Western Balkans Competitiveness Outlook 2024: Albania

7. Anti-corruption policy

Abstract

An effective anti-corruption policy is essential for promoting fair competition. This chapter, along four sub-dimensions, explores the effectiveness of the prevention, investigation and prosecution of corruption cases. The first sub‑dimension, anti-corruption policy and risk management, assesses the planning, co-ordination and monitoring of anti-corruption policies, including corruption risk assessments and corruption proofing of legislation. The second sub-dimension, prevention of corruption, focuses on anti-corruption public-awareness as well as the effectiveness of the legal framework regarding corruption prevention bodies, conflicts of interest, and whistleblower protection. The third sub-dimension, business integrity and corporate liability, explores the robustness of the framework for businesses integrity and regulatory mechanisms, as well as the liability of legal persons. The fourth sub-dimension, investigation and prosecution, assesses the capacities of specialised anti-corruption investigative and prosecutorial bodies in investigating and prosecuting high-level corruption cases.

Key findings

Albania has the highest score of the WB6 economies for the anti-corruption policy dimension, outperforming the region notably in the areas of corruption prevention as well as investigation and prosecution (Table 7.1). The economy has an elaborate anti-corruption policy in place, but its overall strategic, legal and institutional framework to prevent and combat corruption has changed little since the previous Competitiveness Outlook (CO). While the economy made significant efforts to improve practices in several areas, including the assessment of corruption risk as well as the control of assets and conflicts of interest, limited legislative reforms are the main factor that prevented even stronger progress.

Table 7.1. Albania’s scores for anti-corruption policy

Dimension	Sub-dimension	2018 score	2021 score	2024 score	2024 WB6 average
Anti-corruption	6.1: Anti-corruption policy and risk assessment			2.8	2.4
	6.2: Prevention of corruption			3.5	2.9
	6.3: Business integrity and corporate liability			2.0	1.9
	6.4: Investigation and prosecution			3.8	2.4
Albania’s overall score		1.8	2.1	3.2	2.5

Notes: Scores for 2024 are not directly comparable to the 2021 scores due changes in the scoring methodology of this indicator. Sub‑dimension 3 as well as several indicators in the other sub-dimensions is scored for the first time in this assessment. Therefore, changes in the scores may reflect the change in methodology more than actual changes to policy.

The key findings are:

• The Ministry of Justice has continuously monitored the implementation of the anti-corruption strategy and action plan based on a sophisticated methodology and reported publicly on implementation progress. In 2024 the monitoring became the responsibility of the new State Minister for Public Administration and Anti-Corruption. However, statutory obligations to carry out corruption risk assessments and corruption proofing of legislation have not been introduced.

• Albania has established several anti-corruption institutions with growing human-financial resources. Considered together, the Ministry of Justice until 2024 and now the State Minister in its capacity as the National Anti-Corruption Co-ordinator (NACC), and the High Inspectorate for the Declaration and Audit of Assets and Conflicts of Interest (HIDAACI), have comprehensive competency and powers for prevention of corruption, and performance reports reveal extensive activity in their areas of competency.

• In 2022, a new digital system for declarations of assets and interests by public officials was launched. However, plans to publish the declared data on line under the new system are yet to be implemented.

• The Law on Whistleblowing and Whistleblower Protection protects whistleblowers in the public and private sectors, but it significantly deviates from the relevant EU Directive. For the time being, only corruption can be the subject of whistleblowing, whereas external whistleblowing (i.e. reporting to the HIDAACI) is subject to conditions and the law strips the whistleblower of the right to protection once they make a public announcement.

• The law establishes the liability of legal persons for all criminal offences, but corporate liability is not clearly autonomous and the upper limit of fines for certain corruption offences is low. The number of cases where liability for legal persons has been applied for corruption is limited.

• Albania has achieved a moderate track record of convictions for high-level corruption, with the number of final sanctions for high-level corruption that entail imprisonment without conditional or other type of releases increasing since 2018. The Special Anti-Corruption Structure (SPAK), comprising the Special Prosecutor’s Office (SPO) and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), has strong safeguards of independence, a growing albeit not yet sufficient resource base, and a relatively successful early performance record.

State of play and key developments

The perceived level of corruption for Albania has not changed significantly since 2018. On a scale from ‑2.5 (worst) to +2.5 (best), Albania’s score in the World Bank’s Control of Corruption Indicator has slightly improved, from ‑0.55 in 2018 to ‑0.41 in 2022, which is also reflected in a higher global ranking (Table 7.2). Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index also reflects limited change. On a scale from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean), Albania scored between 35 and 37 in the period 2018‑23, which is below the Western Balkan regional average.

Table 7.2. Albania’s perceived anti-corruption policy performance in 2018-23

	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Control of Corruption Indicator
ALB (percentile rank)	33.33	32.28	31.43	31.91	38.68
ALB (score)	-0.55	-0.56	-0.57	-0.58	-0.41
WB6 (score)	-0.41	-0.45	-0.44	-0.41	-0.38
Corruption Perceptions Index
ALB (rank)	99/180	106/180	104/180	101/180	101/180	98/180
ALB (score)	36	35	36	35	36	37
WB6 (score)	38.67	37.67	37.5	38.67	38.67	39.50

Notes: Percentile rank (0-100) indicates rank of economy among all economies in the world; (0 corresponds to lowest rank and 100 corresponds to highest rank).

