This chapter provides an introduction into Uzbekistan’s legal and institutional framework for managing conflicts of interest. In particular, it describes the existing arrangements for management, co-ordination and sanctioning of conflict-of-interest situations. Furthermore, it provides recommendations on the need to improve co-ordination and management in the conflict-of-interest regime, as well as the use of a risk-based approach in reviewing and analysing asset declarations.
OECD Public Governance Reviews: Uzbekistan
Towards a More Modern, Effective and Strategic Public Administration
OECD Public Governance Reviews
Abstract
Public integrity refers to the consistent alignment of, and adherence to, shared ethical values, principles and norms for upholding and prioritising the public interest over private interests in the public sector. The perspective shifts the focus from ad hoc integrity policies to a context-dependent, behavioural, risk-based approach with an emphasis on cultivating a culture of integrity across the whole of society (OECD, 2017[1]). The OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity (OECD, 2017[1]) has called for countries to set high standards of conduct for public officials, in particular through:
Setting clear and proportionate procedures to help prevent violations of public integrity standards and to manage actual or potential conflicts of interest.
Providing easily accessible formal and informal guidance and consultation mechanisms to help public officials apply public integrity standards in their daily work as well as to manage conflict-of interest situations.
Averting the capture of public policies by narrow interest groups through managing conflict-of interest situations.
A “conflict of interest” involves a conflict between the public duty and private interests of a public official. When conflict-of-interest situations are not properly identified and managed, they can seriously endanger the integrity of organisations and may lead to corruption in the public sector and private sector alike (OECD, 2004[2]). Conflicts of interest have become a major matter of public concern worldwide. Furthermore, a public sector that increasingly works closely with the business and non-profit sectors gives rise to new forms of conflict between the private interests of public officials and their public duties. When prevention mechanisms fail and a conflict of interest becomes corruption, the reputation of democratic institutions are put to the test and trust in government is undermined. In the private sector too, conflicts of interest have been identified as a major cause behind corporate governance shortcomings (OECD, 2004[2]). Therefore, having a strong and consolidated framework, where management and prevention of conflict-of-interest situations are effective, is key to safeguarding democratic achievements. Of key importance are the understanding and recognition that everybody has interests; interests cannot be prohibited, but rather must be properly managed.
Over the last few years, Uzbekistan has initiated ambitious anti-corruption reforms to overhaul many areas of public governance, backed by political commitment at the highest level (Table 4.1). These reforms, as of 2019, were still at the early stages of implementation (OECD, 2019[3]). In particular, civil society organisations were of the view that conflict-of-interest situations are common in the public sector and are not perceived as inappropriate by the public. Moreso, ethical rules tended to be rarely enforced and not duly controlled (UNCAC Civil Society Coalition, 2021[4]).
Uzbekistan adopted Law 419 of 2017, the “Law on Combatting Corruption”, which for the first time defined a clear legal framework for a preventive framework in the area of integrity. The law introduces Article 19, which contains a number of measures to prevent corruption in the sphere of public administration, including the implementation of parliamentary and public control over activities of state bodies; the prevention of corruption offenses in activities of state bodies and their employees; the introduction of performance criteria, standards and systems for assessing a quality of implementation by officials and other employees of state bodies of their official duties and the effective implementation of the rules of ethical conduct of employees of state bodies (Government of Uzbekistan, 2017[5]).
Source: OECD desk research based on information provided by the government of Uzbekistan.
Furthermore, the law includes several innovative provisions, that albeit need to be fully implemented, create strong legal foundations for its future implementation. Amongst those are improvement of organisational and legal bases in resolving conflicts of interests of state employees and ensuring a monitoring of compliance. The recommendations provided in this chapter aim at strengthening implementation of this legal framework as well as providing Uzbekistan with practical tools that could help further develop already existing or future legal provisions.
Conflict of Interest
Law 419 of 2017, the Law “On Combatting Corruption” provides an overarching legal framework for the management of conflict of interest in Uzbekistan. Article 3 established a definition of what would constitute a conflict of interest. Article 3 does not define the different categories of conflict of interest in accordance with OECD standards (OECD, 2004[2]), namely it does not clarify the difference between real, potential and apparent conflict of interest. This Law has also established several obligations, in particular for the management of conflict-of-interest situations. For example, it has listed the measures to prevent and resolve conflicts of interest, including a blanket prohibition for not allowing personal interest to intervene in stately decisions and promptly informing their immediate supervisor when a possible conflict may arise. No other channels for reporting were considered. The law has also established that “special units” or ethics commissions of institutions can monitor compliance with rules for resolving conflicts of interest. In principle, this allowed for a decentralised and custom-made approach which could be adapted at sector level. Finally, Article 21 of Law 419 of 2017, states that employees of state bodies and their managers, who committed a violation of the requirements for prevention or settlement of conflicts of interest, are liable in accordance with the legislation. The criteria of what is considered a violation is not clear in the law, for instance, whether the act of not reporting a potential conflict of interest, reporting but with incomplete information, taking a decision that increases its personal benefit or not following the appropriate procedure for reporting. These distinctions are of the outmost importance as it may determine the severity of the sanction.
In 2024, Uzbekistan enacted the Law “On Conflict of Interest” that clarifies and provides further tools for the management of conflict of interest. This law is quite comprehensive and contains novel elements for any conflict-of-interest regime. Article 3 further clarifies the distinction between a real conflict of interest and a potential conflict of interest:
Article 3. A situation in which the personal interest (direct or indirect) of a person influences or may influence the proper performance of his official duties and in which a contradiction arises (real conflict of interest) or may arise (potential conflict of interest) between personal interest and rights, legitimate interests of citizens, organizations, society or the state.
Articles 6 and 15 address the issue of reporting a conflict of interest. The new legislation allows reporting not only to the direct supervisor but also to the anti-corruption division or HR department, making this a more flexible regime than the one stated in the Law 419 of 2017. However, Article 3 only provides a very general description of what an “special unit” entail (internal anti-corruption control units and (or) personnel units of government bodies or other organisations).
According to Uzbek authorities, the provisions on Law 419 of 2017 would rely on and be complemented by the guidance provided in the resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers “On additional measures to ensure compliance with ethical rules by state civil servants” of October 2022 (Box 4.1). However, an OECD report found that the guidance remains too general to be effective (OECD, 2019[3]) and many of the issues regarding application remained unclear.
Definition of Conflict of Interest: Civil servants should not allow personal interests that leads or may lead to a conflict of interest during the performance of official or official duties. In the event of a conflict of interest, employees must immediately notify their supervisor. A leader who receives information about the existence of a conflict of interest is obliged to take timely measures to prevent or eliminate this conflict.
Control over compliance with ethical rules: Control over compliance with the rules of ethics by civil servants is carried out by human resources management units of state bodies and organisations or Ethics Commissions, as well as by a specially authorised state body. Civil servants appointed to positions in state bodies and organisations are introduced into the applicable ethical rules by the human resources management units. Service inspection of cases of violation shall be conducted by Ethics Commissions in accordance with the instructions of the head of state bodies and organisations.
Sanctions: Non-compliance with the Rules of Conduct by civil servants is the basis for the application of moral and disciplinary measures against them. The Ethics Commission applies the following ethical measures to civil servants for non-compliance with the rules:
Warning
Demand an apology or formal apology
Reprimanding at collegial meetings of state bodies and organisations
The Ethics Commission may make a submission to the head of state bodies and organisations to apply disciplinary action against a civil servant. In case of violations of the rules of ethics by the head of the state body and organisation, the Ethics Commission sends proposals to the head of the higher state body and organisation regarding the issue of taking appropriate measures against them. Violation of the Code of Conduct by a civil servant is the basis for bringing them to disciplinary and other liability in accordance with the law.
Prohibition from engaging in entrepreneurial activities: civil servants may not engage in entrepreneurship or other paid activities (except for pedagogical, scientific and creative activities), except for the cases provided for by the laws of the Republic of Uzbekistan and the decisions of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan.
Source: (Goverment of Uzbekistan, 2022[6]).
Interviews conducted for this report provided an outlook of the difficulties in the implementation of the “Law on Combatting Corruption” that may trickle down into the effective implementation of the Law “On Conflict of Interest”. Indeed, improving the organisational and legal basis for resolving the conflict of employees of public bodies has become a key priority for Uzbek authorities. Therefore, several of the upcoming recommendations of this report could potentially make their way into a more detailed and prescriptive legislation, including making co-ordination between ethics/control commissions mandatory, providing managers with a typology of the most recurrent cases of conflict of interest and considering broadening liability for conflict-of-interest violations, which should not be limited to disciplinary sanctions. Many of these recommendations will be explained in detail in upcoming sections (OECD, 2019[3]).
Asset declarations
As it comes to regulating assets and interest declarations, Uzbekistan does not have a legal framework that provides for these obligations nor regulates it. Previous reports have stated that the Public Prosecutor's Office (PPO) was instructed to draft proposals for the introduction of a system of mandatory declaration of property by public officials, including verification of the declarations and making them public. This proposal included:
Obligation to file annually a declaration on property, income and large expenses, as well as a declaration on property, income and large expenses of their family members (parents, spouse, children, including adopted children).
Additional requirements may be established for disclosure of property, income and large expenses, including an expanded range of family members listed in the declaration for certain categories of officials.
Information on filing the declaration will be checked by the authorised body for the civil service affairs before the decision on enrolment of the candidate for civil service.
