This chapter considers how the Slovak Republic can bolster its strategic policy objectives on integrity and anti-corruption. In particular, it addresses channels through which strategic decision making can be achieved, such as by engaging in dialogue with civil society and private sector stakeholders and by developing and integrating anti-corruption measures at the subnational level. This chapter also highlights the need to incorporate risk-based problem analysis into the design of the strategic objectives, and considers the benefits of creating budget and monitoring and evaluation frameworks. Finally, this chapter emphasises the necessity to communicate about the anti-corruption strategy to build trust in government efforts to promote public integrity and accountability.
OECD Integrity Review of the Slovak Republic
1. Delivering a strategic approach to public integrity in the Slovak Republic
Abstract
Introduction
A strategic approach for public integrity is essential for directing and supporting a coherent and comprehensive fight against corruption. As such, it is not an end in itself but rather a means to an end, and in order to serve its cause and be relevant, a strategic approach needs to be underpinned by evidence on integrity risks and drivers of corruption, and by objectives and measurement framework. As the OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity stipulates: adherents should “develop a strategic approach for the public sector that is based on evidence and aimed at mitigating public integrity risks, in particular through:
1. Setting strategic objectives and priorities for the public integrity system based on a risk-based approach to violations of public integrity standards, and that takes into account factors that contribute to effective public integrity policies.
2. Developing benchmarks and indicators and gathering credible and relevant data on the level of implementation, performance and overall effectiveness of the public integrity system” (OECD, 2017[1]).
The process of strategy development is as important as the resulting strategy. An inclusive and rigorous strategy development process can help select relevant strategic objectives that are meaningful to citizens and businesses; prioritise and sequence actions in an open manner to address the most crucial integrity risks; and provide the necessary evidence for the interventions that are most cost-effective and likely to have the greatest impact. Strategies are also a way of demonstrating commitment and can be used to establish institutional responsibilities. If however, strategies do not lead to visible gains – for example, due to inadequate implementation – they can at best become irrelevant and at worst erode public confidence in national authorities (OECD, 2020[2]).
In recent years, the Slovak Republic has advanced its strategic approach for fighting corruption and promoting integrity through a number of strategic policy documents:
The Programme Statement of the Government of the Slovak Republic for the period 2020-2024, also called “Government Manifesto”.
The Anti-Corruption Policy of the Slovak Republic for 2019-2023.
Anti-Corruption Programmes: A National Anti-Corruption programme developed by the Office of the Government, and Sectoral Anti-Corruption Programmes by respective ministries and government agencies.
The Programme Statement of the Government of the Slovak Republic for the period 2020-2024, or “Government Manifesto”, sets out the key priorities of the current coalition government, which was formed on 21 March 2020 following parliamentary elections on 29 February 2020. The fight against corruption was the most prominent theme in the election campaign in the wake of the murder of an investigative journalist and his fiancée in February 2018, which had sparked mass protests. This priority is strongly reflected in the Programme Statement: the first two chapters are dedicated to the fight against corruption and the restoration of rule of law respectively (see Box 1.1).
Box 1.1. 2020-2024 Programme Statement of the Government of the Slovak Republic Anti-corruption highlights
In the 2020-2024 Programme Statement, the Government of the Slovak Republic has set the following objectives and policy measures:
Chapter 1: Fight against corruption
Zero tolerance approach to corrupt behaviour.
Goal to improve the position in the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International by 20 places (the Slovak Republic currently ranks at 59th place out of 180 countries).
Asset declarations for public officials: revision of the law on asset declarations; introducing an effective tool for sanctioning illegal income; establishment of an independent institution for asset declarations.
Adopting legislation on lobbying, including a lobbying register, a code of conduct, and policy measures to resolve conflicts of interest and so-called “revolving door practices”.
Strengthening the powers of the Supreme Audit Office and the Public Procurement Office.
Building professional and transparent state administration, with a focus on ethics, integrity, qualified personnel, and fair and transparent processes.
Adopting a strategic plan for human resources in the civil service, including policy measures to promote fair and transparent recruitment.
Adopting transparent selection procedures for top posts in State-Owned Enterprises.
Strengthening the position and independence of the Public Procurement Office.
Adopting policy measures to promote open government at all levels, including in regions and municipalities; revision of the Freedom of Information Act.
Chapter 2: Rule of law
Reform and modernisation of the judiciary system, with a focus on fighting corruption and bribery in the judiciary system.
Initiating ethical committees and tools for solving ethical dilemmas in the legal profession.
Source: Government of the Slovak Republic (2020), https://www.teraz.sk/download/135/programove-vyhlasenie-vlady.pdf.
The Anti-Corruption Policy was adopted in December 2018 and provides a policy framework for corruption prevention, with a focus on public administration, for the period 2019-2023 (see Box 1.2). The Policy applies and promotes a risk-based and evidence-based approach for integrity policies. Moreover, it lays the foundations for a whole-of-government approach, involving line ministries and central authorities in the formulation and implementation of the Policy. Implementation arrangements include the appointment of Anti-Corruption Co‑ordinators in all line ministries and central authorities, which together form the Board of Anti-Corruption Co‑ordinators, a working group facilitated by the Corruption Prevention Department (CPD) of the Office of the Government of the Slovak Republic. Furthermore, it sets a number of definitions (e.g. on public interest), which provides clarity regarding the terminology.
Box 1.2. Anti-Corruption Policy of the Slovak Republic for 2019-2023
The Anti-Corruption Policy has been drawn up by the Corruption Prevention Department (CPD) of the Office of the Government of the Slovak Republic and focuses on corruption prevention at the national level. Based on an analysis of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) related to the anti-corruption context in the Slovak Republic, the priorities of the Anti-Corruption Policy are:
1. To promote and protect the public interest by reducing the room and opportunities for corruption.
This includes policy measures in the area of asset declarations, whistleblowing, conflict of interest management, risk assessments, public employment, anti-corruption awareness-raising and promotion of a culture of integrity.
2. To improve the quality of the legislative and regulatory environment.
This includes policy measures to prevent policy and regulatory capture, regulate lobbying, increase transparency in the legislative process.
3. To improve conditions for entrepreneurship.
This includes policy measures to promote integrity in the interface between private and public sectors, such as in public procurement, licensing, concessions, subsidies.
The Anti-Corruption Policy also sets out a number of institutional and implementation arrangements, including:
CPD will draw up and implement the National Anti-Corruption Programme.
