Re-migration does not receive much policy attention, except when it is measured to reflect failed reintegration, nor is data available to analyse patterns in a comprehensive way. Re‑migration is a common aspiration and return migrants with specific skills and resources are remigrating independently through a variety of existing regular channels. Those who have benefitted from AVRR support have fewer options for regular re‑migration channels than other migrants who have returned spontaneously.
Return, Reintegration and Re-migration
Understanding Return Dynamics and the Role of Family and Community
6. Understanding re-migration
Abstract
Reintegration assistance is designed to help returning migrants make a new start in their origin countries. While not all of them return permanently, re‑migration receives little policy attention. The policy questionnaire, to which 19 OECD member countries responded, revealed that Türkiye is the only country that collects data on re‑migration as part of its AVRR programme.1 Service providers in origin countries usually have information about return migrants during the first 12 months of assistance. In the absence of comprehensive monitoring mechanisms, it is often unclear whether return migrants remain after the first year or move on to another destination.
The empirical evidence presented in this section is limited to the re‑migration intentions of return migrants. The data is derived from the database on return migrants (DrEM), two national surveys conducted in Morocco and Tunisia (in 2020 and 2021), as well as the Migrant Border Crossing Study, which has collected data on Mexican migrants who cross the US-Mexican border unauthorised since 2007. The sample sizes of these surveys vary, ranging from 330 to 210 000 respondents. The results are not representative and do not capture actual re‑migration behaviour.
6.1. Re-migration aspirations of return migrants
The limited evidence available suggests that most returning migrants do not have a clear position on re‑migration, as shown in Figure 6.1. The majority is either unsure about a possible re‑migration (21% on average) or state that they never want to emigrate again (24% on average). The findings for Tunisia are consistent with the data collected in the MED-HIMS survey, where 18% of the 210 848 return migrants has the intention to emigrate again.
Figure 6.1. Re‑migration intentions of return migrants
Note: Sample sizes are as follows: Armenia (N=349), Morocco (N=330), Algeria (N=332), Tunisia (N=726) and Mali (N=350).
Source: Own calculations based on the data base for return migrants (DReM), available on www.jeanpierrecassarino.com/datasets/dataset-on-return-migrants/.
In Morocco, migrants tend to leave wage employment and 47% become entrepreneurs (Belghazi, Bouazzaoui and Malki, 2023[1]). As self-employment requires capital investment in productive assets and physical presence, at least in the initial stages, this group of returning migrants has a lower propensity to leave again. This may explain why the number of return migrants who are undecided or would like to re‑migrate is in the minority (Table 6.1).
Table 6.1. Re-migration intentions of Moroccan return migrants
Note: N=188 000.
Source: Haut Commissariat au Plan (HCP), Enquête nationale sur la migration internationale 2018‑19.
On average, 60% of return migrants wishing to re‑migrate intend to return to their previous host country. In Mali, this proportion is much lower: Only 36% intend to return to their last country of residence while 41% would like to settle in another country (Figure 6.2).
Figure 6.2. Location for potential re‑migration
Note: Sample sizes for Algeria (N=115), Armenia (N=182), Mali (N=93), Morocco (N=135) and Tunisia (N=281).
Source: Own calculations based on the data base for return migrants (DReM), available on www.jeanpierrecassarino.com/datasets/dataset-on-return-migrants/.
The MED-HIMS survey provides similar results for Tunisian return migrants. Of the 18% who intend to re‑migrate, 71% want to return to their previous country of residence. Migrants returning from European countries are more inclined to re‑migrate there (53.5%) than those who previously resided in the Middle East (7.6%).
Figure 6.3. Re‑migration intentions of Tunisian return migrants by previous region of residence
Note: N=210 742.
Source: Institut National de la Statistique, l’enquête nationale sur les migrations internationales (MED-HIMS), 2021.
Only a minority of those who intend to re‑migrate are sure about the exact time frame. The DReM survey, for example, highlights that on average more than 50% of respondents are unsure about the timing of their departure.2 Armenian return migrants are an exception, with a third planning to leave in less than six months (Figure 6.4).
Figure 6.4. Timeframe for potential re‑migration
Note: Sample sizes for Armenia (N=180), Mali (N=90) and Tunisia (N=147).
Source: Own calculations based on the data base for return migrants (DReM), available on www.jeanpierrecassarino.com/datasets/dataset-on-return-migrants/.