In light of upcoming legislation, this report will provide a few recommendations on how the system can be envisaged, including a risk-based approach for the number and categories of declarants, categories of assets to be declared and role and mandate of a possible reviewing institution.
Pre- and post-employment regulations
One of the main risks and concerns related to conflict of interest is the revolving door. Movements between the private and public sectors result in many positive outcomes, notably the transfer of knowledge and experience. However, it can also be a vehicle for undue or unfair advantage to influence government policies if not properly regulated (OECD, 2020[7]) (OECD, 2021[8]). Uzbekistan does not have a thorough institutional framework in place for the identification and management of conflict-of-interest situations in pre and post public employment, even if legislations on the latter has been recently enacted. However, several good practices are identified in the recently enacted Law “On Conflict of Interest”, including providing the control unit with the responsibility to assess the situation on a case-by-case bases and identify if the official would be covered by this restriction.
However, the scope of the law remains general and further guidance must be given to officials. First, a blank prohibition of two-years may be very limiting for some former officials and there seem not to be in place a risk-based approach to determine the years of debarment based on the decision-making capacity of the official and the types of decision he/she was involved in. Second, it is unclear what the scope of the law refers to, whether this prohibition applies to the organisations or structural divisions that the official exercised control over. This could mean that the official may take a position in a company in the same sector but not sign contracts or exert influence over his/her former institution, or that the official cannot take any kind of employment in the same sector he/she used to work in. Furthermore, it could indicate that the official may take employment in a company in the same sector, but not if they have contracts or procurement processes with the institution he used to work with. The multiple interpretations may be solved by the units deciding upon these issues, but questions remain of an equal application across public sector institutions. This broad definition may create various levels of interpretation, per sector and even per institution and put an unnecessary burden on control units to assess whether the restriction applies or not. Finally, it is unclear what indirect control may mean or how to be interpreted by former officials. This situation is no different from other OECD countries, where public officials who leave the public sector, move beyond administrative government control (Box 4.2).
Furthermore, Uzbekistan lacks the appropriate legal provisions to regulate interaction with the private sector in pre-public employment situations. Besides the legal vacuum, Uzbekistan lacks a policy or procedure for detecting and timely addressing such situations, for example by screening candidates for senior positions with much greater care (e.g. pre-employment screening integrity checks or reference checks).
In Germany, the Civil Service Act stipulates cooling-off periods for civil servants after they have left public service or have reached retirement age. For members of the government and parliamentary state secretaries, the federal government may prohibit, either wholly or in part, taking up gainful or other employment for the first 18 months after leaving office, where there is a concern that such employment will interfere with the public interest. Decisions on a prohibition are taken after a recommendation from a three-member advisory body.
In Spain, the legal framework is used to encourage companies to comply with post-public employment legislation. Law 9/2017 on public sector contracts reinforces the obligation to post the employment activities of high-ranking officials, to minimise conflicts of interest. In particular, companies that have hired anyone who is under the two-year cooling-off period and violates the prohibition on providing services in private companies directly related to the competencies of the position formerly held are prohibited from contracting with any public administration, if the violation has been published in the Official State Gazette. The prohibition on contracting will remain for as long as the person is hired, with the maximum limit of two years from their termination as a high-ranking official.
Source: (OECD, 2021[8]).
Uzbekistan's main anti-corruption body is the Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA), which was established in June 2020. The Agency reports to the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan and is accountable to the chambers of the Oliy Majlis. The ACA is directly entitled to enforce anti-corruption policies, including by co-ordinating all public bodies’ efforts in this area. The body’s notable powers include issuing warrants on preventing corruption activities (UNCAC Civil Society Coalition, 2021[4]).
Furthermore, legislation has included a number of provisions for the establishment of institutional responsibilities (Table 4.2) as well as for co-ordination activities.
Source: Government of Uzbekistan, 2023.
When it comes to co-ordination, Article 8 of the Law “On Combatting Corruption”, establishes the National Anti-Corruption Council of the Republic of Uzbekistan and its territorial councils, to co-ordinate activities of the bodies and organisations that carry out and participate in anti-corruption activities. The order of formation and activities of the National Anti-Corruption Council of the Republic of Uzbekistan by the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan has also established said commissions at the regional level by providing for the territorial councils. The main tasks of the National Anti-Corruption Council of the Republic of Uzbekistan and its territorial councils are:
Organisation of development and implementation of state and other programmes in the field of combatting corruption
Co-ordination of activities and ensuring interaction of bodies and organisations that carry out and participate in anti-corruption activities
Organisation of development and implementation of measures to increase legal consciousness and legal culture of the population, formation of an intolerant attitude towards corruption in the society
Ensuring increase of efficiency of measures to prevent, detect, curb corruption offenses, eliminate their consequences, and causes and conditions that contribute to it
Collection and analysis of information on the status and trends of corruption
Monitoring of implementation of anti-corruption measures, assessing efficiency of existing organisational, practical and legal mechanisms in the area
Preparation of proposals on improving the legislation on combating corruption and improving work in the area
Co-ordination of activities of the territorial commissions
According to Uzbek authorities, co-operation between anti-corruption bodies is organised on the basis of the Regulation of the ACA by Presidential Decree No. PP-34 of 2021. These include a wide range of activities, such as:
Exchange of data on measures taken to prevent and combat corruption.
Exchange of data on criminal cases and cases on administrative offenses on facts of corruption, as well as on measures taken to respond to facts of corruption.
Creating conditions for authorised employees of the Agency to obtain data on corruption offenses from electronic databases of law enforcement agencies.
Establishment of joint working groups for research and administrative investigation, as well as preparation of analytical materials.
Exchange of statistical information.
Conducting joint study and publication of information containing facts of corruption that have attracted public attention.
As in the example shown below (Box 4.3), efforts have been made to co-ordinate anti-corruption initiatives in Uzbekistan, both at sector and local level. This recent anti-corruption initiative assessment tool has been a key component of the development of anti-corruption policies.
With the support of UNDP Seoul Policy Centre (USPC), UNDP Uzbekistan launched a project in 2018 to support Uzbekistan’s institutionalisation of an anti-corruption initiative assessment (AIA) like mechanism. As part of this initiative, a high-level webinar was organised on 11 March 2019 by ACRC, USPC, UNDP Uzbekistan Country Office, PPO of Uzbekistan, and the Uzbekistan Ministry of Justice (MoJ). A study mission to Korea ensued on 3-5 September 2019, aiming to equip Uzbek officials with the technical knowledge and policy insights from Korea’s AIA model.
This resulted in the President’s issuance of Decree No. 81 on 12 January 2022 on the “implementation of a rating system for assessing the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures in government agencies, including local authorities.” The Decree provided a solid legal and organisational framework for the implementation of an AIA-like mechanism in Uzbekistan.
The assessment of corruption risks by a state organisation is carried out on the basis of the requirements of the Methodology for Identification and Assessment of Corruption Risks in the Activities of State Authorities and Management Bodies, including their regional subdivisions, state unitary enterprises and institutions, organisations with a state share of more than 50 percent and is carried out annually until March 1. This assessment is included in “e-antikor.uz”.
To date, the effectiveness of the fight against corruption in state bodies and organisations is assessed in 5 areas and 29 indicators. AIA has successfully promoted integrity within the public sector by providing clear, periodic guidance and supporting capacity-building on corruption prevention.
Source: (UNDP, 2022[9])
Regardless, Uzbekistan should continue ensuring co-ordinated anti-corruption policies and measures. As previously noted by the OECD, the level of corruption remains high and trust in government is low (OECD, 2019[3]). Anti-corruption institutions require adequate resources and training in order to operate effectively. The current legal framework, institutions and practice do not sufficiently guarantee the independence of judges and prosecutors. Many new integrity measures, such as provisions on prevention of conflict of interest, ethics, and whistleblower protection lack effective enforcement mechanisms (OECD, 2019[3]).
Furthermore, at the institutional level, and after the passing of appropriate legislation, modern and effective mechanisms for the prevention of conflicts of interest as well as asset and interest disclosure system must be encouraged. For this, possible consideration could include providing the National Anti-Corruption Council of the Republic of Uzbekistan and its territorial councils with additional resources and targeted training. The Commission could also have a bigger role in establishing ethical guidelines and conflict of interest typologies, where public officials can consult examples of conflict-of-interest situations. This guidance could be provided in specific codes for areas or organisations, with the advantage of allowing to include concrete and relevant examples, or in a complementary guideline or manual. The example from Canada in Box 4.4 could provide an inspiration on how to frame such complementary guidance.
In Canada, the Code of Conduct of the Employment and Social Development Department includes the set of five public sector values – respect for democracy, respect for people, integrity, stewardship and excellence – that should guide public servants in everything they do. Additionally, the code includes the definition of each public sector value, along with the expected behaviours that support them. For example, the value “Respect for people” is further defined as follows:
Definition: Treating all people with respect, dignity and fairness is fundamental to our relationship with the Canadian public and contributes to a safe and healthy work environment that promotes engagement, openness and transparency. The diversity of our people and the ideas they generate are the source of our innovation.
Expected behaviours associated with the value “Respect for people” are:
Treating every person with respect and fairness.
Valuing diversity and the benefit of combining the unique qualities and strengths inherent in a diverse workforce.
Helping to create and maintain safe and healthy workplaces that are free from harassment and discrimination.
Working together in a spirit of openness, honesty and transparency that encourages engagement, collaboration and respectful communication.