Sources: World Bank (2023[1]); Transparency International (2023[2]).

Regarding the fight against corruption, less than half of Albania’s population agreed that the government fights corruption successfully. Although the share who believe government efforts are successful increased significantly in 2021, reaching 43% (RCC, 2021[3]) compared to 25% in 2020 (RCC, 2020[4]), the evidence of changes are inconclusive, as it consists of only a single data point without any follow-up data regarding the sustainability of the trend. Indeed, the Institute for Democracy and Mediation, which has been conducting regular surveys, consistently reveals sceptical public opinion. For example, in its 2021 survey, 68% of respondents indicated having no confidence in the prosecution of grand corruption cases, only marginally less than in 2019 (71%) (IDM, 2022[5]). In 2022, another survey revealed a somewhat indecisive public sentiment where respondents rated the Albanian Government’s efforts in combating corruption over the past year. The results showed that 7% perceived a noticeable or significant improvement, 26% noted a slight improvement, 40% felt that the condition had remained the same, and 26% believed that the situation had worsened (Hallunaj and Strati, 2023[6]). Therefore, it is not possible to confirm that Albania has reached a turning point in its efforts to combat corruption.

Sub-dimension 6.1: Anti-corruption policy and risk assessment

The Inter-Sectoral Anti-Corruption Strategy (ISACS) 2015-23 and the Action Plan 2020-23 form Albania’s anti-corruption policy framework and include the key components of anti-corruption policies: prevention, repression and awareness raising. The Action Plan specifies necessary and available funding amounts for related activities as well as gaps between the needed and secured sums. As reported by the 22 responsible implementing institutions, the state budget funding spent on prevention, repression and awareness-raising activities experienced an increase from ALL 124.4 million (around EUR 1.03 million) in 2021 to ALL 348.7 million (around EUR 3.39 million) spent on such activities between January and June 2023. The Ministry of Justice in its capacity as the National Anti-Corruption Co-ordinator (NACC) has published an outline of the new ISACS 2023-30 (Ministry of Justice, 2022[7]), but the document has not yet been adopted. Since 2024, however, the new State Minister for Public Administration and Anti-Corruption has assumed the position of NACC, replacing the Ministry of Justice in this capacity.

Albania has developed an advanced system of performance monitoring, with the Directorate of Anti‑Corruption Programs and Projects of the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) monitoring the implementation of the ISACS. This responsibility now falls on the new State Minister for Public Administration and Anti‑Corruption, as the NACC since January 2024. In 2018, the Cabinet of Ministers approved the passport of measurable indicators to assess realisation of the strategy’s objectives. Each implementing institution reported to the MoJ, among others, the level of implementation of its activities and problems encountered, while the Ministry of Justice in its former role as the NACC reported on the ISACS’ overall progress to the public. In quantitative terms, the level of implementation is approximately two-thirds of envisaged activities: in 2022, the target values were achieved regarding 14 out of 21 performance indicators in corruption prevention, 7 out of 9 in corruption repression and 3 out of 7 in awareness raising (NACC, 2023[8]).

While the Ministry of Justice as NACC has been engaged in consultations with civil society and, notably, solicits comments on draft monitoring reports of the ISACS through online calls for consultation, the published information suggests that contributions by civil society actors are usually limited. In 2023, the Ministry of Justice also held online consultations on priority policy measures, including on the Roadmap for the Rule of Law Chapter 23, “The Judiciary and Fundamental Rights”, a planning document which outlines measures to address findings by the European Commission for Chapter 23. With the State Minister for Public Administration and Anti-Corruption having assumed the position of NACC in January 2024, the potential implications of this for the development of the ISACS are uncertain. However, it's worth noting that the new NACC's responsibilities encompass participation in formulating national anti‑corruption strategy and policies.

There is no legal obligation for public agencies to carry out corruption risk assessment but increasingly systematic engagement in this activity has been developing. The Action Plan 2020-23 for the ISACS 2015-23 envisaged the development of integrity plans, including the implementation of risk assessment, by all ministries and subordinate institutions. The Ministry of Justice has published the Integrity Risk Assessment Methodology for Institutions of Central Government (2020) (Sulstarova, 2020[9]) and the Methodological Instrument of Integrity Plan Monitoring in Central Institutions (2021) (Ministry of Justice, 2021[10]), on the basis of which all ministries have completed risk assessments and approved integrity plans (NACC, 2023[8]). In 2023, the implementation of risk assessments and development of integrity plans proceeded in institutions subordinate to ministries, with an estimated rate of completion of 50% by the end of June 2023 (Ministry of Justice, 2023[11]). While corruption risk assessments directly lead to actions in the integrity plans based on established methodology, no analysis or evaluation of risk assessment results and effects is carried out at the national level.

