OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews: Germany 2021

4. Germany’s structure and systems

Abstract

This chapter considers whether Germany’s institutional arrangements support its development co-operation objectives. It focuses on the system as a whole and assesses whether Germany has the necessary capabilities in place to deliver its development co-operation effectively and to contribute to sustainable development.

The chapter looks at authority, mandate and co-ordination to assess whether responsibility for development co-operation is clearly defined. It further explores whether the system is well co-ordinated and led with clear, complementary mandates as part of a whole-of-government approach at headquarters and in partner countries. Focusing on systems, the chapter further assesses whether Germany has clear and relevant processes and mechanisms in place. Finally, it looks at capacity across Germany’s development co-operation system — in particular whether Germany has the necessary skills and knowledge where needed, to manage and deliver its development co-operation — and at the effectiveness of its human resources management system.

In brief

Germany is the only Development Assistance Committee (DAC) member to still have a dedicated ministry for development co-operation. Having a separate Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) raises the profile of development co-operation across government and has recently resulted in a higher volume of funding and more influence of development issues in debates on sustainability, migration and domestic politics. Since the last peer review, BMZ’s leadership and ability to influence decisions in the cabinet have increased alongside rising ODA budgets. Yet, Germany faces ongoing challenges in ensuring a coherent and consistent approach to development co-operation, not least due to the fact that each of the 14 federal ministries and 16 federal states is responsible for its own official development assistance (ODA) budget, policies, project implementation, relations and negotiations with partner countries. This makes it challenging for BMZ, as the lead ministry, to convene and have an overview of the entirety of German development co-operation.

BMZ has a leadership and oversight role for the four official German implementing organisations: KfW Development Bank (KfW), Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt (PTB), the National Metrology Institute, and Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources (BGR). They are strong, diverse, differentiated and mutually supportive, with rich technical and geographic expertise. The division of labour between BMZ and the implementing organisations and their roles are clear, complementary and understood for the most part by partner countries.

Germany has stepped up co-ordination on development issues at several levels. A comprehensive German approach across the government would mean being clearer on how and where the German government as a whole, beyond ministerial silos, could deliver the most effective development co‑operation. Working relations between the German embassies, BMZ seconded staff, GIZ and KfW in partner countries are strong.

Germany is working towards reducing bureaucracy to become quicker and more flexible and to make political steering more effective, for example through the joint procedural reform and the new integrated planning and allocation system introduced in the BMZ 2030 reform strategy. Germany has a comprehensive and solid risk management system that assesses, monitors and mitigates risks, including corruption risks, at country, portfolio and project level.

Germany has a broad range of highly skilled staff to manage and deliver its development co-operation and it has a good reputation in partner countries, with BMZ, GIZ and KfW being valued highly for their expertise. Germany’s development co-operation is, however, highly centralised. Considering greater delegation of authority to partner countries and re-thinking the division of labour between staff in headquarters and embassies could facilitate more effective steering of the German portfolio in partner countries - enabling Germany to be more effective, efficient, coherent, flexible and agile. National staff in German development co-operation ensure a sound understanding of the local contexts and constant dialogue with different development stakeholders. Maximising the use of partner countries’ international language in communication and reporting that is not of a formal nature would increase the possibility of national staff contributing more.

Authority, mandate and co-ordination

A dedicated ministry for development co-operation focuses attention on sustainability, migration and development co-operation in the German political agenda

Over the past five years, BMZ’s leadership and ability to influence decisions in the Cabinet have increased.1 BMZ has spearheaded some cross-government initiatives such as the textile partnership (Chapter 1), firmly embedded development topics in the German political agenda, gained support of the Committee for Economic Cooperation and Development and the Budget Committee of parliament, and has succeeded in increasing the German ODA budget. Given its domestic backing2, budget and unique role, BMZ and BMZ seconded staff could play a stronger role in global fora, policy dialogues at partner country level (Guffler et al., 2020[1]) and in development partner co-ordination groups, as it does in Tunisia (Annex C).

The 16 German federal states and German municipalities complement and localise federal initiatives. Important topics of Germany’s development co-operation are discussed during the ministerial conferences of the federal states. This was the case, for example, in 2017 when Chancellor Merkel’s initiatives for a stronger partnership with Africa gained support and in 2016 in discussions of the role of federal states in implementing the 2030 Agenda (German Federal States, 2019[2]). With responsibility for culture, education, police and communal affairs, the federal states provide scholarships for international students and create exchange and research networks. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the economically stronger federal states seem to engage more in development co-operation than others (Table 4.1).

