International Migration Outlook 2018

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International Migration Outlook

20 June 2018

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Chapter 2. Labour market outcomes of migrants and integration policies in OECD countries

Abstract

This chapter examines the labour market outcomes of migrants during the period 2012-17. Particular attention is given to the migrants’ job quality and to the sectors and occupations in which they are concentrated. Case studies on the labour market performance of migrants in Southern Europe, East Asia, and the United Kingdom complement the analysis. The second part of this chapter discusses recent changes in integration policies in OECD countries, with a specific focus on asylum seekers and refugees.

The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.

Introduction

In 2017, in a context of stable world economic growth and strong growth in the Euro area, employment rates in the OECD improved significantly and returned to their pre‑crisis level (OECD, 2018[1]). In this favourable economic environment, a large number of recently arrived refugees and asylum seekers will enter the labour market progressively which could affect average labour market outcomes of the foreign‑born notably in Europe. Yet, labour force survey data for 2017 may be too early to capture such recent inflows of refugees as only private households are surveyed and many recently arrived asylum seekers and refugees still live in collective housing. As a result, so far the data mostly depict a picture of stable recovery of migrants’ labour market outcomes in most OECD countries.

Main findings

On average across the OECD area, migrants benefited from the global labour market recovery, with the unemployment rate decreasing by more than 1 percentage point to 9.5% in 2017, and the employment rate increasing from 65.7% to 67.1%. The improvement between 2016 and 2017 was more marked for foreign-born women, whose average participation and employment rates grew faster than those of male migrants.
Yet on average, migrant women are still performing poorly compared to both migrant men and native-born women. In particular, the gap in participation rates between foreign-born and native-born women has more than doubled over the period 2012-17.
About 10 years after the 2007/08 economic crisis, among hard-hit Southern European countries the employment of migrants has fully recovered only in Portugal. In contrast, the employment rate of the foreign-born in Spain and Greece remains lower than the level in 2008 by at least 11 percentage points.
Specific migrant groups are performing particularly well. This is the case for example for intra-EU migrants. On average their employment rate is higher than for natives by 5 percentage points and reaches 71%. In the United States, for the first time in recent years, Mexican and African migrants have outperformed the employment rate of Asian migrants by 1 and 3 percentage points respectively.
By contrast, some migrant groups are facing persistent difficulties. This is the case notably for migrants originating in the Middle East and North Africa in Europe and Australia.
Foreign-born workers in the OECD area are concentrated in low-skilled occupations, despite their relatively high educational level. On average one‑in‑three tertiary-educated migrant is over-qualified. This is about 12 percentage points greater than for natives. Only about one-fifth of the differences in over-qualification rates between foreign- and native-born workers can be explained by observed skill differences as measured by PIAAC.
Within one year after the 2016 referendum, new recruitment of EU migrants in highly-skilled occupations in the United Kingdom dropped by 38%, i.e. about twice as much as for low- and medium-skilled jobs.
In 2017 and 2018, as asylum inflows stabilised in many countries and began to fall back to levels seen prior to 2015/16, the focus of integration policy shifted. Policy attention has moved from organising the reception and accommodation of new arrivals, to the fine-tuning of migrant integration strategies in the context of heightened demand, and to addressing the needs of vulnerable groups to ensure no one falls through the cracks.
Across OECD countries, there has been a continued trend towards the creation of integration programmes for newly arrived migrants and refugees. More countries are adopting such programmes and many of those countries in which such programmes have existed for some time are increasingly tailoring programmes and restructuring the sequencing of activities.
OECD countries are increasingly turning towards incentivising the acquisition of language skills through compulsory language tests, the outcomes of which determine certain residency and work permit decisions.
The development of assessment and recognition systems of migrants’ qualifications remains a priority in many OECD countries. Several countries are developing systems for the recognition of vocational qualifications in close co‑operation with employers and social partners.
Validation of informally-acquired skills is increasingly used to orient integration advice and interventions, to ensure that training and support build on the skills migrants already possess.
Many OECD countries have also developed measures targeted at the most vulnerable groups, providing enhanced support for those with limited skills and investing in the integration of migrant children. Particular efforts have been made to provide support to unaccompanied minors and to children who arrive late into the education system and risk leaving school without the qualifications to support a resilient career.
Countries have followed divergent trends regarding the support and social protection available to new arrivals. While some OECD countries have extended medical coverage or benefit entitlement to groups previously not covered, elsewhere there has been a trend towards limiting migrant access to benefits.
In many OECD countries, naturalisation requirements increasingly emphasise integration outcomes beyond years of residency.

Recent changes in labour market outcomes of migrants in the OECD area

This section looks at the recent changes in labour market outcomes of the foreign-born in OECD countries. It starts with a snapshot of the changes in employment, unemployment and participation rates between 2016 and 2017 and then extends the analysis to the last few years. The interlinkages between labour market performance and demographic characteristics (such as gender, age and education) as well as regions of origin are examined in order to understand the heterogeneity of different migrant groups. Special attention is then given to migrants’ concentration in certain sectors and occupations, as well as their over-qualification rates compared to the native-born workforce.

Labour market outcomes of migrants in the OECD area continue to improve

Over the course of 2017, the labour market situation of migrants benefited from the overall improvements in economic conditions in the OECD area. On average across the OECD area, migrants’ unemployment rate decreased from 10.8% in 2016 to 9.5% in 2017, and employment rate increased from 65.7% to 67.1% (Table 2.1). This development was partly driven by significant improvements in some EU countries. For example, unemployment rates of the foreign-born decreased by around 3 percentage points in the Czech Republic, Estonia and Latvia, and by approximately 2 percentage points in several other EU countries. In non-European OECD countries such as Australia, Canada, and the United States, as well as in other European OECD countries, such as Norway, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, migrants did not experience a significant change in their unemployment rate.

The picture for the employment rate is also mixed, but follows similar patterns. In particular, European countries that have greatly suffered from the economic crisis are now on the path to recovery, and this leads notably to a higher employment rate for the foreign-born: Ireland, Spain and Portugal all had increases of over two percentage points in the foreign-born employment rate in 2017. In Central and Eastern European countries, such as the Slovak and Czech Republics, female migrants in particular experienced a jump in their employment rate by almost 10%.

On average, migrants’ participation rates saw little, if any, change between 2016 and 2017. Nevertheless, the participation rates of migrants rose by around 1.3 percentage points in Belgium, Portugal and Sweden. Ireland, Slovenia and the Czech Republic also exhibit rising participation rates, which are almost entirely driven by the labour market entry of female migrants, whose participation rates increased by 2 to 4 percentage points compared to the previous year (Table 2.1).

It is useful to compare these findings with the evolution of unemployment rates in the past five years. On average, the unemployment rate of foreign-born has been on the decline throughout the OECD area, falling from 13% in 2012 to 10% in 2017 (Figure 2.1, Panel A). The EU countries that had been more severely affected by the economic crisis were those recovering the most: Spain saw a decrease in migrants’ unemployment rates of 11 percentage points between 2012 and 2017, while in Portugal and Ireland rates dropped by over 9 percentage points (see Box 2.1 for a more detailed discussion on the post-crisis evolution of the labour market outcomes of migrants in Southern Europe).

In addition, the average gap in unemployment rates between the foreign- and native‑born in the OECD area has declined during the 2012-17 period, from 4 percentage points in 2012 to 3 percentage points in 2017 (Figure 2.1, Panel B). Spain and Portugal have been again the countries with the greatest improvements for migrants in relative terms, together with Iceland and Latvia. In contrast, Nordic countries – namely, Norway, Sweden and Finland – saw an increase of the unemployment gap by about 0.5 to 2 percentage points.

Table 2.1. Labour market outcomes of foreign-born in OECD countries by gender, 2017 compared to 2016

Figure 2.1. Unemployment rates of foreign-born and unemployment rate gaps between foreign- and native-born, 2012 and 2017

Migrants’ labour market outcomes differ substantially depending on region of origin

There are several reasons why migrants’ labour market outcomes may strongly depend on their country of origin. Migrants from different regions may differ in terms of main categories of entry or personal characteristics such as level of education, age, language proficiency, duration of stay in the destination country, etc. In addition, there may be labour market differences due, for example, to the imperfect portability of human capital or the different quality of education across countries. Similarly, for historical, cultural, and socio-economic reasons, there may be some sort of latent factors such as specific asymmetries of information, different social networks, or discriminatory practices by employers against the hiring of migrants from particular regions.

