This chapter provides an overview of the economic and policy context in which firms and workers have operated since the unfolding of the COVID-19 crisis in early 2020, and its evolution into 2021. The chapter outlines the initial events of the pandemic, the impacts of the virus as it spread across OECD countries, and the efforts of governments as they raced to implement containment and support measures. It demonstrates the varying degrees of severity of restrictions, country by country, and outlines the subsequent measures put in place to support firms and workers through the crisis. The chapter then reviews immediate aggregate economic impacts, and describes the changes in policy and strategy as the pandemic evolved over time. This chapter aims to help establish contextual understanding for the chapters that follow.
Strengthening Economic Resilience Following the COVID-19 Crisis
2. Context of the crisis
Abstract
Key findings
The COVID-19 pandemic set off the worst global economic crisis since the Second World War. Beyond its severity, the crisis differed from past downturns in several ways:
The economic shock was rooted in a health crisis, exogenous to the economy, which spread quickly and globally. Its immediacy, severity and unpredictability left many governments a step behind, often without best practices to guide policy decisions to flatten the contagion curve.
Supply-side restrictions on economic activity and social distancing had not been factors in other economic crises, adding another complicating factor in designing and implementing support measures and restrictions. Governments had to resort to strict containment actions, effectively halting production and consumption for a large part of the economy – often with little certainty on their tightness, duration, or possible repetition – while simultaneously supporting the survival of businesses that were forced to close down.
The effects of the pandemic abruptly disrupted the real economy via both supply and demand. This, in turn, caused a ripple effect through supply networks, which affected large swathes of the economy that were generally not strongly impacted in previous recessions (e.g. aviation, retail, hospitality and tourism).
Government decisions affected not only livelihoods, but also lives themselves, with few areas of the globe unaffected and policy implementations sometimes a matter of life or death.
Despite the severity of the economic shock, numerous examples of policy successes through government intervention are evident in the time after the initial waves of the pandemic. Governments implemented restrictions to contain the spread of the virus, but did so alongside suites of policy to keep economies afloat through supporting workers, firms and existing employment. Many firms survived the crisis as a result, and despite the challenging conditions, some new firms emerged during the period; these firms can now contribute to a strong and robust recovery.
The recovery period will be long and uncertain, but there are many reasons for hope. Some economies and industries are showing signs of tremendous resilience, with economic activity rebounding strongly as some countries lift restrictions. As vaccines become widespread and the health crisis subsides, governments must learn from this crisis to ensure not only a swift, strong and inclusive recovery, but also resilience and preparedness for the future.
Introduction
The rapid spread of COVID-19 around the globe affected nearly every aspect of people’s lives – health, income, work, leisure, and social interaction. Setting off the most severe economic shock since the Second World War, the COVID-19 pandemic led to a dramatic global recession.
The jolt to the economy differs from previous economic crises in several respects. First, it affected both demand and supply, as efforts on the part of both governments and individuals to limit the spread of the virus curtailed large areas of economic activity. The crisis has changed the modus operandi of firms and individuals, and thereby aggregate patterns of demand. Activities requiring physical proximity were suspended, reduced and substituted over the short term, with potential long-term changes in behaviour and preferences.1 Further, virtually every country in the world has been hit, both through the direct impacts of the pandemic itself, and by its indirect consequences. The latter include changes in consumption, production and aggregate demand; economic recession; impaired movement of individuals and a decrease in travel; disruptions to global value chains and last but surely not least, an acceleration in the adoption of digital technologies.
While the impacts of the pandemic have been global, they have been far from uniform across countries, firms, and population groups. Both the severity of the outbreak itself, and the related economic impacts, have differed in timing and intensity. This reflects differences in not only government approaches and decisions taken by individuals and firms in response to the crisis, but also underlying economic and social conditions at the onset of the outbreak, such as industry structure, development and adoption of digital technologies, innovation and business models and financial soundness.
Although activity rebounded after the initial relaxation of the stringent government-imposed restrictions on mobility and interaction that characterised most of 2020, many countries have continued to face further waves of contagion, and suffer the effects of new restrictions. Global gross domestic product (GDP) projections depend highly on the possible emergence of COVID-19 variants, as well as the successful implementation of vaccination programmes (OECD, 2021[1]). While an upside scenario – with few variants of concern and successful vaccine rollouts – could lead to a strong and fast global economic recovery, the downside scenario – in which vaccination programmes lag and variants cause new waves of contagion – could see productivity and economic growth well below pre-pandemic projections for years to come.