Germany faces ongoing challenges in ensuring a whole-of-government approach

BMZ is responsible for 50% of Germany’s gross ODA; the other 13 federal ministries provide about 19% and the 16 federal states provide 5%. At 12% of gross ODA, the Federal Foreign Office is the most significant development actor after BMZ (Table 4.1). Providers of the remaining 26% of Germany’s gross ODA include, among others, KfW, Deutsche Investitions- und Entwicklungsgesellschaft mbH (DEG), miscellaneous items and the federal parliament. Each federal ministry and federal state is responsible for its own ODA budget, policy, project implementation, relations and negotiations with partner countries outside of the intergovernmental negotiations on development co-operation, making it challenging for BMZ, as the lead ministry, to have an overview of the entirety of German development co‑operation.

As recommended in the 2015 peer review, BMZ could strengthen whole-of-government approaches to include federal ministries, federal states and local governments (Chapter 5) more systematically in information exchange and co-ordination efforts. Diverse German actors offer partner countries a broad range of expertise and partnerships to choose from. With the new BMZ 2030 country list of fewer priority partner countries, clear communication, transparency, and dialogue will be important to ensure as smooth an exit as possible for BMZ, allowing for the fact that some German development co-operation actors are likely to remain in partner countries. For instance, BMU could continue to implement programmes in countries where BMZ is phasing out bilateral co-operation, making it all the more important for German partners to convey clear messages about the entirety of German activities to the partner country.

Table 4.1. Gross ODA of federal ministries and federal states, average 2018-19

Federal Ministry of …	Average disbursement 2018‑19 (in thousands USD)	Federal State	Average disbursement 2018‑19 (in thousands USD)
Labour and Social Affairs (BMAS)	16 082	Baden-Württemberg	7 146
Education and Research (BMBF)	259 285	Bayern	13 488
Food Security and Agriculture (BMEL)	55 508	Berlin	939
Finance (BMF)	324 633	Brandenburg	651
Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth (BMFSFJ)	3 910	Bremen	531
Health (BMG)	118 297	Hamburg	10 888
Interior, Building and Community (BMI)	13 980	Hessen	3 366
Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU)	533 156	Mecklenburg-Vorpommern	737
Defence (BMVg)	221	Niedersachsen	1 417
Transport and Digital Infrastructure (BMVI)	1 194	Nordrhein-Westfalen	11 064
Justice and Consumer Protection (BMVJ)	6 275	Rheinland-Pfalz	1 927
Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi)	66 186	Saarland	180
Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)	14 137 288	Sachsen	767
Federal Foreign Office (AA)	3 474 975	Sachsen-Anhalt	381
Federal Commissioner for Cultural and Media Affairs (BKM)	401 877	Schleswig-Holstein	1 315
TOTAL	19 412 863	Thüringen	253
		All federal states (for imputed student costs)	1 399 442
		TOTAL	1 454 489

Note: The average gross ODA for 2018-19 is USD 28.2 billion (constant 2018 USD). The remaining USD 7.3 billion include, among others, KfW, DEG, miscellaneous items, and the federal parliament.

Source: OECD (2021[3]), Creditor Reporting System (database), https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DataSetCode=CRS1.

BMZ has a leadership and oversight role for the four official German implementing organisations

Germany has strong and diverse implementing organisations that maintain partnerships of mutual trust on the ground. These organisations are differentiated and mutually supportive, with rich technical and geographic expertise. KfW offers predictable funding and a wide array of financial instruments, while GIZ engages with stakeholders in partner countries to build capacities and share knowledge and technical expertise. PTB is a globally renowned metrology institute and has engaged in international co-operation for decades (Box 5.1). BGR is the expert institution for all geo-relevant questions.

The division of labour and roles between BMZ, its seconded staff in German embassies, and the implementing organisations are clear, complementary and understood, for the most part, by partner countries. BMZ is responsible for policy and political guidance. The implementing organisations have technical expertise, project management experience and implementation structures on the ground through their field offices. Thus, they are mutually dependent: BMZ depends on its implementing organisations and they — GIZ, KfW, PTB and BGR — in turn are equally dependent on the ministry as the main financier of their development co-operation programmes and projects. A finer balance between control and trust, and accountability and flexibility, in the spirit of a less hierarchical partnership, could lead to more effective ways of delivering development co-operation in partner countries, as the joint procedural reform and BMZ 2030 seek to accomplish.

