Western Balkans Competitiveness Outlook 2024: Montenegro

7. Anti-corruption policy

Abstract

An effective anti-corruption policy is essential for promoting fair competition. This chapter, along four sub-dimensions, explores the effectiveness of the prevention, investigation and prosecution of corruption cases. The first sub‑dimension, anti-corruption policy and risk management, assesses the planning, co-ordination and monitoring of anti-corruption policies, including corruption risk assessments and corruption proofing of legislation. The second sub-dimension, prevention of corruption, focuses on anti-corruption public-awareness as well as the effectiveness of the legal framework regarding corruption prevention bodies, conflicts of interest, and whistleblower protection. The third sub-dimension, business integrity and corporate liability, explores the robustness of the framework for businesses integrity and regulatory mechanisms, as well as the liability of legal persons. The fourth sub-dimension, investigation and prosecution, assesses the capacities of specialised anti-corruption investigative and prosecutorial bodies in investigating and prosecuting high-level corruption cases.

Key findings

Montenegro (along with North Macedonia) has the second highest score for the anti-corruption policy dimension, following behind the region’s front runner Albania but scoring above the WB6 regional average (Table 7.1). While the overall strategic, legal and institutional anti-corruption framework of Montenegro has changed little since the previous assessment, the economy made efforts to improve practices in several areas, notably with regard to developing integrity plans in public bodies, introducing an electronic solution for declarations of assets and interests, and a stronger record of prosecuting high‑level corruption cases. The main obstacle to achieving greater progress was the lack of legislative reforms.

Table 7.1. Montenegro’s scores for anti-corruption policy

Dimension	Sub-dimension	2018 score	2021 score	2024 score	2024 WB6 average
Anti-corruption	6.1: Anti-corruption policy and risk assessment			2.7	2.4
	6.2: Prevention of corruption			3.5	2.9
	6.3: Business integrity and corporate liability			2.0	1.9
	6.4: Investigation and prosecution			2.5	2.4
Montenegro’s overall score		2.7	3.6	2.8	2.5

Notes: Scores for 2024 are not directly comparable to the 2021 scores due changes in the scoring methodology of this indicator. Sub‑dimension 15.3 as well as several indicators in the other sub-dimensions is scored for the first time in this assessment. Therefore, changes in the scores may reflect the change in methodology more than actual changes to policy.

The key findings are:

• National anti-corruption policy documents expired over 2018-19. In 2022, the government commenced preparatory activities, including consultations with various stakeholders, to develop a new anti-corruption strategy. Planning, co-ordination and monitoring functions have been consolidated under the National Council for Fight against Corruption (established in 2022). However, no draft policy documents have been published yet.

• While the Law on Prevention of Corruption (LPC) aims to protect whistleblowers in both the public and private sector, it deviates in several ways from the relevant EU Directive. Only corruption can be the subject of whistleblowing, and the law does not provide for whistleblowers to make disclosures to the media or public associations. Despite these challenges, there has been an increase in the number of whistleblower reports, suggesting growing trust in the economy’s protection mechanisms for whistleblowers.

• The Special State Prosecutor’s Office (SSPO) is responsible for the prosecution of high-level corruption. While it has initiated several high-profile investigations of corruption, there is a modest track record of imposing final sanctions for high-level corruption that entail imprisonment without conditional or other types of release.

• The Law on the SSPO contains several guarantees for the office’s independence, transparency and accountability. Nonetheless, the SSPO’s autonomy is limited as the Supreme State Prosecutor retains the authority to directly exercise all powers and undertake all actions for which the head of the SSPO is authorised. The Special Police Division (SPD) operates under the directions of a special prosecutor without possessing distinct independence safeguards compared to other police units. However, the appointment of the SPD’s head requires approval from the Chief Special Prosecutor.

State of play and key developments

The perceived level of corruption in Montenegro has not changed significantly since 2018. On a scale from -2.5 (worst) to +2.5 (best), Montenegro’s score in the World Bank’s Control of Corruption indicator has slightly deteriorated, from -0.01 in 2018 to -0.12 in 2022 (Table 7.2). Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index reflects minimal change over the past four years. On a scale from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean), Montenegro consistently scored 45 every year, except for 2021 and 2023, where its score slightly improved to 46. Montenegro’s scores have consistently remained above the WB6 average.

Table 7.2. Montenegro’s perceived anti-corruption policy performance in 2018-23

	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Control of Corruption Indicator
MNE (percentile rank)	56.2	54.8	54.3	52.9	50.9
MNE (score)	-0.01	-0.03	-0.04	-0.04	-0.12
WB6 (score)	-0.41	-0.45	-0.44	-0.41	-0.38
Corruption Perceptions Index
MNE (rank)	67	66	67	64	65	63
MNE (score)	45	45	45	46	45	46
WB6 (score)	38.67	37.67	37.5	38.67	38.67	39.50

Note: Percentile rank (0-100) indicates rank of economy among all economies in the world. (0 corresponds to lowest rank and 100 corresponds to highest rank.)

Sources: World Bank (2023[1]); Transparency International (2023[2]).