Each line ministry and central authority is required to draw up and implement its Sectoral Anti-Corruption Programme.
Each line ministry and central authority is required to appoint an Anti-Corruption Coordinator.
A Board of Anti-Coordinators (“Board”) should be set up and facilitated by CPD, to bring the Anti-Corruption Coordinators together for knowledge sharing and implementation support.
CPD will co‑operate with business organisations and civil society in the area of corruption prevention.
The establishment of an Office for the Protection of Whistleblowers as an independent organisation.
Source: Resolution of the Government of the Slovak Republic No. 585 of 12 December 2018 on the Proposal for Anti-Corruption Policy of the Slovak Republic for 2019-2023.
As stipulated in the Anti-Corruption Policy, the Policy is implemented through Anti-Corruption Programmes. A government-wide National Anti-Corruption Programme (NACP), developed by CPD in 2019, guides the implementation of policy measures that are not sector-specific and typically involve two or more institutional partners. The NACP lists 14 objectives, corresponding with 14 policy measures. For each policy measure, a description is provided, together with a designated responsible government entity, supporting partners, and a timeframe for implementation. In addition to the NACP, Sectoral Anti-Corruption Programmes are being developed by each line ministry and government agency, listing policy measures within their area of competence, also with specific timeframes for implementation. The ministries and agencies are responsible both for the formulation and implementation of their respective Sectoral Anti-Corruption Programme.
Increasing impact and coherence of the strategic policy documents
The Programme Statement, the Anti-Corruption Policy and the Anti-Corruptions Programmes are mutually supporting documents, each serving a complimentary role at the political, policy, and implementation level respectively. They provide a solid basis to effectively address a wide range of integrity risks and contribute to the current policy reform momentum on anti-corruption in the Slovak Republic. Moreover, they reflect a whole-of-government effort to fight corruption and also mobilise stakeholders from the private sector and civil society. Last but not least, the network of functioning and responsive Anti-Corruption Coordinators is a significant institutional policy response to strengthen co‑ordination and policy coherence.
Notwithstanding these significant strengths, the strategic impact and coherence of these policy documents could further be optimised through: 1) fine-tuning the strategic objectives, applying a risk-based approach; 2) matching budget allocations for policy implementation; and 3) setting up a measurement framework.
The Slovak Republic could deepen the problem analysis to identify key risk areas and to inform strategic policy objectives on anti-corruption
The Anti-Corruption Policy lays out the conceptual and institutional approach for corruption prevention in a comprehensive manner, however, in its current version, the analysis of corruption risks is limited, hindering the identification and prioritisation of thematic and sectoral priorities.
In order to be effective, a national anti-corruption strategy should be based on an accurate assessment of the problems and challenges that the particular country faces in combating corruption. This preliminary diagnosis, sometimes termed a “problem analysis” or “situation analysis”, consists of two main elements: an assessment of the nature, extent and impact of the country’s corruption problems; and an assessment of the obstacles that may hinder the implementation of effective anti-corruption reform (OECD, 2020[2]; UNODC, 2015[3]). The latter is reflected in the SWOT analysis of the anti-corruption policy environment, which identifies both elements that are hindering and conducive to the implementation of anti-corruption policy measures.
The former, a problem analysis across sectors, is largely absent in the current strategic framework. Although the Anti-Corruption Policy claims to “[…] respond[s] to current challenges and anti-corruption trends in the Slovak Republic […] (Anti-Corruption Policy, section 2)”, it remains unclear what those challenges and trends are in practice. A small number of corruption risk areas are mentioned, such as public procurement, EU funds, and lobbying. Reference is also made to reviews by international organisations, to the ranking of the Slovak Republic in the Corruption Perception Index and to the estimated credibility of the actors in the justice system measured by the EU Justice Scoreboard. The Anti-Corruption Policy indicates a number of policy measures and solutions, but an account of the underlying diagnostics is not provided. Thus, a number of relevant questions remain unanswered: What sectors of the economy are most affected? What are the corruption mechanisms at play? In what government agencies is corruption most prevalent? How frequently do integrity violations occur in the public sector? Which forms of corruption have the most negative impact on service delivery or on the business climate? Collecting evidence around these questions informs the strategic approach and enables the government to set priorities, allocate resources, and align the strategic objectives accordingly.
In the current strategic framework of the Slovak Republic, the problem analysis is planned for at sector level, as one of the first steps for implementing the Anti-Corruption Policy. Identification of corruption risks at sector level is delegated to line ministries and central authorities through the risk assessment tool that is currently being rolled out across public institutions. It is expected that these risk assessments “[…] shall provide an evidence base for designing efficient and realistic anti-corruption programmes across sectoral bodies and for the development of effective anti-corruption measures” (Anti-Corruption Policy, section 7.3).
Although these risk assessments will yield valuable information about corruption risks at sector level and can inform the Sectoral Anti-Corruption Programmes, it remains unclear how this information will be translated at an aggregated level into government-wide anti-corruption priorities. Moreover, the evidence base may still lack information on the bigger picture, beyond the sum of the sectoral risk assessments, which is necessary to prioritise efforts, identify emerging risks across sectors, as well as understand which groups in the population are affected more than others.
Furthermore, there is no official body or platform mandated to conduct a strategic government-wide situation analysis nor to drive a strategic policy discussion and provide strategic guidance and direction to the Anti-Corruption Policy across line ministries and government agencies. (These institutional issues will be further elaborated on and addressed below).
Without a strategic-level government-wide problem analysis and policy co‑ordination platform, a risk of a silo approach may emerge and become institutionalised, with each line ministry identifying (through the sectoral risk assessment) and (through the Sectoral Anti-Corruption Programme) the corruption issues within their sector and mandate. This may further lead to issues in terms of policy coherence, such as sub-optimal or incompatible policy measures across sectors, or inefficient government spending due to duplication of efforts.
Therefore, the Slovak Republic may conduct a problem analysis to inform a strategic policy discussion on anti-corruption and to inform future updates of the National Anti-Corruption Policy. The problem analysis can be based on the sectoral risk assessments, an assessment of the country’s current experience in combating corruption, an analysis of corruption emerging from corruption cases and investigations, assessments of international partner organisations (such as EU, GRECO, OECD), academic reports, reviews by civil society organisations and private sector organisations. Across the OECD, 45% of existing strategies were based on thorough problem analysis and integrity risk assessment, while four countries took a comprehensive wide sweep of the whole public integrity area by setting up an inter-institutional body to prepare an analysis on public integrity risks (see Figure 1.1).
