This introductory chapter explores the risk of foreign interference and its main channels within OECD countries, and the various public policy tools available to strengthen countries' resilience to this risk. It explains how the transparency of interest representation activities – and of influence activities more broadly – carried out on behalf of a foreign power is an important policy lever for countering the risk of interference.
Strengthening the Transparency and Integrity of Foreign Influence Activities in France
A Tool for Tackling Foreign Interference Risks
OECD Public Governance Reviews
1. Responding to the risks of foreign interference: A priority for OECD countries
Abstract
1.1. Introduction
Strengthening the resilience of democracies to the risk of foreign interference has become a priority for many OECD countries. While foreign interference is not new and has long been addressed through intelligence tools, the effects of globalisation, prevalence of digital technology and more open and participatory approaches to governance have greatly increased the possibilities for interference and destabilisation of political systems. By virtue of their increased openness and transparency, democracies are particularly vulnerable to foreign interference by autocratic systems, who seek to destabilise them by undermining these very values . In recent years, numerous cases of interference illustrate these trends, whether in the form of electoral interference, foreign information manipulation campaigns, political financing or covert lobbying activities.
To mitigate this threat, and as part of its Reinforcing Democracy Initiative, the OECD is supporting France in a reflection on the public policy tools that would help strengthen the integrity of the decision-making processes of public institutions. At the request of the Haute Autorité pour la transparence de la vie publique (HATVP) or French High Authority for Transparency in Public Life, this report aims to identify concrete courses of action to make legitimate foreign lobbying and influence activities more transparent, discourage foreign interference activities through deceptive or covert lobbying and influence practices, and to ensure that the control of movement of public officials and civil servants between the public and private sectors takes better account of this risk.
The analysis and recommendations proposed in this report are based on interviews with the various stakeholders in the French administration responsible for public integrity and national security issues, with academics, and on exchanges with international peers in other OECD countries (see Acknowledgements). Notably, Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom have introduced public policies that are a source of inspiration for France in these areas. This report also draws on the OECD's broader work on foreign interference, public integrity and the transparency and integrity of lobbying activities.
The recommendations put forward by the OECD will enable France to adapt its legal and institutional framework to strengthen the integrity of its democratic processes and complete its range of public policies to deal with the risk of foreign interference. This analysis will also feed into the reflections underway at the European level concerning the Defence of Democracy Package, which has been proposed by the European Commission. Already at the forefront of the fight against foreign information manipulation and the control of foreign investment in relation to national security, France will be able to strengthen its leadership at the European and international level in this area, work towards the more transparent practices of influence with the view of mitigating foreign interference, so as to meet the global challenges of the 21st century.
1.2. From influence to foreign interference
Foreign entities, such as governments, political organisations or companies, have a legitimate interest in promoting and representing their interests in French society as well as in other countries. Through their lobbying and other influence activities, they may seek to influence representatives of a foreign government and/or the public regarding domestic or foreign policies of the country in question to promote their own interests.
These practices generally have three main objectives: (i) to influence the country's decision-making processes, including by influencing public officials and public opinion so that they adopt positions that are favourable to the interests of the foreign entity; (ii) to influence the image of a foreign organisation, company or state within the government, media and population of another country; and (iii) to influence the country's foreign policy orientations, particularly its positions in international negotiations (e.g. on climate, taxation, trade, technology).
Similar to interest representation or lobbying activities that are aimed at influencing public decisions, foreign influence is not by definition an illegitimate activity. By acting on their own behalf or by engaging lobbying or influence actors, foreign entities can inform political debates, advance decision-making processes by considering more diverse interests and promote international co-operation. As such, foreign influence can be a positive force in public decision-making processes and, when it involves states, is a normal and legitimate phenomenon of international relations and diplomacy.
However, foreign influence activities can also be covert or deceptive, undermining the integrity of public policy-making processes. Influence gives way to foreign interference, particularly when such activities are intended not only to affect public decision-making in a deceptive manner, but also to intentionally harm the collective interest of the state in question in order to promote the interests of a foreign government.