Box 2.1. Employment of migrants in Southern Europe has still not fully recovered

A decade after the 2007/08 economic crisis, hard-hit Southern European countries still face significant labour market challenges. Overall unemployment has declined substantially after its peak in 2013 but it remains above pre-crisis levels, according to the European Labour Force Survey. Migrants have not only been particularly affected by the economic downturn, their recovery has also been somewhat slower than for the native‑born. By the end of 2017, only migrants in Portugal exhibit employment rates at or above the level in 2008, while migrants’ employment rates in Spain and Greece are still 8 and 11 percentage points lower, respectively.

Figure 2.2 presents the evolution of foreign-born and native-born employment rates, indexed to the beginning of the economic crisis in 2008. Three stylised facts emerge. Firstly, the magnitude of the decline in employment varied widely across Southern Europe. Greece and Spain experienced greater deteriorations of labour market conditions – with employment rates falling as low as 50% in 2013 – than Italy and Portugal. Secondly, in all four countries foreign-born faced larger declines in employment rates than natives. The divergence between native-born and foreign-born employment rates has been especially pronounced in Spain and Greece. Throughout the period 2008-17, the native-born employment rate in Spain was on average 9% higher than that of migrants. Thirdly, migrants’ employment rates have not yet fully recovered 10 years after the crisis, except in Portugal. In Italy, it was still 4% lower in Q3 2017 than at the beginning of 2008, while the native-born employment rate had fully recovered.

Figure 2.2. Quarterly employment rate by place of birth, 2008-17

	Region of birth	Employment rate		Unemployment rate		Participation rate
	Region of birth	2012	2017	2012	2017	2012	2017
Australia	Other Oceania	76.1	76.3	5.9	5.8	80.9	81.0
	Europe	73.7	76.7	3.9	4.2	76.7	80.0
	North Africa and the Middle East	48.5	49.1	11.2	12.4	54.7	56.0
	Sub-Saharan Africa	74.4	74.6	5.5	7.9	78.7	81.0
	Asia	67.0	68.1	5.7	6.1	71.1	72.5
	Americas	74.0	76.8	5.9	5.5	78.7	81.3
	Foreign-born (total)	70.0	70.8	5.4	5.9	74.0	75.2
	Native-born	73.6	74.3	5.3	5.7	77.8	78.8
Canada	Sub-Saharan Africa	67.2	69.0	12.2	11.9	76.6	78.3
	North Africa	62.9	66.8	14.0	10.6	73.2	74.7
	Middle East	57.5	62.4	14.6	10.1	67.3	69.4
	Asia	69.9	72.8	8.1	6.2	76.1	77.6
	Europe	74.1	77.9	5.9	5.0	78.8	82.0
	Oceania	81.0	81.6	0.0	4.3	81.0	85.3
	Other North America	71.3	71.7	5.8	6.0	75.7	76.3
	Central and South America and Caribbean	71.2	75.1	9.8	6.8	79.0	80.6
	Foreign-born (total)	70.1	72.8	8.4	6.8	76.5	78.1
	Native-born	72.6	73.7	7.1	6.3	78.1	78.6
EU28 countries	EU28 + EFTA	67.5	70.9	12.2	9.1	76.9	77.9
	Other European countries	57.9	59.6	17.4	14.7	70.1	69.8
	North Africa	48.0	48.5	26.4	23.3	65.2	63.2
	Sub-Saharan Africa	59.8	63.3	19.2	14.7	74.0	74.2
	Middle East	51.8	49.3	20.7	22.1	65.3	63.3
	North America	68.9	72.1	7.2	5.8	74.2	76.6
	Central and South America and Caribbean	59.0	62.0	25.3	18.5	79.0	76.1
	Asia	62.0	64.9	10.0	7.5	68.9	70.1
	Other regions	63.6	65.2	10.7	12.5	71.2	74.5
	Foreign-born (total)	62.6	63.4	15.5	13.1	74.1	73.0
	Native-born	63.6	66.4	10.7	8.1	71.2	72.3
United States	Mexico	65.7	70.2	9.3	4.1	72.4	73.2
	Other Central American countries	71.4	73.5	8.1	3.8	77.7	76.3
	South America and Caribbean	68.7	71.8	9.4	5.2	75.9	75.8
	Canada	72.3	76.1	5.6	2.3	76.5	77.8
	Europe	70.7	74.0	6.9	3.4	75.9	76.6
	Africa	66.4	72.0	10.8	5.2	74.4	76.0
	Asia and the Middle East	67.1	69.3	6.3	3.3	71.6	71.7
	Other regions	64.8	66.7	9.8	7.0	71.9	71.7
	Foreign-born (total)	67.7	71.0	8.1	4.0	73.7	74.0
	Native-born	65.6	68.5	8.3	4.6	71.5	71.8

Note: The population refers to working-age population (15-64) for the employment and participation rates and to active population aged 15-64 for the unemployment rate. EU28 does not include Germany because data by region of birth are not available for this country in 2012. The regions of birth could not be made fully comparable across countries of residence because of the way aggregate data provided to the Secretariat are coded. The data for European countries refer to the first three quarters only.

Source: European countries: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Australia, Canada: Labour Force Surveys; United States: Current Population Surveys.

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Table 2.2 details employment, unemployment and participation rates by region of origin. The significant increase of migrants’ employment rate in the United States, from 68% in 2012 to 71% in 2017, was primarily driven by Mexicans (5 percentage points increase) and African migrants (6 percentage points increase), while the employment rates of Asian migrants increased by only 2 percentage points. In Europe, the employment rate of other EU citizens reached 71% in 2017, thereby surpassing by almost 5 percentage points the employment rate of natives. By contrast, North African and Middle Eastern migrants had the lowest employment rates across the whole OECD area, at about 49% in 2017.

Large heterogeneity in terms of region of origin also exists regarding the evolution of unemployment rates. On average in EU28 countries, between 2012 and 2017 unemployment rates dropped slightly more for the native-born (-2.6 percentage points) than for the foreign-born (-2.4 percentage points). Yet, migrants from certain regions have benefited from similar – if not greater – improvements than natives. This is the case for both Sub-Saharan African and Central and South American migrants, whose unemployment rates decreased by 5 and 7 percentage points respectively in the last five years. In Australia, instead, the unemployment rate of the foreign-born marginally increased from 5.4% in 2012 to 5.9% in 2017. Migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa faced the most challenging situation, with their unemployment rising by over 2 percentage points. Migrants from North Africa and the Middle East still remain the most disadvantaged group in Australia, with an unemployment rate of over 12% in 2017, twice the average foreign-born unemployment rate.

Highly-educated, young and male migrants have benefited more from the recovery

Figure 2.3 presents variation of labour market outcomes across demographic groups as defined by gender, age and education. Between 2012 and 2017, both foreign-born women and men experienced greater declines in their unemployment rate than the native-born in Europe. However, the decrease was more marked for foreign-born men than for foreign‑born women. Similarly, in Canada, and to a lesser extent in the United States, foreign-born women improved their labour market conditions compared to native-born women at a slower pace than men.

In Europe, migrant women performed poorly in the labour market compared to both men and native women. Indeed, participation rates of migrant women increased only by 0.5 percentage points between 2012 and 2017, while that of native-born women increased by 3 percentage points. As a result the gap between native- and foreign-born women more than doubled in the past five years.

Looking at changes in labour market outcomes by educational attainment reveals that in Europe the employment rate of the foreign-born has increased more for the highly‑educated than for the medium- and low-educated (Figure 2.3). Canada also exhibits a large employment rate growth only for highly-educated migrants, while the employment rate of low-educated foreign workers decreased by 0.6 percentage points. The opposite is true however in the United States, where the employment rate of highly-educated migrants increased only by 1 percentage point, compared to the 4 percentage points and 3 percentage points increase for medium- and low-educated foreign-born respectively.

Figure 2.3. Changes in labour market outcomes by demographic group and country of birth in selected OECD countries, 2017 compared to 2012

In North America, young migrants (ages 15-24) have experienced greater employment growth than prime-age migrants (ages 25-54). Their greater participation rate growth also suggests that youth are recovering after the substantial employment losses which followed the economic crisis and which often deterred them from entering the labour force. The situation is reversed in Australia, where youth saw their employment rate fall by 2.5 percentage points, while the employment rate of prime-age foreign-born aged 25‑54 increased by 1.2 percentage points between 2012 and 2017.

