This chapter highlights the main global competition enforcement developments in 2022. It contextualises them among the broader trend over time, where relevant. It includes the most significant changes in variables such as resources, cartel enforcement, abuse of dominance enforcement, and advocacy. Merger control has a dedicated chapter that follows this one, and thus does not feature here.
OECD Competition Trends 2024
OECD Competition Trends
2. Key developments in 2022
Abstract
As for last year’s OECD Competition Trends report, this edition focuses on the main annual developments, that is, the key changes in 2022 relative to 2021.
Resources
Competition staff continued to grow
The sustained growth in competition staff at authorities around the world continued in 2022, with an overall annual growth rate of 3.8% (although this was around half the annual growth rate of 6% in 2021). The average number of competition staff per agency increased from 125 in 2021 to 130 in 2022, considerably higher than the average of 118 in 2020. There was an increase in every region except Asia-Pacific. The average number of competition staff increased in every year from 2015 to 2022, except in 2020 where it remained the same as in the previous year. The regional differences in staff levels are largely driven by differences in the size of the jurisdictions.
Figure 2.1. Average number of competition staff per competition authority all (left) and by region (right), 2015-22
Note: Data based on the 71 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for competition staff for eight years.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
Nominal competition budget increased, but real competition budget was flat
The average nominal competition budget increased in 2022 in all regions, except Asia-Pacific. Thus, there was a decline in both competition staff and budget in Asia-Pacific in 2022.
However, average real competition budget decreased in all regions.1 The significant increase in annual growth rate for nominal competition budget (10% in 2022 across all jurisdictions) appears to be predominantly driven by inflation, as the real growth was negative at -2.6%.
Particularly stark was the large increase in nominal budget in MEA jurisdictions in 2022 (52.7%), although in real terms the average competition budget for the region decreased by 1.5%. While inflation was an issue across the region, there was one single MEA jurisdiction that had particularly high inflation in 2022 and explained most of the large difference between nominal and real competition budget. A similar trend can be observed in the Americas region. While the growth in the nominal competition budgets in the region was of 11.5%, mostly driven by two jurisdictions, the average real competition budget decreased in 1.1%. As it is the case with staff, the regional differences in budget levels are largely driven by differences in the size of the jurisdictions.
Figure 2.2. Average nominal (left) and real (right) competition budget (euros), by region, 2015-22
Note: Data based on the 64 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for competition budget for eight years. Nominal and real competition budget figures are in 2015 euros (non-euro currencies are converted using 2015 official exchange rates on 31 December 2015) to eliminate distortions due to currency fluctuations. Inflation rates from all jurisdictions are taken from the World Bank development indicators database.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
Figure 2.3. Average annual percentage growth in nominal (left) and real (right) competition budget (euros), by region, 2015-22
Note: Data based on the 64 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for competition budget for eight years.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
Cartel enforcement
Cartel leniency applications increased, similar to cartel ex-officio investigations
For the first time since 2015, when the OECD began collecting the Competition Statistics data, cases with leniency applications increased in all regions (from 10 cases with leniency applications in 2021 to 13 in 2022 in the Americas, 97 to 131 in Asia-Pacific, 86 to 92 in Europe, and 8 to 12 in MEA). The resurgence began in 2021 in Europe, continuing in 2022, and was accompanied by an increase in all three other regions. The total number of leniency applications increased from 201 in 2021 to 248 in 2022, an annual growth rate of 23.4%.
Notwithstanding the promising development of increasing leniency applications across all regions, the number of cases with applications remains significantly below levels in 2015 (more than 56% lower). Moreover, the increase is quite concentrated in a few jurisdictions. Even though 24 jurisdictions (45% of the 53 jurisdictions that provided data for this variable) saw an annual increase in leniency applications in 2022, four jurisdictions were responsible for most of the increase. One jurisdiction had an increase of 31 leniency applications in 2022, one an increase of 13, and two an increase of 7 leniency applications each. Finally, 16 jurisdictions (30%) had no change, while 13 jurisdictions (25%) had a decline in leniency applications.
