Ownership and Governance of State-Owned Enterprises 2024

Annex B. Additional data and information

Table A B.1. SOEs in the Fortune Global 500 list by industry

Industry	Revenues (USD bn)	Profits (USD bn)	Assets (USD bn)	Employees
Aerospace & Defence	363	14	606	1 267 391
Banks: Commercial and Savings	969	192	2 841	2 182 140
Building Materials, Glass	90	1	146	270 494
Chemicals	211	0	251	265 641
Diversified Financials	535	32	9 662	746 110
Electronics, Electrical Equip.	40	(1)	61	184 940
Energy	871	24	1 418	1 059 332
Engineering & Construction	1 076	12	1 888	1 728 433
Industrial Machinery	122	1	168	383 576
Insurance: Life, Health (Mutual)	39	0	183	68 386
Insurance: Life, Health (stock)	366	16	3 956	633 057
Insurance: Property and Casualty (Stock)	92	4	219	177 852
Mail, Package, and Freight Delivery	299	71	3 385	1 842 664
Metals	747	9	747	1 045 591
Mining, Crude-Oil Production	1 571	204	2 087	2 081 941
Motor Vehicles & Parts	411	8	429	623 412
Petroleum Refining	1 846	113	1 884	1 881 316
Pharmaceuticals	35	0	11	35 057
Railroads	103	2	223	600 407
Real estate	68	1	265	118 007
Shipping	145	9	299	312 290
Telecommunications	497	35	1 086	1 634 846
Trading	455	3	305	206 512
Transportation and Logistics	81	1	314	95 854
Utilities	1 177	(25)	2 030	1 556 097
Wholesalers: Health Care	94	1	82	201 508
Total	12 303	730	53 545	21 202 854

Note: Fiscal years ending before March 2023.

Source: Fortune, Global 500, consulted in January 2024.

