States of Fragility 2022

3. Charting a path through crises in fragile contexts

Abstract

The findings in the previous two chapters illustrate the severity of today's challenges alongside the scale of current responses to addressing the root causes of multidimensional fragility. This final chapter presents several ambitions to support partners in their efforts to chart a path through crises in fragile contexts. These ambitions – embracing a multidimensional approach, promoting collective action, and bridging the divide between development and peace – offer a way forward for the OECD Development Assistance Committee and its partners to navigate fragility in this age of crises.

In Brief

The findings in this report provide the evidence base for a set of practical and pertinent ambitions for the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and other partners in fragile contexts. The ambitions highlight the need for a multidimensional approach to addressing the root causes of fragility, which can ultimately help these actors learn how to prioritise when everything is a priority in the age of crises.

• Place a premium on data and analysis. A sound analysis of multidimensional fragility is a prerequisite to effective action. Understanding and analysing fragility is equally reliant on the quality of data available. While this has improved over time, fragile contexts are still among the most data deprived. Investments in data quality, new methods, joint analysis and multidimensional analysis can open the door to a more co-ordinated, adaptive and evidence-based response to fragility.

• Adopt a context-wide understanding to strengthen the effectiveness of individual projects and approaches. Tailored context-specific strategies that deliberately address multidimensional fragility can harness and enable sector-specific approaches and navigate political sensitivities. These require addressing the multidimensionality of fragility to better understand the dynamic interplay of systems, cultures, risks and coping capacities in fragile contexts.

 Safeguard and strengthen official development assistance (ODA) while leveraging and tailoring other financial resources. ODA is essential for paths out of crises. Responding to crises and fragility means moving to protect ODA volumes, reinforce the predictability of ODA and strengthen confidence around ODA, especially in those fragile contexts that may lack the ability to access other sources of finance for development. It is equally important to support the development of sustainable government and private financing with approaches that are tailored to fragile contexts.

• Capitalise on existing mechanisms and processes such as country platforms and financing strategies. Country platforms and financing strategies offer the potential to link competencies across the humanitarian-development-peace (HDP) nexus and promote more cohesive ways of working.

• Build dialogue between peace and development actors, including conflict-sensitive engagement on issues of economic fragility. It is important for the DAC and its partners to address the communications gaps and incoherence between peace and development actors that are curtailing effective peace processes. Alongside its subsidiary body, the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF), the DAC can play an important role by capitalising on its convening power to help resolve this communications deficit and contribute to more politically aware and informed ways of engagement.

• Leverage the strategic leadership of the DAC to inform collective approaches and drive better prioritisation for more effective results. Having a strategy for development co-operation means recognising the importance of immediate needs but also maintaining a focus on the longer-term horizon and what is essential and on the causes and not just the symptoms. The DAC can provide a strategic perspective to concentrate the focus, capability and collective potential of its members and partners to deal with multidimensional fragility.

Considering the chronic state of fragility in so many contexts and the history of the OECD’s States of Fragility report series, the trends outlined in this report might be greeted as more of the same. However, the severity scale and collective impact of recent global shocks have pushed development co-operation into an uncertain geopolitical and operational space.

It is increasingly acknowledged that, as argued in this series, fragility is multidimensional, with conflict and violence just one possible manifestation. Especially when overlaid with the impacts of COVID-19, climate change and Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the multidimensional and interdependent dimensions of fragility – economic, environmental, human, political, security and societal – create some of the most challenging operating environments in the world for national and local actors and their international partners. There is a danger that these fragilities can “lock a society into a dysfunctional but stable equilibrium” (Collier, 2021[1]). Indeed, the same 21 countries and territories have appeared in every OECD fragility report since the first one in 2005. For all 60 fragile contexts in this year’s edition, transitions from states of fragility have been elusive notwithstanding the substantial support from external partners.

In its 60 years, the DAC, alongside diverse other actors, has reinforced its substantial and substantive role in supporting nationally owned and nationally led solutions out of fragility. With its suite of recent recommendations, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, the DAC aims to refine and improve the support provided to fragile contexts and other developing countries, underscoring its critical function as a standard-setting body for development co-operation. At the same time, providers outside the DAC including the People’s Republic of China, Gulf Cooperation Council countries and Russia are increasing the scale and scope of their activities in fragile contexts.

