Effective climate action is key to achieving countries’ NDCs and net-zero targets. The IPAC Climate Actions and Policies Measurement Framework (CAPMF)1 monitors trends in climate mitigation policy adoption and policy stringency2 for OECD and OECD partner countries (Nachtigall et al., 2022[45]).3 The CAPMF covers a broad range of policy instruments (e.g. market-based, non-market based) and other climate actions (e.g. climate targets, climate governance, climate data), comprising 75% of instruments listed in the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report (IPCC, 2022[46]). It covers several important sector-specific policies that are jointly responsible for 89% of GHG emissions in OECD and OECD partner countries. Although there are still data gaps (e.g., AFOLU sector, see Annex I for details), the CAPMF still allows for an extensive overview of countries’ climate action over time.
The Climate Action Monitor 2023
3. How has countries’ climate action to meet emission targets progressed?
The number of adopted national climate policies and their stringency slowed in 2022
In 2022, the growth rate of the sum of national climate action as measured by the CAPMF slowed down in the OECD and OECD partner countries (Figure 32). The total number of adopted policies expanded by only 1%, while the stringency of policies remained roughly constant. By contrast, between 2000 and 2021, overall climate action as measured by the CAPMF4 increased by an average of 10% a year (for more details see Annex Figure I.3).
It is important to consider geopolitical and macroeconomic shocks when assessing climate policy. On the one hand, the recent energy crisis triggered countries to ramp up fossil fuel support to record levels while postponing planned climate actions such as carbon pricing and the phasing out of fossil fuel infrastructure. With the exception of the implementation of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) in the United States – although not considered in the CAPMF – the fiscal space of most governments to provide additional support to low‑carbon technologies became increasingly limited due to increased government spending on recovery packages in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and rising interest rates to curb inflation (OECD, 2021[47]).5 Some policies (e.g. minimum energy performance standards, energy labels, air emissions standards for coal power plants) have already been widely adopted, further limiting the space for new policy adoption.
On the other hand, the energy crisis triggered more climate action. Concerns over energy security and reliance on fossil fuels motivated some countries to adopt more ambitious targets on renewables and energy efficiency. These targets and commitments, as well as some types of policy measures (e.g. support to green investment) are not yet fully captured by the CAPMF. Further developments of the CAPMF will reveal whether countries underpin these targets by appropriate climate policies in the coming years, and if the aggregate trends on climate action improve.
Policy coverage and policy stringency are not necessarily indicative of policy effectiveness in reducing GHG emissions. However, the trend observed by the CAPMF in 2022 may pose a risk to countries’ achieving their mitigation commitments. Stronger climate action, as measured by the CAPMF, points to steeper emissions reductions (Nachtigall et al., 2022[45]). Nevertheless, CAPMF data shows that all countries still have multiple options for strengthening their climate action by increasing the stringency of existing policies or adopting new policies that are currently not widely used (e.g. carbon pricing in the building and transport sector, bans and phase-outs of fossil fuel extraction, fossil fuel-based heating and transportation modes).
Climate action differs significantly across countries and instrument types
The main causes of the overall slowdown in climate action include decreases in public expenditure in research and development of low-carbon technologies such as renewables, energy efficiency and CCS, postponement of the phase-out date of fossil fuel infrastructures, and reduced funding for climate advisory bodies. The full details of countries’ actions can be observed in the IPAC Dashboard.
Some countries did, however, expand their climate action in 2022. Twenty-two OECD and eight OECD partner countries – accounting for 29% of global GHG emissions – expanded their climate action in 2022, although only three of those countries expanded climate action by more than the average increase in previous years. The 2022 increase was driven principally by new or enhanced net-zero pledges, strengthened regulatory measures and advances in international climate policy frameworks. For example, India submitted its NDC aligned to a net-zero target by 2070, Chile put its net-zero target into law and the European Union significantly enhanced its climate action with a ‘Fit for 55’ package that includes, among others, amendments to its Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) as well as regulations to strengthen energy efficiency and renewables. The United Kingdom strongly increased auctions for solar and wind energy and tightened the ETS on industry and electricity. Finally, Austria launched its national ETS for the transport and building sector in 2022.