Figure 2.4. Total leniency applications, by region, 2015-22
Note: Data based on the 53 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for leniency applications for eight years.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
Cartel ex-officio investigations increased significantly in 2022 relative to 2021, countering the steady decline from 2016 to 2021. The average number of cartel ex-officio investigations launched per jurisdiction in 2022 was 8.4, up from 7.1 in 2021 (an annual growth of 19.3%).
Figure 2.5. Average cartel ex-officio investigations, 2015-22
Note: Data based on the 60 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for cartel ex-officio investigations for eight years.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
Cartel dawn raids remained stable
The average number of cartel dawn raids remained stable in 2022 (with an average across all jurisdictions of 3.6 per jurisdiction in 2022), slightly increasing in Americas and Europe, while decreasing in Asia-Pacific and MEA.
Figure 2.6. Average number of cartel cases in which a dawn raid was carried out, by region, 2015‑22
Note: Data based on the 56 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for cartel dawn raids for eight years.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
Cartel decisions declined in Europe and MEA, but increased in Asia-Pacific and the Americas
In 2022, there was a decline in the number of cartel decisions in Europe and MEA, while the average number of decisions increased in Americas and Asia-Pacific. In Europe, the average number of cartel decisions decreased to 3.8, even below the value of 4.1 in 2020, while the average has been relatively stable around 5 decisions per jurisdiction over the period 2015 to 2021 (excluding 2020). In aggregate, this meant there was a decline in the average number of cartel decisions across all jurisdictions to 6.3 in 2022 from 6.8 in 2021, as well as in OECD and non-OECD jurisdictions (with the biggest decline of -13.9% in non-OECD jurisdictions, relative to only -3.7% in OECD jurisdictions).
Figure 2.7. Average number of cartel decisions, by region, 2015‑22
Note: Data based on the 68 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for cartel decisions for eight years.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
Cartel bid-rigging decisions increased overall
There was an increase in bid-rigging cases across most jurisdictions between 2021 and 2022 (the only two years for which OECD CompStats data exists). The average number of bid-rigging decisions across all jurisdictions went from 2.2 in 2021 to 2.4 in 2022, an increase of 9.7%. As shown in Figure 2.8, bid-rigging cartel decisions in MEA and Americas increased in 2022, while decisions decreased in Europe and Asia-Pacific. The relative order of regions remained unchanged though, with Asia-Pacific having by far the highest number of bid-rigging cartel decisions per jurisdiction and MEA steadily catching up.
As a percentage of all cartel decisions, bid-rigging decisions across all jurisdictions increased from 32% in 2021 to 38% in 2022. In the Americas, MEA and Europe, bid-rigging cartel decisions increased as a share of all cartel decisions, although in Europe this is a reflection of the decrease in total cartel decisions.
Figure 2.8. Average number of cartel bid-rigging decisions (left) and percentage of all cartel decisions that are bid-rigging decisions (right), by region, 2021 and 2022
Note: Data based on the 71 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for cartel bid-rigging decisions for 2021 and 2022.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
Cartel decisions by industry: Manufacturing, Construction and Wholesale Trade were still the industries with most cartel decisions
The top‑10 industries based on the total number of cartel decisions remained relatively similar to the ranking in 2021, although there were some changes in 2022. “Manufacturing”, “Construction” and “Wholesale Trade” remained the three industries with the most cartel decisions in 2022. They represented 44% of all cartel decisions in 2022, down from 48% in 2021. The biggest percentage decline from these three sectors was for “Wholesale Trade” with a decrease in participation of more than 40%.
