High-level corruption is among serious challenges in Eastern Europe compounded by the region’s historic, political and socioeconomic contexts, such as the influence exerted by oligarchs or the role of organised criminal organisations in high-level corruption schemes. This chapter describes the main international approaches used to define high-level corruption and those used in Eastern European countries. The chapter also provides an overview of the patterns and underlying factors of high-level corruption in the region. Eastern European countries should prioritise the development of targeted strategic objectives to combat high-level corruption in their anti-corruption policy documents and ensure that they are aligned, where appropriate, with strategies targeting oligarchic influence and organised crime.
Combatting High-level Corruption in Eastern Europe
2. Anti-corruption policy priorities
Copy link to 2. Anti-corruption policy prioritiesAbstract
2.1. Definition of high-level corruption
Copy link to 2.1. Definition of high-level corruptionThere is currently no universal definition of high-level corruption. The key international anti-corruption legal instruments do not define high-level corruption1 and discussions continue both at the international level, in national legal systems and in academic circles.2
The lack of a common understanding of what high-level corruption is may also contribute to the fact that this phenomenon has received disproportionate attention at both the international and national levels. For example, none of the international legal instruments has singled out high-level corruption as a particularly dangerous phenomenon.
At the same time, the introduction of an official definition of high-level corruption could be an important political signal to the international community and national governments that this phenomenon is a serious threat to both old and emerging democracies and that a unified understanding of high-level corruption and a co-ordinated response at the international and national levels are needed to combat it effectively.
Currently, the European Commission is developing a new directive on combatting corruption3 and the European Parliament included among its proposed amendments a definition of high-level corruption.4 The introduction of this definition in the EU document can serve as a political message and a guideline for both EU member states and countries that have chosen to join the EU, including most of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) member states.
In addition, the introduction of an official definition of high-level corruption will become a legal standard that will be used in international co-operation, particularly in the provision of international legal assistance in cases of high-level corruption, asset recovery, and the design of domestic national anti-corruption strategies and changes to national criminal law with a focus on high-level corruption.
For example, the aforementioned draft of the new EU directive points out that problems such as excessively cumbersome or unclear provisions on lifting immunities and short statutes of limitations are particularly harmful for the investigation of high-level corruption cases.5 This means that EU legislation should be amended to ensure that the rules on immunities and investigation periods are applied with appropriate peculiarities in cases of high-level corruption. In addition, the draft EU directive would unify the definition of high-level corruption at the EU level. Thus, the international community is gradually moving towards the creation of such a legal standard, recognising its necessity.
Finally, the existence of an official definition of high-level corruption can be an impetus for prioritising the fight against high-level corruption at both the international and national levels. The issue of prioritisation is of fundamental importance. For example, despite the fact that all actors agree that high-level corruption is particularly threatening, measures to combat it are rarely included in anti-corruption policy documents.
2.1.1. International definitions
At the international level, several different approaches have been used to develop a clear vision of what might be understood as high-level corruption, at times referred to as “grand corruption”. These approaches vary from linking high-level corruption to acts committed by a list of public officials considered as high-level public officials or when such acts result in losses to the state budget or in a substantial benefit for the public official above a certain threshold or by a combination of these elements within a single definition.
ACN’s approach
Within the framework of the Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan’s fifth round of monitoring, the OECD’s Anti-Corruption Network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ACN) decided to focus on the issues of combatting high-level corruption and used the combined approach of defining high-level corruption as acts involving high-level officials or resulting in a substantial benefit for the public official or their family members or other related persons.
Accordingly, based on different understandings of this phenomenon in ACN member countries, ACN proposed its own term for the monitoring period, which is as follows:
“High-level corruption”: Corruption offences that meet one of the following criteria:
1. involves high-level officials in any capacity punishable by criminal law (for example, as masterminds, perpetrators, abettors or accessories)
2. involves substantial benefits for officials, their family members or other related persons (for example, legal persons they own or control, political parties they belong to)
3. substantial benefit means a pecuniary benefit that is equal to or exceeds the amount of 1 000 monthly statutory minimum wages (or the equivalent of the minimum wage, if it is not applicable) fixed in the respective country on 1 January of the year for which data are provided.
“High-level officials”: The following appointed or elected officials:
1. the president, members of parliament, members of government and their deputies
2. heads of central executive bodies and other central public authorities and their deputies, members of collegiate central public authorities, including independent market regulators and supervisory authorities
3. head and members of the board of the national bank, supreme audit institution
4. judges of general courts and the constitutional court, prosecutors, members of the highest judicial or prosecutorial governance bodies (for example, a judicial or prosecutorial council)
5. regional governors or heads of regional administrations, capital city mayor
6. ambassadors and heads of diplomatic missions
7. any other public officials explicitly designated as politically exposed persons (PEP) by the national anti-money laundering legislation (OECD, 2022[1]).
