Where SOEs engage in economic activities, those activities must be carried out in a way that ensures fair competition in the marketplace. While there is consensus on this objective in principle, obtaining a level playing field is more complicated in practice. SOEs are often subject to differing legal, regulatory and policy frameworks than their private sector peers due to their corporate forms or they may operate with special privileges or protections due in part to the nature of their public policy activities. This chapter highlights trends in the treatment of SOEs compared to commonly accepted corporate norms, in their funding and financing, and in the disclosure of ownership and control structures.
Ownership and Governance of State-Owned Enterprises 2024
Abstract
Although SOEs are usually treated similarly to non-SOEs in terms of regulations and taxation, in practice SOEs often benefit from special advantages not provided to other firms.
Incorporation under ordinary company law helps to ensure competitive neutrality by exposing SOEs to the same corporate norms as other market participants. When SOEs are established under statutory laws, exemptions from legal and regulatory requirements and other types of corporate norms may grant them special rights, privileges or protections. This chapter shows that:
80% of jurisdictions endow SOEs with similar or equal regulatory treatment as other firms, yet 36% grant at least some of their SOEs special tax treatment. Exceptions are made for certain enterprises if they are a natural monopoly, operate in reserved markets, or pursue public service obligations (PSOs).
18% of 45 jurisdictions do not apply insolvency rules consistently across commercial SOEs as for private sector firms.
Public procurement rules apply fairly consistently across the jurisdictions surveyed. Only a few jurisdictions allow commercial SOEs to benefit from more favourable treatment than those available to private sector firms as bidders in public procurement.
Contractual and contingent liabilities are underreported by SOEs, with 38% of jurisdictions not requiring SOEs to report this information. This may affect non-state equity owners and other stakeholders by reducing their ability to assess risks.
The fulfilment of public service obligations by SOEs (as well as other enterprises) should be recognised and compensated adequately. This chapter finds that:
45% of jurisdictions require all or most SOEs to undergo structural separation, or at least accounting separation between the activities that relate to PSOs and those that relate to non-PSO economic activities. 21% do not require separation.
74% of jurisdictions report that the state provides commercial SOEs with adequate compensation for fulfilling their PSOs as outlined in relevant legal documents.
48% of jurisdictions report that the disclosure requirements regarding state support specifically covers subsidies or state guarantees.
74% of jurisdictions report that their SOEs may benefit from indirect financial support in the shape of, inter alia, state guarantees on commercial debt.
SOEs may also serve as an important source of government revenue through dividend payouts. However, dividend policy practices vary a lot ranging from minimum share of net profit to general guidelines linked to optimal capital structure, and one-third of jurisdictions do not issue dividend policy guidance to SOEs.
Lastly, only 39% of jurisdictions report that SOEs are not required to disclose their ownership and/or control structures, including the existence of shareholding agreements, golden shares or veto rights, which facilitates better transparency and accountability towards shareholders and stakeholders.
The SOE Guidelines establish that the legal, regulatory and policy framework for SOEs should ensure a level playing field and fair competition in the marketplace when SOEs engage in economic activities (OECD, 2024[1]). Central to the Guidelines is the delineation between the ownership function of the state and other roles that may influence market dynamics, such as regulation and policy making. Moreover, they emphasise the importance of ensuring that stakeholders, including competitors, have access to efficient avenues for redress. Additionally, the SOE Guidelines advocate a legal structure for SOEs that permits the initiation of insolvency proceedings and the assertion of creditor claims. Furthermore, in cases where SOEs undertake public service obligations (PSOs), transparency is paramount. These obligations should be clearly and specifically identified to facilitate accurate cost and revenue attribution and to avoid the risk of over or under compensation. Importantly, to support fair competition, SOEs should not be utilised to subsidise or grant advantages to other commercial undertakings.
In 2021, the OECD adopted a Recommendation on Competitive Neutrality. The Recommendation establishes a set of principles to ensure that governments’ actions are competitively neutral and that all enterprises face a level playing field, irrespective of factors such as the enterprises’ ownership, location or legal form. A Competitive Neutrality Toolkit supports the implementation of the principles set out in the OECD Recommendation providing a set of good practices, based on examples from international experience, to support public officials in identifying and reducing distortions to competition due to state intervention. (OECD, 2024[2]). The concept of competitive neutrality is relevant for SOEs as it is a fundamental principle of competition law and policy that firms should compete on merits and should not benefit from undue advantages, for example due to their ownership or nationality. Competitive neutrality foresees equal treatment of all market players and posits a market environment where no enterprise is at an undue advantage or disadvantage compared to other enterprises (OECD, 2023[3]) There is widespread consensus among OECD members to uphold these principles, and in practice competitive neutrality may be at risk in situations where legal and regulatory treatment differs between SOEs and other firms, due to their corporate form or other special rights, privileges or protections.
