This chapter examines people’s perceptions of government values in Brazil, specifically related to openness, integrity and fairness, comparing them against current policies and good practices in OECD and LAC countries. Notably, Brazilians exhibit a greater level of skepticism towards their government’s openness, integrity and fairness compared to its responsiveness. The chapter emphasises that, in Brazil, perceptions of fairness and openness serve as vital drivers of trust in public institutions, particularly for the civil service and the local government.
Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions in Brazil
Building Trust in Public Institutions
4. Trust and values in Brazil
Abstract
Prioritising a cultural change within public governance towards openness, integrity and fairness would enhance people’s trust in public institutions. Indeed, the literature highlights that when it comes to public trust, processes – the way policies are designed and implemented – are as important as policy outcomes (Van de Walle and Migchelbrink, 2020[1]; Brezzi et al., 2021[2]). Openness, integrity and fairness are interconnected and mutually dependent public governance values (OECD, 2017[3]; OECD, 2022[4]). Open government promotes more transparent policy-making processes, enhances government accountability and fosters more citizen and stakeholder participation in public decision making (OECD, 2017[5]). Inclusive and accessible governance increases loyalty, co-operation, positive perceptions of political leaders and trust in public institutions. Finally, public integrity policies and practices improve people's perceptions of their government’s trustworthiness and legitimacy (OECD, 2017[3]).
In Brazil, perceptions of fairness and openness are key drivers of trust in public institutions, in particular for the civil service and the local government (Chapter 2). Brazilians are more sceptical about their government’s openness, integrity and fairness than its responsiveness (Figure 2.17).
This chapter reviews people’s perceptions of openness, integrity and fairness in Brazil in the context of the its current policies and good practice in OECD and LAC countries. The analysis in this study relies mainly on the data collected through the OECD Trust Survey, carried out online in Brazil in April 2022. At the time of the survey, the country was still grappling with both the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic and rising inflation, a highly polarised political environment during the presidential campaign for national elections and increased tensions between branches of government. The political and economic context when the data were collected has undoubtedly had an influence on the trust levels. Indeed, historical data indicate that the share of the public expressing trust in the government in Brazil and in Latin American countries has fluctuated significantly over the past 30 years, although remaining, on average, at around 30%. Major peaks in public trust are observed after national elections and the beginning of economic cycles (see Chapter 2), underscoring the importance of the wider context to people’s perceptions and attitudes.
Brazil is often described as an open government pioneer. However, the public’s perception of its openness is not quite as positive, and it continues to face challenges when engaging vulnerable groups in the policy-making process and communicating effectively. There are widespread feelings of unfairness among the Brazilian population, and perceptions of fairness matter for trust in public institutions and political inclusion. Brazilians, like many other Latin Americans, also raise concerns about public integrity. Such concerns exacerbate feelings of unequal treatment and the perception that the system is not working in the same way for everyone. Responding to these concerns will be crucial if people in Brazil are to feel their political voice is heard and that they are able to participate in politics.
4.1. Openness
Open government refers to a culture of governance that promotes transparency, integrity, accountability and stakeholder participation. Active and inclusive open government transforms how the public administration interacts with stakeholders and citizens (OECD, 2017[5]).
Building on the OECD Recommendation of the Council on Open Government (OECD, 2017[5]), the OECD Framework on the Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions measures three key aspects of openness. First, the survey measures the government’s capacity to inform the public about what it does and improve transparency.1 Second, it assesses whether the public are consulted and whether the government seeks feedback from citizens and stakeholders. Third, the survey looks at the government’s response to people’s ideas and views and whether it includes such feedback in its policy design and implementation.
The OECD Trust Survey included the following three questions to measure perceptions of these elements of openness in Brazil:
If you need information about an administrative procedure (for example obtaining a passport, applying for benefits, etc.), how likely or unlikely do you think it is that the information would be easily available?
If a decision affecting your community is to be made by the local government, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that you would have an opportunity to voice your views?
If you participate in a public consultation on reforming a major policy area (e.g. taxation, healthcare, environmental protection), how likely or unlikely do you think it is that the government would adopt the opinions expressed in the public consultation?
At the intersection of government openness and civic action, the OECD Trust Survey includes questions on people’s ability to understand and influence politics (political efficacy) and on forms of political engagement. All these aspects of political engagement and people’s voices in politics are included in the analysis of this chapter:
How much would you say the political system in Brazil allows people like you to have a say in what the government does?
How confident are you in your own ability to participate in politics?
Over the last 12 months, have you done any of the following activities? Please tick all that apply.
Finally, the OECD Trust Survey included a specific question for Brazil on people’s perceptions about how successful collective action might be in their neighbourhoods, addressing their sense of having a stake in collective endeavours beyond political participation:
Many pavements and streets in the city are in bad condition. Imagine that the government will give funds for maintenance to neighbourhoods where residents get 500 signatures on a petition. How likely would it be that the moderators in your neighbourhood would be able to collect the 500 signatures?
4.1.1. Brazil is a regional leader on transparency, but public information is not perceived as being easy to access
Brazil has long been a regional leader on transparent public governance (Figure 4.1) and is one of the founding members of the Open Government Partnership (OGP), committed to promoting transparent, participatory, inclusive and accountable governance (OGP, 2021[6]). Transparency initiatives have played a crucial role in Brazil's open government agenda and its past four OGP action plans have placed a strong emphasis on transparency. These initiatives have helped support subnational governments to meet their access to information obligations, establish a federal open data policy, and promote active transparency in environmental and health matters (OECD, 2022[7]). One key aspect of government transparency is “freedom of information”, which encourages citizens to ask for information and also requires governments to provide information proactively (Mungiu‐Pippidi, 2022[8]). In 2011 Brazil enacted the Law on Access to Information(Law 12.527/2011) requiring public institutions to provide information to citizens online, and since 2016, the country has enforced a time limit for government agencies to respond to requests for information. In parallel, Brazil has introduced a range of digital tools, such as the Federal Access to Information System, allowing the implementation of the Access to Information System and Open Data Portal.
Figure 4.1. Brazil performs well among Latin America countries on the open government agenda
Note: Figure presents the country scores of the open government dimension of the Rule of Law Index. This dimension measures publicised laws and government data, rights to information, civic participation, and complaint mechanisms. The World Justice Project collects nationally representative samples in a mix of face-to-face/online surveys and local expert interviews in each country. All country scores are normalised to a range between 0 (weakest adherence to the rule of law) and 1 (strongest adherence to the rule of law) and component scores are aggregated using simple averages. LAC (31) refers to the unweighted average across 31 LAC countries.
Source: WJP (2022), Rule of Law Index.
Despite these these initiatives and tools, the OECD Trust Survey finds that people have low expectations about the openness of public institutions (Figure 4.2). Only around one-third of surveyed respondents in Brazil (34.9%) believe that it would be easy to find information about administrative procedures – and 44.3% believe it would be difficult – compared to 51.4% expecting it to be easy in Colombia, 71% in Mexico and 65.1% on average across OECD countries.
Figure 4.2. Around one third of Brazilian respondents are pessimistic about the ease of finding information out about administrative procedures
Note: Figure presents the distributions of responses to the question “If you need information about an administrative procedure (for example obtaining a passport, applying for benefits, etc.), how likely or unlikely do you think it is that the information would be easily available?” “Likely” corresponds to responses of 6-10 on a scale of 0-10, “neutral” to a response of 5 and “unlikely” to responses of 0-4; “don't know” was a separate answer choice. OECD (22) refers to the unweighted average across 22 OECD countries.
Source: OECD Trust Survey (http://oe.cd/trust).
