Strengthening the Transparency and Integrity of Foreign Influence Activities in France

2. Enhancing the framework for tackling foreign interference in France

Abstract

This chapter presents the French legal and institutional framework for tackling foreign interference. In particular, the chapter details the relevant measures already in place and explains how this framework could be strengthened beyond the actions of the intelligence services by public governance tools to enhance the transparency of public life in France.

2.1. Foreign interference: A priority for the French government

The risks of foreign interference in society and the functioning of democracy are a priority for the French government. Identifying and characterising the aims, methods and consequences of foreign interference on sovereignty and national interests are among the priority issues of France's 2019 Stratégie nationale du renseignement (SNR) or National Intelligence Strategy (Box ‎2.1).

Box ‎2.1. The National Intelligence Strategy (2019)

Drawn up by the National Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism Coordination Committee (CNRLT), the National Intelligence Strategy concerns the entire intelligence community in France. It is subject to interministerial review and validation by the President of the Republic at the National Intelligence Council (Conseil National du Renseignement).

The 2019 SNR is the second edition, following a first edition in 2014. It identifies four priority issues:

• The terrorist threat.

• Anticipating crises and the risk of major disruptions.

• Defending and promoting France's economic and industrial interests.

• Combating cross-cutting threats.

In particular, the SNR highlights the activities of "interference and espionage carried out by several foreign powers in an uninhibited manner [which] cause major damage to our interests (political, strategic, scientific, etc.), our sovereignty and those of our European partners".

Among the worrying forms of interference, the SNR notes in particular "the acuteness and sophistication of actions to manipulate information, especially those orchestrated by foreign powers hostile to our interests", and stresses the need to identify the actors of the threat and their targets, to describe their aims and methods, and to assess the consequences for France's sovereignty and interests, in order to inform the political decision to respond to these hostile actions.

Source: SGDSN (2019[1]), La stratégie nationale du renseignement, Secrétariat général de la Défense et de la Sécurité nationale, https://www.academie-renseignement.gouv.fr/files/piece_jointe_2_strategie_Nationale_du_Renseignement.pdf.

In recent years, the subject has emerged as a major topical issue. In 2021, a plan was introduced to raise awareness of foreign interference and the launch of discussions to ensure greater transparency of foreign influence on public life (certain media reports referred to these discussions as the introduction of a "FARA à la française") and better protection of knowledge and know-how in higher education and scientific research (French Parliamentary Delegation for Intelligence, 2023[2]; Intelligence Online, 2023[3]). In October 2021, a government circular on increasing the transparency of foreign influence actions targeting State officials was sent to the ministries. This circular identifies levers to be implemented to deal with this issue, namely: (i) the relevant integrity standards in terms of foreign influence attempts for the most senior French public officials; (ii) whistleblowing procedures; (iii) strengthening the transparency mechanism for relations between interest representatives and the public authorities.

A number of parliamentary committees and missions have also taken up the issue, including a Senate information mission on the impact of non-European state influence in the French university and academic sphere (French Senate, 2021[4]), a National Assembly Commission of Inquiry into the political, economic and financial interference of foreign powers (French National Assembly, 2023[5]), the Parliamentary Delegation for Intelligence in its 2023 annual report (French Parliamentary Delegation for Intelligence, 2023[2]), as well as a Senate Commission of Inquiry into public policies relating to foreign influence operations, which began its work in February 2024. The Council of State (Conseil d’État) is also taking an interest in the subject as part of its 2024 annual study on the theme of sovereignty (French Council of State, 2023[6]).

Finally, in February 2024, a bill aimed at preventing foreign interference in France, which proposes to establish "a legislative mechanism making it compulsory to register actors influencing French public life on behalf of a foreign power", was tabled in the National Assembly. This bill, under discussion at the time of publication of this report, is inspired by the provisions in force in the United States and the United Kingdom (French National Assembly, 2024[7]).

2.2. Foreign interference is a phenomenon well covered by the legal framework and public authorities in France

Preventing foreign interference in France is based on “a relevant legal framework and effective institutions to tackle this scourge (French National Assembly, 2023[5]). These include the institutions listed in Table ‎2.1 and the following mechanisms:

• The system for punishing violations of the fundamental interests of the Nation (Criminal Code).

