This chapter sheds light on how countries are upgrading their institutional architecture to strengthen information integrity. It analyses the role of strategic frameworks and effective intergovernmental co-ordination mechanisms within and between countries. Finally, it identifies the need to equip public officials with the skills and resources to better understand disinformation threats and to develop adapted regulatory governance that supports an enabling environment in which reliable information can thrive.
Facts not Fakes: Tackling Disinformation, Strengthening Information Integrity
4. Upgrading governance measures and institutional architecture to uphold the integrity of the information space
Abstract
This chapter includes data from 24 OECD Member countries obtained from the survey “Institutional architecture and governance practices to strengthen information integrity” designed by the OECD DIS/MIS Resource Hub team (hereafter referred to as “the OECD survey”). Countries that responded to the survey include: Australia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Türkiye and the United States.
4.1. Introduction
OECD governments are adapting their institutions and policy frameworks to respond to threats posed by disinformation and to create an enabling environment for accurate, reliable, and plural information to thrive. The challenge from a governance standpoint is significant, as governments find themselves in a complex position: policy measures are needed to counter disinformation and reinforce information integrity, and yet these actions should not result in greater control over publicly available information or undermine freedom of expression.
The range of threats that disinformation campaigns pose – from public health conspiracy theories to foreign information manipulation and interference operations, as recently seen in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia's manipulation of information to undermine international support for Ukraine (European Union External Action Service, 2023[1]) – have acted as a catalyst for governments to address this global phenomenon in a co-ordinated and comprehensive way.
Putting in place national strategic frameworks, administrative co-ordination units, task forces, and capacity building efforts – namely, institutional architecture – is essential as they respond to disinformation and implement measures that enhance information integrity. To that end, governments could asses their own institutional arrangements and practices, recognising that:
Strategic guidance and co-ordinated policy efforts, both at the national and international level, are needed to effectively address the multifaceted and complex effort to build information integrity
A constantly evolving information space requires governments to invest in capacity-building programmes and technology infrastructure within public administrations, enabling them to develop coherent and comprehensive policies to enhance information integrity
Governments will need to adapt and upgrade regulatory governance that supports an enabling environment for reliable information to flourish.
4.2. Government co-ordination and strategic guidance are needed to address this multifaceted policy challenge
A multifaceted challenge like disinformation, involving multiple actors, channels, and tactics, needs to be addressed in a co-ordinated and strategic manner. The scale and speed of the proliferation of false and misleading content has made countries aware of the need to develop a comprehensive view of how to improve the level of integrity in the information space. To this end, governments are increasingly setting up or upgrading their co-ordination mechanisms. Within countries, co-ordination mechanisms vary widely and can consist of central offices (units, cells…) or inter-agency task forces composed of public servants from across the government. The latter generally have focused mandates and scope.
The priority given to these aspects of governance response is clear: almost all respondents to the OECD survey identified developing, updating, or increasing the relevance of policy and/or strategy documents as a top priority1 (Figure 4.1). Most respondent countries also flagged the importance of better co-ordination within and outside of government, as well as building their capacity to identify and respond to disinformation threats. These priorities provide a basis for understanding where governments can focus their efforts to develop more effective governance architecture in this policy area.
Figure 4.1. Areas for future improvements to strengthen information integrity
Note: n = 22
Source: OECD Survey on Institutional architecture and governance practices to strengthen information integrity, 2023.
4.2.1. Developing strategic frameworks to tackle disinformation and reinforce information integrity is a top priority
Strategic frameworks are essential to supporting a coherent vision and response to reinforcing information integrity. National strategies can provide clarity by establishing institutional responsibilities, preventing duplication of efforts, and helping avoid information asymmetries across government. That said, a strategy document is not an end in itself, but a means to guide the design of policy measures and evaluation timeframes to assess the efficiency and progress of the policies implemented (OECD, 2020[2]).
Some countries, particularly in recent years, have developed national strategies that specifically focus on tackling disinformation and reinforcing information integrity. However, data from the OECD survey shows that only nine countries (Australia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Spain, Netherlands, Italy, and United States) have developed a strategic document providing direction on how to tackle disinformation and reinforce information integrity domestically.2 Other countries, such as Ireland and Germany, are in the process of developing national strategies specifically focused on these issues.
Countries’ strategies often cover operational aspects, such as the designation of focal points, the identification of functions of the co-ordination mechanism(s) and set time frames to ensure the efficient implementation and evaluation of progress (see Box 4.1 for an overview of the Netherlands’ national strategy).
Box 4.1. The Netherlands’ government-wide strategy for tackling disinformation
In December 2022, the Dutch Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, Ministry of Justice and Security, and Ministry of Education, Culture and Science presented to the House of Representatives a renewed government-wide strategy to protect the free and open public debate against disinformation.
In the document, they present their national strategy as an effective approach to tackling mis- and disinformation centred on the values and fundamental rights of the rule of law, such as the freedom of speech and press. An important point of the Netherlands’ strategy is that they highlight that qualifying disinformation as such and conducting fact-checking are not primary duties for the government. The document does note, however, that where national security, public health, or social and/or economic stability are at stake, the government can act and debunk false and misleading information.
The strategy outlines that the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations has a co-ordinating responsibility for the policy against disinformation and acts as the primary point of contact within the national government and toward municipal and provincial authorities. The ministry is to conduct this role by promoting collaboration between authorities in this area and by fulfilling a knowledge function. The strategy also emphasises the need for international co-ordination mechanisms, the European Rapid Alert System, the Hybrid Centre of Excellence and the NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence and international fora such as the European Union, G7, and the OECD. This strategy updates the first government-wide disinformation policy presented in 2019 (Parliamentary Documents II 2019/2020, 30821, no. 91).
Source: Government of the Netherlands (2022[3]), Government-wide strategy for effectively tackling disinformation, https://www.government.nl/documents/parliamentary-documents/2022/12/23/government-wide-strategy-for-effectively-tackling-disinformation.
Beyond national strategies, and particularly due to the multifaceted nature of this phenomenon, guidance on responding to disinformation and reinforcing information integrity is in many countries included as part of other national strategic documents. This is the case in Australia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Estonia, France, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg,3 and Slovak Republic.
In Germany and Estonia, for example, measures addressing disinformation are outlined in their national security policy. The German National Security Strategy, adopted by the Federal Cabinet in June 2023, mentions diverse measures to prevent disinformation campaigns and to understand how they intersect with other national security threats. In Estonia, a course of action to tackle disinformation is stipulated in the National Security Concept (updated in February 2023). In Australia, policies to tackle disinformation are also part of their digital and foreign interference priorities, referenced in both Australia’s International Cyber and Critical Tech Engagement Strategy and Australia’s Counter Foreign Interference Strategy. In France, the National Strategic Review (Revue nationale stratégique, in French) presented by the French President in October 2022 provides an overview of the country’s national and international defense and security environment, highlighting the fight against disinformation as a priority. The Review also led to the National Strategy on Influence, currently being drafted by the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, and to the creation of dedicated units to tackle disinformation within several ministries, including the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Armed Forces.
Furthermore, the Slovak Republic adopted its Concept of Strategic Communication in June 2023, which looks to help the strategic communication function respond to and mitigate the harmful effects of influence operations in the information space and increase citizens' trust in democratic institutions. It outlines efforts to improve communication between the state and citizens, formalise and streamline co-operation and co-ordination of state institutions in strategic communication, and speed up the state’s response in the fight against disinformation (Government of the Slovak Republic, 2023[4]).
Beyond the strategic framework itself, the process of developing, implementing, and subsequently monitoring a strategy demands attention. Indeed, an inclusive and rigorous strategy development process can help ensure that objectives promote democratic goals and are meaningful to citizens (OECD, 2020[2]). To ensure this, some countries have established working groups that help articulate this process. For instance, Ireland’s National Counter Disinformation Strategy Working Group, created in 2023, resulted from a recommendation of Ireland’s Future of Media Commission (FoMC) that called for a more co-ordinated and strategic approach to combat the damaging impact of disinformation on Irish society and democracy (Box 4.2).
Box 4.2. Ireland’s National Counter Disinformation Strategy Working Group
In 2022, the Irish government created the “National Counter Disinformation Strategy Working Group” co-ordinated by the Department of Tourism, Culture, Arts, Gaeltacht, Sports, and Media. The body includes representatives from industry, academia, civil society and government departments.
As recommended by the Future of Media Commission, the working group is tasked with developing a National Counter Disinformation Strategy in consultation with all relevant departments and agencies, including Irish European Digital Media Observatory hub, industry stakeholders, news organisations, civil society groups, Irish fact-checkers and disinformation researchers. To this end, three sub-groups were set up to examine subject areas pertinent to disinformation, covering:
The mapping of existing initiatives
The examination of the current and emerging regulatory environment
The support of free independent high-quality journalism and the protection of public interest information.