These results suggest people perceive a gap between Brazil’s stated ambitions on government transparency and its results. One way Brazil could try to bridge this gap is by strengthening the legal framework. Like many other countries, Brazil provisionally suspended its law on access to information during the COVID-19 pandemic, making it harder for citizens to stay informed during the health crisis (OECD, 2020[9]). The law on access to information could be more detailed and include fewer exceptions like those used for this suspension (RTI, 2023[10]). Simplifying regulations and processes would reduce administrative burdens and harmonise implementation at the subnational level. Brazil could also discuss its implementation challenges with other countries that face or have faced similar issues. The OECD Network on Open and Innovative Government in LAC, which Brazil is currently co-leading with Colombia,2 provides a key platform for exchanging information on policies and good practices of open government. For instance, Brazil could follow Mexico’s example and invest further in open data and digitalisation. Mexico included open data as a priority in its National Digital Strategy to drive the digitalisation and capacity building of public sector institutions, as well as focusing on social inclusion in open government data (OECD, 2018[11]). A similar focus on open government data would make an important contribution to Brazil’s transparency agenda.
These formal adjustments could be complemented by a number of initiatives highlighted by the recent OECD Open Government Review of Brazil (OECD, 2022[7]) to help reduce the implementation gap. Public communications could help inform people about Brazil’s existing strong legal framework on the right to access public information. It could also develop a centralised web page combining all existing portals and panels where information is disclosed; adopt interactive guidelines or manuals for citizens and stakeholders on how and where to request government information; host seminars and discussion groups on the potential impact of access to information; and develop multi-channel mechanisms to counter the digital divide (OECD, 2022[7]; Michener, Contreras and Niskier, 2018[12]; Kawashita, Baptista and Soares, 2022[13]). Inclusive communication is key; all groups in society should understand their right to access to information and they should be actively included in the work on transparency and open data. In New Zealand, for example, minority leaders manage data platforms themselves (Box 4.1). This may also help to tackle mis- and disinformation. During the pandemic, some minority community leaders in Brazil made active use of open government data to fight mis- and disinformation about vaccinations (Silva et al., 2021[14]).
Box 4.1. Inclusive data governance in New Zealand
New Zealand Māori Data Governance. In New Zealand, data governance processes are co-designed with indigenous Māori communities (Māori Data Governance). This co-design process provides an opportunity for the New Zealand government to include vulnerable populations in the open government process and to keep abreast of their specific needs and challenges when designing policies addressing social inequalities. The co-design process also engages Māori communities in learning about their data rights and might enhance trust in data and data systems among population groups that have previously been left out. Visualisation tools specifically designed for use by Māori communities help people to actively engage with the data and make informed decisions.
4.1.2. Brazil could build on its history of participatory politics to strengthen meaningful engagement
Apart from its commitment to the transparency agenda, Brazil is well known for its use of innovative tools to promote political participation both at the federal and subnational levels. Brazil has a long tradition of local deliberation processes, such as participatory budgeting – first implemented in Porto Alegre in 1989 – and municipal policy councils. For example, in São Paulo, one of the largest cities in the world, deliberative governance mechanisms were successfully used to include socially vulnerable population groups in participatory budgeting.3 This illustrates the importance of promoting social inclusion and citizen participation in the urban policies of large cities, and which policy options can be used to do so (Hernández-Medina, 2010[17]).
At the federal level, Brazil is known for its two types of deliberative bodies (colegiados, or collegial bodies): National Policy Councils and National Policy Conferences. National Policy Councils are permanent bodies, which discuss policy agendas and public policies and involve both governmental and non-governmental stakeholders. National Policy Conferences are an innovative mechanism to combine input from different levels of government, in which elected local delegates get together with government representatives to inform national policies at the states level. These conferences grew in importance during the 2000s, with civil society organisations playing an increasing role in the process (Pogrebinschi, 2022[18]). The online platform Participa Mais Brasil is another well-known participatory tool, offering a centralised participatory portal (OECD, 2022[7]).
However, recent research finds that Brazil’s historical commitment to innovative tools for citizen and stakeholder participation has faltered in recent years (Pogrebinschi, 2021[19]). Experts interviewed for this study stated that innovative participation, and political participation in general, was declining in the country. Such deliberative initiatives are difficult to manage in such a diverse and large country, and rarely include randomly selected citizens, which may be one of the barriers to ensuring inclusive engagement among the public (OECD, 2020[20]). In 2019, during Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency, Decree 9.759/2019 was enacted in an effort to rationalise the federal administration. This decree closed several National Policy Conferences and changed the mandate of others. It also revoked both the 2014 National Policy of Social Participation and the National System of Social Participation (OECD, 2022[7]).
The experts’ assessment of declining political participation is reflected in Brazilians’ scepticism about how much they can meaningfully participate in political decision making. According to results from the OECD Trust Survey, in April 2022, most Brazilians did not consider they would have the opportunity to participate in political decision making. Less than one-third of respondents (27.2%) believe they would have the opportunity to voice their views on decisions made by local government, while only one in five (21.5%) believe the government would listen to opinions provided in a public consultation on reforming a major policy area (Figure 4.3). Only one in ten believe they have a say in what government does (Figure 4.10).
Figure 4.6). Perceptions about being able to influence local decisions are at similar levels in Colombia (28.5%), while for consultations on major national policy decisions, perceptions of influence are higher in Colombia (29.4%), Mexico (32%) and OECD countries overall (32.9%) than they are in Brazil (Figure 4.3).
Figure 4.3. Perceptions of participatory engagement are low
Note: Figure presents the distributions of responses to the questions 1) “If a decision affecting your community is to be made by the local government, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that you would have an opportunity to voice your views?” (left); and 2) “If you participate in a public consultation on reforming a major policy area (e.g. taxation, healthcare, environmental protection), how likely or unlikely do you think it is that the government would adopt the opinions expressed in the public consultation?” (right). OECD (22) refers to the unweighted average across 22 OECD countries. In Mexico, the question was formulated in a slightly different way.
Source: OECD Trust Survey (http://oe.cd/trust).
Perceptions of effective engagement are especially low among the most vulnerable. In general, women and people with lower levels of education feel less heard (Figure 4.4). For example, while only 21.5% of respondents with lower levels of education believe the government would adopt opinions expressed in public consultations, more educated respondents are more positive (26.7%). This suggests that Brazil needs to enhance its feedback mechanisms and communicate better to people how their views were considered, as is done in the United Kingdom and in deliberaturas in Colombia (Box 4.2). It also needs to ensure participatory engagement is inclusive. Existing participatory initiatives often lack representativeness and should be more inclusive of women, LGBTI (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex) persons, youth and indigenous populations (OECD, 2022[7]). For instance, research led by the Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA) showed that on average, 63% of Council members in Brazil are men, 66% identify as white, and 58% are between 40 and 60 years old (IPEA, 2013[21]). Similar concerns were highlighted during in-depth interviews with minority leaders carried out as part of this study.
Figure 4.4. Women and those with lower levels of education are less optimistic about the government listening to them
Note: Figure presents the responses to the question “If you participate in a public consultation on reforming a major policy area (e.g. taxation, healthcare, environmental protection), how likely or unlikely do you think it is that the government would adopt the opinions expressed in the public consultation?” “Likely” corresponds to responses of 6-10 on a scale of 0-10. BRA mean presents the weighted average across all respondents in Brazil. High education is defined as ISCED 2011 levels 5-8, i.e. university-level degrees such as bachelor’s, master’s or doctorates, and low education refers to below upper secondary attainment. Socio-economic status (SES) is based on household purchasing power following the Brazil Economic Classification Criteria (Critério Brasil-ABEP), which assesses respondents’ households’ access to public utility services, education and possession of several amenities. * means that differences in proportions are statistically significant at the 90% significance level; ** means that differences are statistically significant at the 95% level; *** means that differences are statistically significant at the 99% level. Reference group in light blue.
Source: OECD Trust Survey (http://oe.cd/trust).
Box 4.2. Strategies to provide feedback to citizens in Colombia and the United Kingdom
Updated public consultation principles in the United Kingdom
Government responses following public consultations are important for informing the public about their outcomes and making people feel their opinions mattered. In the United Kingdom, the government must publish a response within 12 weeks of the consultation taking place. Responses must be published in advance or at the same time if public consultations cover changes in the legislation.
