Bertrand Pluyaud
Nikki Kergozou
OECD Economic Surveys: France 2024
OECD Economic Surveys: France
Gross domestic product (GDP), after falling sharply in 2020 on account of the COVID-19 pandemic, had returned to its pre-crisis level by the end of 2021, buoyed by substantial measures to support companies and households. Inflationary pressures emerged alongside the recovery and have been significantly exacerbated by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. The upturn in inflation and subsequent monetary policy tightening have curbed activity in France and other countries (Figure 2.1). New government measures helped mitigate the inflationary shock and support the economy, which showed resilience, avoiding another recession. Nevertheless, these measures came with a high cost for public finances. After reaching 2.6% in 2022 and 1.1% in 2023, GDP growth is expected to slow to 0.8% in 2024, before recovering to 1.3% in 2025, as disinflation allows for moderate growth in household consumption (Table 2.1).
Real GDP, 2019Q4=100
Source: OECD Economic Outlook: Statistics and Projections (database).
Inflation picked up as of mid-2021, due to higher commodity prices and supply constraints, against the backdrop of the global economic recovery (Figure 2.2). At the start of 2022, the upturn in inflation was considerably aggravated by Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine and the subsequent surge in energy prices. Food prices also surged throughout the year. As higher input costs were passed on to prices in industry and services, core inflation in turn picked up. However, despite the increase in wages that followed higher prices, the inflationary trend did not continue beyond the first quarter of 2023. After a peak at 7.3% in February 2023, headline inflation started to recede and fell to 2.7% in May 2024.
The government has introduced various measures to alleviate the effects of the inflationary shock on households and businesses (Table 2.2). The cap on increases in regulated gas and electricity prices, known as the “price shield”, accounted for more than 60% of the total between 2021 and 2023 (Box 2.1). France finds itself among the countries with the most substantial support measures to combat inflation and preserve purchasing power. It has chosen to support the economy primarily by acting on prices, while others, such as Germany, have acted on incomes by providing subsidies (Figure 2.3). These measures have effectively limited inflationary pressures, with inflation restricted to 5.9% in 2022, compared with 8.4% in the euro area. Nevertheless, they entailed a significant cost for public finances. In addition, the fall in inflation has been slower in France than in the euro area in the second half of 2023.
The measures aimed at keeping prices down may hamper the reduction in energy consumption, particularly of fossil fuels (Hemmerlé et al., 2023[1]). However, France has implemented an energy efficiency plan to raise awareness among households and business about energy savings, resulting in decreased energy consumption in 2023 (Ministère de l'Economie, des Finances et de la Souveraineté Industrielle et Numérique, 2023[2]).
YoY, as a %
Source: Eurostat and OECD Economic Outlook: Statistics and Projections (database)
1. Contributions to changes in real GDP, actual amount in the first column.
2. Harmonised consumer price index, excluding energy, food, alcohol and tobacco.
3. Including overseas departments.
Source: OECD (2024), OECD Economic Outlook: Statistics and Projections (database) and updates.
Cost of support measures to address rising energy prices, as a % of GDP (2021-2023)
Source: OECD Energy support measures tracker (2023)
Source: 2024 Budget Draft Bill, Economic, Social and Financial Report, Ministry of the Economy, Finance and Industrial and Digital Sovereignty.
The gas and electricity price shield caps the increase in the regulated sales prices charged to end consumers. These prices are set by the French Energy Regulatory Commission (CRE) and applied by incumbent suppliers to their customers. Under the price shield, the State covers the difference between the regulated sales price and the theoretical price that should have been applied based on the rise in gas and electricity suppliers’ costs of. For gas, the difference is paid directly to the suppliers. For electricity, part of the difference is covered by a tax rebate, and the rest is paid to the suppliers.
The regulated sales prices of natural gas were frozen at their October 2021 level from 1 November 2021 to 31 December 2022. In 2023, the increase in the regulated sales prices of natural gas was limited to 15% on 1 January 2023, before the price shield for gas was removed at the end of June.
The increase in regulated electricity sales prices was limited to 4% from 1 February 2022 to 31 January 2023. There was a 15% increase in February 2023, and a 10% increase in August.
According to INSEE, the gas and electricity price shield reduced the increase in household consumer prices by 3.1 percentage points between the second quarter of 2021 and the second quarter of 2022, including the reduction in the price of non-energy goods and services made possible by lower costs for the companies producing them (Bourgeois, 2022[3]).
Another study, by the Conseil d’analyse économique (CAE), estimates that the price shield helped reduce inflation by an average of 0.7 percentage points in 2022 and a further 0.7 percentage points in 2023. This estimate only takes into account the direct effect on energy prices for households (Malliet, 2023[4]).
According to a Cepremap study, the price shield reduced inflation by 1.1% in 2022 and by 1.8% in 2023, leading to an increase in activity of 1.7% of GDP in 2022 and 0.08% in 2023. The cost of this measure is estimated at EUR 110 billion over two years, representing 3.9% of GDP (Langot et al., 2022[5]).
Source: Insee and OECD Economic Outlook: Statistics and Projections (database)
Despite the inflationary shock, purchasing power was preserved in 2022 and 2023, largely thanks to support measures. Private consumption nonetheless slowed, as households maintained a high savings rate, well above its pre-crisis level (Figure 2.4). The fall in the outlook for demand, both in France and abroad, dampened investment since the last quarter of 2022. Higher interest rates increased financing costs, which also weighed on investment. The implementation of the "France Relance" and "France 2030" plans helped corporate and public investment to hold up (Box 2.2). Household investment, in contrast, fell sharply (Figure 2.5). Subsequently, housing prices started to decrease.
France's exports have increased slightly since end-2022, as foreign demand eased due to high inflation and tighter financial conditions in its main trading partners. Nonetheless, imports decreased during the same period, with foreign trade making a positive contribution to growth in 2023. In some sectors, exports have not fully recovered their pre-pandemic level. In particular, expenditures by non-residents remain 5% below their end-2019 level. The recovery is ongoing for exports of transport equipment, a key sector of France’s foreign trade. Automobile exports have suffered as a result of supply difficulties (Fogelman, 2022[6]), which are diminishing, while aircraft equipment orders have picked up.
Gross fixed capital formation by volume1, 2019Q4=100
1. Data adjusted for seasonal variations and working days.
Source: Insee.
France lost export market share during the COVID-19 crisis, which has yet to be fully recovered, despite a slight increase in 2023 (Figure 2.6). Almost all industrial sectors experienced a decline in market share, while services have proved more resilient (COE-Rexecode, 2023[7]). The improved outlook for transport equipment suggests a recovery of market share in the sector. During the previous decade, France had managed to stabilise its market share due to the slowdown in the integration of emerging countries into the global economy, but also on the back of a policy of reducing social charges on low and medium salaries, which had helped to lower labour costs. However, more needs to be done to improve non-price competitiveness (Berthou, 2021[8]). In particular, this will require efforts in terms of innovation (Chapter 3), as the proportion of innovating companies remains low (BPI France, 2023[9]).
