report on CRM highlighted that, currently, the role of CRM in preventing corruption and fraud at the regional level is limited because they are not well co-ordinated with governments and municipalities (OECD, 2021[6]). Thus, the report recommends considering the expansion of the CRM to include the public administration as members and thus facilitate better co-ordination and dialogue. In the short term, periodic meetings between the CRMs and the regional governments could be promoted. Legislation already contemplates the possibility of inviting Governors and these meetings could be promoted with the support of the Transparency Secretariat and the DAFP on a semi-annual basis. The purpose of these regular interactions is, for example, to share ideas about corruption risks, establish priorities for the department, present progress made in the area of integrity and the fight against corruption and analyse opportunities for action as well as encountered challenges (OECD, 2021[6]).
It is in this framework that the perspective of the new preventive and concomitant control could be particularly conducive to improving the constructive dialogue between the CGR and local administrations. The CGR could make use of the spaces provided by the CRM to make visible the advantages of preventive and concomitant control but also use them as a source of feedback on patterns detected or alerts identified at the territorial level and could even consider passing this information to local administrations to act on it. An example for such a co-ordination, reported during the virtual fact finding mission, is in La Guajira, where an alert was shared by the CRM with the public administration, allowing a follow-up by the latter. This shows the potential for the CRMs to co-ordinate with governors and mayors.
References
[8] Corredor, F. and V. Cortés (2018), “¿Por qué la presencia de las contralorías no disminuye la corrupción en Colombia?”, in Henao Pérez, J. and C. Isaza Espinosa (eds.), Corrupción, política y sociedad, Universidad Externado de Colombia, Bogotá.
[2] Departamento Nacional de Planeacion (2018), Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2018-2022, https://colaboracion.dnp.gov.co/CDT/Prensa/Resumen-PND2018-2022-final.pdf (accessed on 24 August 2021).
[3] DNP (2021), CONPES 4045, https://colaboracion.dnp.gov.co/CDT/Conpes/Econ%C3%B3micos/4045.pdf (accessed on 8 September 2021).
[1] Inter-American Development Bank (2019), Informe de Evaluación del Desempeño, https://www.contraloria.gov.co/documents/20181/449782/Informe+Final+MMD+EFS+CGR+Colombia+2019_unlocked.pdf/611096c8-6eef-4de0-924e-2839eab84552 (accessed on 24 August 2021).
[6] OECD (2021), La Integridad Pública a Nivel Regional en Colombia: Empoderando a las Comisiones Regionales de Moralización, OECD, Paris, http://www.oecd.org/corruption/ethics/integridad-publica-nivel-regional-colombia.pdf (accessed on 25 July 2021).
[7] OECD (2018), Integrity for Good Governance in Latin America and the Caribbean: From Commitments to Action, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264201866-en.
[4] OECD (2017), Mexico’s National Auditing System: Strengthening Accountable Governance, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264264748-en.
[5] OECD (2017), OECD Integrity Review of Colombia: Investing in Integrity for Peace and Prosperity, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264278325-en.