Council of Europe’s approach
Although the legal instruments of the Council of Europe monitored by GRECO do not refer to high-level corruption, for the purpose of the fifth round of the evaluation of corruption in central governments, GRECO focused on a list of persons entrusted with top executive functions at a national level.
Accordingly, and while taking into account each country’s differing constitutional set-up, this list might include “heads of state, heads of central government, members of central government (e.g. ministers), as well as other political appointees who exercise top executive functions such as deputy ministers, state secretaries, heads/members of a minister’s private office (‘cabinet ministériel’) and senior political officials. This might include political advisors, depending on the system of the country” (GRECO, 2017[2]).
It is worth noting that this definition applies only to the executive branch and heads of state, but it is interesting in terms of the approach to limiting the range of persons who can be considered to be actors in high-level corruption. Another very important factor is that GRECO focuses on advisers as a separate category of actors in high-level corruption. Further, in the section dealing with the practice on this matter in EaP countries, we will touch upon the role of advisers as one of the key links in corruption schemes.
The UNCAC’s approach
The UN Convention Against Corruption’s (UNCAC) preamble provides general guidelines for identifying what may constitute high-level or grand corruption, by defining this phenomena as “cases involving vast quantities of assets that may constitute a substantial proportion of the resources of States, and that threaten the political stability and sustainable development of those States” (UNODC, 2004[3]).
Building on the UNCAC’s preamble, the chairpersons of six UN human rights treaty bodies, in a joint statement in 2021, considered that grand corruption “involves large sums of money and typically occurs at the top levels in the public and private sectors, involving individuals that make rules, policies and executive decisions.”6
The FATF’s approach
The FATF approach targets grand corruption only focusing on corruption committed by high-level officials who can be qualified as PEPs.
The FATF defined grand corruption as occurring “where those at the political, decision-making levels of government use their office to enrich themselves, their families and their associates” and noted the natural advantages that PEPs, that is, high-level officials, have by the nature of their position for diverting state assets and laundering the proceeds of corruption (FATF/OECD, 2011[4]). PEPs within the meaning of the FATF’s definition have the same meaning as the term “persons with prominent public functions”, as defined under article 52 of the UNCAC and does not cover middle or low-level public officials, but rather refers to public officials entrusted with prominent public functions; for example, heads of state or of government, senior politicians, senior government, judicial or military officials, senior executives of state-owned corporations, important political party officials, members of senior management of international organisations, their family members and associates (FATF/OECD, 2013[5]).
The EU Directive’s approach
The draft of the new EU Anti-Corruption Directive, as amended by the European Parliament, uses a combined approach to define high-level corruption as cases involving high-level officials or gross misappropriation of public funds or resources (European Parliament, 2024[6]).
The directive defines high-level officials as heads of state, heads of central and regional government, members of central and regional government, as well as other political appointees who hold a high-level public office such as deputy ministers, state secretaries, heads and members of a minister’s private office, and senior political officials, as well as members of parliamentary chambers, members of highest Courts, such as Constitutional and Supreme Courts, and members of Supreme Audit Institutions (European Commission, 2023[7]).
2.1.2. Current approaches adopted by Eastern European countries
Based on the analysis of the fifth round of monitoring and the responses of country delegations to the questionnaires prepared by ACN, it was noted that there is no general definition of high-level corruption in EaP countries either in legislation or in court practice.
At the same time, in some countries, the provisions of the legislation on specialised anti-corruption institutions, as well as the provisions of criminal and criminal procedure legislation, make it possible to differentiate between petty corruption and corruption committed by high-ranking public officials and large-scale corruption (as both terms are often used interchangeably).
For this purpose, the legislation of Ukraine and Moldova describes which corruption offences fall under the jurisdiction of their respective specialised anti-corruption agencies – the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office in Ukraine, and the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office in Moldova – and establishes enhanced liability for the commission of these crimes by high-ranking officials and/or in a large (especially large) scale, and defines the list of high-ranking public officials.
It should be noted that, despite a similar approach, of covering both high-ranking officials and corruption offences involving assets which exceed a statutory threshold, the understanding of what constitutes a high-ranking public official in Ukraine and Moldova significantly differs. For example, in Ukraine, they include only top-level prosecutors, while in Moldova, they include all prosecutors; in Ukraine, this list includes category A civil servants, senior officials of the Armed Forces, other military formations, the national police and members of regional councils, which is not the case in Moldova.
Georgian legislation does not recognise the concept of “high-level corruption” but rather prioritises the fight against any form of corruption. Nevertheless, the Criminal Code of Georgia provides that corruption offences committed by persons holding a public political office would qualify as aggravated offences. Accordingly, the definition of persons holding public political office applies to a rather narrow list of persons – the President of Georgia, members of the Parliament of Georgia, the Prime Minister of Georgia, other members of the Government of Georgia and their deputies, members of the supreme representative bodies of the Abkhaz and Ajarian Autonomous Republics, members of the governments of the Abkhaz and Ajarian Autonomous Republics and their deputies. In addition, the Criminal Code provides for an exemption of criminal liability for the accused where his/her cooperation with investigative authorities reveals the identity of an official/or a person who committed a particularly serious crime and creates essential conditions required for solving the crime (Article 701 CC). Moreover, this form of cooperation may even serve as a basis for reviewing prison sentences (Article 731).