The law does not envisage corruption proofing of legislation. The decree of the Minister of Justice on the Unified Methodology for Drafting Normative Acts (2022) requires that public authorities and persons participating in the development of normative acts must ensure that they do not create gaps for corruption. Drafts must be subject to evaluation of “spaces for corruption” according to the rules laid down in the Manual for Drafting Legislation (2021). According to the authorities, the Ministry of Justice has assessed 186 draft laws and 990 draft decisions of the Council of Ministers based on established methodology, but limited evidence is available about the practical impact of the practice. The Ministry of Justice, in co-operation with the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) presence in Tirana, the Regional Anti-Corruption Initiative (RAI) and the Albanian School of Public Administration, has organised training in this area in 2022 and 2023.

Sub-dimension 6.2: Prevention of corruption

Albania has two corruption prevention bodies with growing human-financial resources. Considered together, the Ministry of Justice in its former capacity as the NACC managing a co-ordination network, and the High Inspectorate for the Declaration and Audit of Assets and Conflicts of Interest (HIDAACI) had comprehensive competency and powers for prevention of corruption. Within the Ministry of Justice, the General Directorate of Anti-Corruption (GDAC) performed multiple tasks such as managing the Network of Anti-Corruption Co-ordinators (Network of ACCs), verifying and investigating abusive, corrupt or arbitrary practices; planning, co-ordinating and monitoring anti-corruption policies; developing anti‑corruption projects; and proposing new activities. The Network of ACCs was comprised of co-ordinators from 44 central institutions and several regional institutions, which, among others, conduct administrative investigations. The director and staff of the GDAC were selected and appointed subject to regulations of civil service, and the unit is accountable to the Minister of Justice. As such it was under control of the political leadership and had no special safeguards for independence. Notably, it was the Minister of Justice who forwarded reports on administrative violations or files of suspected criminal offences prepared by the GDAC to the competent bodies. In 2018-22, the number of employees of the GDAC increased from 6 to 27, which signifies a growing capacity of the unit. With the State Minister for Public Administration and Anti-Corruption having assumed the role of NACC in January 2024, this assessment has not been able to assess and analyse whether new structures emerged following this change in role.

The HIDAACI is a legally independent institution, established in 2003 and headed by the Inspector General. Parliament oversees the body and appoints the Inspector General following an open call for candidates. In the first vote, the support from three-fifths of all members of parliament is required to appoint the Inspector General but a simple majority suffices if the first vote fails. While the number of staff of the HIDAACI has remained constant between 2018 and 2022 at 70 (including 40 inspectors), the annual budget has been increasing from ALL 136 349 100 (around EUR 1.09 million) in 2018 to ALL 191 479 000 (around EUR 1.67 million) in 2022. In 2022, the Council of Europe’s anti-corruption monitoring body, Groupe d'États contre la corruption (GRECO), found that its recommendation to provide necessary legal, human, financial and other resources to the HIDAACI has been implemented satisfactorily by Albania’s authorities (GRECO, 2023[12]).

Albania has rather strict rules on conflicts of interest, but its track record of enforcement is unclear. The HIDAACI is the central authority responsible for overseeing compliance and enforcing the Law on Prevention of Conflict of Interest in the Exercise of Public Functions (adopted in 2005). The Law defines actual, potential and apparent conflicts of interest as well as different kinds of private interests. The rules apply in a comprehensive manner to officials and employees of central and local state institutions, including enterprises and organisations controlled by the state. A public official is obliged to make a case-by-case self-declaration of private interests that may cause a conflict of interest. However, making the self-declaration is voluntary in cases where community, ethnical or religious relationships, or friendship or enmity may cause the conflict. The law prescribes measures of resolution of conflicts of interest in detail but rules concerning post-employment restrictions are scarce. The HIDAACI investigates conflicts of interest and checks compliance with prohibitions and restrictions applicable to public officials (such as restrictions on entering contracts with public institutions). Data on the track record of enforcement of the conflict-of-interest rules remain of poor quality. The statistics on fines imposed by the HIDAACI merge different violations with no possibility to determine the share of fines related to conflicts of interest. The authorities also do not possess aggregated data on the number of invalidated acts and contracts concluded under conditions of conflict of interest.

Albania has a strong track record of effectively enforcing asset and interest disclosure based on declarations submitted by public officials upon taking office, on an annual basis during their time in office, and after leaving office. The Law on the Declaration and Audit of Assets, Financial Obligations of the Elected Persons and Certain Public Officials, adopted in 2003, applies to a comprehensive circle of high- and mid-level public officials as well as to candidates for various positions within the justice system institutions. The obligation to submit asset and interest declarations does not cover all members of regional councils and executives of all state-owned enterprises (SOEs). While the content of these declarations covers information relevant to monitoring the economic situation and interests of the individual, there appear to be gaps, including the absence of an explicit requirement to declare beneficial ownership or virtual assets (for example, cryptocurrencies). The HIDAACI administers the declaration system and carries out verifications. In 2021, the HIDAACI administered and arithmetically checked 4 032 declarations, of which 802 were fully verified (Institute for Democracy and Mediation, 2023[13]). Based on the verifications, if signs of criminal offences are detected, the HIDAACI regularly refers cases to law enforcement for further investigation (72 cases in 2020, 15 cases in 2021, 37 cases in 2022) (European Commission, 2023[14]). However, the effectiveness of law enforcement in following up on these cases remains unclear.