The case of Europe is a particular one: young migrants’ employment rates have not significantly changed over the course of 2012-17, although both their unemployment and participation rates have dropped by 4 percentage points, suggesting that young migrants exited the labour market or more probably that a large share of recently arrived youth remained inactive. This could be a first sign of the effects of recently arrived asylum seekers and refugees in the EU (see Chapter 4).

In both Canada and the United States, also migrants in the age group 55-64 experienced large improvements in their labour market outcomes, with their employment rates increasing by around 4-5 percentage points. The improvement for older migrants is particularly significant in Europe, with their employment rates increasing by 7 percentage points over the course of 2012-17. In Australia, the evolution is less marked, and overall, changes in labour market outcomes by demographic characteristics have been more muted than in the other OECD countries, suggesting a stable economic environment for the foreign-born.

Those not in employment, education or training do not always seek a job

A complementary analysis looks at the share of youth aged 15-24 that is not in employment or education or training (NEET). By distinguishing between the NEET rates of those who do and those who do not actively seek employment, Figure 2.4 finds that only a minority of NEET are looking for a job, thereby emphasising the significance of going beyond unemployment rates when analysing the labour market situation of young people.

In the United States, 15% of young migrants were neither working nor studying or in training in 2017, compared to 12% of young natives. Yet, the share of them actively looking for a job was lower than the corresponding proportion of natives (one-fifth and one-fourth respectively). The relatively large inactivity among the foreign-born NEETs is driven by women: 17% of foreign-born women are NEET and not looking for work, compared to only 7% of male counterparts.

Similar patterns are revealed in other countries. In Australia, in spite of the falling employment rates of foreign-born youth between 2012 and 2017 – as shown in Figure 2.3 – young migrants still had a lower NEET rate than the native-born in 2017, and the share of foreign-born NEETs actively seeking employment was somewhat lower than the share of native-born. Canada shows a similar picture, with 70% of the young migrant NEETs not looking for work compared to 60% of Canadian-born NEETs.

Figure 2.4. NEET rates by place of birth in selected OECD countries, 2017

Migrant employment has increased in specific sectors

Foreign-born workers tend to concentrate in specific sectors across the OECD area. In 2017, a significant share of foreign-born workers was working in services. In particular, migrants were over-represented compared to natives in both hotel and restaurant activities and in domestic services in almost all OECD countries (Annex Table 2.A.1). In Spain and Italy, these two sectors alone accounted for 30% of foreign-born employment. In many countries, migrants are also more likely than natives to work in mining and manufacturing, as well as in construction. In Germany, almost one-fourth of foreign-born workers were in manufacturing.

Changes since 2012 highlight how the economic downturn and the recovery have affected migrant worker allocation across sectors (Figure 2.5). In the past five years in the United States, migrant employment in the non-agricultural private sector grew twice as fast as for natives (15% and 8%, respectively). Employment of migrant workers is noticeable in private services, as well as in both manufacturing and construction – the sectors most impacted by the 2007/08 economic crisis. The last quarter of 2017 also recorded a 2.4% decline in foreign-born employment in private services, in contrast to a slight increase in native-born employment. This was partly driven by a reduction in the employment of foreign-born workers in “accommodation and food service activities” (-1.4%) and “information and communication” (-0.5%).

Figure 2.5. Annual percentage change of employees in the non-agricultural business sector by place of birth, 2012-17

Employment recovery in Europe started later, in 2014 (Figure 2.5). While most job losses during the downturn occurred in the manufacturing and construction sectors, only jobs in private services – and to a smaller extent manufacturing – have been recovered after 2014. This trend was visible for both foreign-born and native-born but was magnified for the former: migrants experienced both greater job losses (up to -10% in construction in Q3 2012 compared to Q3 2011) and greater job creation (including an increase of 12% in construction jobs in Q2 2016 compared to Q2 2015). This suggests that foreign-born workers were more exposed to changes in the business cycle than natives. By the third quarter of 2017, migrants’ employment in the non-agricultural sector in Europe had a similar industry composition as it had in 2011, with almost one-fifth in manufacturing, 11% in construction and the remainder scattered over the private services sector. Although not entirely comparable, Box 2.2 presents a different picture for the evolution of sectoral employment in Japan and Korea, two countries where migration policies often determine the targeted sectors where migrants work.

Box 2.2. Migration policies determine the distribution of migrants across sectors in Korea and Japan

Except for the highly skilled, Japan and Korea generally authorise foreign employment in few sectors. For example, Korea’s main programme for temporary low-skilled migration – the Employment Permit System (EPS) – establishes quotas for the admission of temporary workers into a limited number of sectors, such as manufacturing and agriculture, and strongly restricts cross-sector mobility. Similarly, in Japan, foreign trainees and interns taking part in the Training and Technical Internship Programmes are employed in specific sectors. The resulting distribution of migrants across industries in Japan and Korea is clearly shaped by the design of labour migration programmes.

In Japan, foreign nationals have overall experienced sustained growth in their employment in the non-agricultural sector throughout the period 2013-17 (Figure 2.6). Although the annual percentage change has been largest in the service sector – as high as 13% in 2016 – the number of foreign employees in the manufacturing sector has also grown considerably. By contrast, Korea’s employment growth by industry has been more mixed. Compared to 2012, foreign employment in construction declined by 3% in 2013 and recovered in 2014. In 2016 and 2017 there was little change in the industry distribution of foreign nationals in Korea. Their employment in manufacturing fell by 2% in 2017, mirroring sectoral trends for the whole population (OECD, 2018[2]).

Figure 2.6. Annual percentage change of foreign employees in the non-agricultural sector, 2013-17

In Europe, employment of migrants between 2012 and 2017 increased in almost all sectors but two, utilities and domestic services (Figure 2.7). The most significant growth was recorded in low- and middle-skilled sectors. About 800 000 new jobs were created in retail trade and 350 000 in wholesale trade, while warehousing and transportation activities exhibited a 135% increase in the 2012-17 period. Job creation in the industries most affected by the economic crisis was also large, with construction representing more than 520 000 new jobs and the manufacture of food products adding almost 300 000 jobs. By contrast, native-born employment gains were recorded in more skill-intensive industries, such as increases by 450 000 jobs in both management consulting activities and in computer programming.

In the United States, migrants have also experienced large employment gains in those sectors that typically occupy a substantial share of low- and middle-skilled workers. For instance, 630 000 migrants found jobs in construction and more than 300 000 in warehousing and transportation. Yet, in the United States, foreign-born have also found employment in high-quality and high-paying jobs, such as insurance (+38%) and finance (+17%). Employment of migrants in educational services increased by 230 000, which corresponds to over one-third of the total employment creation in the sector. An additional 240 000 jobs of foreign-born were created in hospitals.

Figure 2.7. Ten industries with the largest changes in employment by place of birth, 2012 and 2017

Migrants remain over-represented in low-skilled occupations

In all OECD countries, the distribution of foreign-born and native-born workers over occupations differs significantly. In 2017, such occupational dissimilarity remained high, especially in Southern European countries (Figure 2.8). In Italy and Greece, more than one-third of migrants would have to move to another occupation in order for their occupational distribution to be the same as that of the native-born. On average, 16% of foreign-born workers in the EU28 would have to change occupation in order to have similar jobs to natives, while this proportion is substantially lower for non-European countries, such as Canada and Australia (8% in both cases). Occupational dissimilarity between foreign-born and native-born workers has not changed significantly in the last few years: in 2012 as well as in 2017, approximately 18% of migrants in the OECD area would have had to change occupation in order to have the same distribution as native‑born workers.

Figure 2.8. Occupational dissimilarity between foreign-born and native-born workers, 2012 and 2017

In total, 65% of employed migrants in the OECD area worked in low- or medium‑skilled jobs in 2017 (Figure 2.9). The corresponding share for native-born workers was almost 10 percentage points lower. In the United States, this figure reaches 67%. An especially high concentration arises in Greece, where nine out of ten foreign-born workers worked in low- or medium-skilled occupations in 2017. In Europe on average, migrant workers are disproportionally concentrated in occupations with high routine task intensity, with a third of all workers in cleaner and helper occupations being foreign‑born in 2015 (OECD, 2017[3]). The situation in the United Kingdom is specific: albeit having a relatively low occupational dissimilarity index for migrants, the most recent trends following the 2016 referendum suggest a reduction in the hiring of recently‑arrived high-skilled EU migrants (see Box 2.3).