1.3. Increased risk of foreign interference in a globalised world
Using covert or deceptive practices to promote one's own interests at the expense of other states has been part of the toolbox of governments to achieve their strategic objectives for as long as international relations have existed. However, these practices seem to have developed considerably in recent years in France and in other OECD countries (Thurber, Campbell and Dulio, 2018[1]). The increase in the risk of foreign interference and the vulnerability of open and democratic societies to it can be explained by several factors.
The circumstances created by globalisation, the rapid development of digital technologies, the re-emergence of authoritarian powers and increased geopolitical tensions have heightened the propensity of non-democratic regimes to engage in interference activities. With the aim of advancing their geopolitical, economic or even military interests (as is the case of Russian interference in Ukraine), these regimes can mobilise various intermediaries on their soil or in the target countries (companies, lobbying firms, non-governmental organisations, think-tanks, community organisations, etc.) to influence public decision-makers and decision-making processes in covert or harmful ways, using coercive economic instruments (investments in strategic sectors), as well as exploiting the possibilities offered by digital tools to manipulate opinions and decision-makers.
Economic and commercial exchanges in a globalised and open economy and increasing public participation in policy-making and consultation processes, with all stakeholders inherent in the functioning of open democracies, offer many opportunities for misleading influence and interference. Similarly, the openness and freedom of academic research, political analysis, civic space and cultural activities in democracies present vulnerabilities. The growing polarisation of public opinion and the lack of trust in public institutions are also seen as opportunities for malicious actors seeking to exploit them. The OECD Survey on the drivers of trust in public institutions shows that only four out of ten respondents (41.4%), on average in OECD countries, trust their national government. France is below this average, with just over a quarter of French people (28%) indicating that they have a high or moderately high level of trust in their national government (Figure 1.1).
Figure 1.1. Just over four in ten people trust their national government
Share of respondents who indicate different levels of trust in their national government (on a 0-10 scale), 2021
Note: Figure presents the within-country distributions of responses to the question “On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust the national government?” Mexico and New Zealand are excluded from the figure as the question on trust in national government is not asked. “OECD” presents the unweighted average across countries.
For more detailed information, please find the survey method document at http://oe.cd/trust.
Source: OECD Trust Survey (http://oe.cd/trust).
By affecting the integrity of public decision-making, foreign interference can have major consequences in the target countries, in terms of sovereignty, trust, economic growth and national security, and more broadly reinforce the democratic crisis facing OECD countries. Since public integrity is one of the drivers of trust in public institutions, foreign interference can significantly undermine citizens' confidence in public institutions. It can also cast doubt on the integrity of electoral processes - the very essence of democracies - when they are targeted.
1.4. The OECD's approach to the risks of foreign interference
Against this backdrop, the OECD has launched a reflection on the risk of foreign interference and the responses that democracies can provide in terms of public policy. This work is part of the OECD Reinforcing Democracy Initiative, adopted by OECD Ministers in November 2022: the Ministerial Declaration on Building Trust and Strengthening Democracy recognises that "democracies face global challenges of increasing scale and complexity, including (...) interference by non-democratic foreign actors" (OECD, 2022[2]). The OECD has since made progress in defining, characterising and responding to this risk.
1.4.1. Towards a common definition of foreign interference
Defining the notion of foreign interference is an important prerequisite for devising appropriate public policy responses. This can prove complex, as the phenomenon is perceived and defined differently by the different governments of OECD Member countries. Beyond the definition, the terminology itself is diverse: some countries, such as the United States and Canada, use both the term "foreign interference" and the term "malign foreign influence". Many countries, particularly in Europe, include the issue of foreign interference in the notion of "hybrid threats". The European External Action Service (EEAS) uses the expression "foreign information manipulation and interference".
In France, the term was recently defined in a report by the National Assembly on behalf of the Commission of Inquiry into political, economic and financial interference by foreign powers aimed at influencing or corrupting French opinion-formers, leaders or political parties as "hostile activities, deliberately kept secret, malicious and deceptive, undertaken by a foreign power and implemented by a multiplicitý of actors", and which "aim to undermine our societies and undermine our political and military sovereignty, but also economic and technological" (French National Assembly, 2023[3]). Box 1.1 gives an overview of the definitions that have been adopted, mostly recently, by other OECD member countries.