On 1 January 2022, the HIDAACI launched a new digitalised system for declaration of assets and interests, and has since only accepted declarations in electronic form (GRECO, 2023[12]). The introduction of the digitalised system required multiple efforts to familiarise users with it, establish inter-institutional co-operation to ensure connection or integration with other systems, ensure security of the data against cyberattacks, and approve electronic declaration forms (HIDAACI, 2023[15]). Under the new system, Albania also announced plans to publish the declared data on line, a departure from the previous practice of releasing information only upon request. The total number of administrative fines imposed by the HIDAACI has increased from 33 in 2020 to 128 in 2022, reversing the observed decrease in 2017-20. The authorities reported that a significant part of these fines concern non-compliance related to asset and interest disclosure, but the HIDAACI does not provide precise disaggregated information on the nature of these violations. The re-evaluation or vetting process for judges and prosecutors that Albania launched in 2016 also comprises a component of asset assessment, which aims to ensure that the wealth of judiciary officials can be accounted for by legal income earned in the past.

The Law on Whistleblowing and Whistleblower Protection adopted in 2016 protects whistleblowers and applies to the public and private sectors. The whistleblower is entitled to confidentiality and protection from any retaliation measures. Yet, the law deviates in several important ways from EU Directive 2019/1937 on the protection of persons who report breaches of European Union law. It envisages the presumption of good faith of the whistleblower unless the contrary is proven, but the good faith standard itself may lead to unfair deprivation of protection as it opens an avenue for construing accusations against the whistleblower. Moreover, only corruption can be the subject of whistleblowing under Albanian law. Whistleblowing can be internal and external, by reporting to the HIDAACI, but external whistleblowing is subject to potentially deterring conditions such as well-grounded reasons to be sceptical about the integrity and impartiality of the responsible unit within the organisation. The law also removes the whistleblower’s right to protection once they publicly disclose allegations of corruption; does not provide protection for facilitators of whistleblowing and people connected to the whistleblower; and contains several other loopholes to the detriment of whistleblowers (Devine and Worth, 2021[16]). Overall, whistleblowing activity in Albania has been relatively low, with 19 reports on whistleblowing in 2022 (Table 7.3). In 2018-22, the HIDAACI received eight requests for protection and, in most cases, found no acts of retaliation. There is no independent evidence available regarding the effectiveness of whistleblower protection, criminal cases initiated, or other consequences resulting from whistleblowing.

Table 7.3. Whistleblower activity in Albania in 2018-22

	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Internal whistleblower reports	5	12	7	9	6
External whistleblower reports	16	14	9	11	13
Total whistleblower reports	21	26	16	20	19

Source: Based on data provided by Albania’s authorities in the context of the Competitiveness Outlook 2024 assessment.

Albania has been implementing various activities for anti-corruption public awareness and education. The MoJ adopts annual communication and visibility plans to raise public awareness about the fight against corruption. For instance, in March 2022, anti-corruption videos were displayed on the streets of Tirana to promote the Network of ACCs; an anti-corruption awareness event was organised with students of the Academy of Arts in April 2022; and the MoJ holds educational activities at high schools. The Ministry of Justice has also prepared and published in 2022 information materials such as the Anti‑Corruption Glossary1 and the Anti-Corruption Guide.2 In addition, training activities have taken place, including training provided by the HIDAACI in 2019-23 to 1 287 representatives of public authorities who are responsible for managing the process of declaring private interests. Similarly, government officials received training in 2022 on the Ministerial Code of Ethics and the rules of integrity. The GDAC bears responsibility for the co-ordination of awareness-raising and education efforts, with six staff members engaged in this area. However, little information is available on the national funding amounts allocated to awareness-raising and education activities, which makes it difficult to assess the adequacy and sustainability of financial resources. Moreover, while monitoring reports of the ISACS track public information and education activities, the effectiveness of particular measures is not evaluated.

Sub-dimension 6.3: Business integrity and corporate liability

Albania’s policy framework for strengthening business integrity is limited. The legal framework does not explicitly envisage corruption risk management in companies and, according to reports by the authorities in the context of this assessment, there is no out-of-court mechanism to address grievances of companies. The non-binding Corporate Governance Code envisages the responsibility of company boards for risk oversight and the creation of a system of internal control, but there is no evidence available about its implementation or other concrete business integrity practices. Albania used to participate in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), a global standard for transparency and accountability in the management of natural resources, but its participation was suspended as of November 2023 due to missed reporting deadlines.

Concerning the transparency of beneficial owners, Albania adopted a Law on the Register of Beneficial Owners in 2020 and launched the register in 2021. According to the Law, certain data on beneficial owners are freely accessible to the public, and the remaining data are available to any person who proves a legitimate interest. The definition of a beneficial owner reflects the definition in the EU anti‑money laundering directives. In 2022, 360 sanctions were applied for failure to submit for registration or update information on beneficial owners, demonstrating a comparatively good track record.

