Foreign states have used political financing to influence the outcome of elections in target nations and undermine the integrity of these critical democratic processes. This funding can be direct in the form of cash payments, in-kind material donations (such as office equipment or the production of campaign materials), or payments to organisations affiliated with political parties. It can also be indirect via, for instance, organisations bringing voters to polls on election day or the mobilisation of donations from diaspora members (Vandewalker and Norden, 2021[36]). This kind of intervention can lead to increased political polarisation in the target country, upswings in support for the intervening nation, skewed and unfair election results, reduced trust and engagement in democratic and electoral processes, and even growth in political violence in the target state (Vandewalker and Norden, 2021[36]; Levin, 2016[96]).
Foreign states have also pursued interference through the exploitation of the revolving door and conflicts of interest in target states. Foreign states are increasingly trying to augment their lobbying power and networks by recruiting current and former ministers and senior officials to support their influence agendas (Jones, 2023[97]; Bressanelli et al., 2020[10]). These engagements seek to draw on the knowledge, networks and profile that these senior public office holders have. Those officials lending their knowledge and skills to foreign entities risk facilitating or shielding foreign interference activity, especially where senior appointments are not transparent or effectively managed through robust integrity safeguards. Such approaches may also lead senior officials to take foreign interests into close consideration, with the perspective of a future recruitment.
Foreign states can also destabilise governments through covert or illicit influencing activities against legitimate decision-making processes and political structures. The use of covert influencing has increased over the past decade, and protecting open societies from foreign covert influence and interference has become a priority for many OECD countries (Bressanelli et al., 2020[10]). Foreign states can exert this influence through foreign information manipulation and interference, covert lobbying practices, hidden agendas pushed by foreign-funded think-tanks and civil society organisations, abuse of academic exchange and scientific co-operation, mobilising and intelligence gathering through diasporas, and influence through state-affiliated corporations. This interference undermines public integrity by increasing the risk that public office holders exercise their powers, consciously or not, in foreign actors’ interests rather than their own country’s public interest. It contributes to weaker internal cohesion of open societies and perceptions that democracies are dysfunctional, corrupt and untrustworthy, and can increase support for non-democratic forms of government.
Foreign interference can also weaken the rule of law in democracies, posing a significant challenge to the integrity of legal processes and the fight against corruption and transnational bribery. Foreign interference in this context can occur through attempts by foreign governments to influence corruption investigations for political reasons, pressuring law enforcement or judicial authorities to either initiate or halt investigations against specific individuals or companies. Disinformation campaigns to manipulate public opinion and perception of corruption cases may spread false information or create fake narratives, which can impact the credibility of investigations and legal proceedings. External actors may also use hacking and cyber-interference to gain access to sensitive information related to corruption cases or to manipulate the course of investigations. Foreign powers may also use economic leverage to influence the handling of corruption cases, leading to compromised investigations or lenient resolutions of cases.