This Chapter provides disaggregated analysis and insights of the evolution of mitigation, adaptation and cross-cutting climate finance. It explores the characteristics of the climate theme split per provider types and sectors, and based on various recipient country characteristics and groups. The analysis covers all four climate finance components: bilateral public, multilateral public, export credits and mobilised private.
Climate Finance Provided and Mobilised by Developed Countries in 2016-2020
Insights from Disaggregated Analysis
Climate Finance and the USD 100 Billion Goal
Climate finance provided and mobilised: an analysis by climate theme
Abstract
As presented in (OECD, 2022[5]), total climate finance provided and mobilised by developed countries for developing countries amounted to USD 83.3 billion in 2020. Of this total, USD 48.6 billion (58%) was for mitigation, USD 28.6 billion (34%) for adaptation, and USD 6.0 billion (7%) for cross-cutting activities. Between 2016 and 2020, adaptation finance grew the most in absolute and relative terms. In 2016, mitigation accounted for USD 42.2 billion (72%), adaptation for USD 10.1 billion (17%) and cross-cutting for USD 6.2 billion (11%).1
Climate theme split across the four climate finance components
In each of the four components, mitigation finance represented on average the largest share throughout the period 2016-2020, although its share varied considerably across the four (Figure 1). Mobilised private climate finance and export credits were almost exclusively mitigation-focused, whereas about one-fourth of public climate finance targeted adaptation.2 Cross-cutting finance, which can relate to both mitigation and adaptation, represented a relatively large share of bilateral public finance (16% on average in 2016-2020), but less than 5% of multilateral public, export credits and mobilised private climate finance over the same period. Among multilateral providers, the share of cross-cutting finance was higher for multilateral climate funds (16%) than MDBs (2%). Both MDBs and climate funds provide and mobilised similar shares of adaptation-focused finance (32% and 30%, respectively).
Figure 1. Climate theme split by climate finance component in 2016-2020 (%)
Source: Based on Biennial Reports to the UNFCCC, OECD DAC and Export Credit Group statistics, complementary reporting to the OECD.
The share of finance targeting only adaptation remained below one-third in each component but increased in bilateral and multilateral public finance between 2016 and 2020. In particular, the share of adaptation finance in bilateral climate finance doubled, from 18% in 2016 to 36% in 2020. The share of adaptation finance in mobilised private witnessed a significant jump in 2019-2020, increasing from 11% to 25%. This increase is mainly due to one large-scale infrastructure project in an African LDC supported by a multilateral institution and reported with a large climate change adaptation component. This project exemplifies how single investments can contribute substantially to driving up climate finance across themes, sectors, or geographies, as further explored later in this Chapter (page 19).
Climate finance reported as cross-cutting relates to projects with both mitigation and adaptation benefits or to climate finance that was not yet allocated to mitigation and/or adaptation at the point of reporting, e.g. capacity-building grants, which the recipient will decide the use of. The share of cross-cutting finance progressively decreased for MDBs over the five years but remained relatively large for bilateral providers and multilateral climate funds. This difference is, however, likely due to different methodological and reporting practices, which in turn can have an impact on the volumes and thematic split of climate finance. In contrast to bilateral providers and multilateral climate funds, MDBs seldom use the cross-cutting category in their climate finance tracking and reporting, as they strive to separate the mitigation and adaptation components within individual projects addressing both objectives (MDB group, 2021[6]). For bilateral public climate finance, the format in which data is reported does not allow for conducting a granular analysis of the exact nature of the activities reported as “cross-cutting”. Nonetheless, it can be observed that in the last years an increasing number of bilateral providers have also strived to reduce the use of the cross-cutting category in reporting their climate finance contributions (see Annex A).
Climate themes across sectors
Mitigation finance focused significantly on the energy (46%) and transport (17%) sectors, which combined accounted for almost two-thirds of the total mitigation finance in 2016-2020. All other sectors accounted each for less than 6% of total mitigation finance. However, over the five years, mitigation finance targeting the energy sector decreased, both in relative (51% to 44%) and in absolute terms (USD 0.8 billion less in 2020 than in 2016). In contrast, mitigation finance steadily increased in sectors that in previous years were mainly linked to adaptation finance. This is the case for agriculture, forestry and fishing, as well as for water supply and sanitation, where mitigation finance more than tripled, both in relative and absolute terms, mainly driven by multilateral public climate finance. For example, the share of mitigation finance targeting agriculture, forestry and fishing almost quadrupled from 1.8% in 2016 to 7% in 2020 (i.e. a USD 2.5 billion increase).
