Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2024

4. Lobbying

Introduction

Lobbying is a natural part of the democratic process, but it needs to be managed properly to ensure influence is brought to bear fairly and effectively on policymaking. By sharing expertise, legitimate needs and evidence with policymakers, different interest groups can provide governments with insights and data on which to base policy and decision making. However, if the proper safeguards are not put in place, lobbying can create advantages for certain groups that lead to asymmetric or undue influence over policymaking, in turn leading to policies that are inefficient, ineffective or do not serve the public interest.

Lobbying is an increasingly complex activity, and the risks it poses are changing. The actors involved in lobbying and the context in which they operate are also evolving. Those seeking to influence policymaking now include trade and industry associations, NGOs, advisory and expert groups, parliamentary liaison groups, academic institutions, and think-tanks (OECD, 2010[18]; OECD, 2021[19]; Benamouzig and Cortinas Muñoz, 2019[20]; Mialon, Swinburn and Sacks, 2015[21]). The methods being used to lobby policymakers and the pressures they create are also changing. Through social media and direct messaging, policymakers are subject to increased scrutiny, political polarisation and misinformation, making it harder to determine legitimate representation and make informed decisions that lead to policies in the public interest (OECD, 2021[19]). Changing public perceptions of whose interest policy is being made in and who should be involved in policymaking are leading to calls for stricter rules around lobbying and even the exclusion of certain interests from debates on certain issues (OECD, 2021[19]; OECD, 2022[6]).

These developments are particularly significant as engagement between OECD governments and external organisations intensifies around issues related to the green transition. AI is presenting new opportunities for those outside of government to influence decision making legitimately through more efficient policy analysis and more targeted influencing activity or illegitimately through, for example, deepfake content. And foreign interference is increasing the risks of not properly defining who has a legitimate interest in the policymaking process.

Lobbying is one of the most underregulated areas of public integrity across the OECD. This chapter finds that:

• The basic elements of a lobbying framework are in place in around half of OECD countries.

• Low levels of transparency around lobbying are increasing the risk that policymaking can be unduly influenced.

The basic elements of a lobbying framework are in place in around half of OECD countries

Lobbying regulations should not aim to prevent or reduce lobbying, but they should establish safeguards and standards to ensure that relevant interests are represented fairly and effectively in policymaking. Despite the changing lobbying landscape, only around half of OECD countries have defined lobbying activities and which actors are considered lobbyists (Figure ‎4.1). Clear regulatory definitions provide a firm basis on which to base other standards and safeguards against undue and asymmetric influence. Countries which do not define lobbying and lobbyists leave scope for those seeking to influence policymaking to misinterpret their obligations or to exploit loopholes in safeguards (OECD, 2021[19]). In addition, only 11 countries have a code of conduct that regulates interactions between public officials and lobbyists that is supported by practical examples of at-risk or undesirable behaviours and situations. This means the remaining countries may not be making the standards to which lobbyists are meant to adhere as clear as they could, leaving policy and decision making open to undesirable lobbying practices and influence.

Figure ‎4.1. A definition of “lobbying” and “lobbyists” and prescribed sanctions are prerequisites for tackling undue influence

Note: Data for definition of lobbying and lobbyists are based on country values for criterion “Lobbying activities are defined in the regulatory framework, including which actors are considered as lobbyists”. Data for sanctions in place are based on country values for the criterion “Sanctions for breaches of standards for transparency and integrity in lobbying are defined and proportional to the severity of the offence”. Poland has a definition for lobbying but not for lobbyists, and has sanctions in place for breaches of standards.

How to read: Austria has regulatory definitions for lobbying and lobbyists and sanctions in place for breaches of lobbying standards. Czechia has neither definitions for lobbyists or lobbying, nor sanctions for breaches of standards in place.

Source: OECD (2024[7]), OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database.