Figure 2.9. Top-10 industries with cartel decisions in 2021 and 2022 as a percentage of all cartel decisions
Note: Decisions by industry were classified according to two‑digit NAICS codes. Their correspondence with the legends in this graph is as follows: 11 – agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting, 21 – mining, quarrying, and oil and gas extraction, 22 – utilities, 23 – construction, 31-33 – manufacturing, 42 – wholesale trade, 44-45 – retail trade, 48-49 – transportation and warehousing, 51 – information, 52 – finance and insurance, 53 – real estate and rental and leasing, 54 – professional, scientific, and technical enterprises, 55 – management of companies and enterprises, 56 – administrative and support and waste management and remediation services, 61 – educational services, 62 – health care and social assistance, 71 – arts, entertainment, and recreation, 72 – accommodation and food services, 81 – other services (except public administration), 92 – public administration. Data based on the 69 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided comparable data for 2021 and 2022.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
Table 2.1. Total cartel decisions by industry, 2021 and 2022
Note: Decisions by industry were classified according to two‑digit NAICS codes. Their correspondence with the legends in this graph is as follows: 11 – agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting, 21 – mining, quarrying, and oil and gas extraction, 22 – utilities, 23 – construction, 31-33 – manufacturing, 42 – wholesale trade, 44-45 – retail trade, 48-49 – transportation and warehousing, 51 – information, 52 – finance and insurance, 53 – real estate and rental and leasing, 54 – professional, scientific, and technical enterprises, 55 – management of companies and enterprises, 56 – administrative and support and waste management and remediation services, 61 – educational services, 62 – health care and social assistance, 71 – arts, entertainment, and recreation, 72 – accommodation and food services, 81 – other services (except public administration), 92 – public administration. Data based on the 69 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided comparable data for 2021 and 2022.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
Cartel settlements were relatively stable
The average number of cartel cases with settlements was relatively stable in 2022, albeit with regional differences.
Across all jurisdictions, the number of cases in which settlements or plea bargain procedures for settling cartel infringement cases were used stayed relatively steady around 1.8 per jurisdiction on average. However, regional differences exist. The number of cases slightly increased in Asia-Pacific, while they strongly decreased in in MEA (from 4.3 in 2021 to 2.9 in 2022) and were relatively stable in Europe and the Americas.
Figure 2.10. Average number of cartel cases in which settlements or plea bargain procedures for settling infringement cases were used, by region, 2015‑22
Note: Data based on the 51 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for cartel settlements for eight years.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
Abuse of dominance enforcement
Abuse of dominance investigations launched declined considerably
The average number of abuse of dominance investigations launched by competition authorities declined in all regions, except MEA. In 50 out of 63 jurisdictions with relevant data for all years, the number of investigations launched declined or remained unchanged. The average number of investigations launched was down from 5.6 in 2021 to 4.2 in 2022 across all jurisdictions, a decline of around 25%. While investigations launched were relatively stable between 2017 and 2021, the overall trend since 2016 shows a decline.
Figure 2.11. Average number of abuse of dominance investigations launched by the competition authority, 2015‑22
Note: Data based on the 63 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for abuse of dominance investigations for eight years. This is the number of separate cases, not the number of companies involved.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
Abuse of dominance dawn raids increased in the Americas and MEA, but decreased in Europe
The use of dawn raids for abuse of dominance cases remains fairly scarce. They increased in the Americas and MEA (albeit from very low values, particularly in the Americas). Most abuse of dominance dawn raids occur in MEA, where the average number per jurisdiction went from 0.5 in 2021 to 1.28 dawn raids in 2022, even though it was driven by a single jurisdiction. In Europe, there was a considerable decline in 2022, all driven by a few jurisdictions, although the movements tend to be quite erratic over the full period (2015-22), and the average value of 0.56 per jurisdiction (across all jurisdictions in 2022) is low in any case. Of the jurisdictions that provided data, most did not perform any dawn raids for abuse of dominance cases in 2022. In Asia-Pacific there have not been any abuse of dominance dawn raids since 2017.