SOEs incorporated under ordinary company law typically receive comparable or identical regulatory, legal, and tax treatment as private enterprises. Incorporation under ordinary company - such as Joint Stock Company (JSC) or Limited Liability Company (LLC) - helps to ensure competitive neutrality by exposing SOEs to the same corporate norms as other market participants. When SOEs are established through statutory laws, exemptions from legal, regulatory and other requirements may grant them special rights, privileges or protections. The uneven application of corporate norms, or provisions, on market participants can be a source of competitive advantage (or disadvantage).
2.3.1. Regulatory treatment
Generally, most incorporated SOEs are subject to the same regulatory regimes as private peers. Exceptions may be found in the case of SOEs performing public interest activities. Regulatory advantages could take the form of exemptions from competition rules which may be laid out in specific provisions of market regulations that apply to sectors where SOEs operate (often in sectors with natural monopoly characteristics, such as in the network industries, utilities or in postal services). Some regulatory advantages can take the form of lower regulatory compliance (e.g. incumbents exempted from new and stricter requirements or lax oversight) which usually lowers the cost of doing business, whereas other regulatory advantages (e.g. licensing or authorisations) may be in the form of preferential treatment for public undertakings (OECD, 2012[4]).
Eighty per cent of jurisdictions (43 out of 54) subject SOEs to a similar or equal regulatory treatment as other businesses (Table 2.1). However, there are also a few exemptions: Seventeen jurisdictions apply different regulatory treatment where SOEs operate in natural monopolies and reserved markets. Eleven jurisdictions allow exemptions in instances where public service obligations are pursued by an SOE. Fourteen jurisdictions allow for other types of exemptions, which can take the form of differentiated application of competition law to certain types of activities or through other types of preferential regulatory treatment. In all cases, when derogations apply, they should apply to all current or potential market participants and the rationale and conditions should be made transparent and clearly established to ensure competitive neutrality (OECD, 2021[5]).
Source: OECD (2021[6]), COVID-19 emergency government support and ensuring a level playing field on the road to recovery, https://doi.org/10.1787/1e5a04de-en; and OECD (2012[7]), Competitive Neutrality: Maintaining a Level Playing Field between Public and Private Business, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264178953-en.
2.3.2. Tax treatment
The SOE Guidelines establish that the state should ensure tax neutrality to prevent undue discrimination between SOEs and their competitors. This applies to a range of direct or indirect tax regimes including corporate/income taxes, value-added taxes, property taxes, registration and other special taxes. It also applies to tax compliance, as there should be no expectation that SOEs may benefit from their near-government status to run up tax arrears or be subject to lenient enforcement of tax rules (OECD, 2024[1]).
SOEs incorporated under company law are for the most part subject to direct taxes in the form of corporate income taxation, and indirect taxes such as value-added tax (VAT). Some exemptions may apply to specific categories of SOEs which may be carrying out non-commercial objectives and which may be exempt from tax on income derived from such obligations in addition to being exempt from paying VAT or charging VAT on these transactions (OECD, 2012[4]). For example, jurisdictions employing tax tools to advance low carbon transition objectives may grant differentiated tax treatment to support climate related public policy objectives (He, Jing and Chen, 2023[8]). Competitive neutrality can be ensured if differentiated tax treatment applies to all current or potential market participants, not just SOEs.
Statutory corporations may be exempt from certain taxes if specified by their statutory laws. And in some cases, categories of SOEs may be disadvantaged by different tax treatment, such as not benefitting from tax write-offs or refunds that would apply to private enterprises (OECD, 2012[4]).
As shown in Table 2.2, the applicability of tax regimes varies across jurisdictions. In 60% (33 out of 55) SOEs are subject to the same tax treatment as private enterprises and in 27% they are subject to a largely similar tax treatment. Thirty-six per cent grant at least some of their SOEs special tax treatment. Often, more extensive differences in tax treatments exist where SOEs operate under their own statutory framework and are thus not subject to company law or other applicable tax laws.
