Trust is an important indicator to measure how people perceive the quality of, and how they relate to, government institutions. Yet, levels of trust in public institutions have steadily declined over the past decade, in line with regional and global trends. This chapter presents an overview of country-specific features that may affect public trust in Chile, grouped according to the OECD Framework as socioeconomic, political and institutional factors. These factors include structural patterns, such as institutional settings and economic inequalities, as well as challenges related to current global context, such as mis- and disinformation.
Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions in Chile
Building Trust in Public Institutions
Abstract
In democracies, public officials and policymakers rely on people’s trust between and in public institutions as a foundation for public governance, whether to govern on a daily basis or to make complex policy choices tackling domestic and global challenges. Trust reduces transaction costs – in governance, in society, and in the economy –, nurtures political participation, and eases compliance with public policies (Putnam, 1993[1]; Rothstein, 2011[2]; Algan and Cahuc, 2013[3]; Brezzi et al., 2021[4]; Fukuyama, 1995[5]). Trust can help foster adherence to challenging reforms and programmes with better outcomes. In democracies, robust levels of trust – along with healthy levels of public scrutiny – can help legitimise and protect democratic institutions and norms (OECD, 2024[6]).
Trust is also an important indicator to measure how people perceive the quality of, and how they relate to, government institutions. At the same time, high levels of trust in public institutions are not a necessary outcome of democratic governance. Indeed, only in democratic systems – unlike in autocratic ones – citizens are not only free to report that they do not trust their government but also encouraged to show ‘sceptical trust’. The resilience of democratic systems comes from the open public debate they foster, enabling them to improve and meet increasing citizen expectations in the continuous pursuit of trustworthiness (OECD, 2024[6]).
Chile has long been seen as one of the more stable democracies in Latin America. Since the re-establishment of democracy, after the end of the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet in 1990, Chile’s strong institutions and robust policies delivered solid economic growth and macroeconomic stability. As a result, the country has often been characterised as an outlier in the region, with satisfaction with democracy and trust in public institutions in Chile being comparatively higher than the regional average (see Figure 1.1).
Yet, levels of trust in public institutions have steadily declined over the past decade, in line with regional and global trends. The political institutions that once enabled Chile’s strong economic growth and ensured sound governance are facing significant challenges (Siavelis, 2016[7]; Couffignal, 2011[8]).
In recent years, Chile has faced significant shocks. In October 2019, an increase in Santiago Metro’s subway fare catalysed massive protests, revealing mounting social discontent with political and economic inequality and well-being outcomes. On the heels of the protests, the COVID-19 pandemic significantly affected the country and global economies, widening disparities in access and availability of services, and a continued strain on the social fabric (PNUD-MDSF, 2020[9]; OECD, 2022[10]). In addition, Chile, along with other countries, continues to navigate multiple challenges, including rising citizen expectations vis à vis public institutions, facing the digital and environmental transitions against a context of increasing mis and disinformation, rising polarisation and citizens further dissociating from traditional democratic processes, which make reaching consensus, as well as delivering needed reforms, significantly more difficult.
In this context, prioritising public trust as an explicit policy objective is crucial for Chile. This report aims to contribute to Chile’s efforts in this area, including through its State Modernisation Agenda 2022-2026. It delivers new evidence on what drives trust in public institutions in Chile and provides recommendations for actions to increase trust.
Trust in public institutions depends on many factors, at both the individual and societal levels. The OECD Framework on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions, which guides this report and on which the OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions is based, focuses predominantly on governments’ competence and values as determinants of public trust (see Table 2.1 in Chapter 2). This report follows similar studies carried out in Brazil, Finland, Korea, New Zealand and Norway.
The analysis in this study relies mainly on data collected during October-November 2023 through the OECD Trust Survey, conducted in Chile along with other 29 OECD countries. It provides new comparative evidence on how citizens experience and evaluate their government and public institutions in terms of responsiveness, reliability, capacity to tackle complex and global challenges, integrity, openness, and fairness. These data are complemented by evidence gathered through fifty-two in-depth interviews with key national stakeholders held in April-May 2024. Together, the quantitative and qualitative data provide a comprehensive view of areas where the government can take action to regain public trust and improve people’s lives.