In 2020, against the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic, France launched the “France Relance” plan, worth EUR 100 billion, or 3.8% of GDP for 2022, to be invested by the end of 2022. The aim was to kick start the economy and speed up the country's structural transformation by focusing on three areas: the green transition (1.14% of GDP), business competitiveness (1.29% of GDP) and regional cohesion (1.37% of GDP for investment in healthcare, local authorities, training and integration, and retraining).
This plan was supplemented the following year by the “France 2030” investment plan, aimed at developing industrial competitiveness and future technologies through investment to support businesses, universities and research bodies. It received EUR 54 billion to be invested between 2023 and 2027 (2.0% of GDP). Both plans were described in the OECD Economic Survey of France 2021 (OECD, 2021[10]).
According to the Evaluation Committee of the “France Relance” plan, 93% of investments had been committed by the end of November 2023 (Comité d’évaluation du plan France Relance, 2022[11]). That said, only 73% of the funds had actually been used by August 2022.
The “France Relance” plan will be partially funded through the European Next Generation EU and REPowerEU funds, with France set to receive EUR 40.3 billion in subsidies between 2021 and 2026, or 1.5% of GDP. Payment of the funds is contingent on meeting targets outlined in the National Recovery and Resilience Plan (PNRR), focusing on investments and reforms. To date, 0.8% of GDP has been paid out following the positive assessment by the European Commission in relation to two payment requests covering completion of 28 of the 46 reform-related targets and 64 of the 134 investment-related targets. Reforms have been carried out in public finance, the labour market and healthcare, while investments have mainly concerned building renovations, transport, decarbonising industry, youth employment and education. A third payment request for an additional 0.3% of GDP was submitted to the European Commission in January 2024.
Finally, by October 2023, 0.8% of GDP of investment had been committed out of the 2% of GDP provided for under the France 2030 plan. By the end of June 2023, France had contributed to the funding of more than 2,400 projects for over 2,700 recipient organisations. 48% of funding was allocated to SMEs and mid-sized enterprises, 13% to large groups and 29% to universities and research bodies.
Export performance1
1. Difference between export growth and export markets’ growth, in volume terms (based on export markets as of 2010).
2. EA4 is the simple average for Germany, Spain, Italy and the Netherlands.
Source: OECD (2024), OECD Economic Outlook (database).
Note: In Panel C, Others include mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials, crude materials, and animal and vegetable oils. In Panel D, Others include insurance and pension, construction services, and cultural services.
Source: OECD (2023), International Trade Statistics (database); OECD International trade in services.
Since the onset of the pandemic, employment has been particularly robust relative to activity. The unemployment rate reached a forty-year low of 7.1% in the first quarter of 2023, before edging up to 7.5% in the first quarter of 2024. Job vacancies have reached a historically high level in 2023. The surge in apprenticeship contracts following the 2018 reform and the introduction in 2020 of an exceptional bonus for hiring apprentices goes some way towards explaining the relatively strong employment figures, as about a third of jobs created between end-2019 and mid-2023 correspond to apprenticeship.
Against a backdrop of inflationary pressures and recruitment difficulties, wages rose sharply in 2022 and 2023, without however matching the price increases over the same period. Between the last quarter of 2021 and the last quarter of 2023, average hourly wages rose by 7.9%, while consumer prices rose by 11.5%. Over the same period, the minimum hourly wage (SMIC) was raised by 9.9% (in May 2023).
After 1.1% in 2023, GDP growth is predicted to be 0.8% in 2024 before bouncing back to 1.3% in 2025, slightly above potential growth. The output gap, estimated at -1.5%, in 2023, will remain negative and is projected at -1.7% in 2025. A lacklustre international environment is set to limit export growth, while rising financing costs are expected to continue to curb investment, which is expected to fall in 2024 and rise only slightly in 2025. The slight upturn in GDP is expected to be driven primarily by a gradual recovery in household consumption, which in turn is set to be underpinned by a gradual fall in inflation from 5.7% in 2023 to 2.3% in 2024 and 2.0% in 2025, assuming that commodity prices stabilise. At the same time, tight labour markets are set to continue to fuel wage growth. Household incomes will also benefit from the indexation of certain welfare benefits to past inflation. The government has introduced an allowance of 100 euros per car at the start of 2024 for low-income households, to compensate for the rise in fuel prices, at a budget cost of 500 million euros. Most of the emergency support measures have gradually disappeared. All in all, household purchasing power will increase in 2024 and 2025.
Risks to economic activity appear evenly balanced. Geopolitical tensions could intensify and trigger a rise in energy prices and a loss of confidence from investors. This would lead to higher inflation and lower growth. The downturn in the real estate market could gather pace, with a sharper-than-expected fall in household investment. On the other hand, higher-than-expected spending of savings accumulated during the pandemic could lead to stronger private consumption. Exports could continue to catch up faster than expected, particularly in the aeronautical sector.
As a result of the higher costs incurred by monetary policy tightening, banks have increased lending rates to businesses and households (Figure 2.8, Panel A). They have also imposed stricter loan conditions (European Central Bank, 2023[12]). However, the slowdown in lending to households and businesses (Figure 2.8, Panel B) seems more to do with a fall in demand than a squeeze in supply (OECD, 2023[13]). Overall, the transmission of monetary policy appears to have fully passed through into financial conditions.
The real estate market is currently slowing, but this is expected to have only a limited impact on the financial situation of households. Rising borrowing costs have led to a fall in housing investment, down by 7.0% year-on-year in the first quarter of 2024. House prices have also started to fall, but at this stage the downturn is contained and less severe than in the other major euro area countries (Figure 2.9). Moreover, as almost all mortgage loans are granted at fixed rates, the rise in interest rates has not significantly affected the ability of borrowers already in debt to repay their loans. In addition, 65% of mortgages are secured by a bank guarantee, which means that the borrower's solvency needs to be assessed twice, thereby limiting the risk of default.
Source: European Central Bank, Banque de France
1. EA4 is the simple average for Germany, Spain, Italy and the Netherlands.
Source: OECD (2024), Analytical House Price Indicators (database).
Household debt has increased as a share of GDP since the 2008 financial crisis, in contrast to the situation in the other large euro area countries, and it is now higher than in these countries (Figure 2.10). However, banks are now subject to rules for granting mortgage loans that limits the risk of excessive household debt to a macroeconomic level. These rules became legally binding in 2022. They require that 80% of loans allocated by banks must be granted with a maturity of less than 25 years (27 in the case of a grace period) and to borrowers with an effort ratio (monthly payments as a proportion of household income) of less than 35%.
Household debt, as a % of GDP
Source: Banque de France
The increase in financing costs and the deterioration of the business outlook has slowed the flow of credit to companies. In 2023 and in early 2024, investment loans continued to rise but liquidity loans fell. Bond market financing experienced a slight year-on-year increase in March 2024.