The lifting of supply-side restrictions, after the first wave of the virus in early 2020, marked the beginning of a first recovery phase for many economies, with activity picking up in several sectors. However, concerns persist that the pandemic is far from over, may see resurgences (OECD, 2021[1]), or may become a seasonally repeating issue (Burra et al., 2021[2]).2 Reduced incomes and increased unemployment across a wide swathe of the population, changes in demand and preferences as individuals and employers act to reduce the risk of infection, and shifts in habits established through this period will affect economic activity even as vaccines become more widely available and the immediate health crisis recedes. Many government support packages implemented during the crisis have been essential “life preservers” for both workers and firms. Governments put strong supports in place alongside restrictions, the results of which provided opportunities to identify areas of economic weakness and learn lessons on best policy practice. Policy makers can apply this knowledge to build back economies that are stronger and more resilient against future crises.
While the COVID-19 crisis has affected all aspects of life, this report focuses on the business sector; that is, on aspects of the crisis that affect industries, firms and workers. It begins with this chapter, which describes the context of the crisis. The chapter outlines some of the early measures put in place to contain the virus, as well as accompanying support policies, and then identifies some of the resulting economic impacts across countries.
Containment measures in response to COVID-19
Throughout the pandemic, governments and individuals have attempted to strike a balance between protecting people’s lives and well-being from the virus, and keeping the economy going.3 Containment measures, in which non-essential activities and movement are heavily restricted, were put in place by many governments, both at local and national levels. Many of these measures helped slow the spread of the virus, reduce the death toll and bought time for health systems to respond. However, they also had severe negative economic consequences,4 and even despite these efforts, many countries and regions have continued to face high and rising infection and fatality rates over 2020 and 2021. A return to fully unrestricted activity may remain a long way in the future – with recovery largely dependent on both vaccinations, and possible continued outbreaks and mutations of the virus (OECD, 2021[1]).
In most OECD countries, initial restrictions on activity peaked in April 2020 (Figure 2.1) before being gradually relaxed in May and June. While all countries imposed some form of restrictions, their severity, the speed at which they were established (and subsequently relaxed), and the activities they targeted differed across – and to a lesser degree, within – countries. Figure 2.2 shows the average level of initial restrictions (in April 2020) across five different measures (confinement and lockdowns, travel bans and restrictions, closure of schools, cancellation of public events and closure of public spaces, and obligatory shutdown of economic activity), based on the OECD COVID-19 Country Policy Tracker.5 While many countries reacted strongly across all five dimensions (e.g. Italy, Greece, New Zealand and Colombia), countries such as Sweden and Japan put in place minimal restrictions, instead promoting personal and collective responsibility to minimise the spread of the virus.6 Iceland, meanwhile, imposed few outright restrictions and instead rapidly embarking on an extensive programme of testing and contact tracing.7
Figure 2.1. Severity/restrictiveness of confinement and lockdown measures
Note: Indexed from 0 to 1, with 1 being the most restrictive measures (original indicator measured on a scale of 0 to 5). The OECD COVID-19 Policy Tracker is a centralised database of government responses to the COVID-19 crisis, compiled and verified by OECD country experts. Daily indices of the strictness of confinement measures have been averaged across two-month windows (February/March, April/May and June/July).
Source: OECD calculations based on OECD (2020[3]), COVID-19 Country Policy Tracker (database), https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/country-policy-tracker/ (accessed on 6 August 2020).
Figure 2.2. Mean level of restrictions in April 2020
Note: The OECD COVID-19 Policy Tracker is a centralised database of government responses to the COVID-19 crisis, compiled and verified by OECD country experts. The graph reports daily measures averaged for the month of April 2020 for each of the five indicators: Confinement and lockdowns, travel bans and restrictions, closure of schools, and obligatory shutdown of economic activities measured on a scale of 0 to 5, where five represents the strictest measures. Cancellation of public events/Closure of public spaces is rescaled from a scale of 0 to 3 to a scale of 0 to 5 for comparability with other measures.
Source: OECD calculations based on OECD (2020[3]), COVID-19 Country Policy Tracker (database), https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/country-policy-tracker/ (accessed on 28 July 2020).