Figure 2.12. Average number of abuse of dominance cases in which a dawn raid was carried out, by region, 2015‑22
Note: Data based on the 54 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for abuse of dominance dawn raids for eight years. This is the number of separate cases, not the number of companies involved.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
Abuse of dominance decisions declined overall, continuing a broader trend since 2015
The average number of dominance decisions declined significantly, decreasing from 2 in 2021 to 1.5 in 2022. This continues a slow downward trend over the period, from an average of 2.4 abuse of dominance decisions per jurisdiction in 2015 to 1.5 in 2022. For both OECD and non-OECD jurisdictions, the average abuse of dominance decisions declined considerably in 2022 by 30% and 21%, respectively. This decrease reverts the growth of abuse of dominance decisions in these regions witnessed between 2020 and 2021.
Figure 2.13. Average number of abuse of dominance decisions taken by the competition authority, 2015‑22
Note: Data based on the 68 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for abuse of dominance decisions for eight years. This is the number of abuse of dominance decisions taken by the competition authority (or judgment by a relevant court, if “competition authority” is not applicable because the competition authority does not take decisions in your jurisdiction).
Source: OECD CompStats database.
Abuse of dominance decisions by industry: Transportation & Warehousing, Manufacturing and Information were still the industries with the most abuse of dominance decisions
The top 10 industries based on the total number of abuse of dominance decisions in 2022 was similar to 2021. “Transportation and Warehousing”, “Manufacturing” and “Information” remained the three industries with the most abuse of dominance decisions in 2022. They represented 47% of all abuse of dominance decisions in 2022, the same proportion as in 2021.
Figure 2.14. Top‑10 industries with abuse of dominance decisions in 2021 and 2022 as a percentage of all abuse of dominance decisions
Note: Decisions by industry were classified according to two‑digit NAICS codes. Their correspondence with the legends in this graph is as follows: 11 – agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting, 21 – mining, quarrying, and oil and gas extraction, 22 – utilities, 23 – construction, 31-33 – manufacturing, 42 – wholesale trade, 44-45 – retail trade, 48-49 – transportation and warehousing, 51 – information, 52 – finance and insurance, 53 – real estate and rental and leasing, 54 – professional, scientific, and technical enterprises, 55 – management of companies and enterprises, 56 – administrative and support and waste management and remediation services, 61 – educational services, 62 – health care and social assistance, 71 – arts, entertainment, and recreation, 72 – accommodation and food services, 81 – other services (except public administration), 92 – public administration. Data based on the 71 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided comparable data for 2021 and 2022.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
Table 2.2. Total abuse of dominance decisions by industry, 2021 and 2022
Note: Decisions by industry were classified according to two‑digit NAICS codes. Their correspondence with the legends in this graph is as follows: 11 – agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting, 21 – mining, quarrying, and oil and gas extraction, 22 – utilities, 23 – construction, 31-33 – manufacturing, 42 – wholesale trade, 44-45 – retail trade, 48-49 – transportation and warehousing, 51 – information, 52 – finance and insurance, 53 – real estate and rental and leasing, 54 – professional, scientific, and technical enterprises, 55 – management of companies and enterprises, 56 – administrative and support and waste management and remediation services, 61 – educational services, 62 – health care and social assistance, 71 – arts, entertainment, and recreation, 72 – accommodation and food services, 81 – other services (except public administration), 92 – public administration. Data based on the 71 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided comparable data for 2021 and 2022.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
Abuse of dominance settlements and commitment decisions declined, mostly driven by the Americas
Few abuse of dominance cases are solved by a way of a settlement or a commitment. In 2022, the use of both figures further declined. The average number of abuse of dominance cases in which settlements or plea bargain procedures for settling infringement cases were used slightly declined in 2022, although this was mostly driven by the Americas and Asia-Pacific. In fact, in Asia-Pacific, no abuse of dominance cases were settled in 2022. Their use increased somewhat in Europe and MEA, although their use of settlements for abuse of dominance cases also remains limited (0.2 and 0.9, respectively).