The financial situation of companies remains generally sound, despite high levels of debt. Gross corporate debt, which was already high in 2019, increased during the pandemic and has fallen only slightly since. As a proportion of GDP, it is much higher than the average across the euro area (Figure 2.11, Panel A). However, corporate cash flow, like corporate debt, increased significantly in 2020 and 2021 (Figure 2.11, Panel B). It fell in 2023 but remains above its 2019 level. Accordingly, net corporate debt has remained close to its long-term average. Profit margins, which peaked in 2021, are close to pre-pandemic levels (Figure 2.11, Panel C). There were very few insolvencies in 2020 and 2021 as a result of the support measures introduced to counter the pandemic. Rising production costs, higher interest rates, the slowdown in activity and initial repayments of government guaranteed loans (PGE) caused a sharp increase in insolvencies in 2022 and 2023 to pre-crisis levels. Insolvencies could continue to rise if the slowdown in activity persists, especially with the expiry of the PGE scheme at the end of 2023. Since March 2020, 685,000 businesses have benefited from this scheme, for a total of 144 billion euros.
The commercial real estate sector has begun to slow. Commercial real estate construction starts have been falling since mid-2022. Demand has been undermined by the rise in transaction costs following the upturn in interest rates and by the more structural effect of growth in teleworking and e-business. While commercial real estate represented only 3.3% of the banking sector's exposure at the end of 2022, it accounted for 8.4% of the assets of insurance companies. Given the proportion of commercial real estate assets in companies’ total assets (11% in 2021), very close attention needs to be paid to developments in the sector, as a fall in prices would reduce the value of companies’ assets (Haut Conseil de Stabilité Financière, 2023[14]).
1. Deposits in monetary financial institutions excluding ESCB in the euro area.
Source: ECB data portal (2024), Insee (2024), Banque de France (2024).
The six leading French banks posted a 5.3% rise in net banking income in 2022. Their interest margin rose by 7.2%, driven mainly by a buoyant lending activity. In 2023, the gradual effect of rising interest rates on banks' return on assets is expected to have boosted their interest margins, but the slowdown in lending volumes will have weighed on their income (Haut Conseil de Stabilité Financière, 2023[14]).
French banks exhibit high levels of solvency and liquidity (Banque de France, 2023[15]). However, their prudential position could deteriorate as lending slows and insolvencies rise, which could affect credit risk. The CET1 solvency ratio of France's main banking groups stood at 16.0% in the last quarter of 2023, above the European average (Single Supervisory Mechanism), while the total capital ratio was 19.4%, compared with 19.7 for the European average. The LCR liquidity ratio remained well above the minimum requirement of 100%, at 149.9% compared with 164.4% for the European average. The non-performing debt ratio improved very slightly since the last quarter of 2022, but remains very low, below its 2019 level. At 1.9% in the last quarter of 2023, the non-performing debt ratio is at the same level as the European average.
The HCSF decided to increase the level of the reserves that banks could draw on in the event of financial risks materialising, having noted that macro-financial vulnerabilities had increased, that credit remained buoyant and that the gross debt of households and businesses appeared high (Haut Conseil de Stabilité Financière, 2022[16]). In December 2022, it decided to raise the rate of the credit protection reserve (the countercyclical capital buffer - CCyB) to 1.0% with effect from January 2024.
The fiscal deficit worsened significantly in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic due to a fall in revenue linked to the decline in activity and an increase in spending linked to measures to support the economy (Table 2.4). From 2021, the upturn in activity led to an improvement in public finances, but the fiscal balance remained in serious deficit.
At the end of 2023, public debt under the Maastricht definition reached 109.7% of GDP, down from 114.9% in 2020 but well above its 98.0% in end-2019. In addition, the cost of debt, which had fallen sharply over the previous decade, increased as interest rates rose. Net interest expenditures by general government rose by half a percentage point in 2022 to reach 1.9% of GDP.
Over the course of 2023, as inflationary pressures gradually eased, the government ended most of its support measures (Table 2.2) and announced that the price shield capping electricity prices would end in February 2025. This was a welcome decision, as it is essential that efforts to reduce the public deficit are not delayed. Future shocks similar to those experienced in the past two years will again warrant targeted responses to support households and firms most at risk, rather than broader measures such as VAT rate cuts.
The budget deficit is projected by the OECD to be reduced by 2025 (Figure 2.12, Panel A), but public debt is set to rise (Figure 2.12, Panel B). The government projects a faster reduction in the budget deficit, to 5.1% of GDP in 2024 and 4.1% in 2025, along with a milder increase in public debt, which is expected to total 112.0% in 2027. The end of support measures put in place to address the pandemic are set to help contain public spending in 2023 and 2024. They still amounted to almost 15 billion euros in 2022 (0.6% of GDP), corresponding mainly to the increase in health spending.
The fiscal stance was expansionary in 2023 and is projected by the OECD to remain so until 2025, under the assumption of a fiscal consolidation of 1.6% of GDP over two years, essentially through a reduction of public spending. This moderate pace of consolidation would be appropriate in the short run in the context of a GDP that is projected to remain below potential through 2025, with growth exceeding potential growth only in 2025.
France's fiscal policy is bound by the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) adopted by the European Union and its Member States, which is due to be reformed in 2024. One aim of the reform is to make better use of Member States' structural reform and investment efforts and improve the implementation of European budgetary rules (European Council, 2023[17]).
Source: OECD Economic Outlook database.
As a percentage of GDP
1. Projections.
2. As a percentage of potential GDP. The underlying balances are adjusted for the cycle and for one-offs. For more details, see OECD Economic Outlook Sources and Methods.
Source: OECD (2024), OECD Economic Outlook: Statistics and Projections (database) and updates.
According to OECD projections, more significant fiscal consolidation efforts will be required to stabilise France’s public debt in the medium and long run (Figure 2.13). Under the assumption of a reduction in the primary deficit from -3.9% of GDP in 2023 to -0.5% in 2030 and kept at that level thereafter, the debt-to-GDP ratio will rise to 150% of GDP in 2060 (Maastricht definition) and could rise to close to 170% of GDP if the rise in interest rates proves greater than initially projected. The government plans to reach a primary deficit of -0.3% of GDP in 2027, which would put its debt on a sustainable path in the long term.
Population ageing is expected to put upward pressure on public spending in the coming years though higher pension, health care and long-term care expenditure. Offsetting this phenomenon by cutting spending in these areas would lead to a substantially lower public debt trajectory. Implementing other reforms recommended in this Survey would reduce public debt further. That said, these simulations remain shrouded in uncertainty and are provided for illustrative purposes only.
Gross government debt, simulations as a % of GDP, Maastricht definition
1. The assumptions are taken from the OECD EO114 projections until 2025 and from the long-term model described in Guillemette and Turner (2021) thereafter. They include nominal GDP growth of 3.2% and an average apparent interest rate of 3.9% by 2060. The primary deficit is expected to narrow gradually to -0.5% of GDP in 2030 and to remain at that level thereafter.
2. This scenario includes a compensation of the costs of ageing related to pensions, health care and long-term care as described in European Commission 2021 Ageing report (2021c). The assumptions regarding the impact of the 2023 pension reform are based on the report "Évolutions et perspectives des retraites en France" published in June 2023 by the Conseil d'Orientation des Retraites. The reform is supposed to gradually reduce public spending by up to 0.2% of GDP in 2030 and then to gradually increase it by up to 0.2% in 2070.
3. The “OECD-recommended reforms” scenario adds the estimated effects of the reforms recommended in this Survey (Box 3.1). This scenario assumes a rise of 2.3% in structural GDP by 2033.