These lists of expected behaviours are further elaborated into practical examples and guidance on how the civil servant should act under certain circumstances. In this way, the code not only encompasses the standards of conduct, but also presents a practical tool for reaching ethical and lawful decisions, safeguarding the integrity of the public service and employees alike.
Finally, the bodies responsible for developing and implementing anti-corruption strategies and measures to prevent corruption need institutional development in Uzbekistan as well as significant additional resources. In particular, the ACA would benefit from having additional human and financial resources. This could translate into effective mainstreaming of integrity policies, both at sector and local level.
Uzbekistan could consider clarifying key related concepts to guide public officials in correctly understanding, identifying and managing real, potential and apparent conflicts of interest
As previously explained, Uzbekistan does include a definition of conflict of interest in its legislation. However, many questions remain regarding such definition. For example, it includes a blanket prohibition for not allowing personal interest to intervene in stately decisions and promptly informing their immediate supervisor or a “special unit” a possible conflict may arise. Further regulation, such as the newly enacted Law “On Conflict of Interest”, addresses and fixes some of these faults. First, it includes a very thorough and complete definition of what a personal interest is. Furthermore, it provides the cases in which a personal interest may contradict official duties. Similarly, the Law includes a definition of real and potential conflict of interest and the procedure to declare both. The Law does not clarify in which cases a personal interest can be considered to affect proper performance, nor what the scope of proper performance entails but this may be included in further guidance provided by the ACA with practical examples and guidance.
Furthermore, Uzbekistan could further elaborate to help clarify and guide public officials when it comes to managing conflict of interest. First, on the definitions of real, apparent and perceived conflicts, some definitions might be clarified by way of guidance (Box 4.5). In addition, the definitions could be supported by concrete examples, while emphasising that this is not an exhaustive list of situations. Other OECD countries have moved towards this direction. A further example from Canada could be an inspiration on why and how to define and address real, potential, and apparent conflict of interest (Box 4.6).
Recognising that countries have different historical, legal and public service traditions, which may impact the way conflict-of-interest situations have been understood, the OECD Guidelines developed a definition of “conflict of interests” which is intended to be simple and practical, to assist effective identification and management of conflict situations:
A “conflict of interest” involves a conflict between the public duty and private interests of a public official, in which the public official’s private-capacity interests could improperly influence the performance of their official duties and responsibilities.
On this basis, a “conflict of interest” involves a situation or relationship which can be current or may have occurred in the past. Defined in this way, “conflict of interest” has the same meaning as real conflict of interest.
By contrast, an apparent conflict of interest exists where it appears that an official’s private interests could improperly influence the performance of their duties, but this is not in fact the case.
A potential conflict of interest occurs where a public official holds a private interest which would constitute a conflict of interest if the relevant circumstances were to change in the future.
It is important to note that this definitional approach is necessary to be consistent with the policy position which recognises that conflicts of interest will arise and must be managed and resolved appropriately.
Source: (OECD, 2004[2]).
The Treasury Board in Canada provides concrete definitions and guidance on real, potential, and apparent conflict of interest as part of the Values and Ethics Code for the Public Service. It is emphasised that “preserving the appearance of integrity in government is as important as actual integrity” and that public servants therefore are required to avoid apparent conflicts of interests as much as actual or potential ones.
The guidance provides the following definitions:
A "real" conflict of interest is where a public servant's private interests are sufficient to influence the exercise of his or her public duties. A "potential" conflict of interest is where such a situation could arise in the future. An "apparent" conflict of interest, however, is where it appears to members of the public that a public servant's private interests could improperly influence the performance of his or her duties. "Private interests" are not limited to financial interests.
As apparent conflicts of interest can be particularly difficult to understand and identify, further guidance is provided, emphasising for example:
In determining apparent conflicts of interest, the appearance of a public servant's actions to the public is the key, not the public servant's integrity or good faith. Public servants can be found to be in apparent conflict of interest even if they are not aware that their actions create an apparent conflict of interest. Public servants - and their managers – are required to think beyond the scope of their own perceptions and motives, and to consider how the public may perceive their actions.
An apparent conflict of interest is determined by the perception of "a reasonable person" (a hypothetical member of the public) who is "reasonably well-informed".
Such a person is to have a "reasonable perception" that a conflict of interest exists, even if the conflict of interest is not a major one.
The onus is on public servants to anticipate apparent conflicts of interest arising from their actions, and to take steps to comply with the rules.
This onus on public servants is ongoing, as apparent conflicts of interest may arise at any time, if their personal affairs or official duties change. This onus extends to disclosing items about which there is doubt, and continues after filing a disclosure report.
Whether a conflict of interest is apparent or potential or real, the consequences are the same. The conflict must be remedied. Efforts should therefore focus on determining appropriate methods of compliance, rather than making definitive classifications on the type of conflict of interest.
Source: (Government of Canada, n.d.[11]).
Similarly, further guidance may be enacted by noting what is considered as affecting proper performance and the types of contradictions between personal interest and the rights and legitimate interests of citizens, organisations, society or the State (Box 4.7). This could be followed up by guidelines and training in practical cases.
There are two core concepts for “conflict of interest”: 1) real, potential and perceived conflict-of-interest
situations, and 2) private interests. Examples of each are:
A real conflict of interest exists when there is a conflict between the public duty and private interests of an individual. For example, a Minister giving a board seat to their cousin might be an actual/real conflict of interest.
A potential conflict of interest exists when an individual has private interests that could lead to a conflict if they were to become involved in relevant (e.g. conflicting) responsibilities in the future. A potential conflict of interest rests on the idea of foreseeability – e.g. there is the possibility that the official’s private interest could lead to a conflict should their public duty and private interest collide in the future. For example, a Minister whose wife works for a company that has the possibility of winning a procurement process at the Ministry he runs.
A perceived conflict of interest exists when it appears that an individual’s private interests could improperly influence the performance of their public duties, but this is not in fact the case. For example, a Minister having lunch with their cousin who happens to work for a potential vendor is a perceived conflict of interest.
Regarding the second concept, private interests are not limited to financial or pecuniary interests, nor are they limited to interests which lead to a direct personal benefit to a public official. Conflicts of interest can arise when otherwise legitimate private-capacity activity, personal affiliations and associations, and family interests, could be reasonably considered likely to improperly influence the performance of a legislator’s duties. As such, private interests can include assets, liabilities and debts, personal relationships, family relationships, business interests, external activities and positions (including secondary employment), and gifts, benefits and hospitality.
Source: (OECD, 2004[2])
Finally, Uzbekistan could consider complementary guidelines clarifying reporting obligations for real, potential and apparent conflict of interest and why each one is relevant to safeguard the public interest (Box 4.8) (OECD, 2004[2]). This is particularly useful for both public officials and control units in charge of assessing whether there is a conflict and the measures required to manage it.
Conflict of Interest- also referred to as an actual or real conflict of interest
Question 1: What official functions or duties is Official X responsible for?
[Refer to functional duty statement, position description, law, or contract of employment, etc., or statement of the functions of the official’s organisation, etc.]
Answer 1: Official X is responsible for functions 1, 2, 3 (etc.) in ministry B.
Question 2: Does Official X have private interests of a relevant kind?
Answer 2: Yes, Official X has job-relevant private interests. [The relevant facts are clear.]
Conclusion: Official X has a conflict of interest
Apparent Conflict of Interest
Question 1: What official functions or duties is Official X responsible for?
[Refer to functional duty statement, position description, law, or contract of employment, etc., or statement of the functions of the official’s organisation, etc.]
Answer 1: Official X has official responsibility for functions 1, 2, 3…, in ministry B.
Question 2: Does Official X hold private interests of a relevant kind?
Answer 2: It appears to be the case that Official X may have relevant private interests. [The relevant facts are not certain.]
Conclusion: Official X has an apparent conflict of interest.
Potential Conflict of Interest
Question 1: What official functions or duties is Official X responsible for?
Answer 1: Official X is responsible for functions X,Y, in ministry B
Question 2: Does Official X hold private interests of a relevant kind?
Answer 2: No. At the present moment, Official X has interests which are not job-relevant, but it is reasonably foreseeable that in the future, X’s personal interests could become relevant interests.
Conclusion: Official X has a potential conflict of interest.
Source: (OECD, 2005[12]).
While provisions on the prevention of conflict of interest have been introduced in legislation, Uzbekistan could consider strengthening its management system by way of additional guidelines and training
Consider introducing training and guidance on the different reporting channels for the management of conflict-of-interest situations
As previously noted by the OECD, there appears to be major momentum to introduce legal reforms aimed at strengthening the integrity system in Uzbekistan. In June 2024, a conflict-of-interest Law was finally approved. This Law was established to prevent and manage conflict of interest situations and includes some regulation on post-employment situations. However, a full regulatory framework for pre- and post-employment regulations and an effective approach to creating a single common system of disclosure of assets and interests remain pending.
As previously explained, several articles of the Law “On Combatting Corruption” could be further explained and clearer procedures established. First, stakeholders were of the view that Uzbekistan could further clarify the channels for reporting a conflict of interest (Article 21), that today relies on the direct supervisor, or a “special unit”. In the interviews conducted for this review, before new legislation came into place, it became clear that reporting to a direct supervisor, although valid by OECD standards (OECD, 2017[1]), could create additional problems in the Uzbek context, where a conflict of interest situation may be seen as a form of corruption and where self-reporting still has strong cultural connotations. With the enactment of the Law “On Conflict of Interest”, Articles 6 and 15 partly resolve this situation by providing alternatives for reporting. Two issues require further clarification, however, and could potentially be introduced as guidance or secondary legislation.