According to the Balkan Barometer, only a minority of people in Montenegro agree that the government fights corruption successfully. The share decreased significantly in 2021 when it dropped to 35% from 43% in 2020 (RCC, 2021[3]; RCC, 2020[4]).

Sub-dimension 6.1: Anti-corruption policy and risk assessment

Montenegro’s anti-corruption policy framework is weak, as most of its national anti-corruption policy documents expired in 2018-19. Montenegro used to plan its anti-corruption policy in the context of the EU accession process. The Action Plan for Chapter 23 “Judiciary and Fundamental Rights” (AC23) of accession negotiations and the “Operating Document (OD) for the Prevention of Corruption in Areas Exposed to Special Risk” served as equivalents of an anti-corruption strategy and action plan. The last public report on the implementation of the AC23 and OD covered the period July-December 2018 (Vlada Crne Gore, 2019[5]). Montenegro also reported to the European Commission on the progress of implementation in 2019. However, since then no monitoring or reporting activities have taken place, suggesting that the implementation of the AC23 and OD have halted.

In 2022, Montenegro initiated preparations for the development of a new national anti-corruption policy document. The government issued a call for consultations with interested members of the public, and organised focus groups along 11 thematic areas with representatives from the public sector, non‑governmental organisations, the business sector, academia and citizens. Moreover, in 2022 the government set up a multi-stakeholder co-ordination body, the National Council for Combating Corruption, which is tasked with preparing the anti-corruption strategy and action plan as well as with subsequently monitoring the implementation and reporting on progress. The prime minister heads the Council, which consists of representatives from various public authorities and several non-governmental organisations. The constitutive session of the Council took place in January 2023 (European Commission, 2023[6]), but as of March 2024 the strategy is still in the process of being drafted.

The legal framework for corruption risk assessment in Montenegro is well established. The LPC, adopted in 2014, requires the adoption and regular renewal of integrity plans. These plans serve as internal anti-corruption documents, outlining measures to prevent and eliminate opportunities for corrupt and unethical behaviour within all public bodies. Corruption risk assessment plays a crucial role in the integrity plan preparation process, with its findings required to be reflected in the plans. The authorities must submit their integrity plans and annual implementation reports to the Agency for Prevention of Corruption (APC) and assess the plans’ efficiency and effectiveness every second year. The level of compliance among public bodies regarding the development, adoption and renewal of integrity plans, including the implementation of corruption risk assessments, is generally high. As of end-2023, 98.9% of authorities had adopted integrity plans. The APC monitors the corruption risk assessments of the authorities and has found a decrease in the average risk intensity. By the end of 2016, the average risk intensity across all valid integrity plans was 27.1 (on a scale of 1-100 with 1 signalling no corruption risks and 100 signalling high corruption risks). By comparison, the average risk intensity had decreased to 20.6 in 2023 (APC, 2024[7]). The APC’s report, however, did not examine the quality of the authorities’ assessments as such.

In 2021, the APC developed in co-operation with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) a methodology for assessing the application of anti-corruption measures to enhance the content and effectiveness of integrity plans. In 2022, this methodology was applied in the state administration and other public authorities as well as by social and child protection authorities (APC, 2023[8]). The report on the state administration highlighted several issues, including infrequent updates to risk registers and the tendency for adopted plans to remain valid for extended periods. Recommendations from the report stress the need for authorities to focus on risk specific to their roles, specify detailed residual risks, and establish corresponding mitigation measures (Sosic, 2022[9]). Montenegro has the legal basis and methodology for corruption proofing of legislation. The LPC envisages proofing indirectly, by granting the APC authority to provide opinions on draft laws, other regulations and general acts regarding their alignment with international anti-corruption standards. As such, the APC can propose amendments to regulatory acts to eliminate corruption risks or to enhance alignment with international standards. Within the APC the Section for Monitoring Regulations and Provision of Opinions on Regulations in the Field of Anti-Corruption is responsible for corruption proofing of legislation. The APC has in addition developed a methodology for corruption proofing (APC, 2022[10]). However, the agency’s website lists only one out of four anticipated staff members for this section, suggesting either a genuine shortage in human capacity or sporadic updates to the website. While the APC published only 7 opinions in 2018-20, there was an increase in activity with 10 opinions published in both 2021 and 2022, and 11 in 2023. Moreover, the APC carried out a broader analysis of 14 legal acts in the field of conflicts of interest in 2022 (APC, 2022[11]). Montenegro provided evidence that recommendations of the APC have led to modifications in several cases. For example, in 2022, the government terminated the “Decision on the method and criteria for solving the housing needs of officials” in response to the critical opinion of the APC on corruption risks. Additionally, in 2022 the APC proposed a set of questions for mandatory preliminary corruption risk assessment during the drafting of laws, but as of November 2023 these proposals have not been adopted (APC, 2022[12]).