This report is organised in four chapters that provide key insights into the main drivers of trust in public institutions in Chile and consequently about the gap between people's democratic expectations and their perceptions of how institutions and political process function. Considering that trust is influenced by multiple interconnected factors, this first chapter presents an overview of country-specific features that may affect public trust in Chile, grouped according to the OECD Framework as socioeconomic, political and institutional factors. These factors include structural patterns, such as institutional settings and economic inequalities, as well as challenges related to current global context, such as mis- and disinformation. Chapter 2 presents levels of trust across various public institutions and population groups in Chile, based on the 2023 OECD Trust Survey. It also discusses the drivers that could currently yield the most benefits for trust in national and local governments, and the national civil service in Chile. Chapters 3 and 4 discuss the survey results on the core public governance drivers of trust in public institutions, against the background of Chile’s relevant policies and initiatives, with Chapter 3 concentrating on competence and Chapter 4 on values. These chapters also draw on comparisons to other countries’ experiences and policies, identifying Chile’s public governance strengths, specific challenges and opportunities for improvement. They provide the basis for a whole-of-government and whole-of-society reflection on how to strengthen trust and reinforce democratic governance.
1.1.1. Chile has achieved significant economic progress and sound public governance initiatives, yet trust levels have steadily declined
Over the last three decades,1 and underpinned by macroeconomic stability, robust macroeconomic policies, and strong institutional policy frameworks, Chile has made remarkable progress in achieving strong economic growth. Despite a deceleration in the last decade, it has maintained an average GDP growth rate of 3.7 percent, above the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) and the OECD averages of 2.3 percent and 1.8 percent, respectively (IMF, 2023[11]). Per-capita incomes have more than doubled since the 1990s and are among the highest in the region. Further, economic growth, as well as a steady increase in social spending have translated into a reduction in poverty rates and better living conditions for large segments of the population (OECD, 2022[10]).
These significant economic advances have been accompanied by democratic stability since the return to democracy in 1990. The country has emerged as a leader for sound public governance at the regional and global levels, championing good practices and standards (Box 1.1), such as the law on Access to Information and its independent administrative oversight body, the exchange of bank information for tax purposes, or the criminal liability of legal persons for bribery of foreign public officials (OECD, 2022[12]).
Efforts to promote sound public governance have helped Chile’s political system perform well in a number of core democratic areas, including the protection of civil liberties and checks and balances between institutions. According to data from the Varieties of Democracy Project, from 1990 onwards, Chile has consistently achieved a high score in the Civil Liberties Index. During the same period, it has also scored above the OECD average on the Horizontal Accountability Index, which measures whether checks between institutions are guaranteed, and abuses of power prevented. In addition, Chile ranks 33rd across 142 countries evaluated by the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index, scoring above global averages in constraints on government powers, regulatory enforcement and open government. Moreover, Chile’s national civil service has been characterised as a top performer in Latin America (Cortázar Velarde et al., 2014[13]), and data from the 2020 Quality of Government (QoG) Expert Survey rank Chile 20th out of 88 countries in the civil service’s merit indicator (Brieba et al., 2024[14]), although research finds that this indicator not necessarily correlated with trust in the civil service or satisfaction with public services (Güemes, 2019[15]).
In 2003, through the Law 19.886 on Public Procurement, Chile created ChileCompra, an institution bringing together public entities requirements to function and provide services to citizens, and private suppliers. It includes a single platform that operates under a unified regulatory framework based on transparency, efficiency, universality, accessibility and non-discrimination.
In 2008, Chile put in place its Transparency and Open government Reform. As such, Law 20.285 on Access to Public Information established the right to access public information, followed by the creation of the Transparency Portal in 2013.
In 2010, Chile established a special committee to bring the State closer to citizens and ease access to public services. As a result, and to offer Chileans a single platform to access to government information and services, it was created ChileAtiende. These efforts have continued through the digitalisation of service delivery and the establishment of the digital identity platform ClaveÚnica.
In 2015, the Decree 270 created a Presidential Advisory Commission on Productivity. In 2021, the regulations of the National Commission for Evaluation and Productivity (CNEP) were modified to contribute to strengthening the quality of regulations and evaluation of public policies.
In 2016, Chile passed Law 20.880 on Probity in Public Office and Prevention of Conflicts of Interests, setting pertinent guidelines regarding the interaction between politics and the private sector, and minimising the risks of conflicts of interest through comprehensive and transparent declarations of interests.
In 2016, Chile’s System for Senior Public Management was reformed by Law 20.955 which eliminated provisional and temporary managers, mitigated the impacts of government changes on dismissals, and enhanced the efficacy and efficiency of public competitions, among other measures.
In 2018, Chile created a specific public governance scheme for a modern and democratic State, which includes an external Council to mainstream modernisation of the State efforts and to advice the President on priority actions to be taken, as well as a Committee comprising all public sector agencies with a strategic role in the design, implementation and monitoring of modernisation initiatives.