This chapter explores how these external actors can better support fragile contexts to develop urgently needed resilience and coping capacities for this new age of crises. It does not offer a standard set of recommendations or prescriptions for effective actions, since navigating fragility is not linear or straightforward and interventions must always be tailored to the needs of a specific context. Rather, this chapter presents ambitions to guide the DAC and other partners in supporting the 1.9 billion people – the furthest behind – who live in fragile contexts. Embracing a multidimensional approach to crises and fragility, promoting collective action, and bridging the divide between development and peace can help the DAC retain and express its core values while co-operating with this broader constellation of actors.

Ambition 1: Embracing a multidimensional approach

A recurring theme of the States of Fragility report series is the need to pursue a multidimensional approach to addressing fragility. Such an approach is a starting point for partners to be “fit for fragility” (Schreiber and Loudon, 2020[2]). It also reflects the emphasis on joint analysis in the DAC Recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus (OECD, 2019[3]). The multidimensionality of fragility is increasingly acknowledged but implementing multidimensional approaches remains a challenge as it often requires strategic collaboration and collective action. But even incremental progress towards a multidimensional approach can yield important and lasting dividends.

Place a premium on data and analysis first

A sound analysis of multidimensional fragility is a prerequisite to effective action. Focusing on a single dimension of fragility at the expense of others, or focusing exclusively on risks without considering accompanying coping capacities or opportunities to overcome and counterbalance such risks, gives a partial perspective of fragility. This can contribute to blind spots in engagement. Like others, the OECD has attempted to improve the conceptualisation of fragility over time, most recently by adding a sixth dimension of fragility – the human dimension – to its analytical framework. The quality of data available is just as important to usefully capture this multidimensionality. While data quality has improved, fragile contexts are still among the most data-deprived (Hoogeveen and Pape, 2020[4]). Contexts at the extreme end of fragility are often missing from datasets. The 2022 review of the OECD’s multidimensional fragility framework highlighted the degree to which additional investments in data would improve analysis, and therefore programming, in fragile contexts.

Investments in data quality, new methods, joint analysis and multidimensional analysis have practical value for how partners approach strategies and programmes. A multidimensional analysis helps identify complex risks, their root causes and potential points of intervention and avoid a singular focus on the symptoms or by-products of fragility (OECD, 2018[5]). Joint analysis can help increase, strategically align and co-ordinate interventions across the HDP nexus (OECD, 2022[6]). The DAC has the potential to be an important proponent of fragility analysis as a unifying concept, especially given its standard-setting role. As a body for peer learning, the DAC can also facilitate opportunities for its members and partners to share learning on better methods and means of fragility analysis, particularly at the country level. This includes supporting research capacity and fragility analysis within fragile contexts themselves to ensure that knowledge is more equitably shared with those for whom it matters most (Jacquet, 2021[7]). In this way, the DAC can continue to contribute to the mainstreaming of the concept and analysis of multidimensional fragility.

Adopt context-wide understanding to strengthen the effectiveness of individual projects and approaches

To address the multidimensional character of fragility, it is important for actors to move beyond overly narrow sectoral approaches and consider factors such as the broader context that may have an impact on the desired outcomes. One tool is systems thinking. Iterative and adaptive programming, rooted in sound analysis, is increasingly recognised as an essential element of development effectiveness in the unpredictable and complex environments of fragile contexts (Desai and Yabe, 2022[8]; OECD, 2022[6]). But this requires a whole-of-context understanding and approach that identifies the varied ways in which a particular intervention may succeed or fail due to the dynamics present in any given context. Such an approach is especially conducive to effective policy and programming on cross-cutting issues, such as the trends discussed in Chapter 1 as well as gender equality and women’s empowerment (OECD, 2022[9]). This context-wide understanding of fragility can also help identify entry points for more systems-focused approaches, such as those aimed at building the resilience of basic services (OECD, 2014[10]). The development of programmes to boost COVID-19 vaccination rates illustrates what such an approach looks like. Beyond simply providing vaccine doses or strengthening supply chains, such programmes must also contend with societal perceptions of vaccination as well as the political economy of vaccine distribution in a particular context or insecurity that may restrict vaccination in certain areas.