Figure 1.1. Use of evidence-based problem analysis and diagnostics when developing integrity strategies, 2020
Note: Data for Belgium, Chile, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Korea, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Slovenia and the United States are not available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators (2020).
Some examples of such problem analysis are the assessment of the corruption environment in the United Kingdom, (Box 1.3), which informed the United Kingdom Anti-corruption Strategy 2017-2022.
Box 1.3. Setting a strategic approach to integrity and anti-corruption in the United Kingdom
The United Kingdom Anti-corruption Strategy 2017-2022 seeks to provide a long-term framework for ensuring a safer, more prosperous and more confident future based on concerted UK action against corruption. The strategy is informed by a detailed analysis of key corruption risk areas, based on data from the following sources:
1. Data of sociological surveys, such as the Ipsos MORI Veracity Index, 1993-2016, the Control Risk 2015 International business attitudes towards corruption, and the PWC 2016 Annual Global CEO Survey.
2. Results of the implementation of the 2014 UK Anti-Corruption Plan.
3. Analysis of the impact of anti-corruption laws in the public and private sectors, based on the results of the London Anti-corruption Summit of 2016.
4. Political and legal factors, such as the effects of Brexit or the leading role of the United Kingdom on pushing for a beneficial ownership transparency agenda, which details the efforts of the United Kingdom to implement international standards on anti-corruption.
Based on this situation analysis, the Strategy identifies priority areas for anti-corruption, including strengthening the integrity of the United Kingdom as an international financial centre; reducing the insider threat in high-risk domestic sectors; promoting integrity across the public and private sectors; reducing corruption in public procurement and grants; improving the business environment globally; and working with other countries to combat corruption.
Source: The United Kingdom Anti-corruption Strategy 2017-2022, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/667221/6_3323_Anti-Corruption_Strategy_WEB.pdf
Building on this, a problem analysis may help fine-tune the strategic objectives of the Anti-Corruption Policy in the Slovak Republic. The Anti-Corruption Policy currently identifies 3 priority areas:
Priority 1: To promote and protect the public interest by reducing the room and opportunities for corruption.
Priority 2: To improve the quality of the legislative and regulatory environment.
Priority 3: To improve conditions for entrepreneurship.
Each of these priority areas lists a number of objectives, ranging from “creating an environment that emphasises the protection of the public interest and rejects corruption-related practices” to “reducing the adverse impact of corruption risks on business and investments in all sectors of the economy”. The priority areas and objectives are formulated in broad terms, which may inhibit prioritisation and allocation of resources. Also here, much of the prioritisation is outsourced to line ministries and sector-level agencies and authorities, which is useful for issues within their direct scope or mandate, but does not provide sufficient direction at government-wide level.
Informed by a deepened problem analysis, the Slovak Republic may further fine-tune the objectives of the Anti-Corruption Policy. Objectives should be directly linked to the findings of the problem analysis, with major integrity risks identified in the problem analysis clearly addressed through primary objectives.1 In order to fine-tune the existing objectives, the Slovak Republic may select a number of priority sectors or issues, and formulate measurable strategic objectives to address these issues. The UK Anti-Corruption Strategy 2017-2022 may serve as an example here (Box 1.4).
Box 1.4. UK Anti-Corruption Strategy 2017-2022
Published in December 2017, the UK anti-corruption strategy establishes a longer-term framework to guide UK government efforts to tackle corruption at home and abroad in the period to 2022. It sets out a longer-term vision of anti-corruption action leading to:
1. reduced threats to national security
2. stronger economic opportunities (especially for British business)
3. greater public trust and confidence in institutions.
This strategy sets out 6 priorities, and for each of the priorities, a number of measurable goals are set:
Priority 1: Reduce the insider threat in high-risk domestic sectors such as borders and ports
Goals:
reduced vulnerability to corrupt insiders in four critical sectors (borders, prisons, policing and defence)
increased awareness of the insider threat in higher-risk sectors.
Priority 2: Strengthen the integrity of the United Kingdom as an international financial centre
Goals:
greater transparency over who owns and controls companies and other legal entities
stronger law enforcement, prosecutorial and criminal justice action
further enhanced anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing capability
stronger public-private partnership, to share information and improve targeting of those who pose greatest risk.
Priority 3: Promote integrity across the public and private sectors
Goals:
greater public sector resilience against the threat of corruption
a more open government that is trusted by citizens, with robust protections for whistleblowers
strengthened UK private sector integrity
greater integrity in domestic and international sport.
Priority 4: Reducing corruption in public procurement and grants
Goals:
greater procurement transparency, enabling better identification and mitigation of corruption risks
strengthened awareness and capability within contracting authorities
greater confidence in efficient and legitimate contract management.
Priority 5: Improving the business environment globally
Goals:
reduced impact of corruption on trade and investment internationally
enhanced international development finance and export finance practices
increased investment by UK companies in challenging overseas markets with integrity
strengthened business-led collective action to reduce corruption.
Priority 6: Working with other countries to combat corruption
Goals:
enhanced international transparency, especially in beneficial ownership, extractives, public finance and contracting
reduced levels of corruption in partner countries
enhanced action to address corruption in fragile and conflict-affected states.
Source: UK Government website, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-anti-corruption-strategy-2017-to-2022.
The Slovak Republic could complement the Anti-Corruption Policy with a budget framework
An effective integrity strategy and action plan not only lays out a comprehensive set of substantive reforms, but also indicates the means for ensuring its implementation, monitoring and evaluation (OECD, 2020[2]). Although the Anti-Corruption Policy sets out a number of policy measures and commits to new initiatives, dedicated and sufficient financial resources have not been assigned. In practice, section 8 of the Anti-Corruption policy requires that the expenses related to implementing the policy and the respective Anti-Corruption Programmes are borne by the respective line ministries and agencies, including the salaries of the anti-corruption co‑ordinators. A minimal form of in-kind support (e.g. training venues) is available through CPD, however, there is no additional operational budget for implementation of the Anti-Corruption Policy. The lack of a matching budget framework is problematic for a number of reasons:
Budget transparency and commitment: without cost (and benefit) estimates of the policy measures, it is difficult to gauge what the impact will be on government resources; once adopted, a budget is also reflecting the commitment of the government to the policy.
Competing workload: as the anti-corruption activities have to be absorbed by the budgets and existing work programme of the line ministries and agencies, they will come at the cost of other activities, creating competition and possibly conflict.
