This chapter briefly outlines the context in the Middle East and North Africa against the backdrop of major transformations and global challenges. It provides a glance at developments in public governance over the past decade across four main areas: (1) fostering sustainable growth; (2) spending public resources efficiently; (3) delivering public services effectively; and (4) promoting open and inclusive societies. In doing so, it sets the stage for an in-depth assessment of governance arrangements and practices adopted by MENA governments in these areas, covered in the respective chapters of the report.
Governing for Sustainable Prosperity in the Middle East and North Africa
OECD Public Governance Reviews
Abstract
The evolution of global challenges over the past decade and their impact on society have brought public governance reforms to the forefront of the policy debate. In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)1 region, in particular, the 2010-2011 Arab uprisings are often portrayed as the result of the breakdown of the “social contract” between governments and citizens (Devarajan and Ianchovichina, 2018[1]). This is due to governments’ failure to deliver on the political, social and economic needs and expectations of their citizens, including in the areas of social justice, integrity and political representation (OECD/UN ESCWA, 2021[2]). The reliance on governments to deliver for citizens in the face of a collective threat was underlined by the COVID-19 crisis and recovery, and again more recently by the negative economic and social impacts of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and of the evolving conflicts in the Middle East, which are generating new risks for governments in the region.
Effective short-term responses and long-term solutions to such crises rest on co-ordinated, cross-cutting and participatory governance approaches. Public administrations in the MENA region will thus need to strengthen their public governance frameworks, tools and capacities to deliver for their citizens in the context of complex and inter-connected phenomena, from climate change to food insecurity, digital transformation, armed conflicts, displacement and migration. Effective and efficient public governance is an end in itself: using limited public resources effectively and efficiently in full transparency and within robust accountability frameworks is in the public interest. But it is also a means to ensure that governments meet the needs of citizens and businesses successfully and enable societies to generate and sustain development and prosperity across generations, thus building and sustaining public confidence in public institutions.
While the MENA region is confronted with common challenges, it is a very diverse and heterogeneous region. The region includes economies with some of the highest Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in the world (e.g., Qatar, the United Arab Emirates – UAE- and Kuwait) as well as others where poverty, conflict and human displacement are widespread (e.g. Libya, West Bank and Gaza Strip, Syria and Yemen). MENA societies also vary across a wide range of other natural, political, socio-economic and cultural factors.
The purpose of this Report is to survey developments in key public governance areas over the past decade and assess MENA governments’ strategic commitments to improve their public governance frameworks, tools and practices as part of their efforts to enhance national sustainable development outcomes and prosperity for all citizens.
In so doing, this Report assesses MENA governments’ approaches to public governance, including governance modernisation efforts, against the OECD standards and best practices on public governance that have been laid out in OECD legal instruments and reviews. The Report draws on evidence and good practices gathered by the OECD Public Governance Committee, the Regulatory Policy Committee, the Committee of Senior Budget Officials and their subsidiary bodies, as well as the working groups and networks of the MENA-OECD Governance Programme. The Report then aims to identify strategic orientations and actionable areas of opportunity for consideration by MENA governments.
Chapter 1 outlines the context in the MENA region and provides a glance at developments in key public governance areas over the past decade, setting the scene for the in-depth assessment of the governance arrangements and practices adopted by MENA governments to grow sustainably (Chapter 2), spend public resources efficiently (Chapter 3), deliver public services effectively (Chapter 4) and promote open and inclusive societies (Chapter 5).
The 2010-2011 Arab uprisings, the COVID-19 crisis, Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the evolving conflicts in the Middle East have represented key turning points for governments across the MENA region. These turning points have exacerbated pre-existing challenges and tested governments’ capacities to overcome crises and deliver on citizens’ expectations.
In late 2010, the self-immolation of a Tunisian citizen in protest of police corruption and ill treatment marked the beginning of the Arab uprisings, triggering unrest, protests and political change across the MENA region, in a context of discontent with corruption, inequalities and a difficult socio-economic situation. Constitutional reform processes were launched in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and Yemen. The uprisings also accelerated reforms in a series of public governance areas. For instance, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia accelerated efforts to adopt principles of open government, promote transparency and decentralise government powers (Shalaby et al., 2020[3]).
Despite these endeavours, public governance challenges persist to this day. In fact, the MENA region is one of a few regions in the world that has lost ground in terms of good governance over the past decade, according to most indicators (World Bank, 2022[4]). For instance, a number of MENA public administrations continue to face challenges in the area of corruption, inefficient public spending, bloated public sector workforces, administrative red tape and inadequate governance structures, tools and capacities (Biganzoli and Gagliardi, 2021[5]).
In Libya, Syria and Yemen, the uprisings deteriorated into wide-scale violent conflicts. These protracted conflicts have produced devastating effects on citizens’ physical, economic and social security and have deteriorated institutional set-ups and capacities. Today, the estimated total number of casualties caused by the conflict in Syria stands at around 500,000-600,000 people, including at least 300,000 civilians according to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, 2023[6]; OHCHR, 2022[7]). Yemen has suffered over 377,000 deaths due to the conflict, including 60% due to conflict-induced famine and healthcare deterioration (BBC, 2023[8]). The conflicts have also generated displacement, increased migration flows and deteriorated people’s well-being and access to services and basic needs. There are also significant economic losses: Syria’s economy shrank by 10% a year on average between 2011 and 2014. Similarly, Libya’s economy contracted by around 14% per year between 2013 and 2015, and Yemen’s by an estimated 38% in 2015 alone (Ianchovichina, 2016[9]). Mitigating the negative ramifications of these crises has represented an unprecedented challenge for these governments in a context of limited public governance capacity.
The COVID-19 crisis also affected MENA economies – although to different degrees – in terms of high levels of debt, budget deficits, drops in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), limited trade and tourism, reduction of remittances, impact on oil prices, decline of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) revenues and rising unemployment (OECD, 2020[10]). The impact of the crisis was particularly severe for young people, women and vulnerable groups (Hoogeveen and Lopez-Acevedo, 2021[11]). For instance, approximately 110 million students no longer had access to education, which led to a decline in youth employment by 7.5% in 2020 across the MENA region (OECD, 2022[12]). Women in the MENA region were at the frontline of the COVID-19 health emergency response and suffered from increased unpaid care burdens, higher exposure to economic fallout and increased risk of gender-based violence (OECD, 2020[13]). While the COVID-19 pandemic had negative impacts across the whole region, public administrations exhibited different levels of readiness and capacity to respond to the crisis, as a result of divergent trajectories in the past ten years. Overall, the COVID-19 pandemic has been a critical test for the region’s fragile resilience and for governments’ capacity to deliver on people’s needs and expectations (OECD, 2020[10]). For instance, some governments demonstrated strong capacity to mobilise and implement prevention measures and prepare stimulus packages to mitigate the economic impact of the crisis on households and firms. At the same time, the crisis exposed structural public governance weak spots and highlighted the importance of reforms in this area.
Since 2022, the war in Ukraine has generated a number of shocks and ripple effects across the world, notably bringing issues of food and energy security to the forefront of the policy debate. While oil exporting economies in the MENA region largely benefitted from elevated energy prices, the rest of the region has directly or indirectly suffered from higher import bills as well as a depreciation of local currencies in some cases (World Bank, 2022[14]). Russia and Ukraine are also major players in the energy, minerals and grains markets, which serve as inputs into the agrifood supply chains, including for fertilisers (FAO, 2022[15]). Before the war, approximately 80% of wheat imports in Egypt and about 95% in Lebanon came from Russia and Ukraine2. These events led to soaring world prices on many food commodities and disruptions to global food value chains, leading to an increase in the share of population exposed to food insecurity in a number of MENA countries and territories (OECD, 2023[16]). The consequences of food and energy insecurity risk exacerbating inequalities, undermining economic prosperity and fuelling political instability. With numerous governments in the MENA region providing food subsidies, higher prices may also have lasting implications for public finances. For instance, in 2021, one third of the calories consumed by people in the MENA region were wheat products subsidised by governments (Belhaj and Soliman, 2021[17]). While the war context continues to evolve and global food prices seem to decrease to pre-war level (The Economist, 2022[18]), the crisis has highlighted the need to develop strong governance systems to ensure food security in the MENA region.
The war in Ukraine has significantly changed world energy markets, with important implications for the MENA region. According to projections from the International Energy Agency, by the mid-2020s, the gap left by Russia global fossil fuel exports will be mainly filled by higher exports from the Middle East, whose share of oil global export markets is expected to rise from over 40% in 2022 to 65% in 2050 (IEA, 2023[19]). Similarly, the Middle East is projected to become the largest producer of natural gas, ahead of North America, increasing its global share of production of natural gas from 15% in 2022 to 25% by 2050 (Figure 1.1). In addition, with large hydrocarbon reserves and renewables potential, many Middle Eastern governments are exploring the potential for hydrogen production and trade (IEA, 2023[19]).
Natural gas production (bcm), 2022 and 2050, by region of the world
Note: bcm=billion cubic meters ; Middle East includes: Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates and Yemen; Information on the Stated Policies Scenario (STEPS) is available at https://www.iea.org/reports/global-energy-and-climate-model/stated-policies-scenario-steps. Information on the Announced Pledges Scenario (APS) is available at https://www.iea.org/reports/global-energy-and-climate-model/announced-pledges-scenario-aps. Regional groupings definitions are available in Annex C of the source.