• Restrictions on foreign funding of political parties and election campaigns.

• The system for tackling breaches to integrity, including corruption, influence peddling and unlawful acquisition of interest.

• The foreign investment screening mechanism.

• Measures to tackle digital interference.

• The framework for interest representation activities.

Table ‎2.1. Institutional overview of institutions working to prevent and combat foreign interference in France

Institution	Status	Main missions (relevant to foreign interference)
National Intelligence Community
Directorate-General for Internal Security (DGSI)	Specialised French intelligence service attached to the Ministry of the Interior	The DGSI has general intelligence powers to tackle all activities likely to undermine the fundamental interests of the nation and national security, in particular the prevention of interference activities by foreign powers on national territory.
National Customs Intelligence and Investigation Directorate– (DNRED)	Specialised French intelligence service reporting to the Ministry of the Economy and Finance	The DNRED is responsible for implementing customs intelligence, control and anti-fraud policies.
Tracfin	National financial intelligence unit reporting to the Ministry of the Economy and Finance	Tracfin contributes to the development of a healthy economy by combating clandestine financial circuits, money laundering and the financing of terrorism. Its priority missions are: (i) the fight against economic and financial crime; (ii) the fight against public finance fraud; (iii) the defence of the fundamental interests of the Nation.
Secretariat General of National Defence
General Secretariat for Defence and National Security(SGDSN)	Prime Minister's department	The SGDSN assists the Prime Minister in fulfilling their responsibilities in the area of defence and national security. Its remit covers military planning, deterrence policy, internal security contributing to national security, economic and energy security, the fight against terrorism and crisis response planning.
French National Agency for Information Systems Security (ANSSI)	National Department	Reporting to the SGDSN, the ANSSI is responsible for information systems security and cyber defence.
Vigilance and protection service against foreign digital interference (VIGINUM)	National Department	State technical and operational service responsible for vigilance and protection against foreign digital information manipulation.
Combating breaches to integrity, including corruption and trafficking of influence
French Anti-Corruption Agency (AFA)	Department with national jurisdiction under the joint authority of the Ministers of the Economy and Justice.	The AFA monitors the existence and effectiveness of anti-corruption measures put in place by public authorities and major companies. It publishes a national anti-corruption plan and carries out an inventory of anti-corruption measures in public administrations.
National Commission for Campaign Accounts and Political Financing (CNCCFP)	Independent administrative authority	The CNCCFP receives campaign accounts from candidates in all elections and political consultations (with the exception of municipal constituencies with a population of 9 000 or less) and checks that their accounting obligations have been met.
High Authority for Transparency in Public Life (HATVP)	Independent administrative authority	The HATVP is responsible for preventing conflicts of interest among public officials by checking the declarations of interest and assets made by some of them, monitoring the movement between the public and private sectors of certain public officials and civil servants, and administering the register of interest representatives.
Central Office for Combating Corruption and Financial and Tax Offences (OCLCIFF)	National department of the Central Directorate of the Judicial Police	The OCLCIFF conducts investigations into national and international corruption, breaches of probity, breaches of business law, complex tax fraud and the laundering of such offences. It also investigates possible cases of corruption of elected representatives by foreign powers.
Justice
National Financial Prosecutor's Office (PNF)	Public prosecutor's office with national jurisdiction	The PNF is responsible for serious economic and financial crime. It deals with offences against public finances, probity, the proper functioning of financial markets and free competition.

Note: This table lists the main institutions that are relevant to this report, but is not intended to be an exhaustive list of institutions with expertise in foreign influence.

Source: Author’s elaboration.

2.2.1. Crimes against the fundamental interests of the Nation in the Criminal Code

While the concept of "interference" as such is not covered by criminal law, the phenomenon is covered by through violations against the fundamental interests of the Nation, which are set out in Title I of Book IV of the Criminal Code, and are defined in article 410-1 of the Criminal Code as damage caused to "its independence, [its] territorial integrity, [its] security, [the] republican form of its institutions, [its] means of defence and diplomacy, [the] safeguarding of its population in France and abroad", [the] equilibrium of its natural environment and [the] essential elements of its scientific and economic potential and its cultural heritage" (Article 410-1). Book IV of the Criminal Code on crimes and offences against the nation, the State and public order also defines a number of offences likely to relate directly to interference by a foreign power, such as treason, espionage and various threats to national defence.