Incentives structure: line ministries and agencies may refrain from exploring relevant integrity risks or implementing anti-corruption activities because they will need to pay for policy measures themselves or because they have no budget available; they may delay the appointment of anti-corruption co‑ordinators or appoint less expensive junior anti-corruption co‑ordinators instead of senior ones because of budgetary interest.
Monitoring: a budget framework can be helpful to monitor the implementation of the policy and to identify which measures are on track or not; moreover, a comparison between the cost estimates and the actual costs can provide lessons to inform future policy discussions.
At a minimum, the Anti-Corruption Policy and the Anti-Corruption Programmes should be accompanied by a cost analysis of the various policy measures. This will provide transparency on the potential budgetary impact of the respective Policy and Programmes in terms of government expenses. For example, in Poland, section 4.4 of the Government Programme for Counteracting Corruption for the years 2018-2020 includes a brief financial plan with an estimate of the overall expenditure.
In addition, an overview of the budget allocation for each policy objective would be helpful to ascertain whether enough resources have been mobilised compared to the estimated costs, and whether additional funding is required. The overview of allocated budget could indicate the allocated funds from the central government and the line ministries’ respective budgets, much they provide in-kind, and how much they mobilise through international donors.
Moreover, a budget framework would also allow for monitoring of the implementation of the Policy and Programmes in terms of budget. The actual spending could be reflected in a budget dashboard, showing which parts are on track, whether there are delays or cases of overspending.
CPD would be well-placed to lead the costing exercise, to draw up the budget overview and to collect information on the spending through the network of Anti-Corruption Coordinators. CPD could further analyse the developments related to the budget and spending situation, which would in turn be relevant information for the strategic policy discussion on anti-corruption.
As the process for requesting additional budgets or obtaining budget approvals is lengthy, especially once a policy is already being rolled out, it is advised to request the budget jointly with the approval of the respective Anti-Corruption Policy and Anti-Corruption Programmes. Based on Act No. 523/2004 Coll. on Budgetary Rules of Public Administration, any budgetary update should be part of the consultation process with the Ministry of Finance. If any public institution would like to change or update its budget, this request should be officially sent to the Ministry of Finance in a document named “Request for a Budgetary Measure”. This process may take several months to over a year to complete.
The Slovak Republic could strengthen the monitoring and evaluation framework to guide the strategic approach on anti-corruption
A strategic approach requires identifying indicators and establishing their baselines, milestones and targets. Indicators should reflect the strategic objectives, some of which may be part of the strategy document and others part of the action plan. The goal of indicators is to support comparability over time. This allows for benchmarking that can assess the effectiveness of different interventions in the strategy and in other parts of the public integrity system. In a national context, such benchmarks can be established using a before-and-after approach, if indicators are established and data collected well in advance of implementing the strategy, or a with-and-without approach where the performance of a comparison group is measured alongside the treatment group (OECD, 2020[2]). Without a solid framework of indicators, baseline values and targets, it is difficult to assess which integrity policy issues are effective, and which are not. A lack of this type of information weakens the evidence base for adjusting and updating the strategic approach and for attributing resources.
The strategic approach to anti-corruption refers to a number of indicators and targets.
The Programme Statement of the Government of the Slovak Republic for the period 2020-2024 stipulates that “The measurable result of the declared anti-corruption measures is to achieve and improvement by 20 places in the ranking of perceived corruption by Transparency International (Corruption Perception Index, CPI).”
The Anti-Corruption Policy 2019-2023 and the National Anti-Corruption Programme of the Slovak Republic also refer to the CPI: “According to the Corruption Perception Index published by Transparency International, the Slovak Republic ranked 57th of 180 countries in 2018, which is a drop compared to the 54th place in 2017 and the 50th place in 2015.” The Programme mentions also another perception indicator: “According to the Eurobarometer survey, 85% of Slovakian citizens in 2017 thought that corruption was widespread, while the EU average was 68%.”
The National Anti-Corruption Programme of the Slovak Republic as well as Sectoral Anti-Corruption Programmes list a number of actions that need to be completed by a certain date.
A number of observations can be made related to this framework. First, perception indicators can indeed help to paint the picture about perceived corruption at a certain point in time in a country. However, using perception indicators for measuring the success of anti-corruption policies is problematic. First of all, there is no direct link between policy measures and perceived corruption. At best, a country may effectively implement anti-corruption measures and actually reduce corruption, but still suffer from a persistent high‑level of perceived corruption due to other reasons, such as increased media attention because of improved detection and prosecution, or due to a number of highly visible cases. At worst, a country can score better on perceived corruption, whereas corruption risks and flaws in the governance system have not successfully been addressed. Often, the picture is mixed and attribution impossible because of the complexity. Second, the CPI score is a composite index combining at least three data sources per country. The confidence intervals are relatively large, and as a result, it is not possible to make scientifically reliable comparisons between countries with similar scores. Such large confidence intervals and the variability of measurements in other countries cast doubt on the reliability of the rankings: if a country falls a few places in the ranking, it may not in fact reflect a real deterioration in the conditions on the ground. Moreover, there is the competition element with other countries: if every country in the proximity of the Slovak Republic would improve their corruption perception levels in the same way, the Slovak Republic would still not move up the ladder. Lastly, the CPI score is a national score, and does not reflect regional or sectoral trends and developments. In sum, despite the merits for advocacy at a global level, the CPI is not suitable as a diagnostic tool or for evaluating anti-corruption and integrity policies in a particular country.
Second, the actions listed in the National Anti-Corruption Programme and in the Sectoral Anti-Corruption Programmes can be considered as output indicators, as they are specific, measurable (output completed or not) and time bound (timeframe is set). As such, they allow for monitoring the implementation of the respective Programme, through a dashboard or checklist system.
Third, the framework currently lacks indicators at outcome level. The Anti-Corruption Policy 2019-2023 lists various “achievements” but they do not provide the who, where, what and when of a goal. Outcomes reflect the intended change of the policy measures; outcome indicators measure this desired change at policy level in the short and medium term. For example, a policy can aim at empowering civil servants on ethical decision making; a policy measure is to update the code of conduct and add practical guidance on ethical dilemmas. The updated code of conduct is the output, and checking this output indicator is relatively straightforward. The outcome is an increase in civil servants’ ability to make ethical decisions. This is what the policy actually wants to achieve, and this can also be measured, for example through a survey or competence assessment among a sample of civil servants. Without indicators at outcome level, it is difficult to track progress or to make informed decisions at the strategic level, for example for priority adjustments or allocation of resources.