Source: Author’s work based on (IEA, 2023[19]).
The COVID-19 crisis and the war in Ukraine with their accompanying shocks to global supply chains have also highlighted the importance of international trade in natural resources and related interdependencies. According to data analysed by Chatham House, the “Northern African and Western Asian”3 region imported natural resources worth USD 375 billion in 2020, and exported the equivalent of USD 752 billion in the same year. When looking at natural resources’ trade flows from the perspective of OECD countries, the “Northern African and Western Asian” region emerges as the third-most significant origin of natural resources after Europe and Northern America (Figure 1.2).
Region of origin of natural resources by value (USD billion), 2020
Note: The chart shows monetary values across over 1,350 different types of natural resources and resource products, including agricultural, fishery and forestry products, fossil fuels, metals and other minerals, and pearls and gemstones. It contains raw materials, intermediate products, and by-products. Information on methodology https://resourcetrade.earth/about. “North Africa and Western Asia” includes the following countries and territories: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Georgia, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, West Bank and Gaza Strip and Yemen.
Source: Author’s work based on (Chatham House, n.d.[20]).
More recently, the evolving conflicts in the Middle East will have long-lasting, profound consequences for the MENA region. One major consequence of the conflict has been the rapid and large-scale displacement of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. While neighbouring states initially dismissed the risk of another migration flow, a protracted conflict could force a revision of this assumption. Important migration flows have also had an impact on the political stability and economy of neighbouring countries and territories. It is estimated that, by the end of 2023, 230,000 additional people had descended into poverty in Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan (UNDP, 2023[21]).
In addition to the humanitarian challenges they pose, the evolving conflicts in the Middle East disrupt the economies of the region. In 2023, the economy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip lost 8.7% of its GDP and was projected as of May 2024 to lose between 25.8 and 29% during 2024 (ESCWA; UNDP, 2024[22]). At the regional level, the economic impact has been contained so far, with growth projected as of April 2024 to remain subdued in 2024 but still improving moderately to 2.7% (from 1.9% in 2023) (IMF, 2024[23]). Nevertheless, the evolving conflicts in the Middle East have heightened uncertainty and risks in the region, particularly as they often result in lasting economic scarring.
The inflationary pressures caused by the combined surge in energy and food markets could lead to long-lasting contractionary monetary policies, affecting in turn the worldwide economy. In fact, a projected rise of 10% in oil prices is expected to result in a 0.15% decline in global growth, accompanied by a 0.4% increase in global inflation (UNDP, 2023[24]). This general price increase is likely to be accompanied by rising public debt, fiscal pressure, and currency devaluation, negatively affecting trade, and putting pressure on foreign reserve holdings to sustain exchange rates. The situation is particularly challenging for neighbouring countries and territories that were already in fragile situations, such as Lebanon, where the financial and economic crisis has been accompanied by high levels of social unrest that peaked in October 2023 (International Monetary Fund, 2024[25]). In terms of the impact of the evolving conflicts in the Middle East on the energy market, supply disruptions and higher and more volatile prices can be expected. Those evolving conflicts in the Middle East could lead to rising prices and affect the already strained regional gas market by hindering current and potential cooperation among neighbouring economies, especially Israeli exports to Jordan and Egypt. The initial effects on the global oil market were limited: after an initial approximate increase of 6% in the price per barrel during October 2023, overall prices went down to previous levels by the end of the year (EIA, 2024[26]). However, as illustrated by World Bank’s projections, a protracted conflict and the escalation of regional tensions could drive oil prices up to 150 USD per barrel (World Bank, 2023[27]), an approximate 80% increase compared to late December 2023 levels.
Overall, the 2010-2011 Arab uprisings, the COVID-19 crisis, the evolving conflicts in the Middle East and neighbouring countries and territories have reiterated the significance of the MENA region for global stability. They also demonstrate that public administrations in the region need to invest significantly in accelerating public governance reforms and in sustaining their implementation to ensure that MENA governments can address major development challenges successfully, regain and retain their citizens’ trust, and ensure inclusive prosperity for all (Kabbani, 2022[28]). This will be essential to support the region’s growth in the coming years, that is expected to outperform all other regions of the world in 2025 - except emerging and developing Asia - in terms of annual GDP growth, according to International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s latest projections (Figure 1.3).
Growth by region in 2023, 2024 projections and 2025 projections (real GDP growth, percent change)
Note: The chart is based on the World Bank’s classification of regions of the world, available at https://datatopics.worldbank.org/sdgatlas/archive/2017/the-world-by-region.html.
Source: Author’s work based on (IMF, 2024[29]).
Public governance determines how governments make and enforce rules, how they deliver services (including education, employment and health services) and how they engage with, and remain accountable to, citizens in making decisions that matter to them, affecting people’s well-being both directly and indirectly (OECD, 2017[30]). The well-being and demographic set-up of society also matter for how governments design and deliver policies and services. Given their mutually reinforcing interlinkages, this section provides a short account of developments in demographics and key well-being indicators in the MENA region, while the rest of the chapter provides an overview of developments in public governance that will be examined in the remaining chapters of this report.
Although a comprehensive and sound analysis of the impact of ongoing conflicts in the MENA region is not yet possible, they will have long-term socio-economic, human, environmental and political consequences – although with varying scope and range - across the region.
A changing demographic situation
The demographic make-up is a key context factor for government action and governance reforms, as it affects the type, quantity and location of different public services and policies needed to meet people’s needs and expectations.
In the MENA region, people under 25 years of age constitute nearly half (48%) of the population, compared with 30% of the population across OECD Member countries (Figure 1.4)4. By 2050, half of the countries and territories in the MENA region are set to experience population increases of at least 50% from their 2015 levels (UNICEF, 2019[31]).
The age-profile of MENA societies calls for youth-sensitive public governance arrangements: the transition of the region’s significant youth cohort to adulthood presents both an opportunity and a need for renewed efforts and investments in governance arrangements, youth policies and public services to ensure their successful transition to an autonomous life and participation in economic, social and public life (OECD, 2022[12]). At the same time, future demographic projections vary significantly within the region; the window of opportunity to benefit from the demographic dividend differs from one society to another (UNICEF, 2019[31]). For instance, the current population under 25 years old ranges from 24% of the total population in the UAE to 60% in Yemen and is projected to range from 24% in Qatar to 50% in Mauritania by 2050 (Figure 1.4).
Share of young people as part of the total population, 2022 and 2050 projections
Note: PSE refers to the West Bank and Gaza Strip or the Palestinian Authority in the figures of the report.
Source: OECD calculations based on (UN DESA, 2022[32]).
To respond to the growing need to deliver to youth, governments have presented holistic youth strategies in recent years. The report Youth at the Centre of Government Action: A Review of the Middle East and North Africa shows that, as of 2022, at least seven governments in the MENA region have adopted a youth strategy to promote a joint vision, co-ordinated approaches and policy coherence in support of young people (OECD, 2022[12]).
The MENA region is home to almost 250 million women and girls (UNICEF, 2021[33])5. Furthermore, a significant part is aged 14 or below: in 2022, girls aged 0-14 represented more than 30% of the total female population in Mauritania, Yemen, Iraq, Egypt, Jordan, Oman and Algeria (Figure 1.5). Fully unlocking the potential of girls and women, including through public governance arrangements for gender equality, remains an important goal for MENA governments to strive towards.
Share of girls aged 0-14 as part of the total female population, 2022
Note: “MENA” here refers to the average of the percentages included in the chart.
Source: Author’s work based on (UN DESA, 2022[32]).
Regarding the geographical distribution of population, most MENA societies have experienced a period of rapid urbanisation over the past decades. In 2022, two thirds of the overall population in the region lived in urban areas (World Bank, 2024[34]). In Kuwait and Qatar, 100% or nearly 100% of the population lives in urban centres, followed by Jordan, Oman, Bahrain, Lebanon, and the UAE, all projected to be over 90% urbanised by 2035 (Un Habitat, 2022[35]). While overcrowding in urban centres can lead to difficulties such as limited water supply, land degradation and air pollution, urbanisation can also lead to growth when supported by adequate policies and services (Un Habitat, 2022). However, Yemen and Egypt are projected to remain 47.6% and 46.8% rural respectively until 2035 (Un Habitat, 2022[35]). This underlines the importance of ensuring adequate government capacities and services outside of major cities to avoid regional disparities and rural-urban divides.
Migration and displacement shape the region’s demographics, societies and economies
As a consequence of war and conflicts as well as economic, social and environmental concerns, migration has emerged as a significant phenomenon in the MENA region. The number of international migrants in the region doubled from approximately 20 million in 2000 to over 40 million in 2020 (International Organization for Migration, 2021[36]; UN Population Division, 2020[37]).
Conflict and violence remain the biggest drivers of displacement in the region (International Organization for Migration, 2021[36]). While home to 7% of the world’s population in 2022, the region hosted 15.5 million displaced persons in 2023, accounting for 17% of the overall population of forcibly displaced persons (UNHCR, 2024[38]; UNHCR, 2023[39]; United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2022[40]). In 2023, the crisis in Syria remained unprecedented in terms of displacement, with 5.1 million of refugees in neighbouring countries (Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey) and 7.2 million being Internally Displaced People (UNHCR, 2023[41]). Similarly, in Yemen, 4.5 million people, accounting for 14% of the population, were displaced at the end of 2022 despite the ceasefire in October of the same year (UNHCR, 2023[39]), and an estimated 24 million (83% of the population) are affected by food insecurity and need humanitarian aid and protection (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2021[42]).