In 2019, Law 21.180 on Digital Transformation of the State mandated public institutions to go paperless for all administrative services across national and sub-national levels, and digitalising administrative procedures, supporting the provision of faster, easier, and closer services to the public.
In 2023, Chile adopted its first National Strategy on Public Integrity 2023-2033. The strategy comprises five main pillars: 1) civil service, 2) public resources, 3) transparency, 4) politics, and 5) private sector, as well as includes outcome-level indicators for all measures and planned goals.
In 2023, Law 21.634 updated Law 19.886 and other laws, to improve the quality of public spending, increase standards of probity and transparency, and introduce circular economy principles in government procurement.
However, beyond the positive indicators of institutional stability, Chile has lagged behind OECD countries in other relevant public governance measurements. For instance, the OECD iREG Indicator on Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) shows that the use of RIA is limited in Chile, as it is mandatory only for major amendments to Executive bills and some subordinate regulations. Chile could expand the implementation of RIA to ensure that the tool is used systematically. Engagement for Developing Subordinate Regulations indicates that Chile performed below OECD and Latin America and the Caribbean averages in 2022 (OECD, 2024[16]). Similarly, in 2023, Chile was below the OECD average in digital government, specifically in areas related to design or user-driven dimensions, which gauge public institutions’ efforts to use digital tools and data, and the governments’ ability to center the design and delivery of policies and services around user needs (OECD, 2024[17]). Finally, concerning government capacities, the majority of civil servants in Chile do not have individual training, and although internal mobility for civil servants is legally possible in the country, it is not encouraged or expected (OECD, 2023[18]).
In addition, senior public officials underscored during the interviews for this study that the country tends to focus on policy design rather than policy implementation. The laws that establish policies and programmes typically lack provisions for monitoring, evaluation, and subsequent adjustments. Consequently, initiatives that could potentially address challenges effectively often stagnate due to the inability to refine and improve them over time. Besides, policy implementation and its quality is uneven across the territory, which is of particular relevance considering constraints in terms of resources, public service management, and policy design at the local level (OECD, 2017[19]).
Against the backdrop of its economic performance and sound public governance initiatives, trust in government in Chile has steadily decreased over the past 25 years. Historically, trust in the national government was higher in Chile than in other LAC countries, but this trend reversed in the early 2010s (Figure 1.1). Trust tends to be a volatile measure, and people regularly change their beliefs and perceptions, so trust in government has naturally varied over time, also following economic and electoral cycles. For example, the peak in trust in 2015 coincides with the passing of an electoral reform, whereas low levels of trust in 2020 followed the 2019 social protests. Gallup World Poll data confirm the declining trend, with the share of Chileans reporting trust in the national government decreasing from 58% in 2009 to 29% in 2022.2 This trend could be linked, among other factors, to a decrease in satisfaction with political institutions in the country over recent years, as suggested by studies examining challenges to democratic representation in contemporary Chile (Siavelis, 2016[7]; Irarrázaval and Cruz, 2023[20]).
Share of respondents who indicate trust in the national government in Chile and LAC average, 1995-2020
Note: Figure presents responses to the survey question “Please look at this card and tell me how much trust you have in each of the following groups/institutions. Would you say you have a lot, some, a little or no trust in? The National Government’’. Percentages show the aggregated responses of “a lot’’ and ‘’some’’ trust in the national government. LAC presents the unweighted country averages across 18 surveyed LAC countries. In 2023 Nicaragua did not participate in the data collection.
Source: Latinobarometer, 1995-2023.
1.1.2. Low levels of interpersonal trust in Chile hinders trust in public institutions
There is a strong reciprocal association between interpersonal and institutional trust (Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005[21]). Those who have higher trust in others tend to place more trust in public institutions, such as the Parliament (Zmerli and Newton, 2008[22]; Bäck and Kestilä, 2009[23]). Interpersonal trust may be high in places where people can be confident that institutions will function impartially and effectively in the public interest. In turn, trust among people promotes co-operative behaviour and curbs opportunistic exchanges, reducing incentives for free riding, and thus has a positive impact on the provision of public goods.