Armenia also does not have a definition of high-level corruption, only a list of corruption crimes contained in Annex 1 of the Criminal Code. There is a general rule on circumstances aggravating the liability and penalty including the commission of a crime using an official position, authority, influence or the commission of multiple corruption crimes.
There is no specific definition of “high-level corruption” in criminal or criminal procedural legislation of Azerbaijan, but such cases would typically fall under aggravated offences.
With respect to other Eastern European countries, Romania informed about a similar approach to Ukraine and Moldova. Romania’s legislation does not contain a definition of high-level corruption, but the focus on addressing high and medium-level corruption is reflected in the mandate of its specialised anti-corruption investigative and prosecutorial body – the National Anti-Corruption Directorate (DNA). The DNA has exclusive jurisdiction over any foreign bribery matter satisfying at least one of the following conditions:
the offence causes “material damage” exceeding the equivalent in lei of EUR 200 000
the “object of the corruption offence” exceeds the equivalent in lei of EUR 10 000
the offence was committed by specific categories of Romanian officials, including those with management positions in SOEs or public institutions, as well as Romanian members of the European Parliament or the European Commission
the offence was committed against the financial interests of the European Union (OECD, 2023[8]).
In Bulgaria, while high-level corruption is not defined in its criminal procedural codes, the recently amended Anti-Corruption law, which defines the mandate and newly acquired investigative powers of the Anti-Corruption Commission, contains a definition of high-level corruption whereby the scope of the law is limited to corruption committed by an exhaustive list of high-ranking public officials.7
Bosnia and Herzegovina reported that while the country’s legislation does not define high-level corruption, its High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council adopted its own definition of high-level corruption cases for the purposes of monitoring how the respective cases are handled in the courts. The definition includes both elements: the involvement of high-ranking public officials as perpetrators and of significant benefits (around EUR 50 000 or 100 000, depending on the official’s position) or intangible damages.
In Kosovo,8 while prosecutorial guidelines issued in 2013 by the Chief State Prosecutor define high-level corruption as those involving high-level officials as defined by the guidelines, they also provide for special investigation procedures that must be used in cases of high-level corruption where the resulting benefit or damage exceeds the amount of USD 1 million (Transparency International, 2023[9]).
Other Eastern European countries, such as Latvia, Lithuania and Montenegro, do not distinguish between corruption and high-level corruption in their legislation and, therefore, do not have a definition of high-level corruption.
Therefore, the approaches to comprehending high-level corruption in EaP and some other Eastern European countries are very heterogeneous, which makes it difficult to precisely analyse the scope of the problem and the effectiveness of response at the regional level. At the same time, acknowledging high-level corruption as a pertinent problem necessitates formulating its coherent definition to establish a shared understanding and prioritise concerted efforts across all relevant entities.
Depending on the scope and nature of the problem, the resources available and in the absence of a standardised definition at the international level, various approaches may be employed to define high-level corruption. These may encompass corruption implicating high-ranking officials with possible supplementary elements such as substantial corrupt benefits or caused losses. The selected definition should aspire to the utmost precision.
Recommendation
Copy link to RecommendationElaborate and introduce a definition of high-level corruption, if addressing itis prioritised or outlined in the mandate of criminal justice anti-corruption institutions, in alignment with the respective policy or mandate objectives to ensure its common understanding among all the stakeholders involved.
2.2. Lack of prioritising the fight against high-level corruption on the policy level
Copy link to 2.2. Lack of prioritising the fight against high-level corruption on the policy level2.2.1. General overview of high-level corruption patterns and underlying factors
Due to their unique historical, political and socioeconomic contexts, high-level corruption represents a critical danger to Eastern European countries. The war in Ukraine showed how high-level corruption can be used to undermine national defence and security.
Corrupt practices within the defence and security sectors create vulnerabilities that can be exploited by external actors, including hostile foreign powers. These actors infiltrate corrupt networks, acquire sensitive information, or manipulate decision-making processes for their own strategic gain, posing significant risks to national security and regional stability (Transparency International, 2019[10]).
Corrupt practices such as embezzlement, bribery, and nepotism within national security and defence sectors weaken their operational efficiency and effectiveness. Funds allocated for defence and security purposes can be diverted for personal gain, resulting in insufficient resources for critical needs such as equipment, training, and personnel (MacLachlan, 2018[11]).
In addition, Eastern European countries have experienced periods of authoritarian rule, during which corruption was used as a tool for political control and to enrich the narrow interest groups within the country. This left behind a legacy of systemic corruption deeply ingrained in state institutions and societal norms.