Table A B.2. Disclosure requirements of SOEs

Jurisdiction	Main commercial and non-commercial objectives?	Separation of the accounts?	Information about the control structures?	Board remuneration or remuneration policies?	Composition of their boards?	Material risk factors and their risk management systems?	State guarantees and/or subsidies received?	Transactions with related parties?	Contractual or contingent liabilities?	Issues related to employees and other stakeholders?
Argentina							Yes
Australia	Yes	No	Yes, SOEs are required to disclose this information	Board remuneration is disclosed.	All SOEs	All SOEs are required to disclose material risks	Yes, partially (only state guarantees)	Non-arm’s length transactions with related parties	Yes, but PPPs between the government and SOEs are rare in practice	Yes, some information
Austria	Yes, partially	Yes, as called for	SOEs do not disclose, but control structures are published on the company register.	Board remuneration is disclosed.	No	Some SOEs are required to disclose material risks	Yes	Shareholdings of SOEs in other limited liability company are published in the company register.	No	Yes, some SOEs
Azerbaijan	Yes, partially		Some SOEs are required to disclose information on control structures	Some SOEs	Some SOEs	Some SOEs are required to disclose material risks	Yes, partially (those which comply with IFRS)	Non-arm’s length transactions with related parties	No	No
Belgium	Yes	No	No	Board remuneration is disclosed.	Some SOEs	Some SOEs are required to disclose material risks	No	Non-arm’s length transactions with related parties	No	No
Brazil	Yes	No	Yes, SOEs are required to disclose this information	Board remuneration is disclosed.	All SOEs	All SOEs are required to disclose material risks	Yes	Non-arm’s length transactions with related parties	Yes	Yes, some SOEs
Bulgaria	Yes, partially	Yes, as called for	Some SOEs are required to disclose information on control structures	Board remuneration is disclosed.	All SOEs	Large SOEs are required to disclose material risks	Yes, partially (large SOEs)	Only large SOEs are required to report non-arm’s length transactions with related parties	Yes, via a national register	Yes, all SOEs
Canada	No	Yes, as called for	Yes, SOEs are required to disclose this information	Board remuneration is disclosed (for some SOEs).	No	All SOEs are required to disclose material risks	Yes, partially (those which comply with IFRS)	Non-arm’s length transactions with related parties	Yes	No
Chile	No	No	Some SOEs are required to disclose information on control structures	Board remuneration is disclosed.	All SOEs	All SOEs are required to disclose material risks	No	Non-arm’s length transactions with related parties	No	Yes
Colombia	Yes	No	Some SOEs are required to disclose information on control structures	Board remuneration is disclosed.	All SOEs	All SOEs are required to disclose material risks	Yes	Some SOEs are required to report non-arm’s length transactions with related parties	No	No
Costa Rica	Yes	Yes	Yes, SOEs are required to disclose this information	Remuneration policies are disclosed.	Some SOEs (financial sector)	All SOEs are required to disclose material risks	Yes, partially (those which comply with IFRS)	Some SOEs are required to report non-arm’s length transactions with related parties	No	Yes, some information
Croatia	No	Yes	Some SOEs are required to disclose information on control structures	Board remuneration is disclosed (for listed SOEs).	All SOEs	Large SOEs are required to disclose material risks	Yes, partially (only state guarantees)	Only listed SOEs are required to report non-arm’s length transactions with related parties	Yes, via the ministry	Yes, some SOEs
Czechia	Yes	No	Yes, SOEs are required to disclose this information	No	All SOEs	No	Yes, partially (only subsidies)	No	Yes, via a national register	No
Denmark	Yes	No	Unclear	Board remuneration is disclosed.	Unclear	Unclear	Unclear	No	Unclear	Unclear
Estonia	Yes	Yes	Yes, SOEs are required to disclose this information	Board remuneration is disclosed.	All SOEs	Large SOEs are required to disclose material risks	Yes	Non-arm’s length transactions with related parties	Yes, but PPPs between the government and SOEs are rare in practice	Yes, some SOEs
Finland	Yes	Yes	SOEs do not disclose, but their governing legislature/ charter details control structures	Board remuneration is disclosed.	All SOEs	All SOEs are required to disclose material risks	Yes	Non-arm’s length transactions with related parties	Yes	Yes, some SOEs
France	Yes, partially	Yes, as called for	Some SOEs are required to disclose information on control structures	Board remuneration is disclosed (for listed SOEs).	Listed SOEs	All SOEs are required to disclose material risks	Yes (state aid)	Non-arm’s length transactions with related parties	No response	Yes, some SOEs (listed and large)
Germany	No	Yes	SOEs do not disclose, but their governing legislature/ charter details control structures	Board remuneration is disclosed.	All SOEs	All SOEs are required to disclose material risks	Yes	Non-arm’s length transactions with related parties	Yes	Yes
Greece	Yes, partially	Yes	No	Board remuneration is disclosed.	All SOEs	All SOEs are required to disclose material risks	Yes	Non-arm’s length transactions with related parties	Yes	No
Hungary	Yes	Yes	No	Board remuneration is disclosed.	No	No	No	Only in certain instances non-arms length transactions can be disclosed.	Yes, via a national register	No
Iceland							Yes
Ireland	Yes, partially	Yes	Yes, SOEs are required to disclose this information	Board remuneration is disclosed.	All SOEs	All SOEs are required to disclose material risks	Yes	Non-arm’s length transactions with related parties	Yes	Yes
Israel	No	No	Yes, SOEs are required to disclose this information	Board remuneration is disclosed.	No	All SOEs are required to disclose material risks	Yes	Non-arm’s length transactions with related parties	No	Yes