4. Further fiscal consolidation would lift the primary deficit by one percentage point of GDP by 2029.
5. Compared to the assumptions in the baseline, the rate is 50 basis points higher in 2025 and remains stable thereafter.
Source: Adapted from OECD (2023), OECD Economic Outlook: Statistics and Projections (database); and European Commission (2021), “The 2021 Ageing Report: Economic and budgetary projections for the EU Member States (2019-2070)” Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs.
France has the highest public expenditure relative to GDP of all OECD countries (Figure 2.14). Public spending is above the OECD average in all headline items, with the exception of education (Table 2.5). Effective fiscal consolidation will involve improvements to spending efficiency, particularly with regard to spending by local governments and tax expenditures, while altering the trajectory of the government’s wage bill. Short-term economic conditions will also need to be taken into account to help determine the appropriate pace of adjustment. Pension spending will need to be compatible with a reduction in public debt. Reducing spending will free up funds in education, the digitalisation of the economy and other measures to boost potential growth, as well as to finance the environmental transition (Chapters 3, 4 and 5).
General government expenditures as a percentage of GDP
Note: OECD and EU are unweighted averages of countries with available data. Data for Colombia, the Netherlands, Türkiye and Chile are for 2021 rather than 2022.
Source: National Accounts at a Glance (database).
2019
1. Non-weighted averages of available data.
Source: Annual National accounts, Government expenditure by function (COFOG) (OECD database); OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX).
Efforts to improve the efficiency of public spending have already been initiated and must continue. Progress has been made in modernising, digitalising and simplifying public administrations as part of the Action Publique 2022 programme launched in 2017. Since 2018, an Interministerial Committee for Public Transformation (CITP) has been meeting to decide on and monitor the implementation of public transformation measures (Ministère de l'Economie, des Finances et de la Relance, 2021[18]).
Drawing on the spending review carried out in the first half of 2023 (Ministère de l'économie, des finances et de la souveraineté industrielle et numérique, 2023[19]), the government identified a number of priorities for reducing public spending by around EUR 10 billion (0.4% of GDP) per year between 2024 and 2027. This includes reducing health spending, particularly in terms of sick pay and drug reimbursements, refocusing the Prêt à Taux Zéro (zero interest loan) scheme and the Pinel scheme to support rental investment, scaling back employment support measures during periods of falling unemployment, lowering the State's share of training costs, tightening the budgetary control of State operators and gradually phasing out tax concessions on fuel. In early 2024, the Government announced a further EUR 10 billion reduction in public spending. Savings of EUR 5 billion will be made on the operating expenses of all ministries, and of EUR 1 billion on each of public development aid, the MaPrimRenov' system and the expenses of State operators. In April 2024, additional savings of EUR 10 billion have been announced, the details of which remain to be defined. However, further efforts to reduce public spending and improve its efficiency will be needed to significantly reduce public debt. First and foremost, the proposals arising from the spending reviews should be fully implemented. For example, abolishing the intermediate VAT rate of 10% for work on residential property and extending of the Supplément de Loyer de Solidarité (additional rent), both recommended in the conclusions of the first annual spending review, correspond to recommendations already made by the OECD and should be implemented as soon as possible (OECD, 2021[20]).
The organisation of local government can be made more efficient. The accumulation of levels of administration creates complexity and overlaps, and the division of responsibilities between various players, including central government, is not always clear (Cour des comptes, 2022[21]). The responsibilities assigned to different administrations should be clarified and justified by clearly defined principles in order to ensure wider acceptance (OECD, 2019[22]). The 2022 "3DS" Act (differentiation, decentralisation, deconcentration and simplification) is designed to give sub-central governments more scope for action, strengthen their powers, improve their cooperation with State services and simplify access to local services for the general public. These clarification and modernisation efforts should be continued.
Mergers of small municipalities allow for economies of scale and should be developed. The number of municipalities per inhabitant in France is well above the OECD average (Figure 2.15). Since the 2015 NOTRe Act, every municipality must belong to a public establishment for inter-municipal cooperation (EPCI). However, these structures suffer from unclear governance, funding and objectives. As a result, the economies of scale that could be achieved are not obvious. The increase in expenditure and staffing levels at EPCIs over the years has not been matched by reduced expenditure and staffing levels in municipalities (Cour des comptes, 2022[21]). The 2019 Gatel Act created the possibility, which is still not widely used, of grouping municipalities together in a "community-municipality" with the status of both a municipality and an EPCI. These "community-municipalities" could be a useful way of clarifying and simplifying the governance and financing of groups of municipalities (Cour des comptes, 2022[23]).
Average number of municipalities per 100,000 inhabitants, 2020
Source: OECD (2023), OECD Cities statistics (database).
As a share of GDP, spending on social protection, housing and community amenities in France is the highest in the OECD (OECD, 2023[24]). France is also one of the countries with the highest levels of redistribution and, while income inequality is higher in France than in the OECD as a whole before redistribution, it is lower after redistribution (Figure 2.16). Redistribution is also efficient in terms of combating relative poverty, with France’s poverty rate at 8.5% against 11.5% on average in the OECD in 2019 (share of people earning less than half of the median disposable income). However, there is still room to strengthen the French social protection system. Improvements can be made to labour market policy (Chapter 3).
Welfare programmes are scattered, making it difficult for potential beneficiaries to identify the benefits available to them. A national consultation exercise was carried out by the Government in 2019 to prepare a systemic reform of minimum income programmes (Revenu Universel d’Activité). The aim of the project was to design a single scheme merging social benefits such as the Revenu de Solidarité Active (minimum income benefit), the prime d’activité (in-work benefit) and the Aide Personnalisée au Logement (housing benefit). While designing an efficient single benefit scheme can be complex, as shown by the experience of the United Kingdom which introduced in 2018 a Universal Credit (OECD, 2019[25]), implementing such a reform would be welcome, as harmonising the calculation bases and unifying request procedures would help reduce non take-up and limit the cost of managing social benefits.
Housing policy could be more targeted at the poorest households, as three quarters of the population are theoretically eligible for social housing (Cour des Comptes, 2023[26]). Also, the annual turnover rate of social housing is low (8.0% in 2022). Setting rent supplements based on income and the duration of the tenancy, and adjusting rents according to the perceived quality of the dwelling would make access to social housing more equal between households with similar incomes.
Household income inequality (18-65 years of age), 2021
Note: The latest data refer to 2021 for all countries except Chile (2022); Australia, Germany, Israel, Mexico, New Zealand, Switzerland and Turkey (2020); Denmark (2019); Japan (2018); and Iceland (2017).
Source: OECD Income Distribution (database).
The financing of health care spending is not balanced. The basic general social security scheme, which covers 90% of the population and is financed by compulsory contributions and related taxes, is organised into five branches corresponding to the various benefits provided (health, family, occupational injuries and diseases, retirement, autonomy) and a branch responsible for collecting contributions. In 2023, the health branch is expected to account for the bulk of the basic social security scheme's deficit. Moreover, the government scenario for the years 2023-2027 is concerning, as the deficit of the health branch expected to be EUR 9.6 billion in 2027, compared with EUR 9.5 billion in 2023, despite a reduction in spending targets (French government, 2023[27]).