The transition from communist regimes to democracy has been accompanied by economic and political transformations, but these processes have often been marred by instability, institutional weaknesses, creating fertile ground for corruption to thrive on. In addition, weak rule of law and ineffective law enforcement have created a culture of impunity where corrupt officials operate without fear of consequences.
This undermines public trust in democratic institutions and fosters cynicism among citizens, leading to decreased civic engagement or, when an active civil society exists, may lead to mass protests, as witnessed in Georgia, Ukraine, Armenia and Romania, where citizens have taken to the streets to demand the urgent need for robust anti-corruption measures and governance reforms to safeguard democratic values and institutions, accountability and systemic reforms.
Moreover, the influence of oligarchs in Eastern European countries often extends beyond the economic sphere, infiltrating political institutions and shaping government policies to serve their interests (Venice Commission, 2023[12]). Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, EaP countries experienced rapid economic privatisation and political transitions. However, weak regulatory frameworks and inadequate oversight created opportunities for corruption, leading to instances of crony capitalism and illicit enrichment among a select few.
In addition to the overall influence generated by the quickly accumulated wealth, oligarchs exploit state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as vehicles for corruption, using their control over these entities to secure lucrative contracts, evade taxes, and siphon off public funds for personal gain. This intertwining of business and politics creates a conducive environment for corruption to flourish, undermining fair competition, stifling economic growth and eroding public trust in governance institutions.
Recognising the seriousness of the oligarchy problem, the governments of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia have focused their policies on adopting special anti-oligarchic strategies and measures. Addressing the problem of oligarchy and high-level corruption is a mandatory condition for Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia to join the European Union.
In this context, it is important to note that addressing the issue of oligarchs cannot be achieved solely through anti-corruption measures. It requires a comprehensive approach involving systemic reforms in areas such as the functioning and financing of political parties, the independence of the judiciary and other criminal justice institutions, corporate governance (especially state-owned enterprises), competition and anti-monopoly policies (not least in the media sector), transparency of beneficial and media ownership, etc.
High-level corruption in Eastern Europe, particularly in the Balkans, is often also connected with organised crime (Krasniqi, 2016[13]). Organised crime groups exploit corrupt officials to further their illicit activities, such as money laundering, drug trafficking and human trafficking (Transparency International, 2023[9]). Additionally, corrupt officials may protect or ignore organised crime groups' activities in exchange for bribes or other benefits, further deepening the nexus between high-level corruption and organised crime in Eastern Europe (UNODC, 2024[14]).
Corruption emerged as a crucial enabler of organised crime in the region, with examples of law enforcement having direct involvement in criminal activity or control of local markets and even playing a conscious role in the elimination of rival groups. Organised crime is facilitated by corruption at several stages of the criminal process. Corrupt officials can assist organised criminal groups in carrying out their activities, maximising profit and evading detection by the criminal justice system. For example, bribery at the borders of the Western Balkans is a critical enabler for many organised criminal activities, including drug trafficking, migrant smuggling and trafficking in persons (UNODC, 2020[15]).
A more recent illustrative example is a criminal case in which two former Montenegrin high-level law enforcement officials were charged with creating and participating in a criminal organisation and respective abuse of office.9 In another ongoing case related to alleged organised crime, narcotics trafficking, money laundering and other related criminal offences in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 22 individuals, including high-ranking police officials and other members of law enforcement institutions, were arrested by police in three different cities (Balkan Insight, 2024[16]). In Serbia and Montenegro, high-level law enforcement officials, a former senior judge, and one cabinet member were implicated in a series of ongoing criminal cases related to alleged organised crime (Balkan Insight, 2024[17]). In one case, it was alleged that the state security services provided protection to a cannabis farm in Serbia (Balkan Insight, 2023[18]) and in Montenegro, a former senior judge was arrested for suspected abuse of office in relation to judicial proceedings involving family members with ties to organised crime (Balkan Insight, 2022[19]).
Generally, the analysis of publicly available allegations of high-level corruption in EaP and other Eastern European countries shows that the most prevalent high-level corruption offences are abuse of office, illicit enrichment, bribery and embezzlement. High-level corruption allegations usually concern senior government officials, members of parliament, members of the judiciary and, to a lesser extent, senior officials of central executive bodies and senior regional or local officials, and relate to public procurement, the acquisition or sale of state land, interference in judicial decisions and political corruption to funnel state funds or kickbacks back to their political parties.
At the same time, the responses to the study questionnaires do not allow more precise identification of specific sectors mostly prone to high-level corruption in the region as the countries indicated various areas, which rather proves the need to put more effort into data collection and analysis, and the cross-cutting nature of the high-level corruption problem.
Extraordinary or emergency situations, which typically involve heightened public expenditure combined with relaxed oversight or restricted access to information, affect the patterns of high-level corruption in the region as well.