Figure 2.9. Low- and medium-skilled employment as a percentage of total employment, 2017

The risk of over-qualification is greater for migrants

Different occupational distributions of native-born and foreign-born workers might reflect differences in their educational attainment. Figure 2.12 presents the educational composition of the employed workforce by place of birth in 2017, for each OECD country where data are available. In 17 of the 29 selected OECD countries, the proportion of highly-educated workers is greater among the foreign-born than among the native‑born. This is the case notably in countries where selective economic migration schemes determine a large part of the migration inflow, such as Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom, but this is also observed in Central and Eastern Europe (e.g. Czech Republic, Estonia and Hungary) and in certain non-European countries (Mexico and Turkey).

The large proportion of migrants with tertiary-level education does not mean that they are also overrepresented in skilled occupations. Figure 2.13 shows large differences in over‑qualification rates between foreign- and native-born workers across the OECD area. In all countries for which data are available, and with the exception of Switzerland, tertiary-educated migrants are more frequently found in low- and medium-skilled occupations than natives. Overall, the average gap between foreign- and native-born in the OECD area is about 12 percentage points, although it reaches 29 and 34 percentage points in Greece and Italy, respectively.

Box 2.3. Migration of EU citizens to the United Kingdom since June 2016

In the referendum of June 23, 2016, the United Kingdom voted in favour of leaving the European Union. The official EU withdrawal process started in March 2017 and is due to be completed by early 2019. This is expected to change British migration policy significantly, in particular, ending the free movement of EU citizens. Although the full effects of the leave vote on migration trends will only be visible in a few years’ time, recent data releases for the first complete year after the referendum shed light on the mobility of EU citizens in response to the vote.

Newly released data from the Office for National Statistics suggest that immigration of EU citizens has fallen by almost one-fifth, from 284 000 persons in June 2016 to 230 000 in June 2017 (Figure 2.10, Panel A). By comparison, the fall in immigration of non-EU citizens was only 10%. Almost the entire drop in EU immigration during the last year was due to fewer EU citizens coming to look for a job, while the number of migrants arriving with a job offer in hand, for formal study purposes or to join a family member, remained approximately stable (Figure 2.10, Panel B).

Analysing emigration data confirms these findings (Figure 2.10, Panel A): in the year following the referendum, the number of EU citizens leaving the UK increased by 29% to 123 000, almost reaching the emigration level of the 2008 economic crisis. Over one in three EU citizens leaving the UK stated that their main reason was to return home: this was a 54% increase from the previous year. In addition, many EU citizens sought security by applying for British citizenship before the withdrawal from the European Union is completed. In the year following the referendum, the number of EU migrants applying for UK citizenship rose by 80% compared to the previous year, up to almost 28 500. Overall, between June 2016 and June 2017, the Home Office issued permanent residence permits to around 145 000 EEA citizens and their families, which represented a five-fold increase when compared with 27 000 in the previous year.

There have not only been changes in the magnitude of EU immigration to the United Kingdom, but also important shifts in the occupational composition of those EU citizens who arrived in the aftermath of the referendum. Overall, new recruitments of EU-born workers have diminished but this was particularly marked for highly-skilled occupations (Figure 2.11). Between the second quarter of 2016 (just before the referendum) and the second quarter of 2017, recruitments of newly arrived EU migrants (i.e. arrived in the past 18 months) in highly-skilled occupations dropped by approximately 38% (from 65 000 to 40 000), about twice as much as the reduction in new hiring in low- and medium-skilled jobs over the same period.

Figure 2.10. Migration trends in the United Kingdom, 2014-17

Figure 2.11. Annual percentage change of EU workers in the United Kingdom by occupational level, 2014-18

Figure 2.12. Education level of the working-age population in employment by place of birth, 2017

Information on formal educational attainment is only a proxy for actual skills. By exploiting the unique OECD Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC), it is possible to account for objectively measured competencies in literacy and numeracy. Confirming the above findings, throughout the PIAAC sample the risk of over-qualification is higher for migrants than for native-born persons (Figure 2.14). Compared to Figure 2.13, this difference in over-qualification rates also controls for the heterogeneous demographic composition of the two populations in terms of age, gender and education. On average, migrants are 15 percentage points more likely to be over-qualified than natives, with the highest differences being observed in Italy (23 percentage points) and Greece (20 percentage points).

Figure 2.13. Differences in over-qualification rates between foreign- and native-born workers, 2017 or latest available year

Figure 2.14. Differences in over-qualification rates between foreign- and native-born workers with and without differences in literacy and numeracy being accounted for, 2015 or latest available

The influence of numeracy and literacy skills on the risk of over-qualification is significant but limited. Only one-fifth of the differences in over-qualification rates can be explained by observed skill differences. On average, migrants are still 12 percentage points more likely than native-born persons to be over-qualified for their jobs, also after accounting for their competencies as measured by PIAAC. This gap must therefore largely be driven by other factors. OECD/EU (2014[4]) stresses the location where the highest qualification is obtained as a key driver of the incidence of over-qualification among migrants, as well as their host-country language proficiency. Asymmetries in job information, lack of social networks or employers’ discrimination may also increase the mismatch between foreign-born workers’ qualifications and their occupation.

Recent changes in integration policies in OECD countries

In 2017 and 2018, as asylum inflows have stabilised in many countries and begun to fall back to levels seen prior to 2015/16, the focus of integration policy has evolved accordingly. Many of the asylum seekers that arrived 2015/16 have now been granted a humanitarian residence permit and, in 2017 and 2018, are gradually joining the labour market and beginning their search for work. In response to these changes, there has been a shift in the focus of integration policy in OECD member countries. Policy attention has moved from organising the reception and accommodation of new arrivals, to the fine-tuning of integration strategies, ensuring resources are used in a cost-effective manner in the context of heightened demand, and to addressing the needs of vulnerable groups to ensure no migrant falls through the cracks. This section provides an update on these recent policy changes in OECD countries as well as in Bulgaria, Lithuania and Romania.

Strengthening early intervention to set new arrivals on the right path

There has been a continuous trend towards the creation of integration programmes to structure early integration activities

In recent years, across the OECD area, countries have increasingly been organising their early integration efforts into structured introduction programmes and strategies. In 2016/2017, new programmes were introduced in Austria, Belgium, Chile and Lithuania.

The new strategies vary considerably in the extent of the services that constitute them, ranging from a co-ordinated attempt to provide information on available activities – such as in the Czech Republic – to the creation of a holistic package of integration measures – as was introduced in Lithuania and Belgium in 2016/17.

In Lithuania, for example, the new “Procedure for Providing State Support for the Integration of Beneficiaries of International Protection” includes measures to enhance migrants’ language skills through the introduction of an intensive Lithuanian language course (for level A1) alongside a course focused on the study of Lithuanian culture.

Where integration programmes have existed for some time, countries are restructuring services…

Elsewhere, where introduction programmes have existed for some time, countries such as Sweden and Finland have implemented structural changes in order to increase the efficiency, the organisation and the co-ordination of these programmes. In Finland, for example, where an integration programme has existed for nearly two decades, changes to the way integration training is organised, implemented in 2016/17, have meant that the integration programme is now divided into sub-modules. These modules combine vocationally-oriented content with integration training at an early stage of the integration path. In conjunction with basic integration studies, the new training modules contain a diverse range of other activities, including on-the-job learning and work experience. Modules may be interspersed with other labour market activities, such as work trials and subsidised employment.

…And participation in introduction measures is increasingly becoming obligatory

Alongside reforms to expand the offer of integration activities, there has been a commensurate trend increasing the emphasis placed on the obligations of the migrants themselves. In Austria, the Integration Act which came into effect in 2017, sets out a series of obligations including participation in various activities, such as language courses and seminars about Austrian values. The obligatory nature of participation is reinforced by a state-wide integration exam, the results of which can impact upon permit decisions. Integration courses, offered by certified course providers, are available to prepare participants for the integration exam, with the costs of these courses refunded up to 50% (or a maximum of EUR 750) for some groups.