Italy	Yes, partially	Yes	Yes, SOEs are required to disclose this information	Board remuneration is disclosed.	All SOEs	Listed SOEs are required to disclose material risks	Yes	Non-arm’s length transactions with related parties	Yes	Yes, all SOEs
Japan							Yes
Korea	Yes	Yes	Yes, SOEs are required to disclose this information	Board remuneration is disclosed.	All SOEs	All SOEs are required to disclose material risks	Yes, partially (those which comply with IFRS)	Some SOEs are required to report non-arm’s length transactions with related parties	No	Yes, some SOEs
Latvia	Yes	Yes, as called for	Yes, SOEs are required to disclose this information	Board remuneration is disclosed.	All SOEs	All SOEs are required to disclose material risks	Yes, partially (only subsidies)	Non-arm’s length transactions with related parties	Yes	No
Lithuania	Yes	No	Yes, SOEs are required to disclose this information	Remuneration policies are disclosed.	All SOEs	All SOEs are required to disclose material risks	Yes	Non-arm’s length transactions with related parties	Yes	Yes, some SOEs
Luxembourg	Yes	Yes	SOEs do not disclose, but their governing legislature/ charter details control structures	Board remuneration is disclosed (for some SOEs).	All SOEs	Large SOEs are required to disclose material risks	No	Only in certain instances non-arms length transactions can be disclosed.	No	No
Netherlands	Yes, partially	Yes, as called for	SOEs do not disclose, but their governing legislature/ charter details control structures	Board remuneration is disclosed.	All SOEs	All SOEs are required to disclose material risks	Yes, partially (only state guarantees)	Only listed SOEs are required to report non-arm’s length transactions with related parties	No	Yes, some SOEs
New Zealand	Yes	Yes	Yes, SOEs are required to disclose this information	Board remuneration is disclosed.	All SOEs	Listed SOEs are required to disclose material risks	Yes	Non-arm’s length transactions with related parties	Yes	Yes
Norway	Yes	Yes	SOEs do not disclose, but their governing legislature/ charter details control structures	Board remuneration is disclosed.	All SOEs	Large SOEs are required to disclose material risks	Yes	Large SOEs are required to report all transactions with related parties	Yes, but PPPs between the government and commercial SOEs are rare in practice	Yes, some SOEs
Philippines	Yes	Yes, as called for	No	Board remuneration is disclosed.	All SOEs	Some SOEs are required to disclose material risks	Yes, partially (some SOEs)	Some SOEs are required to report non-arm’s length transactions with related parties	No	Yes, some SOEs
Poland	No	No	SOEs do not disclose, but their governing legislature/ charter details control structures	No	SOEs do not disclose, but information is available in register.	Large SOEs are required to disclose material risks	Yes, the line ministry discloses such information.	Only listed SOEs are required to report non-arm’s length transactions with related parties	Yes, via a national register	Yes, some SOEs
Portugal	Yes	Yes	Yes, SOEs are required to disclose this information	Board remuneration is disclosed.	All SOEs	Financial SOEs are required to disclose material risks	Yes	Non-arm’s length transactions with related parties	Yes	Yes, some SOEs
Romania	Yes, partially	Yes, as called for	SOEs are required to disclose, but not all SOEs are compliant.	Board remuneration is disclosed.	All SOEs, but not all SOEs are compliant	All SOEs are required to disclose material risks, but not all SOEs are compliant	Yes, but not all SOEs are compliant	Non-arm’s length transactions with related parties	Yes, but PPPs between the government and SOEs are rare in practice	Yes, some SOEs
Slovak Republic	No	Yes	No	Board remuneration is disclosed (for some SOEs).	All SOEs	All SOEs are required to disclose material risks	Yes	Only listed SOEs are required to report non-arm’s length transactions with related parties	Yes	No
Slovenia	Yes	No	Yes, SOEs are required to disclose this information	Board remuneration is disclosed.	All SOEs	All SOEs are required to disclose material risks	Yes	Non-arm’s length transactions with related parties	Yes	Yes, some SOEs
Spain	No	Yes	Some SOEs are required to disclose information on control structures	Board remuneration is disclosed.	Unclear	All SOEs are required to disclose material risks	Yes	Non-arm’s length transactions with related parties	Yes	Unclear
Sweden	Yes	Yes, as called for	Some SOEs are required to disclose information on control structures	Board remuneration is disclosed.	All SOEs	All SOEs are required to disclose material risks	Yes	Non-arm’s length transactions with related parties	Yes, but PPPs between the government and SOEs are rare in practice	Yes, all SOEs
Switzerland	Yes, partially (by large SOEs)	Yes, as called for	No	Board remuneration is disclosed.	All SOEs	No	Yes	Non-arm’s length transactions with related parties	Yes	Yes, all SOEs
Thailand	No	No	No	No	All SOEs	No	No	Non-arm’s length transactions with related parties	No	No
Türkiye	Yes	Yes, as called for	No	Board remuneration is disclosed.	Some SOEs	No	No	No	No	No
Ukraine	Yes, partially	Yes, as called for	Some SOEs are required to disclose information on control structures	Board remuneration is disclosed (for some SOEs).	Some SOEs	Some SOEs are required to disclose material risks	Yes, partially (those which comply with IFRS)	Non-arm’s length transactions with related parties	No	Yes, some SOEs
United Kingdom	Yes	No	SOEs do not disclose, but their governing legislature/ charter details control structures	Board remuneration is disclosed.	All SOEs	All SOEs are required to disclose material risks	Yes	Non-arm’s length transactions with related parties	Yes	No
United States			SOEs do not disclose, but their governing legislature details control structures
Viet Nam	Yes, partially	No	Yes, SOEs are required to disclose this information	Board remuneration is disclosed	All SOEs	No	No	Non-arm’s length transactions with related parties	No	No