Support measures in response to containment responses
The restrictions put in place resulted in much business activity coming to a temporarily halt. However, governments also provided support to guarantee livelihoods; alongside restrictions and containment measures, they implemented extensive policy packages to keep households, firms and economies afloat.8 These policies varied widely (e.g. country by country, industry by industry), focusing on both employment and social areas, as well as fiscal and monetary stability. Initial support measures included worker pay supports (e.g. furlough schemes, basic income support), financial assistance, loan guarantees and cash grants to firms, tax deferrals, and changes to insolvency procedures as the crisis wore on. For the recovery period, governments need to implement different policies that enable resource allocation, enhance access to finance, and support investment in reskilling and digital infrastructure. Recovery plans thus far put significant emphasis on supporting small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) in rebuilding business, continuing the digital transformation, and financial and support for workers to re- or upskill during the job reallocation phase.9
Worker support initially relied on pre-existing systems already established in labour market institutions, to support workers’ incomes and employment in the face of idiosyncratic shocks. Such policies generally focus on either job retention or unemployment support (Annex D of this report describes these systems in more detail). Most OECD countries mainly had job retention schemes in place before the crisis (see Table A D.1 in Annex D for a detailed list), and had the ability to rapidly scale up programmes when the pandemic hit. While the use of job retention schemes in response to COVID-19 is widespread in all sectors, and across all types of firms, take-up varies across countries (OECD, 2020[4]; 2021[5]). Figure 2.3 below demonstrates the variation in uptake of such supports during the initial waves of the crisis.10
Figure 2.3. Participation in job retention schemes
Note: Take-up rates defined as approved applications or actual participants in job retention schemes as a share of dependent employees in Q1 2020. Peak date refers to April/May 2020 for most countries (July 2020 for Chile, Korea and the United States, October 2020 for Hungary and Japan).
Source: OECD (2021[5]), “Supporting jobs and companies: A bridge to the recovery phase”, https://doi.org/10.1787/08962553-en.
In the case of the COVID-19 crisis, job retention policies such as temporary layoff schemes or salary payment programmes by governments were more effective than many of those designed to help people find alternative employment, such as reallocation or temporary work schemes, due to nature of the crisis limiting the availability of work and jobs. Measures designed to support the adaptation of jobs to keep them viable, such as through telework, were widespread across OECD countries.11Recent OECD work suggests that employment resilience during the current COVID-19 crisis has been higher in countries relying on comprehensive job retention schemes, rather than unemployment insurance schemes, as the former preserves job matches and may allow countries to bounce back faster to pre-crisis productivity levels (OECD, 2020[6]; 2021[7]).
Unemployment support schemes helped in the beginning of the crisis to immediately support workers who lost their jobs. However, these types of schemes were often not designed for the large volumes of newly unemployed workers from a systematic shock such as the COVID-19 pandemic, making retention schemes a potentially better support policy in many instances and over the longer term.
It should be noted that the type and quality of social safety nets already in place in countries often affected the extent of further support to firms, and make comparing the level of business support country by country somewhat difficult. Countries with broader supports already in place likely required fewer new measures, simply due to having pre-established systems. Nevertheless, to help the business sector, most OECD countries immediately implemented extensive measures to support firms, which remained in place in some form throughout the pandemic. As the crisis wore on, more targeted policies became possible as data emerged and the evidence base grew, and countries were able to adapt interventions to target the most at-risk industries, firms and workers. An example is the extension of employment retention and furlough schemes to include atypical forms of employment, such as self-employed and agency workers (OECD, 2020[8])
Public sector-funded subsidies, grants, loans and loan guarantees to businesses have been a common type of policy support in OECD countries. Across OECD countries, direct financial support of firms totalled unprecedented sums. Direct payments to businesses affected by restrictions on activity were designed to allow firms to stay solvent by covering necessary expenses, such as rent payments (while staffing costs were often under the umbrella of employment schemes, as discussed above). Such financial support was often provided without the need to repay, or as interest-free loans. Similar measures targeted specific hard-hit sectors, and encouraged economic re-starts where possible. An example of an intervention that did both is the “Eat Out to Help Out” scheme in the United Kingdom, a programme worth nearly GBP 1 billion, which gave consumers a discount at restaurants in the summer of 2020, when outdoor dining was possible (Hutton, 2020[9]).