2.2.2. Controlling the financing of political parties and election campaigns

The framework for the financing of political parties and election campaigns is set out in Act no. 88-227 of 11 March 1988 on the financial transparency of political life and strengthened by Act no. 2017-1339 of 15 September 2017 on promoting trust in political life. The Commission nationale des comptes de campagne et des financements politiques (CNCCFP) or National Commission for Campaign Accounts and Political Financing (oversees the campaign accounts of candidates in all elections and political parties' compliance with their accounting obligations. In 2017, reforms to the political financing system were introduced as part of the law on promoting trust in political life, following questions about the financing of a French political party's presidential campaign through a Czech-Russian bank. For both election campaigns and political parties, the law now prohibits loans from any legal entity other than political parties filing their accounts with the CNCCFP and banks or credit companies with registered offices in the European Economic Area (Table ‎2.2). The OECD Public Integrity Indicators show that France meets 100% of the regulatory criteria for political financing, whereas the OECD average is 73% (OECD, 2023[8]).

Table ‎2.2. Summary of rules on private funding of political parties and election campaigns

Source of financing		Donations and subscriptions	Loans and guarantees
Individuals	French nationality or resident in France	Authorised (up to a maximum of EUR 7 500 per year for parties and EUR 4 600 per election for candidates)	Authorised (subject to the legal interest rate and, for parties, 24 months and EUR 15 000, for candidates, 18 months and the campaign expenditure ceiling)
	Of foreign nationality and not resident in France	Forbidden	(not specified in the laws and regulations)
Legal entities	Domestic law	Forbidden (except other parties)	Prohibited (except other parties and banks)
	Under foreign law (including States)	Forbidden (even indirectly)	Forbidden (except banks domiciled in the EU or EEA)

Source: Assemblée nationale (2023[5]), Rapport fait au nom de la Commission d'enquête relative aux ingérences politiques, économiques et financières de puissances étrangères visant à influencer ou corrompre des relais d’opinion, des dirigeants ou des partis politiques français.

2.2.3. The system for combating breaches to integrity, including corruption, and trafficking of influence

The fight against corruption in France took a decisive step forward starting in the eighties, with the Act of 13 July 1983 on the rights and obligations of civil servants - which prohibits civil servants taking an interest in a company subject to the control of their administration - and the adoption in 1993 of the first Sapin Act on the prevention of corruption and the transparency of economic life and public procedures. Between 2013 and 2017, a number of laws established operational tools to combat corruption and promote transparency in public life.

• Law 2013-907 on the transparency of public life of 11 October 2013 required more than 18 000 public officials, both elected and non-elected, to file both a declaration of assets and a declaration of interests online with the High Authority for Transparency of Public Life (HATVP).

• Act 2013-1117 of 6 December 2013 relating to the fight against tax fraud and large economic and financial crime created the National Financial Prosecutor's Office and the Central Office for Combating Corruption and Financial and Tax Offences, which are responsible for investigating the most complex cases of corruption.

• Law 2016-1691 of 9 December 2016 on transparency, the fight against corruption and the modernisation of economic life requires companies to set up an anti-corruption programme to identify and manage corruption risks. Public bodies are also required to adopt procedures to prevent breaches of integrity. The law creates the French Anti-Corruption Agency (Agence française anti-corruption, AFA), provides for the creation of an online Register of interest representatives to be implemented by the HATVP, and introduces a system to protect whistleblowers.

• Law 2017-1339 of 2017 for promoting trust in public life strengthens the ethical obligations of members of government and parliament and creates mandatory penalties of ineligibility for breaches of probity.

2.2.4. The foreign investment screening mechanism

France has a comprehensive system for screening foreign investment (Investissements étrangers en France, IEF), which covers sectors relating to national defence or likely to jeopardise public order and activities essential to safeguarding the country's interests (governed by article L. 151-3 of the Monetary and Financial Code). In practical terms, any foreign entity wishing to invest in these sectors must apply to the Treasury Department for prior authorisation. The decision to treat a foreign investment as foreign interference is taken on a "case-by-case" basis by the Interministerial Committee on Foreign Investment in France (CIIEF), which brings together government representatives to analyse the sensitivity of the French company's activity to national security issues.