Similarly, in Belgium, where labour market integration programmes remained a priority, 2017 saw the implementation of new and compulsory integration pathways across the country. Since May 2017, all newcomers in Brussels younger than 65 years of age, who have lived in Belgium for less than three years, and who have a residence permit valid for more than three months, will be required to follow an integration programme, including language training. The newly-introduced integration programme in Wallonia – which includes a reception module, French language training as well as citizenship training and socio-professional assistance – is also compulsory. In Flanders, candidates wanting to acquire a certificate of civic integration at the end of the integration programme have, since January 2016, to pass a test and demonstrate they have reached a certain level of Dutch.

At the same time, in Norway, the requirement of a minimum level of spoken Norwegian and having passed a test of knowledge of the Norwegian society to be eligible for permanent residence, entered into force in January 2017. In Sweden, the budget bill for 2018 introduced an education and training obligation for newly-arrived migrants who are considered in need of further education to find work. The education and training obligation makes clear the individual’s responsibility to obtain the skills necessary to be matched to a job, to take part in labour market policy measures, or continue studying.

In Germany, asylum seekers with a good prospect to remain have been allowed to participate in an integration course during their asylum procedure since October 2015. Changes made in early 2017 introduced the obligation to participate in these courses – enforced through accompanying sanctions – for those asylum seekers claiming benefits.

Language training remains the key building block of integration training…

In the majority of OECD countries, language remains a primary focus of integration policy. In France, the Contrat d’Intégration Républicaine introduced changes to expand access to language courses, and ensure that language training was more systematic. While this expansion in access was initially accompanied by a reduction in the number of hours offered to each individual, recent proposals announced in early 2018 anticipate a reversal of this reduction. Alongside this increase, from 200 hours of language training to 600, a parliamentary report published in early 2018 has put forward a set of proposals to enhance the support offered to new arrivals. These proposals include a decrease in the delay before asylum seekers can seek work from nine to six months, an enhanced link between skills assessments and subsequent professional and vocational training and a more than tenfold increase in integration spending, taking it to EUR 607 million.

The Austrian 2017 Integration Act also included a strong increase in budgetary support for language courses, and more generally many OECD countries have made changes to increase the efficiency of language learning.

In the Czech Republic, the Integration Plan for 2018 proposes the provision of increased methodological support for teachers of language courses; while in Australia, the Department of Education and Training implemented a new business model for the Adult Migrant English Program (AMEP). The introduction of the new model, in July 2017, coincided with the commencement of a new service provider contract which incorporates elements to promote efficiency of delivery while providing extra support for those with the strongest needs. New features of the model include: increased flexibility to let service providers choose a curriculum that meets their clients’ needs, and a choice of streams to deliver tuition tailored both to the needs and the goals of participants. In addition, the new model introduces the possibility of up to 490 hours of further tuition for migrants who have not reached functional English after completing their entitlement of 510 hours, and the removal of the funding cap on additional training for eligible humanitarian migrants.

In Germany, efforts to increase the efficiency of language training have, instead, focused on increasing the efficiency with which migrants are allocated to language courses. To this end, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees developed a system to allow case workers to send migrants directly to courses with available places. Previously, free choice by migrants had meant long waiting lists for some oversubscribed courses.

…And countries are increasingly turning towards incentivising the acquisition of language skills

Efforts to strengthen language skills have also increasingly focused on the incentives of the migrants themselves. In Denmark, to incentivise attendance and reduce dropout rates, amendments to the Law on Danish Language Courses have introduced, since July 2017, a deposit of DKK 1 250 (EUR 168) to be paid by students upon registering for a Danish course. The deposit is either refunded upon completion of the course or can be transferred, automatically, to the following module. Refugees and family migrants are not, however, required to pay the deposit. In a contrasting move, the language bonus that was introduced in 2015 to increase language learning incentives has, as of 2018, been limited, such that language students will now only be able to obtain the bonus for six months.

Rather than a language bonus, many OECD countries incentivise language acquisition by introducing compulsory language tests, the outcomes of which determine certain permit decisions. Countries taking steps in this direction in 2017/18 include Austria, Norway, Poland and the Czech Republic. In Poland, the amended Act on Foreigners, which entered into force on 12 February 2018, makes immigrants’ access to permanent residence conditional on Polish language knowledge (level B1 or an appropriate graduation certificate). However, children under 16, beneficiaries of international protection, victims of human trafficking and foreigners of Polish descent are exempt. In Switzerland, since 2018, naturalisation requires knowledge of a Swiss language to a minimum spoken level of B1 and written level of A2.

Assessment of skills and recognition of formal qualifications continues to develop

The assessment and recognition of qualifications, and the validation of skills, can be valuable tools to support the integration of all skilled migrants. In recent years, there has been increasing acknowledgement that investments in assessment and recognition have the highest yield when undertaken early in the integration process.

When skilled migrants work in jobs for which they are overqualified, potential is wasted. Assessment and recognition of foreign qualifications is an important tool in increasing the transparency of the skills migrantspossess, as such it plays an important role in overcoming the employer uncertainty – one of the root causes of over-qualification. As a result, the development of assessment and recognition systems remains a priority in many OECD countries. In Luxembourg, a Law on the Recognition of Professional Qualifications simplified the recognition procedure and created a register of professional titles and a register of qualification titles.

Alongside the recognition of academic qualifications, several OECD countries are developing systems for the recognition of vocational qualifications. Norway continues to be particularly active in this regard. In late 2017, Norway’s Agency for Quality Assurance in Education (NOKUT) expanded the coverage of the recognition procedure for foreign vocational education and training that was launched the previous year. The procedure now covers five countries (Germany, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland) and 15 qualifications that have been selected in co-operation with the Norwegian social partners. In addition, since August 2017, the Norwegian government has also established new bridging courses for those trained as nurses and teachers, to enable them to obtain the additional training required to work in these professions in Norway. Similar bridging courses are currently under development targeting refugees with science or technology qualifications.

Such vocational recognition requires close collaboration with employers and social partners. In many ways, Sweden led the way on such vocational recognition with the 2015 launch of its Fast-Track scheme that combines recognition with concurrent bridging courses and language tuition. In 2017, the number of Fast-Track participants has continued to grow and the Swedish Public Employment Service is working closely with industry to procure industry specific validation across the 14 Fast-Track professions.

For refugees, who frequently have no proof of their qualifications, recognition can be a particular challenge. To overcome these difficulties, several international initiatives took place in 2017. In June, the European Union launched its EU Skills Profile Tool for Third‑Country Nationals (Box 2.4). Likewise, a new pilot project developed by the Council of Europe, began in 2017 granting European Qualifications Passports for Refugees. The project is based on a recognition methodology developed by the NOKUT as part of their Recognition Procedure for Persons without Verifiable Documentation (UVD-procedure). The Council of Europe is now working to expand the scheme to include more countries and partners from 2018. However, all such instruments have in common that the success will depend on the extent to which stakeholders use and accept them.

Box 2.4. EU Skills Profile Tool for Third-Country Nationals

An EU Skills Profile Tool for Third-Country Nationals was launched in June 2017 to support the early-stage profiling of the qualifications and skills of refugees and other citizens of non‑EU countries who are staying in the EU (third-country nationals).

Developed as part of the New Skills Agenda for Europe, the profiling tool has the ambitious aim of ensuring that skills development, training and support for third-country nationals are effectively targeted to build efficiently on the skills they already possess.

The tool is not intended to explicitly recognise or authenticate skills, but is instead designed to be used in an interview situation to get to know the individual, their skills, qualifications and experiences. In this manner, the information collected can be used to:

support further assessment
form a basis for offering guidance
identify up-skilling needs
support job-searching and job-matching.

The tool is available in all EU languages (except Irish) as well as in Arabic, Farsi, Pashto, Sorani, Somali, Tigrinya and Turkish. In addition, in order to reduce the language barriers between caseworkers and citizens of non-EU countries, it is possible to use the tool in two languages at the same time on one screen.

While the tool is available as a web-based tool for anyone to use free of charge, it is specifically designed to aid the skills assessment undertaken by: national authorities responsible for reception and integration of refugees; reception centres; employment assistance services; education and training advisers; social services; NGOs and charitable organisations.