Furthermore, the current strategic approach to anti-corruption in the Slovak Republic makes no particular distinction between monitoring and evaluation. Under the section “monitoring”, the Anti-Corruption Policy describes the goals of monitoring and evaluation for measuring the achievement of the anti-corruption objectives, and for providing feedback on the anti-corruption policies. The National Anti-Corruption Programme also underscores the need for monitoring “to measure the success rate of the implementation of anti-corruption measures and the degree of assurance on the improvements made”. However, the concepts of monitoring and evaluation are used in an interchangeable manner.
In response, the Slovak Republic may consider a number of actions to strengthen the M&E framework on anti-corruption policy. First, CPD may identify a small number of measurable outcome level indicators for each of the priorities of the Anti-Corruption Policy. This will help to estimate whether the intended “achievements” have been met, or how far the target is still away. The OECD Public Integrity Indicators can serve as inspiration for developing these outcome-level indicators (see Box 1.5).
Box 1.5. OECD Public Integrity Indicators
Since the adoption of the OECD Council Recommendation on Public Integrity in 2017, a Task Force within the OECD Working Party of Senior Public Integrity Officials (SPIO) has been developing a framework of indicators (Public Integrity Indicators) to “measure the successful implementation of the OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity”, as described in the 2017 Roadmap for the Task Force on OECD Public Integrity Indicators. The indicator framework establishes standard indicators for the preparedness and resilience of the public integrity system at the national level to prevent corruption, mismanagement and waste of public funds, and to assess the likelihood of detecting and mitigating various corruption risks by different actors in the system. They complement the Public Integrity Handbook and the OECD Public Integrity Maturity Models.
The value added of the Public Integrity Indicators is to provide policy makers and practitioners with an international perspective on the state of play for relevant parts of the integrity system, and offer a credible alternative to existing indices. The purpose is not to rank countries, but rather to identify the multiple steps that can be taken to strengthen core parts of the integrity system. The indicators combine sub-indicators establishing minimum legal, procedural and institutional safeguards for the independence, mandate and operational capability of essential actors in the integrity system with more outcome-oriented sub-indicators drawing on administrative data and surveys.
The scope of the Recommendation requires data collection from a wide range of actors across the executive, legislative and judiciary branches. Finally, the successful implementation of the indicators will help enhance the capacity of countries to measure corruption, corruption risks, effects of anticorruption interventions and the resilience of the public integrity system and will provide an evidence-based approach to developing and implementing better integrity policies for better lives.
The Public Integrity Indicators for the OECD Recommendation of the Council on Public Integrity were validated for piloting in November 2019 by the SPIO and underwent expert consultations in May 2020. The Slovak Republic is one of the countries where the indicators were piloted for Indicator 3 on the quality of the strategic framework. Data collection for this indicator was completed between September 2020 and June 2021. The Public Integrity Indicators were launched in December 2021.
Source: OECD (2020) Public Integrity Indicators: Explanatory Note, https://www.oecd-public-integrity-indicators.org/.
Second, to the Slovak Republic could conduct a baseline measurement for the selected outcome-level indicators. The baseline measurement will set the current values of the outcome indicators, against which progress can be observed through subsequent measurements, for example after 2 or 4 years. CPD could lead this measurement, with co‑operation of other institutions for delivering data or facilitating the measurement activity with their sector or organisation. A number of countries have established regular measurement practices on integrity in the public sector, such as the Netherlands (see Box 1.6) and Korea (see Box 1.7). Table 1.1 provides an overview of practices in select OECD countries as well as an adequacy score for monitoring and reporting.
Box 1.6. Integrity Monitor in the Dutch public administration
Since 2004, the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations in the Netherlands regularly observes the state of integrity in the Dutch public sector. To this end, civil servants (among them political office holders, secretaries-general and directors) are surveyed in all levels of government using mixed methods (including large-sample online surveys and in-depth interviews). The Integrity Monitor, which is a flexible system of integrity assessments, supports policy makers in the design, implementation and communication of integrity policies. The survey’s results are reported to Parliament. The Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations uses the Monitor to raise ethical awareness, detect implementation gaps and engage the decentralised public administration in taking responsibility for integrity regulations. Insights from past surveys have helped to identify priorities for anti-corruption efforts and shift integrity policies from prohibition to creating an organisational culture of integrity.
Source: Presentation by Marja van der Werf given at the meeting of the OECD Working Party of Senior Public Integrity Officials (28 March 2017, Paris); (Lamboo and de Jong, 2016[4]).
Box 1.7. Monitoring and assessing integrity in Korea
The Anti-corruption and Civil Rights Commission (ACRC) in Korea uses two complementary assessment frameworks to monitor and assess the quality of implementation of anti-corruption efforts as well as their results: Integrity Assessment and Anti-corruption Initiative Assessment.
Integrity Assessment (IA)
Korea annually assesses integrity in all government agencies through standardised surveys. Staff from 617 organisations are asked about their experience with and perception of corruption. Furthermore, citizens who have been in contact with the respective organisations are surveyed as well as stakeholders and experts who have an interest in the work of those organisations. The answers, together with other information, are scored into a composite indicator – the Comprehensive Integrity Index.
Anti-Corruption Initiative Assessment (AIA)
The Anti-Corruption Initiative Assessment is a comparative assessment of integrity policies across government agencies in Korea. Agencies selected for assessment submit a performance report on their implementation of integrity policies. On-site visits verify the information, which is then scored by an external assessment team. This allows the ACRC to observe integrity willingness and efforts across the public sector.
Benchmarking and competition
Underperformance in the IA or the AIA does not lead to sanctions. However, the results are made public and the direct comparison of different government entities based on integrity indicators creates competition among these entities. The results also enter the Government Performance Evaluation. In addition, there are institutional and individual high-performance rewards, such as an overseas study programme for the officials presiding over outstanding integrity performance. Continuous improvement of the performance results has indicated that these incentives might be effective.
Source: Presentation by Sung-sim Min, Director, Anti-Corruption Survey & Evaluation Division, ACRC, at the meeting of the Working Party of Senior Public Integrity Officials (SPIO) at the OECD Headquarters in Paris in November 2016.
Table 1.1. Adequacy of implementation structures and reporting
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators (2020).