Sub-dimension 6.2: Prevention of corruption

The APC, established in 2016, is Montenegro’s main corruption prevention body with a broad competency. The LPC includes strong safeguards to uphold the autonomy and accountability of the APC, which is accountable to the parliament. The APC is overseen by its governing bodies – the Council and the Director. The Council consists of five members who are selected based on a public vacancy announcement and appointed by the parliament. The most recent Council members were elected in 2019, and their terms expired in 2023. As of March 2024, new Council members have yet to be selected. The Council selects the Director based on a public call and has the authority to dismiss the Director. The procedures are designed to ensure transparency, while minimising undue influences. Over recent years, the APC experienced significant budget increases, reaching over EUR 2 million in 2023. While the capacity of the APC has been improving, it falls short of target levels. As of September 2023, only 61 employees were actively engaged in their roles despite a target number of 77 staff (APC, 2023[13]). The APC regularly prepares activity reports, which are all published on line, contributing to the transparency and accountability of the APC.

Trust in the APC’s independence and effectiveness has improved over time, although it remains far from universal. The 2023 report of the European Commission noted an improvement of the APC’s performance in “quantitative terms” (European Commission, 2023[6]). In 2022, the Groupe d'États contre la corruption (GRECO) issued a cautiously favourable opinion noting signs of progress towards more independence, efficiency, and pro-activeness, especially after the appointment of the new director in 2020 (GRECO, 2022[14]). Civil society analysts have also noted a heightened level of proactivity from the APC, including investigations against high-level public officials. Nevertheless, concerns persist regarding the practical independence of the APC (Papovic et al., 2023[15]).

The LPC governs the management of conflicts of interest, which apply to a wide range of public officials. Civil servants, however, are not considered public officials and are subject to conflict-of-interest rules of the Law on Civil Servants and State Employees. While the LPC outlines measures to address conflicts of interest, it lacks specific guidance on the actions that public officials must take to effectively avoid such conflicts. The APC, as the competent oversight institution, has been increasingly active in issuing opinions (2020-23) on conflicts of interest and compliance with restrictions in exercising public functions and finding violations (2021-23) (Table 7.3). The Director of the APC has the authority to decide whether a public official has violated the provisions of the LPC. Once a decision is made, it is published on line. If the decision confirms a violation, the APC notifies the relevant authorities where the officials serve to initiate procedures of dismissal, suspension, or the imposition of disciplinary measures. As such, a total of 20 resignations were prompted by the opinions and decisions of the APC in 2023, showing a decrease compared with earlier years, possibly indicating greater compliance by public officials. Some violations are sanctioned as misdemeanours although the number of such sanctions has been declining (APC, 2023[8]; 2024[7]). Moreover, sanctions related to violations of post-employment rules are notably scarce.

Table 7.3. Oversight and enforcement to prevent conflicts of interest and breaches of limitations in the exercise of public functions (2020-23)

	2020	2021	2022	2023
Opinions on conflicts of interest and compliance with restrictions in exercising public functions issued by the APC	135	186	213	227
Number of violations in the areas of prevention of conflicts of interest and limitations on the exercise of public functions found by the APC	38	23	24	27
Resignations prompted by the opinions and decisions of the APC due to functions or duties incompatible with public office	41	26	24	20
Misdemeanour sanctions	7	6	3	2
Sanctions related to violations of post-employment rules	0	0	1	Missing data

Source: Public reports of the APC and data provided by Montenegro’s authorities in the context of the Competitiveness Outlook assessment.

Various challenges persist, such as the courts imposing minimal fines and the lack of a requirement for state institutions to provide updated lists of public officials to the APC on a regular basis. These issues affect not only the controlling of conflicts of interest but also income and property verification of public officials (Gilic, 2023[16]). The procedure whereby the APC finds facts and decides on the existence of a violation, while other entities handle the legal repercussions, further constrains the effectiveness of the law. The government did not provide any evidence of invalidating decisions or contracts made in breach of conflict-of-interest rules, suggesting that consequences of conflicts of interest are not necessarily fully remedied.

All public officials and certain categories of civil servants are required to comply with asset and interest disclosure requirements. Members of a political official’s cabinet, however, are exempt from this obligation. The declarations generally comprise comprehensive data, although there are some notable gaps. For instance, there are no explicit requirements to report beneficial ownership, virtual assets, or movable assets registered abroad. Additionally, there is no requirement to provide transaction values for asset acquisitions and other major expenses in the declaration form in a consistent manner, which complicates financial analysis of the data. The digital system for declaration is well developed with an online platform that facilitates the submission of declarations and publishes declared information by default, with certain data exempted for privacy reasons. The platform also allows for declarations to be searchable and electronically readable, making it easier for the public to access and analyse the information. In recent years the APC has reached agreements with all relevant authorities to access data for the verification of declarations. However, a significant obstacle remains due to the LPC’s stipulation that the APC must obtain consent from public officials to gain access to their bank data. In collaboration with a software company, the APC is in the process of further enhancing the digital system for the verification and analysis of declarations.

The APC’s section responsible for verification of income and assets of public officials has seven staff positions, although the website of the APC only lists four employed officers, suggesting limited human resources. In recent years, the APC has been issuing constantly rising numbers of requests to courts to initiate misdemeanour proceedings for violations related to the reports of assets and income (Table 7.4). According to the APC, the primary reasons are related to failure to submit annual asset declarations in due time and failure to submit declarations after termination of office.