In Latin America, most people are not only sceptical about public institutions, but also report remarkably low levels of trust in each other (Figure 1.2). Indeed, levels of interpersonal trust have been comparatively lower than institutional trust over time in Chile (see Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2). Results from the World Values Survey show low and declining levels of interpersonal trust in the region –there has been an increase of ten percent in the share of people reporting low levels of interpersonal trust, from 75% between 1989 to 2004, to 85% since 2010. The lack of public and interpersonal trust may have a detrimental reciprocal effect, leading to a vicious cycle in which institutions worsen over time and reinforce a divisive society. A recent report by the IDB attributes the negative correlation between interpersonal and distrust in Latin America to the high levels of inequalities and low levels of social cohesion in the region (Keefer and Scartascini, 2022[24]).
In Chile, a general low trust environment affects trust in public institutions. According to evidence from population surveys, Chileans have historically exhibited low levels of trust in others, apart from family and friends (Bargsted et al., 2022[25]), in line with trends in all countries in Latin America.
Share of population who indicate trust in others in Chile and LAC average, 1996-2023
Note: Figure presents responses to the survey question “Generally speaking, would you say that you can trust most people, or that you can never be too careful in dealing with others?”. Percentages show the responses of “One can trust most people’’. LAC presents the unweighted country averages across 18 surveyed LAC countries. In 2023 Nicaragua did not participate in the data collection.
Source: Latinobarometer, 1996-2023.
1.1.3. High feelings of insecurity affect public trust
Multiple factors contribute to low levels of interpersonal trust in Latin America. Regional cross-national and country studies associate low levels of trust in others with increasing levels of violence and crime. In fact, crime is a direct result of social decline, and Latin America is often portrayed as the world’s most violent region (UNODC, 2023[26]). In 2021, in most LAC countries, at least two in five respondents to the Americas Barometer say they feel somewhat or very unsafe in their neighbourhood (Lupu, Rodríguez and Zechmeister, 2021[27]). As trusting others entails taking risks and shaping expectations, the sense of insecurity that prevails in a country with heightened violence and crime, represents an important impediment to the development of trust (Delhey and Newton, 2003[28]).
Chile has consistently been identified as one of the safest countries in Latin America and recent studies underscore public security is an essential condition for the fulfilment of people (Cadena-Urzúa, Iftimi and Montes-Suay, 2023[29]). However, evidence shows an increasing trend in people’s fear of falling victim of a crime in Chile since 2017 (Figure 1.3), likely impacting levels of trust in institutions. Perceptions of insecurity have been associated with a sense of impunity and views of a justice system that struggles to effectively deal with offenders (Dammert, 2005[30]). At the same time, Chile is currently carrying on reforms as part of the government’s public safety agenda, involving multiple stakeholders, among which newly elected regional governments. The salience of the issue in news media, as highlighted in previous research, could be one among other factors increasing negative impacts on Chileans’ trust in public institutions (Liebertz and Bunch, 2019[31]).
Share of population who indicate feeling unsafe in their neighbourhood in Chile and LAC average, 2006-2023
Note: Figure presents responses to the survey question ‘’Speaking of the neighborhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe, or very unsafe?’’. Percentages show the aggregated responses of “very unsafe’’ and ‘’somewhat unsafe’. LAC presents the unweighted country averages across 33 LAC countries surveyed.
Source: Americas Barometer, 2006-2023.
1.1.4. Economic inequalities and high levels of informality are potentially contributing to low trust levels
High levels of inequality create sharp divisions in society and fuel social discontent, which structurally undermines social capital and public trust (Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005[21]; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002[32]). When inequality increases, individuals become more concerned about their economic status than about a shared fate or belonging to a moral community, which encourages competition and reduces incentives for cooperation (Uslaner, 2004[33]). Further, if people's economic interests increasingly diverge, it becomes more challenging for the government to define and pursue the public interest. Both data (Figure 1.4) and recent studies show that elevated or rising levels of inequality are associated with lower levels of political trust across all social strata, undermining social cohesion (Goubin and Hooghe, 2020[34]; Oishi, Kesebir and Diener, 2011[35]). Further, perceptions of fairness in a country’s income distribution were found to have a higher correlation with trust than the actual income distribution (Scartascini and Valle Luna, 2020[36]). These elements suggest that trust is crucially affected not only by individual but also by collective experiences.
Gini index of income inequality of a country (X-axis) and percentage of people who reported having confidence in other people (Y-axis) across OECD and Latin American countries
Note: This scatterplot presents the Gini coefficient for latest available year on the X-axis. The Gini coefficient is a standard measure of inequality representing the income distribution of the population within a given country. It takes the value of 0 when all households have identical income and 100 when one household has all the income. The Y-axis presents the share of respondents who responded “Most people can be trusted” to the question “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?”.