As of January 2024, an estimated 1.7 million people living in the northern part of the Gaza strip had to evacuate to the south (UNOCHA, 2024[43]). Domestic and international population displacement requires that governments invest in administrative capacities and resources to provide access to basic public services to the millions of refugees and displaced persons.
Economic and social factors also frame migration flows within the MENA region and with other regions of the world. 44% of people aged 18-24 years surveyed by the Arab Youth Survey in 2023 reported that they had considered emigrating. The primary reason for half of them was to find a job (ASDA’A BCW, 2023[44]). Outward migration, including towards OECD Member countries, is prominent in the MENA region, although inward migration, especially towards Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries (i.e. Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE) remains most significant. Most migrants from MENA countries and territories thus move to other countries in the region (54.7%) and to Western Europe (20.7%) (International Organization for Migration, 2023[45]). Moreover, as shown in Figure 1.6, the number of migrants in OECD Member countries from the MENA region increased by 95% between 2010 and 2020, largely outpacing increases from other regions of the world, including those that had been the origin of significant migration towards OECD Member countries in the past. In addition, despite a notable improvement in the employment situation of immigrants from Africa and the Middle East since 2019, they remain the most disadvantaged group of immigrants in most OECD Member countries (OECD, 2022[46]).
Destination regions for migrants from MENA countries and territories, 2020
Note: The figure relies on the definition of geographical regions adopted by the United Nations, which defines regions on the basis of the following countries and territories: Western Asia (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Cyprus, Georgia, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen and the West Bank and Gaza Strip), Western Europe (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and Switzerland), Northern America (Canada, United States of America, Greenland, Saint Pierre and Miquelon and Bermuda) and Southern Europe (Albania, Andorra, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece, Holy See, Italy, Malta, Montenegro, Portugal, San Marino, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain and Gibraltar).
Source: (UN DESA, 2020[47]).
The MENA region is also home to over two million migrants from sub-Saharan Africa. A significant number are located in Yemen and Saudi Arabia and come from neighbouring countries and territories, including Ethiopia, Somalia and South Sudan. These migration patterns are mainly driven by political instability and the secession of South Sudan in 2011 (International Organization for Migration, 2023[45]). North Africa is also a significant transit point and departure area for migrants and MENA nationals, from the subregion itself and sub-Saharan Africa, towards Europe and other destinations as shown in Figure 1.7 (International Organization for Migration, 2023[45]).
Evolution in number of migrants in OECD countries, by origin, 1990-2000, 2000-2010 and 2010-2020, percentage
Source: OECD calculations based on (UN DESA, 2020[47]).
Migration and displacement due to climate change are also increasing significantly in the MENA region. Several countries and territories in the region have suffered significant disasters in recent years. For instance, in 2020, floods displaced more people in Yemen than conflict and violence, with nearly a quarter of a million new displacements (International Organization for Migration, 2021[36]). In 2021 alone, around three million people were forced to leave their homes due to natural disasters and climate induced events (Freedman, 2023[48]), and there is ongoing concern that displacement due to climate change could sharply increase. The multiplication of climate events in a region facing important environmental challenges exacerbates existing crises and their consequences on the population. In areas affected by conflicts or hosting important refugee populations such as in Jordan and Lebanon, climate disasters have aggravated ongoing humanitarian crises. In Syria, evidence suggests that the extended drought that devastated livelihoods prior to the start of the conflict may have played a role in the complex set of factors that triggered the country’s civil war (International Organization for Migration, 2021[36]).
Overview of key well-being dimensions across MENA countries and territories
Public governance can influence people’s lives and well-being; at the same time, how people feel about their lives is an important driver of trust in government and public institutions.
The MENA region displays a wide variety in levels of well-being and human development (having a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and having a decent standard of living). The Human Development Index6 (HDI) ranked Djibouti and Yemen as societies with “low human development” in 2021, while Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE displayed “very high human development” (UNDP, 2021[49]). According to the HDI, most countries and territories in the MENA region have improved human development since 2010, largely due to advances in primary and secondary education as well as in healthcare delivery. Nevertheless, economic and political crises as well as conflicts and wars have deteriorated health, education and income outcomes, especially in Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Syria and Yemen, which showed a lower HDI score in 2021 than in 2010. Indeed, according to the 2022 Arab Human Development Report, the COVID-19 crisis “has erased several years of previous gains in human development” across the whole region (UNDP, 2022[50]). Furthermore, gender inequality in human development persists, despite an overall positive trajectory in the last two decades: the MENA region7 ranks last among all regions, with a gender parity score of 61.7% (World Economic Forum, 2024[51]).
Beyond the aggregate picture provided by the HDI, the OECD Well-being Framework provides a useful structure to look at key dimensions of well-being. Comprising 11 dimensions, the Framework covers indicators related to material conditions shaping people’s economic options as well as to quality-of-life factors that encompass how well people are, what they know and can do, how healthy and safe their places of living are and how connected and engaged they are (OECD, 2020[52]). While not covering all 11 dimensions of the OECD Well-being Framework, the following sections provide a snapshot of some well-being dimensions in the MENA region, with a focus on those that are related to key areas of public service delivery.
Access to education is improving across the region
Governments across the MENA region have made significant progress in providing access to education, despite challenges brought about by the COVID-19 crisis. For instance, literacy rates among young people (15-24) reached 91% in 2022 (93% for young men and 89% for young women) compared to 86% in 2000 (90% for young men and 81% for young women) (World Bank, n.d.[53])8. Despite the progress achieved in providing education for all, 14 million children were estimated to be out of school in the region in 2020 (Equitas Education; Save the Children; World Food Programme; UNICEF, 2021[54]).
Tertiary education enrolment rates vary widely across the MENA region, with the gross enrolment ratio9 ranging from 6% in Mauritania to 71% in Saudi Arabia in 2020 (World Bank, n.d.[55]). Education statistics have improved for women. School completion among women in the region has reached its highest levels in recent years (World Bank, n.d.[56]). Female graduates of tertiary education outnumber their male counterparts in Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia. More generally, the Gender Parity Index (GPI) indicates that girls exceeded boys in tertiary school enrolment by 1.08 % on average in 202210 (World Bank, n.d.[57]). Furthermore, Algeria, Oman and Tunisia achieved gender parity in sciences, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) degrees in tertiary-level education, outperforming OECD Member countries where women on average account for 31% of graduates in these areas (OECD/ILO/CAWTAR, 2020[58]).
Although these statistics point to significant achievements in increasing access to education, the performance of education systems remains low. OECD’s Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) 2022 results show that students in the six MENA countries and territories11 surveyed scored less than the OECD average in mathematics, reading and sciences (OECD, 2023[59]). For three countries and territories, results were worse than in 2018. Moreover, inequality in access to education opportunities along household socio-economic indicators remains relatively high (ESCWA, 2021[60]). Nevertheless, between 2012 and 2022 the gap in performance between students from different socio-economic status narrowed in most MENA countries and territories, while it remained stable across OECD Member countries over the same period (OECD, 2023[59]).
Conflict and violence greatly disrupt access to education for children in the region. Around 2.2 million of the region’s forcibly displaced and stateless people in 2022 were school-aged (UNHCR, 2022[61]). As of January 2024, more than 625,000 students had been affected by school closures for over two months in the context of the evolving conflicts in the Middle East, and almost 70% of school buildings had suffered war-related damages. Furthermore, refugee children and adolescents are at greater risk of remaining out of school: for instance, despite the important contributions of host countries and territories, around 35% of school-aged Syrian refugees were still out of school in 2019, eight years after the beginning of the conflict (UNICEF, 2019[31]).
Going forward, the number of students requiring education will grow by 25 million by 2030 (a 23% increase compared to 2019), which will test the capacities of MENA governments in providing quality education to all (UNICEF, 2019[31]). According to the 2023 Arab Youth Survey, 40% of young people surveyed also expressed a lack of confidence about the ability of their governments to tackle educational reform (ASDA’A BCW, 2023[44]). This represents a key challenge for the future of the region. Studies show that investing in the skills of primary and secondary school children in the MENA region could generate an additional $266 billion for the region’s economy by 2030 (World Economic Forum, 2022[62]).
The labour market is recovering from COVID-19, but remains structurally fragile
As a whole, the MENA region’s labour market is on its way to recover from the consequences of the COVID-19 crisis. Following an increase in 2020 and 2021 compared to pre-COVID rates, unemployment rates fell in the MENA region by around 1% in 2022 to 10.1%, below pre-pandemic levels. It remained stable in 2023 at 10.2%, although much higher than the world average of 5.1% (ILO, 2024[63]).
The age and gender dimensions of employment remain long-standing issues in the region and were further exacerbated during the COVID-19 crisis (UNDP, 2022[50]). The MENA region has one of the highest and fastest growing rates of youth unemployment (15-24 year olds) in the world12, exceeding 26% on average in 2023 (ASDA’A BCW, 2023[44]; ILO, 2024[64]). However, youth unemployment rates vary significantly across the region, from Qatar (0.6%), Bahrain (5.8%), Oman (7%) and the UAE (9.8%), all below the OECD average (13.3%), to Djibouti (76.9%) in 2023 (ILO, 2024[63])13. Furthermore, more than 30% of unemployed people in the MENA region have a university degree, a figure largely exceeding those of other world regions (Kabbani, 2019[65]).