For example, during the COVID-19 pandemic, numerous investigations were initiated into corruption related to emergency situations. These often-involved high-ranking officials, particularly in public procurement, where vendors were awarded contracts for the purchase of overpriced or substandard medical and protective equipment. Public officials involved in or able to influence the procurement process were found to be soliciting or accepting bribes in exchange for favourable decisions. Frequently, the selected suppliers had minimal or no experience in the trade or production of medical products (OECD, 2023[20]).
Box 2.1. Bosnia and Herzegovina case study: The ventilators case
Copy link to Box 2.1. Bosnia and Herzegovina case study: The ventilators caseIn April 2020, the Civil Protection of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) purchased ventilators aimed at responding to the needs of COVID-19 patients in intensive care units (ICUs). The company that won the tender was neither registered to import medical equipment into BiH nor had experience in the field. The company purchased ventilators from a foreign company through a complex commercial scheme involving numerous intermediaries in five jurisdictions. An associated group, including high-level public officials from BiH, allegedly orchestrated the transaction to obtain unlawful material benefit. The delivered ventilators were not suitable for ICU treatment of COVID-19 patients and were purchased at an inflated price.
An investigative journalist first triggered the case and disclosed the purchasing contract. Under high public scrutiny, the State Prosecutor’s Office took over the investigation from local prosecutors. Investigators gathered evidence, including searching mobile phones and collecting data from telecommunications providers.
One of the prosecution service's first investigative steps was to conduct an expert analysis of the acquired medical ventilators, more specifically, regarding their purpose. The expert analysis showed that the acquired medical ventilators were not meant to be used in ICUs to treat COVID-19 patients. Thus, the equipment purchased did not meet the criteria required under the procurement proceeding.
The investigation concluded that the company was selected regardless of its ability in the field. Due to an emergency after being awarded the contract, the licence to trade medical equipment was provided through a faster procedure. The head of the Civil Protection of the Federation of BiH allegedly approved the arrangement. Investigators also sought assistance from several jurisdictions.
Two high-level defendants, including the regional prime minister and one involved entrepreneur, were convicted by a first-instance court and given different prison sentences, while one high-level defendant was acquitted.
Sources: OECD peer learning activities; Law Enforcement Response to Corruption in Emergencies Project; https://apnews.com/article/bosnia-corruption-conviction-prison-covid-207e1a96b2bed6632cc715acf37eaef4
Recently, the Ukrainian authorities have launched a number of investigations into corruption within the defence sector. For example, officials of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence, including one high-level, were charged with abuse of office, embezzlement and other offences for manipulating the procurement of protective equipment, food and other supplies for the military.10
A recent study from the European Commission on “Citizens' attitudes towards corruption in the EU in 2024” revealed that almost seven in ten EU citizens (65%), including the majority of respondents in all Eastern European members (with most notable increases compared to the 2023 survey in Slovenia and Lithuania), agree that high-level corruption cases are not pursued sufficiently in their countries (European Commission, 2024[21]).
Another study from the European Commission on “Businesses' attitudes towards corruption” reported that a clear majority (58%) of companies in the EU disagree that people and businesses caught for bribing a senior official are appropriately punished. Equal shares agree (44%) and disagree (45%) that people and businesses caught for petty corruption are appropriately punished in their country. Two-thirds of companies in the EU (66%) disagree that there is sufficient transparency and supervision of the funding of political parties (European Commission, 2024[22]).
According to the Balkan Barometer 2023 public opinion, corruption is perceived to be the third main problem facing Western Balkan economies (Regional Cooperation Council, 2023[23]).
In its 2023 enlargement package reports, the European Commission indicated that fighting high-level corruption is an important priority for all candidate or potential candidate non-members in that part of the region while also indicating some results achieved by Albania and increased efforts by Ukraine, and no significant progress demonstrated by Moldova and Georgia.11 The 2024 EU Rule of Law Report indicated no progress was made in improving Bulgaria's track record in high-level corruption cases, while Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia and Romania demonstrated a stable or progressive track record. The Report stressed the increase in the number of persons investigated, prosecuted, and convicted for corruption offences in Albania but also expressed concerns regarding a recently passed law granting amnesty or reducing the sentence of a number of individuals convicted for corruption-related offences. The track record of investigations and prosecutions in cases of high-level corruption in Montenegro was found stable, but the lack of trials and final decisions contributed to a perception of impunity. (European Commission, 2024[24]).
In 2023, Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index noted that in Eastern Europe, many governments control the judiciary and law enforcement institutions to maintain impunity for corruption for those in their privileged circles (Transparency International, 2023[25]). In order to succeed in the fight against high-level corruption, it is obvious that the efforts and resources of key national and international stakeholders must be mobilised for such efforts. This should be clearly identified by countries as a priority in their anti-corruption documents.