For example, Uzbekistan could describe what the “special units” are within institutions. Considering the number of tasks and responsibilities assigned to these units in the new law, more guidance should be given, as the law states very broadly that these could be anti-corruption control units, HR units or even a very general reference to “other organisations”. More information should be provided into their composition, necessary expertise for the assigned tasks as well as what “other organisations” means (for example if it is another unit within other Ministry does it still need expertise and independence to fulfil all the new tasks). Similarly, Uzbekistan may consider updating the decision on “Additional measures to ensure compliance with the rules by state civil servants” enacted by the Cabinet of Ministers of Uzbekistan which still provides the reporting obligation to be solely made to the direct supervisor (Chapter 7). For example, Uzbekistan could consider the possibility of making a specific reference in this guidance for the public official to not only report, but seek previous advice to HR offices, in line with Article 6 of the Law "On Conflict of Interest". This will provide coherence with the new legislation, clarification on what constitutes “advice from a special unit” in Article 6 (for example if this would fall within their rights or if it is an obligation), as well as advice and possible avenues for the management of such conflict.
Even if the procedure of disclosure of conflict of interest has been somehow clarified in the new Law, Uzbekistan could consider targeted training on how to disclose such situations, to whom and when. For example, a compilation of case law or practical guidance establishing the standard of its application in the past, thus allowing each manager to make decisions based on its own criteria. Another avenue Uzbekistan could consider is relying on technological self-assessment tools, as a first filter (Box 4.9). As informed during the fact-finding mission, this lack of guidance to both public officials seeking advice and the superior taking a decision is quite concerning to Uzbek authorities.
To provide specific guidance and orientation on conflict-of-interest situations, the Anti-corruption Office of Argentina (Oficina Anticorrupción, OA) implemented an online conflict-of-interest simulator. Through the selection of answers to certain questions, public officials receive an assessment of whether they are in a situation of current or potential conflict of interest and orientation about what to do. The simulator is available for future, current and past public officials. By asking the public official various questions throughout the simulation, the simulator determines if the official is in a conflict-of-interest situation based on the legal framework. If a potential conflict of interest is detected, the simulator informs the official of the violated norm of the Public Ethics Law and advises the public official to seek more specific guidance of the OA. The simulator is a useful tool to enable officials to clarify any doubts they might have over a situation.
Source: (OECD, 2019[13]).
Besides clarification and training for public officials, Uzbekistan could consider providing awareness raising and training to those who manage or could potentially manage conflict of interest situations in an institution (supervisors, HR and special units). Currently, neither public officials nor their superiors receive regular training to guide their decisions. This would allow symmetry in the treatment of similar cases across sectors as well as ensure due process when providing advice for different categories of officials, who may otherwise receive a different treatment when confronted with similar situations.
According to Uzbek authorities, the Ministry of Justice developed a Code of Ethics in 2020-2021 before the adoption of the Law "On the State Civil Service" in 2022. As previously explained, in October 2022, the Cabinet of Ministers adopted the "Additional measures to ensure compliance with ethical rules by state civil servants", which was developed on the basis of Article 17 of the Law "On the State Civil Service". However, the additional measures provided by the Cabinet of Ministers do not equal a Code of Ethics, that should provide guidance on the establishing of integrity measures across the public administration. Therefore, the Ministry of Justice could update the existing 2020-2021 Code of Ethics by including new obligations and procedures brought under the Law “On Conflict of Interest”. Similarly, as way of guidance, this could be generalised, meaning applied and mainstreamed across the public administration, as in other OECD countries (Box 4.10). Moreover, the management of conflict-of-interest situations should be addressed in such Code, alongside other issues that may create potential conflicts of interest, such as the procedure and rules for accepting gifts by public officials.
Costa Rica’s judiciary has moved forward in establishing specific and well-defined conflict-of-interest regulations and in providing guidance. The Regulation for the “Prevention, Identification and Management of conflict of interest in the Judiciary” seeks to allow judicial operators to prevent, identify and manage possible conflicts of interest. It also provides a definition of a conflict of interest in the judicial branch and the types of private interests with the ability to generate conflicts of interest. The Regulation contains guidance on steps to formally report a possible conflict of interest (to its hierarchical superior) and recusals when handling cases related to their former private practice.
More interestingly, it contains a specific set of measures and obligations directed to managers. In those, it stresses the key role of management in identifying possible conflict of interest in their offices, sending reminders to staff about the importance of reporting conflict of interest situations and the scope of the applicable obligations. It also encourages management to create open spaces and an environment of confidence so that their teams can formulate questions and reveal situations that may place them in a potential conflict of interest. Furthermore, it states that providing an appropriate solution to situations is key to prevent a bigger negative impact on judicial management, affecting the image and credibility of the Judiciary.
Source: (OECD, 2022[14]).
Further guidance has also been developed by the OECD regarding when conflicts of interest could be reported. First, upon taking up their duties, all new staff could be required to submit a conflict-of-interest declaration. In Uzbekistan, the new Law on conflict of interest enacted in June 2024 requires an employee of a government agency or other organisation to submit a declaration of potential conflict of interest when a potential situation of a conflict arises, as well as fill out and submit a declaration of a potential conflict of interest to a special unit annually and no later than January 15.
Second, OECD standards determine that staff should be required to disclose a conflict of interest when a new conflict arises – for example, a staff member’s partner takes on a new job that leads to a real or potential conflict with the activities carried out by the staff. This is usually referred to as ad hoc or emerging conflicts of interest. Articles 14 and 15 of the new Law on conflict of interest seem to cover this situation.
Notwithstanding the very good tools provided by the new Law on conflict of interest, further analysis could be conducted on the scope and functionalities of Article 19. A conflict of interest arises when the individual decision-making power collides with a personal interest. An obligation of family members to report assets is quite clear, as some of those assets can be hidden by a third party. However, an interest declaration by third parties may be unnecessary as the official itself can include this information in their own declaration and specify any contrasting interest they or their relatives may have (OECD, 2021[15]); (OECD, 2004[2]). Another potential loophole in the management of conflict of interest in Uzbekistan is the lack of central registration of emerging conflicts of interest. Recent efforts have been made to address this. Clause 3 of the Presidential Decree No. PQ-210 tasked the ACA with analysing information on conflicts of interest through the “E-anticor.uz” platform, and plans to include a third module related to identifying and eliminating conflicts of interest within the platform. Details on the implementation of this module remain to be analysed. However, Uzbekistan could consider including an annual register of reported conflicting interests per institution and sector.
Consider strengthening and increasing co-ordination between control units and between existing Ethics Commissions
Considering the role provided by the Law “On Combatting Corruption”, in particular in Article 21, Uzbekistan could consider assigning a bigger role to the control units, both in law and in practice. According to the Presidential Decree No. PQ-5177, internal anti-corruption control units are established in all state bodies and organisations. These units are responsible for early detection and prevention of corruption cases, preventing conflicts of interest, and integrity awareness raising. Considering the successful role of these units, Uzbekistan could consider further strengthening its integrity management systems by creating a network of sector-specific “ethics or control units”, following the example of other OECD countries (Box 4.11). This would help developing a more stringent meritocratic process through the sector as well as developing innovative tools to detect integrity violations, and in particular, to help mainstream conflict of interest regulations throughout the entire public administration in a coherent and cohesive manner.
In Austria, the Federal Bureau to prevent and fight corruption (Bundesamt zur Korruptionspraevention und Korruptionsbekaempfung, BAK) created the Austrian Integrity Network (Integritaetsbeauftragten Netzwerk) with the purpose to strengthen integrity by firmly anchoring integrity as a fundamental element in public sector. To this end, the BAK trains integrity advisors to become experts in the field of integrity and corruption prevention within the framework of the Integrity Network.
These integrity officers provide advice and guidance to strengthen integrity within specific entities. The integrity officers can access further information on compliance, corruption, ethics, integrity and organisational culture. In addition to the Internet platform, the BAK also offers regular follow-up meetings for integrity officers on specific topics such as risk management and ethics and values.
Source: (IBN, 2024[16]).
Similar co-ordination efforts could be made between the Ethics Commissions, both at national and local levels. Such a network could develop the following actions, as part of its mandate:
Monitor compliance with rules for resolving conflicts of interest, providing with a rule of supervising the adequate implementation of these regulations.
Creating typologies of conflict-of-interest situations based on existing cases and practice.
Developing methodologies for assessing individual and collective behavioural change of public officials in conflict-of-interest situations.
Ethics guidance to be complemented with examples and specific cases, including by enacting regulation on gifts.
Overall, information reported by control units and then received by the Ethics Commission can trickle down into standardised guidance that can be applied at cross-sector level and with the local level. These networks of dedicated “integrity actors” in public entities can contribute to overcome the challenge of mainstreaming integrity policies to ensure implementation and to promote organisational cultures of integrity (Box 4.12).
Dedicated “integrity actors” in public entities can contribute to overcome the challenge of mainstreaming integrity policies to ensure implementation and to promote organisational cultures of integrity. International experience shows the value of having a specialised and dedicated person or unit that is responsible and can be held accountable for the internal implementation and promotion of integrity laws and policies.
In Peru, for example, Offices of Institutional Integrity have to be established throughout the national public administration and in local governments, with the Secretariat for Public Integrity as governing body.