Compared to mitigation, adaptation finance was spread over a larger number of sectors. The largest two sectors were water and sanitation, as well as agriculture, forestry and fishing. These accounted for 21% and 19% respectively of total adaptation finance in 2016-2020, followed by multisector (13%) and transport sector (11%). Each of the other remaining sectors accounted for 5% or less of total adaptation finance on average. Over 2016 to 2020, the most noticeable increase in adaptation finance within a given sector was in transport, which more than quintupled, from USD 0.7 billion in 2016 to USD 4.7 billion in 2020. Over the same period support for activities related to health, population policies and programmes, and education also grew significantly, from USD 0.1 billion to USD 1.2 billion. Other sectors where climate finance grew quickly include business and other services, and social infrastructure and services.3
In 2016-2020, cross-cutting finance, which is mainly reported by bilateral providers, for the most part, targeted the general environment protection sector (21%), agriculture, forestry and fishing (17%) and the so-called “multisector” (14%). These shares remained stable over the five years.
Climate themes across different recipient countries’ groupings
Mitigation finance accounted for over two-thirds of total climate finance provided and mobilised within each region over the period 2016-2020, with the exception of Oceania (see Figure 2). Still, between 2016 and 2020, the share of adaptation finance provided or mobilised in each region increased, most notably in Africa, where it jumped from 25% in 2016 to 45% in 2020 (i.e. a USD 6.6 billion increase).4 In all regions but Oceania, the share of cross-cutting finance remained small (less than 10%).
Figure 2. Climate theme across regions and income groups in 2016-2020 (%)
Note: This figure does not fully reflect developing countries’ differences in terms of size, population, and other socio-economic conditions. The regions included cover developing countries only, as defined in Annex B.
Source: Based on Biennial Reports to the UNFCCC, OECD DAC and Export Credit Group statistics, complementary reporting to the OECD.
In relative terms, adaptation finance represented a larger share in regions with a relatively high number of lower-income countries (Africa, Asia) than regions with a greater number of middle-income countries (Europe, America). At an aggregate level, the lower the income group, the higher the share of adaptation finance and the lower the share of mitigation finance. In LICs, adaptation accounted for as much as 50% of total climate finance provided and mobilised, as opposed to 15% in UMICs. In contrast, the share of mitigation finance was 78% in UMICs and 40% in LICs. Low- and lower-middle-income countries benefitted together from two-thirds of adaptation finance in 2016-2020.
At the same time, aggregate trends may mask significant differences in country-specific trends. Within regions and country groupings, there is a considerable variation in the thematic split of climate finance for individual recipient countries. For instance, the share of adaptation finance for individual recipient countries ranged from 1% to 95% in 2016-2020. In half of the recipient countries, the share of adaptation finance increased over this period.
Adaptation finance for SIDS and LDCs
On average, nearly half of total climate finance provided and mobilised for SIDS and LDCs between 2016 and 2020 specifically targeted adaptation (48% and 45%, respectively) (Figure 3). Moreover, 12% and 7% of total climate finance provided and mobilised in SIDS and LDCs targeted cross-cutting objectives. Over the five years, a total of USD 3.6 billion were provided and mobilised for adaptation in SIDS and USD 28.6 billion in LDCs, i.e. an annual average of USD 0.7 billion and USD 5.7 billion.5
Figure 3. Adaptation finance provided and mobilised in SIDS and LDCs in 2016-2020
Note: SIDS and LDCs are listed in Annex B.
Source: Based on Biennial Reports to the UNFCCC, OECD DAC and Export Credit Group statistics, complementary reporting to the OECD.
On a per capita basis, SIDS benefitted from a per capita annual median of USD 33 for adaptation, which is nearly four times the adaptation per capita annual median for all developing countries (USD 9). In contrast, LDCs benefitted from USD 8 per capita.
In absolute terms, adaptation finance provided and mobilised in both SIDS and LDCs increased steadily over the five years. However, adaptation finance for SIDS and LDCs was relatively concentrated in a small number of countries. Between 2016 and 2020, more than 40% of total adaptation finance for LDCs was directed to only 5 of the 45 least developed countries. Similarly, 39% of adaptation finance for SIDS was directed to 5 of the 40 SIDS.
Public finance represented the overwhelming majority (98% and 93%) of total adaptation finance provided and mobilised in SIDS and LDCs. The share of mobilised private climate finance remained extremely low (2% on average), whereas that of export credits was close to zero. The year 2020 represents an exception, with 10% of adaptation finance for LDCs coming from the private mobilised component. This is, however, almost entirely due to the large-scale infrastructure project in one LDC as mentioned earlier.