By unduly influencing public decisions over laws and policies, i.e. “capturing them”, narrow interest groups directly shape the future legal and regulatory environment, making the most out of loopholes and grey areas offering room for discretion (OECD, 2017, p. 24[26]). This can lead to blocked reforms or inadequately enforced policies to protect entrenched interests or redirect ongoing reforms away from the public interest (OECD, 2017, p. 12[26]). Similarly, anti-corruption efforts may prioritise measures aimed at combatting corruption mainly in areas where they do not affect or have a limited impact on these narrow interest groups.
The Recommendation of the OECD Council on Public Integrity, under Principle 13, underlined the importance of averting the capture of public policies by narrow interest groups through managing conflict-of-interest situations, and instilling transparency in lobbying activities and in the financing of political parties and election campaigns in order to encourage transparency and stakeholder engagement at all stages of the political process and policy cycle to promote accountability and the public interest (OECD, 2017[27]).’
While some of the EaP countries have created specialised anti-corruption institutions, they have yet to articulate clear strategies to tackle high-level corruption in their anti-corruption policy documents. Although certain measures against high-level corruption are outlined, none of the EaP countries has a systematic approach to establishing the goals and objectives, measures of accomplishing them, providing resources and monitoring the effectiveness of the implementation of such measures in their policy documents.
The Anti-Corruption Strategy of Armenia for 2019-2022, while considered a sound policy document, developed based on results of available surveys and analysis, whose main goal was building a strong institutional infrastructure for preventing and combatting corruption, “did not focus on high-risk sectors, and more importantly did not have an explicit focus on combatting high-level corruption” (OECD, 2022[28]). The Strategy for 2023-2026 includes some relevant measures aimed at addressing high-level corruption, such as the improvement of integrity checks prior to appointment, the enhancement of the effectiveness of oversight mechanisms for political parties’ financial activity, the exclusion of high-ranking officials and their family members from participation in public procurement, and anti-corruption measures in the judicial system other, but does not explicitly indicate fighting high-level corruption as a priority area (OECD, 2017[27]).
On the other hand, Azerbaijan does not have a genuine strategic anti-corruption policy document or a clear anti-corruption action plan. While the authorities indicated the Action Plan on Open Government Partnership 2020-22 as a key anti-corruption policy document, it mainly includes recommendations that the country received through its participation in international initiatives and does not acknowledge nor address the problem of high-level corruption (OECD, 2022[29]).
According to the OECD assessment in 2022, in Georgia, “there was no justification for selecting priority areas that duplicate from one anti-corruption strategy to another. In addition, policy documents did not explicitly acknowledge and address the problem of high-level corruption. Although, in the opinion of authorities, a number of anti-corruption activities included in the policy documents addressed this problem preventively” (OECD, 2022[30]). Civil society in Georgia also considered that “the policy documents did not address high-level corruption despite numerous recommendations by CSOs to do it throughout several policy cycles” (OECD, 2022[30]). More recently, following amendments in 2022 to the Law “On the Fight against Corruption”, the assessment of corruption risks is now an integral part of the development of anti-corruption policy documents, such as the Anti-Corruption Strategy and its Action Plan. A corruption risk assessment methodology is currently being developed, and the future Strategy and Action Plan are supposed to be based on the results of this risk assessment.
In Moldova, the National Integrity and Anti-Corruption Strategy (extended through 2023) and the action plan cover a number of issues (such as asset disclosure and monitoring of electoral campaign financing) that could be considered part of a policy designed to address high-level corruption, as well as targeting the institutions where high-level corruption may occur (including the Parliament, the Government, the judiciary, the local government and political parties), but the strategy also does not explicitly address high-level corruption (OECD, 2022[31]). The new National Integrity and Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2024-2028, approved by the Parliament’s Decision No. 442 of 28 December 2023, prioritises “fulfilling the commitment to fight corruption at all the levels by taking decisive measures towards proactive and efficient investigations”, and by the implementation of the “deoligarchising” commitment aimed at eliminating the excessive influence of private interests on economic, political and public life and by strengthening the fight against organised crime. However, the new strategy still does not clearly focus on measures to combat high-level corruption.
The situation is quite similar in Ukraine: neither the 2014 anti-corruption strategy nor the new anti-corruption strategy approved in 2022 prioritises the fight against high-level corruption. However, one of the features of the 2014 strategy was the creation of specialised anti-corruption bodies aimed at fighting high-level corruption, so it can be assumed that the authorities partially formulated the relevant goal in 2014. Although the new anti-corruption strategy of 2022 and the state programme for its implementation of 2023 provide for measures that may be related to the fight against high-level corruption, they do not prioritise these measures in the anti-corruption policy documents (OECD, 2022[32]).
A lack of clear prioritisation in the fight against high-level corruption concerns both national policy, at the level of the anti-corruption strategy, and sectoral policies, as well as the prosecution of high-level corruption.
The analysis of the reports on the fifth pilot round of the OECD ACN monitoring for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine indicates that they do not have criminal policy guidelines for prosecuting high-level corruption.