Validation of informally-acquired skills is increasingly used to orient integration advice and interventions

Those migrants who lack formal vocational degrees often have particular difficulty in signalling the skills they hold to potential employers. This can make it difficult for migrants to get their first foothold in the labour market and prove that they hold the skills needed for the job (see Box 2.5 on "Engaging with employers in the hiring of refugees"). In response to this challenge, the “My Skills” tool, developed by the public employment service in Germany, has the goal of providing more precise information on specific competences held. Standardised computer-based tests – supported by pictures and videos, to overcome language barriers – have been developed to capture the relevant competences in the 30 professional areas deemed to be most relevant among refugees and low-skilled Germans. In this manner the new tool aims to increase transparency and thereby enable either qualified placement or the arrangement of targeted further vocational training. The My Skills tool is available in six languages including German, English, Arabic, Persian, Turkish and Russian.

Box 2.5. OECD-UNHCR action plan on “Engaging with Employers in the Hiring of Refugees”

Through a series of regional dialogues on “Employing Refugees”, the OECD and UNHCR have brought together employers and employer organisations to share lessons learned on how to promote refugee employment. On the basis of these consultations, the two international organisations have drawn up an action plan for employers, refugees, civil society and governments on Engaging with Employers in the Hiring of Refugees.

The plan has been further informed by subsequent consultations with refugees, governments, and civil society to validate the outcomes of the dialogues with employers and employer organisations. Released in April 2018, it is composed of 10 “action areas” identified as key to supporting the successful labour market integration of refugees. The action areas are illustrative of the process and issues faced by employers concerning the hiring of refugees. The Action Plan is structured as follows: As a starting point, employers must be in a position to navigate the administrative framework regarding work rights (Action 1) and have sufficient legal certainty on the length of stay of refugee workers (Action 2). Once these preconditions are met, the necessary first step in the labour market integration process is the initial assessment of refugees’ skills (Action 3). Some skills gaps may be identified in this process, and measures for re- and upskilling may be needed to increase refugee employability (Action 4). With this base, a proper matching can be done with employers’ skill needs (Action 5). For a fair recruitment process, equal opportunities are a precondition (Action 6), and the working environment must be prepared (Action 7). Enabling long-term employability requires specific attention (Action 8). To ensure that scalable models for refugee employment are sustained and championed by employers, building a real business case for employment is essential (Action 9). Finally, different stakeholders need to work effectively and efficiently together throughout the process (Action 10).

The Action Plan intends to inspire focused policy action and structural co-ordination among different stakeholders with the aim of facilitating the process of refugee employment for employers, governments, civil society actors and refugees, and thereby getting the most out of refugees’ skills to the benefit of all stakeholders.

Ensuring that vulnerable migrants do not fall through the cracks

Many OECD countries have developed measures targeted at the most vulnerable groups

As integration systems adapt to accommodate the large number of new migrants – many of whom, as refugees, have substantial service needs – a number of integration policy changes have focused on the most vulnerable of these new arrivals. Many of the policy initiatives outlined in this chapter have been introduced in reaction to the large inflow of asylum seekers and refugees. Other groups that are increasingly in the focus are those with very low skills, young children (in particular those who are unaccompanied), and women – to ensure that no migrant is left to fall through the cracks. Indeed, in many cases, there is an overlap of vulnerabilities, with many refugees, unaccompanied minors, and migrant women bringing limited skills and education with them when they migrate.

Migrants with limited skills often require increased support

Migrants arriving with very low levels of skills can experience quite some difficulty in finding durable employment. As a result, in 2017-18, a number of OECD countries have introduced policy changes to encourage migrants to undertake further education to attain the levels needed for long-term employability in the host-country labour market.

In Sweden, since January 2018, the government has introduced the requirement that all newly-arrived migrants who are considered to be in need of education and training undertake such education on a full-time basis. The goal of this policy is to create a more coherent pathway for those with low skills, rather than attempt to move them directly into the labour market in a way that may not be sustainable. Alongside these changes, the National Agency for Education has been tasked with analysing whether the adult education system meets the needs of newly-arrived adults requiring further education at compulsory education level.

In a similar vein, amendments to the Education Act in Norway have ensured that adult migrants with completed upper-secondary education from abroad, which has not been recognised in Norway, will have the right to free local upper secondary education.

Children can often have difficulties integrating early enough to earn a sufficient education…

Investments into the successful integration of migrant children pay long-run dividends, and many OECD countries have updated policy to ensure that young migrants have the information and support to effectively integrate into the school system quickly after arrival. In Luxembourg, changes introduced in August 2017 aim to strengthen the integration into the compulsory schooling system of Luxembourg of newly-arrived foreign pupils, through the extension of the multi-lingual education programme to early childhood education and through the provision of care service vouchers aimed to mitigate inequalities and provide an equal start to all children. Alongside these changes, access to the orientation services offered by the “Reception Desk for Newly-Arrived Pupils” has been extended from age 17 to 24. With a similar aim, the 2018 Swedish Budget Bill announced changes to ensure all children have an equal start by announcing that preschool class is to be made mandatory. Alongside this, a review has been commissioned to look at ways to increase attendance among newly-arrived children.

In Norway, an amendment to the Education Act has been introduced, specifying that all children are entitled to primary and lower secondary education as soon as possible, and no later than within one month after arrival. Similarly, in Lithuania an amendment introduced in May 2017 provides for the right of asylum-seeking minors to pre-school and pre-primary education within three months after lodging an application for asylum. And in Chile, in support of the process of regularisation of migrant children, a no-cost special visa has been created to enable children to access health and educational benefits independently of the visa situation of their parents. Likewise, in the Czech Republic, students moving into Czech Primary schools are now offered free language preparation.

In some OECD countries, there has been a specific focus on children who arrive late into the host-country education system. In Austria, for example, in order to reduce the number of youth without a school leaving certificate, a 2016 amendment to the Austrian Law on Education and Training raised the minimum age for the achievement of the compulsory school leaving certificate to 18 years. In Sweden, in addition to allowing extra time for late-arrivals, a 2017 inquiry proposed that late-arriving students should be offered: a customised timetable with a narrower subject base; an individual study plan that accompanies them from school to school if relocation necessitates such transfers; further study guidance; and increased funding for additional education during the summer. Further, the report proposes that students failing to obtain a pass grade should be provided, in place of a fail grade, with a written review detailing their distance from a pass.

Unaccompanied minors face particular challenges

Unaccompanied minors, applying for asylum in OECD countries, often do so after a long and perilous journey during which they may have experienced abuse and exploitation. In 2017/2018, many OECD governments have introduced changes targeting the specific challenges facing this vulnerable group during the asylum procedure and in the early integration process.

Unaccompanied minors represent an important group among the refugees arriving in Greece. More than 5 000 arrived in 2016, and 2 350 applied for asylum. The efforts of the Greek government to address the needs of these children include a ministerial decision to increase educational support, to harmonise the age assessment procedure, and to provide a legal guardian for every child. However, adequate housing remains a major challenge and it is estimated that there are twice as many unaccompanied minors waiting for a place in a shelter as are currently available.

In Italy, the law “Provisions on measures to protect unaccompanied foreign minors”, approved by the Italian parliament in March 2017, pledges that foreign minors arriving in Italy without adults cannot be repatriated, and must be hosted by specialised shelters for the reception of minors for a maximum of 30 days. Following this time, minors should be placed within a family for foster care. In light of the abrupt and disruptive changes in the rights of the child that occur in many OECD countries when they reach the age of 18, the Italian law initiates the possibility to be supported up to the age of 21 years. Such possibilities for continued support are available in a number of OECD countries, including Germany, Sweden and France.

To limit the time unaccompanied minors spend in limbo, a 2017 legislative package in Germany requires youth welfare offices to apply quickly for asylum on behalf of unaccompanied minors. Meanwhile Belgium has published a manual – available in nine languages – to provide information on the asylum procedure to unaccompanied minors and their guardians.

In order to limit such disruptions and ensure that status does not change during the asylum application process, recent changes introduced in Sweden in May 2017 enable the migration agency to assess the age of a minor at the outset of the asylum procedure instead of in connection with the final decision. In addition, since March 2017, asylum‑seeking minors are offered a voluntary medical age assessment in support of their age determination decision. Finally, in June 2017, amendments were made to ensure that those aged between 18 and 25 are able to extend their temporary residence permit for the duration of their upper secondary school studies. Similarly, in Germany adolescents whose removal has been suspended during and after their vocational training can stay in Germany for the duration of their vocational studies and possible subsequent employment.