There is also some evidence of re‑migration intentions among Mexicans. Since many Mexicans are seasonal workers in the United States and Canada, most studies have focused on economic factors to explain circular migration, as Molina and Jewell did in the 1970s. The authors examined the factors that influence the propensity of male Mexican migrants to stay in the United States (“single‑trip migrants”), return permanently to Mexico (“stayers”), or engage in circular mobility (“multiple‑trip migrants”). The results suggest that Mexicans who are older at the time of their first migration to the United States are less likely to engage in circular mobility or return permanently to Mexico. Not surprisingly, Mexicans who come from more agricultural labour markets are more likely to engage in circular migration. In contrast, married men with a spouse in Mexico have a lower propensity to stay in the United States, underscoring the importance of family factors in both return and re‑migration aspirations. At the same time, remitters whose families depend on the income earned abroad are more likely to engage in circular mobility and less likely to be stayers (Molina and Jewell, 1970[2]).
More recent literature looks at re‑migration intentions of Mexican migrants who involuntarily returned from the United States. Based on post-deportation surveys, Martínez et al. show that most returnees do not intend to re‑migrate in the following week (55%), but the same proportion considers it for the future (Table 6.2).
Table 6.2. Re‑migration intentions of deported Mexican return migrants
Note: MI was estimated with the inclusion of the dependent variables. Cases in which values for dependent variables were missing were omitted from the analyses (N=47), ultimately yielding a sample size of 1 062.
Source: Migrant Border Crossing Study II, weighted data.
In examining various social factors and the effects of immigration enforcement programmes in the United States on the re‑migration intentions of Mexicans, the authors draw three conclusions. programme‑First, place attachment and strong social ties in the United States appear to be important factors: return migrants who call the United States “home” (31%), those who have more experience living in the country, and those who have family in the destination country (40%) are more likely to intend to return than those without these ties. In addition, those who returned through Operation Streamline3 are less likely to express re‑migration intentions, and long-term detention appears to be a significant deterrent to future migration intentions. However, the absolute effect of detention appears to be offset by having family in the United States. Third, respondents from Mexican states with higher unemployment rates are more likely, in relative terms, to report that they will cross again within the next week (Martínez, Slack and Martínez-Schuldt, 2018[3]).
The results of these surveys, which suggest that most return migrants have re‑migration intentions, need to be treated with some caution. Interviews provide a snapshot of respondents’ perspectives and may not fully capture intentions, which may evolve over time. The limited scope of existing research, focusing on return migrants from a small number of origin countries, raises doubts about the representativeness of these findings. In addition, sampling issues arise as not all respondents answered questions on re‑migration. In the DReM survey, for example, the sample size for the section on re‑migration was smaller than for other topics such as reasons for return. There is a potential conflict of interest for respondents who are AVRR beneficiaries if they openly express their aspiration to re‑migrate.
6.2. Determinants of re-migration
Despite the lack of data on realised re‑migration, studies point to various determinants that influence the propensity to re‑migrate. These include, but are not limited to, temporal factors, the mode of return, structural factors in origin countries, family and community dynamics, as well as individual characteristics of return migrants.
It has been shown that the number of years spent abroad increases the propensity to re‑migrate. Ecuadorian return migrants, for example, who previously lived in Spain describe their long absence as challenging, while maintaining transnational networks helps to plan for re‑migration (Mercier et al., 2016[4]). Other studies highlight that the propensity to re‑migrate decreases with each year spent in the origin country. In Armenia, Fleischer explains that those who returned between 2003 and 2005 are less likely to consider leaving Armenia again than return migrants who returned between 2008 and 2012. For those who returned later, contrary to Mercier et al.’s findings, the length of stay abroad does not have a significant impact on re‑migration intentions (Fleischer, 2008[5]).
The mode of return may also influence the propensity to re‑migrate. Several studies underline that voluntary return migrants are less likely to re‑migrate than those who returned involuntarily. The Swedish Migration Studies Delegation (DELMI), for example, interviewed 100 rejected asylum seekers who had returned to Iraq and Afghanistan. Re‑migration intentions were high due to limited access to reintegration support, social stigma, and lack of trust in state institutions (Lindberg, Vera-Larrucea and Asplund, 2021[6]). Schuster and Majidi, on the other hand, stress that deportation does not automatically lead to re‑migration, although it is the most likely outcome if fear, poverty, debt, and stigma persist. Particularly in the context of Afghanistan, re‑migration to neighbouring countries is a common coping strategy for protracted conflicts (Schuster and Majidi, 2015[7]). A similar rationale can be observed among deportees from Libya, for whom involuntary return does not represent the end of a migration cycle, but rather an interruption of ongoing mobility (Kleist, 2017[8]).