Source: OECD (2021[6]), COVID-19 emergency government support and ensuring a level playing field on the road to recovery, https://doi.org/10.1787/5b0fd8cd-en; and OECD (OECD, 2012[7]), Competitive Neutrality: Maintaining a Level Playing Field between Public and Private Business, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264178953-en.
2.3.3. Insolvency rules
The SOE Guidelines establish that the legal forms of SOEs should allow them to initiate insolvency procedures and for creditors to press their claims. SOEs should also be subject to bankruptcy and insolvency rules equivalent to those for comparable competing private enterprises (OECD, 2024[1]).
In practice, while many SOEs are formally subject to bankruptcy law, their creditors cannot initiate bankruptcy or administration procedures. SOEs may face differences in legal treatment regarding insolvency if legislation exempts SOEs’ assets from being taken by execution of a judgement, debt or insolvency. Moreover, even if not formally exempted by insolvency legislation, they may benefit from lower bankruptcy risks than private enterprises if they benefit from softer budget constraints and lower financial discipline offset by state support in the form of state aids, lending, equity injections/bail outs, and protection from competition (OECD, 2024[2]).
OECD Product Market Regulation (PMR) indicators suggest that over 82% of 45 jurisdictions apply the same insolvency rules to commercial SOEs than to private enterprises. Bulgaria, Canada, Mexico and Portugal allow for exceptions across some of their commercial SOEs, while Brazil, Costa Rica, Korea, and the United States have different insolvency rules for SOEs. In Costa Rica, for example, the insolvency process is subject to legislative review as SOEs are created through statutory laws. Table 2.3 offers a detailed breakdown.
Do the insolvency rules that apply to private enterprises also apply to commercial SOEs?
Source: OECD PMR database 2023.
2.3.4. Competition law
Almost all OECD economies ensure that competition law – including antitrust law and merger control - applies holistically across SOEs undertaking economic activities. Although laws preventing anti-competitive behaviour of firms are designed to correct unfair advantages or disadvantages within the market, exceptions from such laws can exist for SOEs that are not incorporated as LLC or JSC, or for companies charged with delivering public service obligations. (Table 2.4) Recent OECD studies point to the fact that while SOEs’ economic activities may be subject to competition law, SOEs may enjoy more favourable treatment in merger control or antitrust enforcement (OECD, 2024[2]).
Are commercial SOEs subject to an exclusion/exemption from the application of the competition law in specific sectors when performing commercial activities potentially in competition with private enterprises?
Source: OECD PMR database 2023.
2.3.5. Public procurement and other types of favourable treatment
The SOE Guidelines establish that when SOEs engage in public procurement, whether as bidder or procurer, the procedures should be open, competitive, based on fair and objective selection criteria, promote supplier diversity and be safeguarded by appropriate standards of integrity and transparency (OECD, 2024[1]). Increased transparency of public procurement conditions and practices can help to ensure all potential suppliers can take part in public tenders, and all bidders are treated in an equitable manner.
Source: OECD PMR database 2023.
As shown in Table 2.5, nearly all 45 jurisdictions for which information is available do not grant benefits and favourable treatment to SOEs participating as bidders in public procurement processes. Costa Rica, Estonia and Peru are exceptions. In Costa Rica, Article 3 of Law N.9986 establishes an exception from the ordinary procurement process for contracts between public entities. These are registered through the electronic procurement platform and must be backed by a reasoned convenience analysis. In the case of Estonia, state authorities can grant direct contracts to SOEs, so-called in-house contracts, though these must be concluded under market conditions.
Other types of favourable treatment
The SOE Guidelines note that SOEs should not receive or provide any in-kind inputs such as real estate, goods or services, but also access to data and information resources, or infrastructure at prices or conditions more favourable than those available to privately-owned competitors operating at arm’s length in accordance with commercial considerations. Some exceptions may be required in the fulfilment of public service obligations.
While recent OECD research examining the impact of state support measures in industrial sectors point to concerns in this area (OECD, 2023[9]),most jurisdictions report that SOEs are rarely provided favourable treatment to obtain access to resources such as energy, water or land.
2.3.6. Public-private partnerships and contractual obligations
As recommended in the SOE Guidelines, when SOEs engage in joint projects such as public-private partnerships (PPPs), the contracting parties should ensure that contractual rights and obligations are upheld, and disputes addressed in a timely and objective manner. PPPs should be adequately disclosed, especially if the partnership entails transfers of risks, resources, and financial rewards (OECD, 2024[1]).