Source: European Value Study (EVS) and World Value Survey (WVS) wave 10 (interpersonal trust) and OECD Income Distribution Database and World Bank Poverty and Inequality Platform (Gini coefficient).
Around one-third of Chile’s population is economically vulnerable, earning less than USD 13 per day and spending more than 30% of their income on debt servicing (OECD, 2022[10]). The country’s Gini Coefficient (0.46) is above the OECD average (0.31) and the average income of the 10% richest is 19 times higher than the income of the 10% poorest (compared to 9.3, on average, across OECD countries). Moreover, high levels of inequality tend to be a key obstacle to social mobility in Chile: it could take six generations for someone from a family in the bottom 10% of the income distribution to reach the average income in the country (OECD, 2019[37]) and parental income strongly affects children's earnings (OECD, 2018[38]).
Indicators of inequality are also paired with low levels of redistribution and social expenditure. According to a recent OECD study, the tax system in Chile promotes vertical equity but at a relatively low level compared to other OECD countries. When taxes and transfers are taken into account, the Gini index only decreases by 5% in Chile, compared to the OECD average of 25% (OECD, 2021[39]). Chile has the highest demand for redistribution in OECD countries, and there is a high demand for progressive taxation, reflecting the belief that a significant portion of national income goes to the richest and that social mobility is structurally limited for the poor (OECD, 2021[40]).
Further, while social spending in Chile has increased over the last decade, it remains low and below the OECD average (20%), at 11.4% of GDP (OECD, 2022[10]). A significant portion of social spending is allocated to pensions, while a smaller percentage is dedicated to social assistance programs for the poor and vulnerable. At the same time, high levels of labour informality suggests that around 20% of Chileans may lack of access to social protection networks (OECD et al., 2023[41]).
Persistent economic inequalities, labour informality and low levels of redistribution contribute to feelings of unfairness and dissatisfaction with the economy in Chile. More than half of Chileans (52.8%) consider the current income distribution to be unfair (Latinobarometro, 2020[42]) and evidence from the 2023 OECD Trust Survey found that one in five Chileans (20.8%) believe they will do worse or a lot worse than their parents. Remarkable economic advances and success in tackling poverty were not accompanied by similar encouraging results in the fight against inequality (Ominami, 2019[43]), suggesting that not all Chileans have equally benefitted from the country’s economic progress, jeopardising social cohesion and undermining trust.
1.1.5. Unequal exercise of civil and political rights and uneven access to services and policies have undermined Chile’s social contract
Beyond economic inequalities, there is significant evidence suggesting that inequalities experienced in people’s experiences with the State, the public, and the political realm may also impact their perceptions of public institutions, including their levels of trust.
Data from the Latinobarometer (2023) show that a staggering 83.7% of Chileans believe that their country is controlled by a select few in their own interest and recent academic research argue that civil, social, and political rights are granted unequally in the country, disproportionately impacting marginalised communities and impoverished citizens. Analysis before the introduction of compulsory vote in December 2022, using proxies for political and social rights in Santiago, showed that poor citizens and ethnic minorities had lower rates of electoral participation, while the wealthy were overrepresented in Congress (Luna and Medel, 2023[44]). Further, studies on the state of human rights in the country show that some challenges remain for the full exercise of certain civil and political rights. Concluding observations of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights underscore concerns about reports of counter-terrorism legislation being applied against members of the Mapuche people and reports of criminal law being applied in a discriminatory manner against Mapuche defendants. In addition, the Committee states that Chile should continue its efforts to increase the participation of women in political and public life and their representation in the public and private sectors, particularly in decision-making positions, ensuring that such representation includes indigenous women, as well as it should take all measures necessary to prevent the excessive use of force during law enforcement operations (UN, 2024[45]).
Recent studies and data found Chile faces significant inequalities in access to and quality of services, particularly in education and healthcare (OECD, 2022[10]). Access to quality education is strongly linked to socio-economic status in Chile (OECD, 2021[46]) and opportunities for young Chileans to have successful careers still depend to a large extent on their parents’ economic and social conditions or the neighbourhood in which they grow up (OECD, 2018[38]). Chile has also high out-of-pocket health expenses compared to other OECD countries. According to the last OECD’s Health at a Glance, 63% of health spending is covered by mandatory prepayment in Chile, a share lower than the OECD average of 76% (OECD, 2023[47]). Besides, social protection is segmented and many informal workers with incomes above the poverty line cannot access cash transfer benefits or unemployment insurance, leading to low coverage of social protection in the country (OECD, 2022[10]).