Structural factors in origin countries, such as political instability and poor socio‑economic conditions, can also trigger re‑migration. These factors are particularly present in post-conflict and fragile contexts, such as Somalia, where return migration has been on the rise in recent years due to expulsions from Saudi Arabia and European countries, refugee repatriations from Kenya and Yemen, and evacuations from Libya. Many return migrants settle in informal camps in cities such as Baidoa, Kismayo and Mogadishu, which continue to be plagued by violence and political unrest. High unemployment rates and the absence of social networks further complicate reintegration processes. While many return migrants aspire to re‑migrate, those with strong family support and community ties are less likely to do so (Owigo, 2022[9]).
The DReM survey also shows that return migrants struggle with structural factors in their origin countries (Figure 6.5). Most of the difficulties reported relate to the employment situation, such as unsatisfactory salary levels (38% on average) and poor working conditions (28% on average), as well as inadequate health and welfare systems (30% on average).
Figure 6.5. Difficulties faced by return migrants in Armenia, Mali and Tunisia
Note: Sample sizes: Armenia (N=349), Mali (N=350), Tunisia (N=726).
Source: Own calculations based on the data base for return migrants (DReM), available on www.jeanpierrecassarino.com/datasets/dataset-on-return-migrants/.
In the Western Balkans, re‑migration intentions of return migrants are partly linked to the diminishing prospects of economic convergence with EU countries, which, at current growth rates, could be decades or generations away. The global economic crisis of 2008 further damaged the region’s economy, leading to austerity measures that prevented substantial growth. The lack of visible progress and limited prospects for a better life and opportunities have created a deep-seated belief among return migrants that profound change is unattainable. In search of better living standards and greater opportunities, many return migrants are willing to re‑migrate to other countries (Vracic, 2023[10]).
In addition to structural factors, family and community dynamics can influence the propensity to re‑migrate. Many of the return migrants interviewed in Konzett-Smoliner’s study wanted to stay in Austria long-term, but considered to leave again ‑due to limited work opportunities for their foreign partner and reintegration challenges of their teenage children (Konzett-Smoliner, 2016[11]). Family tensions can also be a catalyst for re‑migration. In Iraq, return migrants who sought refuge in Jordan and Syria were able to gain physical distance and recover from the trauma of the 2003 war. In contrast, family members who remained in Iraq continued to show signs of post-traumatic stress, which negatively affected cohabitation (Iaria, 2012[12]).
Another reason for considering re‑migration may be the lack of social cohesion in local communities. In the Western Balkans, for example, incidents of discrimination, prejudiced discourse and hate crimes inspired by religious bias are a persistent reality. It is not uncommon for these incidents to target religious places, which are symbols of a community’s cultural and religious identity. This problem is particularly acute in areas inhabited by minorities and return migrants, which undermines fragile peace and reconciliation processes (Dyrstad, 2012[13]; Xhemaili, 2016[14]; Čermák, 2017[15]). Very few regions enforce laws against hate crimes and have adequate reporting mechanisms in place to protect vulnerable sites and communities (Vracic, 2023[10]).
The propensity to remigrate can also be attributed to individual characteristics of return migrants. Some studies analyse causalities between employment status and the likelihood of re‑migration. Unsurprisingly, unemployed return migrants are more likely to express re‑migration aspirations than those with stable employment in the origin country (Bilgili and Siegel, 2017[16]; Fleischer, 2008[5]; Mercier et al., 2016[4]). Return migrants who are self-employed, on the other hand, are more likely to remain in the origin country, as shown in (Table 6.3).
Table 6.3. Re-migration intentions of Moroccan return migrants by employment status
Note: Sample size: 87 745.
Source: Haut Commissariat au Plan (HCP), Enquête nationale sur la migration internationale 2018‑19.
Key informant interviews with Moroccans revealed two other factors that influence re‑migration. First, Moroccans who have acquired EU citizenship are more likely to engage in circular movements. Dual citizenship provides access to different labour markets and a degree of flexibility to assess which work opportunities are more lucrative. If job opportunities in Morocco are more attractive and other social factors – such as having family there – are in place, Moroccans are likely to return permanently (Belghazi, Bouazzaoui and Malki, 2023[1]).