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Countries are also not ensuring the standards set out in their regulatory frameworks are maintained in practice through effective enforcement and oversight mechanisms. Even the best lobbying regulations are only effective if they are adhered to. However, many countries have not defined sanctions regimes within their lobbying rules, and existing sanctions regimes may not be effective. Only around a third of OECD countries have defined proportionate sanctions for breaches of standards for transparency and integrity in lobbying. Even among the 17 countries with a legal definition of lobbying and lobbyists, 6 have not prescribed sanctions. In countries where sanctions regimes do exist, their deterrent effect may be undermined because those subject to them are unaware of them (OECD, 2021[19]; Šimral, 2020[22]). A recent OECD survey of parliamentarians and lobbyists found that most were not aware of sanctions having been applied and a large proportion were not even aware that sanctions existed, significantly undermining the effectiveness of these countries’ regulatory and sanctions regimes (OECD, 2021[19]).

Many OECD countries’ oversight of lobbying rules and investigation of potential breaches could also be improved. Only 14 OECD countries have established an authority to oversee compliance with lobbying regulations. And of the 12 countries with sanctions in place, 10 conducted an investigation for non-compliance with lobbying regulations within the past year. On the other hand, no country without sanctions in place conducted an investigation, making it hard for them to assess whether their rules are being followed and good lobbying practices observed. These results also highlight a strong contrast between a core group of OECD countries that has taken many steps to promote integrity and transparency in lobbying and another group that has taken few steps in this direction.

Low levels of transparency around lobbying are increasing the risk that policymaking can be unduly influenced

Transparency measures around lobbying are designed to make clearer who is lobbying, who is being lobbied, how they are lobbying, and what they are lobbying about. Transparency in this area can help ensure integrity and higher ethical standards by allowing governments to understand which interests are being represented in policymaking, and inviting public scrutiny over the activities of lobbyists and public office holders (Crepaz, 2020[23]; Năstase and Muurmans, 2020[24]; OECD, 2021[19]). In situations where lobbying rules are working well, transparency measures can also help reassure citizens that all interests are fairly represented in the policymaking process.

Among the primary tools for increasing transparency in lobbying is a public lobbying register. In the past decade, the number of OECD countries with lobbying registers has increased, with 17 countries now having a publicly available lobbying register. However, many OECD countries’ lobbying registers do not provide enough information to mitigate integrity risks. Of the 17 countries with a publicly available register, all include in their register the name of the lobbyist, but only 13 include information about the type of lobbying conducted. Only eight countries include information on the piece of legislation or regulation targeted, and only three include information on the budget and expenses for lobbying (Figure ‎4.2). Therefore, despite the increase in the number of countries with registers, many OECD countries’ registers may not be meaningfully improving transparency in lobbying. This limits the degree to which lobbying registers can incentivise ethical behaviour, promote more effective public policymaking, and increase citizens’ trust.

Figure ‎4.2. Characteristics of lobbying register by country

Note: Data based on country values from the criteria “Information disclosed by lobbyists in the register includes their name, organisation, domain of intervention, and type of lobbying activities”, “Information disclosed by lobbyists in the register include budget/expenses for lobbying activities, and pieces of legislation and regulation targeted” and “The lobby register is accessible online”. Luxembourg's register does disclose the name of the lobbyist but not the company name. Finland's register does disclose the company name but not the name of the lobbyist.

Source: OECD (2024[7]), OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database.

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In addition to lobbying registers, other transparency tools can also help provide clarity on who is shaping the policymaking process. For example, 12 countries publish open agendas for ministers online that provide information about who ministers are meeting and about what. Furthermore, 13 countries have a publicly available register of beneficial ownership, which helps enable both citizens and policymakers to better understand who is influencing policymaking when opaque corporate structures are involved. As the OECD Recommendation on Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying set out, transparency in lobbying works best where a combination of methods is used. While some countries’ adoption of transparency measures is a positive step to improve lobbying practices and influence over policymaking, adoption of these measures is still the exception rather than the rule.