Each sub-group published a report on their subject area. The consultation period has now finished, and comprised a written public consultation and a consultation forum open to a wide range of stakeholders. It is intended that the Strategy will be published by the end of Q1 2024.
The Strategy aims to co-ordinate national efforts to combat disinformation and provide a joined-up approach to ensure effective restraints are applied to the creation and dissemination of this harmful material. The working group is also tasked with developing effective long-term monitoring of the application of the EU Code of Practice on Disinformation and the Digital Services Act in Ireland. Minutes of the meetings of the working group and other relevant documents are made public via the official government website.
Source: Government of Ireland (2023[5]), National Counter Disinformation Strategy Working Group, https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/04f9e-national-counter-disinformation-strategy-working-group.
As government efforts to build information integrity continue to develop, it will be worth advancing understanding on trends and priorities in order to clarify and strengthen the role of strategic guidance in this area.
4.2.2. Government mechanisms to ensure co-ordinated policies in support of information integrity should have clear mandates and scope
A consistent multi-agency approach can help countries identify synergies between sectoral priorities, assign clear responsibilities, avoid duplication of efforts, and promote mutually supporting actions across institutions tackling disinformation. For example, establishing the operational capacity to track, pre-bunk, and debunk information manipulation campaigns often requires co-ordination at the strategic level, to put in place systems, processes, and monitoring functions, as well as at the tactical level to ensure actions can be taken in a timely manner.
The ways in which countries co-ordinate their responses to disinformation threats and efforts to enhance information integrity are varied and evolving rapidly. At the national level, responsibilities are found across the public sector, including the centre of government, line ministries (including security, digital, communication, media, culture, education, and research), security and intelligence agencies, and regulators. The complexity of efforts to reinforce information integrity in democracies calls for establishing co-ordination mechanisms to facilitate co-operation within and between governments.
Data from the OECD survey shows that half of respondent countries (54%) have at least one cross-government mechanism dedicated to co-ordinate national efforts to identify and respond to disinformation and/or to provide technical advice on policies related to this matter.4 These are generally established either as central units (such as offices or cells) that have an official mandate to co-ordinate responsibilities, and/or as formal task forces or working groups composed of public servants from across the government (Figure 4.2).
Figure 4.2. Government co-ordination mechanisms to tackle disinformation
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
Notably, the formation of co-ordination mechanisms has been a relatively recent effort, with all of them having been established, at least in their current form, since 2016. Given recent trends in disinformation, governments have struggled to define their roles in addressing such threats. The establishment of official offices or mechanisms has helped democratic governments understand and respond to these threats, including by providing clarity regarding the exact types of behaviour and content that government agencies should respond to (Kleis Nielsen, 2021[6]). Co-ordination groups also create focal points within governments that promote transparency, to help manage the risk that measures designed to combat disinformation exacerbate social distrust and mitigate unintended effects on freedom of expression and opinion (Butcher, 2019[7]).
Co-ordination mechanisms that have been established largely share priority objectives in relation to conducting research on disinformation dynamics, increasing societal resilience to the spread of false and misleading information, and developing or increasing relevance of guidelines and/or strategic documents (Figure 4.3).
Figure 4.3. Objectives cross-government co-ordination mechanism
Note: n = 13 countries.
Source: OECD Survey on Institutional architecture and governance practices to strengthen information integrity (2023).
Cross-government co-ordination units
Regarding cross-government co-ordination mechanisms, survey responses and available public information suggest that countries have generally developed legal frameworks that define the parameters within which these mechanisms can operate. These legal provisions are particularly important to explain the scope of action of the co-ordination mechanism, to establish internal controls and reporting procedures for its activities, and to reduce the risk of possible abuse of public policy measures.
Indeed, cross-government co-ordination mechanisms and units need to have clear mandates and be explicitly prevented from intervening in policy areas that could endanger freedom of expression and undermine democratic quality. To that end, in May 2023, Latvia approved the by-laws of the National Coordination Group on Information Space Security. These by-laws define the legally binding rules that the mechanism uses to operate and establishes the State Chancellery's Strategic Communication Coordination Department as the central managing authority (Box 4.3).
Box 4.3. The National Co-ordination Group on Information Space Security – Latvia
The National Information Space Security Co-ordination Group is a consultative body that facilitates co-operation and exchange of information between the institutions involved in responding to and mitigating relevant security risks and challenges.
Led by the State Chancellery's Strategic Communication Co-ordination Department (StratCom), this group has two main functions: (i) to co-ordinate and oversee the implementation of the Conceptual Report on the State Strategic Communication and Security of the Information Space for 2023-2027; and (ii) to facilitate the detection, reduction, and prevention of risks and threats to the State information space and public security.
The bodies that are part of such group include: the Chancery of the President, the Ministries of Culture, Foreign Affairs, Interior, Defence, Justice, Environmental Protection and Regional Development, Finance, Transport, Education and Science, Economy, the Prime Minister's Office, the State Security Service, the State Police, National Council for Electronic Media, the Council for Public Electronic Media, the Information Technologies Security Incidents Response Institution CERT.lv, and the Office for the Protection of the Constitution.
Source: Latvijas Vēstnesis (2023[8]), “Valsts informatīvās telpas drošības koordinācijas grupas nolikums”, https://likumi.lv/ta/id/341811-valsts-informativas-telpas-drosibas-koordinacijas-grupas-nolikums.
One key function is the need for governments to respond rapidly and often within the news cycle, particularly during crises, to ensure accurate information is being shared and prevent false or misleading content from taking hold. Information crisis structures are an important tool in this regard. In Lithuania, the National Security Strategy established the creation of the National Crisis Management Centre (NKVC), a focal point and situation centre to co-ordinate responses to national security threats, including disinformation (Box 4.4).
Box 4.4. The National Crisis Management Centre – Lithuania
Since 2017, disinformation threats directed to Lithuania have been managed by the Chancellery of the Government as established by the country’s National Security Strategy. In 2022, the National Crisis Management Centre (NCMC) was set up as the body to co-ordinate crisis prevention and management, including the state's response to disinformation at the national level. In the case of a crisis or emergency, the Centre proposes responses and solutions, supports their implementation, and facilitates inter-institutional co-ordination.
Within the NCMC, a Strategic Communication Coordination Task Force co-ordinates strategic communication in the field of national security via:
A cross-government task force (consisting of weekly meetings and Signal chats)
Co-operation with municipalities (via Signal chats).
Engaging civil society and academic experts (via quarterly meetings and Signal chats)
Engagement with media (via Signal chats)
This model was tested successfully during the 2023 NATO summit in Vilnius. To formalise and strengthen the model, in 2024, the NCMC will create a cross-governmental information monitoring, assessment and sharing model consisting of 10 government institutions, as well as develop a strategy on strategic communication in the field of national security.
Source: State Security Department of Lithuania (2022[9]), Threat Assessment, https://www.vsd.lt/en/threats/threats-national-security-lithuania/; Government of the Republic of Lithuania (2023[10]), “Lithuania’s new crisis management model presented at Baltic States Centres of Government Meeting”, https://lrv.lt/en/news/lithuanias-new-crisis-management-model-presented-at-baltic-states-centres-of-government-meeting/.
Other countries have put in place national-level co-ordination bodies with a scope that focuses on detecting and characterising disinformation operations orchestrated by foreign agents. France’s Service for Vigilance and Protection against Foreign Digital Interference (VIGINUM) (Box 4.5), Sweden’s Psychological Defense Agency (Box 4.6) and the Global Engagement Center in the United States (Box 4.7) have mandates limited to the threat of foreign information manipulation and interference. In these cases, a clear distinction is made regarding the provenance (domestic/external) of disinformation threats. In addition, the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs has established a dedicated unit to monitor disinformation operations against the French diplomatic network.
Box 4.5. The Service for Vigilance and Protection against Foreign Digital Interference – France
The French Service for Vigilance and Protection against Foreign Digital Interference (VIGINUM) was created under the General Secretariat for Defence and National Security (SGDSN) by the Decree no. 2021-922 of 13 July 2021 which sets out its missions.
The task of this national agency is to detect and characterise, through the analysis of publicly available online content, foreign manipulation of online information that may affect core issues of national interest (territorial integrity, security, diplomacy, and the functioning of its institutions, etc.). It also analyses their effects and co-ordinates the protection of the State against such operations.