Notwithstanding these trends, it is important to underscore that countries’ policy approaches are the result of a complex interaction between past climate action, climate ambitions, emissions profile, and available technologies, as well as countries’ cultural, social, political and institutional conditions. There is no one-size-fits-all policy approach. Each country needs to tailor its policy approach to its specific circumstances: some may prefer to adopt few, albeit very stringent policies, whereas others prefer to adopt many policies with rather low stringency. Similarly, some countries put more emphasis on market‑based instruments while others make more use of regulatory non-market-based instruments such as regulations. Ultimately, effectiveness can only be assessed through modelling techniques, such as those proposed under the OECD Inclusive Forum on Carbon Mitigation Approaches (IFCMA).
Climate action is increasingly diverging across countries over time
Climate action is increasingly diverging between OECD and OECD partner countries (Figure 33). Some OECD countries had already stronger policies in place and accelerated climate action faster than other countries. For example, European Union countries subject to EU regulation had already adopted a wide range of climate policies and have continued expanding climate action at a fast pace. While the trend of divergence can be observed between 1990 and 2020, it accelerated markedly in 2021, though not in 2022.
Diverging climate action reinforces the need for more international co-ordination and co-operation on climate action, notably in times of the current geopolitical challenges. Achieving the Paris Agreement long‑term temperature goal requires improved institutional, technical, and human capacity, and scale-up of finance for climate action. Moreover, in an interconnected world, diverging climate action across countries may affect competitiveness and trigger carbon leakage, therefore limiting the effectiveness of increased climate action (Nachtigall et al., 2021[48]). Some countries, notably the European Union, started to implement safeguards such as border carbon adjustment to reduce the risk of carbon leakage and mitigate negative competitiveness effects (OECD, 2023[49]).
Climate action in international climate co-operation policies and cross-sectoral policies expanded marginally, but slowed down for sectoral policies
Climate action in international climate co-operation policies6 and cross-sectoral policies7 continued its upward trend in 2022, though at a significantly slower pace compared with previous years (Figure 34). The increase in international climate action and cross-sectoral action was stronger in OECD partner countries than in OECD countries (Figure I.4 and Figure I.5). The increase in international climate action observed after 2020 can mostly be attributed to i) the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits, in which participants agreed to end the support for unabated coal power plants (OECD, 2023[50]); ii) a joint commitment forged at COP26 in 2021 that committed signatories to “align international public support towards the clean energy transition and out of unabated fossil fuels” (UK Government, 2021[51]); and iii) the launch of the pilot phase of CORSIA. Climate action in cross-sectoral policies principally increased due to enhanced NDCs and net-zero targets in some countries.
Climate action in sectoral policies8 slowed down in 2022. The slight increase in climate action in the building sector was offset by decreases in climate action in the electricity and industry sectors (Figure 35). This was mostly due to a decrease in governments holding renewable energy auctions, postponed phase‑out dates of coal power plants, and carbon tax breaks for energy‑intensive industries in view of the energy crisis. Climate action in the transport sector – the sector with least progress on climate action between 2010 and 2021 – halted in 2022.
Sectoral policies are key levers to reduce sector-specific GHG emissions. Most countries emphasise the importance of sectoral policies in their NDCs. For example, 92% and 83% of countries declare that action in the electricity and transport sectors respectively are key mitigation strategies to reach their NDCs, whereas only 78% report the same for cross-sectoral policies (UNFCCC, 2022[52]). However, a slowdown in climate action in sectoral policies is observed by the CAPMF in the two sectors that account for the highest shares of GHG emissions in OECD and OECD partner countries: electricity (36%) and industry (22%) (Chapter 1).
The relative importance of market-based instruments decreased in the last decade
As explained above, each country needs to tailor its policy approach and policy mix to its own specific circumstances. All types of climate actions and policies have a role to play in reducing emissions and achieving the long-term temperature goal of the Paris Agreement.
Market-based instruments (MBIs), such as subsidies and carbon pricing, can cause relative prices to shift the investment, production and consumption decisions towards low-carbon alternatives. Carbon pricing schemes are also a source of revenues to finance climate action.
Non-market-based instruments (nMBIs), such as standards and information instruments, are instrumental to mainstream advanced low-carbon technologies, provide climate-relevant information to stakeholders, steer broad, bottom-up support for climate measures, and develop infrastructure for low-carbon alternatives.