The costs of managing the health system can be reduced, with administration costs accounting for a large share of spending (Figure 2.17). For instance, maternity leave is financed by the health branch of the social security system, while paternity leave is financed by the family branch. It would be more efficient to move towards joint management by the family branch (Cour des Comptes, 2023[28]). Improved and more widespread use of information systems can lead to more efficient health spending. Digital prescriptions and medical invoices, which practitioners are required to adopt by end-2024, would help combat over-invoicing of services if fully implemented and backed by automatic inspections (Cour des Comptes, 2023[28]). Medium-term financial planning is useful for establishing priorities in public health spending. However, under French law it is conducted for information purposes only, whereas other countries use planning to establish binding budget allocations (Finland, Iceland, Italy, Latvia) or to set compulsory ceilings (Greece, Israel, Netherlands) (OECD, 2023[24]). The mechanism adopted by France provides greater flexibility but does not impose strong spending constraints.
Efforts to reduce spending on pharmaceuticals are underway and should be continued. Expenditure on retail pharmaceuticals per capita was 14% above the OECD average in 2021 and France is the OECD country where the share of pharmaceuticals financed by government or compulsory insurance schemes is the highest, at 83% in 2021 against 56% on average across OECD countries (OECD, 2023[29]). This situation is in part due to national policies, such as full reimbursement for long-term illnesses and a recent focus on developing outpatient care. Restraining pharmaceutical expenditure is one of the governments’ priorities to reduce public spending (see above). The 2024 social security law aims to save more than EUR 1.5 billion on medication and medical devices while doubling the co-payments for reimbursed services, including medication.
Governance and Health System and Financing Administration as a % of health spending, 2021
Note: The latest data refer to 2021 for all countries except Australia, Israel and Japan (2020). More information on the methodology can be found in: A System of Health Accounts 2011: Revised edition (oecd-ilibrary.org).
Source: OECD Health Statistics
Population ageing implies, all else equal, an increase in pension expenditure. Against this backdrop, a significant reform was undertaken in 2023 to ensure the sustainability of the pension system (Box 2.3). This is a welcome change. Prior to the reform, the statutory early retirement age was 62. Following the reform, it has been set at 64, which corresponds to the average early retirement age in the OECD for people entering the labour market, taking into account reforms implemented in other countries (Figure 2.18).
In January 2023, the government predicted that the reform would enable a return to balance in pension funding by 2030 (Ministère du travail, 2023[30]). Without the reform, the deficit would have risen to 13.5 billion euros, or 0.5% of GDP. These forecasts were updated in June 2023 by the Conseil d'Orientation des Retraites (COR), the independent body responsible for analysing pension system issues, which brings together members of parliament, representatives of social partners, experts and government representatives. The COR forecasts that, despite the reform, the pension system deficit will reach 0.2% of GDP in 2030, rising to 0.8% of GDP in 2070 (Conseil d'Orientation des Retraites, 2023[31]). Furthermore, in January 2023, the Haut Conseil des Finances Publiques (HCPF - High Council of Public Finances), the official body responsible for independently assessing the overall trend in public finances, ruled that pension reform alone would not be sufficient to ensure "a return to levels of public debt that would give France sufficient room for manoeuvre", particularly to meet the investment needs to address climate change (Haut Conseil des Finances Publiques, 2023[32]).
It will therefore be necessary to keep a close eye on the impact of the 2023 reform. In this regard, the Comité de Suivi des Retraites (Pensions Monitoring Committee) is tasked with submitting a report to Parliament before October 2027 assessing its effects. Also, even if the extension of the statutory retirement age introduced by the 2023 reform is welcome, the 2021 Economic Survey of France nevertheless recommended introducing an increase in line with life expectancy, as is the case in several OECD countries such as Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden (OECD, 2021[33]).
Current and future early retirement ages for a man after a full career starting at age 22
Note: Current and future refer to retiring 2022 and entering the labour market in 2022, respectively. Chile, Colombia and Mexico are not included as early retirement is possible at any age subject to reaching a minimum benefit level.
Source: OECD Pensions at a Glance Database.
One of the desired effects of the reform is an increase in the employment rate, due to the extension of the retirement age. The French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) predicts that the reform will increase the working population by close to 700,000 by 2030. However, the distribution of this extra workforce between employment and unemployment remains uncertain. To maximise the impact of the reform on employment, it will be important to strengthen policies to support the employment of older workers. Encouraging training for people in the middle and end of their careers, particularly in digital skills, is crucial to boosting the employment of older people (OECD/Generation: You Employed, Inc., 2023[34]). In addition, age discrimination in recruitment must be tackled and barriers to the employment of older workers must be reduced as far as possible. In particular, this means restricting the impact of tenure on pay and strengthening the link between pay and skills and productivity. In Japan, for example, the government provides subsidies to help small and medium-sized enterprises integrate incorporate worker performance and ability into their wage and personnel systems (OECD, 2019[35]).
France has 42 different pension regimes, so abolishing the main special pension regimes for new entrants brought about by the reform is a welcome step. The fact that there are several different systems makes it more difficult to implement fair rules and forecast future pension expenditure. In addition, the specific rules governing special regimes have had a detrimental effect on the employment of older people in recent years. Alongside early retirement for long careers, they are one of the reasons why, in 2020, 29% of people aged 61 were already receiving a pension despite an official minimum retirement age of 62 (Boulhol, 2023[36]). Furthermore, the problems workers face in predicting their pension entitlements under the different regimes can act as a brake on labour mobility (Boulhol, 2019[37]).
Ultimately, setting up a unified pension system remains the best solution in terms of predictable expenditure, transparent information, and equity between citizens (Boulhol, 2019[37]). A draft reform was presented in 2019 that recommended introducing a universal points-based pension system (Delevoye, 2019[38]). This approach remains an interesting possibility for future developments. Under such a reform, it would be important to define clear rules for changes in pension points, taking into consideration future demographic trends.
The pension reform entered into force on 1 September 2023. The reform's flagship measure is the gradual increase in the statutory retirement age from 62 to 64 at a rate of three months per year for people born from 1 September 1961 onwards. As such, it will reach 64 for people born in 1968 and thereafter. The retirement age is maintained at 62 for workers who can prove that they are unfit or disabled. As before, disabled workers will be able to retire from the age of 55. Specific provisions have been introduced for long careers: people who started work at 16, 18, 20 or 21 will be able to retire at 58, 60, 62 or 63.
Provisions have been introduced to encourage people to combine work and retirement: the conditions for accessing the phased retirement scheme, which allows employees at the end of their career to work part-time while receiving part of their pension, have been made more flexible. The scheme has been extended to all affiliates, and it is now possible for people who are combining work and retirement to acquire pension rights.
The contribution period required to qualify for a full pension will be increased from 42 years to 43 years in 2027, starting with the generation born in 1965. Before the reform the increase the contribution period to 43 years was planned to occur by 2035, starting with the 1973 generation. For those who would not have been able to contribute for 43 years, the retirement age for entitlement to a full pension remains 67.