The UK government adopted new public consultation principles in 2018 to engage more effectively with citizens and introduce a feedback circle into the public consultation process. The government aims to use digital public consultation methods in early stages of policy formulation to facilitate a broader involvement, following trends in other countries to introduce online consultations in the wake of the pandemic. Consultation documents should use clear and plain language, so they are easy for the public to understand.
Deliberatura: Council to the street in Colombia
In the city of Buenaventura, the local council and mayor meet with citizens to answer questions and concerns related to the city’s budget. Community leaders identify and suggest discussion priorities and the meetings are held in public places in the city so that everyone can participate. Citizens are designated to follow up with politicians on the commitments discussed in the meetings, to be adopted in municipal agreements. The initiative started in 2021 and several meetings have been taken place since then. Colombia plans to replicate the practice piloted in Buenaventura in other cities to strengthen the policy co-creation process and provide innovative solutions for city development.
Source: (Chwalisz, 2021[22]; OPSI, 2023[23])
OECD countries face similar issues to Brazil with the under- or over-representation of certain groups in participatory processes but because of its extension, population size and administrative complexities Brazil may face additional challenges in scaling and streamlining local initiatives to the federal level. A good practice example of promoting political participation among vulnerable groups are the Finnish National dialogues, based on the experience of lockdown dialogues held by the government during the pandemic. These provide specific mechanisms to ensure that a representative group of people participated. Other more targeted initiatives, such as the Danish Senior Citizens’ Council, help to strengthen participatory engagement among vulnerable groups (Box 4.3). Established Brazilian Councils, for example the National Council for the Rights of the Elderly, could look to this example for ways to increase representation in participatory engagement. In addition to measures that actively seek to recruit a more representative group of citizens to take part in participatory initiatives, diverse individuals may also be more likely to participate if they believe these initiatives will have an impact. One example of boosting the incentive to participate is the European Citizens Initiative, which offers EU citizens an avenue to directly propose legislation (Box 4.3).
Box 4.3. Signature initiatives to increase participation
Finnish National Dialogues
The Finnish National Dialogues are a social dialogue initiative aimed at increasing communication and exchanges between public institutions and civil society. The National Dialogues cover different themes, and a new form of dialogue on the topic of immigration is currently being piloted, to inform policy revisions. Everyone is encouraged to participate, and summaries of the dialogues are published online.
The initiative originally emerged as a mechanism to consult citizens during the COVID-19 lockdowns (Lockdown Dialogues). One of the original ideas behind these lockdown dialogues was to enhance trust in public institutions in times of crisis. During the pandemic, relevant non-governmental organisations (NGOs) reached out to vulnerable communities to inform them about the ongoing dialogues and to ensure that a representative group of citizens participated in the open discussions.
National Association of Senior Citizens’ Councils (Danske Ældreråd)
The Senior Citizens’ Councils in Denmark were first established as a local initiative, serving as a legislated function of local municipalities to increase political engagement and influence among the population aged 60 and older. Today, the National Association of Senior Citizens’ Councils (Danske Ældreråd) has 1 000 members from across Denmark. Senior citizens can run as candidates to represent senior citizens’ interests.
National guidance and legislation ensures further representativeness by gender and ethnicity in the Senior Citizens’ Councils. For example, the inclusion of women is encouraged via expense allowances, and financing for the organisation of council activities.
European Citizens’ Initiative
The European Union (EU) has developed several initiatives to promote civic society participation. These initiatives attempt to strengthen the link between policy outcomes and citizens’ preferences, to strengthen democratic legitimacy. For example, the European Citizens’ Initiative allows citizens to propose legislation to the Commission if they can show support from at least 1 million EU citizens. At least seven EU citizens living in seven different EU countries are required to team up to register an initiative. Once the initiative is accepted, the team needs to collect a million signatures of support within 12 months. The initiative must then be submitted to the Commission within three months, together with detailed information, signatures and funding received. There have been more than 100 registration requests, some of which have been successful.
Source: Ministry of the Interior, Finland (2022), “Immigration dialogues”, https://intermin.fi/en/immigration-dialogues; https://www.sitra.fi/app/uploads/2022/06/sitra-lockdown-dialogues.pdf; https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12219; https://epd.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/case-study-latin-america.pdf; (Falanga et al., 2020[24]) (Davidson, 2017[25])
According to results from the OECD Trust Survey, Brazilians participate in various forms of political engagement, with one in five reporting posting political content online and signing petitions (Figure 4.5). This reflects the country’s traditionally high voter turnout, which has tended to be at around 80% for national elections (IDEA, 2023[26]). Even so, 27.8% of respondents stated that they did not participate in any of these forms.
Figure 4.5. After voting, posting political content and signing petitions are the most common form of political participation in Brazil
Note: Figure presents the share of respondents that mentioned having participated in the following forms of political participation during the last 12 months (“Over the last 12 months, have you done any of the following activities? Please tick all that apply”).
Source: OECD Trust Survey (http://oe.cd/trust).
Even though the majority of people in Brazil are rather sceptical about their opportunities for meaningful engagement, a significant share feel confident about their own ability to participate in politics (34.8%), similar to the average across OECD countries (41%) (Figure 4.10).
Figure 4.6). A majority of Brazilian respondents (61.4%) also think it likely that collective action in their neighbourhood would succeed, measured as their neighbourhood’s ability to collect signatures for a petition to fund the maintenance of their streets and pavements (Figure 4.7). These results could offer some grounds for optimism, especially as people’s perceptions of their ability to participate in politics is the main driver of trust in government and the civil service in Brazil (see Chapter 2). Belief in the success of collective action in the form of a neighbourhood petition is also strongly associated with trust (Figure 4.10).
Figure 4.6. Despite their scepticism over whether government will let them have a say, many Brazilians are confident in their own ability to participate in politics
Note: Figure presents the distributions of responses to the questions 1) “How confident are you in your own ability to participate in politics?” (left figure) and 2) “How much would you say the political system in your country allows people like you to have a say in what the government does?” (right figure). “Confident” corresponds to responses of 6-10 on a scale of 0-10, “neutral” to a response of 5 and “not confident” to responses of 0-4; “don't know” was a separate answer choice. OECD (22) refers to the unweighted average across 22 OECD countries.
Source: OECD Trust Survey (http://oe.cd/trust).
Figure 4.7. A majority of Brazilians believe that collective action at the local level would be successful
Note: Figure presents the responses to the question “Many pavements and streets in the city are in bad condition. Imagine that the government will give funds for maintenance to neighbourhoods where residents get 500 signatures on a petition. How likely would it be that the moderators in your neighbourhood would be able to collect the 500 signatures?” “Likely” represents the aggregated responses of “very likely” and “likely”, and “unlikely” represents the aggregated responses of “very unlikely” and “unlikely”; “don't know” was a separate answer choice.
Source: OECD Trust Survey (http://oe.cd/trust).
These more positive results about the potential for successful collective action and people’s own ability to participate in politics suggest there may be room to improve and shape representative deliberative processes, even if Brazilians have little trust in more traditional democratic institutions (Chapter 2). Box 4.4 gives an example of one such process in Ireland. Alongside initiatives to strengthen representative institutions such as political parties – for instance taking a proactive approach to enhance transparency and good governance, by ensuring accountability of leaders and democratic candidate selection procedures or promoting participative decision-making processes within organisations – investing in initiatives to provide Brazilians with more information on political processes and opportunities to influence policies could also generate significant trust gains. Implementing participatory programmes in schools, like the mock elections in Norwegian schools, could promote participatory engagement from an early age (Box 4.5). Brazil could tap into its existing Brazilian National Youth Conferences, shaping the political education of the youngest generation (Silveira Rocha and Gonçalves Brasil, 2021[27]).