Territorial disparities in terms of access to services and policies also remain significant. Chile is one of the most centralised countries in the OECD, as well as one with the highest levels of territorial disparities, featuring very high levels of GDP concentration (OECD, 2017[19]). Disparities in access to services and opportunities result in people living in richer areas have higher life expectancies compared to those in poorer areas, with a difference of up to 18 years for women in Santiago (UNDP, 2022[48]). UNDP data also show that immigrants, mainly located in the Northern area, face particular dissatisfaction and vulnerability (UNDP, 2022[48]). At the same time, people of higher socioeconomic status, tend to cluster and occupy well-defined spaces in cities (Bro and Mendoza, 2021[49]).
Unequal exercise of political and civil rights and uneven access to public services are contributing to weaken the social contract in the country. Addressing these inequalities and territorial disparities is crucial for Chile to provide better public services and opportunities for all, as well as to rebuild trust.
1.1.6. Public Institutions struggle to meet citizens’ increasing expectations
The return to democracy in 1990 suggests that Chileans’ democratic experience is relatively short compared to that in other OECD democracies, with a potential impact on levels of public trust (Lühiste, 2006[50]) (Box 1.2). At the same time, Chileans, as democratic citizens around the globe, have increasing expectations for what institutions in democratic systems can deliver (Open Society Foundations, 2023[51]; OECD, 2024[6]), and the political system has been under strain due to successive demonstrations and social movements. Institutional arrangements inherited from the return to democracy were designed to enhance stability but came with trade-offs against other important dimensions of democracy such as representation, accountability, and legitimacy (Siavelis, 2016[7]). The National Constitution, for instance, established a strong presidential system, granted veto power and created institutions heavily influenced by the military, which were limited over the years through legislative reforms. In 2005, Law 20.050 abolished life-long senators, or changed the political role of the National Security Council to an advisory one, among other measures.
Academic research suggests that long-standing democracies foster the development of institutional trust because of the long-standing experience with democratic institutions, the stability of norms and values that guide citizens’ interaction, and the presence of spaces for political participation (Letki and Evans, 2005[52]; Letki, 2018[53]). In these political systems, trust in institutions overall and support for democracy are more likely to be internalised and somewhat detached from the performance of a given government or institution. On the contrary, in young democracies, as Chile’s and most Latin American ones, where citizens have limited experience with democratic institutions, the performance of institutions and governments matters a great deal (Letki, 2018[53]; Catterberg, 2006[54]).
Chile returned to democracy in 1990, following results to a national referendum held in October 1988, in which a majority of Chileans registered to participate (more than 90% of the population allowed to vote) voted against the continuity of the military in power. As a result, in 1989 the outgoing dictatorship proposed constitutional changes –that the opposition could accept or reject, but not modify- which reduced restrictions on political pluralism and eliminated barriers to political party activity, but also secured provisions that made the military more independent of civilian authorities than originally conceived in the 1980 Constitution (Heiss and Navia, 2007[55]).
Long-standing academic literature states agreements between the ruling elites and opposition forces are crucial for a peaceful transition, but often limit the scope of initial democratic reforms (O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead Laurence, 1986[56]). As such, Chile’s electoral system was one of the features resulting from the agreed transition that limited political competition and led to a “closed-door” contest and overrepresentation of minorities for decades. The binomial system,1 reformed in 2015 into a proportional one, created strong incentives for coalition formation and led to the rotation of power between two coalitions. While power-sharing arrangements were successful in ensuring stability in a divided context after the fall of the dictatorship, they have been criticised for promoting elite domination and excluding the broader population. As a result, there has been a perception that voting had little impact (Couffignal, 2011[8]) and political competition was closed to any new political force.
1. The system established two-member districts with open lists, as voters indicated a preference for one or another candidate on their preferred list. Though voting was candidate-centered, in determining the winner, the total votes for both candidates on any list were first pooled before distributing seats to lists. Seats were then awarded to individual candidates based on their rank on their list (Polga-Hecimovich and Siavelis, 2015[57]).
Social movements since 2011, particularly the social protests in 2019 (Box 1.3), highlighted the limitations of institutional settings and the exclusive political model, as perceived by Chileans (in 2020, 78% of Chileans voted for a comprehensive constitutional reform). However, generating and solidifying a consensus around new institutions has proven to be a challenging endeavour (Carrasco, 2022[58]). A recent UNDP report highlights that most of Chileans demand for a common project and would be willing to change while they would prefer changes to be carried out gradually (PNUD, 2024[59]).