The main special pension regimes (Banque de France, RATP, IEG, CESE, notary clerks and employees) will be abolished for employees recruited from 1 September 2023. Some special regimes have been retained due to the specific hardships of the professions concerned (seafarers, employees of the Paris Opera and the Comédie française). The autonomous schemes for liberal professions and lawyers, which are financed separately, have also been maintained.
The minimum pension has been increased by 100 euros per month and will now be indexed to changes in the minimum wage (SMIC), with the aim of guaranteeing a total gross pension equivalent to 85% of the net minimum wage for a person with a full career of contributions at the minimum wage and working full time.
The reform also introduces new rights targeted at families. These include survivors' pension for orphans, a contribution bonus for certain mothers, better inclusion of parental leave in the calculation of the minimum pension and in eligibility for early retirement for long careers, creation of an old-age insurance scheme for the parents of children with disabilities and the extension of certain rights to liberal professions.
Tax expenditures could be reviewed with regard to their efficiency and their impact on the redistribution of income. In 2022, there were 467 tax expenditure items, representing EUR 85.6 billion (3.2% of GDP). By 2024, 60 of them are set to be abolished, and the total tax expenditure is to be reduced to EUR 78.7 billion (Ministère de l'économie, des finances et de la souveraineté industrielle et numérique, 2024[39]). However, efforts to overhaul tax expenditure could be even more ambitious. High saving rates would justify removing some tax breaks on saving flows (OECD, 2021[33]). There are a large number of reduced VAT rates and the associated loss of tax revenues represents around EUR 10 billion, including EUR 1.5 billion for the reduced rate applied to the catering sector (Central Government scope) and over EUR 2 billion for the reduced rate for work on residential property not related to energy efficiency. The abolition of the latter measure is one of the proposals in the spending review carried out in 2023. The impact of reduced VAT rates on activity and employment is debatable, and they do not always benefit the poorest households (Ecalle, 2018[40]). The main beneficiaries of these reduced rates are the companies in the sectors concerned (Benzarti and Carloni, 2019[41]).
Taxation on labour remains high despite the successive measures to ease the burden on low income earners and the reforms of in-work benefits (“Prime d’Activité”) and personal income taxation, which have reduced the tax burden of the lowest paid workers (Sicsic and Vermersch, 2021[42]) (OCDE, 2023[43]). France has the fourth highest tax wedge (income tax and social security contributions as a percentage of the labour costs) in the OECD, at 47.0%, compared with an OECD average of 34.6%. It also has the highest social security contributions paid by employers of all OECD countries, at 26.7% of labour costs. Further efforts to reduce taxation on labour would make businesses more cost competitive.
Some business taxes with distortive effects could also be eliminated (Martin and Trannoy, 2019[44]), (Martin and Paris, 2020[45]). For instance, the social solidarity contribution (C3S), based on revenue regardless of profits, makes businesses more vulnerable in times of crisis.
At the same time, to avoid jeopardising the necessary consolidation of public finances, taxation could be rebalanced by shifting tax bases from labour taxes towards other levies, especially broad-based and non-distortive taxes and environmental taxes. Raising environmental taxes would notably imply accelerating the phasing-out of fossil fuel subsidies, reduced rates and exemptions on fossil-fuel taxes (Chapter 4). The government has tasked two economists, Antoine Bozio and Etienne Wasmer, to look into "the articulation between wages, the cost of labour and the prime d’activité and its effect on employment, the level of wages and economic activity”. This should help guide future policy reforms in this area.
The French government has reported a EUR 50 billion reduction in mandatory levies between 2017 and 2022, split equally between households and businesses. Income tax was lowered and the property tax on primary residences was eliminated. The French authorities also plan to reduce the tax-to-GDP ratio by one percentage point from 2022 to 2027, mainly by eliminating a tax on business (“Cotisation sur la Valeur Ajoutée des Entreprises”). Despite these changes, France will continue to have one of the highest tax rates among OECD countries (Figure 2.19). Taxation could be further reduced once public finances are balanced.
Taxes as a percentage of GDP
Source: OECD Global revenue statistics database.
Spending reviews are a particularly useful tool for identifying measures and structural reforms to improve the efficiency of public action. The OECD recommends implementing these reviews and has published a guide on best practices in this area (Tryggvadottir, 2022[46]). France drew on the OECD's recommendations and introduced annual spending reviews in 2023 to identify and document sources of savings needed to keep public finances on track ahead of the vote on annual draft budgets. These reviews consist of broad evaluations of public action, covering the resources allocated to administrations, subsidies paid to other entities, and tax exemptions. The first round built upon the findings of 12 thematic missions covering areas such housing and employment policies, apprenticeships and environmental taxation. To prepare for the 2025 budget bill, new spending reviews were initiated in late 2023, targeting areas such as aid for businesses and medical devices. The goal was to identify EUR 12 billion in savings. The initial findings are expected in the first half of 2024. The Cour des Comptes has welcomed the introduction of these spending reviews, while nevertheless noting that past actions in this area (RGPP, MAP, Action Publique 2022) have had only a limited impact on public spending (Cour des comptes, 2022[21]). As a result, the conclusions of the spending reviews will require close monitoring, as recommended in the OECD's guide to best practice.
The Public Finance Programming Act (LPFP), first introduced in 2008, is designed to enable the medium-term management of the State budget. The Haut Conseil des Finances Publiques (HCPF - High Council of Public Finances) is responsible for identifying any substantial discrepancies between the execution of the budget and the path set out in the LPFP, which the government then has to address by presenting remedial measures. However, the targets of the five LPFPs adopted since it was first introduced have rarely been met. In this respect, the Haut Conseil des Finances Publiques has questioned the non-binding nature of the objectives of the LPFPs and their "generally optimistic and rapidly outdated assumptions" (Haut Conseil des Finances Publiques, 2023[47]).
Independent evaluations of budget sustainability over 30, 40 or 50 years, as practised in Sweden, the United States, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, would provide a better understanding of the relevance of fiscal and budgetary decision-making (Commission pour l'avenir des finances publiques, 2021[48]). In Australia, the Parliamentary Budget Office informs the parliament, notably on long-term fiscal sustainability, by providing independent assessments. In New Zealand, the Office of the Auditor-General publishes commentaries of the Treasury’s statements on the long-term fiscal position. France does not conduct any systematic assessments of long-term trends in public finances. However, the proposed reform of the European Union’s economic governance framework aims to introduce this type of projections (Conseil de l'Union européenne, 2023[49]). Independent institutions could also be given responsibility for conducting these exercises to provide alternative assessments.
The State has an important role to play in reducing gender inequalities. Factoring this into budget management is essential for reducing inequalities in all areas of public action, and in particular to ensure better access to employment for women (Nicol, 2022[50]). Since 2022, France is one of the countries to have introduced gender budgeting. Nevertheless, there is still room for progress, for example in terms of publishing information on the subject, involving civil society, and developing appropriate tools and methods (OECD, 2023[24]). To go further in this direction, the French authorities can draw on the OECD's best practices for gender budgeting (OCDE, 2023[51]), which show in particular that the countries that have made the most progress in this area, such as Canada, Austria, Iceland, Spain and Sweden, all use legal advances and specifically developed methods and data.