Table 7.4. Misdemeanour proceedings for violations related to the reports of assets and income

	2020	2021	2022	2023
Requests to courts to initiate misdemeanour proceedings for violations related to the reports of assets and income	442	1 002	1 057	1 722
Fines imposed by courts	177	473	332	388
Warnings issued by courts	88	229	438	595

Source: Public reports of the APC.

While the APC verifies a large share of declarations, with a focus on cross-checking the reported data with databases of the competent authorities, the number of full in-depth verifications remains limited, totalling only 20 annually in 2021-23 (APC, 2023[8]) (APC, 2024[7]). The APC does not have the mandate to conclusively determine instances of inexplicable wealth based on the verifications. In case of suspected inexplicable wealth, the APC refers the files to the prosecutor’s office with unclear prospects of legal consequences.

The LPC also contains provisions for the protection of whistleblowers who report corruption-related wrongdoing that they believe to be true at the time of reporting and do so in good faith. These protections are crucial in fostering a culture of accountability and transparency and extend to employees in both the public and private sector. However, the law deviates in several ways from the EU Directive 2019/1937 on the protection of persons reporting breaches of EU law. The good faith standard may lead to unfair and unnecessary deprivation of protection if implementers decide to probe the motives of whistleblowers. Additionally, the LPC limits whistleblowing to corruption-related matters and does not explicitly provide protection for whistleblowers who disclose information publicly. Furthermore, while the LPC lists fewer and narrower forms of retaliation than the relevant EU Directive, it does not exclude considering other types of retaliation. The burden of proof on the person or entity that may have committed an act of retaliation against a whistleblower is narrower in Montenegro, with the LPC requiring proof that the act was not a result of whistleblowing. In contrast, the EU Directive demands proof that any retaliation was founded on duly justified grounds. The LPC’s relevant provisions also lack specificity regarding available protection measures, such as full legal aid, compensation for damage and interim protection before the resolution of legal proceedings. In the past, Montenegro faced public controversy over decisions to reject whistleblower protection status, most notably in the case where a hotel employee was fired in 2016 after revealing that a public entity paid the bill for a political party, and was not granted protection as a whistleblower (Council of Europe, 2017[17]). However, there has been a steady rise of whistleblower reports received by the APC over time, rising from 75 reports in 2020 to 190 in 2023. Despite this increase, the effectiveness of whistleblowing in uncovering corruption has been modest. In 2023, the APC completed 64 procedures based on whistleblower reports. Additionally, based on whistleblower reports, the APC referred 12 proceedings to the prosecutor's office in 2022 and 16 in 2023, and received feedback that in two cases from 2022 investigations have been initiated (APC, 2023[8]) (APC, 2024[7]).

The APC regularly carries out anti-corruption public awareness and education activities. In 2022-23, the APC ran a campaign with posters and video material to promote corruption reporting and to inform the public about whistleblower protection. The agency also focused on facilitating the process of income and asset declarations for public officials by publishing a manual and video with information on deadlines and reporting procedures (APC, 2022[18]). In 2023, the APC launched a communication strategy for the period 2023-25 laying out its plan to improve public understanding of the APC’s role, improve the presentation of achieved results, strengthen society's resistance to corruption, and increase the number of registered lobbyists. Moreover, training activities constitute a fundamental aspect of the APC’s awareness-raising efforts, with events organised for newly appointed public officials and for entities subject to the law under the jurisdiction of the APC (APC, 2023[8]). In the period 2018-22, the APC budgeted annual procurement expenses for awareness-related activities ranging between EUR 13 000 and EUR 69 000, reflecting a serious commitment by the authorities to public awareness and education on anti-corruption efforts. The APC has a dedicated Section for Public Relations, Research and Campaigns with four staff members. Furthermore, the agency commissioned opinion surveys, including on “Public Attitudes on Corruption and Awareness of the Work of the Agency for Prevention of Corruption”. This survey gauges citizens’ trust in the APC, their perceptions of the APC’s contribution to the overall fight against corruption, and their willingness to report corruption to the APC and other institutions (APC, 2021[19]). A new survey has been conducted in 2023, reflecting a relatively high trust of citizens in the APC (APC, 2024[7]). According to the authorities, the results of these surveys have been considered in the preparation of planning documents of the APC.

Sub-dimension 6.3: Business integrity and corporate liability

The policy framework for strengthening business integrity is limited in Montenegro. While the Law on Business Organisations, adopted in 2020, stipulates the development of companies’ risk management policies as one of the responsibilities of the board of directors, it does not mandate responsibilities regarding corruption risk management. Moreover, there is no out-of-court mechanism, such as a business ombudsman, to address claims of companies that have been impacted by corruption-related activities. The Chamber of Economy of Montenegro, representing Montenegrin business interests, adopted the Business Ethics Code in 2011. According to the Chamber’s legal foundations, a Court of Honor is set up which decides in proceedings against members of the Chamber for violating the rules of good business conduct. However, annual reports of the Chamber do not contain any evidence of court activity, thus hindering an assessment of the effectiveness of such proceedings.