Source: OECD Working Party on State Ownership and Privatisation Practices.

Table A B.3. Corporate governance framework of unlisted SOEs

	The boards of directors of SOEs are encouraged to perform the following function(s) through the corporate governance framework
Jurisdiction	Formulate, approve, review and monitor the corporate strategy for SOEs	Monitor the effectiveness of the company’s governance practices and managerial performance of the top management	Decide on CEO appointment	Decide on CEO dismissal	Decide on executive board/CEO remuneration	Ensuring the integrity of accounting and financial reporting systems	Applying high ethical standards including a code of corporate ethics	Monitoring and managing potential conflicts of interest
Australia	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Austria	x	x	x	x	x			x
Belgium	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Brazil	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Bulgaria	x	x	x		x	x	x	x
Canada	x	x				x	x	x
Chile	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Colombia	x				x	x	x	x
Costa Rica	x	x	x	x		x	x	x
Czechia	x	x				x	x
Denmark	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Estonia	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Finland	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
France	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Germany	x	x			x	x	x	x
Greece	x	x				x	x	x
Hungary	x	x
Ireland	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Israel	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Italy	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Korea	x	x		x	x	x	x
Latvia	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Lithuania	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Luxembourg	x	x	x	x	x	x
Netherlands	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
New Zealand	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Norway	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Peru	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Philippines	x	x	x	x		x	x	x
Poland	x
Portugal	x					x	x	x
Romania	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Slovak Republic	x	x	x	x	x	x
Slovenia	x	x				x	x	x
Spain	x	x			x	x	x	x
Sweden	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Switzerland	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Thailand	x	x	x	x	x
Türkiye	x					x	x
Ukraine	x		x	x	x		x
United Kingdom	x	x			x	x	x
Viet Nam	x

Note: In principle the boards of directors in Thailand have the authority to appoint and remove the CEO. However, in practice it requires government approval.

Source: OECD Working Party on State Ownership and Privatisation Practices.

Table A B.4. Consultation of the government shareholder during the CEO appointment process