In Brazil, the established Public Integrity System of the Federal Executive Branch (SIPEF) aims at mainstreaming integrity policies with the Office of the Comptroller General (CGU) as central organ and Integrity Management Units (UGI) in all entities of the federal executive branch.
In Romania, an initiative called the “Champions network for the local public administration” promoted the exchange of good practices on integrity issues at local level. Awareness raising activities have been developed with a selected group of local administrations to encourage them to make further use of existing planning methodologies provided by both the MoJ and the Ministry for Development, Public Works and Administration.
Sources: (OECD, 2023[17]) (OECD, 2017[18]) (OECD, 2022[14]).
Consider defining the type of violations that could potentially constitute a sanction to the conflict-of-interest regime
The basic provisions of Article 21 of the Law "On Combatting Corruption" form the foundation for sanctioning conflict-of-interest violations. Additionally, the "Additional Measures to Ensure Compliance with Ethical Rules by State Civil Servants," approved by the Cabinet of Ministers in October 2022, provide clearer and more detailed interpretations of the rules governing such violations. As noted in previous OECD reports, these provisions require public servants, upon appointment and throughout their tenure, to declare any actual or potential personal interests that could influence the proper performance of their duties. Violations of conflict-of-interest rules are subject to sanctions. According to Chapter 10 of the "Additional Measures to Ensure Compliance with Ethical Rules by State Civil Servants," an investigation by the Ethics Committee results in a conclusion regarding whether a disciplinary or other violation has occurred. Based on the findings, a recommendation for appropriate disciplinary action is submitted to the head of the state body. Depending on the severity of the violation, the Commission may issue a warning to the public servant. For violations of the Ethics Rules, including failure to report personal interests that may affect the performance of duties (conflict of interest), the Ethics Commission may apply the following disciplinary sanctions: a warning, a request for an apology or formal apology, and public reprimanding at meetings of state bodies and organisations. Furthermore, the new Law on Conflict of Interest, enacted in June 2024, introduces additional administrative sanctions, including fines, for violations of the conflict-of-interest regime.
The Law also clarifies what qualifies as a violation and the different categories of violations. However, there are no specific sanctions for wilful violations of the conflict-of-interest regime or a legal standard to determine whether the conflict-of-interest situation is the product of a mistake or a dolus act. The situation becomes more confusing when public officials may face both criminal, administrative and disciplinary sanctions, because the law currently does not envisage such situations.
Therefore, by way of the recently enacted Law, Uzbekistan has included how the sanctioning regime would work in practice and strengthened the types of sanctions available. However, it has not included all types of violations, in particular some that may be difficult to assess in real cases, such as reporting with incomplete information, not following the appropriate procedure for reporting, or reporting to someone else than those established in the law. Uzbekistan has also established a set of rules on how the fines increase and aggravating factors. In any case, these rules remain quite general and focus only on repetition of the conduct rather than establishing mitigating and aggravating factors of the conduct. Therefore, principles to determine sanctions for each case remain absent. These distinctions are of the outmost importance as they may determine the severity and determination of the sanction.
Finally, Uzbekistan does keep not track or statistics of the overall number and type of violations to its current conflict of interest regime. On the contrary, this exercise seems to be dispersed and very much dependant of each institution. The situation creates possible legal loopholes, as each institution may sanction officials in a different way, even in situations with similar facts. The lack of standardisation may prove difficult to sustain if cases are taken to a higher instance. Therefore, as in some OECD countries, Uzbekistan may consider establishing legislation to reinforce specific disciplinary sanctions for violations of conflict-of interest regulations whilst considering wilful acts as opposed to slight negligence or mismanagement. This may be reinforced by the inclusion of conflict-of-interest standards in ethics codes as well as the development of internal regulations in public institutions to address specific sectorial situations. Furthermore, by means of legislation, the situations when both criminal and administrative sanctions apply should be clarified. Finally, Uzbekistan would benefit from clarifying what administrative sanctions can be applied, including aggravating and mitigating factors, as well as which circumstance and which actor would be responsible for investigating and sanctioning in each situation.
Uzbekistan could consider developing conflict of interest policies with a risk-based approach
In Uzbekistan, efforts have been made to develop risk and compliance indicators at the central level. As explained in previous chapters Uzbekistan has developed a very stringent system to determine integrity violation and risks at the central level. However, a sectorial approach to mapping, preventing and mitigating conflict of interest is still missing. Furthermore, stakeholders interviewed for this report were of the view that the ACA currently lacks the capacity to conduct sectorial risk assessments and that the development of a methodology on conflict-of-interest risk assessment at sector level needs to be developed.
Uzbekistan could consider developing guidance at sector level on both the risks and frequency of conflict-of-interest situations at sector level and co-ordinate with compliance officers at each institution on their implementation. This would also ensure a higher understanding and awareness of existing regulations and available procedures for resolving a conflict of interest. Instead of providing generic guidance, a sector approach, based on a risk assessment of the most recurrent cases in the sector, would provide public officials with very concrete and realistic situations of conflict of interest (perhaps even based on examples from real life) that they can recognise and relate to their day-to-day work. Additionally, the ACA could provide guidance on the identification and management of conflict-of-interest situation per sector. This could be discussed and later mainstreamed at local level. To conduct a thorough risk assessment exercise on conflict of interest, Uzbekistan could consider developing a methodology to conduct sectorial risk assessments on conflict of interest and provide training to officials at the ACA on the newly developed methodology. Uzbekistan could also consider increasing the use of corruption research data on sector specific situations that may create conflicts for public officials combined with strengthening provisions in Codes of Conducts at sector level, targeting at risk areas.
Furthermore, Uzbekistan could consider establishing a structured checklist of possible interests to be disclosed for officials at risk (e.g., financial ties or other affiliations through consulting, stock or shares, grants, honoraria, travel support, patents) as well as an open-ended option to disclose any other interests not covered by the structured checklist. OECD guidance on this area could be helpful when identifying specific question and at-risk areas (Box 4.13). For example, in Australia, the National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) has developed a list of sector-specific conflict of interest risks (Box 4.14).
Additional ancillary employment
Has the organisation defined a policy and related administrative procedure for approval of additional/ancillary employment?
Is all the staff made aware of the existence of the policy and procedure?
Does the policy identify potential conflict of interest arising from the proposed ancillary employment as an issue for managers to assess when considering applications for approval?
Is there a formal authorisation procedure, under which staff may apply in advance for approval to engage in additional employment while retaining their official position?
Is the policy applied consistently and responsibly, so as not to discourage staff from applying for approval?
Are approvals reviewed from time to time to ensure that they are still appropriate?
Inside information
Has the organisation defined a policy and administrative procedure for ensuring that inside information, especially privileged information which is obtained in confidence from private citizens or other officials in the course of official duties, is kept secure and is not misused by staff of the organisation? In particular: – Commercially sensitive business information. – Taxation and regulatory information. – Personally sensitive information. – Law enforcement and prosecution information. – Government economic policy and financial management information.
Is all staff made aware of the existence of the policy and procedure?
Are all managers made aware of their various responsibilities to enforce the policy?
Contracts
Does the organisation ensure that any staff/employed official who is or may be involved in the preparation, negotiation, management, or enforcement of a contract involving the organisation has notified the organisation of any private interest relevant to the contract?
Does the organisation prohibit staff, etc. from participating in the preparation, negotiation, management or enforcement of a contract if they have a relevant interest, or require that they dispose or otherwise manage the relevant interest before participating in such a function?
Does the organisation have the power to cancel or modify a contract for its benefit if it is proved that the contracting process was significantly compromised by a conflict of interest or corrupt conduct on the part of either an official or a contractor?
Where a contract has been identified as compromised by a conflict of interest involving an official or former official of the organisation, does the organisation retrospectively assess other significant decisions made by the official in his/her official capacity to ensure that they were not also similarly compromised?
Official decision-making
Does the organisation ensure that any staff/employed official who makes official decisions of a significant kind involving the organisation, its resources, strategies, staff, functions, administrative or statutory responsibilities, (for example, a decision concerning a draft law, expenditure, purchase, budgetary allocation, implementation of a law or policy, granting or refusing a licence or permission to a citizen, appointment to a position, recruitment, promotion, discipline, performance assessment, etc.) has notified the organisation of any private interest relevant to a decision which could constitute a conflict of interest on the part of the person making the decision?
Does the organisation prohibit staff, etc. from participating in the preparation, negotiation, management or enforcement of an official decision if they have a relevant interest, or require that they dispose or otherwise manage the relevant interest before participating in such a decision?
Does the organisation have the power, either by law or by other means, to review and modify or cancel an official decision if it is proved that the decision-making process was significantly compromised by a conflict of interest or corrupt conduct on the part of a member of its staff/an official?
Policy advising
Does the organisation ensure that any staff/employed official who provides advice to the government or to other public officials on any official matter concerning any kind of policy measure, strategy, law, expenditure, purchase, the implementation of a policy or law, contract, privatisation, budget measure, appointment to a position, or administrative strategy, etc., has notified the organisation of any private interest relevant to that advice which could constitute a conflict of interest on the part of the person providing the advice?
Does the organisation prohibit staff, etc. from participating in the preparation, negotiation, or advocacy of an official policy advice if they have a relevant interest, or require that they dispose or otherwise manage the relevant interest before participating in preparing or giving such policy advice?