In this respect, VIGINUM supports the SGDSN in co-ordinating an inter-ministerial network of administrations and services with technical capabilities in the field of information manipulation and foreign digital interference. It works closely with services and administrations contributing directly or indirectly to the fight against manipulation of information to detect and investigate malign operations. When malign operations are detected, the open-source investigation of VIGINUM supports counter-measures through the use of public communication aimed at restoring public trust, engaging with other ministries (including the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs, Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of the Armed Forces, etc.) and with the authorities responsible for the smooth running of elections during electoral periods. Based on the investigation of VIGINUM, France has also publicly exposed multiple foreign digital interference campaigns
At the international level, VIGINUM engages in regular exchanges with international counterparts, both bilaterally and within the context of multilateral frameworks, such as the Rapid Alert System and the G7 RRM.
A fundamental element of VIGINUM is that it operates within a rigorous legal and ethical framework, notably defined by the Decree no. 2021-1587 of 7 December 2021. The latter is the result of consultations with parliamentary representatives and legal work with the French Council of State, based on its authorisation to consult, collect, and use, in an automated way, personal data publicly available online. The control of the management of the personal data collected online is supervised by the CNIL (the French National Commission for Information Technology and Civil Liberties). In addition, an ethical and scientific committee attached to the SGDSN has been set up to follow VIGINUM’s activities. A representative of the highest French administrative court (the French Council of State) chairs the committee, which brings together qualified representatives from the fields of diplomacy, law enforcement, science, and media.
Source: SGDSN (2022[11]), Service de vigilance et protection contre les ingérences numériques étrangères "VIGINUM", https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/notre-organisation/composantes/service-de-vigilance-et-protection-contre-les-ingerences-numeriques.
Box 4.6. The Swedish Psychological Defence Agency – Sweden
In January 2022, Sweden created the Swedish Psychological Defence Agency, a government agency under the Ministry of Defence that identifies, analyses and counters foreign malign information influence activities and other disinformation operations directed at Sweden or at Swedish interests.
The purpose of psychological defence is to safeguard Sweden’s fundamental freedoms and independence through an open and democratic society and the free formation of opinion. The agency highlights that the government has a responsibility to ensure there is public awareness about information threats, without impinging on the freedoms of speech and expression. This preventive approach has a strong focus on critical thinking and education to build societal defences against disinformation, so that malign actors find a less favourable environment in which to conduct information influence activities.
The agency is organised in three departments: administration, operations, and capability development. In collaboration with other government agencies, its core tasks include:
Producing reports and analysis relating to certain situations, threat actors, and societal vulnerabilities, as well as proposing relevant countermeasures.
Developing methods and technologies for identifying and countering foreign malign information influence activities.
Developing and strengthening Sweden’s overall societal capability in terms of psychological defence. This includes providing support to the Swedish population, government agencies, municipalities, the media, voluntary defence organisations, and civil society, as well as enabling increased co-ordination between these actors.
Supporting training exercises and knowledge development, for example initiating and funding research related to psychological defence.
Source: Swedish Psychological Defence Agency (2023[12]), Swedish Psychological Defence Agency website, https://www.mpf.se/en/about-us/.
Box 4.7. The Global Engagement Center – United States
The U.S. Department of State’s Global Engagement Center (GEC), housed at the Department of State, was created in 2016 by Executive Order 13721. Its mission is to lead the U.S. government efforts to recognize, understand, expose, and counter foreign state and non-state propaganda and disinformation efforts aimed at undermining or influencing the policies, security, or stability of the United States, its allies, and partner nations. The GEC pursues this mission in five areas:
Analytics and Research: Analysts and data scientists at the GEC collect data from foreign state and foreign non-state actors to produce analysis on their malign information influence narratives, tactics, and techniques.
International Partnerships: GEC has built and takes part in multiple international coalitions and partnerships with other national governments for the purpose of co-ordinating counter-disinformation analyses and actions, and collectively buttressing the integrity of the global information environment.
Programmes and Campaigns: GEC tailors its initiatives to the specific challenges in unique overseas information environments and co-ordinates both internally within the Department, and with inter-agency and international partners to build societal and institutional resilience to foreign propaganda and disinformation efforts abroad.
Exposure: GEC plays a co-ordination role in inter-agency efforts to expose foreign information influence operations, including the use of proxy sites and social media networks overseas.
Technology Assessment and Engagement: GEC identifies, assesses, and tests the use of technologies to counter foreign disinformation and propaganda abroad, and to reduce the risks posed by AI-generated media use in foreign malign actors’ information manipulation overseas by sharing expertise among U.S. Government departments and agencies, and international partners.
Source: U.S. Department of State (n.d.[13]), “About Us – Global Engagement Center”, https://www.state.gov/about-us-global-engagement-center-2/ (accessed on 31 August 2023).
The public communication function has also played a prominent role in co-ordinating efforts to respond to disinformation threats. Provided it has appropriate governance and sufficient resources, this function can play an important role in governments’ efforts to strengthen their situational awareness of information threats and promote effective co-ordination of the response. To that end, the function should be grounded in efforts to promote the public good, should be undertaken transparently, and be guided by clear mandates that separate political and public communication activities. In that context, the French Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs has for instance run in 2023 and 2024 three public exposure campaigns based on investigations from VIGINUM with the publication of a technical report sharing the open sources data that helped French authorities draw the conclusions that Foreign digital interference had targeted the country.
The OECD Understanding Public Communication Survey from 2020 found that 64% of the 46 respondent countries indicated there were specific structures, teams, or individuals engaged in public communication efforts related to countering disinformation (OECD, 2021[14]). The focus on countering disinformation through the public communication function expanded rapidly during the COVID-19 pandemic, as governments sought to counter fast-spreading false narratives about the causes of the virus and medically unproven cures.
As it applies to public communication, centralised capacity can be useful in producing communal resources, sharing information, and developing a coherent public response for agencies and ministries at the national level. In the United Kingdom, the architecture of public communication responses has emerged as a result of interventions and approaches designed to tackle several waves of disinformation. For example, the Counter Disinformation Unit (CDU) leads ongoing actions to monitor and flag false and misleading content, either to prompt debunking or to liaise with online platforms. In addition, the Government Information Cell (GIC), which sits within the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), was set up on the eve of Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine with the mission of countering information operations by hostile actors that pose threats to UK security, foreign policy, and democratic institutions (OECD, 2023[15]).
Additional examples of such offices include those focused on implementing specific initiatives and policies designed to counter disinformation by strengthening the media and information space more broadly. This is the approach taken in Italy, for example, via the Department for Information and Publishing (see Box 4.8).
Box 4.8. The role of the Department for Information and Publishing in Italy
In Italy, the Department for Information and Publishing – seated within the Prime Minister’s Office under the political responsibility of a Secretary of State – oversees the design and of the implementation of policies to support media freedom and pluralism both for traditional media (publishing houses, newspapers, and periodicals) and digital media, while enforcing copyright protection. Countering disinformation has become one of the defining objectives of the Department, as it is focused on guaranteeing a professional, independent, and diverse information ecosystem and the free flow of trustworthy information.
One of the Department’s main activities is to provide financial support to professional media to foster information pluralism (see Chapter 2). Financial sustainability is a pressing challenge for quality journalism, as both traditional and digital-first publishers face severe financing constraints. The new Single Fund for Pluralism and Digital Innovation in the Information and Media Publishing Sector replaces all previous permanent and one-off facilities and mainstreams public financial support to the media ecosystem. The aim of this effort is to strengthen information quality and reliability, and to provide incentives to increase the number of professional journalists, including through innovative media products and investments in new content and new technology.
The Department for Information and Publishing also supports the implementation of the National Cybersecurity Strategy (2022-2026). As the national co-ordinator of the measure to prevent and fight online disinformation, the Department focuses on two projects: a) strengthening citizens’ media literacy, including through information campaigns on possible harmful uses of artificial intelligence; and b) developing in-depth knowledge of the relevant threats, in partnership with universities, to issue guidelines to support the public communication function.
In addition, the Department has set up a Committee of Experts with the task of analysing the impact of generative AI in the information and publishing sector. The Committee’s 2024 report highlights the perceived risk that artificial intelligence poses to the spread of disinformation; the broad support for establishing stable multi-stakeholder alliances for reliable and quality information sharing between citizens, public institutions, and the media; the need to protect the employment of journalists and to defend the sector’s professionalism; and recommendations to protect the democratic space from foreign interference and manipulation by malign actors.
Source: Article 1 § 315 of the Law No. 213 of 2023 (Budget Law for 2024); Article 17 of the Decree Law No. 198 of 2022 converted into Law No. 14 of 2023 and Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers of 11 July 2023; Measure #24 of the National Cybersecurity Strategy Implementation Plan; Decree of the Undersecretary of State responsible for information and publishing of 23 October 2023.