Despite relatively poor labour market outcomes, policy initiatives targeted at migrant women remain rare

Integration failures among migrant women risk leaving a lasting impact on the integration outcomes of their children. Passing from generation to generation in this manner, poor integration outcomes among women can have long-run repercussions. Yet across the OECD, migrant women tend to take longer to integrate into the labour market than their male counterparts and tend to experience larger employment disparities when compared with the native-born peers in their host countries.

To tackle the barriers created by the difficulties involved in juggling employment and integration activities with childcare duties, in 2017 Germany has reintroduced and expanded the availability of childcare during integration activities. In Sweden, alongside mandating pre-school attendance, the Budget Bill of 2018 announced special measures to increase the opportunities for newly-arrived migrant women to learn Swedish, find a job, or run a business. In Australia, the 2018 national expansion of the “Parents Next” initiative intends to help parents across the country access personalised assistance to improve their work readiness. While this is not specifically targeted at migrants, they are likely to disproportionately benefit from such services.

Countries have followed divergent trends regarding the support and social protection available to new arrivals

Well-designed social protection programmes, including those that reduce poverty, increase employment opportunities, and provide affordable healthcare are important tools to promote integration and prevent the concentration of poverty and vulnerability among migrants. In a number of OECD countries, recent policy changes have also been motivated by public opinion concerns regarding the use of social transfers by migrants.

There has been a trend towards limiting migrant access to benefits…

In mid-2015, the Danish government introduced a new Integration Benefit that replaced the previous unemployment and welfare benefits for newly-arrived refugees. From January 2016, the target of this new integration benefit – which is substantially lower than the unemployment benefit it replaces – has been expanded to include all foreigners who have not resided in Denmark for seven of the past eight years. While the benefit reduction was initially mitigated by a monthly bonus, available to those who had passed an intermediate level Danish exam, in 2017, eligibility for this bonus was limited to a duration of six months. Furthermore, in June 2017, agreement was reached to reduce by 3% the rate of the integration allowance.

Elsewhere, according to plans unveiled by the new Dutch government in October 2017, migrants with residency permits will not be able to claim welfare benefits, such as healthcare allowance or rent allowance for the first two years of their stay. Meanwhile in Austria, three of the country’s nine provinces have reduced the benefits to which new arrivals have access. Benefits for new arrivals, have been cut to around EUR 570 a month with benefits at the household level capped at EUR 1 500.

In addition, under plans announced under the recently unveiled “No-Ghetto” programme in Denmark, a person receiving state income payments (kontanthjælp) would see these benefits reduced if they move to an area defined by the government as a “ghetto” area. In addition, municipalities will not be allowed to move people receiving the unemployment allowance into these areas.

In a similar vein, Hungary has also rolled back support for refugees now offered accommodation for a maximum of 30 days, down from the 60 days previously granted, following recognition of refugee or subsidiary protection status. After this period, housing support for refugees and other beneficiaries of international protection is only available through civil society initiatives. Alongside reduced accommodation support, eligibility for basic health care services has also been halved to a period of six months. The Immigration and Asylum Office (IAO) no longer provides integration support to beneficiaries of international protection. Moreover, the amendments introduced an automatic revision of the refugee and subsidiary protection status every three years. Belgium has reduced the pocket money available to asylum-seekers in reception centres.

…while some OECD countries have extended medical coverage or benefit entitlement to migrant groups previously not covered

Recent policy changes in a number of OECD countries have extended access to such social protection programmes to groups previously ineligible. In Germany, for example, an amendment to the Asylum Seekers’ Benefits Act will ensure that asylum seekers who have been in Germany for at least 15 months are entitled to the same healthcare benefits as those who are members of the statutory healthcare system. In April 2017, Canada launched new pre-departure medical services for refugees destined for Canada. Services include: an immigration medical examination, certain pre-departure vaccinations aligned with Canadian guidelines, services to manage disease outbreaks in refugee camps, and medical support during travel to Canada. Turkey has also made significant efforts to ensure that those living in the country under temporary protection receive the education, labour market support and healthcare services they need (see Box 2.6) In Chile, a circular published in June of 2016 provides pathways through which irregular migrants, without documents or residence permits, can access the public healthcare system. A further circular, issued in August of 2017, created the Temporary Training and Employment Visa, which allows participation in training with a view to insertion into the formal labour market upon course completion.

In Sweden, those granted international protection are, since 2016, offered temporary rather than permanent permits. New legislation introduced in August 2017 ensures that temporary residents are able to keep health care and social benefits if they apply for an extension before the temporary permit expires.

Citizenship

Naturalisation can be an important step towards integration. It encourages investment in host-country specific skills on the part of the migrant, and reduces the uncertainty facing potential employers when making hiring or training decisions. Yet, while the vast majority of countries have legal provisions that allow immigrants to become naturalised citizens, the criteria for acquisition of citizenship, and the procedural measures necessary, vary from country to country.

Box 2.6. Integration policy in Turkey

By mid-March 2018, over 3.7 million registered people under temporary protection were living in Turkey, including Syrians, Iraqis, Afghans, Iranians, and Somalis. The 3.5 million Syrians officially residing in Turkey represent over 63% of all displaced Syrians and 3.8% of Turkey’s total population. Of these individuals, close to 240 000 people are hosted in 21 camps run by Turkish authorities, where people have access to shelter, health, education, food and social activities. In response to the growing number of people in need of protection, Turkey has taken a number of steps to facilitate access to the labour market, education, and healthcare.

Labour market: in 2014 the Turkish government adopted the Law on Foreigners and International Protection which makes it possible to apply for a work permit six months after their international protection claim. In January 2016 the Regulation on Work Permits for Foreigners under Temporary Protection extended this right. Employers have to apply on behalf of employees once residency, registration, and health requirements are met. The application is then approved by the local authority if Syrians do not exceed 10% of the Turkish workforce employed in the same workplace.

Education: national Turkish legislation states that all children, including foreign nationals, have the right to free basic education. However, reports indicate that Syrian refugees have had difficulties enrolling their children into the public school system. These difficulties stem from a lack of clarity regarding enrolment procedures as well as practical limitations such as language barriers and lack of space in the classrooms. Alongside public education, an alternative option for the children of Syrian refugees is to enrol at one of the Temporary Education Centres available in urban areas and in some refugee camps. These centres follow a modified Syrian curriculum and are taught in Arabic in order to overcome the language barriers the children face in public schools. Alongside offering vocational training and courses in teaching Turkish, these centres also arrange social and cultural activities. The Temporary Education Centres do, however, face a number of challenges: travel costs to these centres appear to be a problem for some urban refugees and some centres are not accredited by the Turkish government due to the low quality of teaching.

UNICEF is providing incentives to Syrian voluntary teachers and training them on pedagogical techniques, classroom management, and psycho-social support.

Healthcare: since 2014, with the introduction of the Temporary Protection Regulation, Syrians receiving temporary protection have the right to benefit from healthcare services. To this end, Migrant Health Centres have been established by the Ministry of Health in order to provide healthcare services such as outpatient, maternal and child health, health education, and vaccination services to refugees under temporary protection.

While language barriers with healthcare providers represent a hurdle to de facto access, since early 2016, the new work permit for foreign health professionals has assuaged this problem. Since this time, after approval from the Ministry of Health, Syrian medical staff has been able to work and serve Syrian patients mainly in Migrant Health Centres and the health facilities of the refugee camps. Alongside this, the World Health Organization (WHO) is training refugee doctors and nurses for their smooth adaptation in the Turkish health system.

Housing: there is currently no public housing outside the refugee camps in Turkey. And, while the majority of refugees choose to reside outside these camps, this decision implies that they must provide for their own housing and living costs. This has led to overcrowding and poor conditions in certain neighbourhoods.

Naturalisation requirements increasingly emphasise integration outcomes rather than years of residency

For several years, there has been a trend to enhance the importance of citizenship acquisition and a convergence across countries towards similar conditions for access, and 2017/18 was no exception in this respect. Many changes have tended to reduce the focus on years spent in the country, shortening residency requirements in many cases – especially where the required duration was long – while placing greater emphasis on integration outcomes, such as knowledge of host country language and civic responsibilities.