Mitigation finance in high-emitting countries
Different developing countries vary widely in terms of levels and composition of national GHG emissions, and large emitters tend to attract larger shares of climate finance in support of mitigation activities. The 10 developing countries with the highest overall level of CO2e emissions in 2016-2019 (hereinafter “top 10 emitters”)6, and which represented 68% of total developing country CO2e emissions in 2016-2019, benefitted from 25% of total mitigation finance provided and mobilised over 2016-2020. In contrast, the lowest 50 developing country emitters, representing 1% of total developing country CO2e emissions, only benefitted from 3% of total mitigation finance provided and mobilised in 2016-2020 (Figure 4).
Looking at the median values of mitigation finance provided and mobilised per capita provides a different perspective that nuances the picture: the yearly median of per capita climate finance provided and mobilised in the top 10 developing countries' emitters was USD 3 per capita over 2016-2020, compared to USD 17 per capita in the lowest 50 emitters.
Only 3% of climate finance was provided and mobilised in 2016-2020 for the top 10 developing countries with the fastest growth in CO2e emissions (in absolute terms) over 1990-2020. However, most of these fast-growing emitters are SIDS with very small populations, which also explains a significantly above-average median per capita USD 48 amount of mitigation finance provided and mobilised in these countries over 2016-2020.
Figure 4. Mitigation finance provided and mobilised across countries in 2016-2020 (%)
Note: Each dot represents 1%. This figure does not fully reflect developing countries’ differences in terms of size, population, and other socio-economic conditions.
Source: Based on Biennial Reports to the UNFCCC, OECD DAC and Export Credit Group statistics, complementary reporting to the OECD.
Insights from the disaggregated analysis of adaptation and mitigation finance
As presented in (OECD, 2022[5]) and detailed in previous sections, climate finance provided and mobilised by developed countries was predominantly mitigation-focused. While adaptation finance grew in absolute and relative terms, it continues to be primarily driven by the public sector and mainly targets lower-income and more vulnerable countries. This section unpacks possible explanations for these observed trends.
Climate finance provided and mobilised largely focused on mitigation
It is challenging to provide a comprehensive explanation for the trends in the thematic split of climate finance provided and mobilised by developed countries, due to the complexity of the international financial architecture, as well as the impact of large individual projects and adaptation and mitigation finance tracking methods. However, there may have been, to date, relatively stronger incentives for providers to prioritise climate finance for mitigation activities.
Firstly, the prospect of financial sustainability and returns, which are more easily attained in mitigation than in adaptation projects, provides an incentive for public and private stakeholders to invest. Mitigation activities often consist of infrastructure projects in the fields of energy generation (e.g. construction of power plants) and transport (e.g. construction of metro lines, railways), which often have an associated revenue stream and thus generate sufficient cash inflows to recover the initial investment and generate returns (Table 1). While adaptation finance can support large infrastructure projects (e.g. seawalls, raised roads and railways), many adaptation activities tend to focus on capacity-building or technical assistance that involve limited if any, financial returns. Moreover, there is an incentive for supporting “shovel-ready” projects (i.e. projects at advanced stages of development), which often are mitigation-related. In contrast, there is less such incentive for projects that relate more to planning, communication or engagement, which are often found within adaptation activities (Moser et al., 2019[7]).
Table 1. Selected examples of mitigation- and adaptation-related activities
Note: The examples were selected by the authors to provide a non-exhaustive overview of common adaptation- and mitigation-related activities supported by climate finance. This table is to be read in the broader context of the Chapter.
Source: Based on Biennial Reports to the UNFCCC, OECD DAC and Export Credit Group statistics, complementary reporting to the OECD.
Secondly, the importance attributed over the years to mitigation in the context of climate action provides stronger planning and public governance incentives for mitigation projects compared to adaptation ones. While the urgency and importance of climate change adaptation have gained increased momentum in the last decade, mitigation has previously been more prominent in international and national climate policy. This is also in part because to mitigate climate change globally, collective effort from each country is needed. Adaptation, in contrast, depends on individual country context, and, for the most part, countries’ adaptation action is pursued individually and independently of each other. In fact, while under the Paris Agreement countries “shall pursue domestic mitigation measures”, a similar requirement is not included for adaptation measures (UNFCCC, 2015[8]).