The OECD proposes a relatively similar definition for its work, which is the one used in this report: "intentional actions of state or non-state actors conducted in the interest of a foreign government. These activities are covert, non-transparent or manipulative in nature, and are aimed at negatively impacting the structures or processes of the political system, the economy, the society or the informational space”. Kinetic operations, such as sabotage attacks, targeted assassinations and terrorist actions, as well as overt or covert military operations, are excluded from the scope of this definition. This definition pays particular attention to distinguishing the concept of foreign interference from that used in certain non-democratic regimes by emphasising the negative impact on the target country and its sovereign functioning as a democratic state For example, the Foreign Agent Law in Russia mainly targets organisations, particularly civil society organisations, that receive funding from abroad. This is sufficient to characterise them as foreign agents, with civil and criminal consequences for these organisations and their staff.
Box 1.1. Definitions of "foreign interference" used in OECD jurisdictions
Australia
Foreign interference activities are "activities carried out by, or on behalf of, a foreign power, that are coercive, corrupting, deceptive or clandestine, and contrary to Australia's sovereignty, values and national interests. These activities involve foreign powers trying to secretly and improperly interfere in Australian society to advance their strategic, political, military, social or economic goals, adversely affecting individuals, information and infrastructure of governments, industry, academia, the media and communities".
Canada
The Canadian government defines foreign interference as "activities perpetrated by a foreign state, or proxy, that are harmful to Canada’s interests and are clandestine or deceptive or involve a threat to any person". Malicious foreign influence is defined as "a covert or non-transparent undertaking by, at the direction of, on behalf of, or with the substantial support of a foreign principal, with the objective of exerting influence and affecting outcomes. This is a subset of foreign interference" (a foreign principal is "an entity that is owned or directed, in law or in practice, by a foreign government. This could inter alia include a foreign power, a foreign economic entity, a foreign political organisation or an individual or group with links to a foreign government").
United States
According to the US Code, the term "foreign malign influence" means "any hostile effort undertaken by, at the direction of, or on behalf of or with the substantial support of, the government of a covert foreign country with the objective of influencing, through overt or covert means: (A) the political, military, economic, or other policies or activities of the government of the United States Government or of State or local governments, including any election within the United States; or (B) the public opinion in the United States".
An additional US definition of "foreign malign influence" is provided by the US National Intelligence Council. It includes “subversive, undeclared (including covert and clandestine), coercive or criminal activities by foreign governments, non-state actors, or their proxies to affect another nation’s popular or political attitudes, perceptions, or behaviours to advance their interests. This can include efforts to sow division, undermine democratic processes and institutions, or steer policy and regulatory decisions in favour of the foreign actor’s strategic objectives”.
The US Department of Homeland Security also uses the term "foreign interference", defined as "malign actions taken by foreign governments or foreign actors designed to sow discord, manipulate public discourse, discredit the electoral system, the development of policy, or disrupt markets for the purpose of undermining the interests of the United States and its allies".
European Union
The European Commission’s definition of "foreign interference" was stated in a working document on research and innovation adopted in 2022 as: "foreign interference occurs when activities are carried out by or on behalf of a foreign state-level actor which are coercive, covert, deceptive or corrupting and are contrary to the sovereignty, values and interests of the European Union".
The European Parliament's definition of January 2023 is more detailed: "foreign interference is illegitimate interference by foreign powers in the democratic and political processes of the EU and Member States. It includes covert or coercive interference by a foreign power in the political or governmental system from within, such as politicians and officials who are working for or under the influence of overseas regimes; influence on the political system from without, such as abuse of the lobbying system, corruption, espionage, cyber-attacks; and manipulative influence on public engagement or views, for example through online disinformation and manipulation campaigns ".