In line with international practice, legal persons' liability is applicable to all criminal offences. According to the Penal Code and the Law on Penal Liability of Legal Persons (adopted in 2007), a legal person will be held accountable for criminal offences that have been committed in its name or for its benefit, by its bodies and representatives; by a person who is under the authority of the person representing, directing and administering the legal person; or due to the lack of control or supervision by the person who directs, represents and administers the legal person. Albania’s legislation does not clearly establish corporate liability as autonomous, possibly requiring the conviction of a natural person for the liability of the legal person to be applied. However, an in-depth assessment to clarify whether the conviction of a natural person-perpetrator is a prerequisite for the liability of the legal person in practice would require a review of case law. The law envisages fines and the termination of the legal entity as main penalties for (corruption) offences by legal persons. The upper limit of fines for a legal person for offences with a maximum prison sentence of less than seven years, such as active corruption of public officials and active trading in influence, is up to ALL 5 million (around EUR 48 000), which is low relative to the possible scale of large corruption transactions. The elimination of organisational shortcomings that resulted in the criminal offence is a mitigating circumstance. The general level of enforcement of liability of legal persons for corruption offences appears low. According to the data provided by the authorities, no sanctions were imposed on legal persons for corruption offences in 2018-20, but non-monetary sanctions were imposed in two cases in both 2021 and 2022. More detailed statistics on the detection, investigation, prosecution, trial and sanctions imposed on legal persons are not available for public access on line.

Sub-dimension 6.4: Investigation and prosecution

Albania continues its efforts regarding the investigation and prosecution of high-level corruption and has achieved a moderate track record of convictions in recent years. As shown in Table 7.4, convictions for high-level corruption by first-instance courts rose to four persons in 2022 with the same amount of sanctions applied that entail imprisonment without conditional or other type of release.

Table 7.4. Convictions and sanctions for high-level corruption in 2018-22

	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Persons convicted for high-level corruption by first-instance courts	2	0	2	0	4
Number of final sanctions for high-level corruption that entail imprisonment without conditional or other type of release	2	2	0	2	4

Source: Based on data provided by Albania’s authorities in the context of the Competitiveness Outlook 2024 assessment.

Prominent recent examples include a two-year jail sentence for the former prosecutor general for concealing assets valued at approximately EUR 1 million (Hoxhaj, 2021[17]), and in 2023 the almost seven‑year jail sentence for a former environment minister and conviction of several other individuals in a case related to a government-awarded concessionary agreement worth EUR 28 million for building and operating a waste incinerator (Erebara, 2023[18]). Altogether in 2020-22, the Special Prosecutor’s Office (SPO) investigated cases concerning 25 former high-level officials, including 8 former judges, 3 former public prosecutors, 2 former members of parliament, 1 former deputy minister, 1 member of the Independent Qualification Commission and 4 former mayors (SPAK, 2023[19]). The authorities stated that confiscation is routinely applied in high-level corruption cases, with confiscation orders being fully executed in at least half of such cases in 2021-22. There were no instances of corruption proceeds being returned from abroad in high-level corruption cases during 2018-22.

The Special Anti-Corruption Structure (SPAK), comprising the Special Prosecutor’s Office (SPO) and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), and specialised courts represent the specialised anti-corruption investigative and specialised anti-corruption prosecutorial bodies in Albania. The SPO was established in 2019 and presents indictments in the anti-corruption and organised crime courts of first instance and appeal as well as in the Albanian Supreme Court. In 2022, the SPO transferred 43 criminal cases concerning 208 defendants accused of criminal offences related to corruption for trial. This represents an increase of 30% in the number of cases and 117% in the number of defendants compared to the previous year, reflecting an increasingly effective role of the SPO in the fight against corruption (SPAK, 2023[19]). The SPO’s prosecutors supervise the NBI and give directions to its investigators. Public opinion regarding the SPAK is ambivalent. On the one hand, 43.7% did not believe that the SPAK would investigate all senior politicians and just 21.2% believed so in October 2022 (Si, 2022[20]). On the other hand, 50% of survey respondents rated SPAK’s work positively, 25% neutrally, and only 23.8% negatively in November 2023 (Euronews Albania, 2023[21]).

Both bodies have sound legal safeguards of independence. The SPO is independent from the prosecutor general, and the higher prosecutor may not instruct a special prosecutor on the merits of an investigation or case. Based on competitive procedures, the High Prosecutorial Council (HPC) elects the Chief Special Prosecutor of the SPO for a three-year term without the right to reappointment, and the Director of the NBI for a five-year term with the right to reappointment once. The SPO’s Chief Special Prosecutor shall be selected from among the prosecutors of the SPO. In the most recent election of the current Chief Special Prosecutor by the HPC in December 2022, the European Commission considered the nomination process to be sound (European Commission, 2023[14]). Two-thirds of the members of the HPC can dismiss a prosecutor of the SPO for committing a crime or a serious disciplinary violation. Following an open and transparent recruitment process, a committee comprising the Chief Special Prosecutor and the two special prosecutors with the most years of service recommends a candidate for the Director position of the NBI to be appointed by the HPC. The law prescribes specific circumstances under which the HPC must dismiss the NBI Director, including when sentenced by a final decision of the court for commissioning a criminal act, in case of violation of the constitution or a serious violation of law during the performance of duty, or in case of serious and very serious breaches of discipline.