Estimated change in the fiscal balance in the medium term, as a percentage of 2023 GDP
Note: The estimated changes in the fiscal balance are static estimates that abstract from behavioural responses that could be induced from policy changes. These estimates are reported only for illustrative purposes. The measures concerning local government - mutualisation of purchases of goods and services by public entities and local government reforms would improve the balance by EUR 4 billion. The expected cuts in health spending correspond to halving the deficit of the healthcare branch of the basic social security scheme anticipated for 2025 in the Social Security law project (PLFSS). For the fiscal benefits from streamlining tax expenditure (remove of some tax breaks on saving flows, remove the reduced VAT rates on work in dwellings not related to energy efficiency and on hotels and restaurants), estimates available in the Évaluation des voies et moyens Tome II – Dépenses fiscales 2024 budget draft bill are used.
Source: OECD calculations.
References
[55] Banque de France (2023), Accès des entreprises au crédit, 2ème trimestre 2023, https://www.banque-france.fr/sites/bdf_espaces2/files/webstat_pdf/ACC_ENT_CRE_2264_fr__2023_T2_SI_EAC_FR.pdf.
[15] Banque de France (2023), Evaluation des risques du système financier français, https://publications.banque-france.fr/evaluation-des-risques-du-systeme-financier-francais-juin-2023#:~:text=Les%20risques%20climatiques%20continuent%20d,g%C3%A9rer%20pour%20les%20institutions%20financi%C3%A8res. (accessed on Juin 2023).
[41] Benzarti, Y. and D. Carloni (2019), “Who Really Benefits from Consumption Tax Cuts? Evidence from a Large VAT Reform in France”, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, Vol. 11/1, pp. 38-63, https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20170504.
[8] Berthou, A. (2021), Quel bilan de la compétitivité prix et coût dans les exportations de la France depuis le début des années 2000 ?, https://publications.banque-france.fr/sites/default/files/medias/documents/bdf235-6_competitivite-prix-cout.pdf.
[36] Boulhol, H. (2023), Retraites: le déséquilibre financier et ses enjeux, https://www.telos-eu.com/fr/retraites-le-desequilibre-financier-et-ses-enjeux.html (accessed on 22 Février 2023).
[37] Boulhol, H. (2019), “Objectives and challenges in the implementation of a universal pension system in France”, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 1553, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/5a476f15-en.
[3] Bourgeois, A. (2022), La flambée des prix de l’énergie : un effet sur l’inflation réduit de moitié par le “bouclier tarifaire”, https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/6524161 (accessed on Septembre 2022).
[9] BPI France (2023), Note d’analyse du contexte économique international, https://www.bpifrance.fr/sites/default/files/inline-files/2023-06-Note%20d%27analyse%20du%20contexte%20%C3%A9conomique%20fran%C3%A7ais%20et%20international-Bpifrance.pdf (accessed on Juin 2023).
[7] COE-Rexecode (2023), Bilan de la compétitivité française 2022, http://www.rexecode.fr/public/Indicateurs-et-Graphiques/Competitivite-l-observatoire/Bilan-de-la-competitivite-francaise.
[11] Comité d’évaluation du plan France Relance (2022), Deuxième Rapport, https://www.strategie.gouv.fr/publications/comite-devaluation-plan-france-relance-deuxieme-rapport (accessed on Décembre 2022).
[48] Commission pour l’avenir des finances publiques (2021), Nos finances publiques post-Covid-19 : pour decnouvelles règles du jeu, https://www.vie-publique.fr/rapport/279847-nos-finances-publiques-post-covid-19-pour-de-nouvelles-regles-du-jeu (accessed on Mars 2021).
[49] Conseil de l’Union européenne (2023), Proposition de DIRECTIVE DU CONSEIL modifiant la directive 2011/85/UE sur les exigences applicables aux cadres budgétaires des États membres, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15396-2023-REV-4/fr/pdf.
[31] Conseil d’Orientation des Retraites (2023), Evolutions et perspectives de retraites en France - Rapport annuel, https://www.cor-retraites.fr/sites/default/files/2023-09/RA_2023_Def_0.pdf (accessed on Juin 2023).
[26] Cour des Comptes (2023), Assurer la cohérence de la politique du logement face à ses nouveaux défis, https://www.ccomptes.fr/sites/default/files/2023-10/20230707-note-thematique-Assurer-coherence-politique-logement-face-nouveaux-defis.pdf.
[28] Cour des Comptes (2023), La sécurité sociale : Rapport sur l’application des lois de financement de la sécurité sociale, https://www.ccomptes.fr/fr/publications/securite-sociale-2023 (accessed on Mai 2023).
[53] Cour des Comptes (2022), La préparation et la mise en oeuvre du plan de relance, https://www.ccomptes.fr/sites/default/files/2022-03/20220309-elaboration-composition-pilotage-mise-en-%C5%93uvre-plan-relance.pdf (accessed on Mars 2022).
[21] Cour des comptes (2022), Le financement des collectivités territoriales : des scénarios d’évolution, https://www.ccomptes.fr/fr/publications/les-scenarios-de-financement-des-collectivites-territoriales (accessed on Octobre 2022).
[23] Cour des comptes (2022), Les finances publiques locales 2022 - fascicule 2, https://www.ccomptes.fr/fr/publications/les-finances-publiques-locales-2022-fascicule-2 (accessed on 26 Octobre 2022).
[38] Delevoye, J. (2019), Pour un système universel de retraite, https://travail-emploi.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/retraite_01-09_leger.pdf (accessed on Juillet 2019).
[40] Ecalle, F. (2018), Les taux réduiits de TVA, https://www.fipeco.fr/pdf/0.53888600%201529561487.pdf.
[12] European Central Bank (2023), Bank Lending Survey, October 2023, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/ecb_surveys/bank_lending_survey/html/index.en.html.
[17] European Council (2023), Economic governance review: Council agrees on reform of fiscal rules, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/12/21/economic-governance-review-council-agrees-on-reform-of-fiscal-rules/.
[6] Fogelman, M. (2022), Transformations et défis de la filière automobile, https://www.entreprises.gouv.fr/fr/etudes-et-statistiques/themas-de-la-dge/transformations-et-defis-de-la-filiere-automobile.
[27] French government (2023), Projet de loi de financement de la sécurité sociale pour 2024, dossier de presse, https://presse.economie.gouv.fr/27092023-dp-projet-de-loi-de-financement-de-la-securite-sociale-pour-2024/ (accessed on 27 Septembre 2023).
[14] Haut Conseil de Stabilité Financière (2023), Rapport annuel 2023, https://www.economie.gouv.fr/files/files/directions_services/hcsf/HCSF_Rapport_annuel_2023.pdf?v=1698223836.
[16] Haut Conseil de Stabilité Financière (2022), Décision n°D-HCSF-2022-6 du 27 décembre 2022 relative au taux du coussin de fonds propres contra-cyclique, https://www.economie.gouv.fr/files/files/directions_services/hcsf/Decision_D-HCSF-2022-06_CCyB.pdf?v=1699281027.