Source: Australia: https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about-us/our-portfolios/national-security/countering-foreign-interference/defining-foreign-interference; Canada: https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/ntnl-scrt/frgn-ntrfrnc/fi-en.aspx; United States: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/3059#e_2, https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/NIC-Declassified-ICA-Foreign-Threats-to-the-2022-US-Elections-Dec2023.pdf and https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/19_0717_cisa_foreign-influence-taxonomy.pdf; European Union: (European Commission, 2022[4])
1.4.2. Better characterisation of foreign interference
Foreign interference is a complex and constantly evolving process, which requires OECD governments to improve their knowledge and collective understanding of the interference practices used in democracies in the 21st century. The OECD is developing a mapping of the various channels that can be used by foreign powers to influence negatively and covertly the political processes, economies or societies of target countries. These channels are as follows, illustrated by recent concrete cases in Box 1.2:
Elite capture: the aim is to establish a relationship of subordination with political, economic, media or civil society elites so that they then act in favour of the country that is conducting the interference. Corruption, undue influence, the offer of gifts and other benefits, or the professional mobility of public decision-makers in foreign entities, are among the many tools used.
The financing of political life: necessary for democratic functioning, political financing is one of the main sources of undue influence and political capture in general (OECD, 2017[5]). Used by foreign actors, this can enable the influence of political processes of the target country, particularly if it enables the targeted candidates to enter parliament or government.
Electoral interference: attempts at electoral interference have taken a variety of forms, which have already been documented, aimed at manipulating the electoral process itself, from the campaign to the results (Charon and Jeangène Vilmer, 2021[6]). In addition to political financing, the development of misleading narratives through disinformation campaigns, smear attacks or computer hacking against candidates, and the funding of targeted advertising, are used by foreign powers to favour candidates or simply to weaken confidence in the democratic system of the target country.
Foreign information manipulation: campaigns to manipulate information have become common in an increasingly digital and globalised information environment (OECD, 2024[7]). Aimed at shaping public opinion and often reinforcing political polarisation and distrust in public institutions, information manipulation can take various forms: use of state media from a foreign power (e.g. Sputnik, Russia Today, Xinhua or CCTV); - investment in the target country's media, disinformation websites, troll farms and bots on social networks; influencers and journalists under foreign influence, artificial intelligence.
Economic coercion: international investment and trade offer a wide range of opportunities for foreign interference in today's globalised and interdependent world. Direct investment by foreign powers, state-owned companies or similar entities in strategic sectors or critical infrastructures can create strong dependencies. The use of trade restrictions, sanctions or indirect barriers targeting a specific country can also be a powerful lever for influencing international policy.
Misuse of academic and cultural co-operation, civil society organisations and think-tanks: The many opportunities for academic and cultural exchanges and travel, as well as the openness and freedom of academic research, political analysis, civic space and cultural activities in democracies, can easily pave the way for foreign interference. Whether directed at the ideas conveyed, the individuals (researchers, students, influencers, artists) or institutions themselves, the creation of financial dependencies, the capture of elites, propaganda and intimidation are all methods used by authoritarian powers in democracies. The Confucius Institutes, for example, have been documented on numerous occasions as being involved in such activities, under the guise of teaching language and culture (Charon and Jeangène Vilmer, 2021[6]).
Transnational control, surveillance and repression of diasporas: diaspora communities can offer several opportunities for interference, ranging from influencing local or national politics, to using diaspora businesses as a means of financing interference activities, or manipulating individuals involved in politics, administration or strategic economic sectors A foreign power can rely on embassies and consulates, on the community's cultural, social, political or religious organisations (which are formally independent but de facto linked to the host country), the community’s media (particularly in foreign languages or on social media networks), and can even in the most extreme cases resort to repression or intimidation.
Box 1.2. Examples of recent foreign interference
Qatargate: An interference operation within the European Parliament was uncovered by the Belgian security services, who found large sums of cash in the homes of several Members of Parliament and their staff. These sums were allegedly paid by a foreign power in exchange for interventions by these actors or the NGOs they headed within the European institutions in favour of the interests of the said power (European Parliament, 2023[8]).