According to the Law on Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, adopted in 2018, Montenegro’s tax administration keeps and maintains a register of beneficial owners, which was launched in 2021 within the Central Register of Business Entities. The definition of a beneficial owner largely reflects the definition of the EU anti-money laundering directives. Entities must provide the data about beneficial owners within eight days from their registration or from the change of the beneficial owners, which indicates a possible gap exempting entities that have been established before coming into force of the provision. The law provides for sanctions in the form of fines ranging from EUR 3 000 to EUR 20 000 for the failure to provide data on beneficial owners or inform about changes in beneficial ownership. However, there are no data available about the practice of imposing these sanctions.

Montenegro’s legal framework clearly establishes the liability of legal persons, which subject to the conditions of the Criminal Code of Montenegro are liable for all criminal offences. The Law on Criminal Liability of Legal Entities establishes a comprehensive framework for imposing penalties on legal entities found guilty of offences, including both financial repercussions amounting to at least double the illicit gains or damages incurred, and a spectrum of non-monetary sanctions such as security measures. This law also establishes the autonomous liability of legal persons, contingent upon identification of the physical person within the organisation. The law moreover outlines sentencing principles specifically designed for legal persons, offering the possibility of a reduced fine or exemption from punishment if the legal person has undertaken all the necessary, effective, and reasonable measures to prevent and uncover the commission of the criminal offence. A legal person shall be liable for criminal offences of a responsible person who committed the criminal offence acting within their authority on behalf of the legal entity with the intention to obtain some gain for the legal entity, or when the activity of the responsible person was contrary to the business policy or orders of the legal entity. Hence, corporate liability is not automatically invoked for acts committed by lower-level employees or beneficial owners. Despite the existence of these legal provisions the actual enforcement of corporate liability for corruption-related offences appears to be lacking, as there are no online statistics available detailing the prosecution, trial outcomes, or sanctions imposed on legal entities for such transgressions.

Sub-dimension 6.4: Investigation and prosecution

Montenegro has a limited track record in the investigation and prosecution of high-level corruption. Performance reports of the Prosecutorial Council and State Prosecutor’s Office contain data about cases of high-level corruption, but the definition of high-level corruption, as per the Law on SSPO, is rather broad and comprises offences committed by public officials of any level (Prosecutorial Council, 2023[20]). The track record of convictions for high-level corruption in 2018-22 remained limited and decreased in 2021-22. According to data provided by Montenegro, the number of convictions, subject to appeal and final, for high-level corruption have been consistently low (Table 7.5).

Table 7.5. Misdemeanour proceedings for violations related to the reports of assets and income (2018-22)

	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Number of convictions (subject to appeal and final) for high-level corruption	0	3	3	2	1
Final sanctions that entailed imprisonment without conditional or other type of release	0	2	3	1	1

Source: Data provided by Montenegro’s authorities in the context of the CO 2024 assessment.

The SSPO has started several high-profile investigations of corruption. In 2023, the parliament lifted the immunity of five members of parliament upon request of the SSPO in a case related to suspected abuse of office in the allocation of apartments and loans (European Commission, 2023[6]). No evidence has been provided regarding confiscations or return of corruption proceeds from abroad in high-level corruption cases in 2018-22.

The SSPO, established in 2015, forms the core of the specialised anti-corruption investigative and prosecutorial bodies and has several safeguards of independence. The competency of the SSPO covers various corruption offences committed by public officials, money laundering, the abuse of position in business operations and the abuse of authority in economy if the obtained proceeds exceed EUR 40 000. The SSPO brings its actions before the Special Division of the High Court in Podgorica. The Law on the SSPO contains several guarantees for the independence, transparency and accountability of the SSPO. The Chief Special Prosecutor and special prosecutors are selected from applicants who have responded to a public advertisement and are elected by the Prosecutorial Council. The law sets out the selection process and criteria in detail. The tenure of the Chief Special Prosecutor is five years while special prosecutors shall be elected to serve life tenure if they have worked for at least four years as a state prosecutor or as a judge. However, the autonomy of the SSPO is limited in that the Supreme State Prosecutor may directly exercise all powers and undertake all actions for which the head of the SSPO is authorised. Despite the consistent occupancy of the acting Supreme State Prosecutor position by the same individual since 2019, the prosecution system lacks a properly appointed leader, resulting in instability in the position. Montenegro has made efforts to strengthen the capacity of the SSPO. According to the government, the number of prosecutors of the SSPO increased from 13 in 2018 to 18 in 2022, but the external report cites fewer prosecutors and raises concerns about persistently poor office conditions (European Commission, 2023[6]). The SSPO has a separate budget since 2022 that was totalling over EUR 1.6 million in 2022 and over EUR 2 million in 2023, reflecting efforts to strengthen the institution. In 2022, the SSPO filed 230 indictments for offences of high-level corruption (Prosecutorial Council, 2023[20]). While this figure appears substantial, the expansive scope of the term “high corruption” in Montenegro implies that numerous cases might not meet the criteria for high-level corruption as per the OECD definition.1

Montenegro’s specialised investigation units operate within the police. The Police Directorate comprises the Special Police Division (SPD), which has recently expanded from 32 to 50 positions. Additionally, in 2022, the Department for Fighting against Corruption, Economic Crime and Conducting of Financial Investigations was formed within the Police Directorate, comprising 60 posts. However, a significant share of the newly created posts has remained vacant as of November 2023 (European Commission, 2023[6]). The new rulebook introduced in the Police Directorate in 2022 envisages the possibility of employing bank, accountancy and tax specialists (European Commission, 2023[6]). The SPD is an integral organisational unit of the Police Directorate and, as such, does not have special formal independence guarantees different from those of other police units. The head of the division is appointed by the director of the administrative authority responsible for police affairs subject to the consent of the Chief Special Prosecutor, and the SPD acts on the orders and instructions of a special prosecutor. The independence of the SPD is a matter of controversy, as evidenced by an expression of the Minister of Justice that the division’s head “will not be the head” of the SPD (State Prosecutor, 2023[21]).