Moreover, actions and targets needed to mitigate climate change are more easily identifiable (e.g. achieving net-zero emissions). In contrast, the availability of country-level impact assessments to form an agreed basis on which to design adaptation responses is more limited. As a result, many developing countries may have stronger planning and financial frameworks in place for mitigation-related activities (e.g. energy efficiency or renewable energy regulations, tax incentives, etc.).
Finally, there may be a political incentive for policymakers and climate finance providers to prioritise the implementation of activities that can demonstrably contribute to the goals of the Paris Agreement. In this context, the impacts of mitigation projects can be more easily measured and quantified (e.g. in terms of emission reductions) and assessed against national quantitative targets of emissions reductions, e.g. those included in countries’ NDCs. In contrast, it is more difficult to define successful and effective adaptation projects and activities and assess their contribution toward national adaptation goals (see final Chapter).
Mitigation and adaptation finance focus on four economic sectors
Over half (63%) of total climate finance provided and mobilised is concentrated in four economic sectors: energy, transport, water and sanitation and agriculture, forestry and fishing, with mitigation finance focusing on the first two, and adaptation finance focusing on the last two. All these sectors are often included in recipient countries' NDCs or long-term development strategies, and offer opportunities for infrastructure-related projects, providing for an attractive investment destination.
The sectoral split of both mitigation and adaptation finance provided and mobilised in 2016-2020 broadly reflects the priority sectors identified in qualitative terms in the UNFCCC Standing Committee on Finance report on the “determination of the needs of developing country Parties related to implementing the Convention and the Paris Agreement" (hereinafter “UNFCCC Needs Determination Report”) (UNFCCC SCF, 2021[9]). According to the report’s findings, most needs for mitigation finance relate to energy; land use and forestry; transport; agriculture; and waste and sanitation. For adaptation finance, needs are mainly related to agriculture and water. A more recent private-sector study of the information communicated by developing countries through their NDCs reaches similar conclusions (Clima Capital Partners LLC and Aviva Investors, 2022[10]). According to its findings, developing countries’ NDCs highlight energy generation, transport, and industry and mining as the most cited sectors where mitigation finance is needed. Both reports face some limitations and challenges in terms of coverage and methodologies used to assess and define developing countries’ needs.7 They nonetheless provide a broad indication of in which sectors adaptation and mitigation finance may be most needed in the next years.
The increasing trend in mitigation finance provided and mobilised for agriculture, forestry and fishing addresses sectors that are also important to reducing GHG emissions. According to the IPCC, the Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU) sector can play a critical role in achieving reductions in emissions that are in line with the temperature goal of the Paris Agreement (IPCC, 2022[11]). Several developing countries with a carbon- or climate-neutrality target include AFOLU in their pledges, and at least 86 developing countries adhered to the Global Methane Pledge (which, in addition to energy and waste, targets agriculture)8 (Climate Action Tracker, 2022[12]; Global Methane Pledge, 2022[13]). Mitigation finance for agriculture, forestry and fishing focused on projects directed towards livestock production, reforestation and sustainable crops. Support in these areas can help developing countries close the investment gap needed to achieve emission reductions in AFOLU.
In contrast, many adaptation activities may not fall clearly into a defined sectoral classification, as reflected by the diversified sectoral split of adaptation finance. Water and sanitation as well as agriculture, forestry and fishing attract higher shares of support likely due to their vulnerability to climate change impacts. Agriculture in particular is one of the most exposed sectors to the impacts of climate change, and most adaptation finance towards agriculture supports projects for improved crop resilience, e.g. through the financing of irrigation schemes or capacity-building programmes on integrated soil fertility management. Further, water and sanitation and agriculture, forestry and fishing offer on average better returns on investments than other adaptation activities.
At the same time, the increasing trend in support for social sectors such as education, health and population policies is addressing sectors that are key to building resilience and adaptive capacity in the long-term, as they tackle the contextual conditions that render countries more vulnerable to climate change (Atteridge, Verkuijl and Dzebo, 2019[14]). The types of activities supported in these sectors include, for example, scholarships for high education in subjects relevant to climate action, programmes aimed at sensitizing citizens to the problem of climate change, or the purchase of medical equipment to address health issues that have been exacerbated by climate change. Similarly, the increasing trend of adaptation finance towards the risk preparedness sector stems in particular from growing support for projects to establish or enhance early warning systems, which are key to helping developing countries avoid or reduce the damages caused by climate-related hazards.