Interference in the US elections: In 2018, thirteen Russian citizens and three Russian companies - including the Internet Research Agency (IRA) - were charged with seeking to influence the US political system, including the 2016 presidential elections, through information manipulation and failure to register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act. The charged defendants remain fugitives in Russia (U.S. Department of Justice, 2019[9]). In 2023, one Russian national, two Russian intelligence officers, and four US citizens were charged with engaging in a foreign malign influence campaign that included Russian funding and direction of separatist political groups in the United States to spread pro-Russian propaganda, sow discord, and advance the political campaign of a particular candidate in a local election (U.S. Department of Justice, 2023[10]).
Interference in a French news channel: In France, a TV journalist was influenced to broadcast biased information by a lobbyist working on behalf of the "Team Jorge" consultancy, which offers a whole range of practices and strategies for manipulating information, mainly for foreign states. The Story Killers investigation conducted by the Forbidden Stories consortium revealed interference by this company in thirty-three elections around the world, twenty-seven of which are said to have had an influence on the outcome (French National Assembly, 2023[3]).
Manipulation of information in the Netherlands following the crash of the MH17 plane: In 2014, through the intermediary of its Minister for Foreign Affairs and various media, Russia deliberately conveyed misleading information about the origin of the crash of the Malaysian Airlines flight, which caused 193 victims, when in fact it had been caused by a missile of Russian origin (Council of the European Union, n.d.[11]).
Information manipulation in Europe to discredit Western support for Ukraine: In 2022, the French agency VIGINUM was able to identify a digital information manipulation campaign targeting several European countries, including France. Known as "RRN", the campaign involved impersonating major national media and European government websites, with the aim of discrediting Western support for Ukraine (VIGINUM, 2023[12]). More recently, VIGINUM also uncovered the activity of a network called "Portal Kombat" made up of digital "information portals" disseminating pro-Russian content, targeting French-speaking audiences, seeking to polarise public debate and using mass automation to disseminate content (VIGINUM, 2024[13]).
Economic coercion of Lithuania: In 2021, following its official recognition of Taiwan and various measures aimed at limiting Chinese influence, Lithuania fell victim to large-scale economic coercion measures by China, causing trade between the two countries to fall by 90% without any measures being officially announced (NATO, 2022[14]; European Commission, 2023[15]).
Interference in universities in the United Kingdom: The UK Parliament's Security and Intelligence Committee has highlighted the important role played by Confucius Institutes in interfering in universities. Using the leverage generated by their funding, the intimidation of researchers, the control of Chinese students and the coercion of think-tanks, the committee considers that this type of interference threatens academic freedom (UK Parliament, 2023[16]).
These various channels of interference, often used concurrently, demonstrate the multiplicity of actors and tools that can be used by non-democratic regimes to advance their geopolitical or geo-economic objectives through interference in OECD countries. In addition to intelligence services or diplomatic institutions, many actors, particularly non-governmental, such as companies(state-owned or private), think-tanks, cultural institutions, civil society organisations, universities, diasporas and the media, are mobilised for these purposes, serving as cover for malicious activities. Their effective - and sometimes forced - mobilisation requires both a strategic approach and co-ordination of interference activities by the centres of government of foreign powers.
There are many instruments and tools of foreign interference, some of them legal, through which the various channels can operate to achieve the desired results. Espionage, hacking and other forms of cyber attack, bribery and lobbying are among the most common. Corruption is a general tool used in several channels to generate a means of control or pressure on elites, political decision-makers, companies, the media, researchers or diasporas in particular. Similarly, the use of lobbying activities or the representation of legitimate interests, such as the recruitment of lobbyists, can be very effective.
1.4.3. Raising the response to the risk of foreign interference
Given the multifaceted and co-ordinated nature of this threat, and the fact that it is more prevalent in OECD countries in the current geopolitical context, traditional intelligence tools, particularly counter-intelligence, no longer seem sufficient. A more co-ordinated approach by public authorities, the introduction of regulatory measures to increase the transparency of foreign influence in the many sectors in which it manifests itself, greater awareness of the society and potentially targeted players, and enhanced international co-operation in this area are some of the avenues for action for OECD governments to raise the level of their response to this risk and strengthen their resilience to foreign interference.