Ambition 2: Promoting collective action in financing, policy and programming

As outlined in Chapter 2, ODA is a vital resource for fragile contexts. It is essential support in crises, especially where humanitarian actors confront chronic fragility. At a global level, ODA tends to be stable and resilient over time and amid crises (Ahmad et al., 2020[11]), though its distribution across countries and contexts, policy priorities, and modalities may change. Local-level crises may shift donors’ focus towards humanitarian action while enduring, global-level crises may alter the role of ODA – for example, towards just energy transitions and away from investment in fossil fuels (OECD, 2021[12]).

Safeguard and strengthen official development assistance

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is an event that is likely to challenge the role of ODA and alter its composition. Some donors have indicated that they plan to redirect ODA to cover the costs of hosting Ukrainian refugees in their countries, and this may result in less country-programmable aid to meet the growing demand arising from the global impacts of the war (Ahmad and Carey, 2022[13]). This is happening at a time when the universal aspects of fragility, highlighted by shocks like the COVID-19 pandemic, underline the importance of maintaining a focus on fragile contexts (Oldekop et al., 2020[14]). Given existing pressures on ODA budgets and on livelihoods in fragile contexts, it is important for the DAC to move to protect ODA volumes, reinforce the predictability of ODA and strengthen confidence around ODA, especially in fragile contexts without access to other sources of finance for development.

Capitalise on existing mechanisms and processes such as country platforms and financing strategies

Protecting ODA volumes, while necessary, is insufficient to support fragile contexts towards positive development trajectories. It is equally if not more important to ensure that every ODA dollar works harder and better to further development gains and also that different actors are working in coherent, complementary and co-ordinated ways, including beyond ODA-funded activities (OECD, 2022[6]; OECD, forthcoming[15]). Development partners often lack an understanding or appreciation of the activities of their counterparts in the peace and security space and vice versa (Zürcher, 2020[16]). Financing, including for peace and prevention, is often piecemeal and fragmented (Day and Caus, 2020[17]; OECD, forthcoming[15]). Holistic approaches such as country platforms and financing strategies can help harness collective action in fragile contexts, thereby contributing to development effectiveness, and can complement existing analyses and processes at the country level.1 To date, such analyses have not been systematically linked with a sound theory of change, raising questions regarding resourcing and programming at the strategic, collective level across the funding ecosystem. Country platforms and financing strategies offer the potential to facilitate these links and promote more cohesive ways of working:

• Country platforms can serve as the centre of gravity for collective action and evidence-based dialogue by the government, development partners and other relevant actors in fragile contexts around a shared agenda and a clear focus on results and mutual accountability. Such platforms come in different guises but generally consist of a high-level steering group, sectoral working groups and a secretariat. There is sufficient evidence of their effectiveness in Mozambique, Rwanda and Somalia to merit further consideration (Kelly and Papoulidis, 2022[18]). Though not new, these platforms are experiencing a resurgence, with recent mentions by the G20 Eminent Persons Group on Global Financing Governance (2020[19]) and the Just Energy Transition Partnership and Group of Seven members in the context of climate action for COP26 (Hadley et al., 2022[20]). The success of such platforms depends on the leadership of the government, the inclusiveness of their representation, and the innovative features that are built into their structure and function. They can provide an institutional anchor for strengthening effective development interventions and partnerships through continuous reflection, dialogue and action around the results of the monitoring exercise of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC).

• Financing strategies: An absolute lack of funding is sometimes, but not always, the main problem. While humanitarian actors’ centralised cluster system is well established, it is often also overloaded. The development system has resources but is not always collectively strategic and lacks clear prioritisation, clear choices, an interface between humanitarian development and peace, and connection to national reform agendas. Financing strategies are called for in the DAC HDP nexus Recommendation to help deal with these issues and bring together the main players from the humanitarian, development and (ideally) peace pillars for the strategic budget and programming process. These financing strategies can also provide a mechanism to connect the goals, activities and expertise of HDP actors with national, macro-level financing strategies such as integrated national financing frameworks2 national development plans and results frameworks or to transition towards such national, government-led processes (OECD, forthcoming[15]; OECD, 2019[3]). Under the leadership of the national government, these high-level frameworks bring together diverse actors, including the International Monetary Fund and other international finance institutions. However, they have not traditionally included consideration of either humanitarian or security funding, risks and vulnerabilities, and they are not generally linked to collective outcomes or priorities to address fragility across humanitarian, development and peace actors.