Despite clear improvements in female education, women continue to be distinctly disadvantaged on the labour market in the MENA region (ILO, 2024[64]). In 2023, the average female labour force participation rate in the MENA region (18.8%) – ranging from 5.1% in Yemen to 64.1% in Qatar – was the lowest of all the world’s regions, well below the regional average for men (71.1%) and the global average for women (48.7%) (ILO, 2024[63]). Figures are even higher among young women aged 15-24. Nevertheless, it is important to highlight that women’s representation in professional roles has been evolving positively in recent years (World Economic Forum, 2024[51]). A variety of factors can explain such gender imparity, including restrictive legal frameworks, traditional views on women’s roles in society, an uneven allocation of family responsibilities as well as a slow-down in public sector recruitment (Assaad et al., 2020[66]; OECD, 2022[12]). Overall, barriers to expanded employment opportunities include poor quality education, a mismatch between skills learned at school and those required by the labour market and a lack of available jobs (ILO, 2024[64]). Policymakers will also need to factor in the impact of climate change, environmental pressures and the digital transition. For instance, according to UNICEF, half of the jobs of the future do not yet exist and today’s learners will need to acquire new skills by the time they enter the workforce (UNICEF, 2019[31]). By 2030, the MENA region will also see an increase of 39 million (+27% compared to 2019) new entrants to the labour force to be integrated in the economy (UNICEF, 2019[31]).
The labour market in the MENA region relies heavily on the informal economy, accounting for between 20 and 30% of GDP from 1990-2018, although with shares varying significantly across economies (OECD/ILO/UNDP, 2024[67]). As Figure 1.8 shows, the MENA region has the third-highest regional level of informal employment in the world (56.9% according to data available14) (ILO, 2024[68]). Informal employment is most prevalent in the agricultural sector, where in countries like Egypt, Syria and Yemen, it represents almost the entire workforce (Saoudi, 2022[69]). High levels of informality prevent inclusive growth because of limited social protection for workers without access to social insurance, reduced productivity and growth. Informality also constrains fiscal capacity of the government (Nadir et al., 2023[70]), and limits opportunities for social mobility and professional development in the formal sector, especially among women and young people. In fact, latest data show that 78.5% of young people aged 15-24 in MENA economies15 hold informal jobs compared to an average of 54.8% for the population aged 25+ (ILO, 2024[63]). Tackling informality cannot be solved by economic growth alone. It also requires strong institutions, clear legal frameworks for social protection, quality public services and co-ordinated cross-sectoral policies. The impact of economic and social policy initiatives on formalisation or informalisation should be core to the efforts undertaken by policymakers and researchers (OECD/ILO/UNDP, 2024[67]).
Share of informal employment in total employment by region, 2024 or latest available
Note: MENA average is based on data from the following countries and territories, latest available: Djibouti (2017), Egypt (2019), Iraq (2021), Jordan (2021), Lebanon (2019), Mauritania (2017); West Bank and Gaza Strip (2022) and Tunisia (2019) (ILO, 2024[68]).
Source: Author’s work based in (ILO, 2024[68]).
The labour market in the MENA region is also particularly impacted by conflict and violence. In addition to high levels of forced displacement and migration, conflicts cause important losses in employment in areas directly impacted. The unemployment rate in West Bank and Gaza Strip was estimated to have reached 46.1% as of March 2024 (compared to 25.7% in October 2023) and should further increase in the coming months if the conflict continues, in a labour market already facing working poverty, unemployment and other decent work deficits (ESCWA; UNDP, 2024[22]). A protracted conflict in the region would have important consequences on employment and economic losses, projected to increase if military operations intensify and the humanitarian crisis continues to unfold.
Health care access and delivery are slowly advancing
The MENA region has achieved significant progress on health outcomes through the implementation of reforms to improve health care access and delivery for their population. For instance, all MENA countries and territories (excluding Libya and Yemen) have experienced an increase in life expectancy at birth between 2010 and 2019 (World Health Organization, 2024[71]). Child mortality has decreased significantly in most of them16 in the last decade, at rates faster than other developing countries and territories in the world (World Health Organization, 2024[71]; Katoue MG, 2022[72]), although this is not the case everywhere in the region due to ongoing conflicts. More widely, the MENA region is advancing towards providing essential health services to the population. The Universal Health Coverage (UHC) service coverage index17, that assesses “population’s access to health services they need without facing financial hardship”, reached 69 in 2021 in the MENA region (compared to 50 in 2000), ahead of Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia (World Bank, World Health Organization, 2023[73]).
There are however some persisting health risks. Although the share of GDP for domestic general government health expenditure has improved in most MENA countries and territories in recent years, all countries and territories except Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia remain below the world average (Table 1.1). Table 1.1 also highlights the wide variation in density of health care personnel across the region: for instance, in Lebanon, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, there are more than 25 physicians per 10,000 people, while in Djibouti and Mauritania, there are just 2 physicians per 10,000 people (World Health Organization, 2023[74]). Evolution in the last decade is also diverse, with a number of countries and territories experiencing an increase in the number of physicians (Djibouti, Jordan, Oman, Tunisia and the UAE) while others saw their situation worsen (Bahrain, Qatar and Syria) (World Health Organization, 2024[71]).
Domestic general government health expenditure (% of GDP) and medical doctors per 10,000 population, latest data available
Note: Data are collected from UNESCO, World Bank, WHO reports between 2009 and 2021.
As elsewhere in the world, the COVID-19 crisis has also exposed low performance on other indicators such as the number of ventilators, intensive care units, and hospital beds. Compared to world and OECD averages of 29 and 43 hospital beds per 10,000 people respectively, the region scores low with 16.3 beds per 10,000 people, and the number is as low as 4 and 7.1 in Mauritania and Yemen (World Health Organization, 2024[71]; World Bank, 2024[76]; OECD, 2023[77]).
Women and young people are particularly vulnerable to health risks. For instance, the MENA region hosts overall the third highest obesity rate (20.8%) worldwide behind America and Europe, but the second highest female obesity rate (26%) (World Health Organization, 2024[71]). Women in the MENA region are also particularly vulnerable to reproductive health issues, especially in rural contexts. According to available data, there are approximately 900,000 births to adolescent girls aged 10–19 years each year (UNICEF Middle East and North Africa Regional Office and Burnet Institute, 2023[78]), which can contribute to poor infant health as adolescents are likely to have less knowledge about family planning and sexual and reproductive health than their older counterparts (UNDP, 2016[79]). Young people in the MENA region also face a higher prevalence of risk factors for health compared to older generations. For instance, latest data available18 show that only 55.7% of young people aged 15-19 have their demand for family planning satisfied, compared to 72.5% of people aged 20-49 (World Health Organization, 2022[80]).
Conflict and violence continue to strongly affect the region’s stability
As highlighted in previous sections, conflict and violence have severe implications for people’s social and economic prospects and aspirations, as well as for social cohesion and institutional capacities (OECD, 2022[12]). According to the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators, the MENA region is the lowest ranking region of the world when it comes to political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (Figure 1.9). Conflicts continue in several countries and territories, with expected human, socio-economic and political consequences on the long-term across the region (IMF, 2024[23]). For instance, as of 2020 the Syrian conflict had pushed up poverty rates by four percentage points in Jordan, six percentage points in Iraq and 7.1 percentage points in Lebanon (ESCWA; UNDP, 2024[81]).
Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, percentile rank (0-100), 2022
Note: Percentile rank indicates the percentage of countries and territories worldwide that rate below the selected region of the world. Higher values indicate better political stability and lower violence/terrorism. Latest data available in 2022.
Source: Author’s work based on (World Bank, n.d.[82]).
Evidence shows that significant governance reforms are key to supporting stability and promoting development that is strong, sustainable and resilient to future risks. They represent an avenue for MENA governments to foster well-being outcomes, notably to build a more accountable and efficient public sector and generate increasingly inclusive and performant services and policies, especially in light of the specific demographic characteristics of the region (high young populations; significant migration and population churn, etc), as highlighted in the preceding section.
The rest of this chapter provides an overview of developments in four key areas for a strong, sustainable and resilient prosperity, setting the stage for the in-depth analysis of existing public governance arrangements and ways forward contained in the remaining chapters of the Report.
From increased periods of extreme temperatures to droughts, desertification, food insecurity and climate-induced migration, climate change and unsustainable development pose several risks in the MENA region. Many MENA governments, especially middle and high-income economies, have started transitioning to renewable energy, adopting green technologies and aligning national development agendas to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (Wehrey and Fawal, 2022[83]). MENA governments have also continued to engage in global discourses on sustainability, as exemplified by Morocco hosting the climate Conference Of Parties (COP) 22 in 2016, Egypt hosting COP 27 in 2022 and the UAE hosting COP 28 in 2023.
Yet, when it comes to climate challenges, 50.2% of respondents surveyed by the Arab Barometer in 2021-202219 across 10 MENA administrations reported on average that their national governments should be doing more to address climate change. Full compliance with Nationally Determined Contributions is expected to fall short of tangible outcomes, as they would result in a 22% drop from 2030 business-as-usual emissions levels albeit still an increase in emissions by 14% compared to 2019 (World Economic Forum, 2023[84]).