Task forces and working groups
In addition to establishing central units to co-ordinate responses to disinformation, governments can also consider putting in place task forces composed of officials from across the public service or external partners to advise policy responses. These task forces can be either permanent or temporary in nature. It is important to note that different expert units can be set up within the same country, which may allow for more responsive interventions and technical work when specific objectives are at stake.
Germany has followed a specific configuration, with one ministry directing national policy to disinformation, complemented by a network of inter-ministerial task forces and working groups co-operating on specific thematic priorities (Box 4.9).
Box 4.9. Inter-ministerial working groups to counter disinformation – Germany
Within Germany’s Federal Government, the Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community (BMI) has a strategic co-ordinating role in relation to disinformation threats. Germany has also set up special working groups that bring together officials from different ministries at the national and federal level and intelligence services.
The BMI chairs an inter-ministerial working group on hybrid threats created in 2018 to deal with the manipulation of public opinion via the spread of disinformation and propaganda online, espionage and cyber-attacks on critical infrastructures, among other threats.
When Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine began, a special task force within this working group was created to focus on Russian disinformation. The BMI together with the Federal Foreign Office (AA), the Press and Information Office of the Federal Government and national intelligence services carefully monitor the information space to identify Russian narratives. They also invest efforts in reinforcing pro-active and fact-based communication, providing updates on the situation and encouraging a more critical approach to information and sources, particularly those in social media. The BMI focuses on disinformation orchestrated by foreign states or actors to influence public opinion and strives to strengthen societal resilience. The Federal Government also engages in regular and intensive discussions with international partners, both bilaterally and in the context of the European Union, G7, and NATO.
Source: Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community (2023[16]), “Measures taken by the Federal Government to fight disinformation”, https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/schwerpunkte/EN/disinformation/measures-taken-by-the-federal-government.html.
In Chile, a “National Commission Against Disinformation” was set up in 2023 as an advisory committee to provide counsel to the Ministry of Science, Technology, Knowledge, and Innovation and the General Secretariat of Government (Segegob) on the effects of disinformation on democratic quality of digital platforms, digital literacy, and good digital practices (Box 4.10).
Box 4.10. Chile’s National Commission Against Disinformation
Chile’s National Commission Against Disinformation, located within the Ministry of Science, Technology, Knowledge and Innovation, was created by official decree in May 2023. The aim of this temporary body is to provide advice to the Minister of Science, Technology, Knowledge, and Innovation, and the Minister Secretary General of Government, on matters related to the global phenomenon of disinformation and its manifestation in Chile. The commission is composed of 9 members representing state and private universities, NGOs, foundations and fact-checking organisations. The Commission is tasked with delivering two reports within one year: the first to examine disinformation threats, and the second to provide guidelines and recommendations for the formulation of relevant public policies.
Source: Ministry of Science, Technology, Knowledge and Innovation (n.d.[17]), “Comisión Asesora contra la Desinformación”, https://www.minciencia.gob.cl/areas/comision-contra-la-desinformacion/.
Countries have also set up regular consultations and assessments to ensure that policy responses are adapted to developments in the information space. For instance, Canada’s Protecting Democracy Unit at the Privy Council Office recently established an inter-departmental group to identify policy gaps in the Government of Canada's approach to disinformation, and an interdepartmental research co-ordination group to ensure well aligned and comprehensive research efforts on the topic.
Finally, even where countries have not established a cross-government co-ordination mechanism dedicated to counteracting disinformation or building information integrity generally, governments may establish task forces bringing together different offices, such as the Centre of Government (Cabinet Office or Office of the Presidency) and ministries or departments of foreign affairs, strategic communications, health, education, culture, defence, and digital policies, particularly when responding to specific thematic priorities. For example, in 2023, Brazil established an inter-ministerial Committee to Combat Disinformation related to the National Immunization and Public Health Policies. The aim of the Committee is to provide a strategic and integrated approach to support the Ministry of Health in developing and evaluating public communication around health issues, exchange information across the government on disinformation related to the public health policies, and develop relevant research, resources, and trainings to support the government’s efforts to counteract disinformation in this space. The Committee includes representatives from the Secretariat of Social Communication of the Presidency of the Republic, the Attorney’s-General office, the Comptroller General, the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, and the Ministry of Health (Government of Brazil, 2023[18]).
Country experiences in establishing co-ordination mechanisms to-date suggest that governments are increasingly appreciating the value of organised and coherent efforts to counter disinformation threats and enhance information integrity. The initiatives also highlight the importance that the offices do not contribute to politicisation or facilitate speech restrictions, while at the same time enabling efficient and timely dissemination of intelligence between relevant authorities (including at the local, federal, and national level) and, potentially, external partners. Efforts to ensure robust and sustainable functioning of the co-ordination mechanisms also point to the importance of setting clear mandates, including by defining the disinformation threat(s) the mechanism or office seeks to address.
4.2.3. International co-ordination and co-operation is essential in the fight against disinformation
As information flows know no borders in today’s globalised and digitalised world, international co-operation and co-ordination is a critical element to design policy responses at the level of the information integrity challenge. The transnational nature of this challenge is also visible in the use of information manipulation by foreign malign actors to interfere in national affairs; failing to engage in transnational dialogues could lead hostile states to use a fragmented approach to their advantage (Pamment, 2020[19]). False and misleading information can also have negative effects across borders on issues related to public health, minority communities, and climate change (Lewandowsky, 2021[20]; UNDP, 2021[21]). In this context, as for other areas of the digital economy, international regulatory co-operation should be part of the policy toolbox aimed at responding to disinformation threats and reinforcing information integrity.
Countries are therefore collaborating and co-ordinating their actions internationally to reinforce their ability to counteract these threats. Indeed, national responses are most effective when they are informed by other countries facing similar problems and can draw on relevant lessons. Enhancing domestic co-ordination will therefore facilitate countries’ efforts to participate and engage in international initiatives whose mission is to prevent and counter disinformation activities (Jeangène Vilmer, 2021[22]).
There are multiple international fora and co-ordination mechanisms, each presenting different configurations of country alliances and thematic priorities. International organisations, specialised or ad hoc groups, and government-led convenings and framework agreements account for the primary methods by which countries engage on these issues bilaterally and multilaterally. Despite the range and diversity of international co-ordination options, 90% of survey respondents indicated that strengthening co-operation with partner countries is a priority area for improvement when it comes to tackling disinformation threats.5
First, international organisations are continuing to build their efforts to support countries in reinforcing information integrity. For example, in addition to the OECD’s DIS/MIS Resource Hub,6 which serves as a platform for policy analysis and dialogue among the 38 Member countries and beyond, the OECD brings together Member and non-member countries via a range of initiatives and networks. These initiatives focus on issues such as artificial intelligence,7 the exploration and promotion of more effective governance for information integrity in developing countries,8 and transparency reporting by online platforms.9 Together, these OECD initiatives help inform the work of the OECD DIS/MIS Resource Hub and the global effort to reinforce information integrity.
The NATO Secretariat and the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (NATO StratCom COE, established in Latvia in 2014), conduct analysis, research, and support strategic communication responses to the spread of disinformation. EUvsDisinfo10 is a project of the European External Action Service’s East StratCom Task Force established in 2015 with the aim to better forecast, address, and respond to Russian disinformation campaigns affecting the European Union, its Member States, and other countries in the region (the EU’s trans-national regulatory impact is discussed further in Chapter II). Finally, the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE) was established in Finland in 2017 to counter hybrid threats and build capacity and awareness in participating countries (Box 4.11).
Box 4.11. The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE)
An international hub of experts to optimise analytical capabilities and training opportunities
The Hybrid CoE was established in 2017 by the first nine participating states, NATO, and the European Union in Helsinki. The motivation for its creation was to develop resilience and build capacity to counter hybrid threats through research and practical training and exercises involving participants from private, public, civil, military and academic sectors. Today, Hybrid CoE counts 33 participating states.
The term hybrid threat can be defined as an action conducted by state or non-state actors to undermine or harm democratic governments by influencing decision-making. These threats combine military and non-military, as well as covert and overt means, including disinformation, cyber-attacks, economic pressure, migration, deployment of irregular armed groups and use of regular forces. Such actions are co-ordinated and synchronised, using a variety of means and designed to remain below the level of detection and attribution (NATO, 2023[23]).
The Hybrid CoE is actively involved in a wide range of educational projects and training exercises. In 2022, they organised the Helsinki Countering Disinformation Wargame, a hybrid threat simulation game focused on Russian and Chinese disinformation designed to help identify gaps and strengths in the resilience systems of countries. The aim of these real-word simulations is to further develop tools and techniques to counter disinformation and strategic communication plans tailored to Hybrid CoE’s participating states needs and threat landscapes.