Targets (e.g., net-zero targets and NDCs), international co-operation, governance and climate data are key enabling conditions for effective mitigation. While these actions may not have a direct material effect on emissions, they provide the policy framework with mid- and long-term signals for all stakeholders. They also create the institutional capacity to effectively implement policies, enable the tracking of progress, and identify key emissions drivers.
Climate action on MBIs slowed down significantly between 2010 and 2022 (Figure 36). While action on nMBIs and ‘Targets, governance and climate data’ increased by 88% and almost 300% respectively, action on MBI only increased by 43% between 2010 and 2022. While the number of adopted MBIs increased by 33% between 2010 and 2022, the number of adopted nMBIs as well as policies related to ‘Targets, governance and climate data’ increased by 66% and 250% respectively.
In 2022, overall climate action in market-based instruments slowed (Figure 36). This is the result of two opposing trends: (i) the expansion and increase in stringency of carbon pricing (e.g. permit prices in most ETS increased, partly driven by more stringent emissions caps set by countries), and (ii) backtracking on other MBI policies, notably related to fossil fuel support (see below). Out of nine countries with preliminary data, four (France, Italy, Portugal, and Slovakia) saw a reduction in energy related tax revenue in 2022, and five saw an increase (Denmark, Estonia, Luxembourg, Norway, and Sweden) (OECD, 2023[53]).
These findings suggest that the relative importance of MBIs in countries’ policy mixes has decreased, despite their potential to incentivise cost-effective emissions reductions. A possible explanation is the lack of public acceptability, notably for carbon pricing (Jenkins, 2014[54]) (Dechezleprêtre et al., 2022[55]). Carbon pricing design that contemplates revenue recycling or other mechanisms to deal with public resistance can better compensate vulnerable households and help boost public support for these approaches. Indeed, countries use different revenue recycling approaches (Nachtigall, Ellis and Errendal, 2022[56]).
Countries made some progress on carbon pricing
Progress on carbon pricing has been mixed since 2020. On the positive side, between 2020 and 2022 eight new carbon pricing instruments were adopted, mostly in form of ETS, covering the transport and buildings sectors. For example, Austria and Germany introduced a national ETS for transportation and buildings which are not yet covered by the EU ETS. The EU proposed, under its ‘Fit for 55’ package, a separate ETS to cover transport and heating fuels in the bloc from 2026 and to further expand the sectoral coverage of its existing ETS to maritime transport. In terms of price levels, ETS permit prices reached new highs, increasing from an average of EUR 11.2 per tCO2 in 2018 to EUR 15.5 in 2021 (OECD, 2023[57]).
On the negative side, some countries responded to the energy crisis by controlling prices or (temporarily) removing or reducing taxes on energy. This price support weighs on government budgets and distorts price signals. For example, Germany temporarily froze the scheduled price increases of its national ETS (OECD, 2023[24]).
Carbon pricing systems are designed based on the socio-economic conditions of each country, including exemptions and free allocation of carbon permits. Therefore, determining effectiveness will depend on an evaluation of those conditions. While many countries have a high share of economy‑wide GHG emissions subject to a positive net effective carbon rate,9 price levels are generally considered too low to be compatible with Paris Agreement temperature goal, and only three countries price more than 50% of their GHG emissions at more than EUR 60 (Figure 37) – a medium-range estimate deemed to be necessary to reach climate goals (High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices, 2017[58]). In most countries, notably in large economies, this share is around or below 25%. In addition, GHGs such as CH4, N2O, and F-gases remain largely unpriced.
Fossil fuel subsidies rose to a record high in 2022
Fossil fuel consumption subsidies increased dramatically, rising to a record high in 2022 by surpassing USD 1 trillion (IEA, 2023[59]).10 Fossil fuel subsidies send the wrong price signal to energy consumers and need to be limited and restricted to meet the long-term temperature goal of the Paris Agreement.11 Most of the rise in subsidies was related to the energy crisis, as governments shielded vulnerable consumers and firms from energy price hikes. Once energy prices normalise, it is expected that fossil fuel subsidies will decrease. By contrast, global subsidies on clean energy technologies were about 600 billion annually for the same period (IEA, 2022[60]).
Support for RD&D for clean energy increased
Despite recent economic uncertainties, global public spending on energy research development and demonstration (RD&D) increased by 5%, up to USD 44 billion in 2022 compared to 2021 (Figure 39). The share of clean energy RD&D rose from 79% in 2020 to 80% and 81% in 2021 and 2022. Spending is expected to increase further with the implementation of the US Inflation Reduction Act, the largest funding for clean energy RD&D innovation.