Third, in order to maximise the benefits of monitoring and evaluation, it is helpful to distinguish both activities (see Box 1.8). Each government institution can lead the monitoring of their respective Sectoral Anti-Corruption Programme, and report on the status to CPD. Therefore, monitoring is suitable to track progress against the timeframe and outputs listed in the Anti-Corruption Programme. As evaluation is a more comprehensive and flexible tool that can be used for selected policy areas or sectors, CPD is well-placed to commission or lead evaluations in partnership with external evaluators to avoid conflict of interest. Evaluation reports on integrity policies should be made publicly available, and it is often useful to include non-state actors either as evaluators or as part of a formal quality assurance process. Monitoring data should be actively used in evaluation reports, along with other data sources. As evaluations are specific activities, they are not for free, so it is helpful to foresee a budget for evaluation purposes. Both the information from monitoring and from evaluations can inform the design and priorities of follow-up interventions.
Box 1.8. Differences in monitoring and evaluation
Monitoring refers to the recurrent process of collecting and analysing information on a policy’s direct and intermediary outputs. Outputs are the direct results in the sphere immediately affected by the policy. What functions is the policy expected to implement? This question is typically answered on the output level. In some cases, outputs of a policy are self-evident, to the degree that monitoring them becomes redundant.
Evaluation, in turn, is not a process, but a specific activity. It is an assessment of the performance and impact of a policy, either in its entirety or focusing on specific elements and issues. Evaluations may be undertaken during the lifetime of the policy (often known as reviews, e.g. mid-term reviews), but are most frequently carried out at the end to assess its impact and to learn lessons for similar interventions in future.
While monitoring is often a continuous function, evaluation involves an effort at measurement specifically set up to investigate a given policy’s effect, with a causal attribution.
Source: OECD (2017[5]), “Monitoring and evaluating integrity policies”; Mathisen et al. (2011[6]), “How to monitor and evaluate anti-corruption agencies: Guidelines for agencies, donors, and evaluators”, U4 Issue, No. 8, U4, Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, https://www.u4.no/publications/how-to-monitor-and-evaluate-anti-corruption-agencies-guidelines-for-agencies-donors-and-evaluators-2.
The Slovak Republic could consider creating a platform for strategic discussion and decision making on anti-corruption policy
Any strategic approach to anti-corruption covering multiple years can be confronted with new integrity risks, challenges in policy implementation, bottlenecks related to funding or the adoption of new legislation. Similarly, new opportunities may emerge, such as financial support by international partners, political momentum in certain policy areas, or new international standards or policy instruments. In order to adapt the approach to the evolving circumstances and to maximise the opportunities, the strategic approach should allow for a certain degree of flexibility.
As much as the Anti-Corruption Policy recognises the need for amendments or updates during the implementation phase, there is currently no formal body that can drive a policy discussion on anti-corruption at strategic level and agree on modifications to the strategic approach. In response, a group of senior officials of key institutions in the fight against corruption may convene once or twice a year, with the following role:
to review the progress of implementation of the Anti-Corruption Policy and the Anti-Corruption Programmes, based on monitoring data
to review the implementation in terms of budget, using data on costings and expenses (if available)
to review the findings from the problem analysis and the sectoral risk mappings
to review the lessons from policy evaluations
to interpret and to make sense of the outcome level data (“what is the story behind the data?”; “what are the data telling us?”)
to check whether the strategic orientations and priorities of the respective policy documents are still valid, and agree on refinement of the policy objective and on adjustments in terms and budgets (if applicable).
The strategic-level platform may be composed of the following institutions:
selected line ministries and other central authorities
the Slovak National Public Prosecutor’s Office
the National Criminal Agency
the Office of the Government’s Plenipotentiary for the Development of Civil Society
the Judicial Council of the Slovak Republic
the Association of Towns and Municipalities
representatives from the Rule of Law Initiative
academics.
At technical and operational level, CPD and the network of Anti-Corruption Coordinators are well-equipped and well-placed to drive the implementation of the anti-corruption agenda in terms of outputs and activities, and can inform the discussions and decision making at strategic level. In practice, CPD could take up a secretariat role for the strategic-level meetings and underpin the agenda items with evidence and technical data.
The strategic level deliberations and decisions may lead to an annual follow-up report on the strategic approach to anti-corruption. This report may provide a summary of the state of play of the Anti-Corruption Policy, highlight a number of successes and achievements, and provide a justification for the adjustments in terms of priorities and budgets (if applicable). The annual update reports from the United Kingdom (see Box 1.9) may serve as an example. Moreover, to reflect the strategic nature of the platform, the term “board” or “council” may be considered.
Box 1.9. Annual updates of the UK Anti-Corruption Strategy 2017-2022
Published in December 2017, the anti-corruption strategy establishes an ambitious longer-term framework to guide UK government efforts to tackle corruption at home and abroad until 2022.
In 2018, a first update was published to adjust the strategy taking into account the United Kingdom’s departure from the European Union. The Updates, therefore, prioritises strengthening international co‑operation and fostering partnerships to bolster global efforts to tackle corruption. The Update furthermore highlights the action taken since the launch of the Strategy. It details the progress made across the various commitments and demonstrates how the United Kingdom have largely fulfilled the commitments that were due by the end of 2018.
In 2019, a second annual update was published, covering the period up to and including 31 December 2019. The Update highlights progress made against the Strategy Commitments and shows that the United Kingdom continues to make progress in implementing the Commitments. The update highlights those areas where the United Kingdom had a number of notable successes and those where there is more limited progress. It provides detailed descriptions of activity across the priority areas of the Strategy and focuses on a number of key areas; the multilateral work, the Prosperity Fund anti-corruption programme and the beneficial ownership campaign.
Source: UK Government website, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-anti-corruption-strategy-2017-to-2022.
Adopting a strategic approach for policy delivery on public integrity and anti-corruption
Corruption is a complex phenomenon, involving and affecting citizens, business, and government. Therefore, anti-corruption action needs to go beyond government, and involve individuals and the private sector. Action should also cross all jurisdictional borders. Integrity does not only concern the national government but should permeate all the way down to municipalities where individuals experience integrity first hand (OECD, 2017[1]). Because of the interconnectedness of corruption risks, a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach is needed, both in terms of strategy development and policy implementation. This section addresses the former.