Source: Hybrid CoE (n.d.[24]), “What is Hybrid CoE?”, https://www.hybridcoe.fi/about-us/.
For its part, UNESCO supports its global membership in developing media and information literacy activities and enhancing the capacity of policymakers, educators, journalists and media professionals, youth organisations, and disadvantaged populations.11 Additionally, UNESCO has developed Guidelines for Regulating Digital Platforms, a high-level document that aims to “safeguard freedom of expression and access to information and other human rights in digital platform governance, while dealing with harmful content that can be permissibly restricted under international human rights law and standards online (UNESCO, 2023[25]).” Also within the UN system, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) explores information integrity as it relates to UNDP’s mandate and thematic areas of focus. At the programmatic level, UNDP provides practical guidance for programme design.12
Beyond broad-based member engagement via international organisations or the European Union, governments have established more targeted engagement mechanisms to tackle aspects of the fight against disinformation. The United States recently unveiled a new tool to build international consensus around a common approach to foreign disinformation and information manipulation and protect free and open societies (see Box 4.12 for additional information).
Box 4.12. The Framework to Counter Foreign State Information Manipulation – U.S. Department of State
The Framework to Counter Foreign State Information Manipulation was announced by the U.S. Department of State in January 2024 and is being implemented by the Global Engagement Center. It seeks to develop a common understanding of this threat and deepen co-operation between like-minded partners, establish a common operating picture, and support the development of resilient, fact-based information ecosystems. It fosters alignment along a common set of action areas to enable the development of co-ordinated responses to foreign information manipulation. It includes five key action areas:
1. National Strategies and Policies
2. Governance Structures and Institutions
3. Human and Technical Capacity
4. Civil Society, Independent Media, and Academia
5. Multilateral Engagement
By committing to these five key action areas, international partners can improve bilateral and multilateral cohesion to build societal resiliency to foreign disinformation and information manipulation.
Source: U.S. Department of State (2024[26]), “The Framework to Counter Foreign State Information Manipulation”, https://www.state.gov/the-framework-to-counter-foreign-state-information-manipulation/.
At the G7 level, for example, the Rapid Response Mechanism (G7 RRM) constitutes a mechanism to strengthen co-ordination to identify and respond to diverse and evolving foreign threats to democracy. Created in 2018, it comprises Focal Points from G7 Members, and includes the European Union, NATO, Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands, and Sweden as observers (see Box 4.13).
Box 4.13. The G7 Rapid Response Mechanism
The G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (G7 RRM) was established by Leaders at the 2018 G7 Summit in Charlevoix. Global Affairs Canada’s Rapid Response Mechanism Canada (RRM Canada) team serves as its permanent secretariat. The G7 RRM mission is to strengthen co-ordination between G7 countries to identify and respond to diverse and evolving foreign threats to democracy, including by focusing on strengthening the media and information environment; responding to foreign threats to the rights and freedoms of citizens; and promoting elections security. The G7 RRM Focal Points meet monthly to share information, best practices, and lessons learned.
Source: Rapid Response Mechanism Canada: Global Affairs Canada, https://www.international.gc.ca/transparency-transparence/rapid-response-mechanism-mecanisme-reponse-rapide/index.aspx?lang=eng.
The Lublin Triangle was put in place by Poland, Lithuania, and Ukraine to establish trilateral co-operation to counter Russian disinformation campaigns. These three countries have worked together to identify specific narratives, messages, and tactics used against them; analyse the degree of societal resilience to Russian government propaganda; and make recommendations to better address evolving threats (Box 4.14).
Box 4.14. The Lublin Triangle – Trilateral co-operation to tackle Russian disinformation
In July 2020, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Poland, Lithuania, and Ukraine established the Lublin Triangle (L3), a regional initiative to strengthen mutual military, cultural, economic, and political co-operation based on historical ties and traditions. In 2021, the L3 countries signed a Roadmap setting the key directions of expanding the co-operation, including joint strategic activities to respond to hybrid threats, counteract disinformation, and strengthen societal resilience. The work of the Lublin Triangle is guided by a Joint Action Plan to Combat Disinformation for 2022-2023.
Source: Instytut Kościuszki (2022[27]), Report – Resilience to Disinformation, https://ik.org.pl/en/.
Governments have also established a range of convenings and frameworks that provide platforms for discussion, establish priorities moving forward, and set a common direction for action. For example, the United States established and hosted the first two meetings of the Summit for Democracy (in December 2021 and March 2023, respectively), with the third hosted by the Republic of Korea in March 2024. Around 100 governments participated in the first two Summits, and a theme of the 2023 Summit for Democracy focused on Information Integrity, with specific attention paid to issues around international co-operation, information literacy, and definitions.13
Building directly on the work of the Summit for Democracy’s Cohort on Information Integrity, the Governments of Canada and the Netherlands launched the Global Declaration on Information Integrity Online in September 2023. This declaration “lays out a set of high-level international commitments to protect and promote information integrity online…and seeks to strengthen existing multilateral efforts to protect the information ecosystem (Government of the Netherlands, 2023[28])” (see Box 4.15).
Box 4.15. The Global Declaration on Information Integrity Online
The Global Declaration on Information Integrity Online, launched in September 2023 and signed by 34 countries, lays out international commitments by participating states to protect and promote information integrity online. It also sets out expectations for the private sector and online platforms to employ business practices that contribute to a healthy information ecosystem online. The Declaration is endorsed by: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Czechia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Georgia, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Kenya, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Moldova, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Republic of Korea, Slovak Republic, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Uruguay, and United States.
The Declaration defines the term “information integrity” as an information ecosystem that “produces accurate, trustworthy, and reliable information, meaning that people can rely on the accuracy of the information they access while being exposed to a variety of ideas.”
Specific commitments made by participating states include:
Abstaining from and condemning state-led disinformation campaigns
Respecting, promoting, and fulfilling the right to freedom of expression
Implementing relevant legislation in compliance with international law
Avoiding stifling freedom of expression under the guise of countering disinformation
Promoting stronger civic education online and digital literacy
Supporting independent media, news, and journalism
Taking active steps to address disinformation targeting groups in vulnerable situations.
The Declaration also calls on online platforms and the industry to play a constructive role by respecting the rule of law, human rights, and fundamental freedoms; promoting research; enhancing transparency; enhancing oversight of algorithms; and preserving election and democratic integrity.
Source: Government of the Netherlands (2023[29]), Global Declaration on Information Integrity Online, https://www.government.nl/ministries/ministry-of-foreign-affairs/documents/diplomatic-statements/2023/09/20/global-declaration-on-information-integrity-online.
Another example of a platform for multi-lateral discussion is the EU-US Trade and Technology Council (TTC), which was established in 2021 to serve as a forum for the United States and European Union to co-ordinate on global trade, economic, and technology issues. At the fourth Ministerial meeting of the TTC in May 2023, the Joint Statement noted the shared “deep concern regarding foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) and disinformation.” It also flagged the “opportunity to develop a shared standard for threat information exchange on FIMI” and included a call to “enhance the preparedness of the multi-stakeholder community to step up their actions against FIMI threats, including by exploring further support for capacity building in Africa, Latin America, and EU Neighbourhood countries (TTC, 2023[30]).”
The International Partnership on Information and Democracy is an intergovernmental non-binding agreement endorsed by 52 countries to promote and implement democratic principles in the global information and communication space (see Box 4.16). Oversight and implementation of the Partnership is co-ordinated by the Forum on Information and Democracy, which is an independent non-profit entity led by civil society organisations. Mandating the Forum to serve as an independent civil society group to support the Partnership provides important engagement opportunities for government and non-government partners to benefit from experts and scholars convened to evaluate the global information and communication space, as well as to develop recommendations to the different stakeholders that shape how norms should evolve (Forum on Information and Democracy, 2023[31]).
Box 4.16. International Partnership for Information and Democracy
Signed during the 74th UN General Assembly in September 2019, the International Partnership for Information and Democracy affirms the following principles:
1. The global information and communication space, which is a shared public good of significant democratic value, must support the exercise of human rights, most notably the right to freedom of opinion and expression, including the freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, through any media of one’s choice regardless of frontiers, in accordance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 19).
2. Access to reliable information must be protected and promoted to enable democratic participation and the exercise of freedom of opinion and expression.
3. Information can be regarded as reliable insofar as its collection, processing and dissemination are free and independent, based on cross-checking of various sources, in a pluralistic media landscape where the facts can give rise to a diversity of interpretation and viewpoints.
4. In accordance with the international law and standards on the right to freedom of opinion and expression, journalists and media workers, in the course of their function, must be protected against all forms of violence, threats, and discrimination; against all forms of arbitrary detention, abusive legal proceedings; against any unduly restrictive efforts to prevent them from carrying out their works and have access to appropriate legal remedies, including as relevant with respect to the confidentiality of their sources.