Germany has stepped up co-ordination on development issues at several levels

A comprehensive approach across all government actors would enable Germany to deliver more effective development co-operation. BMZ staff are seconded to the mirror division for development policy in the Federal Chancellery, which was changed in 2017 to better liaise with BMZ and the parliament. The mirror division also engages in regular co-ordination groups of the State Secretaries (Chapter 1). To ensure transparency and accountability to partner countries, BMZ together with German embassies could step up efforts to collect information from all German actors in a partner country, with a view to sharing this with the partner country and avoiding duplication and contradictions. Furthermore, BMZ could seek to engage more with other federal ministries to seek agreement on joint policy guidelines for thematic areas or regions, for example by building on Federal Government guidelines for Africa (Federal Government, 2019[4]) and the Indo-Pacific region (Federal Government, 2020[5]).

BMZ is in the lead and plays a co-ordinating role in preparing government-to-government negotiations with partner countries. All federal ministries are invited to contribute to the preparations and participate in the negotiations, together with the four official implementing organisations. Additionally, the so-called Ländergespräche, or country talks, with all German ministries, civil society organisations (CSOs), including the political foundations, have been introduced as a regular consultation and exchange mechanism through which BMZ broadens the information and input base for partner countries.

Working relations between the German embassies, GIZ and KfW in partner countries are strong. Yet, political steering happens mostly from BMZ headquarters with the embassies maintaining overall political relations with partner countries and authority is delegated to the implementing organisations for project implementation only. Aligning the political and implementation levels better with a vision of which results the German development co-operation aims to achieve through its co-operation with the partner country, could allow Germany to exert more influence at the country level in agenda-setting, policy processes, and implementation of internal policies, making it a more strategic, effective and efficient partner in development co-operation (Guffler et al., 2020[1]).

Maintaining an overview and strategic vision of all German activities in a partner country, is facilitated through regular exchanges hosted by the embassies. Building on this good practice, Germany could better incentivise synergies among the activities of German institutions in partner countries, especially in reform partner countries such as Tunisia, where budgets and portfolios have increased and efforts are focused on co-ordinated approaches to ensure a sustainable and effective disbursement of funds. These include regional and global programmes and the interventions of all federal ministries, federal states, municipalities and private actors in a whole-of-country mapping.

The complexity and size of the German system presents challenges. Germany is the only DAC member to have representatives from three different institutions (embassy, GIZ and KfW) in conversations with partner governments, development partner co-ordination groups and other development fora, reflecting in part capacity constraints at the embassies to join all meetings and sector co-ordination tables, but also the narrower, more technical roles expected of GIZ and KfW. Roles and the division of labour seem clear for most partners and for the German institutions and any major decision is a team effort, potentially leading to better decisions and better results, on the one hand. On the other hand, having three German institutions at the table adds to the complexity of Germany’s system and co-ordination efforts, and may hamper the ability of any single representative to influence and exercise political and diplomatic weight.

Systems

Germany is working towards reducing bureaucracy

BMZ aims to reduce bureaucracy, become quicker and more flexible, and make political steering more effective. In the joint procedural reform of 2018-19, BMZ revised, simplified and took steps to speed up the procedures for bilateral technical and financial co-operation (Table 4.2). These included allowing different planning steps to happen in parallel, streamlining programme proposals and reporting, reducing the number of international agreements, and focusing more on the envisioned impact and results of a programme (Chapter 6). BMZ has a clear steering role and invites the implementing organisations to propose two programme offers that would lead to achieving the envisioned results. Once these are agreed, GIZ and KfW have flexibility to revise offers and re-steer with BMZ, without needing to submit change offers, which strengthens relations and exchange between BMZ and the implementing organisations.

The parliament recently eased the requirement for all new programmes to have intergovernmental agreements, triggered by the joint procedural reform. Such agreements are now only required under special circumstances, which is expected to lead to an 80% reduction in intergovernmental agreements for financial co-operation. Previously, each new project required an intergovernmental agreement — and sometimes the agreement of the parliament as well — which often resulted in significant delays in implementation, as seen in Tunisia (Annex C). The parliament is also responsible for approving general budget support.

The new integrated planning and allocation aims to synchronise allocations from different budget lines and draws together thematic and regional considerations, special initiatives, climate change investments and all instruments of ODA. The annual planning and allocation summits involve the state secretaries and directors-general. It is too soon to tell if the new system, in place since early 2020, is resulting in better synchronised programming and more synergies across instruments. Investments are based on already-existing modules and programming. While the whole portfolio in a country is captured at the highest strategic level in BMZ, a careful balance is needed between strategic processes; the perception of a top-down, supply-driven process; and ownership. Regular political dialogue through the German embassies as well as through the activities of the implementing organisations in the field could help to signal stronger partner country ownership.