In the past few years, Chile has implemented a series of electoral reforms to enhance representation in the political system and strengthen democracy (BertelsmannStiftung, 2022[60]). However, these reforms may come with a tradeoff in terms of consensus building and ease of decision-making. The electoral reform in 2015 replaced the binomial electoral system and introduced proportional and inclusive representation. The new system expanded the number of Members of Congress and Senators, implemented a gender quota for party lists, and allowed for electoral alliances between parties at the national level (BertelsmannStiftung, 2022[60]). This reform aimed to foster a more diverse party system and to pave the way for the rise of new actors beyond the traditional centre-left and centre-right parties and coalitions. Nonetheless, many associate this reform with greater fragmentation and competition, as well as increased personalisation of politics and fragmented coalition building negotiations (Luna, 2021[61]). In a similar vein, in 2017, Law 20.990 introduced direct popular election of regional governors. According to national stakeholders interviewed in occasion of this study, on the one hand, this encouraged decentralisation and opened a new channel for people’s participation. However, it also implied including new players in policy negotiations who might exercise their veto power over needed reforms.
The scale and breadth of social protests that took place in 2019 represented a significant turning point in Chile's politics and the public's perception of the political system. An increase in public transport fees served as a catalyst to express deep-rooted discontent with political and economic inequalities and dissatisfaction with the country's social contract. Uneven access to essential services, such as education, health care and transport, fuelled the idea that there are two Chiles, as stated by experts interviewed in occasion of this study, where opportunities to influence political decision-making likewise are uneven. In 2020, around four in five Chileans (86.4%) thought that the country was run by few powerful groups in their own benefit; in contrast, only one in five believed they have a say in what the government does (Latinobarometro, 2020[42]).
As a result, the government cancel rises in public transportation fares and electricity prices, created a health plan and a new tax bracket (OECD, 2021[46]). Chile’s institutions proved to be resilient and channelled social discontent in a national referendum where people voted in favour of a constitutional reform. Despite two failed attempts for a new constitution, constitutional processes demonstrated the country’s ability to respond with forbearance, averting more dire consequences and a new spike of social unrest.
While there is general agreement about the need for reforms in critical areas, such as tax or pension (Box 1.4), there are still obstacles to achieve consensus. Concurrently, the context is increasingly challenging as according to experts interviewed in occasion of this study, many voters view political consensus and agreements with suspicion (due to the long-standing exclusive binomial system), generating a gridlocked political landscape and fueling polarisation. The first national study on polarisation in Chile showed high levels of political polarization, and found that political polarisation is higher than social polarisation in the country. The study found gaps of 31 percentage points, on average, when people were asked about different 18 political topics in the public debate (such as human rights and dictatorship, inclusive language, social injustice and protests, etc.), and signaled that only around 34% of respondents were open to discussing with others (Criteria, 2023[62]). As such, the success of these transformative changes will depend on the government's ability to build alliances, foster social cohesion, and regain trust. In addition, according to literature, increasing levels of political polarisation were found to have a strong impact on trust (Jennings et al., 2021[63]; Hetherington and Rudolph, 2017[64]; Jones, 2015[65]). People’s alignment across partisan lines motivates perceptions and evaluation criteria focused on party preferences and discredits an objective evaluation of the opposition, sometimes even leading to a complete lack of trust across public institutions.
Chile’s government has proposed a tax reform that aims to fund social protection expansions by increasing the tax-to-GDP ratio, currently among the lowest across OECD countries. The tax-to-GDP ratio in 2019 in Chile was 20.7% compared to 33.8% in the OECD (OECD, 2022[66]). However, the initial proposal, including tax hikes for high earners and measures against tax evasion, which was expected to generate revenue equivalent to 2.7% of GDP, was rejected by lawmakers in March 2023 (Reuters, 2023[67]). The government's second iteration of the reform, presented in August 2023, will be separated into tax compliance enforcement and tax benefits and changes in income tax (Paul, 2023[68]).
On its end, the proposal for the pension reform, aimed to be passed before the end of the year, involves raising pension savings, establishing clear parameters for the Universal Guaranteed Pension (UGP) and improving management of funds, among other measures. Currently, 72% of pensions are below the minimum wage, and one in four retirees receive a pension below the poverty line (Government of Chile, 2022[69]). Women are particularly affected, with less than half contributing for more than 20 years and only 54% receiving a pension financed with their savings. Past reform efforts introduced measures such as the Solidarity Pillar and the Universal Guaranteed Pension to address low pensions (de La Fuente and Laborde, 2023[70]).