Box 4.4. Representative deliberative processes in Ireland
Deliberative processes are used to inform recommendations on policy questions, gather opinions on policy issues, collect evaluations before ballots and create permanent representative deliberative bodies. In representative deliberative processes, citizens are selected randomly to participate in face-to-face deliberation with public authorities. In Latin America, however, even though deliberative processes are widely used, countries often do not randomly select the citizens taking part.
The Irish Citizens’ Assembly (2016-2018)
The Irish Citizens’ Assembly involved 100 randomly selected citizens who discussed five legal and policy issues: the 8th amendment of the constitution on abortion, ageing populations, referendum processes, fixed-term parliaments and climate change. The Assembly’s recommendations were submitted to parliament for further debate. Based on its recommendations, the government called a referendum on amending the 8th amendment and declared a climate emergency.
Box 4.5. Mock elections in Norwegian schools
Norwegians show high levels of trust, with many people are confident in their own ability to participate in politics (OECD, 2022[28]). Political education in school is one means to engage people in the democratic process from an early age. In Norway, schools conduct mock elections in the weeks leading up to local and parliamentary elections. Norway has been conducting mock elections now for over 70 years, the only country to do so.
The exercise includes debates and interaction with party members from youth organisations, held one week before local or parliamentary elections. These debates familiarise students with the political realm and train them to be active democratic citizens, by increasing democratic accountability. A study on the impact of political education at schools in Norway showed that mock elections had a positive effect on students’ willingness to vote in parliamentary elections (Borge, 2016[29]).
Source: (Borge, 2016[29])
4.1.3. Opportunities for enhancing communication and engagement between government and population
This section summarises the main findings and presents potential policy avenues Brazil could consider to improve openness and strengthen public trust in Brazil.
Brazil has long been a regional leader in mainstreaming transparency, yet only one-third of respondents (35%) – less than in other Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries – believe that information about administrative procedures would be easily available, which is a significant driver of trust in the civil service. To improve these perceptions Brazil could:
Adopting a comprehensive approach to transparency by proactively communicating the relevant information and data to people, and providing guidance on how to access public information.
Developing initiatives to strengthen inclusive communication.
Voter turnout in Brazil is high (around 80% for national elections), and federal and subnational governments have established innovative tools to promote political participation. However, when asked in April 2022, most Brazilian respondents were sceptical about whether they could have an effective political voice and meaningful engagement. Only one in three believe they could influence community decisions and only one in five believe the government would adopt ideas provided in public consultations, both important drivers of trust in public institutions. Based on this analysis, Brazil could:
Developing and strengthening participatory initiatives that incentivise and support political engagement, in particular reaching out to the most vulnerable groups and ensuring their representation in participatory engagement.
Enhancing feedback and communication with people about how their views are considered in policy making, potentially offering considerable improvements in trust levels.
One-third of people in Brazil (35%) are confident in their ability to participate in politics, similar to the OECD average, and 61% believe initiatives requiring collective action in their community would succeed. Yet, political parties, the institutions that ensure people’s interests are represented in decision making, are the least trusted institutions. To improve participation, Brazil could:
Improving people’s attitudes about their ability to participate proactively in politics by sharing more information about political processes and opportunities to influence policies.
Reinforcing political participation through measures such as participatory programmes in schools and strengthening political parties, for example by democratising candidate selection procedures or decision making.
4.2. Integrity
The OECD refers to public integrity as shared ethical values and principles and the continuous prioritisation of public over private interests in the public sector. Integrity laws and policies aim to promote public integrity by nurturing a change of culture in the public sector and the whole of society, while establishing a coherent and comprehensive framework of effective vertical and horizontal accountability mechanisms (OECD, 2017[30]; OECD, 2020[31]; OECD, 2021[32]). Positive perceptions of a country’s public integrity are crucial for public trust (OECD, 2017[3]; Murtin et al., 2018[33]), and have also been found to increase policy support and compliance, for example with (costly) climate policies (Kitt et al., 2021[34]). Similarly, public sector integrity is an important component of open government: initiatives and policies that promote transparency and accountability often also facilitate the reporting and detection of corruption and fraud and vice versa (Huberts, 2018[35]). For instance, a study on the use of participatory health councils in Brazil shows that they are associated with a reduction in corruption in municipalities (Avelino, Barberia and Biderman, 2013[36]).
The OECD Framework on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions considers integrity in relation to the government’s mandate to use powers and public resources ethically, by upholding high standards of behaviour, committing to fight corruption and promoting accountability. The OECD Trust Survey includes three questions to measure integrity, addressing petty corruption of public employees, “revolving doors” for high-level political officials, and political influence and horizontal accountability between different branches of the government:
If a public employee were offered money by a citizen or a firm for speeding up access to a public service, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that they would refuse it?
If a high-level political official was offered the prospect of a well-paid job in the private sector in exchange for a political favour, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that they would refuse it?
If a court is about to make a decision that could negatively impact on the government’s image, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that the court would make the decision free from political influence?
Given that in Brazil, as in many Latin American countries, “clientelist” relations are seen as widespread (Rocha, Souza and Araújo, 2019[37]; Koster and Eiró, 2021[38]), an additional question was piloted in the OECD Trust Survey in Brazil aiming to gauge the importance of knowing someone to access public goods and services:
Do you consider it important to know someone who would help you to access public goods and/or services, for example, to receive social benefits, to obtain a place in a public school or a medical appointment?
4.2.1. Despite robust policies to improve government integrity, efforts still seem to fall short of citizens expectations and perceptions of corruption
Since its transition to democracy, Brazil has developed a comprehensive legal framework to promote public integrity and tackle corruption. Relevant integrity standards include the Code of Professional Ethics of the Public Servants of the Federal Executive Branch, Law 8112/1990 regulating the civil service regime; Law 12846/2013, known as the Anti-Corruption Law; and Law 12813/2013 on conflicts of interest for public officials of the Federal Executive Branch (OECD, 2021[32]). In addition to this legal framework, in 2021 Brazil established the Public Integrity System of the Federal Executive Branch (Sistema de Integridade Pública do Poder Executivo Federal- SIPEF) and in May 2023 it created the Federal Public Administration’s System of Integrity, Transparency and Access to Information (Sistema de Integridade, Transparência e Acesso à Informação da Administração Pública Federal- SITAI), intended to mainstream integrity policies within federal entities. This is of particular relevance considering that Brazil’s integrity system at the federal level is steered by three main actors covering different branches of government: the Office of the Comptroller General of the Union (Controladoria-Geral da União, CGU), the Public Ethics Commission (Comissão de Ética Pública, CEP) and the Federal Court of Accounts (Tribunal de Contas da União, TCU) (OECD, 2021[32]).
Despite this well-developed institutional and legal framework, challenges remain. The different agencies’ responsibilities need to be streamlined (OECD, 2021[32]) and expectations of public integrity in Brazil are low. Experts characterise political corruption in the country as pervasive (V-Dem, 2022);4 Brazil scores 0.55 on the Political Corruption Index (where 0 indicates the lowest corruption level and 1 the highest; Figure 4.8). Brazil also scores 38 out of 100 points on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (where 0 indicates a country is highly corrupt and 100 that it is very clean) (Transparency International, 2022). Several studies have found that corruption is among the top issues of concern for Brazilian people (Avis, Ferraz and Finan, 2018[39]). Addressing corruption in the public sector and establishing coherent and clear public integrity frameworks has been a common challenge across the LAC region (OECD, 2019[40]), and comparable data from the Latinobarometer show a high and long-standing perception of corruption among public servants and politicians (Latinobarómetro, 2023[41]).
Figure 4.8. Brazil is around the regional average on the Political Corruption Index
Note: Figure presents the country scores of the V-Dem Political Corruption Index, which measures six different forms of corruption across the executive, legislative and judicial branches, and can be further disaggregated into the executive corruption index and the public sector corruption index. The index ranges from 0 (less corruption) to 1 (more corruption), in contrast to other V-Dem indices, which have higher democratic components on the upper end. LAC refers to the unweighted average across LAC countries.