Table 4.2. Assessment of German development co-operation system

	Yes	No	Comment
Clear and transparent processes and procedures are in place to make decisions on:
Policies (Chapter 2)	●		●Guided by Agenda 2030; exist for most themes, regions, sectors and partners. Regular revisions make it difficult to identify a coherent overarching approach. BMZ 2030 has the potential to change this
Programming	●		▲Decision-making processes are clear. ●Joint procedural reform and BMZ 2030 are reducing bureaucracy. ▼Country strategies are not comprehensive and are internal BMZ documents
Partnerships (Chapters 2 and 5)	●		▲Germany values the autonomy of its strong partners: federal states and municipalities, political foundations, CSOs, faith-based organisations, the private sector and research institutes ▼Country strategies not shared with partner countries and only written in German
Systems are in place to assure the quality of development co-operation, including:
Audit	●		▲Effective internal and external audit function in KfW and GIZ; annual audits of BMZ by the Federal Court of Audit; KfW and GIZ comply with BMZ spending rules; robust internal control processes in headquarters and the field
Mainstreaming cross-cutting issues (Chapter 2)	●		●Moving from a checkbox to an impact approach in mainstreaming cross-cutting issues, such as gender, climate, and environment, human rights, and poverty ▲Digitalisation emerged recently as a cross-cutting issue and gained more prominence with BMZ 2030
Systems support the member to implement its policies and commitments in a fair and efficient way:
Procurement, contracting, agreement-making	●		▲Robust procurement and contracting by KfW, DEG* and GIZ ▲German companies not favoured in procurement; Germany uses GIZ, its government-owned federal enterprise, as the de facto channel for most technical co-operation (Chapter 2)
Adequate and relevant systems and processes to assess and adapt to risks including:
Strategic, reputational, programming, security	●		▲Risks systematically assessed in proposals submitted to BMZ for approval ▲Risk and country assessments are informed by a broad range of sources, including think tanks such as German Development Institute, GIGA** or SWP***
Corruption	●		▲ A comprehensive corruption risk management system that assesses corruption risks at country, portfolio and programme level. Germany systematically analyses different types of risks, including corruption risks, and uses the analysis, including mitigation measures, to design country strategies and interventions and to manage its programmes
Sexual exploitation, abuse and harassment	●		▲Recommendation published and disseminated ●In operationalising, PSEAH**** needs to be mainstreamed and implemented throughout KfW internal mechanisms and not only in programmes and projects in partner countries; GIZ has made considerable progress
Innovation and adaptation:
The leadership and internal system promote a culture of experimentation and adaptability to changes in the development landscape	●		●More could be done to adapt quicker and more flexibly to changes in the development landscape and to promote a culture of experimentation. KfW’s recently rolled out new collaboration model based on agile principles for more efficient and effective collaboration is a good step in that direction as is engaging in foresight exercises to inform development programming in Africa
Capabilities exist to introduce, encourage, measure and scale up innovation in development co‑operation	●		▲First steps undertaken towards building a culture and capabilities across BMZ, KfW and GIZ. ●Innovation could be introduced more firmly on the political agenda of conversations with partner countries

Notes: *DEG = Deutsche Investitions- und Entwicklungsgesellschaft; **GIGA = German Institute for Global and Area Studies; ***SWP = German Institute for International and Security Affairs; ****PSEAH = Preventing sexual exploitation, abuse and harassment. Green triangles refer to good practice; orange circles point to areas where progress is being made but more could be done; and red triangles refer to areas where progress is needed.

Source: Developed by the OECD Secretariat following the structure of the DAC Peer Review Reference Guide, based on the headquarters and field visits, documentation provided by BMZ, GIZ and KfW, and the Bundesrechnungshof (Federal Audit Office) (2020[6]) report to parliament available at https://www.bundesrechnungshof.de/de/veroeffentlichungen/produkte/beratungsberichte/entwicklung-einzelplaene/2020/langfassungen/2019-bericht-information-uber-die-entwicklung-des-einzelplans-23-bundesministerium-fur-wirtschaftliche-zusammen-arbeit-und-entw.