Certain exceptions may be the situations in Ukraine and Moldova (after the powers of the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office and the National Anti-Corruption Center were clarified in 2023). In fact, the creation of specialised anti-corruption bodies tasked with prosecuting high-ranking officials may in itself be considered a certain priority of the state in the fight against high-level corruption. However, these institutions are still relatively new and, as evidenced by practical experience, they continue facing challenges in prosecuting certain high-ranking officials who have the capacity to undermine them. Therefore, the mere existence of an anti-corruption infrastructure tasked with fighting high-level corruption cannot be sufficient to recognise that the state actually prioritises this fight.
The situation in many Eastern European countries is quite similar, although there are signs of emerging efforts to monitor the effectiveness of efforts to combat high-level corruption.
In Bulgaria, the Prosecutor’s Office started, in 2023, to collect statistics on the outcomes of cases involving high-ranking public officials, disaggregated by the position of the public official and by the type of corruption offences in their annual reports to parliament. These reports also include information on the procedural stage of these cases, the number of convictions and acquittals and the grounds for terminating criminal proceedings in cases involving high-ranking public officials.12
The Special Investigation Service (STT) in Lithuania assigns high-level corruption cases to the list of those that require increased attention in terms of organising and conducting respective investigations.
Some agencies, like the Latvian Corruption Prevention and Combatting Bureau (KNAB), have an informally set priority of tackling high-level corruption, but this usually does not produce a distinct analysis or assessment of the situation in this area.
The lack of attention to high-level corruption in national criminal policy leads to the absence of systems for assessing effectiveness, collecting statistical data, adjusting policy based on data, coordinating efforts, and ensuring public accountability over the quality of law enforcement response to this problem.
Recommendations
Copy link to RecommendationsCarry out problem analysis to identify the enabling factors of high-level corruption, and informed by the findings, develop targeted, strategic objectives to counter high-level corruption in the national anti-corruption policy and/or documents defining sectoral measures to combat corruption. Consider OECD standards for conducting problem analysis’ and developing SMART objectives in line with the OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity, OECD Public Integrity Handbook and OECD Public Integrity Indicators.
Ensure that efforts to combat high-level corruption are aligned, where appropriate, with strategies targeting oligarchic influence and organised crime.
References
[16] Balkan Insight (2024), Bosnia arrests senior police officials in organised crime swoop, https://balkaninsight.com/2024/04/22/bosnia-arrests-senior-police-officials-in-organised-crime-swoop/.
[17] Balkan Insight (2024), In declaring Serbia free of organised crime, govt ignores the obvious, https://balkaninsight.com/2024/01/18/in-declaring-serbia-free-of-organised-crime-govt-ignores-the-obvious/.
[18] Balkan Insight (2023), Serbian police in ’illegal cannabis farm’ case face mounting pressures, https://balkaninsight.com/2023/09/07/serbian-police-in-illegal-cannabis-farm-case-face-mounting-pressures/.
[19] Balkan Insight (2022), Encrypted phone crack no silver bullet against Balkan crime gangs, https://balkaninsight.com/2022/04/25/encrypted-phone-crack-no-silver-bullet-against-balkan-crime-gangs/.
[24] European Commission (2024), 2024 Rule of Law report: Communication and country chapters, https://commission.europa.eu/publications/2024-rule-law-report-communication-and-country-chapters_en.
[22] European Commission (2024), Businesses’ attitudes towards corruption, https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/3180.
[21] European Commission (2024), Citizens’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU in 2024, https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/3217.
[7] European Commission (2023), Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on combatting corruption, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2023%3A234%3AFIN.
[6] European Parliament (2024), Report - A9-0048/2024, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-9-2024-0048_EN.html.
[5] FATF/OECD (2013), FATF guidance: Politically exposed persons (recommendations 12 and 22), https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/guidance/Guidance-PEP-Rec12-22.pdf.coredownload.pdf.
[4] FATF/OECD (2011), Laundering the proceeds of corruption, https://eurasiangroup.org/files/FATF_docs/Laundering_the_Proceeds_of_Corruption.pdf.
[2] GRECO (2017), 18th general activity report (2017) of the Group of States against Corruption, https://rm.coe.int/eighteenth-general-activity-report-2017-of-the-group-of-states-against/16807c0e91.
[13] Krasniqi, K. (2016), “Oranized crime in the Balkans”, European Scientific Journal, Vol. 12/19, https://doi.org/10.19044/esj.2016.v12n19p204.
[11] MacLachlan, D. (2018), “Corruption and conflict: Hand in glove”, NATO Review, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2018/12/06/corruption-and-conflict-hand-in-glove/index.html.
[20] OECD (2023), “Law enforcement responses to corruption in emergency situations: Practical guidelines”, OECD Business and Finance Policy Papers, No. 30, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/b2e5344f-en.
[8] OECD (2023), Review of Implementation of the Convention and 1997 Recommendation Phase 1 Report: Romania, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/91a19969-en.