The Head of the SPO, the Chief Special Prosecutor, prepares the draft budget of the SPAK. When the Council of Ministers submits a different budget proposal, the Head of the SPO may participate in parliamentary proceedings to defend the SPO proposal. For 2022, the initial budget for the SPAK was set at ALL 1 038 000 000 (around EUR 10 million), but the revised budget decreased to ALL 663 300 000 (around EUR 6.4 million), of which 89% was spent (SPAK, 2023[19]) In terms of staffing, the SPO had 17 prosecutors and 3 vacant prosecutorial posts in 2022. According to the law, the SPO is supported by several administrative units such as the Expertise Sector, the Financial Investigation Sector, and the Sector for International Cooperation and Liaison for Joint Investigations. In 2022, the Council of Europe’s anti-corruption monitoring body GRECO found that its recommendation regarding “the recruitment of prosecutorial and technical staff to the office of the Special Anti-corruption Prosecutor be completed as a matter of priority and that its members [be] provided with adequate human and technical resources and prosecutors benefit of highly specialised training” had been implemented satisfactorily (GRECO, 2023[12]). At the end of 2022, the NBI had 73 staff members including its director, 60 investigators and 12 administrative personnel. However, at the beginning of 2023, the SPAK reported that it still faced certain capacity-related challenges associated with the growth of the number of cases, insufficient premises, and incomplete staff of financial investigators (SPAK, 2023[19]).

Overview of implementation of Competitiveness Outlook 2021 recommendations

Albania’s progress in implementing the recommendations from the previous assessment cycle has overall been modest (Table 7.5), with no major legislative reforms undertaken in the areas of whistleblower protection or liability of legal persons. However, moderate progress was made in areas such as modernising and digitalising the system of asset and interest declaration and ensuring a track record of convictions for high-level corruption.

Table 7.5. Albania’s progress on past recommendations for anti-corruption policy

Competitiveness Outlook 2021 recommendations	Progress status	Level of progress
Establish legal obligations to carry out corruption risk assessments, develop integrity plans and implement corruption proofing of legislation	There were no legal obligations established but Albania’s authorities are assessing corruption risks and developing integrity plans in an increasingly systematic manner. A ministerial decree requires that the drafting of legal acts include the evaluation of areas prone to corruption.	Limited
Ensure effective operation of the new electronic system for declarations of public officials	A new digitalised system for the declaration of assets and interests was launched in 2022. However, plans to make declared data accessible on line for the general public are yet to be implemented.	Moderate
Further develop legislation to protect whistleblowers	No relevant amendments or reforms have been introduced.	None
Strengthen corporate liability for corruption offences	No relevant amendments or reforms have been introduced.	None
Monitor and analyse the investigation, prosecution and adjudication of high-level corruption cases	Albania continues its efforts regarding the investigation and prosecution of high-level corruption and has achieved a moderate track record of convictions in 2018-23.	Moderate

The way forward for anti-corruption policy

Considering the overall slow pace of implementing the previous CO 2021 Recommendations, Albania should further strengthen its anti-corruption framework and practices. It should continue efforts to follow the policy advice set forth in CO 2021 and consider some additional recommendations:

• Incentivise public bodies to improve the implementation of the anti-corruption strategy and action plan. The successful suppression of corruption requires not only the effective functioning of key laws and institutions, but also comprehensive efforts across the public sector to implement policy measures. To strengthen implementation, additional incentives for public bodies could include: (1) making data on implementation progress accessible in a user-friendly manner that reflects the achievements of each public body, (2) integrating the progress on anti-corruption actions into the key performance indicators of public bodies and into performance appraisal of managers, and (3) ensuring that all planned anti-corruption actions are financially secured by the state budget through legal guarantees. Lithuania could offer some useful inspiration for implementing new legal provisions and practices more effectively (See Box 7.1).

Box 7.1. Strengthening the responsibility of public sector bodies to prevent corruption in Lithuania

Like many economies, Lithuania encountered and recognised the challenges of insufficient proactiveness and low capacity of public bodies in implementing anti-corruption actions despite the existence of specialised anti-corruption institutions at the national level that aim to ensure the overall development, coherence and implementation of anti-corruption policies.

In 2021, Lithuania adopted a new Law on Prevention of Corruption in an attempt to overcome these challenges. Among the innovations brought by the law were:

• a direct responsibility of public sector bodies and their heads for preventing corruption and ensuring they live up to the anti-corruption standards

• the preparation of special methodologies for corruption risk assessments and evaluations of resilience for individual public bodies

• a requirement for entities to assess their own anti-corruption practices (quality and effectiveness) and those of subordinate bodies

• an obligation to publish information about violations detected over the past three years and actions taken to mitigate the impact.

Despite the recent implementation of the new law, which has not yet allowed for a comprehensive impact evaluation, Lithuania’s anti-corruption agency, the Special Investigation Service (SIS), reported an unprecedented interest of public sector representatives in understanding their role and demand for practical recommendations. The SIS saw a fourfold increase in requests to explain how to implement anti-corruption practices and divide anti-corruption-related responsibilities within institutions, which it interprets as a positive sign of increasingly active engagement.

As Lithuania’s challenges appear similar to those faced by Albania, it could be beneficial for these economies to share experiences regarding the implementation and effectiveness of the new legal provisions and practices.

Source: Huss et al. (2023[22]).