[54] Haut Conseil de Stabilité Financière (2021), Bilan de la recommandation n°R-HCSF-2021-1 du 27 janvier 2021 relative à l’octroi de crédits immobiliers résidentiels en France, https://www.economie.gouv.fr/files/files/directions_services/hcsf/HCSF%2020210914%20annexe-CP.pdf (accessed on 14 Septembre 2021).
[47] Haut Conseil des Finances Publiques (2023), Avis n° 7 relatif à la révision du projet de loi de programmation des finances publiques pour les années 2023-2027, https://www.hcfp.fr/sites/default/files/2023-09/Avis%20PLPFP-21-09-2023.pdf (accessed on 22 Septembre 2023).
[32] Haut Conseil des Finances Publiques (2023), Avis n° HCFP - 2023 -1 relatif au projet de loi de financement rectificative de la sécurité sociale pour l’année 2023, https://www.hcfp.fr/sites/default/files/2023-01/1-Avis%20PLFRSS-1%202023%20-17-01-23_vdef.pdf (accessed on 18 Janvier 2023).
[56] Haut Conseil des Finances Publiques (2023), Avis n°8 relatif aux projets de lois de finances et de financement de la sécurité sociale pour l’année 2024, https://www.hcfp.fr/liste-avis/avis-ndeg2023-8-lois-de-finances-2024 (accessed on 22 Septembre 2023).
[1] Hemmerlé, Y. et al. (2023), “Aiming better: Government support for households and firms during the energy crisis”, OECD Economic Policy Papers, No. 32, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/839e3ae1-en.
[52] Insee (2022), Note de Conjoncture, décembre 2022, https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/6677447 (accessed on Décembre 2022).
[5] Langot, F. et al. (2022), Loi de finance 2023 : quel impact a eu le bouclier tarifaire sur la croissance, l’inflation, la dette publique et les inégalités ?, Cepremap, https://www.cepremap.fr/2022/11/loi-de-finance-2023-quel-impact-a-eu-le-bouclier-tarifaire-sur-la-croissance-linflation-la-dette-publique-et-les-inegalites/.
[4] Malliet, P. (2023), Les effets macroéconomiques du bouclier tarifaire : une évaluation à l’aide du modèle ThreeME, https://www.cae-eco.fr/les-effets-macroeconomiques-du-bouclier-tarifaire-une-evaluation-a-laide-du-modele-threeme (accessed on juillet 2023).
[45] Martin, P. and H. Paris (2020), https://www.cae-eco.fr/Focus-no42-Eclairages-complementaires-sur-les-impots-sur-la-production, Conseil d’Analyse Economique, https://www.cae-eco.fr/Focus-no42-Eclairages-complementaires-sur-les-impots-sur-la-production.
[44] Martin, P. and A. Trannoy (2019), Taxes on Production: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, https://www.cae-eco.fr/en/Les-impots-sur-ou-contre-la-production.
[18] Ministère de l’Economie, des Finances et de la Relance (2021), Bilan des réformes de productivité de l’action publique, https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwiouIawpK2CAxWufKQEHfZRDPsQFnoECBEQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.budget.gouv.fr%2Fdocumentation%2Ffile-download%2F14200&usg=AOvVaw0jgNQnj75G9gzCCNtNqTTI&opi=89978449.
[2] Ministère de l’Economie, des Finances et de la Souveraineté Industrielle et Numérique (2023), Projet de Loi de Finances 2024, Rapport Economique, Social et Financier, https://www.tresor.economie.gouv.fr/Articles/149b902e-98a5-4d0d-b927-f9a7cb54121e/files/182ec7de-36c8-44ce-b923-8509fda98410.
[39] Ministère de l’économie, des finances et de la souveraineté industrielle et numérique (2024), Projet de Loi de Finances pour 2024, Evaluation des voies et moyens, Tome 2, https://www.budget.gouv.fr/documentation/documents-budgetaires/exercice-2024/le-projet-de-loi-de-finances-et-les-documents-annexes-pour-2024.
[19] Ministère de l’économie, des finances et de la souveraineté industrielle et numérique (2023), Rapport sur l’évaluation de la qualité de l’action publique, https://www.budget.gouv.fr/files/files/plf/plf-2024/evaluation-qualite-action-publique-rapport-au-parlement.pdf (accessed on Juillet 2023).
[30] Ministère du travail, D. (2023), Rapport sur les objectifs et les effets du projet de réforme des retraites, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/contenu/Media/files/autour-de-la-loi/legislatif-et-reglementaire/actualite-legislative/2023/plfrss_ecox2300575l_rapport_annexe_cm_23.01.2023_0.pdf (accessed on Janvier 2023).
[50] Nicol, S. (2022), “Gender budgeting: The economic and fiscal rationale”, OECD Journal on Budgeting, https://doi.org/10.1787/9ca9b221-en.
[51] OCDE (2023), “Bonnes pratiques de l’OCDE en matière de budgétisation sensible au genre”, Revue de l’OCDE sur la gestion budgétaire, https://doi.org/10.1787/78a7e5f7-fr.
[43] OCDE (2023), Les impôts sur les salaires 2023 (version abrégée): Indexation de la fiscalité du travail et des prestations dans les pays de l’OCDE, Éditions OCDE, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/edd9a79b-fr.
[60] OCDE (2021), Études économiques de l’OCDE : France 2021, Éditions OCDE, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/80013359-fr.
[13] OECD (2023), Economic Outlook.
[24] OECD (2023), Government at a Glance 2023, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/3d5c5d31-en.
[29] OECD (2023), Health at a Glance 2023: OECD Indicators, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/7a7afb35-en.
[10] OECD (2021), OECD Economic Surveys: France 2021, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/289a0a17-en.
[20] OECD (2021), OECD Economic Surveys: France 2021, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/289a0a17-en.
[33] OECD (2021), OECD Economic Surveys: France 2021, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/289a0a17-en.
[59] OECD (2021), Pensions at a Glance 2021: OECD and G20 Indicators, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/ca401ebd-en.
[22] OECD (2019), Making Decentralisation Work: A Handbook for Policy-Makers, OECD Publishing, https://doi.org/10.1787/g2g9faa7-en.
[58] OECD (2019), Making Decentralisation Work: A Handbook for Policy-Makers, OECD Multi-level Governance Studies, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/g2g9faa7-en.
[25] OECD (2019), OECD Economic Surveys: France 2019, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/a0eee144-en.
[35] OECD (2019), Working bettter with age, OECD Publishing, https://doi.org/10.1787/c4d4f66a-en.
[34] OECD/Generation: You Employed, Inc. (2023), The Midcareer Opportunity: Meeting the Challenges of an Ageing Workforce, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/ed91b0c7-en.
[57] Secrétariat général du Conseil d’orientation des retraites (2016), Revue de littérature des effets macroéconomiques du recul de l’âge de la retraite, https://www.cor-retraites.fr/sites/default/files/2019-06/doc-3612.pdf.
[42] Sicsic, M. and G. Vermersch (2021), Les incitations monétaires au travail sont plus élevées en 2019 qu’en 2014, https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/5411761.
[46] Tryggvadottir, Á. (2022), “OECD Best Practices for Spending Reviews”, OECD Journal on Budgeting, https://doi.org/10.1787/90f9002c-en.