2.2.5. Measures to combat foreign digital interference

In June 2021, France created a national agency to combat information manipulation from abroad aimed at "destabilising the State" (VIGINUM), reporting to the General Secretary for Defence and National Security (SGDSN). VIGINUM's main mission is to detect and characterise foreign digital interference affecting digital public debate in France and uses four legal criteria to characterise foreign digital interference: (i) potential harm to the fundamental interests of the Nation; (ii) involvement of a foreign actor, which does not necessarily mean that the attack is attributed to a designated protagonist; (iii) manifestly inaccurate or misleading content ; (iv) artificial or automated, massive and deliberate dissemination, or the intention to carry out such dissemination.

2.2.6. The framework for interest representation activities

The provisions of the Sapin II Act establish legal recognition of the existence of lobbying (“interest representation”), while addressing the risks associated with lobbying through mandatory registration in a public register and the application of ethical obligations for lobbyists. While interest representation activities carried out on behalf of foreign states were not explicitly excluded from the legal framework, in practice they were not included in the register. Since the publication and entry into force of the new HATVP guidelines in October 2023, third countries must be declared as clients of consultancies carrying out lobbying activities.

2.3. The legal and institutional framework needs to be strengthened to better address the issue from the perspective of transparency in public life and breaches to integrity

While France has a solid legal and institutional framework for dealing with the risks of foreign interference from various angles, this framework remains incomplete. In particular, the two parliamentary reports published in 2023 on this subject note that tackling foreign interference still relies too heavily on intelligence services and the agencies that support them. Among the priorities for reform, the reports identify the need for transparency for the interests of natural persons or legal entities operating in the public sphere and carrying out interest representation activities, and for tighter control of movement of public officials in the public and private sectors.

The following chapters provide recommendations on strengthening the transparency of foreign lobbying and influence activities (Chapter 3) and the integrity standards applicable to senior French public officials and civil servants in matters of foreign influence (Chapter 4).

References

[6] French Council of State (2023), La souveraineté , nouveau cycle annuel de conférences du Conseil d’État et sujet de l’étude annuelle 2024, https://www.conseil-etat.fr/actualites/la-souverainete-nouveau-cycle-annuel-de-conferences-du-conseil-d-etat-et-sujet-de-l-etude-annuelle-2024.

[7] French National Assembly (2024), Proposition de loi No. 2150 visant à prévenir les ingérences étrangères en France, https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/16/textes/l16b2150_proposition-loi.

[5] French National Assembly (2023), Rapport fait au nom de la Commission d’enquête relative aux ingérences politiques, économiques et financières de puissances étrangères visant à influencer ou corrompre des relais d’opinion, des dirigeants ou des partis politiques français, https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/16/rapports/ceingeren/l16b1311-t1_rapport-enquete.

[2] French Parliamentary Delegation for Intelligence (2023), Rapport de la délégation parlementaire au renseignement relatif à l’activité de la délégation parlementaire au renseignement pour l’année 2022-2023, https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/16/rapports/dpr/l16b1454_rapport-information.pdf.

[4] French Senate (2021), Rapport No. 873 fait au nom de la mission d’information sur les influences étatiques extra-européennes dans le monde universitaire et académique français et leurs incidences, https://www.senat.fr/rap/r20-873/r20-8731.pdf.

[3] Intelligence Online (2023), Après Londres, Paris tentée par un vrai modèle FARA pour lutter contre les influences étrangères, https://www.intelligenceonline.fr/renseignement-d-etat/2023/04/05/apres-londres-paris-tentee-par-un-vrai-modele-fara-pour-lutter-contre-les-influences-etrangeres,109930609-art.

[8] OECD (2023), OECD Public Integrity Indicators: Indicator on “Accountability of Public Policy Making”, https://oecd-public-integrity-indicators.org/indicators/1000097?country2=FRA.

[1] SGDSN (2019), La stratégie nationale du renseignement, Secrétariat général de la Défense et de la Sécurité nationale, https://www.academie-renseignement.gouv.fr/files/piece_jointe_2_strategie_Nationale_du_Renseignement.pdf.