Source: V-Dem, 2022.
According to the OECD Trust Survey, a majority of respondents in Brazil (60.2%) believe that if public employees were offered money for speeding up access to a public service, they would be unlikely to refuse it, similar to perceptions in Colombia (60.1%) and Mexico (68.9%), and above the average across OECD countries (40.1%) (Figure 4.9).
Figure 4.9. Most of Brazilian respondents do not believe that a public employee would refuse a bribe
Note: Figure presents the distributions of responses to the question “If a public employee were offered money by a citizen or a firm for speeding up access to a public service, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that they would refuse it?”. “Likely” corresponds to responses of 6-10 on a scale of 0-10, “neutral” to a response of 5 and “unlikely” to responses of 0-4; “don't know” was a separate answer choice. OECD (22) refers to the unweighted average across 22 OECD countries. In Mexico the question was asked in a slightly different way.
Source: OECD Trust Survey (http://oe.cd/trust).
Similarly, when Brazilian people were asked about the relevance of help in accessing public goods and services, 64.6% of respondents agreed that contacts are important (Chapter 3, Figure 3.9). Trust in the federal government is more than twice as high among respondents who attach less importance to such clientelist relations or who are confident about the success of collective actions than among those who are sceptical about these two aspects (Figure 4.10). This suggests that perceptions about petty corruption are linked with other informal practices, such as clientelism or nepotism, that are detrimental to public integrity (Nichter, 2018[42]; Ansell, 2018[43]), and are underscored as a key concern in the forthcoming OECD Public Integrity Review of Brazil.
Figure 4.10. People who believe contacts are not important for accessing public services or are confident in the success of collective actions have greater trust in government
Note: Figure presents the responses to the question “On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust the national government?” “High or moderately high trust” corresponds to responses of 6-10. Trust responses are disaggregated by perceptions of the importance of clientelistic relations (“Do you consider it important to know someone who could help you access public goods and/or services, for example, receive social benefits, obtain a place in a public school or a form to attend a medical center?”) and the likelihood of success of collective action (“Many pavements and streets in the city are in bad condition. Imagine that the government will give funds for maintenance to neighbourhoods where residents get 500 signatures on a petition. How likely would it be that the moderators in your neighbourhood would be able to collect the 500 signatures?”).
Source: OECD Trust Survey (http://oe.cd/trust).
In addition to petty corruption and clientelism, systemic corruption at higher levels of government is a particular challenge for Brazil. High-level corruption scandals contribute to increasing mistrust towards the political system and pose threats to the democratic process. Recent corruption scandals, such as the Mensalão and especially the large-scale Lava Jato (Car Wash) scandal5, seem to have had a big impact on people’s perception of government as well as trust in public institutions (Samuels and Zucco, 2018[44]; Gonzalez-Ocantos et al., 2023[45]). Although it is difficult to estimate the effects of large corruption scandals on Brazilians’ attitudes toward politics, a study that collected data with an experimental survey in Brazil found that respondents who were primed to think about the scandal were more disengaged from politics (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al., 2023[45]).
To tackle widespread integrity issues, whether “everyday” petty corruption, or larger scandals, a systemic shift is needed. Such a shift cannot focus merely on tackling corruption but must go hand in hand with cultural changes placing trust as the core strategy for the public administration, and communicating integrity values and positive actions, even at the individual level. As the OECD’s Recommendation on Public Integrity highlights, management and integrity training to support ethical leadership and codes of conduct in the public sector workforce are important mechanisms for strengthening awareness about public integrity standards and creating a culture of integrity (OECD, 2017[30]). Brazil has had limited and fragmented integrity programmes and training courses, not well advertised, yet its efforts have been renewed through the SITAI. A good example of mainstreaming training across the whole country is the Flemish Public Service integrity training (Box 4.6).
Box 4.6. Public service integrity training in Flanders, Belgium
The Flemish Agency for Government Employees offers practical training to public officials that differs from traditional training methods.
Rather than providing public officials with recommendations and guidelines, officials are presented with practical scenarios that may arise in their daily work, which pose ethical dilemmas. These scenarios do not have clear solutions, and the facilitator encourages participants to engage in discussions about how to resolve them with integrity. The main focus is on the debate and exploration of different choices and behaviour, which allows participants to identify opposing values.
Source: (OECD, 2019[46])
Brazil could also further improve its efforts to mainstream integrity policies throughout the public administration, for instance building on the new SITAI to clarify responsibilities with other programmes in place and create a more agile system that avoids overlaps (OECD, 2021[32]).
Finally, as part of ongoing initiatives led by the main integrity actors in Brazil, one frequently cited area where anti-corruption regulations in Brazil fall short of international standards is the whistle-blowing regulation (Transparency International, 2019[47]). Indeed, a World Bank study carried out in 2021 stated many civil servants reported that they witnessed some form of unethical behaviour while in office but most refrained from reporting it, citing a lack of protection of whistle-blowers as the main barrier to doing so (World Bank, 2021[48]). Brazil could take the opportunity of the Anticorruption Plan20 by the Inter-ministerial Committee against Corruption (Comitê Interministerial de Combate à Corrupção, CCIC), which has already worked on implementing a whistle-blower regulation, to further strengthen the proposed framework.
4.2.2. There is a widespread perception that public policies may be captured by vested interests at the expense of the public interest
Beyond the visible and illegal forms of corruption, such as bribery, other more subtle activities may skew public decision making away from what is in the public interest. Brazil lacks provisions on pre- and post-public employment restrictions for public servants and for public officials in the Federal Executive Branch. Those at risk include those who have regular contact with the private sector including officials working in public procurement, regulatory policy, inspections, tax and customs. Brazil also lacks appropriate regulations on post-public employment for national representatives in the legislative branch, leaving the door open to undue or unfair influence over government decision making (OECD, forthcoming).
At the start of this decade, Latinobarometer found that 74.3% of Brazilians perceive the country to be governed by a few powerful groups in their own interest, with 15.8% thinking members of congress are corrupt (Figure 4.11). These findings are also reflected in results from the OECD Trust Survey: most Brazilian respondents identify issues with “revolving doors” between the public and private sector. Only two out of ten people say that a high-level political official would refuse a well-paid job in return for a political favour (19.7%), compared to around three out of ten respondents in Colombia (33%) and across OECD countries (30.4%) (Figure 4.12).
Figure 4.11. Almost 16% of respondents in Brazil believe that Congress representatives are involved in corruption
Note: Figure presents the responses to the question: “How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say?” It shows the share of respondents mentioning each of the following political actors: members of parliament, local government and civil servants. LAC refers to the unweighted average across LAC countries
Source: Latinobarometer, 2020.
Figure 4.12. Perception of revolving doors practices is a challenge in Brazil
Note: Figure presents the distributions of responses to the question “If a high-level politician was offered the prospect of a well-paid job in the private sector in exchange for a political favour, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that they would refuse it?” “Likely” corresponds to responses of 6-10 on a scale of 0-10, “neutral” to a response of 5 and “unlikely” to responses of 0-4; “don't know” was a separate answer choice. OECD (22) refers to the unweighted average across 22 OECD countries.
Source: OECD Trust Survey (http://oe.cd/trust).
The scepticism among the Brazilian population might be linked to the absence of lobbying regulations and significant gaps in the regulation of political finance (Transparency International, 2019[47]). For instance, academic research has found that specific sectors and companies have long benefitted from deals in exchange for financing political campaigns (Boas, Hidalgo and Richardson, 2014[49]). Brazil could take the opportunity of ongoing discussions about lobbying practices and regulations to develop a comprehensive and dedicated law to ensure transparency of lobbying activities, using participatory initiatives to gather input from citizens. Brazil could use examples from other OECD countries as its inspiration to develop a lobbying regulation coherent with the existing integrity framework (Box 4.7) (OECD, forthcoming).