Overview of implementation of Competitiveness Outlook 2021 recommendations

Montenegro’s progress on implementing past CO recommendations has been modest (Table 7.6). In some areas, such as the alignment of the whistleblower protection framework with the relevant EU Directive or the improvement of anti-corruption investigative and prosecuting bodies’ independence, no tangible progress has been observed. The most notable improvements have been made in the enhanced practice of corruption proofing legislation and establishing a beneficial owners register.

Table 7.6. Montenegro’s progress on past recommendations for anti-corruption policy

Competitiveness Outlook 2021 recommendations	Progress status	Level of progress
Develop and adopt a renewed national anti-corruption plan or strategy based on an overall corruption risk and gap assessment	In 2022, Montenegro initiated preparations for the development of a new national anti-corruption policy document. However, no draft of the document has been published.	Limited
Widen the scope of corruption proofing of legislation to cover most of the laws and regulatory acts that may embody corruption risks. For this task, the capacity of the APC may need to be strengthened	The APC increased the number of assessments of legislation in 2021-23. However, assessments for all draft laws are not mandatory. Moreover, the relevant corruption proofing section of the APC falls short of projected staffing levels.	Moderate
Strengthen the verification of asset and interest reports by encouraging public officials to give permission for the APC to access the necessary bank information and by exploring the options for developing an advanced electronic risk monitoring system. Explore further possibilities for strengthening the effectiveness of inexplicable wealth detection	The APC is developing a new digital system for the verification and analysis of the declarations. In case of suspected inexplicable wealth, the APC refers the files to the prosecutor’s office with unclear prospects of legal consequences.	Limited
Continue the dissemination of information for potential whistleblowers. Strive to fully implement the EU Directive regarding opportunities for public reporting	In 2022-23, the APC produced and disseminated posters and a video animation to promote reporting of corruption as well as to inform the public about whistleblower protection. The Law on Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing has not been amended to align with the EU Directive on opportunities for public reporting.	Limited
Ensure registration and oversight of the disclosure of beneficiary owners of legal entities	The beneficial owners register was launched in 2021. The law provides fines for failure to provide data on beneficial ownership but no data regarding oversight are available.	Moderate
Consider further strengthening the independence of anti-corruption investigative and prosecuting bodies	No evidence of progress.	None

The way forward for anti-corruption policy

Considering the varied level of implementation of the previous recommendations, Montenegro may wish to further strengthen its anti-corruption framework and practice by continuing to follow the policy advice of the CO 2021. These policy recommendations, with some elements added to fine-tune them, are as follows:

• Intensify efforts to develop and adopt a new national anti-corruption policy document based on an overall corruption risk and gap assessment. The United Nations Convention against Corruption requires that states develop and implement or maintain effective, co-ordinated anti‑corruption policies that promote the participation of society (United Nations, 2004[22]). Montenegro should introduce participatory and evidence-based practices to develop its planned anti-corruption strategy and action plan, which have become a staple in anti-corruption efforts in OECD countries. Elements of the development of an anti-corruption action plan in Greece could offer some useful inspiration for Montenegro, as Greece developed its National Anti-Corruption Action Plan 2022-25 based on a comprehensive assessment of the previous plan's outcomes and impact, and in consultation with various stakeholders from the public, private and civil society sectors. An action identification document was prepared for each new planned action with details on stakeholders, descriptive analysis of the action, implementation steps, deliverables, and outcomes. Another innovative element was a comprehensive set of output and results indicators to allow for measuring the outcomes and the impact of the interventions (Huss et al., 2023[23]).

• Enhance legal clarity for public officials in instances of conflicts of interest. Montenegro should enhance clarity within the Law on Prevention of Corruption (LPC) regarding the procedural steps that public officials must follow in case of conflict of interest. Moreover, the economy should introduce the practice of invalidating decisions or contracts made in circumstances of conflict of interest. The OECD Guidelines for Managing Conflict of Interest in the Public Service (2004[24]) defines several strategies for the resolution or management of a conflict of interest, such as the recusal of the public official from involvement in an affected decision-making process; the restriction of access by the affected public official to particular information; the transfer of the public official to duty in a non-conflicting function; or the resignation of the public official from their public office (OECD, 2022[25]).