Both, the tax and pension reform have faced stumbling blocks related to quorum required to be under debate as well as strong opposition from political parties and the business community.
In recent years, concerns over the reliability and integrity of information have grown, with significant implications for democracy and trust (OECD, 2024[6]). Information serves as the interface between the government and the population, reflects and shapes their perceptions of government competence and values. At the same time, trust is essential for implementing regulations and measures that seek to limit the threat posed by the spread of mis- and disinformation, as otherwise governments can easily be perceived by the public as attempting to control the information space and undermining democratic principles.
Chile, like many countries in the 21st century, has had to contend with a rapidly changing media landscape and information environment as a backdrop to complex crises. Similar to OECD average, 87% of households in Chile have broadband Internet access at home, and between 2010 and 2018, Chile had one of the fastest rates of mobile broadband adoption in the OECD with subscriptions increasing tenfold to 92.4 per 100 people by June 2019 (Garda, 2021[71]).
Recent studies highlight that a global decline in trust in media could be related to the rise of social media as a source of information and the significant effects this has had on the information environment (Knight Foundation, 2023[72]). According to the 2023 OECD Trust Survey, only a third (27.9%) of Chileans reported high or moderately high levels of trust in news media, below the average across OECD countries (38.9%) (Figure 1.5). Further, analysis on the information landscape in Chile has shown that false content spreads faster and reaches more users than true content on platforms like Twitter and Facebook, and access barriers to false content are also lower compared to other types of content (Mendoza et al., 2023[73]).
Share of population who indicate different levels of trust in news media, 2023
Note: The figure shows the within-country distributions of responses to the question “On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust the news media?”. A 0-4 response corresponds to ‘low or no trust’, a 5 to ‘neutral’ and a 6-10 to ‘high or moderately high trust’. “OECD” presents the unweighted average of responses across countries.
Source: OECD Trust Survey 2023.
Indeed, recent significant events like the social uprising in late 2019, COVID-19 pandemic,3 and the constitutional referendum have amplified trends that encourage the spread of mis- and disinformation, contribute to polarisation, and pose a challenge for information integrity more widely (Molina, 2022[74]). With high internet penetration and millions of users, social media has become a crucial tool for participation and engagement (Hootsuite & We Are Social, 2021[75]; Valenzuela et al., 2019[76]; OECD, 2017[77]). As such, Chile put in place a National Commission Against Disinformation Integrity to provide advice to the Minister of Science, Technology, Knowledge, and Innovation, and the Minister Secretary General of Government, on matters related to the global phenomenon of disinformation and its manifestation in the country. The commission is composed of nine members, including representatives from public and private universities, NGOs, foundations and fact-checking organisations (OECD, 2024[78]). In addition to governance responses, other national stakeholders developed new projects to fact-check information, such as FastCheckcl or MalaEspinaCheck, started by journalists, or EfectoFactCheck.cl run by the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.
Simultaneously, other challenges to consider relate to segmentation and concentration of information, which is not exclusive to the internet. Protecting civic space is a cornerstone of democratic governance (OECD, 2022[79]). The presence of multiple voices and perspectives is essential for active citizenship and public debates, and concentration of media may hamper this diversity (UNESCO, 2017[80]). However, Chile stands out among other Latin American countries in terms of high media concentration, particularly in print and television markets (Núñez-Mussa, 2021[81]), which may limit the media's ability to reflect the variety of ideas, viewpoints, and opinions in society, and to represent all political, cultural, and social groups. In this regard, ensuring a vibrant and pluralistic media landscape, diverse and independent news sources, and a free and open discourse could be key to facilitate an informed democratic debate in Chile (OECD, 2024[78]).
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← 1. In 2020, the Chilean economy contracted 6.2% in GDP due to the Covid-19 pandemic, it has nevertheless recovered forcefully since the pandemic with growth of 11.9% in 2021 (OECD, 2022[10]). The rapid growth contributed to significant overheating, and the economy eventually collapsed when policy support was withdrawn and high inflation slowed down household consumption. Real GDP growth in 2022 decelerated to 2.4% as household consumption returned to normalcy amidst a significant contraction in fiscal and monetary policies (World Bank, 2023[82]).
← 2. The Gallup World Poll includes the binary question: ‘’In this country, do you have confidence in each of the following, or not? How about national government?’’, and the possible response options are “Yes’’ and “No’’.
← 3. In spite of challenges posed, Chile’s vaccination campaign during COVID was highlighted as a successful case in the region, and public institutions were able to wielded from mis and disinformation (see Box 3.9 in Chapter 3).