Despite the ‘decoupling challenge’ of trying to reduce emissions in a context of growing energy demand, the region has the potential and the resources to play a leading role in the energy transition. MENA governments face an imperative to strengthen their public governance arrangements in order to ensure they recover and grow sustainably in the context of climate change. Public administrations in the MENA region can benefit from developing and implementing risk governance frameworks and tools to manage climate disasters and develop climate-resilient societies. More widely, long-term whole-of-government strategies, dedicated institutional structures and comprehensive monitoring and evaluation systems can support MENA public administrations in promoting policy coherence for the achievement of the SDGs. As a prelude to Chapter 2, which assesses existing governance arrangements and identifies outstanding capacity gaps to pursue sustainable development coherently in the MENA region, this section introduces the most pressing contextual challenges affecting governance in the region.
Heat stress and water (in)security are rising quickly
In the MENA region and especially in North Africa, climate impacts on water availability and heat stress will be most acute. Temperatures across the region increased by 0.46°C per decade in the period 1980-2022, well above the world average of 0.18°C (IEA, 2023[85]). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) research indicates that average temperatures in the MENA region are likely to increase between 3°C and 4°C on average this century, far surpassing the global average limits of 2°C envisioned by the Paris Agreement (Zittis et al., 2021[86]). Latest estimates show that some countries and territories, such as Algeria, could see their average summer temperature increase by 8°C by the end of the century (Yabi, 2023[87]). Moreover, concern is growing in the region around decreasing rainfall. Between 1980 and 2022, total precipitation in the southern and eastern Mediterranean region has decreased by around 8.3% per decade.
Annual mean precipitation is projected to decrease in these areas (IEA, 2023[85]). In Tunisia for instance, depending on climate-change scenarios, the frequency of dry years may increase from 52% (10 out of 19 years) to 79% (15 out of 19 years) between 2031 and 2050. Although the gravity of the situation remains uncertain, this will inevitably exacerbate the already challenging water situation, particularly in the agricultural sector and in rural areas (World Bank Group, 2023[88]). Furthermore, the IPCC considers likely that drops in precipitation will coincide with an increased frequency and intensity of droughts in the region (Masson-Delmotte, 2021[89]). This observation seems to confirm the trend already observed in Morocco and Tunisia, with droughts becoming more frequent and, perhaps, more severe (World Bank Group, 2022[90]; World Bank Group, 2023[88]).The sharp increase in temperatures, along with the region’s sparse freshwater reserves and arid climates, thus brings elevated risks of droughts and water unavailability.
The MENA region is already the most water-stressed region in the world, where 83% of the population is exposed to extremely high-water stress (Kuzma, Saccocia and Chertock, 2023[91]). According to latest figures, the region is home to 14 of the 25 most water-stressed countries and territories20 in the world (Kuzma, Saccocia and Chertock, 2023[91]), and as Figure 1.10 shows, total renewable water resources per capita in 13 MENA countries and territories were already below the absolute water scarcity threshold of 500 cubic meters per person per year as of 2021. By 2030, the water available per capita annually in the MENA region is expected to fall below the absolute water scarcity threshold overall (De Waal et al., 2023[92]). Its impacts on agriculture, health and incomes are also projected to cost MENA economies between 6 and 14% of their GDP by 2050, compared to a global average reduction of GDP of less than 1 percent by 2050 (De Waal et al., 2023[92]).
Competition over scarce water resources may also increase internal and regional conflicts, with a higher risk of vulnerabilities and tensions for MENA countries and territories facing armed conflict and weak institutions “in a vicious cycle of water insecurity and fragility” (Borgomeo et al., 2021[93]; Kabbani, 2022[28]). In this context, while the MENA region has invested significantly in water infrastructure (such as dams, irrigation systems and water desalination systems), studies highlight challenges in water governance and management in the MENA region, including inefficient centralised systems, underfunded utilities and lack of legitimacy on water regulations and tariffs (Belhaj et al., 2022[94]; De Waal et al., 2023[92]).
Total Renewable water resources per capita per year, 2021
Note: If the amount of renewable water in a country is below 1,700 m3 per person per year, that country is said to be experiencing water stress; below 1,000 m3 it is said to be experiencing water scarcity; and below 500 m3, absolute water scarcity.
Source: Author’s work based on (FAO, n.d.[95]).
Food insecurity is further exacerbated by climate change and demographic changes
Although many MENA countries and territories have reduced malnourishment over the past decades, water unavailability and rising temperatures pose considerable risks to food security. Furthermore, less than 5% of land is arable in two-thirds of MENA countries and territories, and this figure is projected to worsen due to climate change (Bertini and Zouache, 2021[96]). In fact, 45% of agricultural land is already exposed to climate-induced challenges such as nutrient depletion, erosion, and salinity (World Economic Forum, 2023[84]).
These challenges are coupled with a dramatic increase in population in the region, leading to an unsustainable increase in demand for food and agricultural products (Belhaj and Soliman, 2021[17]). Evolving conflicts in the Middle East over the last years have also exacerbated disparities in terms of food security and malnutrition across the region (Figure 1.11). For instance, the World Food Programme estimates that despite ongoing humanitarian assistance,17 million people in Yemen were afflicted by food insecurity in 2023 (52% of the population), with 3.5 million pregnant or breastfeeding women and children under five suffering from acute malnutrition. In Syria, the protracted conflict and the continued shocks such as the earthquakes of February 2023 had equally devastating consequences, with over 12 million Syrians (more than half of the population) affected by hunger in 2024 (World Food Programme, 2024[97]).
Undernourishment in the MENA region, % total population, 2021
Note: “MENA” here refers to the average across Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen.
Source: Author’s work based on (World Bank, n.d.[98]).
The effects of the COVID-19 crisis on purchasing power and foreign reserves and more recently the evolving conflicts in the Middle East and in neighbouring countries and territories have considerably challenged governments’ efforts to meet their populations’ food demand. Undernourishment increased overall in the MENA region from 11.8% in 2019 to 12.9% in 2022, reaching almost 60 million, the highest value since 2000 (FAO, 2023[99]). As net importer of food products, and with 40% of its needs for agricultural products met by imports, the MENA region was also heavily affected by the pandemic’s containment measures and related disruptions to global food supply chains.
The region’s vulnerabilities regarding food security were further exposed by the repercussions of the war in Ukraine on food exports, energy prices and inflation. The MENA region’s food and agriculture markets face many risks, such as trade-associated, price-associated, logistical, production and ecological risks (FAO, 2022[15]). In five out of nine MENA countries and territories covered by the Arab Barometer in 2021-2022, more than half of surveyed people reported that they ran out of food before they had money to buy more (Arab Barometer, 2022[100]). Furthermore, as shown in Figure 1.12, women in all surveyed countries and territories were more likely to report food insufficiency than men. To reduce malnutrition and inequality, governments in the MENA region have established food fortification policy, in alignment with other food, nutrition, and agriculture policies. Ensuring sound regulatory governance will be essential to achieving the desired health outcomes from these fortification initiatives (Karapanou, Ardnt-Bascle and Toktosunova, n.d.[101]). For example, the governments of Egypt and Jordan mandate wheat flour fortification with vitamins and minerals to combat micronutrient-related public health issues, such as anaemia and birth defects (FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO, 2020[102]). Additionally, fortified foods are distributed through social safety net programmes as well as marketed at subsidised cost to vulnerable population and/ or at emergency settings. In particular, in Egypt, the government’s food subsidy programme, where fortified baladi bread is sold in markets at a subsidised cost, reached more than 50 million low-income population (Elhakim et al., 2012[103]).
Reported food insufficiency across MENA countries and territories, 2021-2022
Note: Percentage of surveyed people saying that the following statement is often or sometimes true: “The food that we bought did not last and we did not have money to get more.”
Source: Author’s work based on (Arab Barometer, 2022[104]).
Climate spill-overs will increasingly impact the region’s social, political and economic security
In the absence of effective policy responses, climate impacts are also expected to compound vulnerabilities and have various adverse spill-over effects on the social, political and economic security of the region. Notably, most MENA countries and territories are projected to suffer from climate-related displacement and migration “in the shadow of conflict” (Borgomeo et al., 2021[93]), as already discussed in previous sections. Climate change may also widen rural-urban divides and exacerbate challenges linked to rapid urbanisation. Such climate spill-over effects make clear the need for MENA public administrations to promote whole-of-government, multidimensional and coherent policy frameworks for sustainable development.
The public sector in the MENA region remains one of the world’s largest. For decades, it has been the first national employer across MENA countries and territories (Biganzoli and Gagliardi, 2021[5]). The efficient and effective use of government human and financial resources is hence even more important in the region. Ensuring adequate fiscal buffers and capacities will be crucial to ensure governments can promote high-level priorities and tackle future crises. This section provides a glance at the size of the public sector in the MENA region and governments’ capacities to raise taxes. Chapter 3 will cover in detail budgetary governance and public procurement arrangements.