Germany balances the need for compliance in its system with broadening its risk management efforts to make a stronger contribution to improving the operating environment in partner countries

Germany and its implementing organisations GIZ and KfW have a comprehensive and solid risk management system that assesses, monitors and mitigates risks, including corruption risks, at country, portfolio and project level. This includes an anti-corruption strategy, codes of conduct, training programmes on corruption for staff and a whistleblowing system, monitoring tools, financial controls including auditing systems, and a solid sanctioning system. However, the focus on risks is mostly limited to the German interventions itself, while these risks should be addressed at a wider level.

Germany has improved its reporting mechanism since the last peer review. BMZ has a whistleblowing system for external complaints on its website. GIZ has a reporting mechanism based on four pillars: Integrity advisors, the ombudsperson, compliance officers and an online whistleblower portal in several languages has been available since May 2019. KfW has introduced a confidential and anonymous whistleblowing system for all staff and third parties, with contact details provided on its website.

Germany is active in global fora on anti-corruption, such as the OECD DAC Anti-Corruption Task Team. Germany has entered into strategic partnerships on anti-corruption with Transparency International and initiated the German business-driven initiative, Alliance for Integrity. Germany also supports partner countries in combating corruption and illicit financial flows with a focus on prevention, financial investigation and asset recovery.

While BMZ and KfW are still working on implementing the OECD recommendation on preventing sexual exploitation, abuse and harassment (PSEAH), GIZ has made considerable progress, since 2020. PSEAH is now included in the GIZ Code of Conduct that is an essential part of all labour contracts (German and national contracts). GIZ provides compulsory online training (available in four languages) for all staff members on compliance and offers an anonymous GIZ whistleblower portal that is accessible 24/7 worldwide via the GIZ homepage (for all staff, partners or any other person).

Germany’s leadership is committed to supporting innovation and digitalisation across its development co-operation

The Federal Government wants to be a trailblazer for innovation. It has introduced a new data strategy (Federal Government, 2021[7]) as well as strategies on shaping digitalisation (Federal Government, 2018[8]) and the responsible development and use of artificial intelligence (Federal Government, 2020[9]). BMZ and numerous other federal ministries (among them BMEL and BMWi) encourage innovation in their development co‑operation. For example, BMEL supports innovation in agriculture and BMWi in green energy solutions in partner countries. BMZ fosters innovation on the ground in collaboration with GIZ and KfW through the use of blockchain, machine learning and artificial intelligence and is the largest supporter of the United Nations Development Programme’s accelerator labs.3 BMZ promotes the use of digital tools, set up an Inequality Challenge4and GIZ created the Innovation Fund5 in 2017 to leverage the innovation potential of its staff and project partners. Recognising that the COVID-19 crisis requires quick actions, BMZ together with Team Europe partners called for innovative digital solutions to tackle the challenges of the pandemic through #SmartDevelopmentHack.6

BMZ has developed a comprehensive and ambitious approach to digitalisation. BMZ’s newly created unit and strategy for digitalisation (BMZ, 2019[10]) lay a solid basis for mainstreaming digitalisation throughout its portfolio and as one of the six quality criteria of BMZ 2030 (Chapter 2). In BMZ’s digital forum, focal points from each division and experts from KfW and GIZ develop ideas and strategies that explore digitalisation not only as a technical issue but together with its social and developmental dimensions. The plans for starting a new DigiLab fostering multi-stakeholder arrangements to scale-up existing innovations and jointly develop new innovations are a promising approach. One example is the partnership with the Mozilla Foundation using machine learning and artificial intelligence to collect speech data in local languages to provide information in Kinyarwanda. Another example is the blockchain-based governance tool TruBudget, which is piloted in 3 countries to improve transparency and efficiency in the use of ODA-financed projects.

Based on Germany’s expertise, Rwanda turned to Germany to support its ambition to transition to a knowledge-based society and become an information communications technology (ICT) hub in East Africa. The new Digitalisation Fund and the Digital Solutions for Sustainable Development programme with its Digital Centre serve as enablers and provide a convening space for the Rwandan ICT community, bringing together innovators, start-ups and the private sector (Annex C). They also provide a platform for exchange on sensitive issues such as data protection, human rights and ensuring civic space — issues of great importance for rolling out digitalisation in different political contexts.

Overall, Germany is on a good track regarding innovation. Yet, it will be important that innovation is promoted beyond digitalisation, which will require a holistic approach across the German system — from incentivising individual staff to spot and scale up innovations and fostering an innovation mindset, institutional structures and work atmosphere to strategic planning, procurement and engaging in new partnerships to engage in radical thinking and approaches. Going forward, continued support at the highest political level will be important to establish innovation and digitalisation firmly on the political agenda with partner countries and encourage a mindset change in a new digital reality.