Methodologies used to track climate-specific finance influence the thematic split of climate finance provided and mobilised
Trends in the thematic split of climate finance provided and mobilised are based on official activity-level reporting and thus, reflect the best-available data. In this context, however, the thematic split of climate finance in a given year and its year-on-year variations can be significantly influenced by the methodologies used by individual climate finance providers to identify mitigation- and adaptation-specific-specific finance as well as finance for cross-cutting activities, and possible changes in such methodologies.
Several activities supported by climate finance provided and mobilised target both climate mitigation and adaptation. When providers are not able to separate the two components, the project is marked as “cross-cutting”. However, bilateral providers are increasingly striving to estimate mitigation- and adaptation-specific amounts of cross-cutting projects through the use of coefficients and reporting the resulting amounts as two separate lines of the same project.9 Donor countries, as well as multilateral institutions, use different methodologies to estimate mitigation- and adaptation-specific finance, and to determine what share of a contribution targets adaptation as opposed to mitigation. In particular, while some countries determine the share of a contribution targeting adaptation on a case-by-case basis, most donors use standardised coefficients to estimate the portion of a contribution targeting adaptation or mitigation specifically. This issue is further discussed in Annex C and detailed in (OECD, 2022[15]).
The methodologies used by providers to track adaptation finance activities and estimate their adaptation-specific component (e.g. the use of coefficients), may have an impact on the volume and share represented by adaptation finance. Many adaptation activities falling under the water and sanitation; agriculture, forestry and fishing; energy and transport sectors are a component of larger and infrastructure-related mitigation projects. This is the case for mitigation projects that include considerations of activities for improving climate resilience or adaptation. For example, a mitigation activity involving the construction of a metro line may include an adaptation component that consists of rendering the infrastructure resilient to floods. Depending on the methodologies used by providers to estimate the value of such an adaptation component, the value of the adaptation component will vary significantly.
Finally, lower shares of adaptation finance can also be related to challenges in tracking adaptation finance, mainly due to the lack of a precise definition of what could constitute adaptation, as well as its cross-cutting nature. These challenges are particularly relevant in the context of mobilised private finance, where activities aimed at improving resilience to climate change are rarely stand-alone but rather integrated into normal business operations and development activities and therefore often not reported separately (Brown et al., 2015[16]). Increased efforts in improving the identification of adaptation components of private investments can play an important part in better tracking private finance mobilised for adaptation.
Adaptation finance represented a larger share in vulnerable and/or poorer countries
The IPCC defines vulnerability as “the degree to which a system is susceptible to, or unable to cope with, adverse effects of climate change” (IPCC, 2022). In practice, some countries are more vulnerable to the impacts of climate change than others, based on their geographical location and socio-economic situation. SIDS, LDCs and LICs are amongst the most vulnerable countries to the adverse effects of climate change. For SIDS, this is due to their size, remoteness and exposure to natural hazards; for LDCs and LICs, it is because they are amongst the least able to recover from climate stresses and their economic growth is highly dependent on sectors vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. Furthermore, these groups of countries face severely constrained capacity and ability to mobilise domestic resources and access capital markets. In these countries, larger shares of adaptation finance are key to support not only infrastructure projects that help them improve their resilience to climate-related hazards and risks but also capacity-building activities that can also strongly contribute to their socio-economic development in the longer term.
At the same time, it is important to ensure these vulnerable and lower-income countries are not locked out of finance for infrastructure and mitigation. Currently, broader access to climate finance for large-scale projects may prove challenging for the poorest and most vulnerable countries. For example, there is documented evidence that SIDS and LDCs face challenges in accessing financing from multilateral climate funds due to the complexity of the application processes, for which there is a lack of technical capacity (OECD, 2018[17]; Garschagen and Doshi, 2022[18]; Caldwell and Larsen, 2021[19]). Data analysis shows that, at an aggregate level, vulnerable groups of countries receive higher shares of adaptation finance. However, existing literature (Doshi and Garschagen, 2020[20]), as well as a quantitative analysis conducted in the context of this report, find that there is no systematic link nor correlation between the level of estimated vulnerability at the country level (as defined by selected vulnerability indexes) and the amount or share of climate adaptation finance received or mobilised (see Box 1).
There are instead several other factors that can play a role, from a donor perspective, in the way finance is provided or mobilised across different regions. These could include historical or trade relationships with the donor country, or the recipient country’s stated level of NDC ambition and/or other political priorities (Doshi and Garschagen, 2020[20]; Saunders, 2019[21]). Some studies point to the perceived institutional and regulatory capacity of recipient countries to absorb and use funds effectively as a key factor in the country’s ability to attract climate finance (Barrett, 2014[22]; Doshi and Garschagen, 2020[20]).
