391. Another simplification measure could consist of excluding jurisdictions from the GloBE rules which have less than a certain percentage of the MNE Group’s pre-tax profit. This may result in a significant reduction of compliance costs, while continuing to ensure that the GloBE rules remain effective in addressing some of the most important tax planning structures using low taxed principal or entrepreneurial IP structures.
392. Under these structures, an MNE shifts the ownership of valuable IP into a vehicle that is subject to low effective rates of taxation. The vehicle then exploits the IP and/or enters into manufacturing and/or sales and marketing arrangements with other group entities which often allow the IP vehicle to capture the full return from the exploitation of that IP. The net effect of these arrangements is that significant amounts of profits are rolled-up into the IP vehicle with the other entities in the group deriving only nominal returns.
393. The changes to the transfer pricing guidance that were introduced under Actions 8-10 of the BEPS Action Plan prevent MNEs from shifting intangible income into such IP vehicles unless they perform relevant functions in respect of the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation of the transferred intangible (commonly referred to as DEMPE functions). The requirement imposed on the IP holding vehicle under Actions 8-10 to undertake the related DEMPE functions impedes the MNE from splitting the ownership of its valuable IP amongst a large number of different low taxed IP vehicles.2
394. A de minimis profit exclusion rule would build on these operational constraints imposed on MNEs by Actions 8-10. It would operate by targeting the GloBE rules at only those jurisdictions above a certain de minimis profit threshold.3 Because IP vehicles will generally be the most profitable within the group, a low de minimis threshold, such as 2.5% of the group’s pre-tax profit, would ensure the GloBE rules applied to all the MNE’s IP vehicles while avoiding the compliance burden associated with applying the rule to every jurisdiction.
395. Effectively, this simplification measure puts a ceiling on the number of jurisdictional ETR calculations. For example, if the de minimis threshold were to be set at 2.5% of the group’s pre-tax profit, then a maximum of 40 jurisdictional ETR calculations would be required, rather than the 100 or more calculations that may otherwise be required. In order to apply this simplification measure, MNEs would still be required to compute the pre-tax profit for every jurisdiction; however, MNEs would only need to compute covered taxes for jurisdictions with profits above the de minimis threshold. To reduce the compliance burden of computing pre-tax profit for every jurisdiction, it may be possible to use unadjusted CbC data (or potentially adjusted for the same items described in the context of the CbCR ETR safe-harbour), assuming the CbC data source was the parent’s consolidated financial accounts.
396. Setting the de minimis threshold at a relatively low percentage should prevent an MNE from fragmenting its IP holdings among a large number of low tax structures in order to avoid the GloBE rules. Given the nature of the DEMPE functions required to support the transfer of the IP, it would not seem likely or commercially practical, at an operational level, for an MNE to divide its IP amongst a sufficiently large number of jurisdictions to reduce the profitability of each IP vehicle below the de minimis threshold.
397. In order to be implemented, further technical work would be required in several areas, including:
(a) Whether the denominator of the de minimis calculation would be global pre-tax profit (i.e., including the parent jurisdiction) or foreign pre-tax profit (i.e., excluding the parent jurisdiction);
(b) The treatment of losses, which absent an adjustment could upset the ceiling feature of the simplification measure;
(c) How to best coordinate this rule with the management of temporary differences, in particular how to deal with jurisdictions that bounce in and out of scope from year-to-year;
(d) Whether further rules are necessary to neutralise the risk of fragmentation; and
(e) Where to set the de minimis percentage balancing simplification with other considerations, including the overall effectiveness of the GloBE rules.
398. A de minimis based simplification measure could also be structured as a fixed de minimis threshold, such as EUR 100,000, rather than a relative de minimis threshold, such as 2.5% of group profit. The benefit of the relative threshold is it puts a ceiling on the number of jurisdictional ETR calculations for every MNE whereas a fixed threshold would apply differently across MNEs and in some cases may not result in material simplification. These two approaches could also perhaps be combined, for example, the lesser of 2.5% of group profit and EUR 100,000.