Other factors that affect re‑migration include the employability of returnees and the absorptive capacity of local labour markets. In Morocco, re‑migration appears to be a common episode in the professional careers of many young people. This applies particularly to Moroccans who have studied and gained work experience in EU countries. They are often looking to diversify their experience at the international level, which may involve working in different regions. For this group of Moroccans, working practices in Moroccan companies seem to be a challenge and often the reason for seeking longer-term employment abroad (Belghazi, Bouazzaoui and Malki, 2023[1]).
Other individual characteristics include level of education and place of residence. In their study on return and re‑migration patterns in Poland, Fihel and Górny found that return migrants with tertiary education living in rural areas were 50% more likely to re‑migrate than highly educated return migrants living in urban areas. The propensity to re‑migrate was highest for return migrants with vocational education and relatively lower, but still significant, for those with secondary education. These findings reflect the structural changes in Polish industry during the post-communist transition, characterised by rising unemployment and declining investment. Return migrants with high qualifications were in a privileged situation, in contrast to those with average qualifications who continued to seek employment opportunities abroad (Fihel and Górny, 2013[17]).
6.3. Policy responses to re‑migration
The previous subsections show that a significant proportion of return migrants are considering re‑migration. This raises the question of whether current policies address these aspirations and what regular channels are available.
6.3.1. Policies to allow return with re‑migration possibilities in OECD countries
Many OECD countries have provisions that allow legal permanent residents to leave the host country for extended periods. The maximum length of absence varies across countries, ranging from six months to up to four years (Table 6.4). Norway is the only country without a fixed maximum period of absence. This depends on the validity of the residence permit, which can generally be up to two years after leaving Norway.
There is no one‑size‑fits-all approach to allowed absences for permanent legally residents. Legal provisions vary across and within countries, depending on the different categories of permanent residents (former EU Blue Card holders, long-term residents and beneficiaries of international protection), the destination (EU, non-EU, origin country) and the calculation of absences (fixed or based on presence over a period of time).
Table 6.4. Maximum duration of absence for permanent residents
Note: N=14 OECD countries.
Source: OECD Policy Questionnaire on Return, Reintegration and Remigration 2023.
Absences can be extended in some countries. The German Aliens Office can extend absences for settlement permit holders (Niederlassungserlaubnis), which is generally limited to six months. In Sweden, permanent residents must notify the Swedish Migration Agency for an extension of up to 24 months. In Austria, EU long-term residents can reside outside the European Economic Area (EEA) for up to 24 months for special reasons, including severe illness or military service. The Slovak Police Department decides on the extension of absences for permanent residents on a case‑by-case basis.
The maximum period of absence may be waived for long-term permanent residents. In Germany, the residence permits of individuals who have been legally resident for at least 15 years do not expire if their livelihood is secured.
Returning to origin countries may bear risks for individuals who have been granted international protection. Recognised refugees in Belgium can generally be absent for 12 months, but any travel to the origin country must be reported to the municipality of residence during the first five years of residence. As a return to the origin country calls into question the grounds for granting international protection, there is a risk of losing refugee status.
Migrants are often reluctant to give up residence status for return if it prevents them from re‑migrating back to the host country. This was evident in the limited uptake of return programmes offered to unemployed migrants during the economic downturn of the late 2000s (OECD, 2009[18]). Return programmes which grant financial assistance to return on the condition of not returning again may have little appeal (Box 6.1).
Box 6.1. When return assistance includes a re‑migration ban, it is less attractive
Japan’s Return Programme for Brazilians
Starting in the late 1980s, Japan opened the possibility for descendants of Japanese in Brazil and Peru (up to the third generation) to come to Japan for employment. The economic crisis of the late 2000s threw many of these “Nikkeijin” into unemployment at much higher rates than native workers. Retraining was difficult since few spoke Japanese. From April 2009 through March 2010, the Japanese Government offered grants to those who were willing to return to their home countries, on the condition they not come back to Japan on the same type of visa. The programme offered JPY 300 000 (about EUR 2 300 at the time) to each Long-Term Resident and an additional 200 000 (EUR 1 540) for each family member – and more for those entitled to unemployment insurance. Of those who departed Japan, 21 700 persons took the benefit, but about 80 000 preferred to return without taking a financial contribution, primarily due to the return ban. Japan lifted the ban in Oct 2013, allowing prior recipients to come back if they hold a labour contract for a year or more.