In other words, there may be an implicit bias to support activities in countries that can put forward better project proposals that offer more secure returns and that possess a long history of managing funding. However, it is often challenging for most vulnerable and low-income countries to demonstrate fund management capacity and project implementation experience at the national level. Relatively underdeveloped local capital markets as well as the limited ability of such countries to secure and repay loans is another barrier that may prevent them from accessing larger quantities of finance. Financial and technical assistance for projects and local capital market development in frontier markets can therefore have an important development impact, by creating the conditions for future development assistance and private sector participation in the future.
Box 1. Country vulnerability level and adaptation finance provided and mobilised
A quantitative analysis was conducted to assess the relationship between recipient countries’ vulnerability level and the amounts of adaptation finance provided or mobilised in that country, finding that there is no link nor correlation between the two (Figure 5. The level of vulnerability of recipient countries was analysed based on two alternative proxy indices: the Notre Dame-Global Adaptation Index (ND-GAIN) and the Physical Vulnerability to Climate Change Index (PVCCI) (Chen et al., 2015[23]; Feindouno, Guillaumont and Simonet, 2020[24]). Both these indices provide an indication of the level of vulnerability at the country level, although they both present some limitations. Measuring the level of vulnerability of a country is inherently difficult due to the broad nature of the concept of vulnerability itself, which does not offer a precise definition. Moreover, it is challenging to identify a single index capable of capturing the diverse manifestations of climate change and its impacts on a country. As a result, most vulnerability indices, including the ND-GAIN and PVCCI, are composed of sets of sub-indicators that capture different aspects of vulnerability (Chen et al., 2015[23]; Feindouno, Guillaumont and Simonet, 2020[24]). In the context of this analysis, the significant variation in country rankings across the two indices used implied that their value is largely dependent on the selection of sub-indicators that each index used and on the data used for their estimation (Feindouno and Guillaumont, 2019[25]). At the same time, vulnerability is most often context- and location-specific, and there are significant differences within countries in terms of exposure to, frequency and intensity of climate-related hazards (OECD, Forthcoming[26]). Yet, the level of disaggregation of the dataset used for this report did not allow for an analysis of which groups or communities adaptation finance is reaching within countries.
Figure 5. Share of adaptation in total climate finance provided and mobilised by level of vulnerability (per recipient country)
Source: Authors
Notes
← 1. The sum of individual climate theme components may not add up to totals due to rounding.
← 2. For export credits, this thematic split is at least in part due to coverage biases, as available export credit data focuses almost solely on renewable energy-related transactions (see Annex A for further detail).
← 3. Industry, mining and construction is the sector that expanded most significantly in 2016-2020, growing by 2200%, although from a very low base. This is however due to the above-mentioned large-scale infrastructure project.
← 4. Adaptation finance towards Africa has increased steadily between 2016 and 2019, followed by a noticeable jump in 2019-2020 due to the aforementioned large infrastructure project supported by mobilised private climate finance.
← 5. Since these two country groupings overlap, these figures cannot be added up. A full list of SIDS and LDCs is available in Annex B.
← 6. CO2e emission data is sourced from the CAIT dataset (Climate Watch, 2022[72]). CAIT CO2e emission data is only available for the 1990-2019 timeframe. Top 10 developing countries emitters have been identified as the first 10 recipient countries with the highest CO2e emission average over 2016-2019. The top 10 fastest growing developing countries emitters have been identified as the first 10 recipient countries with the highest percentage change in emissions between 1990 and 2019.
← 7. Challenges and limitations reported by both studies include: (a) inconsistencies across countries in the definition of “needs”; (b) inconsistencies across countries in the methodologies used to identify and estimate needs; (c) inconsistencies across countries in the sectoral definitions and subsequent sectoral classification of identified needs; and (d) gaps in the coverage of information, as a number of developing countries have not reported information on needs (UNFCCC SCF, 2021[9]; Clima Capital Partners LLC and Aviva Investors, 2022[10]).
← 8. Participants joining the Pledge commit to a collective effort to reduce global methane emissions by at least 30% by 2030, compared to 2020 levels (Global Methane Pledge, 2022[13]).
← 9. For example, a provider may conclude that 95% of a USD 100,000 grant contributes to climate change mitigation, whereas the remaining 5% contributes to adaptation objectives. As a result, the grant is reported in two separate lines: USD 5,000 of adaptation finance, and USD 95,000 of mitigation finance.