Jurisdiction	To what extent is the government shareholder consulted on CEO appointment and dismissal decisions?
Australia	Under the constitution of the SOE, the SOE board may, following consultation with the Shareholder Ministers, remove the CEO from office, subject to the terms of any contract between the SOE and the CEO.
Austria	In the case of stock corporations, the CEOs are appointed by the supervisory board. The supervisory board of SOEs is appointed by the owner(s). To this extent, there is an indirect influence on the appointment of the CEOs. In the case of limited liability companies, the managing director(s) of an SOE is/are appointed by the owner(s) (the state). There is no difference between fully-owned SOEs and partially-owned SOEs.
Belgium	The Minister under whose tutelage the SOEs in question fall is informed by the decision to appoint or dismiss a CEO.
Brazil	The indications are made by the line ministries as specified in the Decree Law nº 200/67 and the Ministry of Economy.
Bulgaria	The Executive Director/CEO is also a member of the Board and is elected by the Board in accordance with the Commercial Act. Competitive procedures are in place.
Canada	For virtually all parent Crown corporations, the shareholder appoints, terminates and sets compensation for the CEO. For subsidiary Crown corporations, these actions are dealt with by the parent Crown corporation or the board of the subsidiary.
Colombia	It is the President who nominates their CEOs and some members of the board.
Costa Rica	State-owned enterprises in the Non-Financial Sector In the case of State-Owned Companies operating in the non-financial sector, in accordance with the organizational structure of each institution, the Management Body acts in absolute independence and within its functions is attributed the appointment and removal of senior management officials, including the CEO. State-owned enterprises in the financial sector In the case of State-owned enterprises operating in the financial sector, in accordance with the provisions of Article 27 of Law No. 1644, the Board of Directors acts in absolute independence and according to Article 34, paragraph 5, it is an attribution of this body to appoint and remove, when appropriate, to the Manager, Deputy Manager, Auditor and Deputy Auditor of the Bank, and assign to them their functions and duties, within the prescriptions of this law.
Croatia	In SOEs in which the state is the majority owner, the member of the Management Board shall be elected exclusively on the proposal of the ownership body (competent ministry) and the Government of the Republic of Croatia, in the case of legal persons of special interest. In the case of SOEs which are not of special interest in this case, the members of the management board are proposed by the CERP Governing Council, which is formed by a majority of state officials.
Czechia	The government shareholder is responsible for the appointment and removal of the CEO to the extent permitted by the company's articles of association.
Denmark	The board of directors appoints/dismisses the CEO.
Estonia	The government has no say in the appointment of CEOs, which are appointed by supervisory boards, but usually the chair of the supervisory board introduces new management board members to the owner before publication.
Finland	The Board of Directors appoints the Managing Director and decides on his or her remuneration.
France	With regard to the appointment/revocation of managers, a distinction must be made between companies in which the State holds more than 50% directly and those in which it holds less than 50% indirectly: In companies where the State holds a majority of the capital directly, the board of directors proposes the appointment of the chief executive officer, who is appointed by decree of the President of the Republic in accordance with the order of August 20, 2014 relating to the governance and capital transactions of companies with public participation. In these same companies, the general manager is dismissed by decree. In other companies in which the State holds a stake or those held indirectly, the Chief Executive Officer is appointed and, if necessary, dismissed by the Board of Directors as in any other company. The State participates in the vote through its representative on the board.
Germany	The Federal Republic is always involved in appointment and dismissal decisions, but only within the general legal framework of Corporate law.
Greece	The government shareholder is not consulted on the CEO appointment and dismissal decisions of SOEs within the HCAP portfolio. The establishment of HCAP entails, by its nature, the minimization of political interventions into the management of SOEs within the HCAP portfolio.
Hungary	Organisations exercising ownership rights have formal nomination power. They are not subject to parliamentary approval nor accreditation/vetting across the government. Typically board does not appoint CEO. Organisations exercising ownership rights appoint CEO.
Ireland	Typically the governing legislation of the SOEs gives the SOE’s board the power to select and appoint the CEO, but the terms and conditions of employment of the CEO, including as to remuneration and pension, are subject to Ministerial approval.
Italy	In both cases of fully-owned and partially-owned SOEs, the government entity exercises its rights as a shareholder in decisions regarding the appointment or the dismissal of all the directors, whereas decisions regarding the role of the CEOs and his managerial powers are adopted by board of director
Korea	CEO appointment process: Large SOEs: Nomination committee (PCs: OSC) Recommendation by line minister President Small SOEs: Nomination committee (PCs: OSC) Line minister
Latvia	The regulations state that nomination of CEO and all executive board members shall be initiated by Supervisory Board, but in SOEs with no Supervisory Board established the shareholder holds the initiative of SRO nomination process. Whoever initiates the CEO nomination process, shall establish a nomination commission for the selection and evaluation of candidates. The nomination commission shall include the representatives of the shareholder or the Supervisory Board of SOE, independent experts and the coordinating institution.