Source: Ministry of Justice; Ministry of Health Labour and Welfare, Japan.
6.3.2. Legal channels to the EU available for third country nationals
In addition to policies that permit extended absences for legal permanent residents, there have been a growing number of initiatives to open regular migration channels. These initiatives have been launched to address skills shortages in the EU and to improve migration co‑operation with partner countries. They vary in nature, ranging from skills mobility partnerships and international student programmes to circular mobility programmes. Circular mobility schemes target individuals with specific skills or seasonal workers, who are often employed in the agricultural sector (Box 6.2).
Germany, for example, has several initiatives for the admission of skilled workers from third countries. One such programme is the Partnership Approaches for Development-oriented Vocational Training and Labour Migration (PAM), which creates mobility models with partner countries in Ecuador, Nigeria, Viet Nam, and Jordan, including partnerships between public, private, and civil society actors (GIZ, 2023[19]). The THAMM project fosters labour migration and mobility with North African countries. It aims to provide a comprehensive approach to training and employment in co‑operation with national institutions in Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia (GIZ, 2022[20]).
At the European level, the EU Commission launched the EU Talent Partnerships in June 2021 as part of the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum. The Partnerships offer direct support for partner country nationals to study, work, or train in the EU. This is achieved through co‑operation between public authorities, employment services, social and economic partners, and education and training providers. The partnerships also provide capacity building support to partner countries in areas such as vocational training, reintegration of returning migrants, and diaspora mobilisation. In April 2022, the EU Commission announced the launch of the first Talent Partnerships with North African partners, specifically Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia (European Commission, 2021[21]). Discussions with Tunisia began in May 2023 to establish the framework and content of the partnership (DG Near, 2023[22]). In July 2023, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed with Tunisia, which includes the creation of a new visa programme for Tunisian citizens to work in the EU (European Commission, 2023[23]).
Box 6.2. Circular mobility schemes in the agricultural sector: examples from Spain and Canada
GECCO
Spain’s GECCO Programme is managed by the Directorate General for Migration with the aim to recruit workers in sectors with labour shortages (e.g. agriculture) which are difficult to fill with the national labour force. Upon their return, foreign workers can capitalise the knowledge acquired in Spain for their employability in the local labour market. Spain is taking steps to facilitate entrepreneurial skills for women selected through GECCO.
WAFIRA
WAFIRA seeks to improve the GECCO programme. The project aims to address a critical policy gap in the reintegration of Moroccan women who harvest strawberries each year in Huelva, Spain. Through WAFIRA, 250 Moroccan women will receive targeted reintegration support through business skills and entrepreneurship development training and financial assistance. WAFIRA is being implemented by the Secretary of State for Migration of the Spanish Ministry of Social Integration, Social Security and Migration, in partnership with the International Labour Organization (ILO), and in co‑operation with Spanish agri-food co‑operatives in Andalusia (Spain) and the Moroccan employment agency ANAPEC.
Seasonal Agricultural Worker Programme (SAWP)
Mexico and Canada have been promoting circular migration through the Seasonal Agricultural Worker Programme (SAWP) since 1974. The Ministry of Labour and Social Well-being as well as the National Employment Service in Mexico oversee recruiting and sending off agricultural workers to different provinces in Canada in accordance with the requirements of Canadian employers. The maximum stay allowed by the Canadian Government is eight months, during which Mexican workers are placed on different farms where they develop their activities. In accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding, agricultural workers have the right to proper lodgings, a fixed salary and other work guarantees. They are similarly protected by Canadian provincial and federal labour laws and are covered by provincial medical insurance. As of November 2022, 25 669 Mexican workers migrated under the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program.
Despite the expansion of these initiatives, finding the right pool of candidates remains a challenge as highlighted during the workshop in Tunisia. One example is the young professional exchange programmes set up by France and Switzerland in co‑operation with Tunisia. While these programmes offer young graduates the opportunity to do an internship abroad, they lack an integrated communication strategy to identify and reach suitable profiles. Circular migration programmes, on the other hand, show the opposite pattern: The programmes often benefit participants from the same regions or cities over several generations, limiting the opportunities for individuals without direct networks to find seasonal work in EU countries.