5. Sustainable business models must be developed to serve high-quality independent journalism.
Source: Forum on Information & Democracy (n.d.[32]), “International Partnership for Information & Democracy”, https://informationdemocracy.org/international-partnership-on-information-democracy/.
Notably, these examples do not include bi-lateral engagements or international co-operation focused on intelligence or security issues. Countries have noted, however, that they engage in these networks and initiatives to benefit from timely information sharing, cross-fertilise research, engage in capacity building activities and the exchange of best-practices, and clarify directions for shared action. These mechanisms are also key to developing common terminology, sharing strategic intelligence and analytical methodologies, enhancing research, and overcoming domestic political divides.
Moving forward, governments and international organisations alike will need to continue to respond to new and emerging issues in the information space while avoiding overlapping with or duplicating other initiatives (see, for example the OECD Recommendation on International Regulatory Co-operation to Tackle Global Challenges (OECD, 2022[33])). More needs to be done to ensure a clear focus on taking advantage of the opportunities provided by unique perspectives, membership, and mandates of relevant organisations and to co-ordinate shared global action.
4.3. Changes within the information space require a greater focus on building capacity in the public administration
Building collective government capacity to help address the challenges posed by disinformation starts with the public officials who confront these threats in their daily work. The level of sophistication of disinformation campaigns requires upskilling and training at all levels of government to ensure that elected officials and policymakers have the knowledge and tools to recognise, monitor, and counter the spread of false and misleading information without impinging on human rights and fundamental freedoms. Capacity building efforts should also be designed with the wider aim of encouraging critical thinking and increasing public officials’ awareness about the risks of disinformation. This is also important to help prevent them from spreading false narratives. To that end, involving national schools of public administration or specialised offices, such as the Belgian Integrity Bureau, may help ensure the capacity building efforts in this space reinforce the broader aims of reinforcing information integrity and building citizen trust.
According to the OECD survey, 90% of responding countries indicated that building the capacity of public officials to track and respond to disinformation threats is a priority for the future. At the same time, however, only 65% reported having regular and specialised training on countering disinformation. For instance, in Colombia, the Ministry of Information and Communication Technologies (MinTIC) has taken proactive steps to train its Press Office team. Those who join the Press Office team receive training on how to identify possible disinformation narratives and to better react to these situations. The Dutch Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, for its part, drafted a “Guidance on dealing with disinformation” in 2022 to provide civil servants with general guidance (see Box 4.17).
Box 4.17. Guidance on dealing with disinformation – The Netherlands
In January 2022, the Dutch Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations drafted a “Guidance on dealing with disinformation,” which provides public officials with an overview of how false and misleading information can be spread and recognised; the mechanics of polarisation in the information space; and legal and practical advice on how to minimise the impact of disinformation and what they can do if confronted with it. The guidance is structured around four main themes:
1. Overview of disinformation risks and effects: This section reiterates media and information literacy skills of verifying sources and content; it also provides an overview of the societal risks of disinformation, including that purposefully false and misleading content can exacerbate polarisation and undermine trust in democracy.
2. Preparing: This section presents an overview of the importance of establishing effective organisational structures; communicating with the media and the public to build media and information literacy; and establishing effective and proactive public communication initiatives.
3. Responding to disinformation: This section presents an overview of how communicators should decide how best – or even whether – to respond to particular narratives, as well as examples of effective messages.
4. Legal options: This section reiterates that the government must always act within the constitutional framework of freedom of expression and that disinformation content cannot simply be restricted; it also lays out the legal framework that informs illegal content and harms caused by the spread of false or misleading content.
Source: Jahangir (2023[34]), Disinformation Landscape in the Netherlands, https://www.disinfo.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/20230919_NL_DisinfoFS.pdf; Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (2022[35]), Handreiking omgaan met desinformatie, https://www.weerbaarbestuur.nl/sites/default/files/inline-files/BZK%20-%20Handreiking%20omgaan%20met%20desinformatie.pdf.
Another example is the UK’s RESIST 2 Toolkit, which is used in trainings to help government officials build individual and societal resilience to disinformation through strategic communications (Box 4.18).
Box 4.18. United Kingdom’s RESIST Counter-Disinformation Toolkit
In 2018, the UK government, in consultation with civil society and partner countries, developed the RESIST framework, a step-by-step approach to countering disinformation that helps deal with the challenge in a systematic and efficient way, while ensuring that core democratic principles such as freedom of expression are protected. RESIST stands for Recognise mis- and disinformation, Early warning, Situational insight, Impact analysis, Strategic communication, and Tracking effectiveness.
This framework was translated into a public toolkit with the primary aim of giving professional communicators and citizens confidence in assessing the veracity of information. Since the publication of RESIST in 2019, the UK government has trained over five hundred communicators from at least 20 partner countries through a mixture of in-person training, remote sessions and digital learning.
Since the original RESIST framework, communications professionals and civil servants from the United Kingdom and around the world have provided feedback about how they use the toolkit, and what they would like to see in future iterations. This is why in 2021 the UK government published the RESIST 2 Counter-Disinformation Toolkit an updated version that reflects both the changing demands of the communication profession, and the evolving information environment exploring new techniques and tactics.
Source: UK Government Communication Service (2021[36]), RESIST 2 Counter Disinformation Toolkit, https://gcs.civilservice.gov.uk/publications/resist-2-counter-disinformation-toolkit/.
Capacity building programmes should also be closely connected with the latest available research. Partnering with organisations active in the field of information integrity can therefore help ensure the provision of high-quality, innovative and cost-effective learning opportunities. Public officials in Italy, for example, benefit from trainings informed by research from the European Digital Media Observatory, an independent centre of expertise that promotes scientific knowledge on online disinformation, encourages the development of fact-checking services, and supports media literacy projects (see Box 4.19 – additional information on engaging with non-governmental partners can be found in Chapter III).
Box 4.19. Ministry of Foreign Affairs training on disinformation and strategic communication – Italy
The Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) provides training on disinformation and strategic communication as part of its capacity building efforts for diplomats, public servants in Italian Cultural Institutes, and military personnel to be deployed abroad. The MFA also supported the creation of an Italian national hub to combat disinformation – the Italian Digital Media Observatory (IDMO), an EU-funded project that promotes scientific knowledge on online disinformation, encourages the development of fact-checking services and supports media literacy programmes. IDMO works with embassy representatives and key interlocutors such as RAI, the LUISS School of Journalism and Newsguard, among others.
The Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs also produces communication products and co-ordinates social media campaigns to raise public awareness of disinformation, such as a special episode of the podcast "Voci dalla Farnesina" (Voices from the Farnesina), which featured journalists, academics and diplomats to discuss differences in terminology between misinformation, disinformation and malinformation and to encourage citizens to think critically about the industry of information manipulation on digital platforms.
Source: Italian Digital Media Observatory (n.d.[37]), “Uniti contro la disinformazione”, https://www.idmo.it/.
Canada has also invested in training for civil servants focused on cultivating an understanding of and resilience to disinformation by adapting the UK’s RESIST 2 Toolkit to the Canadian context (Box 4.20).
Box 4.20. Privy Council Office counter-disinformation training – Canada
Canada has approached building understanding of and resilience to disinformation in the Canadian context by promoting an informed and engaged citizenry, including its public servants. With an annual budget of CAD 2 million, the Protecting Democracy Unit at the Privy Council Office co-ordinates, develops, and implements government-wide measures designed to combat disinformation. This includes the Countering Disinformation: A Guidebook for Public Servants, which offers guidance on how to navigate the threat of mis- and disinformation, building upon the United Kingdom’s RESIST model. Canada's School of Public Service also combines face-to-face training via hybrid courses, covering topics such as research on the behavioural drivers of misinformation and trust in institutions, and the use of social media platforms for public communication.
Source: Government of Canada (2022[38]), “Backgrounder: Government of Canada to fund projects addressing the growing problem of online mis/disinformation”, https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-heritage/news/2022/07/backgroundergovernment-of-canada-to-fund-projects-addressing-the-growing-problem-of-online-misdisinformation.html; Government of Canada (n.d.[39]), “Countering Disinformation: A Guidebook for Public Servants”, https://www.canada.ca/en/democratic-institutions/services/protecting-democratic-institutions/countering-disinformation-guidebook-public-servants.html; Government of Canada (2023[40]), “The Trust Series: Trust and Misinformation in Digital Information Ecosystems (TRN1-E11)”, https://catalogue.csps-efpc.gc.ca/product?catalog=TRN1-E11&cm_locale=en; Government of Canada (2022[41]), “Navigating Social Media as a Public Servant (TRN125)”, https://catalogue.csps-efpc.gc.ca/product?catalog=TRN125&cm_locale=en.