Capabilities throughout the system

Germany has a broad range of highly skilled staff to manage and deliver its development co-operation

German development co-operation has a good reputation in partner countries, and BMZ, GIZ and KfW staff are valued highly for their expertise across different sectors and project management and they engage in regular exchanges and dialogues with partner institutions. Germany continues to attract and retain qualified, committed and experienced staff with appropriate skills. Generalists in BMZ could draw more on the expertise available in the system. Only where necessary, KfW and GIZ rely on consultants, e.g. to support and bring in specific expertise in financial co-operation programmes or for external evaluations.

Considering greater delegation of authority to the field and re-thinking the division of labour could facilitate more effective steering of the German portfolio in partner countries

Germany’s development co-operation is highly centralised with over 6 000 staff in headquarters (BMZ, GIZ and KfW). The bulk of staff in headquarters are working for GIZ, which is at the same time the most decentralised institution in the German development co-operation system. Each of the three main German development co-operation institutions has regional and sectoral structures in headquarters and staff working in partner countries (Table 4.3). When including locally employed staff, 33% of KfW and 80% of GIZ staff are working in partner countries. BMZ, GIZ, and KfW all report back to their respective three headquarters (Bonn/Berlin, Eschborn, Frankfurt); at the same time KfW and GIZ are also accountable to BMZ. It is commendable that BMZ has seconded more staff to embassies since the last peer review, yet currently, only one-tenth of BMZ staff are posted abroad, which is low compared with other DAC members. For instance, 87% of staff of the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs who work on development are posted abroad and only 13% are located in Paris (OECD, 2018[11]). As recommended in the 2015 peer review, German development co-operation would benefit from a more decentralised model, revising the understanding of working relationships between BMZ and Federal Foreign Office/embassies and the reporting lines (OECD, 2015[12]). BMZ staff in embassies could be in constant exchange with BMZ headquarters and the Federal Foreign Office, including at senior level, and involved in strategic discussions and thus better equipped to ensure a field and regional perspective in BMZ policy decisions.

In line with BMZ 2030’s ambition to reduce bureaucracy, be more efficient, flexible and agile, Germany could consider reducing the high transaction costs from its top-heavy, complex co‑ordination system, and aim for more effective partnerships and greater responsiveness to local contexts.

Table 4.3. Staff breakdown in German development co-operation

Institution	Total	Headquarters	Embassies & country offices	Local staff (in embassies and country offices)	Change of total staff since 2015
BMZ	1 210	1 005	128	n.a.	27%
GIZ	22 199	4 543	2 536	15 120	33%
KfW (excl. DEG)	1 237	828	79	330	24%
Total	24 646	6 376	2 843	15 450	Average: 28%

Note: In addition, all federal ministries as well as the 16 federal states and several German municipalities have dedicated staff for international development co-operation. PTB has staff in headquarters managing and implementing projects with a volume of EUR 17.2 million financed by BMZ in 2019 (National Metrology Institute of Germany, 2019[13]). Similarly, BGR has staff in headquarters and the field. The difference in total staff numbers and the sum of headquarters, field and local staff is mainly due staff on leave (e.g. for family reasons). The staff figures for 2015 are taken from the 2015 DAC Peer Review of Germany.

Source: Federal Government (2020[14]) Memorandum for the DAC Peer Review of Germany 2020/2021 (unpublished); GIZ (2020[15]), Integrated Company Report 2019; https://www.giz.de/en/downloads/giz2020-en-integrated-company-report-2019.pdf; OECD (2015[12]) OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews: Germany 2015; https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264246133-en.

Shifting more authority for German development co-operation to partner countries would require rethinking the German business model. It would also entail career incentives, e.g. creating posts for BMZ managerial staff in the field,7 and continuous training and staff development. Identifying the right staff at all career levels would also address the imbalance of more senior staff posted in the German implementing organisations while BMZ seconded staff often are entry to mid-level staff (i.e. level of A13 to A15). Currently, BMZ staff fill 12 deputy ambassador positions in embassies, as Federal Foreign Office career diplomats traditionally fill senior positions.