Box 4.7. Lobbying practices in Chile and Ireland
Chile
Chile enacted a Lobbying Regulation in 2014 (Lobbying Law 20.730/2014). It requires all lobbying activities, as covered by the regulation, to be disclosed in a public registry, for instance regular meetings. The regulation applies to paid lobbyists, but also unpaid individuals as well as political actors, civil servants and individuals from other public agencies. Lobbying information is publicly available at https://www.infolobby.cl. The online portal is managed and designed by the Transparency Council (Consejo para la Transparencia) and publishes information on lobbyists and about meetings, trips and donations disaggregated by public agency.
Ireland
The Irish regulations on lobbying were developed through a wide consultation process that gathered opinions on its design, structure and implementation. The 2015 Regulation of Lobbying Act is simple and comprehensive: any individual, company or NGO that seeks to directly or indirectly influence officials on a policy issue must list themselves on a public register and disclose any lobbying activity. The rules cover any meeting with high-level public officials, as well as letters, emails or tweets intended to influence policy. According to regulation, a lobbyist is anyone who employs more than 10 individuals, works for an advocacy body, is a professional paid by a client to communicate on someone else’s behalf or is advocating about land development. In addition to the law, on 28 November 2018, the Standards in Public Office Commission launched its Code of Conduct for persons carrying out lobbying activities. It came into effect on 1 January 2019 and is meant to be reviewed every three years.
Source: Regulation of Lobbying Act and website https://www.lobbying.ie; Lobbying Law No. 20.730 of 2014; http://www.infolobby.cl/.
Weaknesses in the checks and balances between branches of government could be another source of the perception that the system works in the favour of particular interest groups. People in Brazil are quite sceptical about the independence of courts from political power (Figure 4.13). While on average in OECD countries, 42.2% feel that a court would make a decision free from political influence if the decision could negatively influence the government’s image, in Brazil only 22.2% of respondents felt the same way. In turn, results from the Rule of Law Index show Brazil is in line with the regional average on governmental and non-governmental constraints (Figure 4.14). These results align with other surveys conducted on perceptions of public integrity in Brazil (World Bank, 2021[48]). They are worrying as they suggest Brazilian people have little confidence in their system’s checks and balances, which provide the horizontal accountability that should be at the core of democracy. Nevertheless, historical survey data show that the share of the population who believe the judiciary to be corrupt has fallen over time (Avis, Ferraz and Finan, 2018[39]; Ferraz and Finan, 2011[50]).
Figure 4.13. Few Brazilians expect the courts to act independently of political pressure
Note: Figure presents the distributions of responses to the question “If a court is about to make a decision that could negatively impact on the government’s image, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that the court would make the decision free from political influence?” “Likely” corresponds to responses of 6-10 on a scale of 0-10, “neutral” to a response of 5 and “unlikely” to responses of 0-4; “don't know” was a separate answer choice. OECD (22) refers to the unweighted average across 22 OECD countries.
Source: OECD Trust Survey (http://oe.cd/trust).
Figure 4.14. Constraints on government powers in Brazil are in line with the regional average
Note: Figure presents the country scores of the sub-dimension of the Rule of Law Index: constraints on government powers. The World Justice Project collects nationally representative samples in a mix of face-to-face/online surveys and local expert interviews in each country. All country scores are normalised to a range between 0 (weakest adherence to the rule of law) and 1 (strongest adherence to the rule of law) and component scores are aggregated using simple averages. LAC (31) refers to the unweighted average across 31 LAC countries.
Source: WJP (2022), Rule of Law Index.
Perceptions of judicial independence are even lower among the most vulnerable population groups in Brazil (Figure 4.15). Among younger adults (18-29 year-olds), 20.4% believe in the independence of the courts, compared to 24.3% of people aged 30-49. Regional differences are also stark. People in the North (26%) are most optimistic about the free decision making of courts, whereas people living in the Centre-West are the least positive (19.3%). In contrast to other indicators of perceptions of government integrity, women are more likely to believe in the courts’ independence from political influence: the gap between women and men stands at 4 percentage points.
Figure 4.15. Perceptions on the political independence of the courts vary by age, gender and region
Note: Figure presents the distributions of responses to the question “If a court is about to make a decision that could negatively impact on the government’s image, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that the court would make the decision free from political influence?” “Likely” corresponds to responses of 6-10 on a 0-10 scale. BRA mean presents the weighted average across all respondents in Brazil. High education is defined as ISCED 2011 levels 5-8, i.e. university-level degrees such as bachelor’s, master’s or doctorates, and low education refers to below upper secondary attainment. Socio-economic status (SES) is based on household purchasing power following the Brazil Economic Classification Criteria (Critério Brasil-ABEP), which assesses respondents’ households’ access to public utility services, education and possession of several amenities. * means that differences in proportions are statistically significant at the 90% significance level; ** means that differences are statistically significant at the 95% level; *** means that differences are statistically significant at the 99% level. Reference group in light blue.
Source: OECD Trust Survey (http://oe.cd/trust).
4.2.3. Opportunities for strengthening public integrity and improving perceptions of corruption
This section summarises the key results and presents potential policy avenues that Brazil could consider to improve integrity and strengthen public trust.
Perceptions of public integrity in Brazil are lower than perceptions of responsiveness, reliability, fairness and openness. Most Brazilian respondents (60.2%) believe that public employees would accept a bribe for speeding up access to services, similar to the share in other Latin American countries. To increase perceptions of public integrity Brazil could:
Investing in providing integrity guidance for civil servants and training to support ethical leadership.
Strengthening co-ordination across agencies and levels of government to mainstream integrity policies.
Continuing to develop a whistle-blower regulation to lay the foundations for a regulatory framework.
4.3. Fairness
Fairness is an important value and the foundation of sound public governance. Fair governance processes are closely linked with openness and integrity: corrupt practices in the public sector can hinder the fair treatment of citizens, while open and inclusive citizen engagement enables fair processes. Perceptions of fair treatment are often used as a proxy for measuring people's feelings of inclusion/exclusion and status in society (OECD, 2017[3]). Fair treatment by government institutions also matters for trust (Ciani, Fréget and Manfredi, 2021[51]; Frey, 2004[52]; Lind and Arndt, 2016[53]). Indeed, fair processes in the design and implementation of services and interaction with institutions and officials are important prerequisites for people's feelings of loyalty, co-operation and government legitimacy (OECD, 2017[3]). The perceived fairness and competence of government may also influence preferences for redistribution of income and wealth – thereby affecting income inequality outcomes (Ciani, Fréget and Manfredi, 2021[51]).
Another important component of trust is the perception of fairness and equality in socio-economic outcomes, not just in political processes. Academic research finds people's perceptions of fair outcomes and inequality are related to their satisfaction with democracy (Saxton, 2021[54]). On the other hand, perceptions of unfairness can be a catalyst for political engagement if people believe they can have any influence, and as such are closely related to key values such as openness (Reyes and Gasparini, 2022[55]; Zmerli and Castillo, 2015[56]).
Perceptions of fairness and equality in socio-economic outcomes are particularly relevant in a large and diverse country such as Brazil. Like many countries in Latin America, Brazil still has strikingly high levels of inequality and comparatively low levels of redistribution (Higgins and Pereira, 2013[57]; OECD, 2023[58]).
Brazil has succeeded in reducing poverty and income inequality over a long period by expanding social protection through programmes such as Bolsa Família/Auxílio Brasil. However, the current social transfer system is failing to provide an effective universal and accessible social safety net (OECD, 2020[20]) and income inequality and poverty have started to rise again after a long decline during the 2000s. A study that analysed attitudes to politics and democracy among Bolsa Família beneficiaries from 2007 to 2014 found that, on average, support for specific political institutions, such as trust in local governments, is higher among those beneficiaries than among people without such support (Layton, 2017[59]). Confirming the relationship between expectations of fair processes and outcomes and credibility of policies, results from the OECD Trust Survey find that perceptions of fairness have a significant and positive impact on trust in public institutions (see Chapter 2).