Countries’ experiences with capacity building on this topic point to the importance of developing public officials’ knowledge of and skills to track and counter disinformation. Examples of capacity building efforts point to the value of designing evidence-based and accessible programmes that consider cultural and linguistic sensitivities and that are delivered in multiple formats, including offline and online, workshops, toolkits, and handbooks. Experience also points to the value of encouraging mobility of personal across agencies and offices so that they leverage expertise among projects and peers.
4.4. Governments will need to continue to develop agile regulatory governance to build information integrity
Regulation is an essential tool for governments to build information integrity, respond to the threat of disinformation, and to achieve the societal aims of reinforcing democracy more broadly. Nevertheless, key questions remain around what strategies to pursue and how best to approach the act of regulating. Considerations include the processes and institutions that are put in place to design, enforce, and review regulation (OECD, 2018[42]). This is further captured by the OECD Recommendation of the Council on Agile Regulatory Governance (OECD, 2021[43]).
More recently, the OECD launched the Better Regulation in the Digital aGE (BRIDGE) initiative, which seeks to support countries in implementing effective regulatory governance for digital activities. When approached from the "better regulation" perspective, it highlights how regulation has the power to effectively manage risks associated with digital technologies, while also promoting digital innovation. However, the pace of technological change, existing regimes that lack agility in the digital world, new activities and business models, and the global nature of digital activities are putting limits on governments’ abilities to effectively reinforce information integrity.
Moving forward, considerations related to regulatory policy should focus on, as appropriate:
Fostering a more agile regulatory governance approach to regulating in the information space
Clarifying enforcement approaches for regulation related to information integrity.
4.4.1. Fostering a more agile regulatory governance approach to regulating in the information space
Particularly in the rapidly evolving information space, regulatory policy should be designed to be agile and responsive to the challenges brought by digitalisation and emerging technologies. Whereas traditional regulation is often designed on an issue-by-issue, sector-by-sector, or technology-by-technology basis, digital and emerging communication technologies often erode, straddle, or blur the usual delineations. Digital and emerging technologies also blur the traditional distinction between consumers and producers (Amaral et al., 2020[44]).
The traditional notion of liability is therefore often insufficient as it relates to responding to mis- and disinformation, given that the risks to those affected, the technologies used, and the origins of such content may all be in different jurisdictions. The erosion of the usual delineation of markets undermines the relevance of regulators’ traditional mandates and remits; new ways of communicating and engaging pose challenges to enforcement of existing rules; fragmentated approaches across jurisdictions prevent consistent and co-ordinated approaches despite the cross-border effects of many information and communication technologies; and the mismatch between the pace of technological development and that at which regulatory frameworks evolve (the “pacing problem”) all pose new and challenging issues for governments and regulators (Amaral et al., 2020[44]).
Given the regulatory challenges raised by the complexity of the information space, undertaking a shift in regulatory policy processes will be essential. As noted by the OECD Recommendation on Agile Regulatory Governance to Harness Innovation, “the traditional ‘regulate and forget’ mindset must give way to ‘adapt-and-learn’ approaches. A more agile approach to regulatory policymaking will help ensure governments have the capability to understand innovations and their potential impact on existing regulations and public values more broadly (OECD, 2021[45]). In the information space, regulatory agility should be directed at understanding the intended (and unintended) effects of existing regulation, as well as applying lessons to new technologies such as generative AI.
Utilising proper management tools to effectively design, implement, and evaluate regulations will be important in this regard. For example, putting in place mechanisms for public and stakeholder engagement in the regulatory process, including citizens, small and medium-sized enterprises, and start-ups, from an early stage and throughout the policy cycle can help enhance transparency, build trust, and capitalise on diverse sources of expertise. Carrying out regulatory impact assessments (RIA) that assess all relevant policy options, including non-regulatory alternatives, is also crucial, as is putting in place comprehensive RIA processes and outlining subsequent evaluation (see Box 4.21 for an overview of the Impact Assessment Report of the DSA). Finally, monitoring the impact of regulations systematically and continually, engaging in timely and proportionate re-evaluation, and embedding review requirements in appropriate frameworks will all help contribute to agile regulation (OECD, 2021[45]).
Box 4.21. The EU Digital Services Act Impact Assessment Report
The DSA Impact Assessment Report notes that the regulation builds on the evaluation of the E-Commerce Directive from 2000 and that it seeks to respond to three core problems driving the regulation, including: that citizens are exposed to increasing risks online, and particularly on very large online platforms; that the supervision of online platforms is largely uncoordinated and ineffective in the European Union; and that national-level regulations risk leading to increasing barriers in the internal market and reinforcing competitive advantages for established very large platforms and digital services.
The Impact Assessment Report also noted that anticipated benefits of the DSA would be to boost competitiveness, innovation, and investment in digital services, while targeting specific harms. Furthermore, the regulation will seek to promote transparency and safety online, as well as protect fundamental rights. Enhanced co-operation between Member States and the EU level governance will improve enforcement and provide an up-to-date supervisory system for digital services. Notably, the Impact Assessment Report also notes that revision should take place within five years of the entry into force, and that regular reports would be part of the design of the supervisory system.
Source: European Commission, Brussels, 15.12.2020 SWD(2020) 349 final, Executive Summary of the Impact Assessment Report Accompanying the document: Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Single Market for Digital Services (Digital Services Act) and amending Directive 2000/31/EC.
That said, addressing the rapid pace of technological progress requires shortening timeframes throughout the policymaking process and using regulatory management tools in a more dynamic manner. To help promote more agile and flexible regulation, these policy processes – public engagement, conducting regulatory impact assessments (RIA), monitoring, and ex post evaluation – should “not be undertaken as a series of discrete requirements to be conducted successively, but rather as mutually complementary tools embedded in the policy cycle to inform the appropriate adaptation of regulatory (or alternative) approaches (OECD, 2021[45]).” Ensuring the flexibility and proportionality of regulation should be backed by government institutions that protect the rights of stakeholders and give them access to redress mechanisms if these rights are violated (OECD, 2018[46]).
The pace and breadth of change also requires a more anticipatory regulatory approach grounded in institutional capacity and mechanisms to better understand how emerging technologies may affect societies, markets, and government actions. Notably, such an effort will require establishing constructive partnerships with non-governmental partners to facilitate greater understanding of – and more effective responses to – the challenges to information integrity brought by technological development (OECD, 2022[47]). Governments should also increase the capacity of oversight and advisory bodies to anticipate and implement strategic foresight that informs the design, implementation, and analysis of regulations. Building capacity requires devoting appropriate resources to develop the necessary skills around conducting impacts assessments, building strategic foresight, as well as understanding the costs and benefits of innovation and new technologies (OECD, 2021[43]).
Experimentation, including in the form of regulatory sandboxes, can help to render frameworks more adaptive through ongoing learning and adjustment. It can also help to reduce uncertainty levels surrounding decision-making, particularly in situations where sufficient reliable information on potential impacts or effectiveness of regulatory options cannot be obtained through traditional approaches, such as information gathering and consultations. Similarly, it can serve to enhance the evidence base that can help inform the revision of existing regulation or inspire new rules.
Finally, in an increasingly inter-connected world, co-operation among governments and policymakers across jurisdictions is essential to ensure the effectiveness, coherence, and continued relevance of regulatory policies and frameworks. To this end, international regulatory co-operation (IRC) is critical to avoid fragmentation and prevent regulatory arbitrage, or the effort to take advantage of differences between systems to avoid more burdensome regulation (OECD, 2012[48]). Moreover, considering the substantial resource needs associated with regulating the information space, IRC can help governments and regulators target and use those resources as efficiently as possible.
4.4.2. Enforcement considerations for regulation in the information space should be clarified
Regulations in this space cannot achieve their stated objectives unless actors comply and the requirements are properly enforced. To do so, countries should consider implementing a range of strategies and mechanisms to ensure compliance, including a combination of monitoring actions by oversight bodies, oversight by third-party auditors, and the provision and application of sanctions. Integrating these enforcement-related considerations in legislative proposals and related assessments can help provide clarity and direction.