Along similar lines, it has been important for governments to ensure firms’ access to finance, allow direct capital injections, and make changes to insolvency procedure and regulation. These policy areas have been particularly important for SMEs, which often face greater barriers to finance and have fewer cash reserves to rely on in periods of crisis. Government-backed loans with lower interest rates, subscription of shares, and extensions of lines of credit are examples of implemented policies. Moratoria on insolvency procedures have also prevented a wave of bankruptcies; an example of a very successful policy measure that is discussed in further detail in Chapter 4.
Another common support measure among OECD countries has been to allow various tax deferrals, alongside changes to overall tax structures and systems. Governments used changes to tax policy to alleviate business cash flow difficulties through measures such as extending deadlines, lowering tax rates or eliminating certain types of taxes altogether, accelerating refunds and delaying payments to later periods (OECD, 2021[10]). Annex table A D.2 provides an overview of the main tax measures to support business cash flow in OECD countries in the initial stages of the pandemic.
Another area of substantial government spending is economic stimulus packages. These have been, in some cases, massive sums; for example, by April 2021, the United States had approved nearly USD 5 trillion in dedicated stimulus spending since the pandemic began. Comparisons between countries’ stimulus spending are not always straightforward, due to differences in what is classified as stimulus rather than business or social support. For example, while the US fiscal stimulus amounts to 27% of GDP, Japan’s reported amount is 55%. However, Japan’s tally includes spending on existing long-term goals (e.g. climate neutrality) and financial policy classified as industry support by other nations.12 While important to mention in the discussion on support measures, packages of stimulus spending are outside the scope of this publication, and therefore not discussed in more detail.
Economic consequences
Measures put in place to limit the health costs of the pandemic exacted a high economic cost, bringing business activity to an abrupt halt in many sectors (OECD, 2020[6]). As economies continue to languish under the strain of prior and continued restrictions and interruptions, one can clearly see the magnitude and suddenness of the first shocks through monthly data on economic activity. Figure 2.4 depicts the percentage change in industrial production across OECD and G20 countries, for the months of February to May 2020, as well as March 2021, relative to the same month of the previous year.
Figure 2.4. Percentage change in total industry production from previous year
Note: Percentage change in total industry production (encompassing mining, manufacturing and utilities, but excluding construction and related finance), relative to the same month the previous year. Construction included for Costa Rica and Mexico. January 2021 instead of March 2021 for Austria, February 2021 for Canada, Costa Rica and the United Kingdom.
Source: OECD calculations based on OECD (2021[11]), “Production and sales”, Main Economic Indicators (database), https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00048-en (accessed on 7 June 2021).
Three patterns are apparent. First, the abruptness of the decrease in production was substantial. For the OECD as a whole, total industrial production in January 2020 was only 0.7% lower than in January 2019. In February, it was 0.4% lower, and by March it was 6.4% lower than the previous year. In April and May, when the pandemic spread globally and restrictions on activity peaked, production experienced its most dramatic decrease – 20.0% for April and 17.5% for May. Second, there was substantial variation in impact across countries. For some countries (e.g. Chile, Norway, Finland, Lithuania and Korea), the drop in industrial activity over the period from February to May 2020 was limited (less than 10% in any month relative to the previous year). More heavily affected countries such as France and Italy – which also put in place stricter restrictions – experienced a fall in output of more than 30% during lockdowns. Third, there was also variation in rebound and recovery periods. While two-thirds of the countries were beginning to see a recovery in industrial production by May 2020, many of the countries that experienced a relatively muted impact in the first few months instead saw continued declines in production (e.g. Costa Rica, Korea, Denmark, the Netherlands and the Russian Federation). Similar patterns emerge for retail trade volumes (Figure 2.5), although the recovery in retail sales seems to have been relatively stronger than in industrial production. This may be owed partly to retailers reorganising activities towards online sales and contactless or low-contact delivery (OECD, 2020[12]; 2020[13]), but may also reflect the – often discounted – sale of existing inventories that had seen a backlog (Morgan, 2020[14]).
Figure 2.5. Percentage change in retail trade volume from previous year
Note: Percentage change in retail trade volume, relative to the same month the previous year. February 2021 instead of March 2021 for Slovenia.