Numerous measures can therefore be put in place by governments, such as foreign influence transparency schemes; rules on the financing of political parties; the strengthening of rules on movement of public officials between the public and private sectors; advice for public officials on the risks associated with foreign interference, screening of foreign investments, contracts, technology purchases and media ownership; improved strategic communications; guidelines on protecting universities and civil society organisations from foreign interference; measures to protect electoral systems; and strengthening the capacity of law enforcement agencies to deal with transnational diaspora repression.
While a number of OECD countries have some of these tools at their disposal to tackle foreign interference - for example, foreign investment screening mechanisms to take account of national security, agencies in charge of cybersecurity, and increasingly to combat foreign disinformation as well - it is only in recent years that more holistic approaches to this risk have been put in place.
Since the enactment of offences in the Criminal Code Act 1995, introduced by the National Security Legislation Amendment (Espionage and Foreign Interference) Act 2018, Australia, for example, has established a national co-ordinator, a national strategy and an interdepartmental co-ordination mechanism dedicated to this risk and covering all the different channels. The United Kingdom revised its National Security Act in 2023 to better counter the risk of interference. Work is underway to adopt a more robust approach to this risk at the European level, particularly following the work of the Special Committee on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes in the European Union (INGE), with its reports published in 2022 and 2023.Furthermore, an Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI) came into force in December 2023 to discourage and respond to economic coercion; and the European Defence of Democracy Package proposed by the European Commission on 12 December 2023 proposes both the strengthening of election protection measures, as well as the establishment of transparency registers for interest representation activities carried out on behalf of non-European countries.
While public policy responses to the increased risk of interference are gradually being structured at the national level in OECD countries, strengthening international co-operation on this issue is an important area for action. Adopting common definitions of the risk of foreign interference, exchanging best practice on the public policies to be put in place, as well as information on the activities and methods of interference identified, and devising shared tools for tackling foreign interference in a globalised world, can enable a common and more robust approach to this risk, which all countries face to varying degrees. Ultimately, this may also lead to a broader dialogue on what constitutes legitimate foreign influence versus harmful interference, in order to expose and end the development of these practices, for healthier international relations that better address today’s pressing global challenges.
1.5. Transparency: An important lever for countering the risk of foreign interference
Among the public policies being implemented in the various OECD countries, transparency registers are gaining traction. Certain lobbying registers in force in OECD jurisdictions already cover some of the lobbying and influence activities carried out on behalf of foreign governments or entities linked to them. In Canada, for example, any person who, for a fee, engages in lobbying activities - within the meaning of the Canadian Lobbying Act - on behalf of "any government other than that of Canada", is required to register in the Registry of Lobbyists (Government of Canada, 1985[17]). Similarly, for European Union institutions, the 2021 Interinstitutional Agreement on a common transparency register specifies that authorities of third countries, including their diplomatic missions and embassies, are excluded from the scope of application "except where such authorities are represented by legal entities, offices or networks without diplomatic status or are represented by an intermediary", who are therefore required to register and disclose their interest representation activities carried out on behalf of third countries (EUR-Lex, 2021[18]).
Other countries have opted for a separate transparency register covering a wider range of influence actors and activities, modelled on the Foreign Agent Registration Act (FARA) that has existed in the United States since 1938. Australia has set up a similar system with the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act in 2018, and the UK is also in the process of establishing the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme following the update of the National Security Act in 2023. These three registers are separate from the existing lobbying registers under the Lobbying Disclosure Act in the US, the Lobbying Code of Conduct in Australia, and the Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act 2014 in the UK. Canada is also currently considering the possibility of establishing a separate foreign influence transparency registry (Public Safety Canada, 2023[19]; Public Safety Canada, 2023[20]). In December 2023, as part of the European Defence of Democracy Package, the European Union also presented a proposal (European Commission, 2023[21]) of a Directive that would establish harmonised requirements in the internal market regarding the transparency of interest representation activities carried on behalf of third countries (European Commission, 2023[22]).