Increasing budgets, topics and responsibilities have taken a toll on BMZ staff

The number of staff grew on average by 28% across BMZ, GIZ and KfW since the 2015 peer review while the budget increased by 93%. With surging budgets and new special initiatives and topics, the individual workload for BMZ staff also has grown. Staff are now expected to be able to adapt quickly to new topics and political priorities, leading to individual workloads that can be overwhelming for BMZ staff. Development co‑operation also has received greater attention in domestic politics, leading to higher visibility of BMZ’s work within Germany and therefore more effort spent domestically to justify spending. For a development ministry, this poses some challenges as the main target groups of its activities are outside of Germany. Even if BMZ follows the principle of rotation and employing generalists, rather than experts, new initiatives, reforms and constant budget increases demand new skills and flexible procedures to react to a changing (political) environment.

National staff in German development co-operation ensure a sound understanding of the local contexts and constant dialogue with different development stakeholders

The majority of staff in partner countries are recruited locally by GIZ and KfW at all levels, including as highly qualified experts (Table 4.3). Local staff are the backbone, providing local knowledge, networks and expertise for German development co-operation. They feel valued and are motivated to contribute to the goals of German co-operation in their countries. The different German institutions are attractive employers for local staff, offering competitive employment packages and opportunities for career development: progression up to management positions (GIZ), opportunities to move from working in country offices to headquarters in Frankfurt (KfW) or opportunities to work as experts in other countries (GIZ). Furthermore, it is commendable that KfW has started decentralising its operations with more project managers in the field.

Maximising the use of the international language of partner countries in non-official documents would draw on the knowledge and enhance the contribution of national staff, making German development co-operation more inclusive and participatory. BMZ and its implementing organisations could reassess which documents are i) mandatory by law to be produced in German; ii) in which cases programme and module documents might be submitted in other languages and translated for official purposes; and iii) which documents can be produced e.g. in English, French or Spanish, as is common practice of other DAC members. Communication in the country offices is mainly in the local international language, e.g. English in Rwanda and French in Tunisia (Annex C), but programme proposals, regular reporting, some training, and communication with BMZ are often in German. Since the 2015 peer review, evaluations are increasingly conducted in English, French and Spanish. Ensuring that language does not hinder career development would enable Germany to be fully inclusive and supportive of international staff and could encourage more staff mobility across different GIZ and KfW offices, including headquarters.

BMZ 2030 has implications for the 1 800 national staff based in GIZ country offices in the 26 countries that are no longer bilateral co-operation partners. Due to the need to look for new employment by 2023, GIZ expects that some staff may leave projects earlier, with the attendant staffing challenges and disruptions in implementing ongoing programmes and projects. Nevertheless, this shift provides an opportunity to explore greater mobility for local staff to move to GIZ offices in other countries or regions. Staffing challenges for staff in GIZ country offices arising from BMZ 2030 will need to be carefully managed. The situation is different for KfW with less challenges arising from BMZ 2030 due to a smaller number of offices and local employees in countries that are no longer bilateral co-operation partners. Furthermore, financial co-operation projects with countries where bilateral co-operation is being phased out, should be completed by 2025. Germany invests in staff development and training on issues related to risk, gender, anti-corruption and cultural sensitivity.

It is commendable that the BMZ budget for training increased by 34% in the last five years. Germany invests in its staff and offers joint training for staff from BMZ, other federal ministries, GIZ and KfW, ensuring a good mix of staff across hierarchy levels and encouraging networking. Training in other languages than German is available at KfW and even increased to around 50% for GIZ. In practice, language issues remain and only 35% of GIZ training participants were national staff in 2019, while this group represents 70% of total staff. A good example is the compulsory GIZ training on PSEAH which is available in four languages.

BMZ has flexible work arrangements in place and offers packages for spouses joining their partners to postings abroad, allowing for career and family life balance. BMZ has active staff representatives who meet regularly with their counterparts in other ministries such as the Federal Foreign Office. Furthermore, BMZ 2030 is a good example of an inclusive, participatory, and staff-driven and staff-owned reform process, as the ideas were developed in mixed working groups of all staff levels and not top down by the senior management. Staff exchanges from BMZ to the implementing organisations in the field may lead to greater mutual understanding of the rationale and ways of working of each German partner.

References

[10] BMZ (2019), Digitalisierung für Entwicklung - den digitalen Wandel gemeinsam gestalten [Digitisation for Development: Shaping Digital Change Together], https://www.bmz.de/de/mediathek/publikationen/reihen/infobroschueren_flyer/infobroschueren/sMaterialie405_digitalisierung.pdf.