Thirty-eight per cent of jurisdictions (16 out of 42) do not require SOEs to disclose contractual or contingent liabilities (Table 2.6). While not all jurisdictions surveyed engage in PPPs with SOEs, some choose to disclose contractual or contingent liabilities that may arise from PPPs via a national register. Jurisdictions that implement a publicly accessible national register or where a ministry issues a report to share such information do not require SOEs to share this information in their annual reports or on their websites. Some jurisdictions require contractual information to be disclosed by the SOE itself. For example, the UK requires disclosures on contractual or contingent liabilities to be made in aggregate. SOEs that implement International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) disclose contractual liabilities if they are assessed as financially and materially significant.
Are SOEs required to disclose information on related contractual or contingent liabilities for PPPs?
Source: OECD Working Party on State Ownership and Privatisation Practices.
Apart from engaging in commercial activities, SOEs (as other economic operators) may fulfil public service obligations (PSOs) which, in certain circumstances, warrants compensation (see Box 1.1 for a definition of PSOs). Among 44 jurisdictions, only in Canada does the state does not ask commercial SOEs to provide services that fall under a PSO (Table 2.7).
Are there any commercial SOEs that – besides providing commercial services – also provide services that fall under a public service obligation?
Source: OECD PMR database 2023.
The reporting of PSOs and the structural separation between PSOs and other objectives that are commercial in nature is a function of the legal framework applicable to a given SOE. Requirements regarding the disclosure of PSOs may be specified in policy, laws and acts that relate to the provision of public services, such as postal services acts or energy acts regulating electricity, oil, and gas sectors, or be specified in the statutory laws of SOEs. The nature of the reporting obligation mostly depends on the SOE legal form and laws on the service carried out.
Forty-five per cent of jurisdictions (20 out of 44) require all or most SOEs to ensure structural separation or, at least, accounting separation between the activities undertaken by SOEs to comply with the PSO and the activities undertaken to provide commercial services (Table 2.8). Thirty-four per cent of jurisdictions require structural or accounting separation between PSOs and commercial activities for some of their SOEs, while 21% do not require any structural and/or accounting separation.
Are there clear legal obligations in place to ensure structural separation or, at least, accounting separation between the activities of SOEs undertaken to comply with the PSO and the activities undertaken to provide commercial services?
Notes: In Korea, SOEs gradually introduced accounting separation. In Sweden, public service obligations are either compensated by the state budget or via cross-subsidisation; this is not always fully funded in every single year.
Source: OECD PMR database 2023.
Note: *The category “As called for” refers to responses where the separation of accounts depends on specific circumstances, such as when state aid rules apply.
Source: OECD Working Party on State Ownership and Privatisation Practices.
There are also transparency requirements that lead SOEs to engage in some degree of accounting separation. For example, EU Commission Directive 2006/111/EC requires the separation of accounts between different activities, costs, and revenues where an undertaking may be provided with public funds. Figure 2.1 illustrates the jurisdictions where SOEs must separate accounts, showing that 46% do so only under certain circumstances or only for certain SOEs. Sub-chapter 3.2 on reporting and disclosure practices of SOEs further discusses transparency practices surrounding the monitoring of PSOs.
Where a separation of accounts is required, compensating SOEs for their fulfilment of PSOs should, in theory, be simple and transparent. In 74% of jurisdictions (32 out of 43), the state provides commercial SOEs with adequate compensation for fulfilling their PSOs as outlined in relevant legal or regulatory provisions (Table 2.9). The remaining 26% do not grant commercial SOEs adequate compensation. It should be noted, though, that compensation practices are not fully comparable across countries, as they may range from direct transfers, capital grants, reimbursements (ex-post and ex-ante), and budget appropriations, to state aids/subsidies. Some countries report that they do not compensate commercial SOEs and may allow SOEs to cross-subsidise from profit-making to loss-making activities, or allow for an indirect compensation expressed as a lower rate-of-return on their investment. The various mechanisms to compensate for a PSO may not necessarily follow a legally pre-defined procedure, but should avoid both over-compensation and under-compensation, and be based on objective and transparent criteria.
Are there requirements in place to provide commercial SOEs with adequate compensation for fulfilling their public service obligations?
Note: Chile is assessed as not providing commercial SOEs with compensation for its PSOs in the PMR database. However, there are two examples where compensation is required in the law: Televisión Nacional de Chile´s organic law (Law N°19.132, https://bcn.cl/2k3nr), establishes a compensation system in articles 35 to 37. Empresa Nacional de Petroleo´s organic law (Decreto con Fuerza de Ley N°1 de 1986, https://bcn.cl/3gkb1), article 9 paragraph 2, also contains a compensation system.