• Strengthen the verification of asset and interest reports by addressing any existing deficiencies within the reports; facilitating access of the APC to the necessary bank information; launching a digital risk monitoring system for detecting violations of law; and strengthening analysis to detect possible inexplicable wealth. The Western Balkan Recommendation on Disclosure of Finances and Interests by Public Officials (2014[26]) recommends that banking secrecy should not be an obstacle to using banking data to verify the economic plausibility of the declared information. Moreover, verification should not be limited to comparing data but should aim at detecting undeclared cash flows and any possible illicit origin. In numerous OECD member countries, bodies responsible for oversight of asset declarations have access to banking data regardless of consent of the public official concerned. The good practice example of the National Integrity Agency in Romania demonstrates that protective measures against the misuse of banking data can be established without necessitating consent of the audited person, as opposed to the current practice in Montenegro (Box 7.1).

Box 7.1. Access to banking data in the case of the National Integrity Agency of Romania

When carrying out wealth evaluations, an integrity inspector of the National Integrity Agency (NIA) may request documents and information from all institutions and public authorities, other legal entities under public or private law, and individuals. The integrity inspector is obliged to treat the accessed information confidentially.

The evaluation, which includes routine requests of bank data, is designed to check whether there are substantial disparities in wealth, specifically when exceeding EUR 10 000, observed during the exercise of public functions and income gained during the same period. The inspectors reconstruct the full picture of the asset situation of the audited persons and request banking information concerning all declarants that have been selected for the relevant audit. Prior to this, the NIA solicits information regarding the existence of bank accounts from the tax administration.

The banking information that the NIA has access to includes current, capital and deposit accounts, account balances and turnover, transactions, and (notably) transfers to foreign financial institutions. As a safeguard, integrity inspectors may request data or information that are not public only after informing the person who is the subject of the evaluation and inviting them to present their point of view. This illustrates that protective measures against the misuse of banking data can be established without necessitating the consent of the audited person.

Sources: Law No. 176 of 1 September 2010 Regarding Integrity in the Exercise of Public Functions and Dignities, for the Amendment and Completion of Law No. 144/2007 Regarding the Establishment, Organization and Operation of the National Integrity Agency, as well as for the Modification and Completion of Other Normative Acts, https://legislatie.just.ro/Public/DetaliiDocument/248216; Information provided by the National Integrity Agency in 2022.

• Further develop legislation to protect whistleblowers, including by removing the good-faith requirement; explicitly providing protection for public disclosure; broadening the burden of proof on the person or entity that may have committed an act of retaliation against a whistleblower; defining more specifically protection measures such as full legal aid, compensation for damages and interim protection before the resolution of legal proceedings; and expanding the scope of the rules to cover those who report violations other than corruption. The good-faith motive of a whistleblower is immaterial for the merits of the reported information. The relevant EU Directive explicitly envisages protection for a person who makes a public disclosure if, among other things, the person has reasonable grounds to believe that the breach may constitute an imminent or manifest danger to the public interest.

• Further strengthen the independence of anti-corruption investigative and prosecuting bodies. Ongoing political controversies surrounding the leadership of the Special Police Division (SPD) contribute to the continuing relevance of this recommendation. Standards under the United Nations Convention against Corruption state that a body or bodies or persons specialised in combating corruption through law enforcement should be granted the necessary independence, in accordance with the fundamental principles of the legal system of the State Party, to be able to carry out their functions effectively and without any undue influence (United Nations, 2004[22]). Montenegro should consider introducing additional measures for safeguarding the independence of the SPD, such as a more public and competitive process for selecting its management and ensuring reliable funding through strengthened budgetary guarantees. Montenegro should also consider whether granting the Supreme State Prosecutor direct authority to wield all powers and execute actions authorised for the head of the Supreme State Prosecution Office (SSPO) aligns with the requisite independence of the SSPO.

References

[7] APC (2024), Summary of the Results of the Agency for Prevention of Corruption in 2023, Agency for Prevention of Corruption, https://antikorupcija.me/media/documents/Rezime__rezultata_rada_ASK_u_2023_eng_YnQWJwh.pdf.

[13] APC (2023), 3rd Quarterly Report on the Implementation of the Work Plan of the APC in 2023, https://antikorupcija.me/media/documents/Izvje%C5%A1taj_o_radu_ASK_-_III_kvartal_2023..pdf.

[8] APC (2023), Work Report of the Agency for Prevention of Corruption in 2022, https://antikorupcija.me/media/documents/Work_Report_of_the_Agency_for_Prevention_of_Corruption_in__2022.pdf.

[11] APC (2022), Analysis of Regulations at the Level of State Administration with the Aim of Improving Solutions for Preventing Conflicts of Interest, https://antikorupcija.me/media/documents/Analiza_propisa_na_nivou_dr%C5%BEavne_uprave_u_cilju_unapre%C4%91enja_rje%C5%A1enja_spr.pdf.

[18] APC (2022), Manual for Filling Out Reports of Income and Assets, https://antikorupcija.me/media/documents/PRIRU%C4%8CNIK_ZA_POPUNJAVANJE_IZVJE%C5%A0TAJA_.pdf.

[10] APC (2022), Methodology for Corruption Proofing in Montenegro, https://www.antikorupcija.me/media/documents/Methodology_for_Corruption_Proofing_in_Montenegro_kUVyIEJ.pdf.

[12] APC (2022), Preliminary Control of Corruption Risks, https://www.antikorupcija.me/media/documents/Preliminarna_kontrolna_lista_rizika_od_korupcije_eng.pdf.