The public sector is significant in the MENA region
According to the World Bank Worldwide Bureaucracy Indicators, public sector employment represents close to 20% of total employment on average in the MENA region, a larger share than in Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia-Pacific and Latin America and the Caribbean (International Monetary Fund, 2022[105]). Public procurement amounts to about 18% of GDP on average in MENA economies, as opposed to an average of 12.9% across the OECD area (OECD, 2023[106]; Giada Modaffari, 2023[107]). Moreover, the government wage bill has increased rapidly in the last decade as many governments have launched expansive job-creation programmes to maintain social peace following the Arab uprisings, reaching a level of around 10% of regional GDP, higher than all regions except Europe. Recent estimates indicate that, on average across the MENA region, public sector salaries represent 34% of total government spending, compared to 23% on average across OECD Member countries (Figure 1.13). Only in Egypt and Jordan the share lies below 20%. State-Owned Entreprises (SOEs) also play an important role in MENA economies, oftentimes generating large costs and requiring government support to offset operational losses. Moreover, fiscal interactions of SOEs are not always accounted for or reported, raising questions about corporate governance, oversight frameworks, management of risks and ownership policies (IMF, 2021[108]).
Wage bill as a percentage of public expenditures, latest year available
Note: “MENA” here refers to the average across Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, the Palestinian Authority, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen. Latest data available is 2020 except for the Palestinian Authority. “OECD” refers to an average across all OECD Members countries except for Canada, Japan and Korea.
Source: Author ‘s work based on (World Bank, 2022[109]; World Bank, n.d.[110]).
Capacity to raise taxes is limited
MENA public administrations generally raise low tax revenues. The region also hosts some of the lowest world outliers such as Iraq and Oman, where tax revenue is equivalent to 0.97% and 1.25% of GDP respectively (UNU WIDER, 2023[111]). More broadly, according to the IMF, total tax revenues in the MENA region represent 9.3% of GDP21, compared to the world average of 17.4% and an OECD average of 25.2% (UNU WIDER, 2023[111]; IMF, 2021[112]).
Many reasons underpin the region’s limited tax revenues. High-income, oil-exporting economies in the Gulf have historically based their economic model and social contract on zero or extremely low taxes on both individuals and businesses. However, spurred by the challenge of volatile oil prices since 2015 and wary of the need to transition towards greener economic models, GCC governments have started introducing reforms to increase tax revenues in recent years. Notably, all but Bahrain have now adopted a corporate tax. Moreover, all six members of the GCC (Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the UAE) have signed an agreement in 2017 that has paved the way for the introduction of Value Added Tax throughout the GCC. Saudi Arabia has uniquely introduced an expat levy in 2017, which aims to both increase government tax revenues as well as favour the competitiveness and growth of local businesses (Schofield, 2021[113]). Beyond the GCC governments, other MENA governments collect relatively more taxes and have also embarked on tax reforms much earlier. However, their tax regimes often exhibit important inefficiencies and a lack of capacities for tax collection (OECD, 2021[114]). Tax collection is also complicated by large informal labour markets, which represent an estimated 61.7% % of total employment in the region in 2023 (ILO, 2024[68]).
MENA governments have nevertheless invested in taxation reforms, even at the international level. For instance, most MENA governments have deposited their instrument of ratification for the OECD’s Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting practices adopted by large multinational companies.
Public debt remains high after the COVID-19 crisis
The MENA region is one of the most highly indebted in the world. Although experiencing diverse situations and challenges, governments face persistent structural weaknesses that include low tax revenue generation, large public sectors and inadequate governance and regulatory frameworks in a context of difficult social conditions (Mazarei, 2023[115]).
These challenges were further exacerbated by the COVID-19 crisis. Major upwards pressures on public spending, coupled with low tax revenue generation, has widened fiscal deficits and boosted public debt, making governments vulnerable to external shocks and rising interest rates. For instance, the average overall balance22 in the region worsen from -2.36% of GDP in 2019 to -8.5% in 2020 and stood at -0.85% in 2023 (IMF, 2024[116]). The central government debt in 2022 compared to pre-COVID levels differed largely across economies (Figure 1.14).
Change in central government debt to GDP ratio, percentage points, 2019 and 2022
Note: Data for Egypt, Lebanon, Libya, Syria and the UAE are not available.
Source: Author’s work based on (International Monetary Fund, n.d.[117]).
Economic projections show that debt levels in these economies are forecast to decline only modestly over the next two years. Nevertheless, the outlook for the MENA region remains highly uncertain and downside risks are resurgent, especially in the current regional context. An escalation or spread of the evolving conflicts in the Middle East, as well as an intensification of disruptions in the Red Sea, could have a severe economic impact on the overall region (IMF, 2024[118]).
Governments need to strengthen the provision of public services that meet the evolving needs and expectations of their citizens. MENA public administrations perform heterogeneously on government effectiveness and on some key factors for effective service delivery, such as regulatory policy, rule of law, public integrity and public procurement. Gender and urban-rural divides also persist in terms of access to digital infrastructure and skills, with implications for the use of digital government tools.
Challenges in effective service delivery are reflected in citizens’ dissatisfaction with public services across the region. For instance, an average of 64% of respondents to the Arab Barometer Wave VII across MENA countries and territories surveyed stated that they were either “dissatisfied” or “completely dissatisfied” with their government’s performance (Arab Barometer, 2022[104]). In particular, only an average of 37% of respondents claimed to be satisfied with the health care system, while over 70% were dissatisfied with the education system, although opinions vary greatly between countries and territories (Arab Barometer, 2022[104])23.
This section provides background on government effectiveness in the MENA region, setting the stage for the analysis of public governance arrangements, tools and practices for the promotion of reliable and responsive public administrations presented in Chapter 4.
Government effectiveness lags behind most regions of the world
According to the Worldwide Governance Indicators, the MENA region has consistently lagged behind most regions in government effectiveness, with only Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia performing worse. Significant weaknesses are also reported on indicators related to the control of corruption, regulatory quality and rule of law, which are core elements for government to deliver effectively (World Bank, 2022[4]).
There are however wide differences across MENA governments. As Figure 1.15 shows, GCC governments perform close to OECD levels in terms of government effectiveness, with the UAE and Qatar outperforming the OECD average. Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia also perform above the MENA average. On the other hand, negative outliers such as Yemen, Libya and Iraq have been undergoing protracted armed conflict, which has deteriorated government effectiveness and compromised institution-building. This is reflected across a number of government indicators, as Yemen and Libya rank in the bottom 4% globally for government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. Lebanon also displays a low score on the World Bank’s Government Effectiveness Index, as its institutions have been weakened by successive economic and political crises.
Government effectiveness in MENA governments, MENA and OECD averages (percentile rank), 2022
Note: Government effectiveness, as measured by the Worldwide Governance Indicators, “captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.” “MENA” refers here to the average across Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestinian Authority, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.
Source: Author’s work based on (World Bank, 2022[4]).
Rule of law and public integrity often remain fragile
The rule of law and public integrity are key elements to enhance public sector performance and in turn promote citizens’ trust in institutions. On the other hand, weak rules and integrity frameworks can sustain corruption, generate waste of public resources and widen social inequalities.
In the MENA region, constitutional reforms were adopted by a number of governments following the 2010-2011 Arab uprisings, including Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia, enshrining fundamental civil rights and freedoms in new or amended constitutions.
Yet, the rule of law and public integrity often remain fragile across the region. According to the Worldwide Governance Indicators, rule of law has been decreasing across the region since 2011. On average, the region has scored better than only 41.2% of countries and territories in the world in 2022, as opposed to 44.7% in 2011 (World Bank, 2024[119]). Moreover, with an average score of 34 out of 100 in the 2023 Corruption Perception Index (CPI), the MENA region struggles to achieve tangible results against corruption. In fact, five MENA countries and territories24 are included in the bottom ten scores of the latest index, with only Jordan and GCC governments scoring higher than the global average of 43 out of 100. The highest-scoring countries in the region include the UAE (68), Qatar (58), and Saudi Arabia (52), whereas those embroiled in protracted conflicts show the lowest scores: Libya (18), Yemen (16) and Syria (13). No MENA country or territory surveyed in the CPI has registered significant improvement in the last decade (Transparency International, 2024[120]). At the same time, some governments have been making considerable efforts to strengthen their public sector integrity frameworks: for instance, Jordan and Morocco adopted national anti-corruption laws and reformed or created independent national anti-corruption agencies (Biganzoli and Gagliardi, 2021[5]).
Significant disparities persist regarding digitalisation across government and society
Governments can use information and communication technologies to embrace good government principles, achieve policy goals and promote government effectiveness. Digital technologies and tools, along with the use of data, can create greater efficiencies, time- and cost-savings in the design and delivery of public services as well as streamline internal procedures of the public administration. Digital government can also act as a lever to achieve greater transparency, engage with stakeholders and promote more open and inclusive societies (OECD, 2024[121]).
Digital government however rests on the accessibility, affordability and quality of digital tools. Leveraging digitalisation to promote the transparency, accountability and oversight of public institutions while striving to enhance digital literacy and inclusion is one of the key priorities of MENA countries and territories (OECD, 2023[122]). For instance, there has been significant progress regarding internet access, as shown by World Bank estimates: while in 2011 only 28% of the population used the internet, by 2021 this figure was already at 77% (World Bank, 2021[123]). However, notable disparities persist despite the general progress. While the GCC countries are on the brink of achieving or have already achieved internet access for their entire population, other less developed economies still contend with substantial segments of their population lacking internet connectivity. This is in turn reflected in disparate advances in digitalising government across the region. According to the latest United Nations’ E-Government Survey (2022[124]), four of the six GCC countries are in the very high E-Government Development Index (EGDI) category25, with the UAE (0.90), Saudi Arabia (0.85) and Oman (0.78) leading in the score.