Use collective approaches to drive better prioritisation for more effective results

As ODA budgets come under increasing domestic and international pressure, joining together to prioritise support to and within the most fragile contexts has never been more important (Green, 2021[21]). DAC members’ priorities for assistance to fragile contexts are broadly aligned, with significant convergence of effort on climate and biodiversity action, decent work and inclusive economic growth, peaceful and inclusive societies, gender equality and women’s empowerment, and health as the top five (Marley, Stasieluk and Hesemann, 2022[22]). Yet, in action within a fragile context, this convergence can break down. It is common to hear of disconnected projects (cash transfers, for example), gaps or overlaps in geographical or demographic targeting, or missing linkages that mean project or sectoral outcomes fail to translate into higher-level results. Given the financial pressures on donors and partners, collective approaches (including building on the experience of pooled funding for fragile contexts) could help with prioritisation and complementarity among donors and partners. One potential approach in some contexts is joint programming (Box 3.1).

Box 3.1. Strategic guidance on joint programming: The example of the European Union

Joint programming is one end of a spectrum that can also include increased alignment or co-ordination. The joint programming process of the European Union (EU), launched in 2011 and adapted as part of its 2020 Team Europe Initiative, harnesses the collective potential of the EU and its member states. It promotes joint analysis of and responses to identified challenges and opportunities in partner contexts. This approach also includes support for the development of priorities and associated financing strategies “based on the EU's values and interests and in support of [a] country's national development” (European Union, 2022[23]). As of August 2022, the EU supports 31 joint programming initiatives in fragile contexts, accounting for 48.4% of its joint programming countries worldwide. This approach is an attempt to address development assistance programmes that had become fragmented and less effective. In 2018, the OECD noted that the joint programming approach added value “by harmonising efforts pragmatically around joint analysis, commonly agreed objectives [and] a clearer division of labour within sectors” (OECD, 2018, p. 83[24]). For example, in Lao People’s Democratic Republic, donor and partner activities are aligned across three priority areas: green and inclusive economy, human capital, and good governance.

Note: Other examples of joint programming have been applied by Belgium, Denmark and the United Nations Development Programme. Belgium used a Fragility Assessment Management Exercise, or FRAME tool, for a more systemic identification of solutions to challenges during the different phases of a programme cycle.

Sources: European Union (2022[23]), Team Europe Initiative and Joint Programming tracker (dashboard), https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/tei-jp-tracker/dashboard; European Union (2022[25]), Capacity4Dev: Team Europe Initiatives - Laos, https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/tei-jp-tracker/laos?tab=tei; OECD (2018[24]), OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews: European Union 2018, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264309494-en; Okai (2021[26]), UNDP Support to Conflict-affected Countries, https://www.undp.org/speeches/undp-support-conflict-affected-countries; Lundsgaard (2019[27]), "Danish development cooperation in fragile states”, https://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/2998922/DIIS_Working_Paper_2019_10_final.pdf; OECD (2020[28]), OECD Development Cooperation Peer Reviews: Belgium 2020, https://doi.org/10.1787/026f1aad-en.

Ambition 3: Bridging the divide between development and peace

The cases of Afghanistan, the Sahel and South Sudan, among others, provide ample evidence of the pitfalls of existing ways of working. More generally, these examples highlight the consequences of a lack of communication and interaction between the development and peace pillars of the nexus. Prevention is at the core of effective ways of working across the HDP nexus. Yet investments in conflict prevention are chronically underfunded relative to development and humanitarian investments. Alongside a lack of resourcing is the persistent inability of actors to strike a balance between their development and peace activities. This, in turn, has contributed to the securitisation of development co-operation and disjointed management of peace processes, leading to outcomes that consistently fall short of ambitions.

Renew and prioritise the case for prevention

Acknowledging the distinction between conflict and fragility – the multidimensional nature of fragility emphasised throughout this report – can help drive more comprehensive and incisive forms of prevention. The analysis presented and reflected in this report shows that the business case for prevention remains strong while more and more analytical concepts and tools are emerging that can drive effective implementation. However, notwithstanding the United Nations Secretary-General’s prevention agenda, development partners have not yet embraced crisis prevention or conflict prevention at scale. For prevention to work, it must be conducted in a holistic cross-cutting manner by development, peace and, where appropriate, humanitarian actors. This means seeing the interconnected nature of fragility and conflict risks instead of worrying about potential interference between agendas. Security-led approaches in isolation cannot address the underlying root causes to ensure long-term prevention3 (Day and Caus, 2020[29]). For development and peace partners, this will require a leap of faith, mutual trust, leadership, and a willingness to take risks with theory and practice on prevention for the possibility of better outcomes.