Outside of these structured initiatives, labour mobility faces fewer challenges in matching workers, as highlighted by private sector actors during the workshop in Morocco. Due to the growing demand for skilled labour, workers can be effectively matched to the needs of employers abroad without operating within the framework of a specific program. Prior migration experience strengthens candidate profiles. However, regular migration channels for third-country nationals often encounter obstacles that can complicate the migration process. These challenges include strict visa requirements, complex application procedures, and lengthy processes for recognising foreign qualifications, which can contribute to delays. Additionally, financial barriers, such as the need to demonstrate proof of financial means, can impede prospective migrants (Angenendt, Knapp and Kipp, 2023[24]).
There is limited evidence on the possibilities for AVRR beneficiaries to use these regular channels for re‑migration. In theory, AVRR beneficiaries are eligible for regular channels, according to the policy questionnaire used for this report. 8 of the 19 countries refer to specific pathways, including family reunification, international study programmes and labour and skills mobility partnerships. Prior AVRR beneficiaries are also eligible for circular migration programmes in Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic (hereafter “Czechia”) and Germany (Figure 6.6). Most OECD countries emphasise the need to fulfil legal conditions and visa requirements for re‑entry, rather than focusing on specific pathways. In Sweden, AVRR beneficiaries who received financial support and decide to re‑migrate may be liable for repayment.
Figure 6.6. Eligibility of AVRR beneficiaries to use regular pathways
Note: N=8 OECD countries.
Source: OECD Policy Questionnaire on Return, Reintegration and Re‑migration (2023).
However, the nature of the visa process makes it unlikely that AVRR beneficiaries would qualify for regular migration channels compared to those who have returned spontaneously. First of all, most AVRR beneficiaries are subject to a visa restriction for one to five years following return. Even when this visa restriction is lifted, rejection rates for visa applicants are already high for many origin countries (Table 6.5), primarily due to the perceived risk of overstaying. Discussions during the workshops in Morocco and Tunisia also showed that former AVRR beneficiaries, some of whom may have been rejected as asylum seekers, have an even higher risk profile for visa applications. The risk factors used by consular officials as grounds for refusal and not reported. However, applicants who have previously been removed or who have benefited from return assistance face a difficult task in convincing consular officials that they will comply with visa conditions. Their application is disadvantaged relative to applicants with no prior migration history.
Table 6.5. Schengen visas issued and refusal rates, by country of origin, 2022
Note: A short-stay visa issued by one of the Schengen States entitles its holder to travel throughout the 27 Schengen States for up to 90 days in any 180‑day period. Visas for visits exceeding that period remain subject to national procedures.
Source: EUROSTAT 2023.
6.4. Conclusion
In summary, this section covers the limited evidence on drivers and intentions of re‑migration in different contexts, both among return migrants in general and among migrants who have returned with assistance or through removal, as well as the options for re‑migration within regular channels. While re‑migration is clearly growing along with return migration, it is rarely captured. Studies on re‑migration intentions suggest that most returning migrants prefer to remain in their origin countries, although small sample sizes and non-response rates make these hard to consider representative or definitive. Nonetheless, the determinants of the propensity to re‑migrate are diverse, often rooted in structural factors in origin countries, as well as family and community dynamics.
In light of the scale of return to origin countries, and the strong interest in re‑migration among different categories of returning migrants, re‑migration is not highlighted in policies. Regular channels do not explicitly take re‑migration intentions into account, Prior migration experience can be an advantage if return was spontaneous and compliant with conditions of stay, but a disadvantage if return was assisted or forced. Use of regular channels with third countries has expanded over the last two decades, but there is very little information on re‑migration to a third country.
The large and visible investments in the context of AVRR are occurring at the same time as large investments in supporting regular channels for labour migration and mobility. While these occur on two separate tracks and with separate logic, they often involve the same institutional partners. Even without an explicit firewall – AVRR beneficiaries may be theoretically eligible to participate in some of these channels – no actor favours their participation in these programmes. In any case, AVRR beneficiaries are only a tiny fraction of all returning migrants.
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[14] Xhemaili, M. (2016), “Challenges of Western Balkan Countries on Their Road to EU Integration”, European Journal of Social Sciences Education and Research, Vol. 8/1, https://doi.org/10.26417/ejser.v8i1.p58-66.
Notes
← 1. The data on re-migration is not publicly available.
← 2. For Tunisia, the MED HIMS survey reports a higher share of those who are unsure about a possible re‑migration (66%), whereas 25% declared to wish to re‑migrate in one year, and 9% in two years or more.
← 3. Operation Streamline, created in 2005, is a joint initiative of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) in the United States, under which federal criminal charges are brought against individuals apprehended crossing the border illegally.