Does the organisation have the ability and processes to review and withdraw an official policy advice if it is proved that the advice-giving process was significantly compromised by a conflict of interest or corrupt conduct on the part of a member of its staff/an official?
Gifts and other forms of benefit
Does the organisation’s current policy deal with conflicts of interest arising from both traditional and new forms of gifts or benefits?
Does the organisation have an established administrative process for controlling gifts, for example by defining acceptable and unacceptable gifts, for accepting specified types of gifts on behalf of the organisation, for disposing or returning unacceptable gifts, for advising recipients on how to decline gifts, and for declaring significant gifts offered to or received by officials?
Personal, family and community expectations and opportunities
Does the organisation recognise the potential for conflict of interest to arise from expectations placed on individual public officials by their immediate family, or by their community, including religious or ethnic communities, especially in a multicultural context?
Does the organisation recognise the potential for conflict of interest to arise from the employment or business activities of other members of an employed official’s immediate family?
Source: (OECD, 2005[12]).
Financial conflicts of interest in the health sectors may include:
Fees paid for service to a company (e.g. consultancy payments, speaking fees, panel memberships). This includes for-profit and some not-for-profit organisations (e.g. Philip Morris Foundation for a Smoke-Free World).
Indirect payments (e.g. funding of travel, accommodation, professional development, hospitality)
Company stock
Royalties
Directorships
Support for a researcher’s clinical or research infrastructure (e.g. funding of data managers, scientists, equipment and clinical staff)
Personal relationships with those who may have the above interests.
Organisational conflict of interest in the health sectors may include:
Conflicts of interest may also arise if guideline development group members serve as representatives of organisations with an interest in the guideline recommendations. This may include members that:
represent, or have roles in, organisations with financial links or affiliations with industry groups which stand to benefit from or be affected by guideline recommendations
represent, or have roles in, organisations which advocate known industrial or policy positions
have personal relationships with those who may have the above interests.
For example, a consumer member might represent an advocacy organisation that is vulnerable to pressure to represent the views of organisations that fund it or a member of a nutrition guideline development group who represents the processed food industry may feel pressured to represent industry views.
Source: (NHMRC, 2018[19]).
Overall, through the ACA, Uzbekistan could consider using surveys and questionnaires, upcoming assets and interest declarations as well as constant communication with ethic units to assess and determine different risks categories at sector level. This should trickle down into guidelines to be mainstreamed at sector level and continued exercises of ownership of such guidelines with sector leaders.
Considering that Uzbekistan implemented significant reforms in anti-corruption policies, including the adoption of the Law on Anti-Corruption, it must now move into the approval of the 2021 Presidential Decree mandating the establishment of a system for income and assets declaration for public officials. Uzbekistan should consider introducing a uniform system of disclosure of assets and interests by relevant public servants (including political officials, judges and prosecutors). Such a system could ensure filing and publication of electronic declarations as well as mandatory risk-based verification of declarations and effective sanctions for the non-submission of declarations or submission of false declarations. In this sense, Uzbekistan could consider the following recommendation when planning and designing such system.
Overall, financial disclosures of assets or interests play an important role in national anti-corruption systems. Asset declarations cover the disclosure of pecuniary interests, they are usually verified with specific and pre-determined frequency, as their role is mainly to reveal inconsistencies and significant variances when comparing declarations for successive years. Asset declarations are not intended as a preventive tool, but rather as a post factum verification of unjustified wealth and illicit enrichment. Interest disclosures, which have existed in Uzbekistan since 2022, include both pecuniary and non-pecuniary interests, and are used to report, manage, and therefore prevent a conflict of interest from arising. By indicating whether the public official has an economic interest that may influence the decision-making process, a conflict-of-interest system may help prevent unlawful situations from arising in the first place. Interest declarations may be reviewed in an ad hoc manner, when the conflict of interest arises, providing flexibility as a preventive tool (OECD, 2023[20]).
Uzbekistan could consider in upcoming legislation a risk-based approach to determine the scope of declarants as well as the assets to be declared
Uzbekistan could consider measures to strengthen the proposed amendments and provide for an increasingly robust asset declarations’ system, in particular by expanding the range of officials subject to reporting obligations and the type of information required to disclose. In particular, it would be important to consider the inclusion of a range of family members and associates of the public official. As the OECD has stated, mechanisms to track the financial assets and interests of not only public officials but also their close relatives and household members can help prevent concealment of assets under the names of family members, spouses or other individuals (OECD, 2011[21]).
As in some OECD countries, the Ministry of Justice and the ACA in Uzbekistan could consider a risk-based approach to determining the categories of declarants to be included in the law and subsequent form. In any case, certain criteria must be included for the verification of declarations for at-risk categories of officials. Most OECD countries apply a risk-based approach to their financial and interest disclosure system. A risk-based approach is needed in the definition of declarants, in so far as it does not require all public officials to declare their assets, but only obliges those that face a higher risk of corruption due to their position. Such a narrowed-down, focused approach is in line with the majority of OECD countries (Figure 4.1). Given their decision-making powers, elected officials and senior civil servants are more influential and are at greater risk for capture or corruption. The focus on elected officials and senior public officials in all branches makes the best use of the limited human and financial capacities of the responsible bodies (OECD, 2019[13]).
Source: (OECD, 2019[13]).
Furthermore, selecting declarations for in-depth inspections should be based on clear and objective criteria established in law and, in practice, not all senior officials should undergo regular detailed checks. As stated, such a system could introduce regulations for disclosures for all at-risk positions and mandatory risk-based verification of declarations should be done based on the position, decision-making power and involvement in budgetary or procurement decisions of certain categories of officials. Other OECD countries have developed a similar risk-based approach to the one proposed (Box 4.15) by identifying public functions prone to conflict-of-interest risks in order to determine the categories of declarants. This may be advisable and in line with a risk-based approach to enforcement.
Australia’s Public Service Code of Conduct lists the following Agency activities with heightened risk of conflict of interest:
Procurement and recruitment:
Procuring goods or services
Tendering for and managing contracts
Engaging and promoting employees
Making appointments to statutory positions
Regulating individual or business activities:
Inspecting, regulating or monitoring standards, businesses, equipment or premises
Issuing qualifications or licences
Issuing or reviewing fines or penalties
Distributing goods, services or funds:
Providing a service
Allocating grants of public funds
Allocating subsidies, financial assistance, concessions or other relief
Making binding decisions:
Issuing determinations on matters
Passing binding judgements
Exercising statutory powers
Voting as a member of a board or committee
Uzbekistan could consider further developing the criteria for the information to be declared and assure its alignment with new trends to identify illicit enrichment
The categories of assets, amount of information and level of detail that an official may be required to disclose, vary from country to country depending on the objectives of the disclosure system and the laws, regulations, and administrative guidelines governing the conduct of public officials. However, most declaration forms require a combination of the following information: movable and non-movable assets, liabilities, financial and business interests, positions outside of office, and information on the sources and values of income.
Stakeholders interviewed for this report were of the view that outside activities and business relations were the main factors contributing to conflicts of interest. Therefore, Uzbekistan could consider following the trend of G20 countries of having greater coverage of financial aspects such as non-movable assets as well as outside activities and business relationships that may create conflicts of interest (OECD/WorldBank, 2014[23]).
Source: (OECD/WorldBank, 2014[23]).
As stated in other OECD reviews, to expand the scope of information to be reported in asset declarations, possibilities may include (OECD, 2023[20]):
Income as a category in MPs declarations, as is the case for Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries.
Luxury and tangible assets (e.g. movable assets such as antiques, luxury cars, etc.) considered valuable assets. These are regularly used to hide profits from money laundering or corruption.
Clear dates, for example on when a property was bought, as this would help in contrasting information on a later stage and understanding patrimonial increases over time.
Disclosure of all types of income as well as gifts and sponsored travel, including disclosure of the identification details of the legal entity or individual who was the source of the income, gift or sponsored travel.
Use of virtual assets (e.g. cryptocurrencies). The reporting of such assets in the form is an important step towards bringing transparency to this new mode of wealth accumulation.
Disclosure of national and foreign bank accounts and safe deposits boxes (vaults) to which the declarant or family members have access, even if formally opened by another person.
Blind trusts, as these are often channels used to evade tax as well as launder proceeds of corruption.
Loans given or received, including to/from private individuals.
Deferred corporate rights (e.g. options to purchase shares) and investments regardless of their form.
Disclosure of expenditure above a certain threshold. This is essential to track significant changes in wealth by comparing income, savings and expenditures over time. Expenditures should cover not only acquisition of assets but also payment for services and works.
Disclosure of interests not related to income or assets, notably contracts with state entities of the declarant and family members or companies in their control, prior employment, and any link with legal entities and associations (e.g. membership in governing bodies) (World Bank, 2021[24]).
Uzbekistan could consider establishing a stringent review mechanism of asset declarations that include an automatised red flags system
Setting clear and proportionate procedures to manage assets declarations is key for the success of the system. As is the case in other countries, an electronic system simplifies the submission process by making the declaration form more user-friendly, reduces the number of mistakes made in the forms, facilitates further analysis and verification of declarations, and improves data management and security (Box 4.16).
The current asset and interest disclosure system in France is regulated by the 2013 Law on Transparency in Public Life, which is administered by the High Authority for Transparency in Public Life. The initial scope of the October 2013 Law covered approximately 10 000 public officials. It incrementally expanded to reach about 15 800 public officials as of 1 January 2018.