According to the OECD Framework on Drivers of Trust in Public institutions, fair treatment by public officials refers not just to the fairness of formal procedures, but also to the style of interactions with public officials and their behaviour during them (OECD, 2017[3]). The OECD Trust Survey addresses fairness, covering people’s perceptions of how public employees and the government interact and treat people, through three questions:
If a public employee has contact with the public in the area where you live, how likely or unlikely is it that they would treat both rich and poor people equally?
If a government employee interacts with the public in your area, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that they would treat all people equally regardless of their gender, sexual identity, ethnicity or country of origin?
If you or a member of your family would apply for a government benefit or service (e.g. unemployment benefits or other forms of income support), how likely or unlikely do you think it is that your application would be treated fairly?
4.3.1. There is a widespread perception of unfairness in Brazil
Although it does not distinguish if referring to services at federal or subnational level, the OECD Trust Survey illustrates widespread dissatisfaction with the treatment of applications for government services in Brazil and finds that less than one in three people (33.1%) believe that their application for government benefits or services would be treated fairly. These results are slightly higher than in Colombia (28.8%), but lower than in Mexico, where more than four out of ten people (44.9%) expect fair treatment of their applications (Figure 4.16). These results confirm other findings on dissatisfaction with access to services (see Chapter 3) and scepticism over public employees’ integrity (see Section 4.2).
Figure 4.16. Few Brazilians expect fair treatment of their government applications
Note: Figure presents the distributions of responses to the question “If you or a member of your family would apply for a government benefit or service (e.g. unemployment benefits or other forms of income support), how likely or unlikely do you think it is that your application would be treated fairly?“ “Likely” corresponds to responses of 6-10 on a scale of 0-10, “neutral” to a response of 5 and “unlikely” to responses of 0-4; “don't know” was a separate answer choice. OECD (22) refers to the unweighted average across 22 OECD countries.
Source: OECD Trust Survey (http://oe.cd/trust).
People are similarly sceptical about public employees’ ability to treat all people equally. When surveyed in April 2022, few people in Brazil reported that they thought public employees would treat people equally regardless of their economic status (19.1% of those responding); or regardless of their gender, ethnicity or sexual orientation (25.3%) (Figure 4.17). These inequalities are felt more strongly among the most vulnerable population groups. Women and people with a lower level of formal education are more likely to expect unfair treatment. The gap in perceptions of fair treatment of all people is 13 percentage points between those with below upper secondary education and those with tertiary or postgraduate attainment (Figure 4.18). Survey data suggest that structural discrimination is a challenge, and is widely accepted among the population as the reason for persistent inequalities in Brazil (Telles and Bailey, 2013[60]). While feelings of being discriminated against are widespread across the LAC region, they are most prevalent in Brazil, where 39% of people reported that they felt discriminated against in 2020 (Latinobarómetro, 2020[61]).
Figure 4.17. Perceptions of unfair treatment by public employees are widespread
Note: Figure presents the distributions of responses to the questions: 1) “If a public employee has contact with the public in the area where you live, how likely or unlikely is it that they would treat both rich and poor people equally?” (left); and 2) “If a government employee interacts with the public in your area, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that they would treat all people equally regardless of their gender, sexual identity, ethnicity or country of origin?“ (right). “Likely” corresponds to responses of 6-10 on a scale of 0-10, “neutral” to a response of 5 and “unlikely” to responses of 0-4; “don't know” was a separate answer choice. OECD (22) refers to the unweighted average across 22 OECD countries.
Source: OECD Trust Survey (http://oe.cd/trust).
Figure 4.18. Women and those with lower levels of education are more likely to expect public employees to treat people unequally
Note: Figure presents responses to the question “If a government employee interacts with the public in your area, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that they would treat all people equally regardless of their gender, sexual identity, ethnicity or country of origin?“ “Likely” corresponds to responses of 6-10 on a scale of 0-10. BRA mean presents the weighted average across all respondents in Brazil. High education is defined as ISCED 2011 levels 5-8, i.e. university-level degrees such as bachelor’s, master’s or doctorates, and low education refers to below upper secondary attainment. Socio-economic status (SES) is based on household's purchasing power following the Brazil Economic Classification Criteria (Critério Brasil-ABEP), which assesses respondents households’ access to public utility services, education and possession of several amenities. * means that differences in proportions are statistically significant at the 90% significance level; ** means that differences are statistically significant at the 95% level; *** means that differences are statistically significant at the 99% level. Reference group in light blue.
Source: OECD Trust Survey (http://oe.cd/trust).
Civil servants seem to carry inherent biases and have occasionally shown resistance to changes aimed at improving the fair and equal treatment of all people. Indeed, a study of civil servants in the Brazilian National Social Security Agency (Instituto Nacional do Seguro Social, INSS) found that the officials’ socio-economic background affects their judgment of deservingness of beneficiaries. These judgements may feed into unequal implementation of policies and unfair treatment of disadvantaged groups (de Andrade and Pekkola, 2022[62]). Similarly, another study analysing the National Policy on Comprehensive Health of the Black Population (Política Nacional em Saúde Integral da População Negra, PNSIPN) found that its implementation faced challenges because agents did not agree with the proposal of offering differentiated attention to the black population and resisted the PNSIPN's formal guidelines and rules (Silva et al., 2022[63]).
These findings pair with concerns and policy demands in Brazil, as a large majority (74%) demand more government action on promoting equal opportunities (Figure 4.19). The promotion of equal opportunities by the federal government was mentioned more frequently than on average in OECD countries (62.9%). Of all the policies surveyed, it was the one that most respondents named when asked where the government should increase its efforts.
Figure 4.19. A large majority in Brazil wants the government to do more to promote equal opportunities for all
Note: Figure presents the distributions of responses to the question “On the following issues, do you think the government should be prioritising them a lot less / less / about the same / more / a lot more?” in reference to the policy priorities of providing equal opportunities for all in Brazil?“. ‘More’ and ‘a lot more”, and ‘less’ and ‘a lot less’ are combined under labels ‘more’ and ‘less’, respectively. OECD (22) refers to the unweighted average across 22 OECD countries.
Source: OECD Trust Survey (http://oe.cd/trust).
The government should ensure vulnerable groups do not bear the cost of policy design failures, as they are often the most exposed to the complexity of the public administration. The implementation of public service delivery can serve to reinforce or reproduce inequalities, where the desired outcomes are mediated by civil servants’ powers of discretion, informed by their background, beliefs, behaviour and daily practices. Regularly collecting and publishing data on vulnerable groups in an open format may help to target policies, tackle inequalities and vulnerabilities, and understand how people of different backgrounds experience interactions with public institutions (Box 4.8).
Box 4.8. Addressing inequalities using government open data in Australia
Data visualisation is an important tool for governments to use to show inequalities across regions or vulnerable population groups and make it accessible and understandable to the public.
Government strategies on publishing disaggregated open data varies across OECD countries. Australia, for example, uses open data portals to publish granular data on several statistical indicators. Australian Government's Open Data Agenda established the central online portal: http://data.gov.au/. Data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics is published to show differences across states and territories, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, migrants and ethnicity, age, disabilities and many other variables.
4.3.2. Increasing the representativeness of the public administration and politicians strengthens inclusive processes
Brazil has introduced initiatives and binding laws to promote the representation of minorities in politics. These include gender quotas and requiring parties to distribute political finances equally among white6 and black candidates at the municipal level (IDEA, 2023[65]). Brazil’s legislation recognises the right of under-represented groups to participate in policy making, for example, the participation of indigenous communities through the National Council of Indigenous Policies and the National Council to Fight Discrimination against Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Individuals. However, the political representation of women is still low in Brazil compared to other LAC countries (Figure 4.20). For other vulnerable population groups, the figures are even worse: while black people account for half of the population in the country, only one-quarter of representatives in Congress are black, as are only 3 of the 54 senators elected in 2022 (Folha de São Paulo, 2022[66]). These shortcomings are relevant as equal representation of all population groups in formal political and deliberative processes increases people’s feeling of having a say and their trust in public institutions (OECD, 2017[3]). Brazil may therefore need to strengthen representativeness in its politics, and could use other countries’ initiatives as an example (Box 4.9).