Lithuania	In case of statutory enterprises (state enterprise), appointment and dismissal of the CEO is a sole responsibility of ownership entity (usually – ministry). In practise, the board may assist or provide opinion regarding appointment or dismissal of CEO, but the final decision is made by ownership entity. In general, this is a decision of the minister of line ministry.
Luxembourg	It will depend on the organic law. The final decision might be reserved to the Government. Process does not change based on the fact of an SOE being partially or fully-owned but rather on the organic law. (Art. 6 https://legilux.public.lu/eli/etat/leg/igc/2004/06/11/n1/jo) The SOE submits for approval to the responsible Ministry the decision for the board when it comes to appoint and dismiss the General director/ the directors when they are under a private law regime.
Netherlands	For some SOEs the shareholder has the right to appoint and dismiss all board members (e.g. Executive Board included), in other cases the shareholders only appoints and dismisses the supervisory board.
New Zealand	The government shareholder is not consulted on the appointment or dismissal of a CEO, although informed.
Norway	Government as a shareholder is not enrolled in CEO-matters. This is strictly left to the board. The government is not consulted in this.
Peru	The appointment and dismissal of the CEO are the prerogative of the directors. As a shareholder, the government sets minimum requirements for CEO appointments.
Philippines	Under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 10149, the President of the Philippines appoints the Appointive Directors of GOCC Governing Boards. Thereafter, the Appointive Directors elect from among themselves the CEO in accordance with Section 18 of Republic Act No. 10149. Thus, “a would-be CEO must first have been qualified under the Fit and Proper Rule GCG Memorandum Circular No. 2012-05 (https://gcg.gov.ph/files/NgdVieoExwkOEXUd0MH1.pdf) and appointed by the President of the Philippines into the Governing Board of the GOCC, and only thereafter will he/she be qualified to be elected as the CEO of the company.” GCG Memorandum Circular No. 2012-09 The Chief Executive Officer (https://gcg.gov.ph/files/zG9g4Z8gqWP3ZXe7qtwY.pdf)
Poland	It is not consulted. When members of the governing body are appointed by the supervisory board, a qualification procedure is conducted. Its purpose is to check and evaluate the qualifications of candidates and to select the best candidate. If members of the management body are appointed by the general meeting/shareholders' assembly, the supervisory board/shareholder's proxy (if such authority is provided by the articles of association or resolution of the shareholders' assembly) may conduct the qualification procedure.
Portugal	In fully-owned SOEs, the appointment and dismissal of board members is the responsibility of the Government. If the SOE has any other shareholder, the appointment and removal of board members is carried out in accordance with the shareholders' agreement.
Romania	In theory, the board has full discretion for appointing executive managers (based on a shortlist of candidates who applied to board positions). However in practice, executive managers are often directly appointed by the state for an "interim" period not exceeding 6 months (which can be extended).
Saudi Arabia
Slovak Republic	As this depends on bylaws of the company, in the fully state-owned SOE, the CEO is the Chair of BoD or it is BoDs´ responsibility to find the CEO.
Slovenia	The government shareholder (or SSH) is not consulted or involved in CEO appointment and dismissal decisions unless the decision has to be taken by the Government or SSH (according to the particular SOE’s internal regulation).
Spain	The government shareholder is not consulted on the CEO appointment and dismissal decisions of SOEs. Board of directors organisation, modus operandi and decision-making shall be governed by the provisions of the by-laws and, wanting that, the provisions hereunder on joint stock companies’ boards of directors.
Sweden	The government shareholder is not consulted in the CEO-decision, only informed.
Switzerland	There is no consultation of the government shareholder on CEO appointment by companies limited by shares, as this is an non-transferable and inalienable duty of the BoD.
Thailand	For CEO nomination and appointment, the board establishes a nomination committee comprising of five board members. This committee’s recommendation is subsequently presented to the board for approval. Following this, the State Enterprise Policy Office (SEPO) of the Ministry of Finance is consulted for approval regarding CEO compensation.
Türkiye	In SOE’s the CEO is appointed by the Presidential Decision.
United Kingdom	Generally, the appointment (and dismissal) of a CEO is a decision of the Board subject to Ministerial consent. Ministers will be engaged when a competition is launching for their views on the job description to be advertised and Ministers will be asked to consent to the Board’s chosen/preferred candidate at the end of the competition. Ministers will also be engaged if there is a decision to remove the CEO
Viet Nam	The appointment of CEO depends on the legal form of the company. In case of joint-stock SOEs, the board of directors (BoD) is entitled to recruit and enter into a labour contract with the CEO, subject to the approval of the state owner. CEOs of whollyowned companies are appointed by the board of members (BoM) following the request of the owner’s representative agency. The proposals and nominations are initially made by the competent ministry based on the pool of candidates, and BoMs are consulted. In the case of company groups, the Chair and CEO/General Director positions are considered to be a “high-level personnel” and thus subject to an appointment by the Prime Minister.