These public officials must submit to the High Authority, within two months of taking office or beginning of their mandate, two declarations: a declaration of assets and a declaration of interests. Public officials must also submit an end-of-term declaration of assets no later than two months after termination of their functions or before the end of term for elected officials. In between, they must update their declaration of assets in case of substantive change (inheritance, acquisition of a property, etc.). If there is no substantial change in assets, the filers do not need to file a new declaration.
In 2014, all declarations were received in paper format only. Starting in March 2015, declarations submitted to the High Authority could either be sent by registered letter with a confirmation receipt or submitted in person at the High Authority, which issued a receipt confirming the submission or through the online service ADEL. Since October 2016, all declarations are filed online. Filers may contact a dedicated hotline (by phone or email) if they have questions, and guidelines are provided online for each step of the process. Beyond the declarations, the High Authority recommends online submission of all documents accompanying the declaration (e.g. blind trust, official notice of appointment etc.).
To register in the electronic filing system, filers need to use a mobile phone number and a valid email address. Registration is validated through text message. Text message validation is also used when a new declaration is filed or when public officials try to access their confidential personal information. The official can also choose to register using an official email address (gouv.fr, assemble-nationale.fr or senat.fr).
Electronic filing (e-filing) may help raise the level of compliance with submission requirements. In addition, electronic submission also allows for an effective automated risk analysis. This analysis would certainly depend on external factors, like access to external sources of information through automated data exchange. There are also challenges of data quality and availability (Kotlyar and Pop, 2019[26]). These issues create a complex process involving various legal, technological, financial, and institutional aspects. Uzbekistan could therefore consider, when planning its legal reforms, to assign in advance the role of the administration of a system of assets declarations to the ACA, whilst providing them with enough resources, both human and technological, to develop such a complex system. On its part, the ACA should start preparations to assess the needs of such a system.
Similarly, the ACA should prepare legislative reforms aiming at allowing the agency to access several databases that permit comparison between the information reported by officials, whilst assigning a red flags system that permits comparisons over information submitted and over time. This is because disclosure forms should allow for year-on-year comparisons of officials’ financial position. Disclosure systems can also vary significantly in functionality, design, level of complexity, or authentication methods. In some systems, for example, declarations are collected with the aim to do a preliminary data validation, followed by a more in-depth analysis of emerging discrepancies.
Therefore, Uzbekistan may consider developing a study, prior to the approval of the law, where all of these aspects are considered, and details are settled in advance. This could be made in co-ordination with the Ministry of Digital Technologies, who could advice on the best way forward. Similarly, the ACA could develop a list of sources of information needed, to be able to process and compare, reported financial information. Sources may include the tax declarations, information gathered by the FIU as well as public registries.
Finally, Uzbekistan could consider providing the ACA with enough power and independence to achieve meaningful controls. Ensuring that the reviewing agency can access information held by other agencies in order to identify discrepancies and verify inaccuracies and omissions is a key component of any asset declaration system (Box 4.17).
To fulfil its mandate, the French High Authority for Transparency in Public Life (Haute Autorité pour la Transparence de la Vie Publique, HATVP) requires a high level of co-ordination and cooperation with institutions and individuals who detain information useful for the monitoring process of asset and interest declarations.
Considering this, the HATVP has signed several inter-agency agreements and protocols with public institutions aimed at ensuring better coordination and facilitating the exchange of relevant information:
In 2016, the HATVP and the tax administration signed a protocol to clarify their relations. Since January 2017, staff members of the HATVP are allowed to connect directly to some of the tax administration databases and applications to carry out routine checks, especially to value real estates, to access the list of registered bank accounts or to access cadastral information.
In September 2017, the HATVP and the National Anti-Money Laundering Service signed a protocol. This protocol, together with legislative developments conducted in December 2016, allows both institutions to share relevant information to their respective controls and investigation procedures.
Regarding co-operation with courts, the HATVP and the Directorate for Criminal Matters and Pardons and the Attorney General signed a memo and an instruction, respectively, to formalise information sharing procedures with prosecutors and audit courts.
In 2019, the HATVP signed a protocol with the French Anticorruption Agency to ensure better co-ordination of actions between the two institutions with complementary missions.
Finally, international co-operation is critical in fighting corruption (Burdescu et al., 2009[28]). As previously stated by the OECD (OECD, 2023[20]), interaction and co-operation with relevant international institutions and counterparts may facilitate knowledge sharing as well as project supporting for the development of specific institutional and legal standards. Considering this, the ACA could develop a strategy to engage in both formal and informal agreements with authorities in other jurisdictions to facilitate technical assistance and co-operation activities in the area of verification of assets and interest declarations. Similarly, it could consider inviting some of them to participate as observers in the technical working group on asset and conflict of interest declarations as a way to compare and measure the capabilities of its system against other examples.
As stated, one of the main risks and concerns related to conflicts of interest is the revolving door. Time limits, or “cooling off” periods, are a useful tool to restrict post-public employment, “switching sides”, and use of insider information. Cooling-off period refers to a time limit imposed on officials previously employed by public sector organisations in order to prevent any offences that they might commit by engaging with their former contacts after they leave public employment (OECD, 2021[8]). When considering the length of cooling-off periods, core factors to consider include whether the time lengths are fair, proportionate and reasonable considering the seriousness of the potential offence. Tailoring the duration of restrictions is necessary depending on the type of problem area and level of seniority (OECD, 2020[7]).
Uzbekistan has recently enacted a conflict-of-interest Law that in Article 8 includes one post-employment provision. However, as explained before, this does not constitute a specific and thorough framework for regulating pre- and post-employment. In a nutshell the soon to be in force provision establishes that if an employee leaves an organisation, they must inform the internal anti-corruption division so they can do a check on a possible debarment of two years to take employment in the private sector.
Regardless, as stated previously, this does not constitute a full framework or system of pre- and post-employment. Eventually, Uzbekistan could consider discussions around this blanket limitation and a development of more specific requirements by way of guidance to both the public official and the anti-corruption control unit. Uzbekistan could consider a risk-based approach depending on the position the official held and decisions made during his/her time in office. Similarly, differentiating periods or prohibitions for certain categories of officials, developing specific prohibitions to sign contracts with the State for certain categories of officials, or provisions that limit contact and discussion with their former employee or colleagues (for example for former parliamentarian looking to lobby former colleagues) could be considered. In this light, Uzbekistan could consider developing a comprehensive framework on pre- and post-employment that considers the aforementioned situations and can be used to identify conflict of interest situations that a recently appointed employee may face (pre-employment check-ups) or those he/she may face after leaving office (post-employment prohibitions).
Many of these measures are difficult to implement, but if left unregulated, countries may risk discouraging talented individuals from accepting public sector positions. In devising its revolving door regime, a country should keep in mind that revolving door restrictions should protect governmental processes from abuse but should not be so onerous that the public sector can no longer attract the highly talented individuals needed for certain positions. This requires a balance of competing public interests (Zimmermann et al., 2020[29]). In some cases, blanket prohibitions, such as limiting post-employment equally for all types of officials in a defined number of years, may not work (Figure 4.3).Therefore, Uzbekistan may consider strengthening pre- and post-public employment restrictions in legislation by establishing the scope of officials and activities covered and the length of the cooling-off period, considering a risk-based approach and an appropriate balance between restrictions and incentives for future public sector officials (e.g. bans on lobbying may be appropriate for a specific period of time, while restrictions related to certain insider information could be applied until the sensitive information becomes public).
Source: (OECD, 2022[30]).
Other measures could include more targeted initiatives, per category of official. First, legislation could create a distinction between civil servants on a general level and high-level officials such as ministers and parliamentarians, which are exposed to higher risks of conflict-of-interest because of their position (Table 4.3). Temporary “cooling-off periods” for public officials and lobbyists that prevent them from immediately taking up positions involving contact with their former employer can help reduce the risks while still allowing for valuable knowledge exchange between the public and private sectors. 19 OECD countries have introduced mandatory cooling-off periods for public office holders, but only two countries have introduced cooling-off periods for lobbyists before they can take public office (OECD, 2024[31]).
Source: OECD Product Market Regulation Indicators (2018) and additional research by the OECD Secretariat.
Furthermore, Uzbekistan could consider longer periods for at-risk positions, as well as compensation measures for those unable to be employed for a longer period of time. Following other OECD countries, public officials who leave the public sector and move beyond administrative government control could be provided a compensation (Table 4.4). The cooling-off period varies between public officials based on the seniority and the nature of the post as it is the case in Slovenia, the United Kingdom and the United States. During the cooling off period, only some categories of public officials in Austria, Israel, Norway, Portugal and Spain receive compensation. For instance, in Spain, public officials receive 80% of their basic salaries as compensation and in Norway, compensation is awarded only for prohibitions on taking up a specific appointment, the level of which is equivalent to the salary received at the time of the public official left public office (OECD, 2015[32]).
Additionally, to provide more clarity and to avoid eventual misuse, Uzbekistan could clarify the institutional setup to review and provide advice on pre- and post-employment checkups. Most importantly, most OECD countries, including many with mandatory cooling-off periods, are not tracking the post-employment activities of public office holders. Only nine OECD countries collect data on the frequency within the past five years with which ministers took up positions in a private sector organisation that operates in their former area of responsibility. Only eight collect the same data for the most senior civil servants (Figure 4.4). This data does not necessarily need to be made public, but the lack of data makes it difficult for governments to assess whether their rules on revolving door are being observed, and therefore whether they are mitigating the risks of movement in and out of public office (OECD, 2024[31]).