[28] OECD (2022), Anti-Corruption Reforms in Armenia: Pilot 5th Round of Monitoring Under the Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/e56cafa9-en.
[29] OECD (2022), Anti-Corruption Reforms in Azerbaijan: Pilot 5th Round of Monitoring Under the Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/3ae2406b-en.
[30] OECD (2022), Anti-Corruption Reforms in Georgia: Pilot 5th Round of Monitoring Under the Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/d709c349-en.
[31] OECD (2022), Anti-Corruption Reforms in Moldova: Pilot 5th Round of Monitoring Under the Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9bb0367e-en.
[32] OECD (2022), Anti-Corruption Reforms in Ukraine: Pilot 5th Round of Monitoring Under the Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/b1901b8c-en.
[1] OECD (2022), Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan: Fifth round of monitoring: Assessment framework, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/6840c3f5-en.
[26] OECD (2017), Preventing Policy Capture: Integrity in Public Decision Making, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264065239-en.
[27] OECD (2017), Recommendation of the Council on Public Integrity, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0435.
[23] Regional Cooperation Council (2023), Balkan Barometer 2023: Public opinion, https://www.rcc.int/balkanbarometer/key_findings/2/.
[25] Transparency International (2023), CPI 2023 for Eastern Europe and Central Asia: Autocracy and weak justice systems enabling widespread corruption, https://www.transparency.org/en/news/cpi-2023-eastern-europe-central-asia-autocracy-weak-justice-systems-widespread-enabling-corruption.
[9] Transparency International (2023), Tackling grand corruption impunity: Proposals for a definition and special measures, https://images.transparencycdn.org/images/2023-Working-paper-Tackling-grand-corruption-impunity.pdf.
[10] Transparency International (2019), Corruption as statecraft: Using corrupt practices as foreign policy tools, https://ti-defence.org/publications/corruption-as-statescraft/.
[14] UNODC (2024), An aid to strategic responses to organized crime in South-Eastern Europe: Regional policy brief, United Nations, Vienna, https://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/tools_and_publications/Strategies_Toolkit/Regional_Policy_Brief_South-Eastern_Europe.pdf.
[15] UNODC (2020), Measuring organized crime in the Western Balkans, UNODC Research, Vienna, https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/OC/Measuring-OC-in-WB.pdf.
[3] UNODC (2004), United Nations Convention against Corruption, United Nations, New York, https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf.
[12] Venice Commission (2023), “Opinion on the law”, On the prevention of threats to national security related to the excessive influence of persons with significant economic and political weight in public life (oligarchs), https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2023)018-e.
Notes
Copy link to Notes← 1. United Nations Convention against Transnational Crime, United Nations Convention against Corruption, Council of Europe’s Criminal Convention against Corruption, Council of Europe’s Civil Convention against Corruption and the OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions.
← 2. For example, Transparency International suggests defining grand corruption as follows: “…grand corruption means the commission of any of the offences in UNCAC Articles 15–25 as part of a scheme that (1) involves a high-level public official; and (2) results in or is intended to result in a gross misappropriation of public funds or resources, or gross violations of the human rights of a substantial part of the population or of a vulnerable group. https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/COSP/session8/V1911801e.pdf, p.2.
← 3. Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on combatting corruption, replacing Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA and the Convention on the fight against corruption involving officials of the European Communities or officials of Member States of the European Union and amending Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council COM/2023/234 final. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2023%3A234%3AFIN
← 4. REPORT on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on combatting corruption, replacing Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA and the Convention on the fight against corruption involving officials of the European Communities or officials of Member States of the European Union and amending Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council, article 1(a).
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-9-2024-0048_EN.html#_section6
← 5. Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on combatting corruption, replacing Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA and the Convention on the fight against corruption involving officials of the European Communities or officials of Member States of the European Union and amending Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council COM/2023/234 final, p.13. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2023%3A234%3AFIN
← 6. Chairpersons of Human Rights Treaty Bodies (31 May 2021), Joint statement on corruption and human rights, https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/HRBodies/TB/AnnualMeeting/JointStatementonCorruptionandHR20May2021.docx
← 7. Articles 3 and 6, Anti-Corruption Law, https://lex.bg/bg/laws/ldoc/2137236963
← 8. This designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244/99 and the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on Kosovo’s declaration of independence.
← 10. https://babel.ua/news/99388-ekszastupniku-ministra-oboroni-shapovalovu-povidomili-shche-odnu-pidozru-za-zakupivlyu-neyakisnih-bronezhiletiv-na-250-mln-grn
https://zn.ua/ukr/anti-corruption/minoboroni-dijsno-zakupovuvalo-produkti-za-zavishchenimi-tsinami-nabu.html
← 11. European Commission (2023), EU Enlargement Package
← 12. Prosecutor’s Office of Bulgaria (2024), Report on The Implementation of the Law and on the Activities of the Prosecutor's Office and the Investigative Authorities in 2023, https://prb.bg/bg/pub_info/dokladi-i-analizi.