[6] Bundesrechnungshof (2020), Bericht an den Haushaltsausschuss des Deutschen Bundestages [Federal Audit Office, Report to the Budget Committee of the German Parliament], https://www.bundesrechnungshof.de/de/veroeffentlichungen/produkte/beratungsberichte/entwicklung-einzelplaene/2020/langfassungen/2019-bericht-information-uber-die-entwicklung-des-einzelplans-23-bundesministerium-fur-wirtschaftliche-zusammen-arbeit-und-entw.

[17] Bundestag (1949), Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf.

[7] Federal Government (2021), Datenstrategie der Bundesregierung [Data Strategy of the Federal Government], https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/suche/datenstrategie-der-bundesregierung-1845632.

[5] Federal Government (2020), Leitlinien zum Indo-Pazifik [Guidelines on the Indo-Pacific], https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/2380500/33f978a9d4f511942c241eb4602086c1/200901-indo-pazifik-leitlinien--1--data.pdf.

[14] Federal Government (2020), Memorandum for the DAC peer review of Germany 2020/2021 (unpublished).

[9] Federal Government (2020), Strategie künstliche Intelligenz der Bundesregierung - Fortschreibung 2020 [Artificial Intelligence Strategy of the Federal Government: 2020 Update], https://www.ki-strategie-deutschland.de/files/downloads/201201_Fortschreibung_KI-Strategie.pdf.

[4] Federal Government (2019), An Enhanced Partnership with Africa: Continuation and Further Development of the Federal Government’s Africa Policy Guidelines, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/2240560/eea16dfde670df8253403dfaf5d3ced7/afrikaleitlinien-englisch-data.pdf.

[8] Federal Government (2018), Shaping Digitalization: Implementation Strategy of the Federal Government, https://www.bundesregierung.de/resource/blob/998194/1605342/284988700922725d63a0fb95db824024/digitalsierung-gestalten-englisch-download-bpa-data.pdf?download=1.

[2] German Federal States (2019), Resolutions of the Minister Presidents of the Federal States 01.26.2017, https://ez-der-laender.de/sites/default/files/2019-01/mpk-beschluesse_1962-2017-english.pdf.

[15] GIZ (2020), 2019 Integrated Company Report: Reliability & Curiosity, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), Bonn, https://www.giz.de/en/downloads/giz2020-en-integrated-company-report-2019.pdf.

[1] Guffler, K. et al. (2020), Development Cooperation from a Partner Perspective. How can Germany and other donors perform better in the eyes of their partner countries?, German Institute for Development Evaluation (DEval), https://www.deval.org/files/content/Dateien/Evaluierung/Berichte/2021/DEval_Report_2020_Development_Cooperation_from_a_Partner_Perspective_web.pdf.

[13] National Metrology Institute of Germany (2019), Annual Report 2019, https://www.ptb.de/cms/fileadmin/internet/publikationen/jahresberichte/pdf_jahresberichte/jahresbericht_2019.pdf.

[3] OECD (2021), Creditor Reporting System (database), https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DataSetCode=CRS1.

[11] OECD (2018), OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews: France 2018, OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264302679-en.

[12] OECD (2015), OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews: Germany 2015, OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264246133-en.

[16] Statista (2020), Geplante Ausgaben im Bundeshaushalt nach Ressorts im Jahr 2020 [Planned Expenditure in the Federal Budget by Department in 2020], https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/449433/umfrage/bundeshaushalt-ausgaben-nach-ressorts/.

Notes

← 1.  As established in the three main principles of the German Basic Law, the Chancellor defines the overarching policy guidelines (Kanzlerprinzip) for the government. In line with the principle of autonomous action by each ministry (Ressortprinzip) (); each federal ministry is autonomous in implementing the guidelines. The third principle refers to decision making through the Cabinet, rather than the Chancellor alone (Kabinettsprinzip) for important decisions. See the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (Bundestag, 1949[17]) at https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf.

← 2.  BMZ has the eighth largest budget among the federal ministries, ahead of the Ministries for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi); Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU); Food and Agriculture (BMEL); and Finance (BMF) and of the Federal Foreign Office (Statista, 2020[16])

← 3.  For further details, see https://acceleratorlabs.undp.org/.

← 4.  For details, see https://www.poverty-inequality.com/portfolios/inequality-challenge/.

← 5.  For details, see https://www.giz.de/expertise/html/60797.html.

← 6.  Further information is available at https://www.poverty-inequality.com/portfolios/inequality-challenge/.

← 7.  Currently, no posts in the field structure for BMZ managerial staff are defined as head of division and above, according to the memorandum for the DAC peer review of Germany (Federal Government, 2020[14]).