The Slovak Republic could set up a structural dialogue on public integrity with civil society and private sector stakeholders
Stakeholder consultation was part of the development process of the Anti-Corruption Policy. Line ministries and central authorities were consulted through the Inter-Sectoral Consultation Procedure, a mandatory online consultation process seeking comments on policy proposals. Furthermore, government institutions, municipalities, professional associations, private sector and civil society organisations and citizens could provide their comments and observations directly through the Slov-Lex web portal. Beyond these obligatory consultations, CPD held a series of informal consultations with external stakeholders to collect views and feedback. As a result, various comments from ministries and government agencies as well as from external stakeholders such as the American Chamber of Commerce and the Association of Employees were received and integrated into the draft Policy. For example, CPD has received around 15 comments from the Rule of Law Initiative, after the inter-sectoral consultation procedure 7 of these comments are part of the draft of the National Anti-Corruption Policy 2021.
As much as external stakeholders have been consulted in the development process of the Anti-Corruption Policy, they have no former role in the implementation of the Policy. Nevertheless, civil society organisations and the business sector do have a role to play in the fight against corruption and restoring trust in government, as recognised in both the Anti-Corruption Policy and in the National Anti-Corruption Programme. Therefore, CPD could build on the ad-hoc consultation and on initiatives such as the Rule of Law Initiative2 to set up a structural dialogue with representatives from civil society and the private sector. This dialogue could take the share of a series of meetings in which information is shared on the implementation of the Anti-Corruption Policy and the Anti-Corruption Programmes, on emerging risks, and on initiatives by civil society private sector organisations. This dialogue could also serve as consultation platform for selected policy initiatives that need to be implemented through the Anti-Corruption Policy. This dialogue could be set up in partnership with the Office of the Plenipotentiary of the Government of the Slovak Republic for the Development of the Civil Society, to facilitate the identification of interlocutors on the civil society side.
Beyond the dialogue, civil society organisations and academia could also take up third-party roles in support of the Anti-Corruption Policy, for example for conducting the baseline measurements or for conducting policy evaluations. They could also serve as an external partner for communication, civic education and awareness raising.
The Slovak Republic could strengthen anti-corruption efforts at the subnational level and further integrate efforts into the strategic approach to anti-corruption
The strategic approach to anti-corruption may benefit from integrating the facilitation of integrity policies at subnational level. In terms of institutional context, the Slovak Republic has a two-tier system of subnational government, whose autonomy is recognised in the 1992 Constitution and then by the 1990 municipal autonomy Act and the 2001 Act on Local Governments of Higher Territorial units. This latter created the self-governing regions. The municipal level includes cities (mesta), rural municipalities, city districts in Bratislava and Košice as well as three military districts. The statute of city is granted by the Parliament to municipalities which are an administrative, economic and cultural centre providing public services to neighbouring municipalities. They have, however, the same responsibilities as other municipalities.
Since 2002, regional responsibilities include regional roads and public transport, education (secondary, professional and vocational education), territorial planning, regional economic development, social welfare (children’s homes, social policy), health (hospitals of second category and specialised services), and culture. Municipal tasks, extended in 2002 (416/2001 Act), include education (pre and primary schools), social welfare (elderly, children, social aid), local roads and public transport, environmental protection, utilities (water and sewerage, waste), parks, local planning and development, tourism, housing, culture, municipal police, fire-fighting, and health (hospitals of first category and medical centres, first aid).
In the Slovak Republic, the level of subnational government spending in GDP amounts to 6.4% of GDP and to 15.7% of public spending. The role of subnational governments as public employers is significant, which is explained by the fact that subnational governments are responsible for paying teacher salaries on behalf of the central government. In terms of public investment, subnational governments account for 56.4% of public investment in 2013, representing 2% of GDP. Tax revenues only represent a small share of municipal and regional financial resources, however, other revenues such as user charges and fees such as municipal fees for waste collection or for the use of municipal property account for 17.6% of subnational government revenue. They also include operating surpluses of public enterprises controlled by subnational governments and assets sales (OECD, 2016[7]).
Subnational integrity may deserve a more prominent place in the strategic approach against corruption in the Slovak Republic. First, given the prominent role of subnational governments in service delivery and public investment, integrity risks are prevalent at subnational level. On the one hand, a number of risk areas identified in the Anti-Corruption Policy are present at the subnational level, such as conflicts of interest, licences and permits, lobbying, and public procurement. On the other hand, a number of corruption risk areas are more pronounced at subnational level due to their mandates, such as fee collection, environmental protection, and territorial planning.
Second, increasingly subnational governments are implementing integrity policies and adopting tools and innovations to mitigate corruption risks. In some instances, the most successful tools are created at the subnational level; in other instances, the application of national tools is more suitable. In both cases, subnational governments may benefit from sharing of good practices, which may also lead to enhanced policy coherence.
Third, subnational government plays an important role in the general perception of corruption and in the restoration of public trust, as this governance level is in closest proximity to citizens. Local integrity initiatives may contribute to a regained trust in government more broadly, and, similarly, local corruption scandals may affect corruption perception levels at the national level.
A number of OECD member states have incorporated the support to subnational anti-corruption and integrity policies in their national anti-corruption strategy. In the United Kingdom, a review into the risks of fraud and corruption in local government procurement was committed to in the UK anti-corruption strategy 2017 to 2022.3 In France, in follow up of a survey on corruption prevention in local governments, support for subnational anti-corruption efforts is one of the priority actions identified in the French National Multi-Year Plan to Fight Corruption 2020-2022 by the French Anti-Corruption Agency AFA (see Box 1.10).
Box 1.10. Support to subnational integrity in the French National Multi-Year Plan to Fight Corruption 2020-2022
Support to subnational anti-corruption efforts is one of the priority actions identified in the French National Multi-Year Plan to Fight Corruption 2020-2022 by the French Anti-Corruption Agency AFA. The proposed action consists of providing guidance for major local government authorities and government-funded institutions in the implementation of their anti-corruption plans, so that they achieve compliance with their legal obligations by 2022.
The action pertains to “regions” and “départements”, along with municipalities and government-funded inter-municipal co‑operation institutions serving populations over certain thresholds. Inter-municipal bodies providing technical services are also targeted by the action. This refers to mixed syndicates managing household waste treatment, sanitation, water supply, electricity supply, etc. Similar action will be conducted for these bodies, based on (among other criteria) budget thresholds.
The action builds on the 2018 AFA “Survey on the prevention of local government corruption”. This survey of local governments (3 277 respondents) showed that very few authorities have implemented corruption prevention measures (7.3%). Only 3.5% of local public employees and fewer than 1.5% of local elected officials have had any training in preventing corruption.