Source: OECD Working Party on State Ownership and Privatisation Practices.

Table A B.5. Who may serve on SOE boards?

Jurisdiction	Former politicians	Political ministerial officials may serve on SOE boards*	Career civil servants may serve on SOE boards	Elected politicians may serve on SOE boards*	None of them are allowed to serve on boards
Argentina	x	x	x
Australia			x
Austria		x	x	x
Azerbaijan	x	x	x	x
Belgium			x
Brazil	x	x	x
Bulgaria					x
Canada		x	x	x
Chile	x
Colombia	x	x	x	x
Costa Rica					x
Croatia	x			x
Czechia		x	x	x
Denmark			x	x
Estonia	x		x
Finland	x
France	x				x
Germany	x	x	x	x
Greece	x				x
Hungary	x	x	x
Ireland	x	x	x
Italy					x
Japan	x
Korea	x				x
Latvia			x
Lithuania	x		x
Luxembourg					x
Malaysia	x		x
Mexico	x	x	x
Netherlands	x
New Zealand	x	x	x
Norway	x
Peru	x	x	x
Philippines		x	x
Poland					x
Portugal					x
Romania		x	x	x
Slovak Republic	x	x
Slovenia					x
South Africa	x		x
Spain	x	x	x
Sweden	x	x	x	x
Switzerland	x		x
Thailand	x		x
Tunisia
Türkiye	x		x
Ukraine	x	x	x
United Kingdom			x
United States	x	x	x	x
Viet Nam	x	x	x	x

Note: In some jurisdictions, such as Finland or Ireland, while there may not be an explicit prohibition for (current or former) ministerial officials or elected politicians to serve on SOE boards in practice this is not typical.

Source: OECD Working Party on State Ownership and Privatisation Practices.

Table A B.6. The role of the Chair

Jurisdiction	Does the Chair of an SOE act as the primary point of contact between the ownership entity and the board?	Is it common, or is it allowed, that the chief executive officer of an SOE at the same time serves as chair of the board?*
Australia	Yes	Allowed but uncommon
Austria	The chair and the CEO	Not allowed
Azerbaijan	Unclear	Not allowed
Belgium	Yes	Not allowed
Brazil	Yes	Not allowed
Bulgaria	No, members of the board represent the company collectively	Allowed and common
Canada	Yes	Allowed but uncommon
Chile	The chair and the CEO	Not allowed
Colombia	No, members of the board represent the company collectively	Allowed but uncommon
Costa Rica	The chair and the CEO	Not allowed
Croatia	Yes	Not allowed
Czechia	Yes	Allowed and common
Denmark	Yes	Not allowed
Estonia	Yes	Not allowed
Finland	Yes	Allowed but uncommon
France	The chair and the CEO	Allowed and common
Germany	No, the respective appointed board member	Not allowed
Greece	No, the CEO	Allowed but uncommon
Hungary	The chair and the CEO	Allowed and common
Ireland	Yes	Not allowed
Israel	Yes	Not allowed
Italy	The chair and the CEO	Allowed but uncommon
Korea	Yes	Allowed but uncommon
Latvia	Unclear	Not allowed
Lithuania	Yes	Not allowed
Luxembourg	No response	Not allowed
Netherlands	The chair and the CEO	Not allowed
New Zealand	The chair and the CEO	Not allowed
Norway	Yes	Allowed but uncommon
Peru	Yes	Not allowed
Philippines	No, the CEO	Allowed but uncommon
Poland	No, members of the board represent the company collectively	NA
Portugal	Yes	NA
Romania	No, members of the board represent the company collectively	Not allowed
Slovak Republic	Yes	Allowed and common
Slovenia	The chair and the CEO	Not allowed
Spain	The chair and the CEO	Allowed but uncommon
Sweden	Yes	Not allowed
Switzerland	Yes	Allowed but uncommon
Thailand	No, members of the board represent the company collectively	Allowed
Türkiye	The chair and the CEO	Allowed and common
Ukraine	No, members of the board represent the company collectively	Not allowed
United Kingdom	The chair, the CEO, and the government shareholder director	Allowed but uncommon
Viet Nam	The chair and the CEO	Not allowed

Note: While in some jurisdictions, it may not be explicitly prohibited that the CEO can simultaneously serve as the Chair, such an arrangement does not happen or rarely happens in practice.

Source: OECD Working Party on State Ownership and Privatisation Practices.