Disparities in access to digital tools and services can reinforce pre-existing inequalities. For instance, 88% of urban areas in the MENA region have 4GB mobile network coverage, while this figure drops to no more than 55% in rural areas (Raïq and Roberts, 2022[125]). Gaps in access to the digital infrastructure emerge also across gender: according to the Arab Barometer, all other factors equal, women have 56% less probability of being internet users compared to men (Arab Barometer, 2020[126]). Beyond access to the Internet and digital infrastructure, people also need appropriate digital skills to reap the benefits of a digital government: inequalities in digital skills across gender, socio-economic status and urban-rural settings can reinforce existing inequalities.
While inequalities in access to information and communication technology infrastructure and in digital competences remain important obstacles, most MENA public administrations have developed strategic policy frameworks to digitalise government, have established open data portals and revised their legal and regulatory frameworks to consolidate citizens’ right of access to information, as covered later in the Report (ESCWA, 2020[127]; OECD, 2023[128]; OECD, 2023[129]; OECD, 2022[130]; OECD, n.d.[131]).
Establishing a culture of participation enables governments to engage with the public to better understand and meet their needs. The 2010-2011 Arab uprisings put the principles of openness and inclusiveness in the spotlight of the policy debate in the MENA region. In addition, governments in the region face increasing pressure from their own citizens to demonstrate that they understand, and are able to address, their increasingly pressing needs, including in the areas of health, education, and security. Ensuring that public institutions act in an open, transparent participatory and inclusive way can help better respond to the needs of different societal groups, avoid policy capture and help keep governments accountable, setting the foundations for inclusive growth and social cohesion (Biganzoli and Gagliardi, 2021[5]).
Open government reforms have been at the core of these efforts. While the situation remains diverse across the MENA region, openness and inclusiveness remain at the heart of the agendas in many MENA public administrations: 48% of MENA public officials surveyed in the Arab Administrative Elites Survey recognise transparency and open government as important trends in the region (Schomaker and Bauer, 2020[132]). However, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia, as well as some of their municipalities and regions, are the only MENA members of the Open Government Partnership (OGP), a multilateral partnership that aims to support the design, implementation, and monitoring of concrete government commitments “to make government more open, responsive, and accountable to citizens” (Open Government Partnership, 2020[133]). Tunisia and Morocco have also adhered to the OECD Recommendation on Open Government (OECD, 2017[134]).
This section provides a short overview on citizen participation, government transparency and decentralisation in the MENA region. This will be covered in detail in Chapter 5.
Citizen and stakeholder engagement in public life remains underdeveloped
Despite common demands for greater political freedom and citizen participation during the Arab uprisings, MENA governments still face challenges to fully promote and harness citizen engagement in public and political life. For instance, during the last decade, the MENA region has consistently lagged behind all other world regions on voice and accountability as measured through the Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank, 2022[4]). As shown in Figure 1.16, MENA governments ranked on average in 2022 in the 19.47 global percentile for this indicator, a score lower than in 2012 (20.19) and much behind the 2022 average for OECD Member countries (86.43). Furthermore, citizen participation initiatives in the MENA region have often remained ad hoc, without structural institutional arrangements and consistent resources underpinning them. More broadly, studies highlight that the MENA region underperforms compared to the rest of the world on accountability, in particular in terms of checks and balances through which state institutions limit the power of the government and in terms of the extent to which governments are accountable to media and civil society (Belhaj et al., 2022[94]).
Voice and accountability in MENA, 2022 and 2012, global percentile ranking (0-100), Worldwide Governance Indicators
Note: Voice and Accountability, as measured by the Worldwide GovernanceIndicators, “captures perceptions of the extent to which citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.”
Source: Author’s work based on (World Bank, 2022[4]).
Citizen participation rests upon an enabling environment: self-reported accounts of citizens from the MENA region indicate challenges in this area. For instance, in Arab Barometer surveys over the last decade, MENA populations expressed an increase in perceived freedoms in the years following the Arab uprisings, but the region has lost ground significantly since then. In 2010, the share of respondents reporting that their freedoms of expressing opinions and protesting peacefully were “guaranteed to a great or a medium extent” stood on average at 60% and 45% respectively. By 2014 these figures had increased to 66% and 57% but stood at 47.7 and 38% respectively in 2022 (Arab Barometer, 2022[104]).
However, there are notable outliers in the MENA region. In 2022, a relatively high share of respondents said they enjoyed freedom of expression in Kuwait (74.6%) (Arab Barometer, 2022[104]). Nevertheless, recent developments observed in societies that had made significant progress in increasing citizens’ political engagement and participation in public life raise uncertainty in this area (OECD, 2023[129]). Citizen participation also diverges within societies, in particular when it comes to women and young people. Women’s participation in political life in the MENA region has significantly increased over the last two decades although it is the lowest on average compared to other regions of the world (Inter Parliamentary Union, 2024[135]). As of 2024, the region still ranks last in the Political Empowerment Index26 of the Global Gender Gap Report, with a score of 11,7% (100% being complete gender parity) compared to a global average of 22.5% (World Economic Forum, 2024[51]). This represents nevertheless an increase of 8.4% compared to the 2006 score, showing the significant process made in terms of women’s representation in ministerial and parliamentary roles across countries and territories.
Similarly, young people tend to vote less and are less likely to be a member of a political party or attend campaign rallies than older people in the MENA region. Furthermore, people aged under 4027 represent only 14% of members of parliament in the MENA region on average, compared to 22.4% across OECD Member countries (Inter Parliamientary Union, 2024[136]). These differences can be partly explained by a lack of interest in politics: for instance, in the MENA countries and territories surveyed by Arab Barometer in 2022, only 22.5% of young people aged 18-29 years reported being very interested or interested in politics (Arab Barometer, 2022[104]). In addition, complicated voter registration rules, high minimum age requirements to vote and run for office, weak civic and citizenship education curricula and cultural norms and stereotypes can hinder young people’s opportunities to participate to public and political life (OECD, 2022[12]).
Governments can take proactive steps to engage young people in decision-making, notably by strengthening youth organisations, enhancing consultations with young people and establishing dedicated institutional structures. If they are set up based on an inclusive approach, youth councils can for example help address the lack of coordination among non-governmental youth stakeholders and help strengthen young people’s voices in policymaking. As of February 2024, available evidence suggests that a number of countries and territories have established youth councils, but that several are not fully operational. For instance, Tunisia and the UAE have an operational national youth council in place, while others such as Morocco are in the process of establishing one (OECD, 2022[12]). Youth councils at the local level also exist in Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia and the West Bank and Gaza Strip widely (OECD, 2022[12]).
Improvements toward government transparency remain uneven and limited
Ensuring transparency in government processes and action can help promote more open and inclusive citizen participation and strengthen accountability and citizen’s trust in government. Moreover, studies highlight how transparency and access to information (ATI) are positively correlated with reduced corruption (Blumkin and Gradstein, 2002[137]), better service delivery (Shin and Glennerster, 2003[138]) and positive economic growth (Schomaker and Bauer, 2020[132]).
Various governments in the MENA region have designed strategies and implemented initiatives to promote transparency, for instance by recognising citizens’ right to access information in the constitution and setting specific ATI provisions in legal frameworks. Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan have particularly spearheaded efforts in this area. For instance, Tunisia’s 2016 Organic Law on the Right to Access Information and Morocco’s 2018 Right to Information Law allow citizens to request access to laws, data, and reports retained by government and public authorities and gain access to the information within 20 days (Biganzoli and Gagliardi, 2021[5]). Lebanon and Yemen have also enacted ATI legislation. Despite these initiatives, there is still space to strengthen transparency further across all functions of MENA governments.
Public budgetary transparency also remains particularly limited in the MENA region. With considerable heterogeneity across governments, the MENA region has ranked lowest globally in budget transparency and has shown little progress over the last decade, with only a marginal increase of two points in the Open Budget Survey (OBS) between 2015 and 2021, from "no/scant budget transparency" (scores 0-20) to the second lowest (“minimal transparency”), and a stagnation of results in the 2023 survey (Frank et al., 2023[139]). According to the most recent OBS, budget transparency remains “weak” in Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and Yemen, and “limited” in Egypt, Jordan and Morocco, with no country or territory in the region ranking as “adequate” in this regard (Figure 1.17)28. In particular, whereas almost all OECD Member countries develop and publish In-Year, Mid-Year and Year-End budget reviews, only Egypt and Saudi Arabia consistently do so in the region. Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan are other high performers in that regard, publishing two out of the three types of reports as of 2021 (Frank et al., 2023[139]).
However, the survey also identifies several MENA governments that do not publish or even develop any budget reviews. In addition, no MENA government except Jordan make audit reports available to the public according to the survey. Finally, participatory budgeting practices also remain limited in the MENA region (Frank et al., 2023[139]). Even when commitments are made in that regard, weak oversight institutions and insufficient resources continue to hamper progress (Iskandar Boustany; Sabine Hatem; Tonia Salameh, 2021[140]).
Budget transparency scores across the MENA region, 2023
Note: The OBS budget transparency score reflects an assessment of eight key budget documents that should be accessible to the public during the budget cycle. “OECD” refers to the average score across the 24 OECD Member countries surveyed in the OBS.
Source: Author’s work based on (International Budget Partnership, 2023[141]).
Access to, and use of, open government data can enhance transparency, help hold government accountable and ameliorate the use of public resources. According to the E-Government Development Index, several MENA governments have made progress in developing Open Government Data (OGD) portals (OECD/UN ESCWA, 2021[2]); (United Nations, 2022[142]). Morocco, Tunisia and the UAE took a number of steps to catalyse the value of open government data (see Chapter 5).