Use of market-based instruments differs significantly across countries
Policy mixes differ considerably across countries (Figure 40). While some countries (e.g. Canada, Poland) emphasise market-based instruments, others (e.g. Peru, Saudi Arabia) prioritise non-market‑based instruments. As mentioned above, countries use different policy mixes to meet their targets, tailored to their specific circumstances.
Climate action of non-market-based instruments increased marginally in 2022
Countries marginally increased the adoption and stringency of non-market-based instruments in 2022 (Figure 40). There is still plenty of scope for them to adopt new measures or strengthen existing ones, however. Information instruments (e.g., labels for appliances and fuel efficiency for passenger cars) and some regulatory instruments such as minimum energy performance standards (MEPS) for appliances, air pollution standards for coal-power plants, and fuel efficiency standards for passenger cars have been implemented since the 1990s. Other standards (e.g. building energy codes and MEPS for electric motors) are more recent, but not all OECD and OECD partner countries had implemented these standards in 2022.
While performance standards were adopted in most countries between the 1990s and the 2010s, their stringency can be further increased to support the uptake of more advanced low-carbon technologies. For example, in 2023 the European Union plans to increase the required efficiency level of electric motors to International Efficiency level IV – the most stringent level that any country has put in place.
Bans and phase-outs of fossil fuel assets and equipment are increasingly used to shift consumption and production decisions
Bans and phase-outs of fossil fuel assets and equipment have become an increasingly popular tool for countries (Figure 41). These technology standards help mainstream low-carbon technologies by prohibiting the sale of conventional technologies based on fossil fuels (a ban) or prohibiting the use of the respective fossil-based technology altogether (a phase-out). Phase-outs also send a clear signal of government commitment for all stakeholders in the energy transition, enabling stakeholders to plan accordingly. The total number of bans and phase-outs across all technologies covered in the CAMPF (e.g. coal power plants, fossil fuel heating) increased from 12 in 2015 to 135 in 2022.
Some countries backtracked from previous commitments in 2022. For example, formerly coal‑free Austria placed one coal plant in reserve in view of the energy crisis, and Hungary postponed the phase‑out date of its lignite power plant from 2025 to 2030. More recently, the European Union adjusted the planned ban of the sale of diesel and petrol passenger cars from 2035, by allowing the sale of cars that run on carbon‑neutral synthetic fuels. These fuels are expected to play a key role in the decarbonisation of hard‑to-abate sectors such as aviation, although they are not yet produced at scale. Allowing the use of synthetic fuels for passenger cars where low-carbon alternatives in form of electric vehicles exist could divert the use of these fuels from hard-to-abate sectors, hampering mitigation efforts (Ueckerdt et al., 2021[64]).
After much momentum with the launch of the Beyond Oil and Gas Alliance (BOGA) at COP26 in 2021 by seven countries (e.g. Costa Rica), no additional country announced banning the exploration of fossil fuels within their territory in 2022 (Beyond Oil and Gas Alliance, 2023[65]). Conversely, many countries accelerated fossil fuel extraction or the construction of fossil fuel infrastructure such as liquified natural gas (LNG) terminals for energy security reasons. For example, to reduce its dependency on Russian gas supply, Germany built two new public LNG terminals within less than one year (OECD, 2023[24]). In August 2023, the UK unfolded a plan approving the drilling of untapped fossil fuel reserves in the North Sea. Worryingly, almost 50% of fossil fuel producing countries state their intention to maintain or even increase fossil fuel production in their latest NDCs (International Institute for Sustainable Development et al., 2023[66]).
The increasing availability of low-cost renewable technologies such as solar photovoltaics (PV) and wind power has supported progress in banning or phasing out coal power. Lower renewables cost implies that reducing coal’s share in the electricity mix has become both feasible and economically viable. In fact, solar PV has seen a massive increase in adoption in recent years, rendering it one of the few clean energy technologies whose adoption is in line with limiting global warming to 1.5°C (IEA, 2023[67]). Phase-out dates vary across countries, ranging from 2023 (e.g. Slovakia) to 2030 (e.g. Mexico) to 2056 (e.g. Indonesia). In a welcome move, in 2023, India – the country with the second largest coal plant fleet after China – announced a ban on the construction of new coal power plants beyond those that are already under construction.