Sources: French Anti-Corruption Agency, National Multi-Year Plan to Fight Corruption 2020-2022, https://www.agence-francaise-anticorruption.gouv.fr/files/files/PlanVAnglais.pdf; French Anti-Corruption Agency (2018) Survey on the prevention of local government corruption, https://www.agence-francaise-anticorruption.gouv.fr/files/2019-07/EN%20Survey%20local%20government%20antibribery%20policy.pdf.
While respecting the self-governance and autonomy of the regions, the Slovak Republic could explore various ways to support anti-corruption efforts at subnational level. In order to deepen the understanding of the integrity risks and the capacity to mitigate those risks, CPD could conduct a survey on corruption prevention at subnational level, in partnership with the Ministry of Interior and the Association of Towns and Municipalities. The results of this survey could be taken forward in an amendment to or update of the Anti-Corruption Policy. In partnership with the Ministry of Interior and the Association of Towns and Municipalities, CPD could also facilitate a systematic platform for dialogue and exchange on anti-corruption policy at subnational level, through which various entities can share knowledge on risk areas and exchange good practices and tools, such as risk mapping instruments, code of conduct, and ethics training modules. This platform may comprise knowledge-sharing events, a network of local anti-corruption focal points, and/or a web-based space for knowledge exchange.
In order to restore trust and promote trust public accountability, the Corruption Prevention Department could strengthen the communication about anti-corruption with the general public
The flow of information between governments, citizens and stakeholders is an essential element of open and inclusive societies. Indeed, it is a prerequisite for government transparency and integrity, and for the ability of citizens to hold themselves accountable and participate in public life. Public communication about the government’s strategic approach to fight corruption is part of that effort. Public communication, understood as any communication activity led by public institutions for the public good, is distinct from political communication, which instead is linked to political parties, debates, or elections. It is a central government function that serves as a main tool of policy implementation and services design and delivery, and allows to listen to and understand citizens.
CPD may strengthen the efforts on public information about the government’s strategic approach to anti-corruption and integrity through a number of ways. A communication plan could be drawn up, planning communication moments and opportunities, and linking key messages to target groups and media channels, including social media. A periodic online newsletter, as exemplified by the United Kingdom (see Box 1.11) could be launched, informing the general public on the implementation of the anti-corruption strategy and on relevant documents and data, such as studies, evaluation reports, monitoring data. More advanced options include setting up an interactive electronic portal where citizens can contribute to discussions and comment on proposals. As communication is an activity requiring tools, skills and resources, a dedicated communication budget could be earmarked for this purpose.
Box 1.11. The UK’s Anti-Corruption Newsletter
As part of the public communication plan of the UK anti-corruption strategy 2017 to 2022, the UK Government has developed a newsletter on anti-corruption. Beyond updates on the implementation of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy, the newsletter addresses related issues such as the UK international beneficial ownership transparency campaign, a business integrity initiative, the economic crime strategic board and the international partnership against corruption in sport.
Source: UK Government, Anti-Corruption Newsletter https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/anti-corruption-newsletter-spring-2019/anti-corruption-newsletter-spring-2019.
Proposals for action
Increasing impact and coherence of the strategic policy documents
The Slovak Republic could deepen the problem analysis to identify key risk areas and to inform strategic policy objectives on anti-corruption.
The Slovak Republic could complement the Anti-Corruption Policy with a budget framework.
the Slovak Republic could strengthen the monitoring and evaluation framework to guide the strategic approach on anti-corruption.
The Slovak Republic could consider creating a platform for strategic discussions and decision making on the anti-corruption strategy.
Adopting a strategic approach for policy delivery on public integrity and anti-corruption
The Slovak Republic could set up a structural dialogue on public integrity with civil society and private sector stakeholders.
The Slovak Republic could strengthen anti-corruption efforts at the subnational level and further integrate efforts into the strategic approach to anti-corruption.
In order to restore trust and promote trust in public accountability, the Corruption Prevention Department could strengthen the communication about anti-corruption with the general public.
References
[4] Lamboo, T. and J. de Jong (2016), “Monitoring integrity: The development of an integral integrity monitor for public administration in the Netherlands”, in Huberts, L. and A. Hoekstra (eds.), Integrity Management in the Public Sector: the Dutch Approach, BIOS, The Hague, https://www.government.nl/binaries/government/documents/reports/2016/01/18/integrity-management-in-the-public-sector-the-dutch-approach/bios-2015-integrity-management-in-the-public-sector-the-dutch-approach.pdf.
[6] Mathisen, H. et al. (2011), “How to monitor and evaluate anti-corruption agencies: Guidelines for agencies, donors, and evaluators”, U4 Issue, No. 8, U4, Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, https://www.u4.no/publications/how-to-monitor-and-evaluate-anti-corruption-agencies-guidelines-for-agencies-donors-and-evaluators-2.
[2] OECD (2020), OECD Public Integrity Handbook, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/ac8ed8e8-en.
[5] OECD (2017), Monitoring and Evaluating Integrity Policies, OECD, Paris, https://one.oecd.org/document/GOV/PGC/INT(2017)4/en/pdf (accessed on 10 December 2021).
[1] OECD (2017), OECD Recommendation of the Council on Public Integrity, OECD, Paris, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0435.
[7] OECD (2016), Regional Policy Profile of the Slovak Republic, OECD, Paris, https://www.oecd.org/regional/regional-policy/profile-Slovak-Republic.pdf.
[3] UNODC (2015), National Anti-Corruption Strategies: A Practical Guide for Development and Implementation, The United Nations Convention against Corruption, United Nations, Vienna, https://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/Publications/2015/National_Anti-Corruption_Strategies_-_A_Practical_Guide_for_Development_and_Implementation_E.pdf.
Notes
← 1. Primary objectives are those formally adopted by a council of ministers or similar body, and are applicable across government or across a sector (OECD, 2020[2]).
← 2. Rule of Law Initiative aims at monitoring and commenting on issues of the rule of law in the Slovak Republic, including on corruption. Facilitated by the American Chamber of Commerce, 14 business associations, employers' associations, and chambers of commerce have launched the joint initiative through which the business community wants to respond professionally to the deteriorating state of justice, fight corruption and promote a transparent and systematic legislative process in the Slovak Republic.
← 3. UK Local government procurement: fraud and corruption risk review, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/local-government-procurement-fraud-and-corruption-risk-review.