Figure 2.15. Average number of abuse of dominance cases in which settlements or plea bargain procedures for settling infringement cases were used, by region, 2021‑22
Note: Data based on the 62 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for abuse of dominance settlements for eight years.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
Figure 2.16. Average number of abuse of dominance cases in which commitment procedures or other types of negotiated/consensual procedures were used, by region, 2021‑22
Note: Data based on the 66 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for abuse of dominance commitment decisions for eight years.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
Sanctions
Overall cartel and abuse of dominance fines decreased
Fines for both cartels and abuse of dominance cases declined in 2022. The average abuse of dominance fines imposed per jurisdiction declined 52% from 42.5 million euros in 2021 to 20.4 million euros in 2022. The average amount of cartel fines imposed per jurisdiction decreased 45% from 89.8 million euros in 2021 to 49.5 million euros in 2022. As in most years, there were more fines for cartel infringements than abuse of dominance cases. The amount of fines imposed is erratic in most jurisdictions, without a clear trend and can vary considerably from year to year, particularly for abuse of dominance fines (which peaked in 2018). Cartel fines are more consistent over the period, with an average of around 82 million euros per jurisdiction across the period 2015 to 2022.
Figure 2.17. Average fines imposed per jurisdiction by type of infringement (cartel cases and abuse of dominance cases), 2015‑22
Note: Data based on the 66 (for cartel) and 64 (for abuse of dominance) jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for cartel and abuse of dominance fines for eight years. Nominal fines imposed are in 2015 euros (non-euro currencies are converted using 2015 official exchange rates on 31 December 2015) to eliminate distortions due to currency fluctuations.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
The value of the total cartel fines imposed in 2022 was EUR 3.27 billion while the total abuse of dominance fines imposed was 1.31 billion. In Asia-Pacific, no fines on abuse of dominance were imposed in 2022.
Figure 2.18. Total fines imposed per jurisdiction in cartels (left) and abuse of dominance cases (right), by region, 2015‑22
Note: Data based on the 66 (for cartel) and 64 (for abuse of dominance) jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for cartel and abuse of dominance fines for eight years. Nominal fines imposed are in 2015 euros (non-euro currencies are converted using 2015 official exchange rates on 31 December 2015) to eliminate distortions due to currency fluctuations.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
The number of companies fined increased for abuse of dominance, but remained relatively steady for cartels
The average number of companies fined per jurisdiction remained relatively steady at around 16 for cartels, while it increased for abuse of dominance in 2022 (close to 2, which is the highest since 2015).
Figure 2.19. Average number of companies fined per jurisdiction in cartel decisions (left) and abuse of dominance decisions (right), 2015‑22
Note: Data based on the 66 jurisdictions (for cartels) and 64 jurisdictions (abuse of dominance) in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for companies fined for cartel and abuse of dominance for eight years.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
The number of cartel cases in which Individuals were fined was fairly low and decreasing
The average number of cartel cases in which individuals were fined in cartel cases was fairly erratic when considering given regions, however this averaged out over the period at around 2.9 cartel cases per jurisdiction in which a fine was imposed on an individual.
Figure 2.20. Average number of cartel cases in which fines on individuals were imposed by the competition authority or by a court (excluding appeals), by region, 2015‑22
Note: Data based on the 49 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for cartel cases in which fines on individuals were imposed for eight years.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
Advocacy
Market studies increased in most regions
The average number of market studies per jurisdiction was relatively stable in all regions, except Asia-Pacific where it increased considerably. In Asia-Pacific, the average per jurisdiction increased from 3.2 in 2021 to 5.4 in 2022 (growth of 65%) market studies per authority. However, this is mostly driven by a handful of jurisdictions in the region. In general, the most relevant increase came from non-OECD jurisdictions (where the average went from 2.1 to 2.7 studies per year), as in OECD jurisdiction the average number remained the same (3 market studies per year).
Figure 2.21. Average number of market studies, by region, 2015‑22
Note: Data based on the 66 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for market studies for eight years.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
Note
← 1. Budgets in real terms are calculated adjusting the values of nominal budgets by the inflation rate presented in each jurisdiction each year.