Countries should further strengthen climate governance and climate data
Adoption of targets, governance, international co-ordination and climate data vary widely across climate actions (Figure 42). All OECD and OECD partner countries submitted NDCs and most of them have net‑zero targets in place. All these countries are signatories to the Paris Agreement and most other key international climate treaties.12 Similarly, these countries are part of at least two international initiatives (e.g. Malta, Saudi Arabia) and some up to 38 (e.g. United Kingdom).13 All countries also provide information to the UNFCCC in the form of official documents (e.g. National Communications). However, not all countries provide all mandatory or recommended information, or do so in a timely manner. For example, 13 countries covered by the CAPMF have not yet submitted their long-term low emissions development strategy (LT-LEDS), a key document providing guidance to stakeholders on national plans for reaching long-term targets (Aguilar Jaber et al., 2020[68]).
Climate advisory bodies play a role in supporting climate action through stakeholder involvement and providing key scientific information. As of 2022, only 13 countries had established independent climate advisory bodies, of which 12 are created by law. In 2021 or 2022 some countries, including Australia, Canada and Denmark, stepped up their funding of climate advisory bodies. Switzerland, on the other hand, abolished its advisory body in 2021, though it plans to reinstate a similar entity while mainstreaming institutions to provide climate advice.
Despite the call for countries to ramp up ambition and submit updated (second) NDCs ahead of COP27, only eight countries did so, including Brazil and Korea.14 While most countries submitted their second NDCs in 2020 or 2021, India submitted its second NDC in 2022.
Climate action and the policy landscape
Monitoring trends in climate action is essential for assessing countries’ efforts. The Climate Action and Policies Measurement Framework, the basis for the analysis presented in this section, provides data on the adoption and stringency of selected relevant climate mitigation actions and policies.
The effectiveness of policies, as well as the choices available to policy makers, must be viewed in the context of the broader policy landscape, however. Some events, conditions, or trends can act as “tailwinds” supporting and facilitating the transition to net zero, such as technological progress, renewable energy prices, or the discovery of critical materials. Others can restrict climate action policy effectiveness by acting as “headwinds” as they hamper the transition or reduce the range of feasible action against climate change, for example falling fossil fuel prices or international conflict.
Without identifying and understanding the full impact of these trends and events, it is difficult to assess the ultimate impact of climate policy on mitigation outcomes. For example, Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine in 2022 reshuffled the climate policy landscape by disrupting global energy markets. On the one hand, it reduced access to fuels and increased energy insecurity, motivating governments to increase the development of domestic fossil fuel energy resources and supports for fuel consumption. On the other hand, high-energy prices and concerns over long-term fossil fuel supply triggered increased funding for renewable energy sources and energy efficiency actions. The final impacts are yet to be determined.
To better support decision makers' policy choices, IPAC could develop indicators that examine the broader policy landscape, as well as indicators on barriers and opportunities, and above all, on a just transition. This could build on and contribute to work under the OECD’s horizontal project Net Zero+, which explores how governments can build climate and economic resilience while taking into account the broader policy landscape, for example looking at challenges such as skills shortages, the supply of critical minerals, other potential bottlenecks to a rapid and resilient net-zero transition. Furthermore, the OECD has embarked on a major initiative, the Inclusive Forum on Carbon Mitigation Approaches (IFCMA), to both carry out a detailed stocktake of current policy instruments as well as assess their effectiveness. These initiative, as well as complementary indicators, are essential to a complete the picture of countries’ mitigation efforts, and will be the cornerstone of OECD work on climate.
Notes
← 1. The CAPMF is the most extensive climate policy database to date, covering countries responsible for 63% of global GHG emissions as well as 75% of instruments listed in the latest IPCC report in key emitting sectors, accounting for 89% of OECD and OECD partners’ GHG emissions. However, results should be interpreted with care. The CAPMF does not capture all policies (sectors and instrument types) due to data availability constraints, such as agriculture and land-based sectors, tax credits and other subsidies for cleaner technologies or an expansion of voluntary approaches, or adaptation policies. Policies included in the CAPMF may, thus, not be fully representative of mitigation approaches of some countries. Rather, these policies represent a range of mitigation actions that countries could employ.