In Luxembourg, for example, where the proportion of the population accounted for by Luxembourgers has been declining in recent years, changes introduced in 2017 reduced the residency requirements for naturalisation from seven to five years. In addition, henceforth only the last year of residence prior to the application must be uninterrupted. Alongside these changes, candidates must pass a new civil introduction course of 24 hours.

Swiss naturalisation laws have also undergone significant changes in recent years and the new Federal Law Concerning the Acquisition and Loss of Swiss Nationality entered into force on 1 January 2018. Henceforth citizenship in Switzerland may be obtained by those who have been resident in the country for at least ten years (reduced from 12) – including three of the five years preceding the application. Years spent in Switzerland between the ages of eight and 18 are counted double. Furthermore, in addition to language requirements, candidates must show familiarity with Swiss habits and customs, must not have claimed social assistance, and must not have a criminal record. Australia, which had among the shortest required duration of residence in the OECD, increased the minimum requirement of previous permanent residency from one year to four years, implying that temporary residency no longer counts towards citizenship. In Norway, since January 2017, applicants for Norwegian citizenship must have passed an oral Norwegian test at a minimum level of A2. This comes in addition to the previous requirement to have completed tuition in Norwegian (or Sami). In Korea, the income requirement for general naturalisation was doubled from KRW 30 M (EUR 22 500) to KRW 60 M (EUR 45 000).

A fundamental reform of citizenship legislation in Canada received Royal Assent in June 2017 to be implemented throughout 2017 and 2018. Under the new law, applicants are no longer required to intend to continue to living in Canada once granted citizenship, providing more flexibility to those who may need to live outside Canada for work or personal reasons. Further changes included reducing the time permanent residents must be physically present in Canada to three out of five years, instead of four out of six, before applying for citizenship; amending the age range for people to meet the language and knowledge requirements for citizenship from 14-64 years to 18-54 years; and counting some of the time applicants spend in Canada as temporary residents or protected persons toward their duration of residence requirements for citizenship. In addition, in Canada, the ability to revoke citizenship from dual citizens convicted of crimes against the national interest has been repealed and such persons will, in future, face the Canadian justice system just as other Canadian citizens who break the law.

OECD countries continue to implement measures to facilitate the naturalisation process for certain groups

The policy trend of speeding up the naturalisation process and introducing facilitated pathways for certain groups has continued in a number of OECD countries. In Poland, residency requirements for people of Polish origin, and holders of the Polish Card, have been reduced from three years to one year. Furthermore, since 2017, holders of the Polish Card who apply for permanent residence are entitled to a nine-month financial allowance. The Polish Card is granted to people who do not have Polish citizenship or a residence permit but who are both citizens of the former Soviet Union states and considered to belong to the Polish Nation. In a similar vein, in Lithuania, those who left the country between 1920 and 1940 – and their descendants – are now allowed to obtain Lithuanian citizenship without revoking the citizenship of their country of residence.

Several other OECD countries also facilitated access to citizenship for the descendants of emigrants. In Estonia in 2016, citizenship acquisition has been facilitated for children of Estonian citizens and children born in Estonia, while in both Portugal and Switzerland, 2017 saw facilitated access to citizenship for the grandchildren of citizens. In Canada, a 2017 legislative amendment made it easier for minors to apply for citizenship on their own behalf, and put all minors on the same footing irrespective of whether they have a Canadian parent.

In Portugal, the Nationality Law was amended in order to speed up the naturalisation process for Portuguese-language speakers. Henceforth, language testing will no longer be a requirement for citizens of Portuguese speaking countries and police record checks will be more limited.

References

[1] OECD (2018), Employment Outlook 2018, OECD Publishing, Paris, Forthcoming.

[2] OECD (2018), Towards Better Social and Employment Security in Korea, Connecting People with Jobs, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264288256-en.

[3] OECD (2017), International Migration Outlook 2017, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/migr_outlook-2017-en.

[4] OECD/EU (2014), Matching Economic Migration with Labour Market Needs, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264216501-en.

Annex 2.A. Supplementary tables

	Agriculture and fishing (%)	Mining, manufacturing and energy (%)	Construction (%)	Wholesale and retail trade (%)	Hotels and restaurants (%)	Education (%)	Health (%)	Activities of households as employers (%)	Admin. and ETO (%)	Other services (%)	Total (%)	Total foreign-born employed (thousands)	Foreign-born in total employment (%)
Australia	1.3	11.0	7.4	11.8	9.0	6.7	14.8	-	9.0	29.1	100.0	14	30.3
Austria	0.7	16.5	10.4	13.7	13.3	5.6	10.1	0.5	10.3	18.9	100.0	817	20.2
Belgium	-	12.3	9.2	12.1	6.9	6.1	13.9	-	21.0	17.8	100.0	564	17.1
Czech Republic	-	26.6	8.9	16.0	4.1	4.8	7.8	-	7.7	22.9	100.0	43	3.4
Denmark	3.3	11.8	2.4	12.0	10.3	9.5	16.5	-	9.6	24.5	100.0	86	12.6
Estonia	-	27.4	7.7	12.1	-	10.8	7.5	-	5.8	24.3	100.0	16	10.6
Finland	-	12.1	6.9	11.4	8.8	7.3	17.3	-	8.7	24.9	100.0	32	5.5
France	1.7	10.5	11.2	12.0	7.9	6.0	13.2	2.8	14.3	20.5	100.0	2 932	11.5
Germany	0.6	24.0	7.8	14.0	8.4	4.8	11.8	1.2	10.1	17.3	100.0	6 588	16.9
Greece	10.9	14.0	11.4	15.5	16.3	1.8	3.0	9.5	6.9	10.7	100.0	80	8.8
Hungary	5.1	18.4	5.4	17.9	5.1	9.6	8.3	-	9.2	20.3	100.0	26	2.4
Iceland	4.8	16.6	5.6	9.7	13.0	9.6	11.8	-	8.5	20.3	100.0	5	10.1
Ireland	1.8	13.6	5.9	14.6	15.1	3.9	11.8	-	7.3	25.4	100.0	106	21.8
Israel	0.5	17.6	3.6	11.4	3.6	7.9	14.5	5.1	6.1	29.7	100.0	830	23.5
Italy	5.4	19.0	9.1	10.9	10.6	2.0	5.5	17.6	6.8	13.0	100.0	3 164	14.5
Latvia	3.7	22.9	6.0	13.2	-	8.7	8.0	0.0	4.7	30.3	100.0	20	9.3
Luxembourg	0.5	5.1	8.9	9.7	4.8	4.7	8.0	3.7	20.1	34.5	100.0	121	56.5
Netherlands	0.9	14.3	3.3	13.9	7.1	6.0	15.3	-	15.4	23.7	100.0	200	10.6
Norway	1.3	10.9	9.2	11.8	7.5	5.8	19.9	-	12.3	21.4	100.0	89	14.0
Portugal	2.1	13.9	6.5	13.9	9.4	9.8	7.8	3.7	11.8	21.2	100.0	106	9.7
Slovak Republic	-	19.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100.0	4	0.7
Slovenia	-	30.8	15.2	8.4	6.5	5.5	6.7	-	10.1	15.4	100.0	22	9.8
Spain	7.6	9.7	7.9	14.9	18.5	3.3	4.8	10.7	7.6	15.1	100.0	690	15.2
Sweden	0.6	10.0	4.6	8.9	7.4	12.9	19.8	-	11.5	24.3	100.0	213	18.1
Switzerland	1.0	15.7	8.8	12.2	7.6	6.3	15.1	1.9	7.9	23.4	100.0	1 282	30.6
United Kingdom	0.7	11.4	6.3	13.8	9.4	7.7	14.5	0.4	10.2	25.4	100.0	5 251	17.9
United States	2.0	12.0	10.4	12.3	9.7	6.0	12.3	1.0	2.4	31.8	100.0	26 305	18.3

Note: Bold indicates that foreign-born are over-represented in the sector compared to the native-born. A dash indicates that the estimate is not reliable enough for publication. ETO stands for extra-territorial organisations. The population refers to the employed population aged 15 to 64. The data for European countries refer to 2016 except for Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Switzerland and the United Kingdom where it refers to 2017 and Belgium where it refers to the first three quarters of 2017.

Source: Australia, Israel: Labour Force Surveys; European countries: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); United States: Current Population Surveys.

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