[19] APC (2021), The Public’s Attitudes Towards Corruption and Awareness of the Work of the Anti-Corruption Agency, https://www.antikorupcija.me/media/documents/Stavovi_javnosti_o_korupciji_i_upoznatosti_sa_radom_ASK.pdf.

[17] Council of Europe (2017), Verdict in the Case “Ramada“, https://www.coe.int/en/web/corruption/completed-projects/enpi/newsroom-enpi/-/asset_publisher/F0LygN4lv4rX/content/verdict-in-the-case-ramada-?inheritRedirect=false&desktop=true.

[6] European Commission (2023), Montenegro 2023 Report, https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-11/SWD_2023_694%20Montenegro%20report.pdf.

[16] Gilic, T. (2023), Report on National Anticorruption Policies: Montenegro 2023, Centre for Monitoring and Research, https://cemi.org.me/en/post/report-on-national-anticorruption-policies-montenegro-2023-1119.

[14] GRECO (2022), Evaluation Report: Montenegro, https://rm.coe.int/fifth-evaluation-round-preventing-corruption-and-promoting-integrity-i/1680a8a106.

[23] Huss, O. et al. (2023), Handbook of Good Practices in the Fight against Corruption, European Union, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/df1a5278-ac18-11ed-b508-01aa75ed71a1.

[25] OECD (2022), Recommendation of the Council on OECD Guidelines for Managing Conflict of Interest in the Public Service, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/public/doc/130/130.en.pdf.

[24] OECD (2004), Managing Conflict of Interest in the Public Service. OECD Guidelines and Country Examples., OECD Publishing, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/9789264104938-en.pdf?expires=1708687430&id=id&accname=ocid84004878&checksum=0C638D08E16EB223A135003D5D32AFE0.

[15] Papovic, B. et al. (2023), Civil Society Report on the Implementation of Chapter II (Prevention) & Chapter V (Asset Recovery) of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption in Montenegro, Centre for Democratic Transition, https://uncaccoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/FINAL-UNCAC-Parallel-Report-Chapters-II-V-CDT-Montenegro-UNCAC-Coalition-14.08.2023.pdf.

[20] Prosecutorial Council (2023), Report on Performance of the Prosecutorial Council and the State Prosecutor’s Office in 2022, https://zakoni.skupstina.me/zakoni/web/dokumenta/zakoni-i-drugi-akti/732/3100-17953-00-72-23-9.pdf.

[3] RCC (2021), Balkan Barometer Public Opinion, Regional Cooperation Council, https://www.rcc.int/balkanbarometer/publications.

[4] RCC (2020), Balkan Barometer Public Opinion, https://www.rcc.int/balkanbarometer/publications (accessed on 12 July 2024).

[26] ReSPA (2014), Western Balkan Recommendation on Disclosure of Finances and Interests by Public Officials, https://www.respaweb.eu/download/doc/02+Policy+Recommendations+on+Income+and+Asset+Declarations.pdf/5d3ea91ed1b5ebcaeeaf5bbb97463ec1.pdf.

[9] Sosic, M. (2022), Integrity in Action: Assessment Report on Enforcement of Anti-Corruption Measures in the State Administration and other Public Authorities, Agency for Prevention of Corruption, https://antikorupcija.me/media/documents/Integrity_in_Action_-_State_Administration.pdf.

[21] State Prosecutor (2023), Response to the Statement of the Minister of Justice in Parliament, https://www.tuzilastvo.me/spdt/sadrzaj/Gl1l.

[2] Transport Community (2023), Action Plans and the EU Acquis Progress Report 2023, https://www.transport-community.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Action-Plans-and-EU-Acquis-Progress-Report-2023-WEB.pdf.

[22] United Nations (2004), United Nations Convention against Corruption, https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf.

[5] Vlada Crne Gore (2019), 8th Semi-Annual Report on the Implementation of the Action Plan for the Negotiations Chapter 23 and the Operational Document, https://www.eu.me/poglavlje-23-pravosudje-i-temeljna-prava/.

[1] World Bank (2023), Worldwide Governance Indicators - Control of Corruption, https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/worldwide-governance-indicators (accessed on 29 May 2024).

Note

← 1.  High-level corruption: corruption offences, which meet any of the following criteria:

1) involve high-level officials in any capacity punishable by criminal law (for example, as masterminds, perpetrators, abettors, or accessories)

2) involve substantial benefits for officials, their family members, or other related persons (for example, legal persons they own or control, political parties they belong to).

A substantial benefit means a pecuniary benefit that is equal to or exceeds the amount of 1 000 monthly statutory minimum wages (or the equivalent of the minimum wage if it is not applicable) fixed in the respective country on 1 January of the year for which data are provided.

High-level officials are the President, Members of Parliament, Members of Government and their deputies, staff of private offices of political officials, heads of executive and other central public authorities and their deputies, members of collegiate central public authorities (including autonomous bodies), ambassadors and heads of diplomatic missions, governors, heads of regional administrations, mayors of the country’s capital and regional capital cities, judges, prosecutors, top managers and executive and supervisory board members of the 10 biggest state-owned enterprises in the economy, and any other officials defined as politically exposed persons under the national law.