Source: (OECD, 2024[31]).
To allow for more clarity for companies hiring former public officials covered by post-employment regulations, the ACA could consider compiling a list of public officials subject to the cooling-off periods regulations, as well as establishing a channel for private sector consultations on the matter. This could be done by way of compiling the concept provided at each institution on individual decisions and making and publishing such list on their website.
With regards to the violation of this regulation, countries should seek to address it by establishing a variety of sanctions that can be applied in case of non-compliance with post-public employment. In addition to fines that are usually part of the sanctions applied to public officials breeching conflict of interest rules, countries may include also rules establishing (Transparency International, 2015[33]):
Cancellation or refusal of contracts with the private sector employer of the offending former official.
Fines to the prospective private employer who hired a former public official irrespective of existing restrictions.
Reduction of the former official’s retirement pension.
Prohibition to occupy public office for a certain period of time (5 to 10 years).
Suspension of registration in professional association or registries.
In all cases, enforcement sanctions should be proportionate, timely and applied in a consistent and equitable manner (Transparency International, 2015[33]). Furthermore, Uzbekistan could consider establishing a sanctions regime that covers different types of penalties, for both the public official who is in breach of this provisions as well as to the private company who has violated the existing rules.
As it comes to pre-employment check-ups, Uzbek authorities provided information during the fact-finding mission stating that much of the pre-employment check-ups get done at Ministerial level, as it is an easier task to do in a decentralised manner. However, Uzbekistan could consider centralising pre-employment check-ups and providing advice to both the future public official and the contracting public institutions of possible conflicts of interest arising from their previous employment in the private sector, as is the case in other OECD countries (see Box 4.18).
France
The public service transformation Act of 6 August 2019 also tasks the High Authority for Transparency in Public Life (Haute Autorité pour la transparence de la vie publique, HATVP) with a “prenomination” control for certain high-ranking positions. A preventive control is carried out before an appointment to one of the following positions, if an individual has held positions in the private sector in the three years prior to the appointment:
Director of a central administration and head of a public entity whose appointment is subject to a decree by the Council of Ministers.
Director-general of services of regions, departments or municipalities of more than 40 000 inhabitants and public establishments of inter-municipal co-operation with their own tax system with more than 40 000 inhabitants.
Director of a public hospital with a budget of more than EUR 200 million.
Member of a ministerial cabinet.
Collaborator of the President of the Republic.
The HATVP controls the pre-employment process by measuring the risk that the future public-sector employee might be pursued in application of article 432-12 of the Penal Code. To avoid any conflict of interests, the HATVP can formulate biding reservation of actions. Indeed, for a period of three years, after the termination of their functions in their previous employment, these public officials may not be entrusted with the supervision or control of a private undertaking, with concluding contracts of any kind with a private undertaking or with giving an opinion on such contracts. They are also not permitted to propose decisions on the operations of a private undertaking or to formulate opinions on such decisions. They must not receive advice from or acquire any capital in such an enterprise. Any breach of this provision is punished by Article 432-12 of the Penal Code by five years’ imprisonment and a fine of EUR 500 000.Overall, this control is aimed to protect both the employee and the administration of any accusations and participate to enhance trust. Moreover, the amount of the fine can be doubled by the amount of the product of the infraction.
United States
Once they have taken office, former private-sector employees and lobbyists are subject to a one-year cooling-off period in situations where their former employer is a party or represents a party in a particular government matter. This restriction applies not only to former private-sector employees and lobbyists, but also to any executive branch employee who has, in the past year, served as an officer, director, trustee, general partner, agent, attorney, consultant, contractor or employee of an individual, organisation or other entity.
In the case of an employee who has received an extraordinary payment exceeding USD 10 000 from their former employer before entering government service, the employee is subject to a two-year cooling-off period with respect to that employer.
Source: (OECD, 2021[8]).
Enhance the legal and institutional framework for the management of conflict of interest.
Clarifying key related concepts to guide public officials in correctly understanding, identifying and managing real, potential and apparent conflicts of interest.
Further elaborate on the definition of conflict of interest, by noting what is the proper performance and the types of contradictions between personal interest and the rights and legitimate interests of citizens, organisations, society or the State.
Enact complementary guidelines clarifying the difference between real, potential and apparent conflict of interest and why each one is relevant to safeguard the public interest.
Improve the management system of conflict of interest, including by providing an alternative to reporting channels as well as training and guidance on management of conflict-of-interest situations.
Further clarify the procedure to report conflict-of-interest situations, including the available channels for reporting.
Design a framework or policy guidelines for identifying and managing conflicts of interest to be mainstreamed through the entire public administration. This would provide consistency on the advice and guidance provided to senior managers and HR Offices.
Enact a set of guidelines for public officials to manage different kinds of conflict-of-interest situation that go beyond “prohibitions” and “incompatibilities” and provide practical examples on how to resolve a specific conflict.
Increase co-ordination across sectors to promote awareness raising on conflict of interest. In particular, the ACA may contribute to changing the negative connotation attributed to conflict of interest as an equal of corruption.
Develop other mechanisms to identify or detect emerging conflict-of-interest situations, including a platform to annually register conflicting interests or activities. The operation of the system could be located at the ACA.
Strengthen and increase co-ordination between control units and between existing Ethics Commissions.
Strengthen its integrity management systems by creating a network of sector-specific “control units”.
Provide the National Anti-Corruption Council of the Republic of Uzbekistan and its territorial councils with additional resources and targeted training.
Provide the Commissions with a role in establishing ethical guidelines and conflict of interest typologies, where public officials can consult examples of conflict-of-interest situations.
Similar co-ordination efforts could be made between the Ethics Commissions, both at national and local levels. Such a network could develop the following actions, as part of its mandate:
Creating typologies of conflict-of-interest situations based on existing cases and practice.
Developing methodologies for assessing individual and collective behavioural change of public officials in conflict-of-interest situations.
Ethics guidance to be complemented with examples and specific cases, including by enacting regulations on gifts.
Define the type of violations that could potentially constitute a sanction to the conflict-of-interest regime.
Establishing legislation to reinforce specific disciplinary sanctions for violations of conflict-of interest regulations whilst considering aggravating and mitigating factors. This may be reinforced by the inclusion of conflict-of-interest standards in ethics codes as well as the development of internal regulations in public institutions to address specific sectorial situations.
Clarifying, by means of legislation, the situations when both criminal and administrative sanctions apply.
Keeping statistical information on the number of public officials with disciplinary sanctions for violations of conflict-of-interest regulations.
Clarify what sanctions can be applied for which circumstance and which actor would be responsible for investigating and sanctioning in each situation.
Uzbekistan could consider developing conflict of interest policies with a risk-based approach.
Develop guidance at sector level on both the risks and frequency of conflict-of-interest situations at sector level and co-ordinate with compliance officers at each institution on their implementation.
The ACA could provide guidance to both HR offices and ethic units on the identification and management of conflict-of-interest situation per sector. This could be discussed and later mainstreamed at local level.
Provide the ACA with enough capacity and training to develop a methodology and procedures for the development of conflict-of-interest risk factors at sector level.
Enhance the legal framework and system of asset declarations.
Uzbekistan could consider in upcoming legislation a risk-based approach to determine the scope of declarants as well as the assets to be declared.
Consider measures to strengthen the proposed amendments and provide for an increasingly robust asset declarations system, in particular by expanding the range of officials subject to reporting obligations and the type of information required to disclose.
Develop a risk-based approach to determining the categories of declarants to be included in the law and subsequent form.
Uzbekistan could consider further developing the criteria for the information to be declared and assure its alignment with new trends to identify illicit enrichment.
For upcoming legislation, Uzbekistan could consider following the trend of G20 countries of having greater coverage of financial aspects such as non-movable assets including outside activities or business relationships that may create conflicts of interest.
Establish a stringent review mechanism of asset declarations that include an automatised red flags system.
Assign in advance the role of the administration of a system of assets declarations to the ACA, whilst providing them with enough resources, both human and technological, to develop such a complex system.
Develop a study, prior to the approval of the law, where all of these aspects are considered and details are settled in advance. This could be made in co-ordination with the Ministry of Digital Technologies, who could advice on the best way forward.
Develop a list of sources of information needed, to be able to process and compare, reported financial information. Sources may include the tax declarations, information gathered by the FIU as well as public registries.
Provide the ACA with enough power and independence to achieve meaningful controls. Ensure that the reviewing agency can access information held by other agencies in order to identify discrepancies and verify inaccuracies and omissions.
Develop a strategy to engage in both formal and informal agreements with authorities in other jurisdictions to facilitate technical assistance and cooperation activities in the area of verification of assets and interest declarations.
Strengthen the identification and management of conflict-of-interest situations in pre and post public employment.
Develop a comprehensive framework on pre- and post-employment, including by considering pre-employment check-ups and post-employment prohibitions.
Strengthening pre- and post-public employment restrictions in legislation by establishing the scope of officials and activities covered, considering a risk-based approach and an appropriate balance between restrictions and incentives for future public sector officials.
Create a distinction between civil servants on a general level and high-level officials such as ministers and parliamentarians, that are exposed to higher risks of conflict-of-interest because of their position.
Consider longer periods for at-risk positions, as well as compensation measures for those unable to be employed for a longer period of time.
Clarify the institutional setup to review and provide advice on pre- and post-employment checkups.
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