Build dialogue between peace and development, including conflict-sensitive engagement on issues of economic fragility

It is important for the DAC and its partners to address the incoherence between peace and development actors that are curtailing effectiveness in many fragile contexts. Addressing the substance and extent of communications would be a valuable first step. Doing so, however, is a political endeavour that requires a long-term engagement that is in direct contrast to the apolitical short-termism that characterises existing investments in peace (Cheng, Goodhand and Meehan, 2018[30]). Such a lack of attention to the primacy of politics has contributed to technocratic interventions in peacebuilding that have not reckoned with the underlying political settlements that shape incentives towards or against violence (Brown, 2022[31]) – often abruptly, as shown in the analysis in Chapter 1 of coup events in recent years. Interacting with such political settlements, therefore, is an important but underappreciated element of effective development co-operation. It goes hand in hand with existing efforts to promote conflict sensitivity, particularly at local levels, and requires moving beyond efforts to promote negative peace – or simply the absence of conflict – to positive peace or activities that involve the fostering of just, equitable and peaceful societies (Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013, pp. 779-789[32]). All these initiatives are important precursors to addressing the incoherence between development and peace activities.

The DAC and INCAF can therefore play an important role by capitalising on their convening power to help resolve the communications deficit between development and peace actors and contribute to more politically aware and politically informed ways of engagement. More regular dialogue between development, peace and security actors would help mitigate risks that contribute to incoherence at the global or country-specific level. Such exchanges would be especially fruitful if they included officials from international finance institutions, which have an increased footprint in peace and prevention activities in fragile contexts, as well as United Nations peace operations and other regional security providers such as the African Union, NATO, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. The exchanges can also help actors build on each other’s comparative advantage and pursue opportunities for collective action, such as through the mechanisms outlined in Ambition 2 on collective action. Specific issues such as renewing peace agreements (Berdal, 2021, pp. 137-164[33]) or security sector reform and assistance provide an ideal entry point for such dialogue, given their relevance for peace processes and longer-term development objectives. The OECD will aim to provide such a forum for development and peace dialogues at the DAC and INCAF in the coming year.

Leverage the DAC’s voice to provide strategic leadership in an age of crises

Having a strategy for development co-operation means recognising the importance of immediate needs but maintaining a focus on the longer term and what is essential, on the causes rather than just the symptoms of fragility (Freedman, 2013, p. ix[34]). Addressing this critical effectiveness tension requires a dedicated and in-depth reflection by the DAC around the behaviour changes that are needed across their policies, systems and partnerships at both headquarter and country level to create an enabling environment for achieving longer term sustainable development impact. Through its ability to understand, assess and communicate on issues affecting development co-operation in fragile contexts, the DAC has unexplored potential as a strategic voice for development co-operation. The worldwide shocks, crises and geopolitical uncertainty highlighted in this report are challenging the DAC to evolve anew as a global leader. The ambitions outlined above can help development partners find pathways through uncertainty and crises. For the DAC, this new evolution also means reconsidering how it uses its leadership role consistent with that of the “servant leader, in tune with the surrounding world, open to new ideas, and ready to lead among peers but not dominate” (OECD DAC, 2017[35]), including for instance by leveraging its collective engagement as a grouping of donors at country level. With the DAC in this role, existing DAC values, principles and body of recommendations could be complemented by the provision of a strategic perspective to concentrate the focus, capability and collective potential of DAC members and partners to deal with multidimensional fragility.

References

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Notes

← 1.  Examples include national development plans, voluntary national reviews against the SDGs; Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessments, especially in the post-crisis phase; Common Country Analyses; United Nations Sustainable Development Co-operation Frameworks; Country Partnership Frameworks and similar exercises; and in some contexts, collective outcomes processes.

← 2.  Integrated national financing frameworks have emerged in developing countries, including fragile contexts. They are centred on national budgets, national development plans and achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals but generally require a certain level of government capacity, legitimacy and leadership. See https://inff.org/assets/resource/state-of-inffs-2022_report.pdf.

← 3.  The cited research conducted by Day and Caus focuses on the implications of the role of climate change in exacerbating today’s conflict risks, but their points on prevention are understood as having broader applications across dimensions of fragility.