These considerations include data and information requirements to verify compliance, as well as institutional and cross-border co-operation initiatives built into the use of regulatory management tools (OECD, 2021[45]). For example, the DSA requires the Very Large Online Platforms (VLOPs) and Very Large Online Search Engines (VLOSEs) to “assess the systemic risks stemming from the design, functioning and use of their services, as well as from potential misuses by the recipients of the service, and should take appropriate mitigating measures in observance of fundamental rights” and be proportionate in their mitigation measures (DSA, Rec. 79 and Art. 34) (European Union, 2022[49]). Notably, the DSA also requires that VLOPs and VLOSEs conduct independent auditing of their compliance with the DSA’s obligations, including codes of conduct and crises protocols (European Union, 2022[49]). Moving forward, the development of baselines for comparisons, as well as clarifying distinctions between types of audits (such as algorithmic impact assessments, bias impact assessments, and accurate labelling of algorithmic systems), will be needed to ensure consistency across the industry (Singh and Doty, 2021[50]). Governments could facilitate comparability of platforms’ audits and risk mitigation activities by developing specific and quantifiable tests, standards, and processes (Forum on Information and Democracy, 2020[51]).
Beyond the actions and tools, governments must also identify which institutions will enforce regulations. Given the fundamental role information plays in democracy and the potential implications for freedom of expression, ensuring regulatory agencies are independent from the government and from those it regulates can provide greater confidence that decisions are fair and impartial (OECD, 2012[48]). Furthermore, the range of regulatory strategies implicated in reinforcing information integrity across media and communication sectors point to the challenge in identifying the appropriate actor(s) to enforce regulations. The increasing role and impact of digital content means that authorities, including those covering data protection and privacy, competition, media, consumer protection, telecommunications, elections, and others, may all play a role in enforcing regulation in this space.
The European Union DSA, for its part, allows for flexibility on this front. On the one hand, due to the “cross-border nature of the services at stake and the horizontal range of (the DSA’s) obligations,” the law calls for member states to designate a Digital Services Co-ordinator to “act as the single contact point with regard to all matters related to the application of this Regulation (European Union, 2022[49]).” The DSA also notes, however, that Member States may rely on more than one authority, particularly one with specific expertise or enforcement tasks and (such as electronic communications’ regulators, media regulators or consumer protection authorities), to support the application of the legislation (European Union, 2022[49]).
4.5. Considerations and path forward
Governments have increasingly recognised the need to put in place accountable, transparent, and agile governance processes and structures as they seek to develop effective responses to the threats posed by disinformation and reinforce information integrity. Effectiveness, as it relates to governance responses within democracies, is not merely about countering disinformation. More broadly, effectiveness refers to information ecosystems that are free, diverse, and transparent and that create the conditions for citizens to make well-informed decisions and engage in constructive civic dialogue, while protecting the human rights of all. These efforts will be most effective if they are focused on diversity and inclusivity from the bottom up, including in staffing, strategic planning, and partnerships. This will help to bring in individuals with the right set of skills and experiences to tackle some of the most pressing topics in information integrity.
To this end, governments will need to adapt and upgrade their institutional architecture by pursuing the following objectives, as appropriate:
Develop and implement strategic frameworks that support a coherent vision and a comprehensive approach to reinforce information integrity. This guidance can be articulated via national strategies that specifically focus on disinformation and information integrity, or included as part of other official documents, such as national strategies on defence and security, digitalisation, public communications, or culture and education. Effective strategic frameworks describe objectives, the time frame and scope of action, and operational aspects around institutional setting, reporting, and evaluation processes. Further analysis will help identify trends and best-practices to enhance the role of strategic guidance in this space.
Establish clearly defined offices, units, or co-ordination mechanisms to promote mutually supporting actions across government bodies in charge of addressing mis- and disinformation threats and reinforcing information integrity. A well co-ordinated multi-agency approach can help countries make connections to sectoral priorities, enable prompt information-sharing, and avoid duplication of efforts between institutional authorities. Governments may also consider creating task forces to provide expert advice on policies related to technical dimensions of disinformation, such as hybrid threats, foreign interference, and electoral interference. A multi-agency approach will also help align short-term needs, such as information provision related to crises, elections, or immediate threats, with longer-term objectives related to building information integrity and societal resilience. Prioritise building mechanisms for effective communication and information sharing and the building of relationships among staff within and across entities. Enable an evidence-driven culture that incorporates measurement and evaluation of each stage of the policy development and implementation process.
Outline the functioning and objectives of relevant offices and units in legal provisions that define the mandate and the parameters within which they operate. These provisions are important to establish accountability and reporting procedures and to help ensure that government activities do not infringe on fundamental rights and freedoms.
Enhance international co-operation to strengthen the democratic response to challenges in the information space via partnerships, alliances, and by connecting and enabling existing networks across different sectors. Sharing strategic intelligence, analytical methodologies, as well as policy responses and their results can help draw on relevant lessons and identify best-practices.
Provide capacity-building opportunities at the local, national, and international level for public officials who address relevant challenges in their daily work. The level of sophistication of disinformation campaigns requires training and upskilling at all levels of government to ensure that public administrators and policymakers have the knowledge and tools to recognise, monitor, and counter the spread of false and misleading information without impinging on freedom of expression. Promote diverse workforces and cultures of inclusivity; these are not only core democratic values, but also a cornerstone to enabling effective countermeasures to disinformation and its impact, due to the multidisciplinary nature of the problem and solutions.
Implement agile regulatory policy responses to the challenges introduced by emerging communication technologies. Particularly in the information space, which is characterised by novel forms of communication that blur traditional delineations between regulated sectors, regulatory policy should adapt and learn throughout the cycle, including with improved co-ordination between authorities to reduce fragmented government responses. Governments should put in place mechanisms for public and stakeholder engagement in the regulatory process; implement comprehensive regulatory Impact Assessments (RIA) processes; conduct impact evaluation and monitoring; evaluate proper audit and enforcement mechanisms and authorities; and conduct timely and proportionate re-evaluation of relevant regulations.
Increase the capacity of regulatory oversight and advisory bodies to anticipate the evaluation of the information ecosystem and implement strategic foresight that informs the design, implementation, and analysis of regulations. Building regulators’ capacity and flexibility will also facilitate experimentation, including in the form of regulatory sandboxes, so that resulting frameworks are more adaptive.
Strengthen international regulatory co-operation to avoid fragmentation and prevent regulatory arbitrage. Given the inherently global nature of online information flows, co-operation among governments and policymakers is essential to ensure the effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, and continued relevance of regulatory policies and frameworks.
4.6. Methodological note
The chapter presents an evidence-based analysis of relevant co-ordination mechanism and strategic priorities established at national level to tackle the spread of false and misleading information. This chapter includes data from 24 OECD Member countries obtained from the survey “Institutional architecture and governance practices to strengthen information integrity” designed by the OECD DIS/MIS Resource Hub team (hereafter referred to as “the OECD survey”). The countries participating are Australia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Türkiye and the United States. Responses were provided by government authorities from April to September 2023. Given the rapid pace of developments in the field of disinformation and information integrity, it is important to note that this chapter reflects the state of affairs in September 2023.
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Notes
← 1. As part of the survey, respondents were asked: “To better understand your priorities moving forward, please indicate the areas where your government will seek to improve over the coming 1-2 years”, one of the suggested priorities was: Develop, update, or increase relevance of guidelines and/or strategic documents.
← 2. As part of the survey, respondents were asked: Is there a national strategic framework or guidance document in force in which the government identifies and describes the main information threats, potential impacts, and response options?
← 3. National Cybersecurity Strategy IV https://hcpn.gouvernement.lu/dam-assets/fr/publications/brochure-livre/strategie-nationale-cybersecurite-4/National-Cybersecurity-Strategy-IV.pdf.
← 4. As part of the survey, respondents were asked “Does a cross-government mechanism (cell, office, unit, etc.) exist to co-ordinate government efforts to identify and/or respond to disinformation?”.
← 5. As part of the survey, respondents were asked: “To better understand your priorities moving forward, please indicate the areas where your government will seek to improve over the coming 1-2 years”, one of the suggested priorities was: Expanding co-operation with partner countries.
← 6. For additional information, see: https://www.oecd.org/stories/dis-misinformation-hub/.
← 7. For additional information, see the work of the OECD’s Artificial Intelligence Policy Observatory (https://oecd.ai/en/) and the OECD hosting the Secretariat of the 29-member Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence (GPAI) (https://gpai.ai/).
← 8. For additional information, see the work of the OECD Development Assistance Committee’s Network on Governance (GovNet): https://www.oecd.org/dac/accountable-effective-institutions/about-govnet.htm.
← 9. For additional information, see the Voluntary Transparency Reporting Framework: https://www.oecd.org/digital/vtrf/.
← 10. For additional information: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/about/.
← 11. For additional information, see: https://www.unesco.org/en/media-information-literacy.
← 12. For additional information, see: https://www.undp.org/policy-centre/oslo/information-integrity.
← 13. For additional information, see: https://summitfordemocracyresources.eu/about/about-the-summit-for-democracy/.