← 2. Policy stringency is defined as the degree to which policies incentivise emissions reductions. Following the methodology of the OECD Environmental Policy Stringency Index (Botta and Koźluk, 2014[164]) (Kruse et al., 2022[163]), the CAPMF operationalises stringency as a relative concept by assigning a stringency score between 0 (not stringent) and 10 (very stringent) for each policy variable based on the in-sample distribution across all countries and years of the policy variables’ level (e.g. tax rate, emission limit value, government expenditure). Basing policy stringency on a relative concept implies that high stringency values in a particular country do not necessarily suggest that the policy is stringent enough to meet its mitigation goals. Rather, it means that the policy in this country and year was more stringent compared to all other countries and years.
← 3. The CAPMF is an extensive, harmonised policy database that measures the adoption and stringency of 56 climate actions and policies based on 130 policy variables, from 1990-2022 across 50 countries and the EU-27 as a block. The United States has been excluded from the CAPMF as the policy data has not been fully verified and validated.
← 4. Operationally, the CAPMF measures overall climate action as the average of policy stringency across all building blocks (sectoral, cross-sectoral, international policies). Policy stringency in each building block is calculated as the average across all underlying modules (e.g. electricity market-based instruments, electricity non market-based instruments…), which – in turn – are calculated as the average of all policies included in each module. See Figure 2.1 in the methodological paper for the structure of the CAPMF (Nachtigall et al., 2022[45]). The reason for this choice is that it is less subject to data availability compared to simply taking the unweighted average across all policies covered by the CAPMF. For some modules (e.g. electricity market-based instruments) the CAPMF comprises a large number of policies whereas for others (e.g. industry non market-based instruments) it comprises only few. Creating an unweighted average across all policies would, thus, bias overall climate action towards policy areas for which data availability is better. Figure I.3 shows that this choice does not affect the qualitative results of the report. The growth rate of climate action between 2000 and 2022 is calculated as the geometric mean of overall climate action between those years.
← 5. The OECD estimated that only 17% of the recovery spending tracked between 2019 and March 2021 can be accounted as environmentally-positive – the same amount as mixed and environmentally-negative measures combined. https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/the-oecd-green-recovery-database-47ae0f0d/#section-d1e324 .
← 6. International policies are related to international climate co-operation (e.g. participation in international initiatives and agreements), international finance (e.g. participation in international emissions pricing schemes such as CORSIA) or compliance with international reporting requirements under the UNFCCC.
← 7. Cross-sectoral actions and policies refer to policies that cut across more than one emission source or sector. These are overarching policy areas to mitigate or remove domestic GHG emissions that cannot be easily attributed to a specific sector (e.g. GHG emissions targets, climate governance).
← 8. Sectoral policies are defined as policies that can be constrained or are designed to apply to a specific source or economic sector (e.g. emission limit values for passenger cars, phase out of power plants).
← 9. Net Effective Carbon Rate (NECR) is the sum of fuel excise taxes, carbon taxes and tradeable permits, that effectively put a price on carbon emissions, adjusted by fossil fuel support.
← 10. The IEA has been tracking fossil fuel subsidies for many years, examining instances where consumer prices are less than the market value of the fuel itself (adjusted for transport costs and VAT, as applicable). The IEA country coverage on fossil fuel subsidies for the numbers in Figure 38 include: Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brunei, China (P.R. of), Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Gabon, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Korea, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, Oman, Nigeria, Pakistan, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Taipei, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, France, United Kingdom, Austria, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic, Croatia.
← 11. Care should be taken when making international comparisons as there is a level of uncertainty associated with the data sources and measurement methods on which the indicators rely. For example, one methodological limitation of fossil fuel support data is that tax expenditures are not systematically comparable across countries and over time, due to the fact that data reported by countries are calculated using different benchmark tax systems to estimate the revenue forgone. Also note that fossil fuel support data from the OECD Inventory is available from 2010.
← 12. Apart from the Paris Agreement, other climate treaties tracked by the CAPMF include: the Montreal Protocol, the Montreal Amendment, the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol, the UNFCCC framework convention.
← 13. See the OECD Working Paper (Nachtigall et al., 2022[45]) for a list of international initiatives tracked by the CAPMF.
← 14. Other countries that updated their NDCs in advance of COP28 include Australia, Indonesia, Mexico, Norway, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.