Source: OECD PMR database 2023.
According to the SOE Guidelines, SOEs’ economic activities should not benefit from or include granting any direct or indirect financial support that confers an advantage over private competitors, such as preferential debt or equity financing. Further, the state should pay attention to its ownership practices of state-owned financial institutions, which should not confer advantages inconsistent with market conditions. For example, state-owned financial institutions should not confer below-market lending or financing. If SOEs receive ad-hoc state support due to a crisis or emergency, such support should be in alignment with the principle of competitive neutrality (OECD, 2024[1]).
Nonetheless, SOEs in practice sometimes benefit from preferential access to equity and debt financing, including below-market borrowing rates, which may be inaccessible to private sector competitors. Additionally, governments at times provide financial assistance to SOEs in cases where these enterprises struggle to generate adequate returns on their investments (Box 2.1).
A recent OECD Trade Policy Paper addressed the role of government support in industrial sectors. State support measures include government grants, corporate tax concessions (especially common in high-tech sectors), debt and equity financing provided on below-market terms, and subsidised energy inputs (especially common in heavy industries). It highlights that SOEs are not only relatively large recipients of state support but can also be providers of support. The analysis has found enterprises with at least 25% government ownership to have received two to three times more support relative to their size than competitors with less government ownership. This increases ten times when looking only at government grants and below-market borrowings.
Source: OECD (2023[9]), “Government support in industrial sectors: A synthesis report”, OECD Trade Policy Papers 270, https://doi.org/10.1787/1d28d299-en
2.5.1. SOEs access to debt and equity financing
Table 2.10 provides a breakdown of the types of financing and funding arrangements available to SOEs. In 74% of jurisdictions (31 of 42), SOEs may be granted state guarantees on commercial debt. It is not possible to determine whether these are referring to explicit or implicit guarantees. In addition, 40% of jurisdictions allow preferential terms on commercial debt for SOEs, and in only 14% are there mechanisms in place to avoid preferential debt for SOEs.
As Figure 2.2 shows, in almost half of jurisdictions the disclosure requirement regarding state support covers specific types of support such as subsidies or state guarantees (when they amount to support). Thirty-five per cent of jurisdictions (17 out of 48) only require the disclosure of either guarantees or subsidies, but not necessarily both, or allow a partial disclosure whereby some SOEs may be excluded from making certain disclosures on state support measures.
Disclosure requirements on certain types of government assistance, such as grants, tend to only apply to SOEs that implement International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and disclose such information as part of their financial statements. Furthermore, in EU member states, state aid is further subject to approval by the EU Commission under the Rules on State Aid.1 However, in such instances, the line ministry tends to disclose such information rather than the SOE itself.
Source: OECD Working Party on State Ownership and Privatisation Practices.
Note: No mark represents no response, not non-existence of guarantees and preferential terms. In Chile, the Constitution states that the state can own enterprises only when permitted by law, and in compliance with the regulations applicable for the private sector. There is also a prohibition for the state and for SOEs (including financial SOEs) to provide credit to other SOEs. One of the objectives behind this public policy is precisely to avoid preferential access to credits by SOEs.
Source: OECD Working Party on State Ownership and Privatisation Practices.
2.5.2. Dividend policies and reporting of dividend payouts
In jurisdictions with profitable SOEs, dividends can accumulate to represent a significant amount of government revenues. Nevertheless, it is important to note that excessive dividend rents may hinder SOEs from performing efficiently and sustainably (OECD/World Bank, 2024[10]).
National practices for setting dividend policies can be classified into three categories:
Policy linked to optimal capital structure: a model where the state’s dividend expectations, communicated via established guidelines, are explicitly linked to the achievement of an optimal capital structure as measured by the maintenance of a target credit rating. The optimal capital structure is thus achieved if a target credit rating for the SOE has been obtained. This type of dividend policy is easier to implement for jurisdictions where the SOE portfolio is small, and thus an individual approach to determining the optimal capital structure is feasible.
Policy based on broad guidelines: a model that relies on broad guidelines that are applicable across all SOEs which pay out dividends. Such guidelines may encompass expectations on the minimum share of profits to be allocated to company reserves before dividends are paid out, or contingencies on the achievement of strategic objectives must be met before dividends are distributed.