Ongoing decentralisation processes are slowly moving forward despite limited capacities
Decentralisation processes can help expand citizen participation, bring government closer to citizens and tailor public service provision to meet citizens’ needs (OECD, 2019[143]). Yet, historically, most MENA countries and territories are highly centralised, with local administration expenditure representing about 5% of GDP on average, compared to about 16% of GDP on average across OECD Member countries (Kherigi, 2019[144]; OECD, 2020[145]). In recent years, some MENA governments have engaged in a process of decentralisation (e.g. Jordan and Tunisia), regionalisation (e.g. Morocco) or recognising increased autonomy to local authorities in constitutions (e.g. Egypt) (OECD, 2023[129]; OECD, 2023[128]). In Morocco, three laws adopted in June 2015 defined the territorial organisation and division of powers for regions, prefectures and provinces and municipalities. The regional and local elections of September 2015 were important steps in implementing the regionalisation process. Similarly, Jordan passed the Decentralisation Law and Municipalities Law in 2015 and held elections in 2017 for the first time for governorate, municipal and local councils. The government presented a new Local Administration Law in early 2020 to merge the previous two laws, following an evaluation of the main legislative, administrative and technical challenges facing decentralisation (OECD, 2020[146]). On the other hand, Egypt has so far not implemented a number of provisions on decentralisation contained in its constitution (Shantir, 2022[147]).
Local governments in the MENA region also suffer from insufficient financial resources and a lack of financial autonomy (Bergh, 2010[148]). Reliable sub-national fiscal data in the MENA region remains limited (Demmelhuber, Sturm and Vollmann, 2020[149]). A USAID comparative analysis of MENA governments29 found fiscal decentralisation to be “weak” in Egypt, Lebanon, Libya, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen and “medium” in Iraq and Morocco. Morocco devotes the largest percentage of central government expenditure to local government in the MENA region, at around 12%, slightly below the median for OECD lower-middle-income Member countries (US AID, 2020[150]).
Since the 2010-2011 Arab uprisings, most of the MENA region has undergone a decade of progress and development across a number of dimensions. At the same time, recent events, including the COVID-19 crisis, the war in Ukraine, and the evolving conflicts in the Middle East have revealed, if not exacerbated, pre-existing challenges and put governments’ capacities to the test. Public governance reforms are at the core of government efforts to trigger and strengthen the positive interdependence between better policies and better lives. For instance, a recent consultative survey, administered by the OECD involving experts from civil society and think tanks from the MENA region, identified influential governance reform areas to strengthen inclusiveness in the region, notably strengthening the rule of law and government accountability, enhancing young people’s and women’s participation in decision-making, and building institutional capacities to deliver policies and services.
Public administrations in the MENA region are aware of the need to pursue efforts to foster strong, sustainable and inclusive prosperity. The next chapter (Chapter 2) assesses MENA governance practices in the areas of visioning, planning for sustainable development, co-ordination across policy areas and administrative silos, strategic communication, and measuring policy performance for impact.
The remaining chapters in this Report will pursue this assessment, examining practices in spending public resources efficiently (Chapter 3), delivering public services effectively to citizens and businesses (Chapter 4) and promoting open and inclusive societies (Chapter 5). Each of these chapters then offers strategic guidance and identifies areas of opportunity to move closer to OECD standards and best practices in areas where MENA governance practices could be further reinforced.
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← 1. For the purposes of this report, the MENA region will refer to the public administrations of the MENA-OECD Initiative on Governance and Competitiveness for Development. The MENA-OECD Initiative covers Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestinian Authority, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen.
← 2. OECD calculations, UN Comtrade database. OECD (2022), Navigating beyond COVID-19, recovery in the MENA region.
← 3. North Africa and Western Asia” includes Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Georgia, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, West Bank and Gaza Strip Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates and Yemen.
← 4. OECD calculations based on United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2022). World Population Prospects 2022, custom data acquired via website.
← 5. The statistics from the UNICEF report cover the following countries and territories: Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, West Bank and Gaza Strip and Yemen.
← 6. The Human Development Index is a composite index measuring average achievement in three basic dimensions of human development—a long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of living. See Technical note 1 at https://hdr.undp.org/system/files/documents//hdr2020pdf.pdf for details on how the HDI is calculated.
← 7. “Middle East and Northern Africa” includes Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia and the UAE.
← 8. Literacy rate, youth total (% of people ages 15-24) - Middle East & North Africa. Reproduce query at https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ADT.1524.LT.ZS?locations=ZQ&view=chart (accessed January 29, 2024).
← 9. The Gross Enrolment Ratio represents the number of students enrolled in a given level of education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the official school-age population corresponding to the same level of education.
← 10. World Bank data based on UNESCO Institute for Statistics (http://uis.unesco.org/). Data as of June 2022. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ENR.TERT.FM.ZS?locations=1A.
← 11. Jordan, Morocco, West Bank and Gaza Strip, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
← 12. When comparing Middle East and North Africa (MEA), Sub-Saharan Africa (SSF), South Asia (SAS), Latin America and Caribbean (LCN), Europe and Central Asia (ECS) and East Asia and Pacific (EAS).
← 13. World Bank, “World Development Indicators,” custom data acquired via https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.ZS?locations=ZQ-ZG-8S-ZJ-Z7-Z4.
← 14. Average based on data from the following economies, latest available: Djibouti (2017), Egypt (2019), Iraq (2021), Jordan (2021), Lebanon (2019), Mauritania (2017); West Bank and Gaza Strip (2022), Tunisia (2019) and Yemen (2014) (ILO, 2024[68]).
← 15. Average based on data from the following economies, latest available: Egypt (2019), Iraq (2021), Jordan (2021), Lebanon (2019), West Bank and Gaza Strip, Tunisia (2019) and Yemen (2014).
← 16. Excluding Yemen and Syria (World Health Organization, 2024[71]).
← 17. The UHC service coverage index (SDG 3.8.1) combines 14 tracer indicators of coverage of essential health services (defined as the average coverage of essential services based on tracer interventions that include reproductive, maternal, newborn and child health, infectious diseases, non-communicable diseases and service capacity and access, among the general and the most disadvantaged population). The indicator is an index reported on a unitless scale of 0 to 100. The tracer indicators are as follows, organized by four components of service coverage: 1. Reproductive, maternal, newborn and child health 2. Infectious diseases 3. Noncommunicable diseases 4. Service capacity and access. https://www.who.int/data/gho/indicator-metadata-registry/imr-details/4834.
← 18. Algeria (2018), Djibouti (2006), Egypt (2014), Iraq (2018), Jordan (2017), Morocco (2003), Qatar (2012), Syria (2006), Tunisia (2018) and Yemen (2003).
← 19. Arab Barometer Wave VII (2021-2022), including Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia.
← 20. Bahrain, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Jordan, Tunisia, Iraq and Syria.
← 21. According to latest data available: Bahrain (2020), Djibouti (2020), Egypt (2020), Iraq (2019) Jordan (2022), Kuwait (2020), Lebanon (2020), Mauritania (2022), Morocco (2022), Oman (2022), West Bank and Gaza Strip (2021), Qatar (2019), Saudi Arabia (2018), Tunisia (2020), UAE (2022) and Yemen (2019). No data available for Algeria, Libya and Syria (UNU WIDER, 2023[111]; IMF, 2021[112]).
← 22. Defined as the difference between revenue and total expenditure, using the 2014 edition of the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics Manual (GFSM 2014). Does not include policy landing. For some countries, the overall balances continue to be based on GFSM 1986, which is defined as total revenue and grants minus total expenditure and net lending (IMF Fiscal Monitor October 2023). The regional average does not include data for the Palestinian Authority.
← 23. Responding governments to the survey are: Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco (only on health), Palestinian Authority and Tunisia.
← 24. Syria, Yemen, Libya, Iraq and Lebanon.
← 25. The E-Government Development Index (EGDI) presents the state of E-Government Development of the United Nations Member States. The EGDI is a composite measure of three important dimensions of e-government, namely: provision of online services, telecommunication connectivity and human capacity. Within 0 to 1 range of EGDI values the countries are then grouped into four levels mathematically defined as follows: very high EGDI values range from 0.75 to 1.00 inclusive, high EGDI group values range from 0.50 to 0.7499 inclusive, middle EGDI values range from 0.25 to 0.4999 inclusive, and low EGDI values range from 0.0 to 0.2499 inclusive. https://publicadministration.un.org/egovkb/en-us/About/Overview/-E-Government-Development-Index.
← 26. This index measures the gap between men and women at the highest level of political decision-making through the ratio of women to men in ministerial positions and the ratio of women to men in parliamentary positions. In addition, the index includes the ratio of women to men in terms of years in executive office (prime minister or president) for the last 50 years. Differences between the participation of women and men at local levels of government are currently not captured (World Economic Forum, 2024[51]).
← 27. Age at last election or renewal (Inter Parliamientary Union, 2024[136]).
← 28. The Open Budget Survey considers budget oversight to be “weak” for countries and territories scoring between 0 and 40, “limited” for countries and territories scoring between 41 and 60, and “adequate” for countries and territories scoring between 61 and 100 https://internationalbudget.org/open-budget-survey/.
← 29. The study includes Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Syria and Yemen.