Figure 4.20. Brazil ranks last among many Latin American countries for the share of women in Congress
Note: Ranking and shares of women in parliament as of 1 January 2023.
Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union Open Data.
Box 4.9. Towards gender equality in politics in Latin America and the Caribbean
In 2015, all Latin American and Caribbean countries committed to a “Parity Democracy” Framework to promote gender equality in politics. The Framework provides policy targets for countries with a focus on changing political parties’ and organisational structures. One of the Framework’s targets states that countries should strive to monitor progress by collecting and publishing granular data and carrying out gender analysis.
Despite a legislated candidate gender quota (minimum 30% of each sex), Brazil is behind on women’s participation in public decision-making processes (IDEA, 2023[67]). Similarly, other groups face difficulties in entering politics.
In other countries, several policies and initiatives have proven helpful to increase equal representation in politics and public decision making:
Political parties’ policies: These include the adoption of measures and guidelines for the prevention of political discrimination and violence, as well as sanctioning measures. These should cover campaigning and political mandates. The National Democratic Institute (NDI) provides recommendations for party strategies to tackle racism and discrimination and two Colombian parties have adopted the framework to the Colombian context (National Democratic Institute, 2023[68]).
Associations, training and mentoring: Women’s caucuses have proven useful for promoting gender equality and gender policies, where female members of parliament from different parties engage in several activities. The Inter-Parliamentary Union’s 2013 guidelines provide further information and tools for politicians.
Public financing: In Brazil, women’s campaigns are indirectly financed through free phone airtime. Additionally, current efforts to finance leadership training for women could be expanded and promoted more widely, looking at examples from Panama, Mexico or Costa Rica.
Brazil also faces imbalances in representation in the public workforce. According to a 2018 study, the share of women in the Brazilian public sector stood at 44.8%. Moreover, approximately 64% of public servants identified as white, rising to around 75% in management, compared to 43% of the Brazilian population. A diverse public sector workforce is often said to increase innovation by bringing together different views and skills on policy design (Nolan-Flecha, 2019[72]). Setting a diversity and inclusion strategy and identifying and collecting data on the diversity of the workforce as well as promoting coaching and diversity training, have been shown to be helpful in increasing diversity and inclusion in OECD countries (OECD, 2021[73]). A cross-country survey administered by the OECD in 26 EU member states in 2015 provided an improved understanding of these countries’ approaches to managing diversity within their public administration. It suggests a multidimensional process to build and implement robust diversity management, which Brazil could draw on to improve its practices (Box 4.10). Further, diversity training offers an important tool to promote an inclusive public workforce. The Ethnic Communities Graduate Programme in New Zealand aims to promote the representation of minorities in the public sector and in leadership positions and could serve as a leading example (Box 4.11). Participants of the programme explained how their participation affected the views of their communities about the government by promoting diversity in the public service and being able to understand and react to people’s needs.
Box 4.10. Elements to build and implement robust diversity management
The OECD highlights the following elements to build robust diversity management, with the aim of contributing to innovation, performance and trust:
collecting a wider range of diversity data;
adopting clear diversity targets;
building an action plan and implementing it;
including diversity-related elements in leadership competency frameworks and development;
providing flexible working arrangements and career patterns’ to ensure employees’ work-life balance and engagement across the life-cycle;
assessing the efficiency of the diversity policies implemented: monitoring on a regular basis to adjust it if needed.
Source: OECD/EUPAN, 2015.
Box 4.11. Ethnic Communities Graduate Programme in New Zealand
The Ethnic Communities Graduate Programme in New Zealand, which started in 2021, promotes early career graduates from ethnic communities to get a first employment opportunity in the public service. Graduates work for 18 months in one of New Zealand’s public agencies. The programme addresses the representation of ethnic minorities and their barriers to entering the public service. In the long run, New Zealand’s Ministry for Ethnic Communities envisions broadening the public service’s cultural competency by increasing its representativeness and reflecting the ethnically diverse communities of New Zealand. In the future, the programme hopes to change the public service in accordance with future societal changes.
4.3.3. Opportunities for improvement for promoting fairness across public institutions
This section summarises key results and presents potential policy avenues Brazil could consider to improve fairness and strengthen public trust in the country.
Over a long period, Brazil succeeded in decreasing income inequality. Nevertheless, when consulted in April 2022, Brazilians reported high perceptions of unequal treatment and inequalities. According to the OECD Trust Survey, few people (19%) believe their application for government benefits would be treated fairly, and the perception of fair treatment of applications is a significant driver of trust in government. To improve these perceptions Brazil could:
Increasing efforts to tackle structural inequalities and ensuring fair social and economic treatment of all population groups in political processes and in the interaction with public officials, for example by providing inclusiveness training to public officials and publishing data and results on population subgroups for an open debate.
Most people in Brazil are sceptical that public employees would treat all people equally, regardless of their economic status (62%) and their gender, ethnicity or sexual orientation (52%). At the same time, perceptions of fair treatment regardless of economic or demographic status are the most important drivers of trust in the civil service. Brazil could:
Investing in building a more diverse public workforce, aiming at greater representation of underrepresented groups. Extending this opportunity to all levels of government that are beyond the reach of federal agencies would be beneficial.
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Notes
← 1. Transparency refers to stakeholder access to, and use of, public information and data concerning the entire public decision-making process, including policies, initiatives, salaries, meeting agendas and minutes, budget allocations and spending, etc. Information and data disclosed should serve a purpose and meet citizens’ needs (OECD, 2017[5]).
← 2. Network on Open and Innovative Government in Latin America and the Caribbean – OECD, www.oecd.org/gov/open-government-in-latin-america-and-caribbean.htm.
← 3. These vulnerable population groups include Afro-Brazilians, senior citizens, children and adolescents, youth, the LGBT community, women, indigenous groups, the homeless and people with disabilities. The inclusion of these population groups in the participatory budgeting has shown to increase redistribution and fight social exclusion. A review of the deliberative processes in Sao Paulo can be found in Hernández-Medina (2010[75]).
← 4. The Corruption Index measures six distinct types of corruption covering different areas and levels of the polity realm, distinguishing between executive, legislative and judicial corruption. Within the executive realm, it also distinguishes between corruption mostly pertaining to bribery, and corruption due to embezzlement. Measures differ across government levels and the index measures corruption in the executive, cabinet and public sector.
← 5. Over the last years, large-scale corruption scandals have gained public attention in Brazil. The Mensalão (2005) was an illegal scheme of campaign contributions that supported a vote-buying arrangement within President Luiz Inácio Lula Da Silva’s (Lula) congressional coalition. The Mensalão trial attracted impressive public interest and resulted in the conviction of 25 of Brazil’s leading political figures, and incarceration of 19 of them. The Lava Jato (Car Wash- 2014) case refers to a corruption scheme at the heart of the state-owned oil giant Petrobras, which involved 11 of the country’s largest companies. According to the investigation, Petrobras executives accepted bribes in exchange for contracts and used these resources to finance elections. Over six years, prosecutors and judges signed 278 leniency and plea bargain agreements with individuals and corporations, arrested at least 546 suspects, conducted 1 864 searches throughout the country, issued 195 indictments, imposed millions of dollars in fines, and convicted 219 defendants. The scandal implicated politicians from 28 different political parties. Yet, the debate over the integrity of the process, as well as private interests of actors involved remain a highly contentious issue in Brazil.
← 6. The Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE) defines População branca as those who identify as descended from European immigrants, adapted from IBGE’s institutional definition.