Policy based on minimum share of net profit: this model sets an explicit minimum share of the net profit of the SOE that should be paid out as dividends. Such net profit targets may be changed depending on the enterprise’s financial position and operational and strategic goals. They may also vary across the SOE portfolio, with some SOEs directed to distribute a higher share of net profit than others.
Within the sample of jurisdictions surveyed, 21% do not implement any guidelines to define SOE dividend policies, and a third adopt broad guidelines (Figure 2.3). A predominant reason for this appears to be the heterogeneity of SOEs, and the interaction of dividend policies with the objectives of each enterprise.
Note: Costa Rica is excluded from this figure as SOEs are not expected to make profits and pay dividends
Source: (OECD/World Bank, 2024[10]).
Only three jurisdictions (Australia, New Zealand and Sweden) implement a dividend policy linked to optimal capital structure. Australia and New Zealand have a system where a target credit rating for the respective SOE is to be maintained. In Australia, the Commonwealth Government Business Enterprise Guidelines (GBE Guidelines) expect that SOEs add to shareholder value in their operations. Accordingly, SOEs are expected to aim for and achieve a principal financial target.
In terms of public disclosure of SOE dividends, Table 2.11 and Figure 2.4 show that all but two jurisdictions disclose dividends through government financial statements. Seventy-six per cent (22 of 29) include this information in aggregate reports and 34% in other types of reports, such as government financial statements.
Note: This figure does not include Costa Rica. More than one answer is possible.
Source: OECD Working Party on State Ownership and Privatisation Practices.
How does the state disclose dividends from SOEs in public reporting?
Source: OECD Working Party on State Ownership and Privatisation Practices.
Equal treatment of shareholders and other investors is underpinned by the protection and facilitation of all shareholders’ rights. Equal access to information should be ensured through disclosures that SOEs may make, including relating to ownership and control structures, such as golden shares and veto or other special rights.
As detailed in the SOE Guidelines, ownership, control and voting structures of SOEs should be transparent so that all shareholders have a clear understanding of their share of cash-flow and voting rights. It should also be clear who retains legal ownership of the state’s shares and where the responsibility for exercising the state’s ownership rights is located, including in complex corporate group structures.
Are SOEs required to disclose information about the control structures in SOEs?
Note: As discussed in OECD (OECD, 2023[11]), not all SOEs are compliant with the disclosure requirement. In Ukraine, only SOEs that are JSCs are required to disclose information on control structures.
Source: OECD Working Party on State Ownership and Privatisation Practices.
In 39% of the jurisdictions surveyed (17 out of 44), information on control structures must be disclosed (Table 2.12). In 23% of jurisdictions, disclosure requirements regarding control structures apply only to a sub-set of listed and large SOEs. Another 20% do not require SOEs to disclose information relating to their ownership or control structures, but publish such information in the company register, or include ownership specifications in their founding legislature and charter documents. Eighteen per cent of jurisdictions are not required to make any disclosures regarding control structures, such as through shareholder agreements.
References
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[2] OECD (2024), Competitive Neutrality Toolkit: Promoting a Level Playing Field, OECD Publishing, https://doi.org/10.1787/3247ba44-en.
[1] OECD (2024), OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises, OECD.
[3] OECD (2023), Competitive neutrality, https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/sub-issues/competitive-and-fair-markets/competitive-neutrality-in-competition-policy.html.
[9] OECD (2023), “Government support in industrial sectors: A synthesis report”, OECD Trade Policy Papers 270, https://doi.org/10.1787/1d28d299-en.
[11] OECD (2023), OECD Review of the Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises in Romania, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/fabf20a8-en.
[6] OECD (2021), “COVID-19 emergency government support and ensuring a level playing field on the road to recovery”, OECD Policy Responses to Coronavirus (COVID-19), OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/1e5a04de-en.
[5] OECD (2021), Ownership and Governance of State-Owned Enterprises: A Compendium of National Practices.
[7] OECD (2012), Competitive Neutrality: Maintaining a Level Playing Field between Public and Private Business, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264178953-en.
[4] OECD (2012), Competitive Neutrality: National Practices, https://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/50250966.pdf.
[10] OECD/World Bank (2024), Dividend payments by state-owned enterprises: Policies and Practices, OECD Publishing, https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/dividend-payments-by-state-owned-enterprises_975b5e78-en.html.
← 1. The Treaty on the European Union generally prohibits state aid unless it is justified by reasons of general economic development.