Source: OECD calculations based on OECD (2021[11]), “Production and sales”, Main Economic Indicators (database), https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00048-en (accessed on 7 June 2021).
Figure 2.6. Severity of economic lockdown measures and fall in industrial production
Note: Monthly averages of the daily levels of the economic lockdown restrictions (y axis, expressed as a negative: lower numbers indicate more restrictive containment measures) plotted against percentage change in total industry production since the same month of 2019 (x-axis). A matching panel for February shows little variation, with data points clustered around the 0,0 point. For the sake of readability, each panel has its own scale.
Sources: OECD (2020[3]), COVID-19 Policy Tracker (database), https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/country-policy-tracker/ (accessed on 6 August 2020); OECD calculations based on OECD (2021[11]), “Production and sales”, Main Economic Indicators (database), https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00048-en (accessed on 5 March 2021).
The duration and severity of government-imposed lockdowns have affected the extent and timing of the drop in economic activity. Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.6 provide an indication of the magnitude of these effects. Although production and sales picked up in the months following the first wave of the pandemic, the relaxation of initial lockdowns did not imply a return to normality as many had hoped. By the beginning of 2021, many OECD countries were again under lockdowns. Resurgences of the virus continued to lead to re-imposition of containment measures at national or local levels. Economic activity had rebounded in only a few countries (Belgium, France, Ireland, Estonia, Israel, Norway, the Czech Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States), while still being substantially below business-as-usual in others (Greece, Italy, Latvia, Mexico, the Netherlands, Portugal and Slovenia). Initial impacts continued to propagate through the economy as prolonged uncertainty and sharp declines in consumer and business confidence restricted both investment and consumption demand, with adverse effects on productivity, innovation and entrepreneurship.
Evidence from previous, and less global, health crises indicates that the economic recovery period from COVID-19 is likely to be long. World Bank analysis (World Bank, 2020[15]) finds that the MERS, SARS, Zika and Ebola epidemics had long-lasting economic effects. Five years after the epidemics, labour productivity was estimated to be 6% lower, and output 9% lower, in affected countries, though total factor productivity was less affected. Comparability to the COVID-19 crisis is limited, however, as far fewer resources were mobilised to support economies through these previous crises.
Even in the absence of further periods of prolonged lockdowns, changes in consumption behaviour due to ongoing health concerns (Andersen et al., 2020[16]; Goolsbee and Syverson, 2020[17]) and the longer-term impacts of economic recession and uncertainty will reduce output and investment for some time. Concurrently, higher production costs associated with social distancing in the workplace, and a potential reduction in productivity and innovation due to required changes in work organisation and a move towards remote work (OECD, 2020[18]), are likely to further dampen economic output.13 Certain changes – such as those having to do with work organisation, consumer behaviour, and social interactions – are also likely to be permanent to some extent. For example, many firms and workers have expressed an intention to maintain higher levels of telework in the post-pandemic future, which will not only have direct consequences for workers and firms themselves (OECD, 2020[18]), but also impact commercial property prices14 and the local servicing industries that support urban centres, among other things. The acceleration of digital technology use and investment in related infrastructure and skills can also lead to higher productivity if accompanied by the right policies, as discussed in Chapter 5.
The activity of industries that have been most affected by distancing restrictions and consumer behaviour changes may be slow to recover, and changes to the location of workplaces and mix of jobs available may be long lasting (OECD, 2021[1]). While some of the long-term consequences are likely negative for some industries (e.g. reduced business travel, lower demand for office space and services catering to the needs of employees and firms on the premises), there are also positive demand shocks, boosting existing and newly emerging industries (e.g. videoconferencing tools, individual forms of mobility) (OECD, 2021[19]). Further, for the duration that the virus continues to circulate, it is unlikely that large-scale events or non-essential activities involving prolonged direct interaction between people will bounce back to pre-crisis levels.15 Additionally, changes in behaviour – in particular lower levels of business travel – might have significant implications for global knowledge exchange and transfer (Coscia, Neffke and Hausmann, 2020[20]), which may have long-term consequences through reduced innovation.