• Establish a statutory obligation for all public bodies to ensure corruption risk management (including assessment) and establish a legal obligation to carry out corruption proofing of legislation, including for legislation already in force. The OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity3 calls to (among other things) ensure a controlled environment4 with clear objectives as well as a strategic approach to risk management that includes assessing risks, addressing control weaknesses and establishing an efficient monitoring and quality assurance mechanism. While Albania is on course to expand the practice of corruption risk assessment to the whole public sector, ensuring full risk management should be a clear statutory duty of each body and its management. Establishing the legal basis for systematic corruption proofing of current legislation would be a further crucial step to limit corruption risks arising from deficiencies in the existing legal framework.

• Prepare and publish detailed statistics about the compliance with obligations, prohibitions and restrictions related to the management of conflicts of interest, including the invalidation of administrative acts and contracts concluded under conditions of conflicts of interest. The availability of comprehensive data would not only better reflect the performance of the HIDAACI but also demonstrate the overall progress in ensuring that the discharge of public powers does not serve narrow private interests. Albania may wish, for instance, to consider the practice of Latvia, which publishes detailed information about each conflict-of-interest-related violation committed by a public official, including the name and position of the individual, a short description of the violation and the applied penalty.5 Albania could also consider developing digital data-mining tools to detect signs of conflict of interest. An example of such a tool is ARACHNE,6 developed by the European Commission. It comprises a database of projects containing information from managing authorities and public sources, identifying “the projects, beneficiaries, contracts and contractors that might be susceptible to risks of fraud, conflicts of interest and irregularities”. ARACHNE features various risk indicators concerning procurement, contract management, eligibility, performance, concentration, and reputational and fraud alerts. Additionally, the tool alerts legal links between persons and identifies risks of conflict of interest (European Commission, 2021[23]).

• Develop legislation to strengthen the protection of whistleblowers, including by removing the good-faith requirement; providing protection for public disclosure, for facilitators of whistleblowing and for persons connected with whistleblowers; and by eliminating deterring conditions for external reporting to the HIDAACI. Whether or not a whistleblower acted under a motive of good faith is immaterial for the merits of the reported information. EU law envisages protection for a person who makes a public disclosure if, for example, the person has reasonable grounds to believe that the breach may constitute an imminent or manifest danger to the public interest or if, when reporting to an external body, there would be a risk of retaliation or a low prospect for an effective handling of the breach. The relevant EU directive also envisages several other rules and measures favourable to the whistleblower and related persons that are currently absent in Albania’s whistleblowing law.

• Strengthen corporate liability for corruption offences by significantly increasing the maximum applicable fines. Monetary sanctions should be sufficiently severe to affect large corporations that may engage in corrupt acts, potentially yielding millions of euros in profits. While international standards do not define what sufficient sanctions look like, the OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions recommends that monetary sanctions should be sufficiently severe to affect large multinational corporations. In certain economies, statutory sanction ceilings of a few million euros have been found to be insufficient (OECD ACN, 2015[24]). Based on these findings, the Working Group has encouraged setting maximum fines as a share of a company’s turnover (OECD, 2022[25]). While such high levels of fines may not appear relevant for an average company, the law should provide the option of applying adequate sanctions in the event of a large business player engaging in corruption.

References

[16] Devine, T. and M. Worth (2021), Gap Analysis of Whistleblower Protection Laws in the Western Balkans and Moldova, Regional Anti-Corruption Initiative, https://rai-see.org/php_sets/uploads/2021/10/RAI-GAP-Analysis-English.pdf.

[18] Erebara, G. (2023), Former Albanian Environment Minister Jailed for Corruption, https://balkaninsight.com/2023/09/25/albania-former-minister-sentenced-for-corruption.

[21] Euronews Albania (2023), Vlerësim për punën e SPAK, sa është përqindja e shqiptarëve?, https://euronews.al/vleresim-per-punen-e-spak-sa-eshte-perqindja-e-shqiptareve.

[14] European Commission (2023), Albania 2023 Report, https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-11/SWD_2023_690%20Albania%20report.pdf.

[23] European Commission (2021), Commission Notice Guidance on the Avoidance and Management of Conflicts of Interest under the Financial Regulation 2021/C 121/01, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.C_.2021.121.01.0001.01.ENG.

[12] GRECO (2023), Compliance Report: Albania, https://rm.coe.int/fifth-evaluation-round-preventing-corruption-and-promoting-integrity-i/1680aa6125.

[6] Hallunaj, M. and N. Strati (2023), Perceptimi publik ndaj institucioneve të sigurisë dhe drejtësisë, si dhe çështjeve të korrupsionit në Shqipëri (Public Perception towards Security and Justice Institutions as well as Corruption Issues in Albania), Qendra Kosovare për Studime të Sigurisë, https://csdgalbania.org/sq/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/WBSB-2022_Albania-Report-2_Jan-2023_ALB.pdf.

[15] HIDAACI (2023), The Annual Report of the Inspector General of the High Inspectorate of the Declaration and Control of Assets and Conflict of Interest 2022, https://www.ildkpki.al/gloolsys/2023/09/Raport-vjetor-2022.pdf.

[17] Hoxhaj, E. (2021), Albania Jails Former General Prosecutor for Hiding Wealth, https://balkaninsight.com/2021/09/22/jail-sentence-for-albania-former-general-prosecutor-but-his-whereabouts-are-unknown.