By making the declaration of influence activities mandatory, these registers aim to strengthen transparency of foreign influence activities and increase their integrity. This allows decision-makers and citizens to know whose interests are being defended, and influence not to be seen as an attempt to interfere. By increasing the transparency of legitimate activities, and thus also facilitating the detection of undeclared or deceptive activities, such tools can provide a powerful incentive for the various actors mobilised by foreign powers in interference activities to refuse to do so and alert decision-makers and other targets to the risk of interference.
In France, the current provisions on the transparency of interest representation activities do not explicitly exclude activities carried out on behalf of third countries, but this type of activity was also not covered in practice until recently. Indeed, within the meaning of Article 18-2 of Law 2013-907, an interest representative carrying out an interest representation activity on behalf of a foreign state could be registered in the directory, as the law does not explicitly exclude foreign States as “clients” of interest representation activities. This is why a government circular dated October 2021 on "reinforcing the transparency of foreign influence actions carried out with State officials" mentioned the transparency mechanism for relations between interest representatives and public authorities as an effective lever for tackling foreign interference. In practice, however, interest representation activities carried out on behalf of foreign states were not declared in the directory of interest representatives.
The entry into force in October 2023 of new HATVP guidelines on the registration of interest representatives has clarified this point and increased the transparency of interest representation activities carried out on behalf of foreign states. As a result, consultancies and law firms must now declare whether any or all their activities have been carried out on behalf of third parties. Any legal entity other than the one carrying out the interest representation, and on whose behalf it is carried out, must be declared as a third party. This may include national public administrations, but also foreign public authorities when the interest representation activity is carried out in relation to national public officials covered by the law (HATVP, 2023[23]). Although the application of these new guidelines will not cover all actors carrying out lobbying and influence activities on behalf of third countries, it is nevertheless a first step towards greater transparency, similarly to the update of the European Union transparency register in 2021.
To date, five OECD countries and the European Union thus have a transparency tool that makes all or some of the lobbying and influence activities carried out on behalf of foreign governments transparent (Figure 1.2).
Figure 1.2. Countries that have a transparency tool that makes certain lobbying activities carried out on behalf of foreign governments transparent
Source: Updated 2024 data based on (OECD, 2021[24]).
In response to the growing and multi-faceted risk of foreign interference, OECD countries, including France, are developing responses to strengthen their resilience and are seeking to implement public policy tools that promote transparency that go beyond responses related to security, in line with their democratic values. The OECD's analysis in this report is designed to support France in this area.
References
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[1] Thurber, J., C. Campbell and D. Dulio (2018), Congress and Diaspora Politics: the Influence of Ethnic and Foreign Lobbying, State University of New York Press, New York, https://sunypress.edu/Books/C/Congress-and-Diaspora-Politics2 (accessed on 2 March 2020).
[10] U.S. Department of Justice (2023), Press release: “U.S. Citizens and Russian Intelligence Officers Charged with Conspiring to Use U.S. Citizens as Illegal Agents of the Russian Government”, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-citizens-and-russian-intelligence-officers-charged-conspiring-use-us-citizens-illegal#:~:text=A%20federal%20grand%20jury%20in,influence%20campaign%20in%20the%20United.
[9] U.S. Department of Justice (2019), Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III. Report On The Investigation Into Russian Interference In The 2016 Presidential Election. Volume I of II Submitted Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 600.8(c), https://www.justice.gov/archives/sco/file/1373816/download.
[16] UK Parliament (2023), Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, China Report, https://isc.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/ISC-China.pdf.
[13] VIGINUM (2024), Portal Kombat: Un réseau structuré et coordonné de propagande prorusse, https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/files/files/20240212_NP_SGDSN_VIGINUM_RAPPORT-RESEAU-PORTAL-KOMBAT_VF.pdf.
[12] VIGINUM (2023), RRN: une campagne numérique de manipulation de l’information complexe et persistante, https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/files/files/13062023_RRN_une%20campagne%20num%C3%A9rique%20de%20manipulation%20de%20l%27information%20complexe%20et%20persistante.pdf.