The initial impacts of the crisis have been very heterogeneous across industries. In some sectors, large parts of economic activity have been able to continue, either through shifting to remote work or because they have been designated as essential industries. In others, activity has been severely curtailed. Many service sectors catering to the domestic market, which have traditionally helped to insulate economies from shocks (Hashiguchi, Yamano and Webb, 2017[21]), have been hit especially hard by social distancing requirements and restrictions on activity. Chapter 3 of this document relates structural characteristics at the industry level with the potential direct and indirect impacts of the crisis. It provides a framework for the analysis in the remaining chapters, which focus on country- and firm-level factors relating to: Business dynamics and financial vulnerabilities (Chapter 4), Supporting productivity through digital technologies (Chapter 5), Industrial and international connectedness (Chapter 6), and Inclusiveness across gender and skill groups (Chapter 7). This volume, in its entirety, presents a whole picture of the factors influencing economic resilience in the crisis.
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Notes
← 1. Since the beginning of the COVID-19 crisis, the OECD has been providing support to governments on a range of topics to address the emerging health, economic and societal crisis. Data, analysis and recommendations are delivered via the OECD COVID-19 Hub (OECD[27]). The guidance includes information pertaining to short-term measures needed in affected sectors, with a specific focus on the vulnerable sectors of society, as well as analysis on the longer-term consequences and impacts of COVID-19. In addition, flagship OECD publications such as the OECD Economic Outlook (OECD, 2021[7]), the OECD Science, Technology and Innovation Outlook (OECD, 2021[19]), the OECD Digital Economy Outlook (OECD, 2020[28]) and numerous working and policy papers from directorates across the Organisation, have provided analysis and evidence to support governments in their efforts to design and implement policy supports and coordinated responses across countries.
← 2. For more on this concern, see for example https://ccdd.hsph.harvard.edu/will-covid-19-go-away-on-its-own-in-warmer-weather/.
← 3. Quick and decisive action has been required to effectively contain the virus, alongside a thorough assessment of the impacts of such actions on economies, firms and people. To counteract adverse impacts, extensive support measures were required in conjunction with restrictions. Early OECD work outlining the decisions regarding this trade-off can be found in OECD (2020[29]). More information on support measures is also in the next section of this chapter.
← 4. Besides adverse economic effects, restrictions on economic and social activity have also had negative consequences on mental health. Unemployment and furlough due to restrictions are risk factors for mental ill-health (Colombo, 2021[24]), and mental health levels deteriorated globally in 2020 (Santé publique France, 2020[25]).
← 5. See Bulman and Koirala (2020[26]) for further discussion of the OECD Policy Tracker database. See also Hale et al. (2020[22]) for a more recently updated policy tracker developed at Oxford University.
← 6. For coverage of these policy strategies, see for example: https://www.businessinsider.fr/us/sweden-covid-19-policy-experts-too-early-judge-2020-7, https://www.euronews.com/2020/07/28/sweden-s-coronavirus-spread-slows-but-immunity-still-a-puzzle, https://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/d00592/, https://www.ft.com/content/7a4ce8b5-20a3-40ab-abaf-1de213a66403.
← 7. See for example https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/06/08/how-iceland-beat-the-coronavirus.
← 8. See Bulman and Koirala (2020[26]) for details.
← 9. See for example https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/build-back-better-our-plan-for-growth/build-back-better-our-plan-for-growth-html and https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/legislation/2021/01/20/president-biden-announces-american-rescue-plan/.
← 10. About 50 million employees participated in job retention schemes across the OECD as of May 2020, roughly ten times as many as during the global financial crisis. See OECD (2020[4]) for details.
← 11. Policy measures supporting each area are, country-by-country, are available in detail at https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/country-policy-tracker/.
← 12. Information from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/03/10/coronavirus-stimulus-international-comparison/.
← 13. In the longer term, some of these costs might be offset if firms are able to reduce the amount of office space they require, economise on travel and transport costs, or attract better-matched workers due to having greater flexibility in the location of work. However, these benefits can be expected to take some time to materialise, and will depend strongly on the characteristics of the firms and their ability to successfully manage the move to remote work.
← 14. See for example Gupta et al. (2021[23]).
← 15. https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2020/08/08/covid-19-seems-to-have-changed-lifestyles-for-good?fsrc=scn/fb/te/bl/ed/90economy120gastronomycovid19seemstohavechangedlifestylesforgoodgraphicdetail&fbclid=IwAR3aaxU8ZcCv4GNFNXtLvOyi1BDwE9n5u5ZJTDZNAgZOzpL2JwXgQEaMK2I (accessed on 19 August 2020).