[22] Huss, O. et al. (2023), Handbook of Good Practices in the Fight against Corruption, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/df1a5278-ac18-11ed-b508-01aa75ed71a1.

[5] IDM (2022), Opinion Poll 2021: Trust in Governance, Institute for Democracy and Mediation, https://idmalbania.org/sq/sondazh-i-opinionit-publik-besimi-ne-qeverisje-2021.

[13] Institute for Democracy and Mediation (2023), Civil Society Report on the Implementation of Chapter II (Prevention) & Chapter V (Asset Recovery) of the United Nations Convention against Corruption in Albania, https://uncaccoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/Republished-Final-%E2%80%93-UNCAC-Parallel-Report-%E2%80%93-IDM-%E2%80%93-UNCAC-Coalition-%E2%80%93-July-2023.pdf.

[11] Ministry of Justice (2023), Raporti i monitorimit për periudhën janar-qershor 2023: Strategjia ndërsektoriale kundër korrupsionit 2015-2023 (Monitoring Report for the Period January-June 2023: Cross-sectoral Anti-corruption Strategy 2015-2023), https://www.drejtesia.gov.al/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/Draft-Raporti-i-monitorimit-SNKK-Janar-%E2%80%93-Qershor-2023_-AL.pdf.

[7] Ministry of Justice (2022), Dokumenti konceptual strategjik: Strategjia Ndërsektoriale Kundër Korrupsionit, 2023-2030 (Conceptual Strategic Document: Inter-Sectoral Anti-Corruption Strategy, 2023-2030), https://www.drejtesia.gov.al/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/DRAFT-_-KONCEPT-DOKUMENTI-STRATEGJIK-SNKK-2023-2030-_-8.8.2022_AL-1.pdf.

[10] Ministry of Justice (2021), Instrumenti metodologjik i monitorimit të planit të integritetit në institucionet qendrore (Methodological instrument for monitoring the integrity plan in central institutions), https://www.drejtesia.gov.al/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/METODOLOGJIA-E-MONITORIMIT-TE-PLANIT-TE-INTEGRITETIT.pdf.

[8] NACC (2023), Monitoring Report for the Period January-December 2022: Intersectoral Strategy against Corruption 2015-2023, https://www.drejtesia.gov.al/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Raporti-i-monitorimit-SNKK_Janar-Dhjetor-2022_EN.pdf.

[25] OECD (2022), Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. Phase 4 Report: Portugal, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/portugal-phase-4-report.pdf.

[26] OECD (2020), OECD Public Integrity Handbook, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/ac8ed8e8-en.

[24] OECD ACN (2015), Liability of Legal Persons for Corruption in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://www.oecd.org/corruption/ACN-Liability-of-Legal-Persons-2015.pdf.

[3] RCC (2021), Balkan Barometer, Regional Cooperation Council, http://www.balkaninnovation.com/docs/20/balkan-barometer-2022--public-opinion.

[4] RCC (2020), Balkan Barometer, Regional Cooperation Council, http://www.rcc.int/pubs/95/balkan-barometer-2020-public-opinion-survey.

[20] Si, N. (2022), Over 59% of Albanians Think that Politics has Captured the Judiciary, https://euronews.al/en/over-59-of-albanians-think-that-politics-has-overtaken-the-justice.

[19] SPAK (2023), Raporti vjetor 2022 (Annual Report 2022), https://spak.gov.al/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/raporti-vjetor-2022_Publikuar.pdf.

[9] Sulstarova, R. (2020), Integrity Risk Assessment Methodology for Institutions of Central Government, Ministria e Drejtësisë, https://www.drejtesia.gov.al/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/4.-Metodologjia-e-Vler%C3%ABsimit-t%C3%AB-Riskut-t%C3%AB-Integritetit-p%C3%ABr-Institucionet-e-Qeverisjes-Qendrore_EN.pdf.

[2] Transport Community (2023), Action Plans and the EU Acquis Progress Report 2023, https://www.transport-community.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Strategy-for-Sustainable-and-Smart-Mobility-in-the-Western-Balkans.pdf.

[1] World Bank (2023), Worldwide Governance Indicators – Control of Corruption, https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/worldwide-governance-indicators (accessed on 1 March 2024).

Notes

← 1.  The Anti-Corruption Glossary can be accessed here: https://www.drejtesia.gov.al/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Fjalori_Antikorrupsion_AL.pdf.

← 2.  The Anti-Corruption Guide can be accessed here: https://www.drejtesia.gov.al/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Guida_Antikorrupsioni_-EN.pdf.

← 3.  In 2017, the OECD adopted a new Recommendation on Public Integrity, which provides policy makers with the blueprint for a public integrity strategy. The text of the recommendation can be accessed here: www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/OECD-Recommendation-Public-Integrity.pdf.

← 4.  The controlled environment consists of the set of standards, processes and structures that provide the basis for carrying out internal control across an organisation. For more information, please consult the OECD Public Integrity Handbook (OECD, 2020[26]).

← 5.  Reports on violations of the Law “On Prevention of Conflict of Interest in the Activities of Public Officials” found in the activities of public officials in Latvia can be accessed here: www.knab.gov.lv/lv/media/4098/download?attachment.

← 6.  For more information on ARACHNE, please consult the European Commission’s website here: ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=325&intPageId=3587&langId=en.